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Chapter 6:

Immigrant Integration

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1. Summary

Research on immigrant integration originated in the so-called “settler” states of the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. However, the increasing number of international migrants worldwide and the changing global nature of contemporary flows have generated an interest in evaluating the fit of theoretical models generated in the settler states to the integration of migrants elsewhere. This chapter explores typologies of immigrant integration across a broad range of contexts, including the U.S, Europe, and the Middle East. The idiosyncrasies of the migratory experience, particularly in non-democratic regimes, suggest that we are far from uncovering universal migratory truths.

2. Empirical Overview

Integration in the Global North

Countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have long considered themselves countries of immigration, and often prided themselves on their ability to integrate

immigrants from diverse backgrounds. However, concerns about immigrant integration have ebbed and flowed across different historical periods, as the types and numbers of immigrants and refugees and where immigrants come from have changed. All four countries restricted immigration in the early part of the 20th century, hoping to maintain the dominance of “white” populations and cultures.

After World War II, labor recruitment, a period of decolonization, and the collapse of the Soviet Union made Europe one of the most popular destinations for millions of immigrants. Since the labor importation stop in the 1970s, the settlement of these populations, many from Muslim backgrounds, has led to the development of a variety of policies related to immigrant integration. Not all policies are specifically designed as integration policies, but policies related to welfare, labor markets, and cultural policies in combination with citizenship laws, have created a set of European approaches to immigrant integration.

Policy makers in Europe had begun to reassess integration policies in the 1990s, in particular revisiting policies identified as “multiculturalism” and re-emphasizing “assimilation” due to the growing size of immigrant populations. What this has meant is an increase in emphasis on policies related to language acquisition, courses designed to teach the civic values and culture of the country of settlement, and a decrease in emphasis on accommodation of difference. A series of terrorist attacks including the 9/11 attack in New York, the 7/7 attacks in London and several attacks by Islamic militants in Paris have pushed policy makers to more fully reconsider existing policies. These tragic events focused attention on the lack of integration of not only immigrants, but even citizens (particularly from Muslim backgrounds) from the second and third generations.

Integration in the Global South

In 2015, South-to-South migration – that is, migration between developing countries – exceeded South-to-North migration in terms of absolute numbers. That year, about 90.2 million migrants from developing countries lived in other developing countries – about 5 million more than the 85.3 million migrants from the Global South who lived in the Global North (International Organization for Migration 2016, 7). Developing states’ migrant integration apparatuses are often less institutionalized than those in “Western” liberal democracies, and in many cases, they are not institutionalized at all. When governments take a passive role regarding the integration of migrants and refugees within their borders, however, integration processes still take place – although their forms and patterns may vary from the integration that has been so well-studied in Europe and North America.

Migrants within the Global South may settle in countries whose governments lack either the capacity or the political will to engage in integration policy. When receiving governments opt not to formally engage with migrants or refugees, informal or *de facto* integration may occur (Grabska 2006; Norman 2018). This relationship, or non-relationship, between non-citizens and state governments has existed to varying degrees, for example, in much of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The MENA region is home to a long history of migration, characterized by both circulation within the region and emigration outwards. Owing to both the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, which permitted free internal migration, and the region’s history of repeated

expulsions of populations following various wars, Arab states including Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq have particularly rich histories of hosting both migrants and refugees from their regional neighbors (Chatty 2010; Fargues 2013). However, despite this long-standing circulation of populations, MENA countries have rarely implemented legislation to formally integrate migrants into their national populations (Fargues 2013).

Because migration to neighboring countries is more common in the Global South than in the Global North, the “neighborhood effect” implies that international migrants in the South may share many cultural similarities with the communities that host them (Gagnon and Koudour-Casteras 2011). Even if their national identities vary, they may share a common language or religious identity with the host community, which can allow for quicker cultural assimilation into new host state than might be found in South-to-North migration (Fitzgerald and Arar 2018). On the other hand, these newcomers may be seen as an economic threat to their co-ethnics who live in a migrant receiving city (Adida 2011). Furthermore, differences in state capacity, the porosity of borders, governance practices, and conceptions of citizenship in developing and authoritarian countries can complicate the conceptions of migrant integration that prevail in Europe and North America.

3. Definition and Modes of Integration

There is no consensus on how integration should be conceptualized. Some scholars define immigrant integration as economic, political, and social and cultural processes that take place after a person has settled in a new country (Givens and Mohanty 2014, 2). According to the International Organization for Migration (2011, 1), integration is “the process of mutual

adaptation between the host society and the migrants themselves, both as individuals and as groups.” This definition takes into consideration the rights and obligations of migrants and host societies, in terms of “access to the labor market, health and social services, and education for children and adults” and “a sense of obligation and respect for a core set of values that bind migrants and their host communities in a common purpose.” On the other hand, Harder et al. (2018, 11484) define the term as the degree to which immigrants obtain the knowledge (fluency in the national language, ability to navigate the host country’s labor market and institutions) and capacity (the mental, social and economic resources immigrants have to invest in their futures) to build a successful and fulfilling life in the host society.

According to Tariq Modood, there are four different modes of integration: 1) assimilation, 2) individualist-integration, 3) multiculturalism, and 4) cosmopolitanism. According to the assimilationist mode, “the processes affecting change and the relationship between social groups are seen as one-way, and the preferred result is one in which the newcomers do little to disturb the society they are settling in and become as much like their new compatriots as possible.” Individualist-integration “only sees any institutional adjustments for migrants or minorities as those of individual claimants and bearers of rights as equal citizens. Minority communities may exist as private associations but are not recognized or supported in the public sphere.” The multiculturalist mode views the processes of integration as two-way and as involving groups as well as individuals and working differently for different groups.” Multiculturalism places the concept of equality at the center and explicitly recognizes the social significance of groups, not just of individuals and organizations. Cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, positively appreciates or pragmatically accepts “difference” but either denies that groups exist or accepts that they exist

but should not be given political recognition. Each approach is only of merit if it is chosen by, rather than imposed on, individuals or groups (Modood 2012, 10–14).

Historically, while in the 1960s, integration was seen as a “one-way” process steered by the individual as a natural process of inclusion, over time migration scholars began to see it as a “two-way process” to account for the action-reaction mechanism between the receiving society, with its reactions to immigrants, and the immigrants themselves, with their degrees of adaptation. Starting from the 1990s, the migration scholarship has embraced a “three-way” approach that takes home states’ relations with their diasporas into consideration. This approach is crucial in understanding why certain immigrant groups fare better in integration than others (Unterreiner, Weinar and Fargues 2017).

4. Models of Integration

Research dating back to the 1990s has worked to identify various models of integration to explain the policies of different countries and differences in outcomes for immigrants (Brubaker 1992; Castles et al. 1993; Favell 1998). The “national models argument” (Joppke 2007; Goodman 2010) argue that nation-states’ unique processes of nation-state formation, their understanding of nationhood, and cultural idioms and philosophies shape how they approach the issue of immigrant integration. In trying to explain the historical institutional development of policy decisions, these authors draw attention to national history and political culture that is resistant to change over time (Koopmans et al. 2012, 1206). Broadly speaking, the national models argument discusses three different models of integration: 1) the assimilationist (or civic)

model, the pluralist (or multicultural) model, and the differential exclusionist (or ethnic) model, each of which has been linked to some traditional immigration countries in Europe (Pasetti 2019).

The assimilationist (civic) model, represented by France, aims to turn migrants into citizens by assimilating them into native culture (Castles 1995). The pluralist (multicultural) model, championed by the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, does not expect migrants to abandon their cultural values and attachment to their homeland. The public expression of ethnic and cultural identity is complemented with a shared national identity (Castles et al. 1993). The differential exclusionist (ethnic) model as in the case of Germany incorporates migrants into certain spheres of life, but excludes them from others (Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo 2016).

Following a labor-oriented approach combined with an ethnic conception of the nation, this approach to integration favors immigrants' inclusion in the labor market but precludes their incorporation into the democratic polity (Pasetti 2019). In a comparison of the Netherlands and Germany, Thränhardt (2000) has found that the politicization of immigration politics in Germany has led to the perception that Germany has been less pro-active in the area of immigrant integration, but when one looks at outcomes, the Netherlands actually has had less success than Germany in improving employment and educational prospects for immigrants.

The national model argument has attracted ample criticism in recent years on the basis that it is excessively rigid and cannot account for policy change (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012; Joppke 2007). These models also present a normative, ideal situation for host states rather than depicting a process that unfolds when immigrants arrive in their new destinations. Bertossi (2011, 1571)

claims that these “highly stylized national models, as we often imagine them, have never existed... for the simple reason that they were never institutionalized or internalized on the basis of stable, univocal, and coherent normative systems over the last 30 years.” Instead, as Freeman argues, these models “do not represent self-conscious, deliberate choices so much as the unintended consequences of subsystem frameworks that are weakly, if at all, coordinated... particular states possess a patchwork of multidimensional frameworks that hardly merit the appellation ‘regime’ or ‘type’” (2004, 946). Both the French assimilationist model and British multicultural model, for example, do not explain how integration takes place in a society on a day-to-day basis (Martiniello 2006). This framework thus overlooks bottom-up insights into the everyday experience of immigrants and the kind of suffering they go through in a society and culture alien to theirs (Sayed 2004).

In addition, many have noted that national approaches to immigration and integration show little correspondence with the messy institutional reality of these countries’ policy efforts.

Consequently, a focus on national approaches as objects of analysis causes us to overlook how these approaches are translated into institutional and bureaucratic reality. Even in centralized systems, policies can be implemented in a more flexible and lenient manner at the local level in some areas, as will be detailed below. For example, a study on the Turkish Muslim organizations in France and Germany has documented that there is a gap between the legal rights reserved for Muslim organizations and their implementation in practice (Arkilic 2015). Others have emphasized that integration policies take place at multiple levels of government (Lahav and Guiraudon 2006).

Goodman (2010) has suggested that a shift to civic integration policies has led to more variance in approaches to citizenship. Carrera and Wiesbrock have recognized “civic integration” as a new approach to immigrant integration policy. They describe it as:

the organisation of integration courses or introductory/orientation programmes, tests and contracts. These compel TCNs to demonstrate that they know, understand and respect the host society’s history and institutions, along with the common shared values (and symbols) of the nation-state and in some cases even those of the EU.³ Civic integration therefore confers strong cultural and identitarian connotations on the juridical framing of the phenomena of human mobility and diversity. It can be considered a new discursive line intending to hide the much-contested classical logics of assimilation or acculturation⁴ (Carrera and Wiesbrock 2009, p. 3).

This concept of integration is assuming a role formerly played by nationality laws, chiefly as a condition for naturalization. These types of policies tend to be more exclusionary and have become the preferred approach in countries like the Netherlands, which had focused on a more multicultural approach to immigrant integration in the 1990s.

The quest for convergence steered migration scholars toward a quantitative assessment of integration policies that measures and compares integration policies by means of synthetic indices with the aim of evaluating trends of convergence vis-à-vis the resilience of national models (Pasetti 2019). Howard’s (2009) Citizenship Policies Index, Goodman’s (2010) Civic Integration Index, Koopmans et al.’s (2012) Indicators of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants

(ICRI), Vink and Bauböck's (2013) CITLAW indicators (2013), Banting and Kymlicka's (2013) Multiculturalism Policy Index, and Helbling's (2013) Citizenship Policy Index are some examples. While this literature provides important insights, immigrant integration literature is in need of more qualitative work that can shed light on the everyday experiences of immigrants.

Recent studies have also categorized European countries' integration models into Southern, Central-Eastern, and North-Western regimes of integration based on empirical considerations related to the welfare system, historical trajectory, and geopolitical location (Doomernik and Bruquetas-Callejo 2016) and argued that Eastern European countries' configuration is more restrictive than the Western one, especially in the areas of labor, education, political participation, and citizenship (Pasetti 2019). Others have concluded that for most East and Central European countries, the pace at which integration policy has developed has been slow and uneven (Craig 2015).

Studies like Barbulescu's (2019) have also looked into different integration approaches aimed at different immigrant categories, such as EU citizens from old and new member states and co-ethnics. Put differently, depending on whether the immigrant group consists of EU citizens and co-ethnics or postcolonial immigrants, states seek different integration strategies. While European state policies addressing non-EU citizens is assimilationist and interventionist, policies targeting EU citizens are laissez-faire in the sense that EU citizens are granted generous rights and national, regional, and municipal strategies do not seek to integrate them actively. Co-ethnics and immigrants from new EU member states, such as Romania and Bulgaria are situated somewhere in the middle.

5. Integration at the Local Level

In recent years, immigrant integration scholarship has emphasized further the role played by local governments in managing integration. These scholars argue that local and decentralized policymaking and implementation should be at the center of integration policies since most individual and group interactions take place at local level (Alexander 2007; Penninx 2009). The local aspect of integration policy is also acknowledged at the EU level, as evidenced by the Eurocities network that brings together the local governments of over 140 of Europe's largest cities and over 45 partner cities and offers members a platform to exchange information and ideas. Many of the studies looking at the city, region, or neighborhood level have a multi-governance perspective in the sense that they examine the discrepancies between local and national integration policies (Scholten 2013; Zapatero-Barrero et al. 2017). This view points to the argument that even though they are restrained by institutional mechanisms of higher levels (national, supranational or international), cities deal with the challenges of integration better as they are more prone to welcome strangers since their membership is relatively open (Bauböck 2003).

Cities are also seen as pragmatic actors; hence the study of integration policy should go beyond rigid national frameworks, which grant rights and resources to only members, suggest critics of the nation-state (Hadj-Abdou 2014). Others conclude that rather than focusing on just one level, scholars should seek to understand the interactions between multiple levels (local, national,

supranational) (Scholten and Penninx 2016). As shown by recent studies, cities such as London have embraced ethno-cultural diversity as a competitive advantage for economic growth and led other cities across Europe to adopt similar immigrant integration policies at the local level (Hadj-Abdou 2019). De Grauw and Vermeulen (2016) add that cities are more likely to produce policies that promote immigrant integration even when the national context is not accommodating to immigrant rights if they have certain conditions:

(1) left-wing governments, (2) immigrants who constitute a significant portion of the city electorate and local decision-making structures, and (3) an infrastructure of community-based organizations that actively represent immigrants' collective interests in local politics and policymaking.

Some have argued that the national models of integration are disintegrating because, as seen in the examples of Denmark and Germany, due to ideological or practical differences, local governments have begun to refrain from adopting official integration policies of the central government (Scholten 2013; Schmidtke 2014). Others, on the other hand, have disagreed with this argument by claiming that the central governments in Denmark and Sweden have increased their control and influence at the local level, thereby reversing a local turn in integration policies (Emilsson 2015).

6. Measuring Integration

While both immigrants and host states desire successful integration, there is little consensus on how to measure it. This failure, which prevents the accumulation of knowledge through

comparison across studies, countries, and time, is mainly due to the recognition that integration as a concept is widely contested and context-specific or too complicated to be captured by a single metric (Harder et al. 2018). In addition, some studies have poorly defined and subjectively selected indicators to prove their theories rather than test them (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012). However, measuring integration is important because integration policy overlaps with several other major policy areas, including economic development, national security, and the protection of human rights. States cannot design effective integration policies in isolation, but collaboration and coherence across policy areas requires reliable indicators by which to measure integration (International Organization for Migration 2011). The need for reliable indicators only grows as immigration increases and its consequences become more visible.

Data on immigrant integration is typically collected through censuses and household surveys on labor force participation and living conditions. These sources measure immigrant integration across a range of areas related to: 1) the labor market (employment rates, wages or income, occupation, activity rate, and the over-qualification rate); 2) education (level of education attainment, dropout rate, grades, and skills); 3) health (years spent healthy and life expectancy); 4) social inclusion (property ownership, housing cost overburden, child poverty, social exclusion); 5) civic and political inclusion and engagement (voting behavior, political representation, public employment, naturalization rates, share of long-term residence and volunteering); 6) cultural inclusion (customs, traditions, language, and religion); 7) financial inclusion (banking, savings, credit, insurance and advice); 8) spatial inclusion (residential segregation by socio-economic status); 9) public opinion (ability to integrate highly

heterogeneous and culturally diverse group of people); and 10) the role of media (inclusion and diversity in public service media) (Migration Data Portal 2019).

Some indicators of integration are based on public opinion and perception, while others are based on an analysis of state policies. The Gallup World Poll, for example, examines the native population's views on immigration and immigrants, while others, including the European Union's (EU) Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU MIDIS), focus on immigrants' experiences of discrimination as an indicator that hinders immigrant integration. The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), on the other hand, measures policies to integrate immigrants in all EU member states, Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and the USA in eight policy areas: education, health, labor market mobility, political participation, access to nationality, family reunion, permanent residence, and anti-discrimination. In an attempt to standardize the measurement of immigrant integration across countries, Harder et al. (2018) have introduced six dimensions of integration: psychological, economic, political, social, linguistic, and navigational. Each dimension is measured with a set of two to four survey questions that are generalizable across different settings.

Attempts at measuring integration indicate that it remains difficult to compare the outcomes of immigrant integration policy. Even though there is some knowledge about particular migrant groups in specific countries and how they measure up to the native population on specific indicators, such as income, wages, or school attendance rates, it is still hard to conclude that migrants are better incorporated in one country versus others.

7. Integration Outside of the “West”

For many years, scholarship about migration and incorporation focused primarily on the movement of migrants from less-developed countries to “Western” liberal democracies (Adamson and Tsourapas 2019). However, the reality of global migration calls into question this overwhelming focus on the Global North, particularly in light of the prevalence of South-South migration pathways. Furthermore, developing countries disproportionately carry the burden of hosting refugees: about 84% of the world’s refugees live in developing countries (UNHCR 2018, 18). It is not sufficient to assume that integration processes and policies in the Global South directly mirror those in the Global North; variations in resources, governance practices, border penetrability, and citizenship models all contribute to a diverse set of integration processes and policies that may take on their own characters in various Global South contexts. Still, some commonalities do exist between integration policies and practices in the South and the North, and each context can draw lessons from the other.

Shifting the lens of analysis beyond Europe, North America, and Australia allows us to consider alternative conceptions of citizenship and membership. Sadiq (2009) argues that in the west, we are accustomed to seeing a clearly drawn boundary between citizens and non-citizens. However, in states with less capacity to enforce this distinction, a noteworthy phenomenon can arise: illegal or undocumented immigrants can relatively easily obtain identification documents that allow them to make “the transition to full membership without following any of the paths officially laid out for them, vanishing into the host population and becoming, in a very real sense, citizens” (Sadiq 2009, 4–5). This “documentary citizenship” allows some Bangladeshis in

India, Indonesians and Filipinos in Malaysia, and Afghans and Bangladeshis in Pakistan to socially and politically integrate into their host communities. Their perceived cultural resemblance to their host communities reinforces this integration (Sadiq 2009, 85). As Sadiq argues, this process blurs the boundaries of membership in host communities – and it certainly differs from processes of membership-building in Europe, North America, and Australia.

Integration in Global South contexts often takes on an informal character, and in many states, national-level integration policies do not exist at all. The UN Population Division reports that among 148 countries in less developed regions in 2015, 37% had no formal policies on the “integration of non-nationals,” while 29% of countries had no data available and 34% had some combination of language training, transfer of professional credentials, and “protection against discrimination” written into government policies (United Nations Population Division 2015). Where formal policies exist, however, the gap between integration policy and actual government practices may be quite wide.

Some states, like Egypt, Turkey, and Morocco, adopt variations of what Norman (2018) calls a “strategy of indifference” towards migrants and refugees. While these states are aware of various migrant and refugee populations that live within their borders, their governments intentionally avoid spending resources on integrating the populations, instead allowing international organizations to pick up the slack and provide necessary services (Norman 2018). Other states, like Lebanon, have refused outright to incorporate certain migrant and refugee groups – Syrian refugees chief among them (Mourad 2017). In face of an influx of more than one million Syrian people after the outbreak of Syria’s civil war, Lebanon both refused to build refugee camps and

initially failed to put rules in place to differentiate Syrians displaced by war from Syrian labor migrants (Mourad 2017). This denied Syrian refugees the entitlements to protection that the international refugee law regime requires.

Both Egypt's "indifference as policy" (Norman 2018) and Lebanon's "policy-of-no-policy" (Mourad 2017; El Mufti 2014) toward refugees and migrants provide pathways toward precarious *de facto* integration. The lack of a policy to incorporate migrants and refugees does not necessarily prevent their incorporation, but it does exacerbate the risks of informality. In settings where migrants and refugees lack access to the formal job market, for example, they may withstand exploitative work conditions, long hours, and low wages, as Grabska (2006, 299) finds among Sudanese refugees in Cairo. Similarly, migrants and refugees who are not given access to job training or work permits may have to compete with local residents for low-skilled jobs (Jacobsen 2006). This can have backlash in the local community. In South Africa, for example, arguments about economic competition partially motivated hostility among some South Africans toward immigrants and refugees boiled over into xenophobic violence in 2008 (Jinnah 2017; Neocosmos 2010).

Refugees in the Global South have particular challenges to incorporation. In situations where refugees are restricted to camps, Fitzgerald and Arar (2018, 398) point out that the neighborly proximity highlighted in the neo-assimilationist studies is simply not possible. Refugees' movement is restricted to camps, so instead of assimilating into the societies of their host countries, refugees in camps assimilate into the population of refugees who were resident in the camp for a longer period of time. Still, the majority of refugees today live in urban areas rather

than camps. For refugees who live in urban areas, host states frequently block access to naturalization and restrict their right to work (Betts and Collier 2017; Fitzgerald and Arar 2018).

Outside of refugee camps, the challenges to migrant incorporation in the Global South bear some resemblance to the challenges that undocumented migrants face in the Global North. For example, like in the North, urban settlement in the South provides more opportunities for migrants and refugees to self-integrate into their host communities. In both Northern and Southern cities, migrants and refugees may find co-nationals who can provide financial or emotional support, information, and insight into local employment networks – in other words, social capital (Jacobsen 2006).

Research on immigrant and refugee incorporation outside the west has lagged behind similar research within it. More work can be done, for example, to understand what effect regime type may have on immigration policy (e.g. Natter, 2018), as many migrants in the Global South end up settling in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian settings (UNDP 2017, Table 1). While many similarities do exist between immigrant incorporation in the North and the South, the diversity of the Global South and its institutions has led immigrant incorporation in different directions than are traditionally studied in the Global North.

8. Continuing Issues

Work on definitions and access to data needs to be done in order to advance comparative research on immigrant integration. The challenge is the poor standardization of concepts and

definitions across countries, and the limited availability of data outside of highly developed liberal democracies. Comparisons among countries are complex because each host country has unique policies and histories of immigration and host very diverse immigrant communities that affect how integration policies are designed and implemented. Moreover, most international studies on immigrant integration are derived from nation-wide surveys that might not always reflect characteristics of small migrant populations or local dynamics. It is important to decide the unit of the analysis (the individual immigrant or the immigrant group) in the measurement of immigrant integration. Available data on immigrant integration focuses on industrialized liberal Western countries. For example, the EU's Eurostat and European Commission as well as the OECD have compiled extensive data on key integration indicators, however their focus is on EU and OECD member countries.

Studies that draw attention to gaps between immigrants and the native population as the key measurement of integration also create problems. If the situation of nationals improves at a faster rate than that of immigrants, immigrants' level of integration may seem as if it is deteriorating even though immigrants overall are faring better. Existing scholarship on discrimination against immigrants should also take into consideration the possibility that discrimination may be caused not only by being an immigrant but also on the basis of sex/gender, religion, age, ethnicity, and other related factors.

In recent years the study of immigrant integration has been called into question. Schinkel (2018) has maintained that integration theory should be discarded altogether given that its foundational principles are essentially flawed and form a basis for the neo-colonial knowledge production

project, which stigmatizes the immigrant as the “other.” He and other critics (Favell 2019) find it problematic that the integration literature rests on a binary division between citizens and immigrants and that successful immigrant integration is measured in terms of immigrants’ adherence to the majority population’s norms and values. This understanding, based on a distortion of reality, assumes that the majority society is a homogeneous group into which immigrants should blend and if integration fails it is due to the inability of the immigrant to do so. These scholars call immigration scholars to turn their attention to racist structures of power, the production and reproduction of inequality in society, and to draw on critical race or postcolonial studies (Saharso 2019). However, this is hard to accomplish given that “without the formation and existence of modern nation states, there would be no migration and integration research in the sense we know it today” (Dahinden 2016, 2028).

While Leila Hadj Abdou (2019) has acknowledged some of the problematic aspects of immigrant integration scholarship, she has concluded that rather than abandoning immigrant integration as a field of research, we need to examine it as a governance technique rendering ethno-cultural differences purposeful for certain ends and bring class, race, gender, and sexuality back into the picture to better understand how these affect immigrant experiences. She proposes that we need to go beyond the nation-state to provide a nuanced understanding of immigrant integration and focus on the management of immigrant integration at the city level.

9. Real World Example Text Box Case:

Turks in Europe

There are an estimated 6 million Turkish citizens living abroad, with approximately 5.5 million living in Western Europe, rendering the Turkish diaspora the largest Muslim immigrant group in Europe (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019). Turkish workers began to arrive in Western Europe in small numbers through private initiatives in the mid-1950s. However, in the 1960s, short-term guest worker agreements struck between Turkey and European governments led to large waves of immigration. Europe's labor shortages and the demographic challenges in the post-war era were the rationale for importing labor. Turkey concluded its first agreement with Germany in 1961, followed by similar agreements with Austria (1964), Belgium (1964), the Netherlands (1964), France (1965), Sweden (1967), Switzerland (1971), Denmark (1973), and Norway (1981) (İçduygu 2009). Even though the economic downturn caused by the 1973 oil crisis slowed down the inflow of low-skilled Turkish emigrants from rural Anatolia into Europe in the 1970s, most of the guest workers had obtained residency permits by then (Akgündüz 2008).

The introduction of lenient family reunification and asylum policies in the mid-1970s once again increased the inflow of Turkish emigrants to European countries, this time spearheaded by spouses and dependents. Turkish emigration to Europe continued in the early 1980s with a surge of asylum applications from Alevis, Kurds, and other political dissidents fleeing Turkey's repressive military regime (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). By the mid-1980s, policymakers in Turkey and Europe came to realize that Turks were no longer temporary residents. Particularly after 9/11, the labeling of Turkish immigrants has changed from "migrant workers" to "Muslim immigrants" against the backdrop of the growing dominance of the culturalist and religious rhetoric among European host states (Kaya 2019).

The ways in which Turkish policymakers approach the Turkish diaspora in Europe have also changed dramatically over time. In the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey's diaspora engagement policy was driven by economic motives. Turkish bureaucrats tended to view Turkish emigrants as uneducated and rural "remittance machines" in this period. In the 1980s and 1990s, Ankara became more interested in containing and co-opting subversive Islamist and Kurdish political dissidence. Turkey forged a more systematic and institutionalized diaspora engagement policy since the Justice and Development Party's (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) rise to power in 2002. Turkey's post-2002 diaspora policies are driven by political incentives, such as promoting a positive image of Turkey, utilizing the Turkish diaspora as a lobby group in Europe, extending the state's legitimacy and 'soft power' beyond its borders, and garnering expatriate votes (Ünver, 2013, Aydın 2014, Aksel 2019).

Particularly after the introduction of expatriate voting in Turkey in 2014 and the organization of a series of pro-Turkish government public rallies in European cities prior to the 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum that replaced Turkey's parliamentary system with presidentialism, thereby increasing AKP leader and President Tayyip Erdoğan's sphere of influence over the legislative and judicial branches, Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria have voiced their concerns regarding Turkey's paternalistic diaspora engagement policies. These countries are concerned that Turkey has been using its citizens abroad for domestic and foreign policy interests and that Turkey's diaspora outreach activities intervene in their domestic affairs. Given that the Turkish diaspora in Europe has become increasingly fragmented following the 2013 Taksim Gezi Park protests and the 2016 failed coup attempt, these countries are also worried that Turkey's diaspora engagement will export homeland tensions to their land and Turks integration processes will be affected negatively by such policies (Arkilic 2018).

The 2009 and 2017 European Union Minorities and Discrimination Surveys have documented that while overall discrimination experienced by Sub-Saharan African and Roma origin minorities decreased between 2009 and 2017 (EU FRA 2009, 2017), Turks' average levels of discrimination remained the same in Europe (EU MIDIS 2009). According to the 2017 EU MIDIS Survey, Turks in Europe overall feel less connected to their country of residence compared to Muslims from North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africans. One out of five Turkish respondents felt discriminated against due to their ethnic or immigrant background within the last year. Turks in Europe also reported a higher rate of discrimination based on religious identity compared to Asian, South Asian, and Sub-Saharan African immigrants. In fact, 40 percent of Turkish Muslims in Europe have reported harassment motivated by hatred (EU MIDIS 2017). The Turkish community is the least integrated immigrant group and experience high degrees of discrimination in many European countries, including Germany, Austria, and Belgium (Wets et al. 2007; *Deutsche Welle* 26 January 2009; Kaas and Manger 2012). Studies have shown that in European countries where Turks perceive high rates of discrimination, Turkish immigrants' interest and participation rates in homeland elections are higher (Arkilic, forthcoming).

Since the mid-2000s, the Turkish diaspora in Europe has increasingly attracted highly skilled Turkish emigrants fleeing political and economic instability and the rise of Islamism in Turkey. This new "white-collar" Turkish emigration wave has begun to transform the face of Turkish immigration in Europe, while at the same time creating tensions between guest-workers and

political dissidents that arrived between the 1960s and 2000s and brain drainers of the post-2002 era due to their generational as well as class-based and ideological differences.

10. Chapter Summary

The politics of immigrant integration will continue to play an important role around the globe as the movement of people continues, whether due to armed conflict, climate change, or political crises. The study of these issues has evolved a great deal over the years, but it is important for scholars with different country specialties to compare cases in a way that allows for a broader range of understanding, as we have shown in the case of authoritarian regimes. Developing an understanding of the lack of integration is just as important as studying the levels of integration in a country. The range of countries included in future research will impact the ways we define these issues. How immigrants are or are not integrated into society will play a role in defining the nature of not only the politics in these countries, but also the way that societies evolve in this era of globalization.

11. Discussion Questions

- a. How do researchers describe the modes and models of integration?
- b. Why is integration difficult to conceptualize and measure?
- c. What role do local governments play in immigrant integration?
- d. What are some of the continuing issues in the research on immigrant integration?
- e. How does immigrant integration take place in non-democratic states?

12. Recommended Readings

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