



Turkish Populist Nationalism in Transnational Space: Explaining Diaspora Voting Behaviour in Homeland Elections

Ayca Arkilic

To cite this article: Ayca Arkilic (2021): Turkish Populist Nationalism in Transnational Space: Explaining Diaspora Voting Behaviour in Homeland Elections, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, DOI: [10.1080/19448953.2021.1888599](https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2021.1888599)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2021.1888599>



Published online: 16 Feb 2021.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 47



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)



Turkish Populist Nationalism in Transnational Space: Explaining Diaspora Voting Behaviour in Homeland Elections

Ayca Arkilic 

Political Science and International Relations Programme Kelburn Parade, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand

ABSTRACT

Turkey has seen a surge in populist nationalism over the last decade. How this has played out in transnational space through overseas Turkish citizens' voting behaviour remains understudied, however. This article takes up this question, focusing on how the populist–nationalist appeals of the ruling AKP have been received by Turkish citizens in Europe. Specifically, it asks why such appeals have resonated highly with voters in some host countries but not in others. The study suggests that expatriates from Turkey facing more discrimination are more likely to be wooed by populist–nationalist discourse from the homeland. The findings draw on official statements and speeches, Turkish electoral data, the European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey, newspaper articles, and secondary sources.

Introduction

The Turkish expatriate community totals about 6.5 million people, of whom approximately 5.5 million live in Western Europe.¹ As the largest Muslim immigrant group in Europe, Turks abroad play a key role in shaping the outcome of their home and host country elections. While a number of studies have focused on the growth in populist or populist–nationalist appeals in Turkish politics over the last two decades,² none has yet systematically explored the extension of this electoral phenomenon into transnational space. This may well be due to the novelty of expatriate voting in Turkish elections, which was only fully implemented in time for the 2014 Turkish presidential elections.

This gap in the literature is surprising, given the burgeoning scholarship on diaspora voting behaviour in general, which has offered a wealth of philosophical and theoretical perspectives on extra-territorial voting.³ Much comparative empirical work has examined expatriate voting in various country cases in Europe,⁴ Latin America,⁵ the Middle East,⁶ Africa,⁷ and Oceania.⁸ The Turkish diaspora's voting behaviour has also attracted scholarly attention in recent years.⁹ For example, some studies have inquired why the Turkish diaspora's turnout rates were low in the 2014 Turkish presidential elections and the 2015 parliamentary elections,¹⁰ and why they increased in the 2017 constitutional referendum and the 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections.¹¹ Scholars have also

discussed the reasons behind the introduction of expatriate voting in Turkey.¹² Another study has asked why many Turks in Europe support President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP), whereas those in the United States and Canada tend to support the opposition Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) and the pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*, HDP), respectively. This is because, the study has argued, a significant number of Turkish immigrants in the United States and Canada are highly educated and affluent people with urban backgrounds (as well as Kurdish asylum seekers), whereas diasporas from Turkey originally emigrated from poor and conservative parts of Anatolia.¹³ While these are significant contributions to the growing Turkish diaspora voting scholarship, no study has provided a comparative analysis that surveys the reasons behind Euro-Turks' varying electoral participation rates in homeland elections.

This article bridges the populist nationalism and diaspora voting literatures to answer the following questions: To what extent have growing populist nationalist appeals in Turkish politics translated into voting behaviour among Turkish electorates living in Europe? Why have certain Turkish diaspora groups in Europe proven more receptive to these political appeals while others much less so? The study sheds much-needed light on the impact of populist-nationalist appeals on European expatriate Turks' voting behaviour in Turkish elections by drawing on official statements and speeches; electoral data from the Turkish Supreme Electoral Council; key findings of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency's 2009 and 2017 European Union Minorities and Discrimination (EU-MIDIS) Survey; stories of various media outlets, including *Hürriyet*, *Sabah Daily*, *Der Spiegel*, *Deutsche Welle*, *BBC*, and *Reuters*; and secondary sources.

This article suggests that the variation in Turkish expatriates' voting behaviour in Europe is not likely to be caused by solely demographic and socio-economic factors, and emigration patterns from Turkey to Europe. The majority of Turkish immigrants in Europe consist of conservative first-generation Turks who have emigrated to Europe from rural Anatolia to take up low-skilled works as a result of guest worker agreements signed between Turkey and various European governments. The first agreement was signed with Germany in 1961, followed by accords with Austria (1964), Belgium (1964), the Netherlands (1964), France (1965), Sweden (1967), Switzerland (1971), Denmark (1973), and Norway (1981).¹⁴ While in some of these countries, such as Switzerland, less than half of the Turkish émigré population voted for Erdoğan and his AKP, in others, such as Belgium, support rates exceeded 70%.¹⁵ This study suggests that there may be another overlooked factor at play: Turks' feelings of discrimination in their host states. Turkish diaspora populations that report stigmatization at a higher rate are more likely to be wooed by a paternalistic populist-nationalist discourse emanating from the homeland.

The article proceeds as follows. It first turns to the populism/populist nationalism literature and details populist nationalism in Turkey and its extension beyond Turkey's borders. It then maps the voting patterns of diaspora Turks since the introduction of absentee voting in 2014, with a focus on the 2017 constitutional referendum and the 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections. The subsequent section analyses variation in Euro-Turks' voting behaviour in those elections, linking it to the degree of discrimination in the host country.

Populism in its many forms

As Ionescu and Gellner foresaw in 1969, populism is an important yet ambiguous and contested concept¹⁶ that has been defined in myriad ways.¹⁷ Canovan, for example, has identified as many as seven types of populism: revolutionary intellectual populism, peasant populism, farmers' radicalism, populist dictatorship, populist democracy, reactionary populism, and politicians' populism.¹⁸ The difficulty in providing a cookie-cutter definition of populism originates from the understanding that it 'is compatible with different forms of government. It is a way of doing politics which can take various forms, depending on the periods and places'.¹⁹ The concept has been examined from numerous theoretical perspectives, including structuralism, post-structuralism, modernization theory, social movement theory, party politics, political economy, and democratic theory; in a variety of regions, ranging from Latin America and the Middle East to North America and Europe; and through the use of various methodological approaches.²⁰ To this date there is no consensus as to whether populism is a democratizing force²¹ or detrimental to democracy.²²

In the early days of the study of populism, the term was used to describe a reaction against the processes of modernization in Russia and the United States.²³ It first came into use in nineteenth-century Russia (*narodnichestvo*) as a description of a movement of the Russian intelligentsia to defend agrarian peasants against landowners, the Tsarist regime, and capitalism.²⁴ In the United States, the People's Party, founded in the nineteenth-century and built on a coalition of white cotton and wheat farmers of the American South, represented a similar collective vision that grew as a rural response to capitalism, modernization, and industrialization.²⁵ Strong peasant movements emerged in other countries as well, such as Stamboliyski's Bulgaria (1919–1923), which revolted against modernization and Western capitalism.²⁶ In the twentieth-century, authoritarian populist leaders in Latin America reacted to the peripherization of their countries and the modernization pressures international markets put on them, as seen in the examples of Péronism in Argentina and the populism of Vargas in Brazil.²⁷ Similar to the Russian and American experiences, increasing industrialization influenced populism in Latin America as a form of working-class politics with the ultimate goal of redefining property.²⁸ Other authoritarian Latin American leaders, such as Alberto Fujimori of Peru, have been labelled neo-populist in the sense that by pursuing neoliberal policies, they sought to amass popular support, particularly from dispossessed groups that were left out of economic and political life.²⁹ In the 2000s Latin American populism evolved into 'an inclusionary vision of society, bringing together diverse ethnic identities into shared political frameworks'.³⁰

Europe also saw the rise of populist leaders. While the *Narodniki* failed to mobilize the peasantry in Russia, they nonetheless had a notable influence on the formation of agrarian populist parties in pre-democratic Europe in the twentieth-century.³¹ Yet some argue that postwar Europe experienced little populism until the 1990s. According to Mudde, for example, *Poujadism* in late 1950s France, the Danish and Norwegian Progress Parties in the 1970s, and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) in the 1980s were largely *sui genesis* rather than part of a broader populist moment.³² While populism can be a response to neoliberalism or capitalism in some cases, it has also been utilized successfully by neoliberal right-wing politicians in Europe, who managed to

garner working-class votes when mainstream social democracy failed to cater to their needs—‘authoritarian populist’ Thatcherism being a case in point, as Hall demonstrates.³³ In the past few decades, the European populism has increasingly been associated with the rise of the radical right, as seen in the case of the National Front/National Rally in France³⁴ as well as left-wing populist parties, such as the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) in Greece and Podemos in Spain.³⁵

This variety in the manifestations of populism has shaped its multiple definitions found in the literature. As Finchelstein and Urbinati note, although somewhat overlapping, there are three major branches of interpretation in today’s scholarship regarding populism’s manifestations and theoretical components.³⁶ The first group sees populism as a form of ideology or a bundle of ideas. Mudde, for example, argues that populism is a ‘thin-centred ideology’ that views society as divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups—‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ and that populism should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people.³⁷ Because populism is defined as a thin-centred ideology, it can take left- or right-wing forms since ‘which ideological features attach to populism depend upon the socio-political context within which the populist actors mobilize,’ as Mudde and Kaltwasser conclude.³⁸

A second approach views populism as a discursive style. Kazin, for example, argues that the dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’ shapes American politics. However, instead of seeing populism as an ideology, Kazin defines it as a political communication style that may be utilized pragmatically by populist leaders.³⁹ This scholarship is grounded in Laclau’s claim that populism ‘is not a fixed constellation but a series of discursive resources which can be put to very different uses’.⁴⁰ Mouffe’s conceptualization of populism can also be placed under this category since she contends that populism is ‘a discursive strategy of constructing a political frontier dividing society into two camps’.⁴¹ Panizza points out that ‘populism as a discursive concept refers to relatively fluid practices of identification, rather than to individuals or parties. It is a form of politics rather than a stable category of political actors’.⁴²

A third perspective asserts that populism is ‘best defined as a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers’.⁴³ Building on Weber’s and Mouzelis’ works,⁴⁴ proponents of this approach, such as Roberts and Jansen focus on policy choices, political organization, and patterns of mobilization.⁴⁵ More specifically, Weyland notes that most populist politicians aim to ‘routinize their charisma’ and benefit from elements of party organization to consolidate their rule and stabilize their mass appeal.⁴⁶

This article’s focus is on populist nationalism, which has been on the rise especially from the latter half of the 2010s onwards. The juxtaposition of populism and nationalism—which organizes ‘the people’ around common heritage, myths, stories, and symbols—is linked to the apparent pathologies of globalization, particularly regarding its economic effects.⁴⁷ Put differently, class has come into the picture once again with the 2008 global recession that has led to ‘the decline of the well-being of the middle class and working class along with a detected dissatisfaction in the “mainstreamism” that existing parties have adopted’.⁴⁸ Accordingly, populist nationalist leaders in different parts of the world, such as Viktor Orbán of Hungary, Donald Trump of the United States, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey have gained ground in elections.⁴⁹ These leaders address a certain

ethnic or racial group that are said to be the ‘pure’ people.⁵⁰ Others have noted that populist nationalist leaders revitalize a sense of peoplehood that is central to the ethnic nation rooted in an historical context and emphasize their attachment to a glorious historical past to allure their followers.⁵¹ Another label used to describe these leaders is ‘ethnopolitist’ since they equate “the people” with “the nation” and maintain that “sovereignty” should be an expression of the will of the “nation-people”.⁵² In examining populist nationalism as a discursive strategy/style used to mobilize voters (supply side) and how citizens engage with that rhetoric (demand side),⁵³ the next section delves into the Turkish case.

Populist nationalism in Turkey and its extension into transnational space

Since his rise to power in 2002, Erdoğan has been a typical populist–nationalist leader. As a politician who spent four months in prison in 1998 for reciting a controversial Islamist poem, he has successfully utilized anti-establishment appeals and established direct linkages between himself and his followers.⁵⁴ Like previous populist Turkish leaders, Erdoğan has frequently labelled himself as a ‘man of the people’. He suggested in his early speeches that the ruling elite were estranged from the reality of ordinary Anatolian folk and vowed to change this once he attained power.⁵⁵

Erdoğan has also strived arduously to reconstruct a ‘fragmented’ nation by rejuvenating ethno–nationalist values. Particularly during his party’s second term, Erdoğan’s populist–nationalist discourse was entrenched in his ‘neo-Ottoman’ foreign policy, which posited that Turkey is not a ‘regional’ or ‘peripheral’ power, but a ‘central super-power’ itself, with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one category.⁵⁶ By invoking revisionist history, Erdoğan forged a new narrative based on nostalgic neo-Ottoman aspirations and a portrayal of himself as the successor to the Ottoman Sultans.⁵⁷ This political play was conspicuous when Erdoğan visited the tomb of Selim I—an Ottoman Sultan known for his successful expansion of the Ottoman Empire between 1512 and 1520—shortly after the April 2017 constitutional referendum, which has equipped Erdoğan with unprecedented power as the country has transitioned from a parliamentary system into a presidential system. In a similar vein, a few months after the referendum, in August 2017, Erdoğan celebrated the 946th anniversary of the Battle of Manzikert (*Malazgirt*), a historic encounter fought between the Byzantines and the Seljuks that culminated in the Turkification of Anatolia following the Seljuk victory. Posing with Turkish soldiers dressed in traditional Ottoman and Seljuk uniforms to celebrate the anniversary, Erdoğan explicitly invoked the triumphs of the country’s Ottoman past and vowed to ‘make Turkey great again’.⁵⁸ Religious justification has also constituted an intrinsic part of Erdoğan’s populist–nationalist myth-making. Sunni Islamist ideology and objectives have shaped the AKP’s domestic policy and foreign policy.⁵⁹

Turkey’s post-2000 consolidation of neo-Ottoman foreign policy and pan-Islamist ‘identity patriotism’ have gradually morphed into the ‘hard populist–nationalist’ turn after the AKP lost its parliamentary majority in the June 2015 elections. Unsuccessful attempts to form a coalition government resulted in a snap general election scheduled for November 2015. Following the November elections, the AKP regained a parliamentary majority. From 2015 onwards, Erdoğan has espoused religious ultranationalist discourses

as tensions with the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistanê*, PKK) have deepened and the AKP has formed closer relations with the conservative-nationalist Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP) to attract votes. The religious component of Erdoğan's ultranationalism has become even more visible in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in July 2016, where nationalist narratives were articulated through Islamic references.⁶⁰

The rise of populist nationalism in Turkey has direct implications for the Turkish diaspora community. Traditionally, Turkish officials conceived of 'diaspora' in relation to non-Muslim communities exiled from their homelands. Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has recently introduced a new definition of 'diaspora', which suggests that anyone who emigrated from Anatolia should be considered part of the Turkish diaspora and that Turkey should embrace all the diaspora communities with roots in Anatolia equally, including Alevis, Armenians, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Greeks, Jews, and Yazidis.⁶¹

Whereas since the mid-2000s Ankara has begun to address its diaspora as an inseparable component of the 'great' Turkish nation, this narrative has targeted certain diaspora groups more than others. Put differently, Turkish officials have consciously re-engineered the position of ideologically proximate conservative-nationalist diaspora Turks, as loyal allies that would help Turkey extend its legitimacy and soft power beyond its borders and to produce a new state-centric identity.⁶² A significant number of conservative diaspora Turks feel supported and empowered by Turkey's new diaspora engagement policy and revisionist neo-Ottomanist and Islamist rhetoric.⁶³ In recent years, Ankara has continued to place heavy emphasis on ethno-nationalism and religion in its diaspora policy.⁶⁴ In the meantime, Turkey's populist-nationalist discourse has often addressed European host states and their leaders as 'the other' that have turned their back on Turkish expatriates.

This semantic change has been observed at diaspora rallies held by Turkish officials in European cities, which have attracted mostly conservative Turks.⁶⁵ For example, at a rally in Cologne in 2008—the first of its kind—Erdoğan said: 'The Turkish people are people of friendship and tolerance. Wherever they go, they bring only love and joy ... Turkey is proud of you!'⁶⁶ At another rally held in Düsseldorf three years later, he added:

'They call you guest workers, foreigners, or German Turks. It doesn't matter what they all call you: You are my fellow citizens, you are my people, you are my friends. You are my brothers and sisters! You are part of Germany, but you are also part of our great Turkey'.⁶⁷

Some recent Turkish rallies—such as the one held in Karlsruhe, Germany on 15 May 2015—targeted diaspora youth. Speaking behind a lectern that read 'The Man of the People Visits Europe', Erdoğan conveyed similar messages to some 14,000 young Turks: 'You are our influence outside our country ... For us you are not guest workers. You are our strength in foreign countries ... The creation of a new Turkey will start in Germany'.⁶⁸ In a similar vein, at a 2014 rally staged in France, he pleaded:

'There are 620,000 Turks in France ... Know your legal rights. You are our ambassadors in France ... Never feel desperate. Your country [Turkey] is a powerful country and it will continue to grow. We will always fight back when they [enemies] attack us. Be proud of your identity, language, and religion ... Never assimilate and never let your children assimilate'.⁶⁹

Erdoğan has also begun to openly criticize the maltreatment of the Turkish diaspora in Europe and projected himself as the saviour of Turkish expatriates. For example, he criticized German policy-makers' negligence after an apartment block fire in the southern German city of Ludwigshafen in which nine Turkish immigrants, including five children, died.⁷⁰ A few years later, he accused German policy-makers of illegally taking Turkish origin children from their biological families and sending them to foster care.⁷¹

Turkey's relations with European host countries took another strained turn when German officials cancelled several Turkish diaspora rallies that had been scheduled to take place in March 2017 citing security concerns. Turkey's Foreign Affairs Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu's response was harsh: 'You are not Turkey's boss. You are not a first class country and we are not a second class country ... You have to treat Turkey properly'.⁷² Turkish officials went even further by likening the German ban to Nazi practices⁷³ and by summoning the German ambassador to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara.⁷⁴ When the Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria followed Germany's decision and cancelled or condemned a series of planned Turkish rallies in March 2017, Turkey responded harshly.⁷⁵ The next section details how populist nationalism has implications for the Turkish diaspora's voting behaviour in Europe.

Voting rights of diaspora Turks

Turkey introduced expatriate voting in 1987 through an amendment to the Law on Elections and Electoral Registers.⁷⁶ However, overseas Turks had to travel to the Turkish border to cast a ballot at one of the dedicated border polling stations set up for this purpose. Yet such a procedure technically falls outside the definition of voting from abroad. In 1995, even though another amendment to the elections law assigned the task of organizing and managing elections abroad to the Turkish Supreme Election Council, voting at the border remained the only option for expatriate Turks. The elections law was changed in 2008 and once again in 2012 to enable Turks to vote in general and presidential elections as well as in referenda in their countries of residence across the globe. However, due to legal and procedural complications it was not until the August 2014 Turkish presidential elections that overseas Turkish voters could vote on the soil of their country of residence.⁷⁷

Although all citizens over the age of 18 registered on the overseas electoral roll at diplomatic missions or population registration offices were eligible to vote in the 2014 presidential elections, overseas Turks' turnout was very low. Among 2,798,726 registered Turkish voters living abroad, only 530,116 cast their ballot. Erdoğan received 62.54% of the valid diaspora votes and won the elections (see [Table 1](#)).⁷⁸ The low turnout rate was the result of serious logistical problems: Ballot boxes were placed only in big cities, mail ballots were not accepted, and voting procedures were not explained well.⁷⁹

Diaspora Turks' turnout rates increased in the June 2015 parliamentary elections once some of the logistical problems had been addressed: With these elections, members of the Turkish diaspora gained the opportunity to cast their votes at more polling stations over an extended period. These elections also introduced two major changes: Immigrant-origin Turks were included in Turkish political

Table 1. The 2014 Turkish presidential elections overseas results.

Candidate	Vote Share (%)
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (AKP)	62.54%
Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu (CHP and MHP)	29.16%
Selahattin Demirtaş (HDP)	8.30%

Source: Turkish Supreme Electoral Council.
 Turkish Supreme Electoral Council, '2014 Presidential Elections', op. cit.

Table 2. November 2015 Turkish parliamentary elections overseas results.

Political Party	Vote Share (%)
AKP	56.23%
HDP	18.20%
CHP	16.42%
MHP	7.13%

Source: Turkish Supreme Electoral Council.
 Turkish Supreme Electoral Council, 'The November 2015 Elections Overseas Results', <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/doc/dosyalar/docs/Milletvekili/1Kasim2015/KesinSecimSonuclari/96-B.pdf> (accessed on 20 April 2019).

parties' election platforms for the first time and diaspora candidates were placed in electable positions on party lists, ensuring they had a real prospect of being elected as deputies in the Turkish parliament.⁸⁰

External voting had a significant impact on the June 2015 election results. Due to the above-mentioned amendments, Turkish expatriates' participation rate rose to 36.42%. Of the eligible 2,899,072 voters, 1,056,078 cast their ballots at polling stations and customs gates across the world. The AKP became the most popular party abroad, receiving 49.90% of the diaspora votes. It was followed by the HDP (20.29%), the CHP (17.23%), and the MHP (9.26%).⁸¹

In the November 2015 elections, the overseas voter turnout stood at 44.78%. Of the eligible 2,899,069 expatriate voters, 1,298,325 cast their ballot. The AKP's vote share rose to 56.23% of the total overseas vote (see Table 2).⁸²

Overseas Turks' turnout rate in the 2017 constitutional referendum was much higher. Of the eligible 2,972,676 voters, 1,424,279 cast a vote in the referendum⁸³ at polling stations set up in select countries and customs gates. The referendum results showcased Turkish expatriates' high degree of support for the AKP and its leader Erdoğan. The diaspora's support for the referendum (59.09%) was even higher than the domestic electorate's (51.41%).⁸⁴ Table 3 details the election results in various European countries.

The 2018 Turkish parliamentary and presidential elections revealed similar results, where 3,047,323 registered overseas voters cast their ballots. Erdoğan received 59.38%⁸⁵

Table 3. Overseas (Europe) voting in the 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum.

Country	Registered Votes	Cast Votes	Valid Votes	Yes (%)	No (%)
Belgium	137,675	73,027	72,166	74.99%	25.01%
Austria	108,561	52,733	52,205	73.24%	26.76%
Netherlands	252,841	118,321	116,551	70.94%	29.06%
France	326,375	142,776	140,741	64.85%	35.15%
Germany	1,430,127	660,666	653,516	63.07%	36.93%
Denmark	34,139	11,360	11,208	60.87%	39.13%
Norway	8,481	3,865	3,838	57.19%	42.81%
Sweden	37,857	10,051	9,900	47.14%	52.86%
Switzerland	95,293	50,929	50,374	38.08%	61.92%
Italy	14,195	5,682	5,627	37.94%	62.06%
Finland	4,947	1,978	1,961	28.45%	71.55%
Hungary	1,935	913	901	25.75%	74.25%
Poland	3,102	1,192	1,179	25.61%	74.39%
Greece	10,562	797	778	22.62%	77.38%
UK	92,942	35,885	35,424	20.26%	79.74%
Ireland	1,866	872	868	19.93%	80.07%
Spain	2,933	1,306	1,291	13.32%	86.68%
Czech Republic	1,111	593	582	12.54%	87.46%

Source: Turkish Supreme Electoral Council.

Turkish Supreme Electoral Council, '2017 Referendum Overseas Results' op. cit.

Table 4. Overseas (Europe) voting for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP in the 2018 Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections.

Country	Support for Erdoğan, presidential elections (%)	Support for the AKP, parliamentary elections (%)
Belgium	74.9%	64.3%
The Netherlands	73%	63%
Austria	72.3%	62.5%
Germany	64.8%	55.7%
France	63.7%	55.1%
Denmark	57.6%	50.5%
Norway	56.2%	49.9%
Sweden	44.6%	36.4%
Switzerland	37.3%	31.3%
Italy	31.9%	28.7%
Hungary	23.4%	20.6%
Greece	22.7%	18%
UK	21.4%	18.5%
Finland	20.9%	17.7%
Poland	18.8%	15.8%
Spain	17.7%	14.7%
Ireland	16%	12.6%
Czech Republic	11%	8.6%

Source: Author's compilation of election results published in *Sabah Daily*.

'The 2018 Turkish Presidential and Parliamentary Election Results, *Sabah Daily*, 24 June 2018, <https://www.sabah.com.tr/secim/24-haziran-2018-secim-sonuclari> (accessed on 20 April 2019).

and the AKP⁸⁶ secured 51% of the total overseas votes.⁸⁷ Table 4 provides the results in different European countries.

Explaining variation in Euro-Turks' voting behaviour

What explains variation in patterns of expatriate voting? Based on a global study involving 144 countries, the largest survey of systems of diaspora voting ever undertaken, Collyer and Vathi have noted that there is no correlation between expatriate voting rates

and the share of remittances in the GDP or the relative size of the population abroad.⁸⁸ Another study has looked at Colombian expatriates' participation rates in the 2010 Colombian presidential elections by using a large exit poll conducted at Colombian consulates in five cities in the United States and Europe. It has found that individual resources and social capital factors are superseded by institutional factors in expatriate voting.⁸⁹ That is, the local context in host states generates significant variation in expatriates' electoral participation in home country elections.⁹⁰

Other works have supported the argument that the participation of expatriates in their country of origin's elections significantly depends on their places of residence.⁹¹ More specifically, some have argued that immigrants that participate in homeland politics tend to be less attached to and less politically integrated in their host state.⁹² In a similar vein, it has been documented that expatriates' political transnational behaviour is primarily caused by the lack of political integration and influence in their settlement countries.⁹³ This argument is corroborated by a recent study that looks at Turkish Muslims in Europe. Vermeulen has contended that the hostile political environment and debates in European host countries influence the political participation of Turkish immigrants and that the situation has changed immensely and negatively for Turkish expatriates in recent years. The study points out that since the early 1990s, there have been many more Dutch–Surinamese than Dutch–Turkish politicians in the Netherlands despite Turks' larger population in the Netherlands.⁹⁴ Turks are politically underrepresented in Germany and Belgium as well, where they form a significant immigrant community. When politicians of Turkish origin immigrants in these countries are asked why they have not held positions of political influence, they refer to their feelings of isolation and stigmatization on a daily basis and assert that they are still seen as strangers who do not belong to their host countries.⁹⁵

Building on this scholarship, this article suggests that Euro–Turks' varying participation rates in the 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum and the 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections may be affected by their feelings of exclusion in their host country. If a Turkish expatriate perceives discrimination at a high rate in his/her settlement country, populist nationalism emanating from the homeland would have a higher appeal. In other words, Turkish officials' protective approach towards expatriates and attempts to revive a glorious past that Turkish expatriates are deemed to be a genuine part of have resonated well with members of the Turkish diasporic community that feel isolated and marginalized in their host countries.

The 2009 and 2017 EU–MIDIS Surveys have found that while overall discrimination experienced by persons of Sub-Saharan African background and Roma respondents decreased between 2009 and 2017, Euro–Turks' average levels of discrimination remained more or less the same.⁹⁶ According to the 2017 Survey, Turks in Europe overall feel less attached to their country of residence compared to Muslim immigrants from North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africans. One out of five Turkish respondents (20%) felt discriminated against due to their ethnic or immigrant background in one or more areas of daily life within the last year. Turks in Europe also reported a higher rate of discrimination based on religious identity compared to Asian, South Asian, and Sub-Saharan African immigrants. In fact, 40% of Turkish Muslims in Europe have reported harassment motivated by hatred.⁹⁷

The 2009 and 2017 EU–MIDIS Surveys and other scholarly works to be discussed below indicate that Turkish immigrants' feelings of discrimination stand at a high rate in particularly Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, where Erdoğan and the AKP have attracted unprecedented diaspora support. For example, the 2009 EU–MIDIS report demonstrated that 69% of Turks in Belgium, 61% in the Netherlands, and 58% in Denmark believed that discrimination on ethnic grounds was common. Turkish respondents in Belgium (71%), the Netherlands (61%), Denmark (52%), and Germany (48%) were also concerned about discrimination on the basis of religion. As such, ethnicity and religion both serve as sources of discrimination against Euro-Turks.⁹⁸ The 2017 EU–MIDIS Survey has revealed that the discrimination rate for second-generation respondents with Turkish background in Belgium and Denmark is more than twice as high as that for first-generation Turkish expatriates whereas in Austria and the Netherlands, first-generation Turkish respondents on average felt more discriminated against than second-generation respondents.⁹⁹

Turks have been identified as the primary immigrant group most unwilling to integrate into the Austrian society.¹⁰⁰ Turks have also become the main target of anti-immigrant political movements in Austria since the 1990s.¹⁰¹ A survey conducted by the European Network Against Racism has found that in Austria 'people with a migrant background, even third-generation migrants, specifically of Turkish descent, are perceived as "foreigners" and face barriers in education . . . , resulting in fewer opportunities in the job market'.¹⁰² Other studies have detected that the unemployment rate of Turks was higher than that of Austrians and foreigners from former Yugoslavian countries—which constitute another significant migrant group in the country—and that Turkish applicants are treated unfavourably in the Austrian labour market.¹⁰³

Likewise, Turks are often presented as the least integrated group of immigrants in Belgium.¹⁰⁴ By looking at two Belgian cities, Antwerp and Brussels, a recent study has shown that Turks indeed experience widespread discrimination in Belgium at schools, workplace, nightclubs and even during interactions with the Belgian police.¹⁰⁵ As another study has pointed out, second-generation Turks are indeed more likely to be unemployed than natives in Belgium, as well as in Germany, France, and Austria.¹⁰⁶ Turkish origin second-generation immigrants also perceive more group discrimination than Moroccan origin second-generation immigrants in certain cities, such as Antwerp, particularly while looking for a job and going out.¹⁰⁷

As the 2009 and 2017 EU–MIDIS Surveys have documented, Turks' feelings of isolation are at an alarming rate in Denmark.¹⁰⁸ Other studies have concluded that Turks in Denmark encounter difficulties in education and workplace. For example, the European Network Against Racism Survey has found that applicants with a Middle Eastern sounding name have to send 52% more job applications to be invited for a job interview compared to applicants with a Danish sounding name.¹⁰⁹

Turks have generally lower levels of integration levels compared to other immigrant groups in France as well.¹¹⁰ More specifically, Turks have the lowest naturalization, electoral registration, and voter turnout rates, and political presence among all immigrant groups in France.¹¹¹ As the Trajectories and Origins Survey¹¹² and other studies¹¹³ have revealed, Turks also experience a high degree of discrimination in France. Turkish immigrants are very likely to wish to return to their country of origin or at least be buried there. Moreover, Southeast Asian immigrants in France are more likely to show national

belonging and Sub-Saharan Africans and North Africans are more likely to intermarry than those of Turkish origin immigrants.¹¹⁴

In a similar vein, Turks are the least integrated immigrant group in Germany.¹¹⁵ They also experience and perceive discrimination at higher rates than other immigrant groups in the country.¹¹⁶ Studies by Wrench¹¹⁷ and Kaas and Manger¹¹⁸ contend that applicants with a Turkish sounding name are discriminated against in the German job market. In fact, students with a Turkish name who are looking for an internship have to send 14% more applications than those with a German name.¹¹⁹

Turks feel excluded in the Netherlands as well. Crul and Doornik have shown that the educational status of second-generation Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands is weaker compared to the children of ethnic Dutch parents and second-generation Turkish women are more inclined to adhere to the norms and values of their own ethnic community compared to second-generation Moroccan women.¹²⁰ Other studies have highlighted a growing problem with the integration of Dutch–Turkish youth in recent years and reported that the unemployment rate for Turkish origin Dutch youth stands at 22%.¹²¹ In a similar vein, the 2017 EU–MIDIS Survey has documented that among all Muslim immigrant groups, Turks in the Netherlands experience the highest rate of discrimination based on religious belief. Moreover, 60% of Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands have experienced harassment motivated by hatred and 52% of Turkish Muslims know a family member or a friend who have been subject to harassment due to ethnic or immigrant background.¹²² The labour market position of Turks in the Netherlands is more unfavourable than in Germany as well.¹²³ Roughly one-third of Turks in the Netherlands feel they have experienced discrimination on one or more occasions at school, by the police, or while looking for an internship.¹²⁴

Conclusion

In parallel to political developments in other parts of the world, Turkey has witnessed growing populist nationalism in recent years. While Turkish President Erdoğan's approach resembles that of his contemporaries in terms of his anti-establishment position and focus on revisionist history, it is unique in the sense that it is based on Turkey's Ottoman past and a vision of Sunni Muslim nationalist identity. Erdoğan's calls to revive an ideal nation based on a nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire is embedded in a new form of state–citizen engagement that has incorporated not only domestic but also expatriate Turks.

This article has focused on an understudied dimension of Turkey's populist nationalism, namely its appeal to the members of the Turkish émigré community. It has suggested that President Erdoğan and his party have secured considerable expatriate support in some European countries because they have restructured previously marginalized and excluded Turkish expatriate identities through a discourse that embraces overseas Turks and offers them protection. Put differently, in European countries where Turks perceive high rates of discrimination, populist nationalism emanating from Ankara has received unprecedented support. This is manifested in the results of the 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum and the 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections across Europe.

This finding in the Turkish case has implications for the relationship between involvement or interest in homeland politics and political integration in host states more

generally.¹²⁵ As Mügge and colleagues conclude, although allegiance to the sending state raises questions concerning diasporas' (political) integration in the receiving country, the assumed negative relationship has not been explored and documented sufficiently.¹²⁶ This is because existing studies look at only one side of the equation, studying political participation either in the homeland or in host state elections, thereby ignoring the interaction between the two. Future studies should further investigate how overseas Turks' voting patterns affect their political participation and integration prospects in their European host countries.

Notes

1. 'Turkish Citizens Living Abroad', Republic of Turkey: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [online], undated, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-expatriate-turkish-citizens.en.mfa> (accessed on 29 October 2019).
2. Ş. Dinçşahin, 'A Symptomatic Analysis of the Justice and Development Party's Populism in Turkey, 2007–2010', *Government and Opposition*, 47(4), 2012, pp. 619–640; Z. Öniş and S.E. Aytac, 'Varieties of Populism in a Changing Global Context: The Divergent Paths of Erdogan and Kirchnerismo', *Comparative Politics*, 41(1), 2014, pp. 41–59; S.E. Aytac and E. Elçi, 'Populism in Turkey', in D. Stockemer (ed), *Populism Around the World: A Comparative Perspective*, Springer, Cham, Switzerland, 2019, pp. 89–108.
3. R. Bauböck, 'Stakeholder Citizenship and Transnational Political Participation: A Normative Evaluation of External Voting', *Fordham Law Review*, 75 (5), 2005, pp. 2393–2447; R. Rubio-Marin, 'Transnational Politics and the Democratic Nation-State: Normative Challenges of Expatriate Voting and Nationality Retention of Emigrants', *New York University Law Review*, 81(1), 2006, pp. 101–131.
4. P. Boccagni, 'Reminiscences, Patriotism, Participation: Approaching External Voting in Ecuadorian Immigration to Italy', *International Migration*, 49(3), 2001, pp. 76–98.
5. J-M. Lafleur and L. Calderon-Chelius, 'Assessing Emigrant Participation in Home Country Elections: The Case of Mexico's 2006 Presidential Elections', *International Migration*, 49(3), 2011, pp. 99–124.
6. L. Brand, 'Arab Uprisings and the Changing Frontiers of Transnational Citizenship: Voting from Abroad in Political Transitions', *Political Geography* 41, 2013, pp. 54–63.
7. C. Hartmann, 'Expatriates as Voters? The New Dynamics of External Voting in Sub-Saharan Africa', *Democratization*, 22(5), 2015, pp. 906–926.
8. F. Barker, and K. McMillan, 'Introduction: Researching Immigrant and Emigrant Voting', *Political Science*, 69(2), 2017, pp. 93–100.
9. F. Adamson, 'Sending States and the Making of Intra-Diasporic Politics: Turkey and Its Diaspora(s)', *International Migration Review*, 53(1), 2019, pp. 210–236; D. Aksel, *Home States and Homeland Politics: Interactions between the Turkish State and Its Emigrants in France and the United States*, London: Routledge, 2019; A. Kaya, *Turkish Origin Migrants and Their Descendants: Hyphenated Identities in Transnational Space*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2019.
10. N. Abadan-Unat, V. Çıdam, D. Çınar, Z. Kadirbeyoğlu, S. Kaynak, B. Özay, and S. Taş, 'Voting Behaviour of Euro-Turks and Turkey's Presidential Elections of 2014', İstanbul: Boğaziçi University and the Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, 2014, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/314207827>; Z. Şahin-Mencütek and Ş.A. Yılmaz, 'Turkey's Experience with Voting from Abroad in the 2014 and 2015 Elections', Rethink Institute Paper, Washington D.C.: Rethink Institute, 2015, <http://www.rethinkinstitute.org/turkeys-experience-with-voting-from-abroad-in-the-2014-and-2015-elections> (accessed on 23 April 2019)
11. Z. Yanaşmayan and Z. Kaşlı, 'Reading diasporic engagements through the lens of citizenship: Turkey as a test case', *Political Geography* 70, 2019, pp. 24–33.

12. Z. Şahin-Mencütek and M. M. Erdoğan, 'The Implementation of Voting from Abroad: Evidence from the 2014 Turkish Presidential Election', *International Migration*, 54(3), 2016, pp. 173–186.
13. Sevi, C. S. Mekik, A. Blais, and S. Çakır, 'How do Turks vote abroad?', *Turkish Studies*, 2019, DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2019.1607311.
14. See A. İçduygu, 'International Migration and Human Development in Turkey', United Nations Development Programme Human Development Research Paper 2009/52, UNDP, October 2009. In addition to the labour recruitment agreements, Turkey also signed social security accords with European countries, including the UK, Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, and Norway. For the entire list of signatory countries, please see 'Social Security Agreements' at: <https://turkishlaw.com/news/business-in-turkey/552-social-security-agreements> (accessed on 23 April 2019).
15. Australia is another interesting case in point. Turkey signed a guest worker agreement with Australia in 1967 (A. İçduygu, 'Facing Changes and Making Choices: Unintended Turkish Migration Settlement in Australia', *International Migration*, 32(1), 1994, pp. 71–93). Yet only 41.82% of Turkish origin Australians voted 'yes' in the 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum. Of Turkish origin Australians, 45.3% voted for Erdoğan and 42.6% voted for the AKP in the 2018 elections (author's compilation of election results published in 'The 2018 Turkish Presidential and Parliamentary Election Results, *Sabah Daily*, 24 June 2018, <https://www.sabah.com.tr/secim/24-haziran-2018-secim-sonuclari> (accessed on 20 April 2019).
16. G. Ionescu and E. Gellner, eds., *Populism: its meanings and national characteristics*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1969.
17. R.R. Barr, 'Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics', *Party Politics*, 15(1), 2009, pp. 29–48.
18. M. Canovan, *Populism*, Harcourt, New York, 1981.
19. C. Mouffe, 'The Populist Moment', *Open Democracy*, 2016 <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/democraciabierta/populist-moment/> (accessed on 15 July 2019).
20. For an overview of the populism literature, please see N. Gidron and B. Bonikowski, 'Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda', Harvard University Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Working Paper Series, No. 13-0004, 2013, <https://scholar.harvard.edu/gidron/publications/varieties-populism-literature-review-and-research-agenda> (accessed on 16 July 2019).
21. M. Canovan, 'Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy', *Political Studies*, 47(1), 1999, pp. 2–16.
22. N. Urbinati, *Democracy Disfigured: Opinion, Truth, and the People*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2014.
23. N. Urbinati, 'Political Theory of Populism', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 22, 2019, pp. 111–127.
24. T. Houwen, 'The Non-European Roots of the Concept of Populism', Sussex European Institute Working Paper 120, 2011, <https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=sei-working-paper-no-120.pdf&site=266> (accessed on 17 July 2019).
25. C. Postel, *The Populist Vision*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007; Houwen, op. cit.; P. Taggart, *Populism*, Open University Press, Buckingham, 2000.
26. G. Duizjings, *Global Villages: Rural and Urban Transformations in Contemporary Bulgaria*, Anthem Press, London, 2013.
27. T. Di Tella, 'Populism and Reform in Latin America', in: C. Véliz (ed.), *Obstacles to Change in Latin America*, pp. 47–73, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1965; G. Germani, *Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism*, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, 1978; D. Fink-Hafner, 'A Typology of Populisms and Changing Forms of Society: The Case of Slovenia', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 68(8), 2016, pp. 1315–1339.

28. C. Vergara, 'Populism as Plebeian Politics: Inequality, Domination, and Popular Empowerment', *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 2019, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12203>.
29. R. Barr, 'The Persistence of Neopopulism in Peru? From Fujimori to Toledo', *Third World Quarterly*, 24(6), 2003, pp. 1161–1178.
30. R. L. Madrid, 'The rise of ethnopopulism in Latin America', *World Politics*, 60(3), 2008, pp. 475–508 and S. Levitsky and J. Loxton, 'Populism and competitive authoritarianism in the Andes', *Democratization*, 20(1), 2013, pp. 107–136 cited in Gidron and Bonikowski, op. cit. pp. 4–5.
31. Ionescu and Gellner, *Populism*, op. cit.
32. C. Mudde, 'Populism in Europe: a primer', *Open Democracy*, 12 May 2015 <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/populism-in-europe-primer/> (accessed on 16 July 2019).
33. S. Hall, 'The Great Moving Right Show', *Marxism Today*, January 1979, pp. 14–20; S. Hall, 'Authoritarian Populism: A Reply', *New Left Review*, 1(151), 1985, pp. 115–124.
34. C. Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007.
35. C. Mouffe, *For a Left Populism*, Verso, London, 2018.
36. F. Finchelstein and N. Urbinati, 'On Populism and Democracy', *Populism* 1(1), 2018, pp. 15–37.
37. C. Mudde, 'The Populist Zeitgeist', *Government and Opposition*, 39(4), 2004, p. 543.
38. C. Mudde and C. R. Kaltwasser, eds., *Populism in Europe and the Americas*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012.
39. M. Kazin, *The Populist Persuasion: An American History*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1995.
40. E. Laclau, *The Populist Reason*, Verso, London, 2005.
41. Mouffe, op. cit.
42. F. Panizza, *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*, Verso, London, 2005 cited in Gidron and Bonikowski, op. cit. p. 9.
43. K. Weyland, 'Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics', *Comparative Politics*, 34(1), 2001, p. 14.
44. M. Weber, *Economy and Society*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978; N. Mouzelis, 'On the concept of populism: populist and clientelistic modes of incorporation in semiperipheral polities', *Politics & Society*, 14(3), 1985, pp. 329–348.
45. K. Roberts, 'Populism, Political Conflict, and Grass-Roots Organization in Latin America', *Comparative Politics*, 38(2), pp. 127–148, 2006; R. S. Jansen, 'Populist Mobilization: A New Theoretical Approach to Populism', *Sociological Theory*, 29(2), pp. 75–96, 2011.
46. Weyland, 'Clarifying a Contested Concept', op. cit. p. 14.
47. D. Johnson and E. Frombgen, 'Racial Contestation and the Emergence of Populist Nationalism in the United States', *Social Identities*, 15(5), 2009, pp. 631–658 at p. 635; F. Lopes-Alves and D. Johnson, 'The Rise of Populist Nationalism in Comparative Perspective: Europe and the Americas', in F. Lopes-Alves and D. Johnson (eds), *Populist Nationalism in Europe and the Americas*, pp. 3–19, Routledge, New York, 2019.
48. Finchelstein and Urbinati, 'On Populism and Democracy', op. cit., p. 31.
49. E. Jenne, 'Is Nationalism or Ethnopopulism on the Rise Today?', *Ethnopolitics*, 17(5), pp. 546–552, 2018.
50. F. Fukuyama, 'The Populist Surge', *The American Interest*, 2018 <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/02/09/the-populist-surge/>.
51. J. De Matas, 'Making the Nation Great Again: Trump, Euro-scepticism, and the Surge of Populist Nationalism', *Journal of Comparative Politics*, 10(2): 19–36, 2017; Johnson and Frombgen, op. cit.
52. Jenne, 'Is Nationalism or Ethnopopulism on the Rise Today?' op. cit., p. 550.
53. C. Miller-Idriss, 'The Global Dimensions of Populist Nationalism', *The International Spectator* 54(2), pp. 17–34, 2019.

54. O. Selçuk, 'Strong presidents and weak institutions: populism in Turkey, Venezuela and Ecuador' *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 16(4), 2016, pp. 571–589.
55. R.T. Erdoğan quoted in Öniş and Aytaç op. cit., p. 45.
56. A. Davutoğlu, 'Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU in 2010', *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 8(3), 2009, pp. 11–17.
57. Özpek and Tanrıverdi-Yaşar, op. cit.
58. A. Bozkurt, 'Erdoğan's Growing Personality Cult in Turkey', *Turkish Minute* [Blog], 2017 <https://www.turkishminute.com/2017/08/28/opinion-erdogans-growing-personality-cult-in-turkey/> (accessed on 20 April 2019).
59. M. Sezal and I. Sezal, 'Dark Taints on the Looking Glass?: Whither "New Turkey"?', *Turkish Studies*, 19 (2), 2018, pp. 217–239
60. B. Kadercan, 'The Year of the Grey Wolf: The Rise of Turkey's New Ultrnationalism,' *War on the Rocks* [Blog], 2018 <https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/the-year-of-the-grey-wolf-the-rise-of-turkeys-new-ultranationalism/> (accessed on 3 May 2019).
61. A. Davutoğlu quoted in K. Öktem, 'Turkey's New Diaspora Policy: The Challenge of Inclusivity, Outreach, and Capacity', İstanbul Policy Center Research Paper, İstanbul: IPC, 2014, p. 22 http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/14627_Kerem%C3%96ktenv (accessed on 20 April 2019).
62. Y. Aydın, 'The New Turkish Diaspora Policy', Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Research Paper, Berlin: SWP, 2014 https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2014_RP10_adn.pdf (accessed on 30 April 2019); Öktem, op. cit.; A. Okay, 'Diaspora-making as a state-led project: Turkey's extensive diaspora strategy and its implications for emigrant and kin populations', Unpub. PhD dissertation, European University Institute, 2015
63. A. Arkilic, 'Empowering a fragmented diaspora: Turkish immigrant organizations' perceptions of and responses to Turkey's diaspora engagement policy', *Mediterranean Politics*, 2020, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2020.1822058>
64. For more information on the AKP's multi-tiered diaspora policy, please see Arkilic, 'Between the Homeland and Host States'; op. cit.; Yanaşmayan and Kaşlı, op. cit
65. 'Erdoğan'ın Köln Çıkarması [Erdoğan's Cologne Landing]', *Deutsche Welle*, 11 February 2008 <http://www.dw.com/tr/erdo%C4%9Fan%C4%B1n-k%C3%B6ln-%C3%A7%C4%B1karmas%C4%B1/a-3119307> (accessed on 1 May 2019).
66. 'Cologne's Turkish Spectacle: Erdogan's One-Man Show', *Der Spiegel*, 11 February 2008 <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/cologne-s-turkish-spectacle-erdogan-s-one-man-show-a-534519.html> (accessed on 20 April 2019).
67. 'Erdogan Urges Turks Not to Assimilate', *Der Spiegel*, 28 February 2011 <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/erdogan-urges-turks-not-to-assimilate-you-are-part-of-germany-but-also-part-of-our-great-turkey-a-748070.html> (accessed on 20 April 2019).
68. This rally took place on 10 May 2015. Erdoğan's complete speech is available in Turkish at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1WdOllwyZHI> (accessed on 20 April 2019).
69. 'Başbakan Erdoğan Fransa'daki Türklere seslendi [Prime Minister Erdoğan Addressed Turks in France]', *Hürriyet*, 21 June 2014 <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/basbakan-erdogan-fransadaki-turklere-seslendi-26657828> (accessed on 29 April 2019).
70. 'Cologne's Turkish Spectacle', op. cit.
71. 'Secret Thatcher Notes: Kohl Wanted Half of Turks Out of Germany', *Der Spiegel*, 18 October 2013 <https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/report-accuses-eu-countries-of-illegally-putting-turkish-children-in-state-care-a-928626.html> (accessed on 20 April 2019).
72. 'Erdogan Anger as Germany-Turkey War of Words Escalates', *BBC* [Online], 3 March 2017 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39156138> (accessed on 20 April 2019).
73. 'Germany Rejects Erdogan's "Absurd" Nazi Comparison, Calls for Calm', *Reuters*, 6 March 2017 <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-turkey-idUSKBN16D1FO> (accessed on 20 April 2019).

74. 'Turkey Summons German Ambassadors as Tensions Mount', *Reuters*, 19 September 2017 <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-turkey/turkey-summons-german-ambassador-as-tensions-mount-idUSKCN1BT1B4> (accessed on 20 April 2019).
75. 'Turkey Threatens to Send Europe "15,000 Refugees a Month"', *Euractiv*, 17 March 2017. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/turkey-threatens-to-send-europe-15000-refugees-a-month/> (accessed on 20 April 2019).
76. Law No. 298, 26/4/1961.
77. Z. Kadirbeyoğlu and A. Okay, 'Turkey: Voting from Abroad in 2015 General Elections', *Global Citizenship Observatory (GLOBALCIT)* [Blog], 2015 <http://globalcit.eu/voting-from-abroad-in-turkey-s-general-elections-2015/> (accessed on 20 April 2019).
78. Turkish Supreme Electoral Council, 'The 2014 Turkish Presidential Elections Overseas Results', http://www.ysk.gov.tr/doc/dosyalar/docs/2014CB/2014CB-Kesin-416_b_Yurtdisi.pdf (accessed on 20 April 2019)
79. Şahin-Mencütek and Yılmaz, op. cit. The Supreme Electoral Council has not broken down the electoral results based on the countries for this election.
80. Şahin-Mencütek and Yılmaz, op. cit.
81. Turkish Supreme Electoral Council, 'The June 2015 Elections Overseas Results', 2015 <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/doc/dosyalar/docs/Milletvekili/7Haziran2015/KesinSecimSonuclari/ResmiGazete/B.pdf> (accessed on 20 April 2019)
82. The Supreme Electoral Council has not broken down the electoral results based on individual countries for this election.
83. Turkish Supreme Electoral Council, 'The 2017 Constitutional Referendum', <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/doc/dosyalar/docs/2017Referandum/2017HO-UlkelerdeOyKullanma.pdf> (accessed on 20 April 2019).
84. Turkish Supreme Electoral Council, '2017 Referendum Overseas Results' op. cit.; Turkish Supreme Electoral Council, 'The 2017 Constitutional Referendum Domestic Results', <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/doc/dosyalar/docs/2017Referandum/2017HO-Ornek134.pdf> (accessed on 20 April 2019).
85. Turkish Supreme Electoral Council, 'The 2018 Presidential Elections Overseas Results', <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/doc/dosyalar/docs/24Haziran2018/KesinSecimSonuclari/2018CB-416B.pdf> (accessed on 20 April 2019).
86. In this election, the AKP formed the People's Alliance (*Cumhur İttifakı*) with the MHP, which competed against the Nation Alliance (*Millet İttifakı*) formed by the CHP, the Good Party (*İyi Parti*), the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*), and the Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*).
87. Turkish Supreme Electoral Council, 'The 2018 Parliamentary Elections Overseas Results', <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/doc/dosyalar/docs/24Haziran2018/KesinSecimSonuclari/2018MV-96B.pdf> (accessed on 20 April 2019).
88. M. Collyer and Z. Vathi, 'Patterns of Extra-territorial Voting', Sussex Centre for Migration Research Working Paper 122, 2007, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08c09e5274a31e0000f5e/WP-T22.pdf> (accessed on 20 April 2019).
89. C. Escobar, R. Arana and J. McCann, 'Expatriate Voting and Migrants' Place of Residence: Explaining Transnational Participation in Colombian Elections', *Migration Studies*, 3(1), 2015, pp. 1–31.
90. Ibid., p. 2.
91. Jaulin, op. cit.; Sevi et al., op. cit.
92. J. Staton, R. Jackson and D. Canache, 'Dual Nationality Among Latinos: What are the Implications for Political Connectedness?', *The Journal of Politics*, 69 (2), 2007, pp. 470–482.
93. R. Koopmans, P. Statham, M. Giugni, and F. Passy, *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2005.
94. F. Vermeulen, 'The Paradox of Immigrant Political Participation in Europe amidst Crises of Multiculturalism', in C. Menjívar, M. Ruiz and I. Ness (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Migration Crises*, pp. 1–17, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018.

95. F. Santing and F. Vermeulen, 'Immigranten keren de gevestigde politiek de rug toe' [Immigrants turn their backs on established politics]. *De Groene Amsterdammer*, 18 February 2015, <https://www.groene.nl/artikel/o-wee-als-wij-in-de-raad-komen> (accessed on 20 April 2019); Vermeulen, 'Paradox', op. cit.
96. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), 'EU-MIDIS—European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey: Main Results Report', December 2009 <https://fra.europa.eu/en/project/2011/eu-midis-european-union-minorities-and-discrimination-survey/publications> (accessed on 20 April 2019); European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), 'EU-MIDIS II—Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey: Main results', 2017 https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2017-eu-midis-ii-main-results_en.pdf (accessed on 29 April 2019).
97. FRA, 'EU-MIDIS II 2017', op. cit.
98. R. Taras, 'Euro-Turks in the Contemporary European Imaginary', *Insight Turkey*, 15 (4), 2013, <https://www.insightturkey.com/article/euro-turks-in-the-contemporary-european-imaginary> (accessed on 20 April 2019).
99. FRA, 'EU-MIDIS II 2017', op. cit.
100. J. Wets, 'The Turkish Community in Austria and Belgium: The Challenge of Integration', *Turkish Studies*, 7(1), 2007, pp. 85–100.
101. W. Sievers, I. Ataç and P. Schnell, 'Turkish Migrants and their Descendants in Austria: Patterns of Exclusion and Individual and Political Responses', *Migration Letters*, 11(3), 2014, pp. 263–274.
102. ENAR, 'Racism and Discrimination in Employment in Europe (2013–2017)', Brussels: European Network Against Racism, 2017, p. 7 https://www.enar-eu.org/IMG/pdf/shadow_report_2016x2017_long_final_lowres.pdf (accessed on 29 April 2019).
103. D. Weichselbaumer, 'Discrimination Against Migrants in Austria: An Experimental Study', IZA DP Working Paper No. 9354, Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA), 2015, p. 4, <http://ftp.iza.org/dp9354.pdf> (accessed on 30 April 2019).
104. Wets, 'The Turkish Community in Austria and Belgium', op. cit.
105. V. Vandezande, K. Phalet and M. Swyngedouw, 'Do Feelings of Discrimination Explain the riots in Brussels? A Comparison of Moroccan and Turkish Groups in Brussels and Antwerp', *Brussels Studies* 47(7), 2011 <http://journals.openedition.org/brussels/848>.
106. V. Corluy, J. Haemels, I. Marx and G. Verbist, 'The Labour Market Position of Second-generation Immigrants in Belgium', NBB Working Paper, No. 285, Brussels: National Bank of Belgium, 2015 <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/144497/1/wp285en.pdf> (accessed on 20 April 2019).
107. A. Alanya, G. Baysu, and M. Swyngedouw, 'Identifying City Differences in Perceived Group Discrimination among Second-generation Turks and Moroccans in Belgium', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 41(7), 2014, pp. 1088–1110.
108. FRA, 'EU-MIDIS 2009', op. cit.; FRA, 'EU-MIDIS II 2017', op. cit.
109. ENAR, op. cit.
110. M. Tribalat, *Faire France: Une enquête sur les immigrés et leurs enfants* [Making France: A Survey of Immigrants and Their Children], Paris: La Découverte, 1995; L. Gabrielli, 'Corridor Report on France: The Case of Tunisians and Turks,' European University Institute INTERACT Research Report 14, 2015 http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/36059/INTERACT-RR-2015%20-%2014_France.pdf;sequence=1 (accessed on 1 May 2019).
111. E. Yalaz, 'Immigrant Political Incorporation: Institutions, Groups, and Inter-Ethnic Context', Unpub. PhD Dissertation, Rutgers University, 2014.
112. Data cited from C. Beauchemin, C. Hamel and P. Simon, 'Trajectoires et Origines: Enquête sur la diversité des populations en France [Trajectories and Origins: Survey of the diversity of populations in France]', INED Documents de Travail 168, 2010 https://www.ined.fr/fichier/s_rubrique/19558/dt168_teo.fr.pdf (accessed on 20 April 2019).
113. P. Simon, 'France and the Unknown Second Generation', *International Migration Review*, 37(4), 2003, pp. 1091–1119; A. Kaya and F. Kentel, Euro-Türkler: Türkiye ile Avrupa Birliği

- Arasında Köprü mü, Engel mi? [Euro-Turks: A Bridge or an Obstacle between Turkey and the EU?], İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2005.
114. M. Safi, 'The Immigrant Integration Process in France: Inequalities and Segmentation', *Revue française de sociologie*, 49(5), 2008, pp. 3–44.
 115. Berlin Institute for Population and Development study, quoted in 'Study Shows Turkish Immigrants Least Integrated in Germany', *Deutsche Welle* [online], 26 January 2009 <http://www.dw.com/en/study-shows-turkish-immigrants-least-integrated-in-germany/a-3975683> (accessed on 20 April 2019).
 116. Yalaz, 'Immigrant Political Incorporation', op. cit.
 117. J. Wrench, 'Data on Discrimination in EU Countries: Statistics, Research, and The Drive for Comparability', Global Migration Policy Paper, 2010 <https://www.globalmigrationpolicy.org/articles/integration/Data%20On%20Discrimination%20in%20EU-%20Statistics,%20Research,%20Comparability,%20WRENCH%202011.pdf>.
 118. L. Kaas and C. Manger, 'Ethnic Discrimination in Germany's Labour Market: A Field Experiment', *German Economic Review*, 13(1), 2012, pp. 1–20.
 119. Ibid.
 120. M. Crul and J. Doornik, 'The Turkish and Moroccan Second Generation in the Netherlands: Divergent Trends between and Polarization within the Two Groups', *International Migration Review*, 37(4), 2003, pp. 1039–1064.
 121. Ö. Karayalçın, 'Integration Problems of Dutch-Turkish Youngsters: A Qualitative Research,' Unpub. MA Thesis, İstanbul Bilgi University, 2015; ENAR, op. cit.
 122. FRA, 'EU-MIDIS II 2017', op. cit.
 123. J. Dagevos, R. Euwals, M. Gijsberts, and H. Roodenburg, 'The Labour Market Position of Turkish Immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands: Reason for Migration, Naturalization and Language Proficiency', The Netherlands Institute for Social Research, 2007 https://www.scp.nl/english/Publications/Summaries_by_year/Summaries_2007/Labour_market_position_of_Turks_in_the_Netherlands_and_Germany (accessed on 22 April 2019).
 124. I. Andriessen, H. Fernee, and K. Wittebrod, 'Perceived Discrimination in the Netherlands', The Netherlands Institute for Social Research, 2014 https://www.scp.nl/Publicaties/Alle_publicaties/Publicaties_2014/Perceived_discrimination_in_the_Netherlands (accessed on 25 April 2019).
 125. A. Schlenker, 'Divided Loyalty? Identification and Political Participation of Dual Citizens in Switzerland', *European Political Science Review*, 8(4), 2016, pp. 517–546; A. Chaudhary, 'Voting Here and There: Political Integration and Transnational Political Engagement among Immigrants in Europe', *Global Networks*, 18(3), 2018, pp. 437–460.
 126. Mügge et al., op. cit.

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this article was presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Conference, April 5–8, 2018, Chicago, USA, and the International Political Science Association Conference, July 21–24, 2018, Brisbane, Australia. The author is grateful for valuable comments received from Rolle Alho, A. Ezgi Gürcan, Xavier Marquez, Floris Vermeulen, and Simon P. Watmough.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding

This work was supported by Victoria University of Wellington under Grant Number 219048 and Grant Number 217910.

Notes on contributor

Ayca Arkilic is a lecturer (assistant professor) in Political Science and International Relations at Victoria University of Wellington. Between 2013 and 2015, she was a Chateaubriand Fellow at Sciences Po-Paris; a visiting researcher at the Berlin Social Science Research Center's (WZB) Migration, Integration, and Transnationalization research unit; and an Imam Tirmizi Visiting Research Fellow at the Oxford Center for Islamic Studies. She has published articles and book chapters on topics related to Turkish emigration to Europe.

ORCID

Ayca Arkilic  <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1775-3311>