

# **The Difficult Choices of a Post-Colonial State: Timor-Leste and International Educational Aid**

---

**A Comparative Look at Educational Aid from Portugal and Australia  
to Timor-Leste**

By  
**NENE CORREIA DE ALMEIDA**

**A thesis  
submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington in fulfilment of the  
requirements for the Degree of Master of International Relations  
(MIR)**

**School of History, Philosophy, Political Science and International  
Relations  
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand**

**2015**

## **ABSTRACT**

Timor-Leste is still a newly independent country, obtaining full independence in 2002. The new Constitution gives all citizens a right to education, showing how important education is for Timor-Leste. Educational aid has accounted for around 10% of the aid budget (and has been as high as 28%) over the three years from 2011 to 2014. This thesis explores the emerging relationship between Timor-Leste and its two largest aid donors: Australia and Portugal, through the lens of educational aid. Although there are currently some studies on Timor-Leste's education policy, there is no current study which explores the relationship between donor foreign policy and educational aid.

The thesis builds on secondary literature and interviews with important figures in the Timorese government. It argues that donors' political priorities have had an important impact on shaping education policy in Timor-Leste and that the provision of educational aid can help to highlight Timor-Leste's position as a highly dependent nation in the world system. Portuguese aid has been strongly driven by Portugal's attempts to maintain political relationships with its former colonies and promote Portuguese language worldwide. Portuguese funding for Portuguese language education has had an impact on language policy, cementing the position of Portuguese as an official language and promoting a Portuguese-influenced position in Timor-Leste's foreign policy. Australian aid, meanwhile, has emphasised Tetum and English as appropriate languages and is connected with Australian attempts to minimise Timorese discontent over oil politics in the Timor Gap (or Timor Sea). Coordination between these two different donors with different interests has been weak. Timor-Leste finds itself in a difficult position of dependency whereby it needs foreign aid but cannot trust that aid is being given in a disinterested and functional way.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am able to complete this thesis because there are many people who tirelessly spent their time to support and help me during the past two years. Therefore, I am using this opportunity to express my gratitude to everyone who supported me throughout the completion of this thesis. First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest appreciation and thanks to my supervisor Dr Ben Thirkell-White, for his tremendous advice, mentorship, and academic support throughout my entire study at the Victoria University of Wellington. Dr Thirkell-White guided me with care, passion, motivation, enthusiasm, and immense knowledge.

I am grateful to my former colleagues at the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT): Allan Mukungu, Louis Gentile and Upasana Garoo, who nudged me into taking the bold step to apply for further studies and have steadfastly been there for me when called upon. My deep thanks to Linsell Richards at Victoria International for supervising my studies as an NZAID student, and Hemish Clayton to proofread this Thesis. I would further like to thank to my former lecturer and undergraduate supervisor at the University of Hawaii, USA, Dr James Dator, who has helped and advised me through the completion of this thesis. Similarly, thank you to all of my fellows in the Timorese student community in Wellington: Cidalio Leite, Horacio Bareto, Joao Vegas, Rofino, Leo, Rino, Kiki, Nela and Maria, who supported and accompanied me during difficult times to strive towards my goal.

A special thanks to my family, words cannot express how grateful I am to my mother and mother-in law, for all of the sacrifices that you have made on my behalf. Your prayers for me are what have sustained me thus far. At the end I would like express appreciation to a person that moved with me to New Zealand and lost her job because of it, my beloved wife Nur A. Noviani, who spent sleepless nights with me and was always my support in the moments when there was no one to answer my queries. Without her support and encouragements I could not have finished this work.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>ABSTRACT .....</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>TABLE OF CONTENTS .....</b>	<b>iv</b>
<b>ACRONYMS.....</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<i>Methodology .....</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>Literature Review .....</i>	<i>7</i>
<i>Chapter Overview .....</i>	<i>12</i>
<b>CHAPTER ONE: Overview of Educational Aid in Timor-Leste .....</b>	<b>14</b>
<i>The Impact of Educational Aid.....</i>	<i>17</i>
<i>Why is Educational Aid Not Working? .....</i>	<i>20</i>
<b>CHAPTER TWO: Portuguese Educational Aid to Timor-Leste.....</b>	<b>27</b>
<i>Overview of Portuguese Foreign Policy.....</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>Bilateral Cooperation Agreements.....</i>	<i>29</i>
<i>Portuguese Educational Aid to Timor-Leste.....</i>	<i>30</i>
<i>The Disadvantages of Portuguese in Timor-Leste.....</i>	<i>41</i>
<i>Conclusion.....</i>	<i>47</i>
<b>CHAPTER THREE: Australian Educational Aid to Timor-Leste.....</b>	<b>52</b>
<i>Overview of Australian Foreign Policy to Timor-Leste.....</i>	<i>52</i>
<i>Educational Aid .....</i>	<i>55</i>
<i>Tertiary Education and Vocational Training .....</i>	<i>60</i>
<i>Language Competition.....</i>	<i>61</i>
<i>Assessing Australian Aid.....</i>	<i>62</i>
<i>Conclusion.....</i>	<i>66</i>
<b>CHAPTER FOUR: Conclusion.....</b>	<b>69</b>
<i>Potential Ways Forward .....</i>	<i>74</i>
<i>Is there anything Timor-Leste could do to gain more control?.....</i>	<i>74</i>
<i>Does Timor-Leste have enough money from its oil and gas revenue to fund its education?.....</i>	<i>76</i>
<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>78</b>

## ACRONYMS

AID	Assistance for International Development
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATP	Aid Transparency Portal
AUSAID	Australian Agency for International Development
CATTL	Commissário para o Apoio á Transição Em Timor-Leste (Commissioner to Support the Transition in Timor-Leste)
CPLP	Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries).
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DIS	Dili International School
DP	Development Partner
EFA	Education For All
ETAN	East Timor and Indonesia Action Network
EU	European Union
FTM	Forum Tau Matan
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INFCP	Instituto Para Formacao Continuada Portuguese (Institute for Continuation of Portuguese Education)
INL	Instituto Nacional de Linguistica (National Institute of Linguistics)
IPAD	Instituto Portuguese de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento (Portuguese Institute for Development Support)
MFAC	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoF	Ministry of Finance
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NP	National Priority
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ODA	Official Development Aid
PALOP	Países Africanos de Lingua Official Portuguesa (Portuguese-speaking African countries)

PNG	Papua New Guinea
PROFEP	Formação de Professores em Exercício Na Escola Primária em Timor-Leste (Teacher Training in Exercise Primary School in Timor-Leste).
RDTL	República Democrática de Timor Leste (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste)
SDP	Strategic Development Plan
TFET	Trust Fund for East Timor
TLDPM	Timor-Leste Development Partner Meeting
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTL	Universidade Nacional de Timor-Leste (National University of Timor-Leste)
UPE	Universal Primary Education
USD	US Dollars
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

## INTRODUCTION

In the past couple of decades there has been a proliferation of literature aimed at highlighting the problems intrinsic in donor practices. Partially in response to this, in recent years donor countries have put considerably more emphasis on educational aid in their official development assistance programmes (Shah & Quinn, 2014; Winthrop & Matsui, 2013; Cassity, 2011; Benavot, 2010; Browne, 2006; & Tilak, 1988)<sup>1</sup>. Timor-Leste, a relatively young country which gained its independence in 2002, has become a primary target for donor countries to deliver aid. Prior to its full independence, Timor-Leste was governed by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) for two and half years from October 1999 to May 2002. During this time, Timor-Leste was fully assisted by the United Nations. However, after gaining its full independence, the new government of Timor-Leste desperately needed support. A helping hand from the international community throughout the first five years was an urgent requirement. Building a democratic nation-state from scratch is a challenging exercise, even given the most ideal circumstances. Consequently, there has been much international aid flowing into the country, primarily from Australia and Portugal who are both comparatively well developed and are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Since then, Australia and Portugal have been the two largest foreign aid providers to Timor-Leste, particularly in educational aid.

---

<sup>1</sup> Shah, R., & Quinn, M. (2014). *Mind the gap: global quality norms, national policy interpretations and local praxis in Timor-Leste*. *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and Development*. doi:10.1080/03057925.2014.952930; Winthrop, R. & Matsui, E. (2013). *A New Agenda for Education in Fragile States*. Working Paper 10. Center for Universal Education; Cassity, E. (2011). *Australia Aid and the Development of Education Policy: Reframing Engagement in Papua New Guinea*. In W. & Jacob, Policy Debates in Comparative, International, and Development Education. Palgrave Macmillan; Benavot, A. (2010). *International Aid to Education*. *Comparative Education Review*, 54(1), 105-124; Browne, S. (2006). *Aid and Influence: do donors help or hinder?* Routledge; & Tilak, J. (1988). *Foreign Aif for Education*. *International Review for Education*, 34(3), 313-335.

From the beginning Australia and Portugal have been competing with each other providing aid to Timor-Leste. Educational aid has focused on primary schooling including teacher training, constructing and rehabilitating school buildings, and technical and vocational education. In 2013, Official Development Aid (ODA) from Timor-Leste's development partners was 230.9mUSD. Of this amount, Australia was the largest provider, contributing 31%, followed by Portugal which provided 10%. The overall average of ODA contributions to Timor-Leste has been approximately 200mUSD per annum since Timor-Leste's independence. The education sector was among the major recipients of total ODA, receiving 15% of the total (Ministerio Finanzas, 2014)<sup>2</sup>.

In recent years Australia and Portugal have both increased and expanded their levels of educational aid to tertiary studies in Timor-Leste. Australia established English studies at the National University of Timor-Leste (UNTL). Similarly, Portugal, through its Institute Camoes, established Portuguese studies at the UNTL. Australia and Portugal's competitive practices have made significant changes to the Timor-Leste's educational system. Both of these countries have different cultural, historical, and political links and models to Timor-Leste which make it difficult to predict the end result of their efforts. In addition, Australia and Portugal have no agreed education development plan between themselves and the government of Timor-Leste (Pires, 2014 & Shah, 2012)<sup>3</sup>. This less than harmonious relationship is believed to have impacted negatively on the quality of education in Timor-Leste. Recent literature on development assistance has suggested that at times aid can actually be detrimental to a country's growth if it is not given for the right reasons or invested in the right places,

---

<sup>2</sup> Ministerio Finanzas. (2014). *Development Report 2013*. Dili, Ministerio Finanzas Timor-Leste.

<sup>3</sup> Pires, A. (2014). *Interview with the Author conducted in Timor-Leste on Educational Aid by Australia and Portugal to Timor-Leste*. (N. Correia De Almeida, Interviewer) Dili, Timor-Leste; & Shah, R. (2012). *It Takes Two or More to Tango: Partnership Within the Education Sector in Timor-Leste*. *International Education Journal: Comparative Perspectives*, 10(2), 71-85.



potentially causing growth to stagnate and cause divisions within a country (King, 1992)<sup>4</sup>. While Timor-Leste must be wary of this, the competitive nature of its largest donors has even further implications for the country. Thus, this thesis looks at how the educational aid provided by Portugal and Australia shapes educational policy emerging in Timor-Leste.

Australia and Portugal have been the biggest donors for Timor-Leste since 1999 and educational aid is given as part of their ODA. Education is important in helping citizens to create and better their futures and can bring major benefits to a society, not only through higher employment opportunities and income but also enhanced skills, improved social status and access to networks. Asiedu & Nandwa (2007)<sup>5</sup> studied the impact of foreign aid in education on growth in 90 developing countries. They discovered that aid given in primary education has boosted growth in low-income countries due to the fact that educational aid is often given in the form of grants. Although educational aid in Timor-Leste is given in the form of grants and the economic growth in the country, according to international standards, is good, that growth is not improving the lives of the poor and middle classes as expected. The current World Bank's world development indicators reported that 49.9% of Timor-Leste's population is still living under the poverty line (The World Bank, 2015)<sup>6</sup>, and that the country is not only one of the poorest countries in the Southeast Asia region but the whole world. Thus, where exactly the assistance provided by Australia and Portugal takes effect in Timor-Leste must be investigated.

In order to respond to the above concerns, it is important to assess studies

---

<sup>4</sup> King, K. (1992). *The External Agenda of Aid in Internal Educational Reform*. *International Journal of Education Development*, 12(4), 257-263.

<sup>5</sup> Asiedu, E & Nandwa, B. (2007). *On the Impact of Foreign Aid in Education on Growth: How Relevant is the Heterogeneity of Aid Flows and the Heterogeneity of Aid Recipients? Review of the World Economics*, 143(4), 631-649.

<sup>6</sup> The World Bank. (n.d.). *Timor-Leste: World Development Indicators*. Retrieved February 15, 2015, from The World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/country/timor-leste>.

on foreign aid or development aid in general and particularly how it affects both donors and recipients. In various studies, Shah & Quinn, (2014)<sup>7</sup>, Shah (2012)<sup>8</sup>, Riddell (2007)<sup>9</sup>, Lancaster (2007)<sup>10</sup>, Hudson (2004)<sup>11</sup>; and King (1992)<sup>12</sup> for example, among others, have argued that aid practices matter because on the one hand some donor countries want recipients to reform their internal sectors based on donor wishes. On the other hand, some indicators suggested that ODA has contributed to the recipient countries' development progress through imparting skills and providing for improvement and development in physical infrastructure and health and education sectors (Riddell, 2012<sup>13</sup> & Riddell, 2007<sup>14</sup>). In fact, education in Timor-Leste is still facing challenges. If one can assume that both Australia and Portugal have their own agenda in delivering educational aid, then what are the effects of this on Timor-Leste? Is Timor-Leste's quality of education really improving? To whose standards is education being delivered and is this congruent to Timor-Leste's culture and context? These questions are important because how aid is delivered greatly affects whether or not it improves or hinders a country's growth. This thesis seeks to replicate existing studies by King (1992)<sup>15</sup> and others to analyse how Australia and Portugal's educational aid influences policy-making in Timor-Leste.

---

<sup>7</sup> Shah, R., & Quinn, M. (2014). *Mind the gap: global quality norms, national policy interpretations and local praxis in Timor-Leste. Compare: A Journal of Comparative and. doi:10.1080/03057925.2014.952930.*

<sup>8</sup> Shah, R. (2012).

<sup>9</sup> Riddell, R. (2007). *Does Foreign Aid Really Work? . Oxford University Press.*

<sup>10</sup> Lancaster, C. (2007). *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics. University of Chicago Press.*

<sup>11</sup> Hudson, J. (2004). *Introduction: Aid and Development . The Economic Journal, 114(496), F185-F190.*

<sup>12</sup> King, K. (1992).

<sup>13</sup> Riddell, A. (2012). *The Effectiveness of Foreign Aid to Education: What Can be Learned? WIDER Working Paper.*

<sup>14</sup> Riddell, R. (2007).

<sup>15</sup> King, K. (1992).

## Methodology

The choice of this research topic arises out of the author's observations of the rebuilding of Timor-Leste as a new nation since its independence from occupying Indonesia. Timor-Leste is a relatively new country with weak economic capacity and institutions. Therefore it needs high levels of aid in order to help rebuild and develop from scratch. In addition, there is currently little research looking at Australian and Portuguese educational aid to Timor-Leste. Previous studies which have addressed aid flows in the country have often been too narrow in their scope, written for specific policy purposes and failing to give a comprehensive analysis of all issues at hand. Thus, Timor-Leste is a traditional example of a post-conflict, fragile state attempting to rapidly restore its shattered education system. However, once donor interest wanes this young nation will struggle to properly deliver services. This thesis seeks to close this gap by undertaking a more in-depth and comprehensive analysis of the impacts of Australia and Portugal's educational assistance to Timor-Leste education policy.

This research uses primary and secondary data sources as a legal basis. The primary data derives from semi-structured interviews with several policy makers and national stakeholders in Timor-Leste including the Ministry of Education (MoE) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MFAC). In addition, the author had also attended Timor-Leste's Development Partners Meeting (TLDPM) in Dili<sup>16</sup>, Timor-Leste on 25-26 July 2014. The interviews were also conducted with International donor partners including the Portuguese and Australian Embassies in Dili. The secondary data is derived from reviewing various literature on aid, educational aid and neo-colonialism, and examining various government document reports and surveys related to aid and educational aid to Timor-Leste. Generally, the author has attempted to develop the limited amount of secondary data literature available to complete this research.

---

<sup>16</sup> *Dili is the capital city of Timor-Leste.*

Secondary literature was used to form an impression of the context and the historical overview of educational aid to Timor-Leste, particularly to gain more understanding into Australian and Portuguese educational aid to Timor-Leste. Broader secondary literature on educational aid to other countries, such as African and Pacific Island nations, was also consulted as comparison. Finally, during an interview with Antoninho Pires – the current General Director of the Ministry of Education of Timor-Leste – an important book, *As Bases Legais Do Sistema Da Educação De Timor-Leste* (*Legal Basis for Education System in Timor-Leste*) was obtained and permitted to be used. During an interview with Vanessa Spencer, Cooperation Officer of the Portuguese Embassy in Dili, another important document, “Strategic Programmes on Cooperation between Portugal and Timor-Leste 2014-2017” was obtained and permission granted for its use in this thesis.

Interviews were conducted with four different groups of people including national stakeholders and donor partners in Timor-Leste. They were Antoninho Pires from the MoE, and Armindo Pedro Simoes, the National Director of Multilateral Cooperation at the MFAC. Additionally, two officials from the aid agencies that are the focus of this research were also interviewed; these were Debbie Wong, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) of Australia at the Australian Embassy in Dili and Vanessa Spencer of the Portuguese Embassy. Also, the Head of Dili International School (DIS) was interviewed, and, as background, some NGO workers involved in education policy. The information gathered from the interviews was used as background information given the limited amount of literature available. Questions were asked to each participant based on the area of their expertise. These interviews attempted to cover educational aid to Timor-Leste and how it affects the education policy of Timor-Leste.

## Literature Review

In recent years there has been an immense expansion on aid literature written by advocates, critics, practitioners and academics alike who seek to critique and improve on development practices. What exactly is development aid or foreign aid, as we know it today? The OECD, for example, argues foreign aid is “the transfer of capital, goods, or services from one country to another. Foreign aid may be given in the form of capital transfers or technical assistance and training for either civilian or military purposes” (OECD, n.d)<sup>17</sup>. In addition, Lancaster (2007)<sup>18</sup> defined foreign aid as “a gift of public resources from one country to another... with purpose to improve human condition in the countries receiving the aid” (p.1). Moreover, Riddell (2007)<sup>19</sup> in his book *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?* broadly explained that foreign aid “consists of all resources – physical goods, skills and technical know-how, financial grants (gifts), or loans (concessional rates) – transferred by donors to recipients” (p.17). Riddell acknowledged that the above definition has not satisfied the whole world, because a lot of questions need to be answered. For example, Riddell referred to development assistance or development aid to describe foreign aid.

Donors have made specific commitments, such as those contained in the ‘Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness’, to ensure that development assistance is offered with no strings attached and strongly informed by the real desires and assessed needs of the intended beneficiary states and their citizens (OECD, 2005)<sup>20</sup>. Timor-Leste, a post conflict country, has been a

---

<sup>17</sup> OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation Development. (n.d.). *Official Development Assistance – Definition and Coverage*. Retrieved February 10, 2015, from OECD Home: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistance/definitionandcoverage.htm>.

<sup>18</sup> Lancaster, C. (2007).

<sup>19</sup> Riddell, R. (2007).

<sup>20</sup> OECD. (2005). *The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*. OECD.

strong advocate for the Paris Declaration. However, Browne (2006)<sup>21</sup> claimed that aid providers influence recipient countries based on donors' demands. Browne examined the policies of the IMF and World Bank and how these changed over time. Brown found that there were several instances of bilateral donors providing aid, but with particular constraints on recipient countries based on their specific agendas and interests of the donors. Such findings can be dated back to Little & Clifford (1966)<sup>22</sup> who argued that foreign aid increases rather than reduces poverty in developing countries primarily benefitting the political elites of the recipients and the donors' interests rather than the people. Furthermore, donor countries have implemented their aid programmes in such a way that they maximise the economic benefits of their own states and citizens.

King (1992)<sup>23</sup> specifically analyses educational aid practices in primarily Sub-Saharan African countries and found out that most donor countries want recipient countries to reform their internal education sectors based on their own wishes. Donor countries potentially attempt to reform recipient countries in their image to justify their expenditure. King further claimed that aid programmes implemented in the Sub-Saharan African region have often failed to meet the goals recipient countries wanted and as a result the positive impact of educational aid has been minimal. Therefore, King suggested that the implementation of educational aid should be sustainable, locally owned and executed, as well as supportive of good policies in not only the education sector but all sectors of recipient countries. In reality, King (1992)<sup>24</sup> confirmed that donor aid providers disregarded this best practice. Donors wanted the developing countries to support their projects, not to impose their national policy into their programmes. In addition, educational aid providers often concerned with time pursued a target deadline at the expense of quality. It can also be argued that donor aid

---

<sup>21</sup> Browne, S. (2006). *Aid and Influence: do donors help or hinder?* Routledge.

<sup>22</sup> Little, I.M.D., & Clifford, J.M. (1966). *International Aid. The Flow of Public Resources From Rich to Poor Countries*. New Jersey, USA: Transaction Publishers.

<sup>23</sup> King, K. (1992).

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid*

providers do not genuinely provide capacity building as expected. King (1992)<sup>25</sup> recommended that in order for education to be effective and successful, educational aid providers should be concerned and in line with national policy about the priorities of recipient countries. Most importantly King argued that education policy needed to be locally-owned from the planning phase to the implementation of projects to ensure its congruence and maximum impact.

Closer to Timor-Leste, Le Fanu (2013)<sup>26</sup> in his research on international education aid in Papua New Guinea (PNG) indicated that the PNG curriculum has been designed by various influences, most especially Western educational ideology particularly Australian and American's system. This was partly because PNG's education policy was designed by technical assistants provided by the international development community. Le Fanu pointed out that foreign countries tried to use PNG as an experimental state. International consultants wrote proposals and hypotheses, which PNG, trusting their expertise, would buy. This was perhaps as Altbach (1971)<sup>27</sup> indicated in his note that modern neocolonialism in developing countries has not involved direct political control from the dominant countries. However, a few aspects of mastership are still maintained by developed nations over their former colonies. Mostly developing countries' education systems in almost all levels are deeply-rooted in the administrative structures of the former colonial rulers. Moreover, these countries tend to use their former colonial language as the medium of instruction in their education systems and administration services. Therefore, the former colonial powers provide foreign aid and technical assistance in helping design curriculums, or else provide physical facilities and other educational materials, which are not necessarily in line

---

<sup>25</sup> King, K. (1992).

<sup>26</sup> Le Fanu, G. (2013). *The Inclusion of Inclusive Education in International Development: Lessons from Papua New Guinea*. *International Journal of Educational Development*, 33(2), 139-148.

<sup>27</sup> Altbach, P. (1971). *Educational and Neocolonialism: A Note*. *Comparative Education Review*, 15(2), 237-239. doi:10.2307/1186733.

with what might be best for the country at hand. Hence, Altbach (1971)<sup>28</sup> argued that “neocolonialism is to designate the continued post-colonial impact of the advanced industrial countries on the educational systems and policies as well as the intellectual life of developing areas” (p.237)<sup>29</sup>.

Furthermore, a study by Brock-Utne (1995)<sup>30</sup> for example, revealed that in the early 1960s, when most of the African states gained their independence from their European colonial masters, the African leaders initiated a gathering to establish a good, communal education system for their newly-formed African nations. Even though the discussion took place on the African continent, Brock-Utne noted, the conference still resulted in the African education system being constructed in line with the Western educational style. This was due to a lack in African leaders and policy-makers in expertise on education policy approaches. Hence, the Africans did not benefit much from the Europeans’ assistance. Dating back to the late 1980s, an African origin writer, Thiong’o (1986)<sup>31</sup>, in his book, *Decolonizing the Mind*, pointed out that although the conquest or colonization physically has ended, the colonization of the mind, spirit, and culture are still ongoing. The colonization of the mind is the main weapon of Western nations to ensure other nations, especially those in the third world, remain subject to the colonizing powers, manifested in another form. The modern neo-colonialism is embedded in various fields, including in the education system. The modern colonisation in the field of the mind and spirit has been introduced in the process of education.

Timor-Leste is a post-colonial country and gets relatively high levels of development aid, but from whom, for what and why? The long struggle for independence from Indonesian occupation and the previous Portuguese

---

<sup>28</sup> Altbach, P. (1971).

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> Brock-Utne, B. (1995). *Cultural Conditionality and Aid to Education in East Africa. International Review of Education*, 41(3-4), 177-197.

<sup>31</sup> Thiong’O, N. W. (1986). *Decolonizing the Mind: the Politics of Language in African Literature*. London: James Currey.



colonization destroyed the fabric of the country and governance institutions. The suppression of citizens has produced a post-conflict state where a lot needs to be done in terms of nation-building to bring it to a modern functional level. This condition has attracted the attention of Australia and Portugal, both keen to help alleviate the suffering of the population of Timor-Leste in the form of foreign aid. Australia and Portugal are the two biggest donors but both have quite different historical relationships with Timor-Leste which could further impact their foreign aid policy in the country.

The study of educational aid practices are important as demonstrated by Le Fanu (2013)<sup>32</sup>, Shah (2012)<sup>33</sup>, Anderson (2010)<sup>34</sup>, Asiedu & Nandwa (2007)<sup>35</sup>, The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin (2002, 2007)<sup>36</sup>, King (1992)<sup>37</sup>, Thiong'o (1986)<sup>38</sup>; Altbach (1971)<sup>39</sup>, & Little & Clifford (1966)<sup>40</sup> who have all argued that educational aid can cause more problems for a country than it resolves. These ideas on educational aid and in relation to Timor-Leste's context raise a number of questions. To address these issues and potential problems, this research seeks to analyse how donor influence shapes the educational policy recently emerging in Timor-Leste. I am not suggesting that all the problems with Timor-Leste's education sector are due to donor influences. There are of course also issues with the quality of the Timor-Leste's governmental public sector, including corruption. However, the focus of this study is the politics of relationships with donors. This analysis is based on the above literature review and other data and surveys.

---

<sup>32</sup> Le Fanu, G. (2013).

<sup>33</sup> Shah, R. (2012).

<sup>34</sup> Anderson, T. (2010). *Timor-Leste: the second Australian intervention*. *Journal of Australian political economy*, 58(December), 62-93.

<sup>35</sup> Asiedu, E & Nandwa, B. (2007).

<sup>36</sup> The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin. (2002). *Analyzing Australian Assistance to East Timor*. Dili, Timor-Leste: The Lao Hamutuk; The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin. (2007). *Australia Aid Should Support Timor-Leste Not Australia's Political Interests*.

<sup>37</sup> King, K. (1992).

<sup>38</sup> Thiong'o, N.W. (1986).

<sup>39</sup> Altbach, P. (1971).

<sup>40</sup> Little, I.M.D., & Clifford, J.M. (1966).

## **Chapter Overview**

This thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter provides an overview of educational aid in Timor-Leste. As a new and young country Timor-Leste is seeking to guarantee its citizens a decent education, after liberation from a long period of colonization and a short time of illegal occupation. These countless challenges forced the country's leaders to look for help from external donors. This chapter examines the impact of these external donors' policies on the education system in Timor-Leste, especially educational aid from Australia and Portugal. Educational aid is part of the ODA, and Australia and Portugal have been the key contributors to education sector in Timor-Leste. Prior to 2006, Timor-Leste's educational sector heavily relied on external donors. This might explain why educational aid from external donors is not working in Timor-Leste. Also, it focuses on the donor interests and agendas and considers the lack of coordination that leads to a lack of improvement in the quality of education in Timor-Leste. Educational aid is always political and it is difficult for recipients that are small dependent nations like Timor-Leste to negotiate with donors.

The second chapter discusses Portuguese educational aid and the politics of the Portuguese language in Timor-Leste. It starts with an overview of Portuguese foreign policy to Timor-Leste. Portuguese foreign policy is designed to promote and protect the Portuguese language and culture throughout the world including Timor-Leste. It presents a number of bilateral cooperation agreements signed by both governments. This chapter mainly examines the reasons that Timor-Leste chose Portuguese as one of its official languages, and why some people disagreed with the language policy. It further explains the advantages and disadvantages in adopting Portuguese language among Timor-Leste's official languages. It underscores that Timor-Leste is in desperate need of the amount of Portuguese aid provided. Thus, Portuguese aid plays an important role in

influencing the Timorese political elites by pushing its agenda towards Portuguese language.

Chapter three discusses the Australian educational aid to Timor-Leste. It starts with the explanation of Australia's foreign policy to Timor-Leste. The chapter further emphasises Australian aid to Timor-Leste focused on humanitarian and development assistance, however, like other donor countries its foreign policy interest is also applied. Australian aid aims for political stability and to promote Australia's oil interests in Timor-Leste. The Australian aid relationship with Timor-Leste is designed to maintain and secure Australian interest. In short, Australian aid involvement in education is clearly designed to encourage Timorese government officials to look at Australia as a friend. In other words, Australia has spent a lot of money in Timor-Leste to buy friendship with Timorese to secure its national interests.

Finally, this research will provide some concluding remarks and underline potential ways forward for the government of Timor-Leste in controlling and reducing its dependency on foreign educational aid. The concluding chapter discusses findings on how Australia and Portugal have been involved in educational assistance in the form of money and technical assistances. Several problems are identified, but mainly discussion focuses on whether technical assistance is appropriate and the political disagreement between the two big donors. In short, no donors are trustworthy, but Timor-Leste needs assistance. If Timor-Leste's human resources are improved, the government can have confidence that it will not depend on donors in the future. The government is working to control and coordinate the donor partners through several means, such as TLDPM, SDP 2011-2030, and the internal policy of the MoE to ensure aid has a more positive impact in line with national priorities.

## CHAPTER ONE: Overview of Educational Aid in Timor-Leste

Every citizen has an equal right to receive a proper education. This statement is well known globally and all governments around the world have been driven to accomplish it. The initiating notion of the Education for All (EFA) and Universal Primary Education (UPE) was welcomed by those in international development aid as a directive to facilitate the access of students all over the world, particularly in poor countries, to education (World Bank, 2014; D'Aiglepierre & Wagner, 2013; Turrent & Oketch, 2009)<sup>41</sup>. Furthermore D'Aiglepierre & Wagner (2013)<sup>42</sup> noted that the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) related to education, particularly the goal of achieving universal primary education, ought to be considered as a main priority for an international community keen to provide educational aid to developing countries. As a young country Timor-Leste has taken the right to universal education into consideration and guarantees its citizens a decent education. The seriousness with which the government takes this goal is embedded in the state's constitution. Under article 59 of the Constitution of Timor-Leste "the state shall recognise and guarantee that every citizen has the right to education... and vocational training" (Assembly Constituent, 2002. pp.27-28)<sup>43</sup>. It is argued that the government was given authority by the constitution to establish a universal basic public education as compulsory and free of charge. The article contains provisions to the rights of the Timorese to a quality education. In order to enforce the law, in recent years, the government has introduced regulations to the education sector including a Basic Law on Education, promulgated in 2008, and an Organic Law of the Ministry of Education. These laws and policies

---

<sup>41</sup> World Bank. (2014). *Education. Retrieved from Education For All:*

<http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/education/brief/education-for-all>;

D'Aiglepierre, R., & Wagner, L. (2013). *Aid and universal primary education. Economics of Education Review*, 37, 95-112; & Turrent, V., & Oketch, M. (2009). *Financing Universal Primary Education: An Analysis of Official Development Assistance in Fragile States. International Journal of Educational Development*, 29(4), 357-365.

<sup>42</sup> D'Aiglepierre, R., & Wagner, L. (2013).

<sup>43</sup> Assembly Constituent. (2002). *Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. Dili: Assembly Constituent.*

provide for a regulatory framework of the education system in Timor-Leste (Ministerio Da Educacao, 2012)<sup>44</sup>. These regulations are good on paper, but putting them into practice is another question. One of the biggest challenges faced by Timor-Leste, post-2002 independence, was how and where to source the funds necessary to finance the country's education development.

Post-conflict situations are well recognised to be periods when countries encounter significant challenges on the path to development. Since independence, human resource development in Timor-Leste has been slow, far from meeting most of the millennium goals targets. Timor-Leste now suffers from a narrow economic and private-sector base, infrastructure deficit, frequent food insecurity, and poor quality education. Thus, it needs the public sector to lead in building institutions, establishing relevant legal frameworks, and building service delivery mechanisms to ensure the development of its human resources and citizenry generally. Furthermore, during occupation, life was tough and the quality of education was poor as Timorese attention was often divided between wider national issues and attendance to the substandard education provided by the occupiers. Social and governance structures in the country were destroyed and hence failed to exercise control over the people, and skilled and knowledgeable people disappeared either involuntarily or through the brain drain of the country. Those concerns need to be addressed. Subsequently, at the declaration of independence, the Timorese responded to the call to start rebuilding the nation and participated in the efforts of the first UNTAET, (Shah & Quinn, 2014; Shah, 2012; & Manor, 2007)<sup>45</sup>. Throughout the UN transition from October 1999 to May 2002, the education sector in Timor-Leste was completely facilitated and supported by international donors, especially Australia and Portugal, which continued even after independence in 2002 to late 2006. For example, in early 2000, the UN had tried to save the

---

<sup>44</sup> *Ministerio Da Educacao. (2012). As Bases Legais Do Sistema Da Educacao De Timor-Leste. Dili, Timor-Leste: Ministerio Da Educacao, Timor-Leste.*

<sup>45</sup> *Shah, R., & Quinn, M. (2014); Shah, R. (2012); & Manor, J. (2007).*

education sector in Timor-Leste by recruiting a few elementary school teachers although arguably these measures ultimately failed (Shah, 2012)<sup>46</sup>.

Antoninho Pires, the current General Director of the MoE, throughout his interview in Timor-Leste, opined that from the period of 1999 to 2006 donor countries that provided educational aid to Timor-Leste were working on their own. The government was often not informed by donors until the projects were completed. As a result it was hard to control their activities and financial support prior to 2010. It was partly because of the establishment of the new government that all institutions started from scratch, hence, the lack of human resources, particularly in respect of inexperienced officials and civil servants in the education sector (Pires, 2014)<sup>47</sup>. In addition, at the time of Timor-Leste's independence, most schools had been destroyed and there was also a lack of primary school teachers. When Timor-Leste succeeded in separating from Indonesia in September 1999, the Indonesian military and its militias carried out mass destruction and mass murder throughout the whole country. It resulted in the massive devastation of infrastructure, and paralyzed all government institutions. There were immediate challenges in reconstructing essential infrastructure, to ensure children could get to a school, along with the recruitment and training of teachers and other education professionals. While this situation derived from being a newly independent state, Timor-Leste desperately needed the help of the international community. Eventually, a significant amount of international assistance flowed into the country. Australia and Portugal acted immediately in responding to the Timor-Leste's distress by providing aid. Since then, Australia and Portugal, with Japan, have been the largest providers of aid to Timor-Leste.

---

<sup>46</sup> Shah, R. (2012).

<sup>47</sup> Pires, A. (2014). Interview.

Numerous research, reports and government documents conducted by the donor countries, researchers, and international and national NGOs, stressed that aid for education to Timor-Leste to date has encompassed a large expenditure of funds (Australian Government, DFAT, 2015; Anderson, 2010; Deutsch, 2009, & The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin, 2002)<sup>48</sup>. On one hand, government officials of Timor-Leste, donor partners and a few individuals have recognised that the ODA, especially educational aid to Timor-Leste, has brought a positive impact and played a significant change in Timor-Leste's education sector. For example, educational aid has been used to rehabilitate school buildings, provide facilities and expertise, and design curricula for primary schools. On the other hand, these reports and findings highlight concerns that the quality of education in Timor-Leste, since its independence, have not met the expected standards. What is actually wrong? Are the causes to be found with the government of Timor-Leste or with the donor countries? The following sections explain what is essentially happening with educational aid in Timor-Leste.

### **The Impact of Educational Aid**

Educational aid is part of the ODA to Timor-Leste, and the ODA has played a significant role in the development of Timor-Leste from the time of independence, especially to the education sector. The education system of Timor-Leste has developed, both in terms of the curriculum for basic education and infrastructure. Hence, the government has been working hard to develop national prosperity and guarantees all its citizens the right to education, with the help of donor partners. As a result, Timor-Leste has

---

<sup>48</sup> Australian Government-DFAT (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade). (2015). *Aid: Development Assistance in Timor-Leste*. Retrieved from <http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/timor-leste/development-assistance/Pages/education-assistance-timor-leste.aspx>; Anderson, T. (2010); Deutsch, A. (2009). *Billions in International Aid for East Timor Missing its Target*. Retrieved from Los Angeles Times: <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/sep/13/news/adfg-east-timor-money1>; & The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin. (2002).

received over a billion dollars in ODA (Ministeriu Finansas 2014)<sup>49</sup>. The average annual amount of ODA funding to Timor-Leste has remained more than 200mUSD per annum in recent years. In the past five years ODA alone has accounted for nearly 15% of the total state budget. The MoE receives 6.8% of the overall off-budget grant of the total ODA. More specifically, the MoE obtained 12.6mUSD in 2014 in off-budget grants of the ODA from different Donor Partners (DP) (MoF, 2014)<sup>50</sup>. These funds support a variety of initiatives including scholarships, primary and secondary education and capacity building. The total amount of educational aid received from DPs between 2011 and 2014 was more than 227mUSD (MoF, 2014b)<sup>51</sup>. The Ministry of Finance (MoF) has created an Aid Transparency Portal (ATP)<sup>52</sup> in collaboration with DPs to trace donors' support to Timor-Leste. However, the portal is in the process of capturing historical information prior to 2010, thus disbursement data may be larger than current commitment data. Pires (2014)<sup>53</sup> and Nicolai, (2004)<sup>54</sup> claimed that the budget for Timor-Leste's education, post-referendum from 1999 to 2002 and after independence from 2002 to 2006, relied heavily on external funds. Pires (2014)<sup>55</sup> admitted that there is currently not enough data to be used as a complete source of reference.

The Portuguese and Australian contributions were in the form of constructing school buildings and facilities, and providing teachers, curriculum designers and other educator expertise. It is undeniable that

---

<sup>49</sup> *Ministerio Finansas. (2014).*

<sup>50</sup> *MoF (Ministry of Finance). (2014). State Budget 2014, Development Partners: Book 5. Dili: Ministry of Finance, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste.*

<sup>51</sup> *MoF (Ministry of Finance). (2014b). Aid Portal Transparency. Retrieved from [www.aidtransparency.gov.tl](http://www.aidtransparency.gov.tl).*

<sup>52</sup> *The government of Timor-Leste created ATP to oversee aid management and coordination. The introduction of the ATP, which is the central repository for all aid information in Timor-Leste, aims in a transparent way to improve accuracy and predictability in aid reporting and to ensure assistance provided is efficient and effective. Development Partners are responsible for providing all data directly into the Aid Transparency Portal system.*

<sup>53</sup> *Pires, A. (2014). Interview.*

<sup>54</sup> *Nicolai, S. (2004). Rebuilding Timor-Leste's Education System. International Institute for Education.*

<sup>55</sup> *Pires, A. (2014). Interview.*



since the independence of Timor-Leste, the development in the education sector has gradually started to improve with the support of a number of donor development partners. Timor-Leste currently receives educational aid from the five largest donors: DFAT-Australia Aid Programme (formerly AUSAID), Portugal-Camoes Instituto Da Cooperacao E Da Lingua (formerly IPAD), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank, and Korean Institutional Cooperation Agency (MoF, 2014)<sup>56</sup>.

In order to oversee aid management and coordination, the government of Timor-Leste established the Development Partnership Management Unit under the MoF. As a result, since December 2002, the government of Timor-Leste has been conducting annual meetings with all external DPs. The Timor-Leste Development Partner Meeting (TLDPM) is an annual conference attended by the Government of Timor-Leste and DPs operating in Timor-Leste. The meeting has been considered by the government as an opportunity to review previous development successes and challenges, and consider ways to strengthen and align future development initiatives. The TLDPM draws strongly upon the belief enshrined in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness that the building of more effective and inclusive partnerships between government and development partners will have a greater impact on reducing poverty and, therefore, ensure a more positive future for the people of Timor-Leste. TLDPM has sought to highlight the significance of forging development partnerships among bilateral and multilateral donors and other key development stakeholders, including civil society, operating in the country.

The government of Timor-Leste acknowledged that educational assistance from external donors has been used and helped the development of

---

<sup>56</sup> *MoF (Ministry of Finance). (2014).*

education in Timor-Leste. Hundreds of primary and secondary school buildings have been built and equipped with materials and hundreds of Timorese have been recruited and trained to be Portuguese teachers, even though, the quality of these teachers is still poor (Shah, 2012)<sup>57</sup>. In fact, the results of the development itself have not satisfied the majority of Timorese people. Unsurprisingly therefore, in the long term, Timor-Leste's education outlook will be affected greatly by its relationship with its two biggest donors Australia and Portugal.

### **Why is Educational Aid Not Working?**

“Nothing is free”; perhaps this phrase should be understood by Timorese when receiving too much foreign aid from the beginning. The more money and aid Timor-Leste takes from Australia and Portugal, the more dependent on them Timor-Leste will be. This fact is not much different from what had been expressed by Sunkel's definition (1969. P.23, in Ferraro, 1996)<sup>58</sup> of dependency as “an explanation of the economic development of a state in terms of the external influences on political, economic, and cultural on the national development policies”. Ferraro (1996) further concluded in his *Dependency Theory: An Introduction* that the external forces included multinational corporations, international commodity markets, foreign assistance, communications, and any other means by which the advanced industrialised countries can represent their economic interest abroad” (p.2)<sup>59</sup>. In spite of the huge educational assistance by Australia and Portugal for more than a decade, the quality of education in Timor-Leste still does not meet acceptable standards (Timor-Leste NGO Forum, 2014; Shah, 2012; & Anderson, 2010)<sup>60</sup>. Educational aid particularly was not a major

---

<sup>57</sup> Shah, R. (2012).

<sup>58</sup> Ferraro, V. (1996). *Dependency Theory: An Introduction. The Development Economics Reader*, ed. Giorgio Secondi (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 58-64.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> Timor-Leste NGO Forum. (2014). *Presentation on Economic Strategic Sector. 2014 Timor-Leste and Development Partners Meeting. Dili: Timor-Leste NGO Forum Document obtained during the TLDPM; Shah, R. (2012); Anderson, T. (2010).*

discussion under the TLDPM held in Dili, July 2014. When the education sector was discussed, one of the biggest concerns from civil society and donor partners during the meeting was the continuation of poor quality education in Timor-Leste. The civil society representative and donor partners as well as the government recognised that continued poor education was due to a lack of coordination between donors and government and civil society. Moreover, the poor quality of education confirmed by numerous reports and research from national and international NGOs and individuals all found that the quality of education in Timor-Leste continued to be poor despite the large support of international donors.

Recent research conducted by Shah (2012)<sup>61</sup> analysed in depth the impacts and dynamics of such cooperation between and amongst the educational aid providers and the state and the civil societies of the basic education sector in Timor-Leste. In his research paper *It Takes Two or More to Tango: Partnerships within the Education Sector in Timor-Leste*, Shah found international donors' commitment to the significance of partnerships between donors and the state and civil society ineffective because donor providers failed to consider Timor-Leste as a fragile state with high levels of distrust between and amongst the donor providers, the state, civil society and the MoE. Furthermore, Shah also explained that the practices of uncontrolled aid flows became common and frequently occurred due to the inability and inexperience of state institutions. Shah (2012)<sup>62</sup> focused on the dynamics of such cooperation in Timor-Leste's basic education sector, particularly on how the state, donors and service providers that have evolved in their partnership arrangements provide in-service training to the large numbers of the country's primary school teachers, though under or

---

<sup>61</sup> Shah, R. (2012); Dr. Ritesh A. Shah is a Professor and Researcher at the University of Auckland, New Zealand. Dr. Shah spent approximately four years at the Ministry of Education of Timor-Leste as an advisor for designing the curriculum of the country. Dr. Shah's assessment based on his doctoral research focuses on documenting and analyzing Timorese primary teachers' strategic responses to reforms to the curriculum following the country's recent independence.

<sup>62</sup> Shah, R. (2012).

unqualified. Shah emphasised the tensions involved in moving towards coordinated activity in fragile states, particularly from the donor perspective.

In early 2000 in order to save and preserve the continuation of the learning process in Timor-Leste after separating from Indonesian occupation, Timor-Leste's transitional government recruited numbers of primary school teachers. In general, however, the majority of these teachers are not qualified to teach (Shah, 2012)<sup>63</sup>. Portugal was the most significant player in the realm of teacher training due to its "comparative language advantage" in meeting the demands of early governments to focus initial teacher training on the reintroduction of Portuguese into the classroom. Shah (2012)<sup>64</sup> assessed a series of reports on Timor-Leste's educational system in 2004 to 2005 and found that the 'access first, quality later' approach taken by UNTAET and the Timorese government, as well as donors, had led to a number of longer-term problems, in particular high student attrition rates, and poor student achievement. He reported that the Instituto Para Formação Continuada (INFCP) has been the main service provider of in-service training since 2004 within the MoE but the staff were mainly foreign technical advisors with no clear guidance and an inappropriate mandate. As a result, in 2008, Shah found from a number of donor reports that the in-service training provision was largely provided through donors such as Portugal, Brazil and UNICEF, alongside a number of smaller NGOs. In-service training provision thus became plagued by fragmentation, duplication of efforts, poor coordination, and poor systems of monitoring and accountability, leading to inefficient use of both teachers' time and the resources poured into such programmes. In his interview with senior officials from INFCP, Shah (2012)<sup>65</sup> found that training providers (donors) had their own agendas, while the lack of coordination and the lack of

---

<sup>63</sup> Shah, R. (2012).

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>65</sup> Shah, R. (2012).

sensitivity to Timorese cultures led to the programme's failure. The Portugal Cooperation representative has also admitted that "One day the teachers would be trained by Portugal, the next by another organization like UNICEF and the next day with PROFEP<sup>66</sup>, and the next with an NGO... there were just too many people sending different messages to these teachers" (p.76)<sup>67</sup>.

Shah (2012)<sup>68</sup> discovered that the IPAD – the previous Portuguese Cooperation (currently converted in Instituto de Camoes) – was acting as a donor as well as the state. This situation also applies to some NGOs and other donor providers such as UNICEF and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). For example in 2010, NRC implemented its Compact Teacher Training Programme to the primary teachers in 30 schools. In developing the pilot project, the NRC controlled all aspects of the project without involving any staff from the Ministry of Education. Shah finally claimed that educational aid from donors to Timor-Leste had failed due to a lack in coordination, and often time donors implemented their programmes based on what they wanted instead of what the government of Timor-Leste needed.

The previous fifth constitutional government of Timor-Leste, elected to power in 2012 and due to hold office until 2017, has firmly affirmed its policy towards international DPs. The government has learned from past experience that the role of government failure in coordinating education policy formulation and implementation led to the poor quality of education. The dramatic structural changes to be made in the sixth constitution of government and due to hold office from February 2015 to 2017, shows the

---

<sup>66</sup> PROFEB (Portuguese) stands for *Formação de Professores em Exercício na Escola Primária em Timor-Leste* (Teacher Training in Exercise Primary School in Timor-Leste). *Cooperation between Timor-Leste and Brazil*.

<sup>67</sup> Shah, R. (2012).

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

government of Timor-Leste's commitment to improving its internal affairs. It is mandatory for all foreign aid providers or DPs to deliver their aid through official government channels. For example, development aid related to education needs to be discussed and agreed by the MoE prior to the programmes' implementation. Hence, the government can easily control the effectiveness and efficiency of the aid as addressed clearly in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The government has begun to address these issues as part of its efforts to foster a consensus among donors on how to work more strategically on the integration between donor partners and the government. The TLDPM was created to respond to this. DPs need to comply with the national priorities of Timor-Leste and the Strategic Development Plan (SDP) 2011-2030. The SDP 2011-2030 is the overarching framework for the DPs' project and programmes design and implementation and re-affirms the alignment of their work with Timor-Leste's strategy plans and targets (Pires, 2014 & MoF, 2014)<sup>69</sup>.

The Paris Declaration commits donors and partners to being accountable to each other in the achievement of development results. Pires (2014)<sup>70</sup> described that in terms of financial support, Australia has been the largest donor to the education sector in Timor-Leste, while Portugal has been the largest donor to the education sector in Timor-Leste in terms of activities and other technical supports, for example, hundreds of Portuguese teachers have been deployed in Timor-Leste by the Portuguese government. From the period of 1999 to 2006, the Timor-Leste government did not control the education process, it was in the hands of donors. For example, the introduction of the Portuguese language to Timorese schools was managed by the Portuguese aid agency. Additionally, at the same time, Australia supported the rehabilitation of school buildings to facilitate the access of Timorese children to school. This was problematic for the new government who lacked the expertise to supervise or provide direction. Consequently the

---

<sup>69</sup> Pires, A. (2014); & MoF (*Ministry of Finance*). 2014).

<sup>70</sup> Pires, A. (2014).

donors who had helped in the early stages of independence were unable to be controlled by the government of Timor-Leste and results became hard to predict (Pires, 2014)<sup>71</sup>. The years from 2006 to 2008 were considered a transitional period. It was marked by a significant change in the ownership programme. The government of Timor-Leste started to support the education sector by contributing 30% with the other 70% provided by the DPs. And by the end of 2010, the government of Timor-Leste had managed to gain more control including the management of DPs' activity. The government has incorporated the big educational donors, Portugal and Australia, to support the education development. For example, even though Portuguese language is used as the language of instruction in schools, Australia still provides funds and expertise for curriculum design. It may indeed be the case that the government is controlling the DPs much better compared to a decade ago (Pires, 2014)<sup>72</sup>

Both Pires (2014)<sup>73</sup> & Shah (2012)<sup>74</sup> admitted that a lack of coordination between aid providers and government was the main cause of the poor quality of education in Timor-Leste. However, it could be argued that educational aid has always contained political power, and therefore drives the donor interests instead of the recipient interest. Australia and Portugal were not accidentally helping Timor-Leste because Timor-Leste needed it, nevertheless Australia and Portugal have been providing aid mostly due to their own political agendas and interests in Timor-Leste. It was due to the fact that Timor-Leste was in a weak position and desperately needed urgent help that Australia and Portugal had the opportunity and power to influence and shape policy in Timor-Leste including its language policy. Consequently, Timor-Leste would depend on Australia and Portugal's policy. This condition had been asserted by a Latin American dependency theorist, Dos Santos (1970) saying that "by dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the

---

<sup>71</sup> Pires, A. (2014). *Interview*.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>74</sup> Shah, R. (2012).

development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relationship of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and become self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development” (p.23)<sup>75</sup>

---

<sup>75</sup> *Dos Santos, T. (1970). The Structure of Dependence. American Economic Association, 231-236.*



## **CHAPTER TWO: Portuguese Educational Aid to Timor-Leste**

### **Overview of Portuguese Foreign Policy**

Portugal started delivering its educational aid to Timor-Leste immediately after the Timorese decided to separate themselves from the Indonesian occupation in 1999. As a new-born nation, Timor-Leste has limited friends and resources to help develop the nation from the ruins of separation. Ultimately, for historical reasons Portugal was the first nation Timorese leaders turned to for help. Timor-Leste as a new country desperately needed a helping hand to establish its country as well as its institutions. The Portuguese took advantage of this to return to Timor-Leste as a hero providing salvation to the new country. The government of Portugal uses its development cooperation policy as an instrument to strengthen its relations to the world. The Portuguese development cooperation is one of the main pillars of its foreign policy. Portugal's cooperation framework strategy aimed to consolidate the Timorese institutional framework and support its effort to fight against poverty. However, Portuguese assistance to Timor-Leste clearly shows special attention to the consolidation of Portuguese as an official language in a wide range of contexts. Generally, the Portuguese foreign policy focuses on the three categories:

“(i) preferential relations with Portuguese-Speaking Countries, in particular the five Portuguese-Speaking African Countries (PALOP) and East Timor (Timor-Leste); (ii) the promotion of Portuguese in the world as a language community of historical value and current worth in this era of globalisation; (iii) the promotion of Portuguese capacity to hold dialogues and exert influence on international issues, directing bi- and multi-lateral Portuguese Cooperation to take advantage of

Portugal's standing in some of the international decision making centres" (IPAD, 2008. p.7) <sup>76</sup>.

Portuguese development cooperation aims to contribute to a better coordination between different national actors to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of its activities. An important element within its foreign policy is the promotion and protection of the Portuguese language and culture. The key themes within Portuguese ODA are sustainable economic development, human security and the active involvement of Portugal in international debates on related topics. Therefore, Portuguese ODA focuses especially on Portuguese speaking countries in PALOP and Timor-Leste in Asia as well as other countries with which Portugal historically has had tight relations. Of the five major development assistances from Portugal, education is the top priority among them. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Portugal oversees the overseas assistance through its two main agencies: the Portuguese Camoes Institute, promoting Portuguese culture and language, and Instituto Portuguese de Apoio Ao Desenvolvimento (IPAD) or Portuguese Institute for Development Assistance, coordinating overall development. The Portuguese believed that its foreign policy had obviously been in line with Timor-Leste's national priorities and needs.

Portugal is one of the three largest donors to Timor-Leste, and the government of Portugal has been visibly influential on the Timorese. One of the major areas of Portuguese assistance worldwide is in the education sector (IPAD, 2000; 2004; 2008; 2011; & The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin, 2002) <sup>77</sup>. Cooperation between Timor-Leste and Portugal began in 1999 on the basis of historical ties between the two countries and the need for humanitarian aid. Portuguese has well-defined objectives in respect of its

---

<sup>76</sup> IPAD (*Instituto Portuguese de Apoio Ao Desenvolvimento / Portuguese Institute for Development Assistance*), (2008). *INDICATIVE COOPETION PROGRAMME. Portuguese Institute for Development Assistance (IPAD)*.

<sup>77</sup> IPAD (*Instituto Portuguese De Apoio Ao Desenvolvimento*), (2000). *Programa Indicativo da Cooperacao Portuguese Para Apoio a Transicao de Timor-Leste 2000*. IPAD; IPAD, (2004). *Indicative Cooperation Programme: Portugal – Timor 2004-2006*. IPAD; IPAD, (2008). *Indicative Cooperation Programme: Portugal – East Timor 2007-2010*. IPAD; IPAD (2011). *Portuguese Development Cooperation 2005-2010*. IPAD; & *The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin*. (2002).

development assistance throughout the world. As stated in the IPAD (2010 & 2011)<sup>78</sup> and by The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin (2002)<sup>79</sup> Portugal is a small donor, and hence its development assistance focuses on countries that share the language and similar legal systems such as PALOP countries and Timor-Leste:

“the language constitutes a key instrument in co-operation with Portuguese speaking countries. These countries also have administrative and legal systems very similar to those prevailing in Portugal. The PALOP (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and S. Tomé and Príncipe), together with Timor-Leste, might be seen as Portugal’s “natural partners”: beyond language, there are large Portuguese communities living there and partners’ communities living in Portugal, tight relationships with local people and important economic ties” (IPAD, 2011. p.25)<sup>80</sup>.

### **Bilateral Cooperation Agreements**

Since Timor-Leste’s independence from Indonesia in 1999, Portugal and Timor-Leste have signed several important bilateral agreements which form the legal basis for cooperation between the two countries. Prior to the full independence of Timor-Leste, Portugal and the transitional government of Timor-Leste signed, in 2000, the cooperation agreement, “Portugal Indicative Cooperation Programme to Support the Transition of Timor-Leste”, in effect from 2000 to 2002. During this period, Portugal focused support on emergency and humanitarian aid, however, the education sector also received special attention. Portugal started to support Timor-Leste’s education system and consolidated the use of Portuguese as the official language by placing a contingent of 160 Portuguese teachers, sending over

---

<sup>78</sup> IPAD. (2010); & IPAD. (2011).

<sup>79</sup> The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin. (2002).

<sup>80</sup> IPAD. (2011).

350 Timorese students to study in Portugal higher education, as well as technical and vocational courses. Portuguese educational aid mainly aimed to reform Timor-Leste's education system through training teacher, building schools and the reintroduction of the Portuguese language, as well as through establishing a Centre for Portuguese language at the National University of Timor-Leste (UNTL). This agreement aimed to transform emergency aid objectives into development aid objectives. (Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros, 2000)<sup>81</sup>.

The second bilateral agreement was the "Indicative Cooperation Programme between Portugal and Timor-Leste for 2004-2006" signed in 2004. Under this agreement, Portugal prioritised its aid to education and reintroduced the Portuguese language through, primary, secondary, technical and vocational education and higher education (IPAD, 2004)<sup>82</sup>. The third bilateral agreement, signed in 2007, was the "Indicative Cooperation Programme between Portugal and Timor-Leste for 2007-2010". Portuguese assistance under this period was focused on the continuation of support to education and the consolidation of Portuguese as an official language and institutional capacity building. The current Indicative Cooperation Programme between Portugal and Timor-Leste signed in 2014 will cover the period of 2014 to 2017. Portugal continued to deliver its assistance on the basis of the continuation of education and consolidation of Portuguese language, including basic education, secondary and tertiary education.

### **Portuguese Educational Aid to Timor-Leste**

Portugal maintained a diplomatic role in helping Timor-Leste's struggle for independence during the Indonesian occupation. This level of solidarity and experience shows strong emotional ties between the Timorese and the Portuguese. Also, the introduction of Portuguese as one of the official

---

<sup>81</sup> *Ministerio dos Negocios Estrangeiros, (2000). Portugal Indicative Cooperation Programme to Support the Transition of Timor-Leste 2000. Timor-Leste. IPAD.*

<sup>82</sup> *IPAD. (2004).*

languages of Timor-Leste strengthened distinctive relations between both countries (OECD, 2006)<sup>83</sup>. In its recent strategic vision, Portugal restated its main objective in providing official development aid to its former colonies including Timor-Leste. This strategic vision consists of five principals. Two of them focus on the MDGs commitment to promoting Portuguese language, (IPAD, 2006b). Portugal's aid to education is provided through cooperation projects, and mainly directed to teaching and to training teachers, as well as scholarship programmes largely focused on university education. Portugal channels its aid to the education sector by sending over hundreds of Portuguese teachers and volunteers to Timor-Leste.

Portugal, one of the members and founders of the OECD, played a major role in channelling assistance to Timor-Leste, especially in the education sector during pre-independence, under the umbrella of the Commissioner for Transition Support in East Timor (CATTL) (Instituto Camoes, 2014; & IPAD, 2004 & 2008)<sup>84</sup>. The CATTL was a commission to oversee all Portuguese aid in Timor-Leste. In addition, according to the Portuguese Development Cooperation report from the period 1999-2010, Portugal has contributed 497.5m€ to Timor-Leste. However, it is hard to trace the exact amount of Portuguese aid from the period 1999-2002 alone. Portuguese assistance to Timor-Leste has three official priorities: "first, to consolidate the Timorese state; second... to deepen the identity of the Timorese people, including through language and culture, and third, to maintain the Portuguese language as an official language" (The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin, 2002)<sup>85</sup>. The education sector has been the largest beneficiary of Portuguese assistance to Timor-Leste since 1999.

Timor-Leste, post-independence, urgently needed assistance to alleviate the

---

<sup>83</sup> OECD (2006). *DAC Peer Review of Portugal*. Retrieved from <http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/36780494.pdf>.

<sup>84</sup> Instituto Camoes. (2014). *Cooperação Bilateral Portugal - Timor-Leste*. Retrieved from Camões - Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua: <http://www.instituto-camoes.pt/timor-leste/root/cooperacao/cooperacao-bilateral/timor-leste>; IPAD. (2004); & IPAD. (2008).

<sup>85</sup> *The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin*. (2002).

country's suffering. Portugal was very serious in helping Timor-Leste, since the country decided to make Portuguese an official language. Portugal's education programme to Timor-Leste has, from the beginning, clearly sought to promote the Portuguese language. Portugal played an important role and most likely heavily influenced Timorese leaders in adopting the Portuguese language as one of the Timorese official languages.

There are fundamental reasons why Portuguese was chosen by Timor-Leste as one of the official languages. First, it was because Portugal was the former colonial master of Timor-Leste for such a long period, from 1515 to 1975. Secondly, it was because the Portuguese language had been used as a lingua franca during the Timorese resistance against the Indonesian occupation. Thirdly, it serves the interest of Timorese political elites who speak Portuguese. Fourthly, it is due to the fact that Portugal had assisted Timor-Leste during its struggle for independence, through diplomatic channels. Thus, Portuguese eases Timor-Leste's foreign relations and allies in the future. Finally, Portugal was considered as a big brother for Timor-Leste and could help improve Timor-Leste's education system. Therefore, supporters of Portuguese language policy believed that the relationship between Timor-Leste and Portugal was based on historical and political ties. On the other hand, there were arguments for not choosing Portuguese as an official language. Firstly, there were fewer than 5% who could speak Portuguese by the time it was adopted to be one of the official languages for Timor-Leste. Secondly, there were fewer qualified teachers to be able to teach Portuguese. And finally, Portuguese could cause geopolitical problems in the region. Timor-Leste aims to join ASEAN and submitted its application in February 2011. Timor-Leste has done much work to convince ASEAN member states that Timor-Leste is ready to join the region's largest economic and geopolitical organization. However, its language policy and allies think the Portuguese to be a stumbling block to joining a bloc where no one else speaks the language. It will complicate proceedings of the block

and add operational costs and centres of disputes (Savage, 2012)<sup>86</sup>. In addition, there are always conditions put by the ASEAN member states. Some said Timor-Leste needs to prepare its human resources and infrastructure in order to meet ASEAN standards (Pinheiro, 2014 & ASEAN, 2014)<sup>87</sup>.

Prior to the independence of Timor-Leste and the development of its constitution, Portugal was supposed to have influenced the Timorese leaders in adopting the Portuguese language. In fact, the result of Portuguese assistance to Timor-Leste had an impact with the adoption of Portuguese language as one of Timor-Leste's official languages. This language policy decision determined Timor-Leste's future friends and allies in the international arena. Timor-Leste's language policy has been controversially debated amongst Timorese as well as worldwide observers. Apart from the pros and cons that this chapter focused on, it also examines how the Portuguese language and Portuguese educational aid influences policy making in Timor-Leste. It is particularly concerned with the period between October 1999 and May 2002, when Timor-Leste was still governed by the UNTAET. The Portuguese took an important chance to implement the transformation in educational aid that was called for by Timorese leaders. This was due to the extensive damage to Timor-Leste's education system during Indonesia's violent withdrawal in 1999. It also discussed Portuguese foreign policy in meeting the needs of the Timorese request, and assessed Portuguese influence in shaping the educational policy that is now emerging in Timor-Leste. Nonetheless, Portugal's efforts in supporting the education sector lacked legitimacy and thus popular acceptance from the majority of people of Timor-Leste.

---

<sup>86</sup> Savage, V. (2012). *Timor-Leste Language Policy: the Boulder on the Shoe*. RSIS Commentaries: 064-12.

<sup>87</sup> Pinheiro, M. F. (2014). *Timor-Leste's Road to ASEAN*. Retrieved from The Asia Foundation: <http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2014/02/12/timor-lestes-road-to-asean/>; & ASEAN. (2014). *Timor-Leste Remains Committed to Join ASEAN*. Retrieved from ASEAN Secretariat News: <http://www.asean.org/news/asean-secretariat-news/item/timor-leste-remains-committed-to-join-asean>.

The birth of the tiny nation of Timor-Leste came at a heavy price for its people after years of colonization, occupation and transition, with conflict, oppression and bloodshed. When the Timorese finally won their independence from Indonesia, surprisingly, national leaders immediately sought to strengthen their relationship with the Portuguese. The relationship between the two nations has been strong and interwoven since then. It is driven by the desire to forge a national identity that differentiated Timor-Leste from Indonesia and consolidated its ties with Portugal. The two countries' relationship can be traced back from the past to the present time. Portuguese had first come into contact with the Islanders of Timor in around 1515, and colonised half the island (the other half of the island was later ruled by the Dutch) known as Portuguese-Timor (Timor-Leste at present day). The Portuguese ruled Portuguese-Timor from the late 16<sup>th</sup> century to late 1975. The Portuguese left the Timorese in 1975 with a civil war, then automatically legitimised and opened the way for Indonesia to invade and annex Portuguese-Timor to become its 27<sup>th</sup> province and renamed it Timor-Timur for the next 24 years. Finally, through a referendum on self-determination under the United Nations (UN) supervision in August 1999, the Timorese overwhelmingly voted to separate themselves from Indonesia, and established a new government with the new name of the state, Timor-Leste. The country's name itself is derived from the Portuguese words meaning East Timor. Under the UN transitional administration, the language used for preparing the Timorese to become an independent country is English. Hence, the language policy and educational politics in Timor-Leste shaped by three significant periods reflect its recent history; it has had four names, reflecting the different languages that have been prominent at different times: East Timor (English), Timor-Leste (Portuguese), Timor-Timur (Indonesian), and Timor Lorosa'e (Tetum) (Shah & Quinn, 2014; & Macalister, 2012)<sup>88</sup>.

---

<sup>88</sup>Shah, R., & Quinn, M. (2014); & Macalister, J. (2012). *Language policies, language planning and linguistic landscapes in Timor-Leste. Language Problems & Language Planning*, 36(1), 25-45.



Notwithstanding, during the 24 years of the occupation, Indonesia had produced numerous reliable human resources and a great deal of infrastructure compared with Portugal, which colonised Timor-Leste for over 400 years and left almost nothing. However, the Indonesian influence on Timor-Leste after independence was not as strong as Portugal's due to Indonesian violations of human rights under its brutal military regime. The Portuguese language has made a comeback to Timor-Leste, after 24 years of being prohibited when the country was under Indonesian occupation at the end of the twentieth century. In 2002, Timor-Leste adopted Portuguese and Tetum – Timorese indigenous language – as its co-official languages. Nonetheless, less than 5% of the Timorese population spoke Portuguese at the time Portuguese was adopted. Prior to the introduction of the 2002 language policy, the Portuguese government and the Timorese transitional government made an immediate effort to reintroduce Portuguese language through training hundreds of Timorese teachers in Portuguese between 1999 and 2002. Portuguese is being steadily employed as the language of instruction, as part of the move to make it the national language. In late 2001, some 500 teachers from Portugal were placed in primary schools throughout Timor-Leste to train both students and teachers in Portuguese. Coinciding with this, some 500 Timorese were sent to Portugal to train as teachers (in Portuguese). It was anticipated that by the time the first cohort of Year One students reach junior secondary school, they will be proficient in Portuguese. Also, six months after Timor-Leste was recognised by the UN as an independent state, Portugal immediately established an official Portuguese School in December 2002 in Dili known as “Escola Portuguesa Ruy Cinatti Timor-Leste” (Pires, 2014)<sup>89</sup>.

Although Portugal was the former colonial master of Timor-Leste, its language was adopted as one of the official languages of Timor-Leste and written into the constitution of the country. As a former Portuguese colony,

---

<sup>89</sup> Pires, A. (2014). *Interview*.

Timor-Leste has a proportion of Portuguese speakers. According to the 2010 national census of Timor-Leste on literacy rates for people aged 15-24, Portuguese speakers have risen to 39.3% in 2010 from only 17.2% in 2004 (Taylor-Leech, 2013; & Statistics Timor-Leste, 2010)<sup>90</sup>. Prior to 2004, the numbers of Portuguese speakers were less than 5%. The steady rise in spoken Portuguese suggests that, although the Portuguese had left Timor-Leste more than two decades before, in the early 2000s the cultural legacy of Portugal was still strongly felt, particularly through the Roman Catholic religion. The Portuguese Catholic missionaries who first arrived in Timor-Leste (Portuguese-Timor back then) started to run schooling and teaching. The missionaries then converted the Timorese to Catholicism. The colonial legacies of Portugal are still strongly tied to the Timorese, obliging the Portuguese to provide educational assistance.

### **The Advantages of Portuguese in Timor-Leste**

Although Portugal had colonised Timor-Leste for 450 years, Timor-Leste thought of Portugal as a big brother. The Timor-Leste government has chosen to use Portuguese as its official language of government since 2002 despite the fact that less than 5% of the population spoke the language. The government chose Portuguese to safeguard their unique culture and identity, maintain their connections with the former colonial master, Portugal, as well as their privileged ties and friendships with other Portuguese-speaking nations (Taylor-Leech, 2013)<sup>91</sup>. Physically, Portugal had left Timor-Leste in 1975, however, as Pires (2014)<sup>92</sup>, understood, the Portuguese support to Timor-Leste continues and may always be with the Timorese. Pires is sure

---

<sup>90</sup>Taylor-Leech, K. (2013). *Finding Space for Non-dominant languages in Education: Language Policy and Medium of Instruction in Timor-Leste 2000-2012*. Graffith Institute for Educational Research, Graffith University, Queensland, Australia; & Dirrecao Nacional Estatistica (2010). *Highlight of the 2010 Census Main Result in Timor-Leste*. Dili, Ministry of Finance of Timor-Leste.

<sup>91</sup> Taylor-Leech, K. (2013).

<sup>92</sup> Pires, A. (2014). Interview.

that the Portuguese actively assisted Timor-Leste through diplomatic channels and various ways in their struggle for self-determination towards the Indonesian occupation. As young brother, Timor-Leste does not want to lose that friendship and support. According to Pires, Timor-Leste considered Portugal as a resource and the closest friend which it could ask for the support necessary to building a new government from scratch. Thus, the adoption of Portuguese as one of the official languages along with Tetum – the Timorese native language (Assembly Constituent, 2002)<sup>93</sup> – was a way to tighten the brotherhood. Due to the adoption of Portuguese, Timor-Leste was later accepted as a full member of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP in Portuguese acronym). The CPLP is composed of eight states. Portugal is the only European nation, five states are African, Brazil is the only South American nation, and Timor-Leste the only Asian state. The objective of CPLP is to work together to achieve shared prosperity, to reduce poverty and bring progress and stability across the Portuguese speaking world (Gusmao, 2014)<sup>94</sup>. According to Pires (2014)<sup>95</sup>, Portugal's assistance to Timor-Leste's education development from 1999 to the present time has had a significant impact compared to other countries and organisations. Portugal started its first aid project to Timor-Leste in 1999 with the introduction of the Portuguese language. Pires noted that there have been two major donors to the education sector in Timor-Leste: Portugal and Australia. Portugal, on the one hand, has been the largest donor to Timor-Leste's education in terms of its activities and technical support. On the other hand, Australia has been one of the largest donors in terms of financial assistance. Portugal is more of an influence on the education system because of its provision of technical assistance, while Australia's influence is more limited because it only provides financial assistance. Australia has a lesser real input into decision making on the policy direction of education in Timor-Leste.

---

<sup>93</sup> *Assembly Constituent. (2002). Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. Dili, Timor-Leste.*

<sup>94</sup> *Gusmao, X. (2014). PRIME MINISTER: The 2014 Timor-Leste Development Partners Meeting. Dili, Timor-Leste.*

<sup>95</sup> *Pires, A. (2012). Interview.*

Timor-Leste has a multilingual landscape and the extent to which the Timorese are polyglots is shown by the numbers of Timorese that speak two or more languages. Although many people are concerned that the use of Portuguese would be difficult, particularly for the youngest Timorese, the government of Timor-Leste believed that all Timorese would succeed. The process of learning and dissemination of the Portuguese language to Timorese has been through several phases. For example, from 1999 to 2002, Portugal started the first project in Timor-Leste entitled ‘the reintroduction of Portuguese’, and continues with the phases of consolidation until today. Portugal has provided educational aid to Timor-Leste over the past 14 years, and committed to continue to support Timor-Leste. The leaders of Timor-Leste from the first government until the present government have always been outwardly adoring of the Portuguese in their positions. The former Timorese Prime Minister, Xanana Gusmao<sup>96</sup>, for example, on his speech on the occasion of a two-day meeting with donor partners in Timor-Leste in July 2014 proudly announced that “Portuguese language has enormous significance for Timorese people and their cultures” (Gusmao, 2014)<sup>97</sup>. He also said that currently Timor-Leste assumes the rotating Presidency of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) for the biennium 2014-2016. Hence, Timor-Leste would use this opportunity to deepen the economic cooperation between member states and open up trade opportunities in the Asia Pacific and across the globe. The bilateral cooperation between Portugal and Timor-Leste is getting stronger with the current new agreement signed by both the Minister of Education of Portugal and the Minister of Education of Timor-Leste on the 8<sup>th</sup> January 2015 in Portugal. Under this new agreement, Portugal committed to boost cooperation in the education sector. The agreement sets out a protocol for the implementation and operation of the project “School Learning and

---

<sup>96</sup> Xanana Gusmao is a hero and a former Timorese resistance leader. He was also the first President of Timor-Leste for period 2002-2007 and assumed the Prime Minister Position from August 2007 to 16 February 2015.

<sup>97</sup> Gusmao, X. (2014). *PRIME MINISTER: The 2014 Timor-Leste Development Partners Meeting*. Dili, Timor-Leste.

Teacher Training Centres of Timor-Leste” which would involve around 150 Portuguese teachers coming to Timor-Leste in 2015 (Pereira, 2015)<sup>98</sup>.

Da Silva Sarmiento (2013)<sup>99</sup>, in his unpublished thesis “Lusophonization Return? The Condition of Language Policy and Planning in a Post-Colonial Plurilingual Timor-Leste”, had done several interviews in Timor-Leste with a few of the country’s key national stakeholders including Members of Parliament. Their opinions and comments mainly favoured Portuguese as one of Timor-Leste’s official languages. Government officials and Members of Parliament believed that it was the correct choice for Timor-Leste because of its long history with Portuguese. The Portuguese language has been used during the administration of Portuguese-Timor, and also as a lingua franca during resistance against the occupation of Indonesia. In the Da Silva Sarmiento (2013)<sup>100</sup> findings, the Timorese MPs reiterated that Timor-Leste’s decision to adopt Portuguese as an official language was partly because the historical connections with Portugal and Timor-Leste upheld their uniqueness in the Southeast Asia region. MPs also argued against adopting Indonesian and English as official languages because of Indonesia’s recent occupation and the possible domination of the Australians.

Hence, these leaders argued Timorese and Portuguese are like two sides of the same coin. In addition, the Portuguese advocates commented that it is a better opportunity for Timorese to have access to European markets through Portugal’s assistance, because Timor-Leste’s constitution permits its citizens to have dual nationality. Therefore, many Timorese have chosen to adopt Portuguese nationality as their second choice nationality. As a result, since independence, a large number of Timorese have been working in several European countries such as the United Kingdom and Northern

---

<sup>98</sup> Pereira, A. (2015). *Portugal Boosts Cooperation in the Education Sector. Media Release. Republica Democratic de Timor-Leste (RDTL). Dili, Timor-Leste.*

<sup>99</sup> Da Silva Sarmiento, J. (2013).

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*

Ireland. Additionally, through the CPLP, which share the same histories and experiences, Timor-Leste has gained an advantage in accessing support and help before and after the independence. Most proponents of the Portuguese as well as the policy makers who chose to adopt Portuguese as the official language for Timor-Leste were from the older generation. The older generations are those who have lived during the Portuguese colonization and Timor-Leste's struggle for independence against the Indonesian occupation. These generations totally opposed the Indonesian influence in Timor-Leste, including its language. Ignoring the potential benefits of adopting Bahasa Indonesia or English are many Timorese with greater ties to Indonesia than to Portugal.

Another reason for the adoption of Portuguese as one of Timor-Leste's official languages is because Tetum<sup>101</sup> is still an oral language. Timor-Leste needs a modern and developed language to accompany Tetum as a backup, and the adoption of Portuguese is the perfect choice (Da Silva Sarmiento, 2013 & Horta, 2012)<sup>102</sup>. Although Tetum today is spoken by almost 90% of Timorese people, Tetum is still in the process of becoming a truly modern, and functional language. It needs a long time for its establishment. A number of Timorese individuals (Da Silva Sarmiento, 2013 & Horta, 2012)<sup>103</sup> expressed their confidence that Tetum in one or two decades would become a very colourful, rich and dynamic language. Portuguese on the other hand is a developed language, able to convey institutional and scientific knowledge. Pires (2014)<sup>104</sup> therefore believed that the adoption of Portuguese was the proper decision for Timor-Leste, and economically benefited both Timorese and Portuguese. On the one hand, Timor-Leste uses Portugal as a bridge to access Europe, while on the other hand Portugal

---

<sup>101</sup> Tetum is the native language of Timor-Leste.

<sup>102</sup> Da Silva Sarmiento, J. (2013); & Horta, R. (2012). *Timor-Leste's Language Policy: Tetum, Portuguese, Bahasa Indonesia Or English? Retrieved from Eurasia Review: <http://www.eurasiareview.com/20042012-jose-ramos-horta-timor-lestes-language-policy-tetum-portuguese-bahasa-indonesia-or-english-oped/>*.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Pires, A. (2012). Interview.

would like to have access to Asia through Timor-Leste. Also, Timor-Leste wanted to differentiate itself from its neighbours, particularly Indonesia, and feel unique in the Asian region and particularly in the Southeast Asia region. Even with the standardising of Tetum, noted Taylor-Leech (2005)<sup>105</sup>, the Instituto Nacional de Linguística (INL) at the Universidade Nacional Timor-Leste (National University of Timor-Leste or UNTL), responsible in producing an official orthography for Tetum, used Portuguese and other local dialects as the sources for borrowing or coining words and tried to avoid Indonesian.

Portuguese and Tetum have become Timor-Leste's co-official languages and are written into Timor-Leste's constitution. Thus, according to Pires (2014)<sup>106</sup>, it will be difficult to change or replace the official languages without a referendum to amend the constitution. As the 2010 national census has shown, Portuguese is now "facing in" – that is, increasing its numbers of speakers – while Indonesian is "facing out" – or decreasing its number of speakers – in Timor-Leste. In June 2011, with the UN mission still present in Timor-Leste, the government issued a resolution to the UN and its agencies, the EU, and Timorese state institutions to strengthen and promote immediately the use of official languages by all means, in particular the Portuguese language in the public domain (Secretariat of State of the Council of Ministers, 2011)<sup>107</sup>.

### **The Disadvantages of Portuguese in Timor-Leste**

Despite the fact the language policy decision may have strengthened ties between Portugal and Timor-Leste, some individuals (Shah & Quinn, 2014; Macalister, 2013; Da Silva Sarmiento, 2013; Shah, 2012; Savage, 2012;

---

<sup>105</sup> Taylor-Leech, K. (2005). *The Ecology of Language Planning in Timor-Leste*. Development Bulletin 68. Graffith University.

<sup>106</sup> Pires, A. (2012). Interview.

<sup>107</sup> Secretariat of State of the Council of Ministers (2011). *PRESS RELEASE: Council of Ministers Meeting*. Dili. Secretariat of State of the Council of Ministers, Timor-Leste.

Appleby, 2006; & The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin, 2002)<sup>108</sup> argued that the decision to use Portuguese as Timor-Leste's official language has been and continues to be controversial, particularly among younger Timorese. These individuals further say that the younger generations concerned about their cultures have been ignored and undermined, and that their national language – Tetum – has been devalued. Moreover, these younger generations cannot speak Portuguese because they were taught only in Indonesian language during the Indonesian occupation. The counter argument against the adoption of Portuguese language further said the language policy of Timor-Leste only serves the few Timorese elites who speak Portuguese. This in fact causes a geopolitical problem in the region and slows down the country's development.

While Timor-Leste begins to find its feet, it faces new issues on its colonial legacies in defining the language policy. Both Portugal and Indonesia have powerfully influenced the decision-making of Timor-Leste post-independence. Portugal, however, was arguably more important. As soon as Timor-Leste resumed its full independence from the UN on the 20<sup>th</sup> May 2002, the first representatives of the people (Timorese first National Parliament) and the country's first government surprisingly decided to adopt Portuguese as one of the official languages for the new-born Timor-Leste along with Tetum. Indonesian was recognised only as one of the working languages, together with English. Articles 13 and 159 of Timor-Leste's Constitution stipulate that Tetum and Portuguese are Timor-Leste's official languages and that Indonesian and English are Timor-Leste working languages (Assembly Constituent, 2002)<sup>109</sup>. The adoption of Portuguese as a part of the language policy of Timor-Leste has brought a controversial debate among Timorese, who are directly affected by the country's leaders' policy. It also caused concerns and reactions abroad. Younger Timorese generations claimed that the language policy decision made by the older

---

<sup>108</sup>Shah, R. & Quinn, M. (2014); Macalister, J. (2013); Da Silva Sarmiento, J. (2013); Shah, R. (2012); Savage, V. R. (2012); Appleby, R. (2006); & The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin. (2002).

<sup>109</sup> Assembly Constituent. (2002).



generation was unilateral, taken without concern or even consultation with the whole Timorese population. Therefore, language policy in Timor-Leste remains a major debatable issue and is still controversial among Timorese (Taylor-Leech, 2011 & 2013; Savage, 2012; & The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin, 2002)<sup>110</sup>. Many Timorese were surprised when Portuguese was adopted because less than 5% Portuguese speakers could not represent the majority of Timorese, of whom approximately 75% spoke Bahasa Indonesian and almost 80% Tetum. The Timorese language policy was rushed and unilateral. In addition, while a lot of money has been poured in by Portugal both pre- and post-independence for more than a decade, the quality of education in Timor-Leste continues to be poor. On the one hand, perhaps the educational aid provided by Portugal so far has not been in the interests of the Timorese, while on the other hand, perhaps Portugal is more concerned with pushing its own agenda in line with its own national interests. What were better choices if Portuguese was not the first option chosen by Timorese leaders for its language policy? Alternatively, while awaiting the development of Tetum into a scientific and modern language, English and or Bahasa could be the best options. Tetum is a native language to Timorese, almost 80% of whom are speakers. It has this advantage though it needs to be developed in order to meet scientific and modern standards. In addition, English has huge advantages and is an international language as well as a language of trading. While Bahasa Indonesia speakers number 75%, this could also be a good choice if Timor-Leste wanted to safeguard its younger generation who studied during Indonesian occupation under Indonesia's education system. Also, the majority of the previous and current government officials are occupied by the younger generation who studied in various universities in Indonesia.

It could be argued that the adoption of Portuguese as an official Timorese language was motivated largely by political and historical interest. As

---

<sup>110</sup> Taylor-Leech, K. (2011). *Timor-Leste: Sustaining and Maintaining the National Language Planning*. Doi:10.1080/14664208.2011.589108; Taylor-Leech, K. (2013); Savage, V. (2012); & The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin. (2002).

obvious for many Timorese, older generations perceived Portuguese as part of their culture and already integrated in Timorese life. The Portuguese colonisation of Timor-Leste for 450 years has basically influenced Timorese culture in various ways, particularly in language but also through Roman Catholicism which 90% of Timorese follow (Government of Timor-Leste, 2014)<sup>111</sup>. Portuguese traditions are also felt in Timorese dance. Therefore, the important note underlined by Altbach (1971)<sup>112</sup> is very similar to what has occurred in Timor-Leste today. As Altbach noted, modern neo-colonialism in developing countries has not involved direct political control from the dominant countries. However, a few aspects of mastership are still maintained by developed nations over their former colonies. Altbach further argued that most emerging countries' education systems at almost every level are deeply-rooted in the administrative structures of the former colonial rulers. Also the former colonial countries tended to use their former colonial language as the medium of instruction in their education systems and administration services. Portugal, as Timor-Leste's former colonial power, has been keen to offer foreign aid and technical assistance in helping design curriculum, and in the provision of physical facilities and other educational materials including books. Altbach (1971)<sup>113</sup> coined the term neo-colonialism to designate the continued post-colonial impact of the advanced industrial countries on the educational systems and policies as well as the intellectual life of developing areas. Portugal's practice in providing educational aid to Timor-Leste could be regarded as neo-colonialism as discussed by Altbach.

Also Thiong'o (1986)<sup>114</sup> discusses the erosion of the African national languages by the arrival of foreign languages, very often European languages. Although the conquest or colonization has physically ended, the

---

<sup>111</sup> Government of Timor-Leste. (2014). *About Timor-Leste*. Retrieved from Government of Timor-Leste: <http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=547&lang=en>.

<sup>112</sup> Altbach, P.G. (1971). *Education and Neocolonialism: A Note*. *Comparative Education Review*, 15(2), 237-239. Doi: 10.2307/1186733.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>114</sup> Thiong'O, N. W. (1986). *Decolonizing the Mind: the Politics of Language in African Literature*. London: James Currey.

colonization of the mind, spirit, and culture of Timor-Leste are still ongoing. Portuguese aid practices have developed along similar lines to the behaviour discussed by Thiong'o (1986)<sup>115</sup>, concerned that aid is in the main weapon of Western nations, keen for the third world to remain subject to colonial powers manifest in another form. Thus neo-colonialism is embedded in various fields, including in the education system. Modern colonisation of the mind and spirit is introduced in the process of education. Although Thiong'o (1986) studied European languages' influence on the African continent and it has been more than two decades since the studies took place, his thought is still relevant to the present, as the Timorese have encountered the same situation in their language policy. Timorese elites believed that their former colonial master, Portugal, could not be separated from Timorese cultures because it is already assimilated in Timorese lives. Under Portuguese rule, all education was through the medium of Portuguese, and Timorese languages used only when necessary. Therefore, Portuguese particularly influenced the dialect of Tetum, which was mainly spoken in the capital, Dili, known as Tetum Prasa. Tetum Prasa is the version more widely used, and is now taught in all levels of schools together with Portuguese.

Nonetheless, the language policy decision was contrary to the wishes of the majority of the younger generations of the country, which are the children and grandchildren of those older generations. Also, these young generations studied and grew up during the Indonesian period, and the majority of them could not even speak and write in Portuguese.

Some individuals, researchers and Timorese people who are directly affected by the language policy have been unhappy with the country's elites' policy decision. These opponent groups believed that the decision was due to the arrogance of Timorese elites who attempted to ignore and differentiate from Indonesian influence and lean back towards its former

---

<sup>115</sup>Thiong'O, N. W. (1986).

colonial master Portugal (Taylor-Leech 2008 & 2013; Sarmento, 2013; Savage 2012, Horta, 2012; Laohamutuk, 2002 & 2012; & Macalister, 2012)<sup>116</sup>. Most young Timorese grew up throughout the Indonesian occupation and have never spoken Portuguese at all, because the Indonesian authority banned Portuguese during its occupation. Da Silva Sarmento (2013)<sup>117</sup> interviewed a few teachers in Timor-Leste's schools. These educators were concerned that the language policy in Timor-Leste was only chosen to satisfy some big egos from people in politics. The politicians have never thought about the majority of young generations who grew up with the Indonesian language. These teachers are aware that freedom has brought a new language to them but also another aspect of neo-colonialism. Additionally, Shah (2012)<sup>118</sup> discovered, during his experiences at the MoE for four years as a curriculum designer, documented evidence and interviews with primary teachers, principals, and stakeholders between donor providers and the MoE as part of his doctoral study. He noted that in early 2000, in order to save and preserve the continuation of the learning process in Timor-Leste after separating from Indonesia's occupation, Timor-Leste's transition government recruited numbers of primary school teachers, the majority of whom were not qualified to teach. However, Portugal was the most significant player in the realm of teacher training due to its "comparative language advantage" in meeting the demands of early governments to focus initial teacher training on the reintroduction of Portuguese into the classroom.

Studies by Shah (2012)<sup>119</sup> examine the problems caused by donors due to the lack of coordination between aid providers and the government of Timor-Leste and how this has led to the poor quality of education in Timor-

---

<sup>116</sup> Taylor-Leech, K. (2008). *Language and identity in East Timor. Language Problems & Language Planning*, 32(2), 153-180; Taylor-Leech, K. (2013); Da Silva Sarmento, J. (2013); Savage, V. (2012); Horta, J.R.(2012); *The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin*. (2002&2012); & Macalister, J. (2013).

<sup>117</sup> Da Silva Sarmento, J. (2013).

<sup>118</sup> Shah, R. (2012).

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*

Leste. Also, Da Silva Sarmiento (2013)<sup>120</sup> restated Timor-Leste's national stakeholders' views that Portuguese should be an official language for Timor-Leste due to the political and historical ties between the two nations. In light of studies, findings and observations, it is an appealing idea that Portuguese aid to the education of Timor-Leste is supposedly offered with no strings attached, as asserted in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. It has had a huge effect on Timor-Leste's policy making, especially the adopting of the Portuguese language into Timor-Leste's official languages. By using its aid influences from 1999-2002, prior to Timor-Leste's independence, Portugal finally won the hearts of Timorese national leaders by convincing them to adopt its language as one of Timor's official languages the same day as Timor-Leste received its independence.

## **Conclusion**

Arguments can be made for or against using the Portuguese language as an official language, as expressed by some researchers and individuals including Da Silva Sarmiento (2013), Savage (2012), Shah (2012), Horta (2012), Taylor-Leech (2012), among others. They said that language policy is always hardly debated in Timor-Leste, and that there are reasons to do with power on the one side and intellectual reason on the other. What significance has the amount of Portuguese aid available, and Portugal's foreign policy interest played in this debate? Clearly it has pushed the Portuguese language into being adopted officially and promoted in practice in Timor-Leste.

Is the great desire of Portugal to provide educational aid to Timor-Leste in response to the will of the Timorese people? It could be understood that the relationship between Timor-Leste and Portugal can easily account for the importance these two countries put on interdependence. Timor-Leste was in a weak position when the decision to offer aid was made. Due to the urgent

---

<sup>120</sup> *Da Silva Sarmiento, J. (2013).*

need for Timor-Leste's development, national leaders had little choice but to follow Portuguese advice. Portugal took advantage of this situation to influence Timorese leaders and push its national interests through its aid agenda. Portuguese education aid, offered mainly to support the expansion of the Portuguese agenda, is very much in line with its foreign policy. Additionally, in advance and to strengthen its influence in Timor-Leste, Portugal has also set up its own schools, ranging from elementary to high school, in Dili, since 2002. The teaching format, curriculum and subjects are designed according to the original format and style in Portugal. The Timor-Leste government recognised the Portuguese Schools in 2006, as confirmed by the current General Director of the MoE Timor-Leste (Pires, 2014)<sup>121</sup>.

Timor-Leste language policy has been closely associated with its historical context, throughout decades of social and political change. What linguistics calls "exogenous languages" (or foreign languages, such as Portuguese, Bahasa Indonesia, and English), have been associated with the dominant political forces at different times. Portuguese assistance in the educational development of Timor-Leste is inevitable, and therefore shapes Timor-Leste's policy making. Long term problems have been caused (by donors, UNTAET and the government of Timor-Leste) to the education system in 2004-2005 through the 'access first, quality later' approach (Millo & Barnett, 2004; Nicolai, 2004; World Bank, 2004; MEC, 2005; Beck, 2008; all cited in Shah, 2012)<sup>122</sup>.

---

<sup>121</sup> Pires, A. (2014). Interview.

<sup>122</sup> Shah, R. A. (2012); Millo, Y., & Barnett, J. (2004). Educational Development in East Timor. *International Journal of Educational Development*, 24(6), 721-737; Nicolai, S. (2004); World Bank. (2004) *Timor-Leste Education Since Independence from Reconstruction to Sustainable Improvement (Report No. 29784-TP): The World Bank*; MEC [Ministry of Education and Culture]. (2005) *Strategic Plan for Universal Primary Completion by 2015*. Dili: Ministry of Education and Culture; Beck, M. (2008) *The Context and History of the Education Sector in Timor-Leste*. In J. Earnest (Ed.), *Rebuilding Education and Health in a Post-Conflict Transitional Nation: Case Studies from Timor-Leste (pp.3-8)*. Rotterdam; Taipei: Sense Publishers.

Due to its weak position prior to independence and in the early stages of independence, Timor-Leste was considerably rushed in its language policy making, particularly in adopting Portuguese as one of the country's official languages. The decision makers considered the relationship between the two nations had been established based on historical and political ties. These dated back to early Portuguese colonization, over 400 years earlier, and continued throughout Timor's struggle for independence. Timorese leaders considered this connection with Portugal to have become a source of moral and financial support, especially at the beginning of independence. Because of the long connection with Portugal, the Tetum language today contains many 'loan words' from Portuguese known as Tetum-Prasa. Portuguese has been constitutionally legislated as one of the two national languages (with Tetum being the other). The assistance, prior to the independence of Timor-Leste and development of its constitution, given by the Portuguese to Timor-Leste had its consequences with the adoption of Portuguese language to be one of Timor's official languages. Portugal, as an external donor, was supposed to have influenced the Timorese leaders to adopt Portuguese. The evidence shows that less than 5% of Timorese could speak Portuguese by this time.

More than 14 years later, with the support of Portugal and other Portuguese-speaking countries such as Brazil, the quality of education in Timor-Leste remains poor and numbers of Portuguese speakers have increased to only 39%. The decision to return to its colonial heritage has determined Timor-Leste's friends and allies. The language policy also has future implications for Timor-Leste's development and geopolitical relations in the region as well as around the globe. Geographically, Timor-Leste is located in the Southeast Asia region. The country has shown its interest in joining ASEAN, yet it has not been allowed to become a member. This is perhaps because of its language policy and its allies' relations. Politically, Timor-Leste is an independent state, but economically, Timor-Leste cannot separate itself from its geopolitical links and the associated geopolitical realities of Indonesia and Australia. Many Timorese government officials

and educational personnel have graduated from universities and technical institutes in Indonesia. As currently reported by Dili Weekly News, an estimated 5000 Timorese students are currently enrolled in Indonesian universities (Freitas, 2014)<sup>123</sup>.

Timor-Leste's language policy has been controversially debated amongst Timorese as well as worldwide observers. Portuguese aid continues to shape educational policy in Timor-Leste. Nonetheless, the quality of education in Timor-Leste remains poor due to the fact that Portugal's efforts in supporting the education sector lacks legitimacy and thus popular acceptance from the majority of people of Timor-Leste. One of the disadvantages of choosing Portuguese as the official language of Timor-Leste is that it slows down the growth and development of progress in Timor-Leste (Taylor-Leech, 2011)<sup>124</sup>. The entire administration in the public domain has to be written in Portuguese and yet there are not many people who speak and write in Portuguese. Worse still most government officials are inexperienced and unqualified as well as lack Portuguese proficiency. They need to learn a new language, but this will take time. Finally, because the government hired hundreds of Portuguese advisors and mentors and other expertise, much of the money offered as support by the Portuguese has, in large amounts, returned to Portugal in salaries and expenses. While Little & Clifford (1966)<sup>125</sup> argue that donors have made specific commitments to ensure that development assistance comes with no strings attached, in fact, foreign aid does not benefit but increases poverty in developing countries. It benefits the political elites of the recipients and the donors' interests. Furthermore, donor countries have implemented their aid

---

<sup>123</sup> Freitas, A. (2014). *Timorese Students Study Illegally in Indonesia*. Retrieved from <http://www.thediliweekly.com/en/news/news/2378-timorese-students-study-illegally-in-indonesia>.

<sup>124</sup> Taylor-Leech, K. (2011). *Timor-Leste: Sustaining and Maintaining the National Languages in Education*. *Current Issues in Language Planning*,. doi:10.1080/14664208.2011.589108.

<sup>125</sup> Little, I.M.D., & Clifford, J.M. (1966). *International Aid. The Flow of Public Resources From Rich to Poor Countries*. New Jersey, USA: Transaction Publishers.



programmes in such a way that they maximise the economic benefits of their own states and citizens.

### **CHAPTER THREE: Australian Educational Aid to Timor-Leste**

Australia has spent a lot of money in Timor-Leste since the country gained its independence. Even though Australia proclaims its aid to Timor-Leste is focused on humanitarian and development assistance, like other donor countries its foreign policy interest is also an influence. The Australian aid to Timor-Leste aims to help political stability and also to protect its oil interests in the area. The Australian aid relationship with Timor-Leste is thus designed to maintain and secure Australian interests. This is evidenced by the number of Australian scholarship awards offered to Timorese students, the vocational training given to government officials, and the role of Dili International School which trains the children of Timorese elites.

#### **Overview of Australian Foreign Policy to Timor-Leste**

Australia, one of Timor-Leste's nearest neighbours (and a better-developed country), was, with Portugal, the first to help the newly independent nation in 1999. Since then, Australia has been one of the largest aid providers to Timor-Leste (Pires, 2014)<sup>126</sup>. Australia has many channels through which to deliver its assistance throughout the world. However, its key aid assistance agency to Timor-Leste was AusAID. Prior to 2002, AusAID was an autonomous agency, subsequently it has been merged into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) of Australia. AusAID aims to advance Australia's national interest by assisting developing countries to reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development, especially in the Asia Pacific region. As the Australian government confirms, its assistance to Timor-Leste, just over 1bnUSD, has been used for the construction of the newly

---

<sup>126</sup> Pires, A. (2014). *Interview*.

independent state of Timor-Leste (Australian Government-DFAT, 2015)<sup>127</sup>. Australian assistance initially focused on humanitarian and infrastructure aid rather than education. In the period of the Timorese transitional government from 1999 to 2002, Australian humanitarian assistance undertaken by AusAID was the largest ever. The Australian government reported that its aid contributed to emergency food, shelter, and medical supplies, and provided transport and logistics for international aid efforts. The Australian aid delivered by multilateral institutions and NGOs provided basic services throughout the transitional period.

After Timor-Leste gained its full independence in 2002, the Australian government was seeking to incorporate its aid with the government of Timor-Leste's national priorities. For instance, several institutions and ministries were established under Australian mentorship, including the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Finance of Timor-Leste. Following civil unrest in Dili in 2006, Australian changed its aid back to humanitarian aid to assist hundreds of thousands of Timorese displaced from their homes. Then, between 2007 and 2010, Australian aid focused on improving political stability and assisting the government's development institutions. Indeed, after nearly a decade in delivering assistance to Timor-Leste, Australia realised its assistance had not properly reached the targets which the Timorese demanded. Several agreements were signed by both governments prior to 2011, but the 2011 Strategic Planning Agreements for Development is considered the key document (AusAID, 2012)<sup>128</sup>. This agreement sets out how Australian aid would support Timor-Leste to achieve the MDGs, particularly eradicating extreme hunger and poverty,

---

<sup>127</sup> Australian Government-DFAT. (2015). *Timor-Leste Country Overview*. Retrieved from Development Assistance in Timor-Leste: <http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/timor-leste/Pages/timor-leste-country-brief.aspx>.

<sup>128</sup> Australian AID (AusAID). (2012). *Australia-Timor-Leste Country Strategy 2009 to 2014*. Australian Government. Retrieved on 2 August, 2013 from [www.aisaid.gov.au](http://www.aisaid.gov.au).

and achieving the goal of universal primary education (MoF, 2013)<sup>129</sup>. Since then, Australia has committed to working closely with the government of Timor-Leste to promote opportunities for all by increasing access to quality education.

It is inevitable that the relationship between Australia and Timor-Leste is difficult to separate from the history of the two countries, even though there are unpleasant aspects to this story. Some say the history of Timor-Leste and its road to independence was considerably influenced by the policy of Australia, the regional power in the region. Dr. Ishizuka (2004)<sup>130</sup> for example, a scholar from University of Kyoei, Japan, pointed out that the Australians' policies towards Timor-Leste have changed from time to time. These policies have always benefited Australians, from the time Timor-Leste was still under Portuguese rule, to the Indonesian military regime, and indeed during the independence of Timor-Leste. For example, when Australia recognised Indonesian sovereignty in Timor-Leste after the 1975 invasion, because Australia wanted to secure and maintain security in the region, it was most important to negotiate a favourable commercial agreement on the oil-rich Timor-Sea. Where Australia has exercised its coercive power most flagrantly is in the economic area. By the same token, Ayson (2007)<sup>131</sup> pointed out the perception of an 'arc of instability' underlying the Australian strategic and political attention to its closest neighbourhood. Even though Australian policy guidance was not clear in addressing such instability, Australia considered itself a prosperous and politically stable country looking out for its closest northern neighbours who comprised a chain of countries with weakened economies, institutional

---

<sup>129</sup> Ministry of Finance (MoF). (2013). *Republica Democratica De Timor-Leste's State Budget 2013 Development Partners. Book 5. Dili, Timor-Leste.*

<sup>130</sup> Ishizuka, K. (2004) *Australia's policy towards East Timor, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, 93:374, 271-285, DOI: 10.1080/00358530410001679611.

<sup>131</sup> Ayson, R. (2007). *The 'Arc of Instability' and Australia's Strategic Policy. The Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 61:2, 215-231, DOI: 10.1080/10357710701358360.

deficits and significant domestic instabilities. Australians led an intervention force into Timor-Leste in 1999 and again in 2006, proving its 'arc of instability' theory. However, in late 2000, for example, *Businessweek* reported that Australian diplomats were pressuring Timorese officials to accept the same deal that Australia had negotiated with Indonesia, with the threat that failure to do so would result in a cut-off of its aid programmes (Navins, 2004, & *Businessweek*, 2000)<sup>132</sup>. Evidently, in June 2005 Australia terminated funding to a local NGO in Timor-Leste, Forum Tau Matan (FTM), because together with other national NGOs, it openly protested against Australia's policy on the sea border between the two countries (Nautilus Institute, 2013 & Lao Hamutuk, 2007)<sup>133</sup>. The Australians referred to the deal or treaty that it had signed with Indonesia in 1989, known as the Timor Gap Treaty. The treaty aimed to share resources in a joint development zone of the Timor Gap. In fact, Timor-Leste and Australia has territorial disputes over the control of oil resources, colouring diplomacy between the two countries. The Australian foreign aid to Timor-Leste is one way to avoid the issue of negotiation over the maritime border.

## Educational Aid

Despite the dispute over the maritime boundary and other accusations between Timorese and Australians, the Australian government has, since 1999, and as acknowledged by the government of Timor-Leste, demonstrated good faith to help Timor-Leste. In practice, however, Timor-

---

<sup>132</sup> Nevins, J. (2004). *Contesting the Boundaries of International Justice: State Countermapping and Offshore Resource Struggles between East Timor and Australia*. Clark University. *Economic Geography*, Vol. 80, No. 1, (Jan., 2004), pp. 1-22. New York, US; & *Businessweek*. (2000). *East Timor's Petro Trouble (int'l edition): Australia is claiming Timorese oil*. Retrieved from *International -- Asian Business*: <http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2000-10-29/east-timors-petro-trouble-intl-edition>.

<sup>133</sup> Nautilus Institute. (2009). *Australia and Timor's Oil*. Retrieved from *East Timor*: <http://nautilus.org/publications/books/australian-forces-abroad/east-timor/australia-and-timors-oil/>; & The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin (2007). *Australia Aid should support Timor-Leste, not Australia's political interests*. Retrieved on 15/12/2014, from <http://www.laohamutuk.org/reports/AusAID/FTM.html>.

Leste more likely favours Portugal as a close friend as reflected in Timor-Leste's language policy. Although English is not an official language in Timor-Leste like Portuguese, its influence among Timorese, particularly the young generations, is quite significant, despite the fact that English is recognised only as one of the working languages together with Bahasa Indonesia. Article 159 of the Timor-Leste Constitution stipulates that "Indonesian and English shall be working languages within civil service side by side with official languages as long as deemed necessary" (Assembly Constituent, 2002)<sup>134</sup>. The recent national census of Timor-Leste revealed that English literacy for people aged from 15 to 24 has more than doubled from 10% in 2004 to 22.3% in 2010 (Direccao Nacional Estatistica, 2010)<sup>135</sup>. Timor-Leste's leaders had privately defended keeping the Portuguese language as a matter of heritage, but at the same time they have also recognised the importance of learning English in schools to survive in a competitive world. They have also acknowledged Bahasa Indonesia.

The language policy of Timor-Leste upset Australia, as found by Taylor-Leech (2007)<sup>136</sup> in his unpublished PhD thesis: "Canberra did not want East Timor to choose Portuguese as its national language or model its constitution on that of Portugal" (p.5), Australia failed to convince Timorese leaders that time, and yet Australia's assistance to Timor-Leste was not affected by the language policy too much, because English as the official language of Australia has also been acknowledged in the legislation of Timor-Leste. Macalister (2012)<sup>137</sup> – a senior researcher at Linguistics Studies at Victoria University of Wellington – in his current research into language policy in Timor-Leste, argued that the existence of the UN and

---

<sup>134</sup> Assembly Constituent. (2002).

<sup>135</sup> Direccao Nacional Estatistica. (2010). *Highlights of the 2010 Census Main Results in Timor-Leste*. Dili: Ministry of Finance of Timor-Leste).

<sup>136</sup> Taylor-Leech, K. J. (2007). *The Ecology of Language Planning in Timor-Leste: A study of Language Policy, Planning and Practices in Identity Construction*. Unpublished PhD diss., Griffith University.

<sup>137</sup> Macalister, J. (2012). *Language policies, language planning and linguistic landscapes in Timor-Leste*. *Language Problems & Language Planning*, 36 (1), 25-45.

other international NGOs could influence the development of English in Timor-Leste; as long as the UN mission and other international NGOs continue to work in Timor-Leste, the development of English will also be developed. Macalister (2012)<sup>138</sup> further expected that Australia, as the largest and one of the Anglophone donor countries to Timor-Leste, as well as a dominant power in the region, might help in influencing the development of English in the country. Some other factors believed to potentially influence the language policy in Timor-Leste will be shifts in economic power and the emergence of a new generation of political leaders.

The Australian government claimed that since 1999 it has provided assistance worth more than 1bnUSD to Timor-Leste. This support is in the form of humanitarian and development aid (Australia Government-DFAT, 2013)<sup>139</sup>. Meanwhile, the government of Timor-Leste officially reported that the Australian assistance to Timor-Leste from 2011 to 2014 has reached 607,151,000.22USD, or just over half a billion. The education sector alone has received 65,442.000.19USD or approximately 11% of the total amount (MoF, 2014b)<sup>140</sup>. MoF, in collaboration with donor partners, is working to collect historical information prior to 2010. Hence, disbursement data may be larger than the current data. Additionally, a joint Timorese-international organisation, The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin, reported that Australian aid to Timor-Leste during the transitional government from 1999 to 2002 alone was 89mUSD; of this amount only 7% was directly allocated to the education sector (The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin, 2002)<sup>141</sup>. However, Australia has also donated 14% of its assistance to TFET (Trust Fund for East Timor), managed by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The TFET

---

<sup>138</sup> Macalister, J. (2012).

<sup>139</sup> Australian Government-DFAT. (2013). *Timor-Leste: How We Give Aid to Timor-Leste*. Retrieved from <http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/eastasia/timor-leste/Pages/how-aid.aspx>.

<sup>140</sup> MoF (Ministry of Finance). (2014b). *Aid Transparency Portal*. Retrieved from [www.aidtransparency.gov.tl](http://www.aidtransparency.gov.tl).

<sup>141</sup> The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin (2002). *Analyzing Australian Assistance to East Timor*. Dili, Timor Leste. The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin; vol 3, no 8. Retrieved from <http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2002/Dec/bulletinv3n8.html>.

spends funds for projects in most sectors including 18% on education. The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin report suggested that Australian aid between 1999 and 2002 to Timor-Leste's education sector practically reached 21% of its total aid to Timor-Leste. Combining all the data to have been reported or yet to be reported on Australian aid to Timor-Leste, whether by the government of Timor-Leste or civil organisations, it is possible that Australian aid to Timor-Leste has been consequently great indeed, amounting to more than 1bnUSD. The amount of assistance provided by Australia to Timor-Leste, for the size of a population currently just 1.1 million (General Directorate of Statistics, 2014)<sup>142</sup>, has perhaps affected the development of rapid change in general, and in particular the education sector. However, the current condition in Timor-Leste is actually reversed. The quality of education has still not improved much, and the people of Timor-Leste are still living below the poverty line. Riddell's central interrogation, in his book *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?* (2007) should be addressed to Australian aid to Timor-Leste. In other words, what has Australia been doing with the huge amount of money it has poured into the education sector in Timor-Leste, and what has been the government of Timor-Leste's response?

As a result, the Australian government reported that education in Timor-Leste has been improved gradually in recent years (AusAID, 2012)<sup>143</sup>. However, the report has also recognised that the quality of education in Timor-Leste is still poor. The period of 1999 to 2002 was the period of emergency and transition for Timor-Leste. The transitional government of Timor-Leste had no power or authority to govern. All external and internal affairs of Timor-Leste were managed by the UNTAET. Yet, it was in this period that the leaders of Timor-Leste made the gladiatorial decision to adopt Portuguese as the official language, though the Timor-Leste

---

<sup>142</sup> General Directorate of Statistics. (2014). *Statistics Timor-Leste*. Retrieved from <http://www.statistics.gov.tl/>.

<sup>143</sup> Australian AID (AusAID). (2012). *AUstralia-Timor-Leste Country Stratgey 2009 to 2014*. Retrieved from Australian Government: [www.aisaid.gov.au](http://www.aisaid.gov.au).



government only received its full independence from the UN on the 20<sup>th</sup> of May 2002. In such circumstances it was difficult to track what the donors did and how and where the donors wanted to deliver their aid. Pires (2014)<sup>144</sup> acknowledged that donor countries provided aid as they wished, determining to whom aid should be delivered and the purpose of the aid. From the beginning Australia has mainly focused its aid on humanitarian and security sectors. However, the Australians considered the education sector to be an important target for aid in order to gain trust from the Timorese leaders like the Portuguese did. Thus, it had directly contributed 7% of its total aid to education during the emergency period. Australian educational aid has focused initially on primary schooling including constructing and rehabilitating school buildings, technical and vocational education training, and a small number of scholarship awards. Australian aid has also supported the government of Timor-Leste through rebuilding and rehabilitating some 2100 classrooms from 2008. These classrooms allow more children to go to school and learn in better and safer conditions. In addition to helping Timorese students to learn better – especially in reading skills – Australia, through its educational aid, supported the delivery of almost 1.4 million school materials to primary schools across Timor-Leste. These materials include 94,500 books in Tetum to each primary school; and student and teacher resources such as worksheets, magazines and other school books. Hence, from the period 2007 to 2011 alone, the Australian government claimed to have contributed to the enrolment of nearly 35,000 additional children into primary schools across Timor-Leste, an increase of 17% (Australian Government-DFAT, 2014)<sup>145</sup>. These significant outcomes inspired the government of Australia to continue its support of the education sector of Timor-Leste. In 2015 for example, Australia has set its educational aid focus to several priority areas such as skills development training and higher education, with the expectation that more Timorese will improve their job opportunities. These projects will increase the skills of vocational training specialists, and support mobile

---

<sup>144</sup> Pires, A. (2014). *Interview*.

<sup>145</sup> Australian Government-DFAT. (2014).

training units to reach rural areas. Australia will continue to provide teacher training and textbooks, and build more classrooms. The Australia Scholarship Awards will also continue to provide up to 35 Timorese recipients in 2015 with the opportunity to study at universities in Australia.

### **Tertiary Education and Vocational Training**

Apart from aiding basic schools in Timor-Leste, Australia recently expanded its educational aid to include vocational education training and tertiary schooling. Australia felt Portugal has helped a lot on basic education in Timor-Leste, hence, Australia slightly shifted its aid to vocational training and to the provision of more scholarship awards. Australia has also been spending lots of money for vocational training in providing skills to Timorese government officials as well as preparing the Timorese youths with technical and job skills. Australian aid, administered by DFAT and channelled by the Australian Embassy in Timor-Leste, has widened to advance and increase English usage in Timor-Leste. In collaboration with UNTL, DFAT has established an English Studies Department, in order to assist university students to master English. Moreover, in 2012, 13 top Australian universities agreed to sign an important 'scope document' with the government of Timor-Leste to engage in Timor-Leste. These universities are involved in teaching and learning, research, academic capacity building or professional commercial development in Timor-Leste (Universities Australia, 2012)<sup>146</sup>. Besides providing support to the national university, Australia has offered Scholarship Awards to Timorese since 2002. The Awards provide scholarships for not only Timorese students, but also researchers and professionals, to study in universities across Australia. The scholarship offered from 10 to 15 awards from 2002 to 2009 and from 25 to 35 awards from 2010. The result has been that hundreds of graduate

---

<sup>146</sup> *Universities Australia. (2012). Australia University Engagement with Timor-Leste. Canberra, Australia. Retrieved from: [www.universitiesaustralia.edu.au](http://www.universitiesaustralia.edu.au).*

and postgraduate scholars have returned home. A few hold senior government member positions including as Ministers in the previous and current governments (Australian Government-DFAT, 2013)<sup>147</sup>. The increase of scholarship awards shows the intention to train scholars who can then contribute to development in Timor-Leste, including the possibility of changing the language policy. Australia invested its educational aid in Timorese students along the lines expressed by Macalister (2012)<sup>148</sup> that these scholars could one day emerge as the new leaders of Timor-Leste. These new leaders could be the agents of change of the language policy in Timor-Leste. Also, because they have studied at and graduated from universities in Australia, and been taught in English only, English could become a more dominant language in Timor-Leste.

### **Language Competition**

In various ways Australia can influence the expansion of the use of the English language, not only among the Timorese public but also among the elites. Somewhat similar to the Portuguese school, the Australians have established an International school in Dili known as Dili International School (DIS). Throughout an interview, the current head of school, Custis Beaverford (a Canadian national), stated that the Australian government did not directly fund the DIS, and that DIS is 100% a private school, reliant on the tuition fees from students (Beaverford, 2014)<sup>149</sup>. In reality, the founders, the curriculum, the learning process and the teachers are almost entirely from Australia (DIS, 2014)<sup>150</sup>. DIS offers an international standard Preschool, and Primary and Secondary education programmes, all delivered in English. Its curriculum is entirely adopted from the Australian curriculum. In 2013 for example, DIS internationally accredited by the

---

<sup>147</sup> Australian Government-DFAT. (2013).

<sup>148</sup> Macalister, J. (2013).

<sup>149</sup> Beaverford, C. (2014). *Interview with the Author Conducted in Timor-Leste: Dili International School (DIS)*. (N. Correia De Almeida, Interviewer).

<sup>150</sup> DIS (Dili International Schools). (2014). *2015 Dili International School Family Handbook*. Retrieved from [www.distimor.org](http://www.distimor.org).

Victorian government of Melbourne, Australia, to offer high school certificates of education. It gives the school an internationally recognised high school leaving certificate. DIS was established by Australian volunteers who, early on, worked in Timor-Leste to accommodate the needs of the expatriate community in the immediate post-referendum development period. However, times have changed and now DIS has also opened to the public. Like the Portuguese school, the tuition fees at DIS are also too expensive for most Timorese. Therefore, DIS is also considered as one of the elite schools in Timor-Leste. It is mostly a school for government officials' children and the children of business people. Currently 85% of its registered students are from overseas and 15% only are from Timor-Leste. Although DIS was established in 2003, the government of Timor-Leste only recognised the school in 2006. The government of Timor-Leste, through the MoE, admitted that it had not established proper regulations to legalise the existence of international schools in Timor-Leste including DIS and the Portuguese School of Dili, Escola Portuguesa Ruy Cinatti Timor-Leste. Thus, the government of Timor-Leste has not gathered any data or information on DIS. The current Timor-Leste Prime Minister has three children enrolled at DIS, and some other Ministers, as well as government officials, also have children enrolled (Beaverford, 2014)<sup>151</sup>.

### **Assessing Australian Aid**

Dolven, Margesson, & Vaughn (2012)<sup>152</sup> claim that Australian foreign aid cannot be underestimated. Australia's political and financial contribution to Timor-Leste has played an important part in maintaining the livelihoods of many Timorese and most importantly has contributed to the country's

---

<sup>151</sup> Beaverford, C. (2014). Interview.

<sup>152</sup> Dolven, B., Margesson, R. & Vaughn, B. (2012). *Timor-Leste: Political Dynamics, Development, and International Involvement*. Australia. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress.

journey to gaining independence. Dolven, Margesson, & Vaughn (2012)<sup>153</sup> further claimed that the 2006 Australian assistance in the form of police and military contingents to secure law and order during the conflict in Timor-Leste was a significant contribution by the Australian government. The Australian government argued that its investment contributed to the development progress of Timor-Leste. Such investments include facilitating thousands of farmers in improving their agricultural farming methods. Other results include helping nearly a hundred thousand of people access clean water and sanitation. In addition, AusAID also provides health care clinics around the country especially in the rural communities.

The result of Australian educational aid as officially reported by the Australian government has been very impressive. However, various reports and research publicising conditions in Timor-Leste underline that the quality of education has continued to be poor. Pires (2014)<sup>154</sup>, recognised that the previous government had a very tough time in dealing with donor aid providers including Australia. In the early years of independence, Timor-Leste did not have enough human resources capacity to control the Australian aid that had flown into the country, and especially the aid donated to education. Prior to 2010, the government of Timor-Leste still found it difficult to control and collect data on Australian aid to education, due to the fact that Australia had delivered its assistance directly to the field without consulting the central/ national government. Australia had often built schools in districts or sub-districts in Timor-Leste without informing central government. The government through MoE only became aware of Australia's activities after the project had been completed. Many primary schools in Timor-Leste have signs saying that the school is funded by AusAID with a big Kangaroo image on it. The government of Timor-Leste, says Pires, started to control donor aid providers including Australia and Portugal between 2008 and 2009. However, it was only in 2010 that the

---

<sup>153</sup> Dolven, B., Margesson, R. & Vaughn, B. (2012).

<sup>154</sup> Pires, A. (2014). Interview.

MoE established a policy to control all donors for the education sector. All donors' programmes to education need to act in accordance with three main conditions set by the Ministry: first, Timor-Leste's Strategic Development Plan (SDP); second, Timor-Leste's national priority for a five year term; and third, MoE policy. An example of the implementation of the Ministry's policy towards Australia could be seen in 2013, when it decided to revoke a contract with Australia due to a technical problem on Australia's part. In addition, AusAID has a complicated and sophisticated bureaucracy which makes it harder for Timor-Leste to access information related to the aid it receives. Pires (2014)<sup>155</sup>, as the representative of the government of Timor-Leste, admitted that, in terms of financial support, Australia has been the largest supporter of the education sector in Timor-Leste. He<sup>156</sup> also admitted that the previous government relied too much on education aid from donors such as Australia. However, the current government has a strong commitment to not depending too much on donors. Hence, the MoE's policy has also clearly stated that all donors need to obey and respect Timor-Leste sovereignty.

Foreign aid, as Lancaster (2007)<sup>157</sup> proposed, is "the gift of public resources from one government to another (or to an international organisation or nongovernmental organisation), sizable and sustained over time, an important purpose of which was to help improve the human condition in the countries receiving the aid" (p.1). In other words, it is meant to save lives and contribute to development, growth, and poverty reduction in poor countries (Riddell, 2007)<sup>158</sup>. Australia's foreign aid to Timor-Leste raises concerns amongst Australians and Timorese. Some people believed that the money used by the Australian government in assisting the government of Timor-Leste was the same money taken from the exploration of the Timor-

---

<sup>155</sup> Pires, A. (2014). *Interview*.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>157</sup> Lancaster, C. (2007). *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics*. University of Chicago Press.

<sup>158</sup> Riddell, R.C. (2007). *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?* Oxford University Press.

Gap. The Timor-Gap, also known as the Timor-Sea, is an oil-rich resource located at the maritime boundary between Timor-Leste and Australia, which is legally owned by Timor-Leste. However, it was exploited by Australia before Timor-Leste gained independence, when it was still under Indonesian occupation. Donor countries have implemented their aid programmes in such a way that they maximise economic benefits for their own states and citizens. Anderson (2010)<sup>159</sup>, an Australian scholar, argued that Australia's assistance to Timor-Leste was seen as exploitative rather than supportive. He argued that the development funds provided by Australia to date have not benefited the people of Timor-Leste. For example, very little education and training happens under AusAID programmes, even though billions of dollars are spent. Anderson (2010)<sup>160</sup> claimed that Australia is acting "as a neo-colonialist, attempting to dominate the development of a client state" (p.1). In Dili<sup>161</sup>, for example, highly paid AusAID consultants from Australia wire the majority of their salaries home. Procurement is still undertaken in Australia rather than buying local products in Timor-Leste to help the economy (The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin, 2002)<sup>162</sup>. Furthermore, former Timor-Leste President, Jose Ramos-Horta, commented that "Australian foreign aid has been all over the places and did not transform the lives of the people" (Kelly & AAP, 2010. p.1)<sup>163</sup>. Warden (2009. p.2)<sup>164</sup> reported that claims of Australian aid inefficiency were also recognised by the then-former Australian Prime Minister – Kevin Rudd – who took office from 2007 to 2010 and again in 2013, in his interview on ABC Radio Australia during his tenure. The former Prime Minister acknowledged "too much Australian aid was being spent on consultants' fees".

---

<sup>159</sup> Anderson, T. (2010). *Timor-Leste: the second Australian intervention*. *Journal of Australian political economy*, 58(December), 62-93.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>161</sup> *Dili is the capital of Timor-Leste.*

<sup>162</sup> *The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin*. (2002).

<sup>163</sup> Kelly, J. & AAP. (2010). *Australian Aid Over the Place, Says East Timor President Jose Ramos Horta*. *The Australian News*. Retrieved from:  
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/archive/politics/australian-aid-all-over-the-place-says-east-timor-president-jose-ramos-horta/story-e6frgczf-1225883177399>.

<sup>164</sup> Warden, C. (2009). *Australia Foreign Aid to East Timor 'Wasted'*. ABC Radio Australia. Retrieved from:  
<http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/onairhighlights/australian-foreign-aid-to-east-timor-wasted>.

## Conclusion

Australia claimed that its bilateral and multilateral aid are given solely for humanitarian and development reasons. However, recent literature reveals that donor governments including Australia usually have political and economic goals when supplying assistance. These goals may include increasing regional stability or influencing the policies of the recipient government and the nation's civil society. Bilateral aid is often "tied," meaning that the donor government puts conditions on the aid, requiring that the funds are used to buy products or services (such as expensive consultants) from the donor country. In this way, the economy of the donor country also benefits, which is strongly against the belief enshrined in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness to build on more effective and inclusive partnerships between recipients and donors.

Numerous organisations and individuals criticised Australian foreign aid to Timor-Leste for how it is coupled with political and economic interest. The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin (2009)<sup>165</sup> for example, criticised Australian aid to Timor-Leste for straying far away from its principals, economically benefitting its own state and citizens as a prime motivation and result. The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin earlier commented that Australia helped Timor-Leste because of its interests in Timor-Leste's oil field resources. Australia insisted on control over land owned oil of Timor-Leste even before Timor-Leste's independence, despite the fact that Australia's distance to the oil field is not comparable to Timor-Leste's. Prior to the current situation, The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin (2002)<sup>166</sup> has argued that Australia's foreign aid to Timor-Leste has not been comparable to what Australia took from Timor-Leste's oil-wealth resource. Moreover, Anderson (2010)<sup>167</sup>, claimed that development funds provided by Australia and other major donor countries to date have not benefited the people of Timor-Leste. Australian aid, it is

---

<sup>165</sup> *The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin*. (2009). *Timor Sea Maritime Boundary; Still Not Settled. A Briefing Paper*. Retrieved from [www.laohamutuk.org](http://www.laohamutuk.org).

<sup>166</sup> *The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin*. (2002).

<sup>167</sup> Anderson, T. (2010).



claimed, is really evidence of an interest in the political and economical situation of Timor-Leste. Foreign aid is supposed to be a gift, as Lancaster (2007)<sup>168</sup> pointed out, given to improve the human condition in the receiving country. However, while bilateral aid from donor countries continues to be critical for Timor-Leste, such aid is not always what it claims to be. On the other hand, Australia claimed that its military assistance to Timor-Leste in 1999 and 2006 could not be compared to the current agreement on the spilt over resources in the Timor Sea (ETAN, 2005)<sup>169</sup>. Aid from Australia, while helping to develop and rebuild Timor-Leste, costs Timor-Leste's ability to effectively claim and assert its sovereignty in the disputed territory.

From the beginning Australia and Portugal have been the two largest aid providers to Timor-Leste. Australia has demonstrated its intention to help Timor-Leste, despite its political and economical interests. Australia's educational aid, therefore, is perhaps a useful counterweight to Portuguese educational aid in Timor-Leste. Australia appears to have been in competition with Portugal in providing educational aid to Timor-Leste. For instance, Australian educational aid has primarily focused on basic schooling including building and rehabilitating school buildings, and technical and vocational educations. However, in recent years Australia has seen Portugal's expansion in educational support to Timor-Leste's tertiary studies (the establishing of Portuguese studies departments at UNTL) as a challenge for Australia to also increase and expand its levels of educational aid to tertiary studies. Along the same lines as Portugal, Australia has set up the English studies department at the UNTL as an additional avenue by which to increase English ability in Timor-Leste.

Competitive practices between Australian and Portuguese interests have made significant changes to the educational system in Timor-Leste. Both of

---

<sup>168</sup> Lancaster, C. (2007).

<sup>169</sup> ETAN (East Timor Indonesia Action Network. (2005). *Plain Facts about Australia & East Timor's Maritime Boundary*. Retrieved from <http://www.etan.org/issues/tsea/plainfact.htm>.

these countries have different cultural, historical, and political links and models to and with Timor-Leste, which makes it difficult to predict the end result of their efforts. In addition, Australia has poorly coordinated, indeed, an absence of, agreed education development plans with the government of Timor-Leste. Recent literature on development assistance has suggested that at times aid can actually be detrimental to a country's growth if it is not given for the right reasons or invested in the right places, potentially causing growth to stagnate and giving rise to divisions within a country. While Timor-Leste must be wary of this, the competitive nature of its largest donors has even further implications for the country.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: Conclusion**

Timor-Leste is a relatively young country which gained its independence in May 2002. After the mass destruction and widespread murder which occurred in 1999, the Timorese decided to free themselves from the Indonesian occupation which had also virtually destroyed an already weak education system. When law and order were restored in late 1999, the UN and the new transitional government of Timor-Leste struggled to build an education system to meet the country's expected needs. During the transitional period, Timor-Leste was governed by the UN. The departure of Indonesians impacted on both administrative and economic infrastructure, and the displacement of people included the few involved in the administration during Indonesian's rule. There was no real Timorese structure to form a government capable of governing a nation state. At this time, Timor-Leste had only limited resources with which to develop the nation from ruin. Therefore, Timor-Leste's post-independence was an extremely difficult period for the country's leaders. Apart from limited resources, the country was also weak in its political institutions. Hence, Timor-Leste was in urgent need of sources to fund the whole country's development. This condition helps explain Portugal and Australia's decision to help alleviate the suffering of the population of Timor-Leste through humanitarian and development assistance. Eventually, Timor-Leste received relatively high levels of foreign development aid from Australia and Portugal, especially to the education sector.

Timor-Leste, however, was in a weak position to determine and control the foreign aid that flowed into the state, due to the fact that as a newly independent state it had no experience and limited resources. While the country needs both money and allies to survive, complicating these needs, Portugal and Australia have quite different historical relationships with Timor-Leste. Australia and Portugal, both want to be involved and offering money and technical assistance to Timor-Leste.

Portugal, on the one hand, has been providing aid to Timor-Leste primarily driven by its political interest. The impact of the relationship between Timor-Leste and Portugal's educational aid is that Timor-Leste ended up choosing Portuguese as one of its official languages. In addition, Portugal has a great source of cash, thus directly affecting Timor-Leste's power relations and dependency to Portugal. Portuguese power comes from Timor-Leste being a weak state that needs allies. Portugal can be an ally and Timor-Leste has to be nice to the Portuguese in order to get access to Portugal's aid. These conditions add to the difficulty of the choices that Timor-Leste has to make. Worse, it was not clear that the first elected Timor-Leste government could even make those choices, because the Portuguese got in to Timor-Leste immediately after Timor-Leste decided to separate itself from the Indonesian occupation.

The historical ties with Timor-Leste was only a mask behind which both Portuguese and a few Timorese elites reinforced Portuguese policy in Timor-Leste's education system. In 2002 Portuguese was adopted as one of Timor-Leste's official languages, stipulated in the country's constitution. Portuguese aid primarily focused on the education sector. Specifically the support it offered sought to promote the Portuguese language, following Timor-Leste's decision to include Portuguese in its official languages. Portugal's educational aid to Timor-Leste has been prioritised in primary, secondary and tertiary education. Consequently, hundreds of primary school buildings were built and thousands of unqualified Timorese primary school teachers were trained as Portuguese teachers. Furthermore, the only language of instruction at primary schools from years one to nine is Portuguese, while all documents in government public services are written and documented in Portuguese. Additionally, to strengthen the foundation of Portuguese expansion in Timor-Leste, Portugal also established a Portuguese school in the capital city of Dili. Portuguese foreign policy to Timor-Leste was reinforced by the first government and national

parliament, the majority of whom were Timorese leaders who had lived in exile during the Indonesian occupation. These leaders had lived in Portuguese-speaking countries such as Portugal, Mozambique, and Angola. They were convinced that the choice of Portuguese as one of Timor-Leste's official languages would safeguard Timorese culture and identity, as well as maintain its connections with Portugal as the former colonial master. It was also intended to maintain privileged ties and friendships with others among the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries. However, the decision to officially adopt Portuguese has most concretely benefitted a few Timorese political elites. More importantly, the political interest of Portugal has been embedded as an influence in the policy-making of Timor-Leste. As a result, the Portuguese language is used throughout all institutions and public services of Timor-Leste. In short, Portugal has sought to "Lusophonize"<sup>170</sup> all Timorese, an effort which had failed during 450 years of colonization over Timor-Leste. It could be argued that Portugal pursued the domination of Timor-Leste for a second time by using its educational aid to push the use of the Portuguese language through the entire country. Portugal's foreign policy to Timor-Leste could be seen as a form of neo-colonialism. Portugal, who had both money and the appearance of a close friend of Timor-Leste, have used these to convince Timorese leaders to reform its language policy.

On the other hand, Australia has been offering its educational aid to Timor-Leste because of its political and economic interest. Australia has spent a lot of money in Timor-Leste to buy friendship. It is inevitable that Australia's foreign aid has positively contributed to the human resources development of Timor-Leste, particularly helping to educate many Timorese overseas. For example, some alumnus, having graduated from Australia's universities, hold positions as Ministers or members of government. Others hold positions in national and international NGOs. Development assistance

---

<sup>170</sup> *Lusophonize is to make all Timorese speak Portuguese.*

provided by Australia and other major donor countries should have helped decrease poverty and improve the quality of education in Timor-Leste. The opposite however is happening, Australia's foreign aid is tied to its great interest in politics and economics. Therefore, Australian foreign aid in Timor-Leste is seen by many as suspicious. An obvious problem relates to the ownership of the oil field; the relationship between Timor-Leste and Australia has unpleasant aspects to do with the maritime frontier and is experiencing tough and highly tense negotiations. Yet despite almost one and half decade of efforts, the dispute remains unresolved. The Timor Gap is an oil-rich resource, which is legally owned by Timor-Leste. However, it has been exploited by Australia even before Timor-Leste gained independence from Indonesian occupation. It can be argued that bilateral aid from Australia to Timor-Leste is perhaps open to criticism and controversy, and that such aid is not always what it claims to be. The aid assistance is nevertheless given to help Timor-Leste, but solely because of Australia's economic interest in Timor-Leste's oil fields. Perhaps the billions of dollars of funds are from the oil revenue taken from the Timor Gap. Evidently, while Australia's aid to Timor-Leste has been supplied for over a decade and more than one billion dollars have been spent, Timorese are still living below the poverty line and the quality of education continues to be as poor as it was previously.

Educational aid provided by both Australia and Portugal greatly influenced Timor-Leste's education policy. Timor-Leste's basic school curriculum, for example, is entirely copied from the Portuguese system, while curriculum designers and educator experts are funded by Australia. Hence, the education sector of Timor-Leste seems, at this time, dependent on foreign aid from Australia and Portugal. The MoF confessed that Timor-Leste, on average, has received ODA of 200mUSD per annum. The continuation of poor quality education in Timor-Leste is believed to be due to a lack of coordination between donors including Australia and Portugal, who have no agreed education development plan between themselves and the government of Timor-Leste. Australia and Portugal delivered their educational aid

directly to local communities without consulting with the central government of Timor-Leste. This resulted in many primary school teachers receiving different instructions from different instructors provided by donors. The consequence is that the majority of primary school teachers are unqualified, thus feeding into the poor quality of the education system. Australia and Portugal, as developed countries, have portrayed their engagement in Timor-Leste as a benevolent or humanitarian engagement when in fact most of what is counted as ODA goes to nationals of those countries, wired back home to banks, as with the high salaries of international consultants from Australia or the hundreds of expensive Portuguese teachers sent from Portugal to Timor-Leste.

Timor-Leste needs to build everything from scratch, with no experience managing its foreign aid, including the establishment of political institutions. Although it is a sovereign nation, Timor-Leste has limited capability to persuade Australia and Portugal to negotiate fairly in complying with the country's necessities. For example, during the emergency or transitional period, Portugal and Australia delivered their educational assistance based on their wishes. Portugal, for instance, was busy training primary school teachers to be able to teach Portuguese as a move towards the adoption of Portuguese and some classroom renovations. Australia, on the other hand, focused its educational aid on repairing primary school classrooms and buildings, and providing school materials as well as offering scholarships for Timorese students to study at Australian universities. Both Portugal and Australia were already in competition in delivering their educational aid to Timor-Leste and yet failing to fulfil essential Timorese education policy needs. The Portuguese School, Escola Rui Cinnaty Dili, and the Australian establishment school, DIS, both established in 2003, were only recognised by the government in 2006. In short, I argue that educational aid always has political force and that it is therefore difficult for the recipient government to negotiate when donors are trying to achieve their own goals.

## **Potential Ways Forward**

### **Is there anything Timor-Leste could do to gain more control?**

It took a decade for the government of Timor-Leste to manage and control donor activities in the education sector. Prior to 2010, Portugal and Australia were directly offering their educational aid to the local community without central government knowledge. In other words, the government of Timor-Leste had no control over donors' activities and expenditures. It was only in 2008 that the government, through the MoE, began to coordinate with all donor providers to the education sector of Timor-Leste. The government of Timor-Leste has undertaken a number of efforts to control and cut down the country's dependence on foreign educational assistance. These efforts include the first Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030. This plan sets a framework to transform Timor-Leste from a low income country to a medium-high income country by 2030, when every Timorese person will have the opportunity to be educated and secured. The SDP 2011-2030 is the overarching framework for the Development Partners project and programmes design and implementation and re-affirms the alignment of their work with Timor-Leste's strategy plans and targets. The government of Timor-Leste and the DPs, with the private sector, are committed to working through the development policy coordination mechanism to drive planning and delivery of the all programmes.

The second effort is to use the government of Timor-Leste's National Priority (NP). The NP defines critical goals and measures progress toward those through an agreed set of monitorable benchmarks and actions outlined in the target year. Hence, DPs are required to adjust their programmes to those already outlined by the government. The third action used to manage DPs is the Internal Policy of the MoE. In 2010, the MoE of Timor-Leste issued a policy to control all donor providers to the education sector. All donor providers, including Portugal and Australia, need to consult at the



early stage and obtain approval from the MoE before the project begins. The MoE has also established a roundtable donor meeting as a coordination mechanism. Alternatively, Timor-Leste currently hires national advisors who have graduated overseas as well as those to have graduated in the country, in order to decrease the country's dependence on international advisors.

Through these efforts, the current government believed that it could effectively control entirely donor providers to the education sector in Timor-Leste including donors' activities and funding. Timor-Leste has established a forum called the Timor-Leste Development Partner Meeting (TLDPM). This is a forum that brings all donor partners in Timor-Leste and the government together to discuss donor performances in Timor-Leste. The TLDPM draws strongly upon the belief enshrined in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The TLDPM aims to build more effective and inclusive partnerships between government and development partners. The government supposed that the result of the TLDPM would have a greater impact on reducing poverty and ensure a more positive future for the people of Timor-Leste. Since December 2002, the TLDPM has sought to highlight the significance of forging development partnerships among bilateral and multilateral donors and other key development stakeholders, including civil society operating in Timor-Leste. However, numerous findings and research published show that the international educational aid to Timor-Leste failed due to lack of coordination amongst donors, government and civil societies, (Shah, 2012 & Pires, 2014, Simoes, 2014<sup>171</sup>, Wong, 2014<sup>172</sup>). In addition, even though the TLDPM has been held for 14 years since Timor-Leste gained its independence, the debate during the TLDPM in 2014 has still

---

<sup>171</sup> Simoes, P.A. (2014) *Interviewed with the Author in Timor-Leste on Foreign Aid in Timor-Lest; Pedro A. Somoes is a National Director for Multilateral Cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Timor-Leste;*

<sup>172</sup> Wong, V. (2014). *Interviewed with the Author in Timor-Leste on Australian Educational Aid in Timor-Leste.*

*Ms. Wong is the current First Secretary on Education at the Australian Embassy in Dili, Timor-Leste.*

focused on the poor coordination between international donor partners and the government. Despite the fact that donors have spent billions of dollars in Timor-Leste, Timor-Leste civil societies and some members of government remain concerned that donor partners have often delivered their assistance based on the interests of the donor, rather than being purely development driven. The country did not have a long term development framework in which DPs could operate providing them an opportunity to do what suited them, whether or not influenced by their foreign policy.

**Does Timor-Leste have enough money from its oil and gas revenue to fund its education?**

Timor-Leste in fact is an oil-rich country and its main economic hope for the future lies in massive reserves of oil and gas in the Timor Sea or Timor Gap. The oil resources, it is believed, could generate billions of dollars that could in turn be directed into the nation's economic engine. Timor-Leste could use its oil resource revenues as a form of capital that directly contributes to the country's education development. However, the country still lacks in human resources in managing and planning. Poverty and the poor quality of education mean that the country remains at third world standards, and very little has been done over the three terms of the government of Timor-Leste to ease the difficulties of the Timorese people. Many oil fields have been found in Timor-Leste's exclusive maritime territory since independence. However, these oil fields are explored by several foreign companies, mostly from Australia. After gaining independence, Timor-Leste has been prioritizing the exploration of oil and gas located in the Timor Sea as a top priority. Nevertheless, having gained independence, the country has little capacity to govern its institutions, let alone manage a billion dollar oil industry. Also, the country lacks technical expertise and capacity in important government institutions to make those institutions work and become effective. Therefore the government still need experts from elsewhere. Consequently, many international agencies and

advisors, mostly from Australia and Portugal, have been requested to assist Timorese in education development. In fact, Timor-Leste has very few experienced managers and public officials. Therefore, elite politicians take up multiple roles in the government. This triggers potential internal conflicts among Timorese policy makers, causing them to stand on the opposing side and be reluctant to argue against donors such as the Australians and the Portuguese. International advisors have greatly influenced Timor-Leste since its independence until today. Timor-Leste has hired an enormous amount of international advisors to act as mentors throughout the whole government. These advisors are mostly from Australia and Portugal and believed to heavily influence the government's decision-making, especially in the education sector. In deploying such power, powerful states such as Australia and Portugal use a variety of tactics to inhibit the ability of a relatively weak state like Timor-Leste to challenge their status quo. The result is that Australia and Portugal have been using their human resources superiority and their developed technology to suppress Timor-Leste.

Freedom for Timor-Leste means it has brought a new language but not prosperity. Timor-Leste is still one of the poorest countries in the region including in terms of its education. It imports nearly all basic goods from abroad including its all its education system from Portugal. Although the country has been independent for one and half decades, the real freedom is still far away. Timor-Leste's education system still depends upon Australia and Portugal for survival. But if the gas and oil are managed properly, the Timorese people should have a very different future with good quality education at the heart of the effort to manage themselves.

## Bibliography

- Altbach, P. (1971). Educational and Neocolonialism: A Note. *Comparative Education Review*, 15(2), 237-239. doi:10.2307/1186733
- Anderson, T. (2010). Timor-Leste: the second Australian intervention. *Journal of Australian political economy*, 58(December), 62-93.
- Appleby, R. (2006). Mobilising and Disabling the Disire for Empowerment: English and the Transition independence in East Timor. *Southeast Asia: A Multidisciplinary Journal* 6, 6.
- ASEAN. (2014). *Timor-Leste Remains Committed to Join ASEAN*. Retrieved from ASEAN Secretariat News: <http://www.asean.org/news/asean-secretariat-news/item/timor-leste-remains-committed-to-join-asean>
- Asiedu, E & Nandwa, B. (2007). On the Impact of Foreign Aid in Education on Growth: How Relevant is the Heterogeneity of Aid Flows and the Heterogeneity of Aid Recipients? *Review of the World Economics*, 143(4), 631-649.
- Assembly Constituent. (2002). *Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste*. Dili: Assembly Constituent.
- AusAID (Australian AID). (2012). *AUstralia-Timor-Leste Country Stratgey 2009 to 2014*. Retrieved from Australian Government: [www.ausaid.gov.au](http://www.ausaid.gov.au)
- Australian Government-DFAT. (2013). *Timor-Leste: How We Give Aid to Timor-Leste*. Retrieved from <http://aid.dfat.gov.au/countries/eastasia/timor-leste/Pages/how-aid.aspx>
- Australian Government-DFAT. (2015). *Aid: Development Assistance in Timor-Leste*. Retrieved from <http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/timor-leste/development-assistance/Pages/education-assistance-timor-leste.aspx>
- Australian Government-DFAT. (2015). *Timor-Leste Country Overview*. Retrieved from Development Assistnce in Timor-Leste:

<http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/timor-leste/Pages/timor-leste-country-brief.aspx>

- Ayson, R. (2007). The 'Arc of Instability' and Australia's Strategic Policy. *The Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 61:2, 215-231. doi:10.1080/10357710701358360
- Beaverford, C. (2014). Interview with the Author conducted in Timor-Leste: Dili International School (DIS). (N. Correia de Almeida, Interviewer)
- Beck, M. (2008). The context and history of the education sector in Timor-Leste. In J. Earnest, *Rebuilding Education and Health in a Post-Conflict Transitional Nation: Case Studies from Timor-Leste* (pp. 3-8). Rotterdam; Taipei: Sense Publishers.
- Benavot, A. (2010). International Aid to Education. *Comparative Education Review*, 54(1), 105-124.
- Brock-Utne, B. (1995). Cultural Conditionality and Aid to Education in East Africa. *International Review of Education*, 41(3-4), 177-197.
- Browne, S. (2006). *Aid and Influence: do donors help or hinder?* Routledge.
- Businessweek. (2000). *East Timor's Petro Trouble (int'l edition): Australia is claiming Timorese oil*. Retrieved from International -- Asian Business: <http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2000-10-29/east-timors-petro-trouble-intl-edition>
- Cassity, E. (2011). Australia Aid and the Development of Education Policy: Reframing Engagement in Papua New Guinea. In W. & Jacob, *Policy Debates in Comparative, International, and Development Education*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Coxon, E. & Cassity, E. (2011). Education in the Pacific: Rethinking Partnerships. *International Education Journal: Comparative Perspectives*, 10(2), 1-6.
- D'Aiglepie, R., & Wagner, L. (2013). Aid and universal primary education. *Economics of Education Review*, 37, 95-112.

- Da Silva Sarmiento, J. (2013). Lusophonization Returns? The condition of language policy and planning in a post-colonial plurilingual Timor-Leste. *Unpublished Thesis, University of Waikato, New Zealand*.
- Deutsch, A. (2009). *Billions in International Aid for East Timor Missing its Target*. Retrieved from Los Angeles Times: <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/sep/13/news/adfg-east-timor-money13>
- Direccao Nacional Estatistica. (2010). *Highlights of the 2010 Census Main Results in Timor-Leste*. Dili: Ministry of Finance of Timor-Leste.
- DIS (Dili Internatioanl School). (2014). *2015 Dili International School Family Hand Book*. Retrieved from [www.distimor.org](http://www.distimor.org)
- Dolven, B. Margesson, R. & Vaughn, B. (2012). Timor-Leste: Political Dynamics, Development, and International Involvement. Australia. *Congressonal Research Service Report for Congress*.
- Dos Santor, T. (1970). The Structure of Dependence. *American Economic Assosiation*, 231-236.
- ETAN (East Timor Indonesia Action Network. (2005). *Plain Facts about Australia & East Timor's Maritime Boundary* . Retrieved from <http://www.etan.org/issues/tsea/plainfact.htm>
- Ferraro, V. (1996). Dependency Theory: An Introduction. *The Development Economics Reader*, ed. Giorgia Secondi (London: Routledge, 2008).
- Freitas, A. (2014). *Timorese Students Study Illegallly in Indonesia*. Retrieved from <http://www.thediliweekly.com/en/news/news/2378-timorese-students-study-illegally-in-indonesia>
- General Directorat of Statistics. (2014). *Statistics Timor-Leste*. Retrieved from <http://www.statistics.gov.tl/>
- Government of Timor-Leste. (2014). *About Timor-Leste*. Retrieved from Government of Timor-Leste: <http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=547&lang=en>

- Gusmao, X. (2014). *Prime Minister: the 2014 Timor-Leste Development Partner Meeting*. Dili: Republica Democratica de Timor-Leste.
- Horta, R. (2012). *Timor-Leste's Language Policy: Tetum, Portuguese, Bahasa Indonesia Or English?* Retrieved from Eurasia Review: <http://www.eurasiareview.com/20042012-jose-ramos-horta-timor-lestes-language-policy-tetum-portuguese-bahasa-indonesia-or-english-oped/>
- Hudson, J. (2004). Introduction: Aid and Development . *The Economic Journal*, 114(496), F185-F190.
- Instituto Camoes. (2014). *Cooperação Bilateral Portugal - Timor-Leste*. Retrieved from Camões - Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua: <http://www.instituto-camoes.pt/timor-leste/root/cooperacao/cooperacao-bilateral/timor-leste>
- IPAD (Instituto Portuguese de Apoio Ao Desenvolvimento). (2000). *Programa Indicativo da Cooperacao Portuguesa Para Apoio a Tansicao de Timor-Leste 2000*. Instituto Portuguese de Apoio Ao Desenvolvimento (IPAD);.
- IPAD (Instituto Portuguese de Apoio Ao Desenvolvimento). (2004). *Indicative Cooperation Programme: Portugal - Timor 2004-2006*. IPAD. Retrieved from <http://www.instituto-camoes.pt/timor-leste/root/cooperacao/cooperacao-bilateral/timor-leste>
- IPAD (Instituto Portuguese de Apoio Ao Desenvolvimento). (2008). *Indicative Cooperation Programme: Portuguese -East Timor 2007-2010*. Portuguese Institute for Development Programme (IPAD).
- IPDA (Instituto Portuguese De Apoio Ao Desenvolvimento). (2011). *Portuguese Development Cooperation 2005-2010*. IPAD.
- Ishizuka, K. (2004). Australia's policy towards East Timor. *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, 93:374, 271-285. doi:10.1080/00358530410001679611
- Kelly, J. & AAP. (2010). *Australian Aid Over the Place, Says East Timor President Jose Ramos Horta*. Retrieved from Australian News:

<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/archive/politics/australian-aid-all-over-the-place-says-east-timor-president-jose-ramos-horta/story-e6frgczf-1225883177399>

- King, K. (1992). The External Agenda of Aid in Internal Educational Reform. *International Journal of Education Development*, 12(4), 257-263.
- Lancaster, C. (2007). *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics*. University of Chicago Press.
- Le Fanu, G. (2013). The Inclusion of Inclusive Education in International Development: Lessons from Papua New Guinea. *International Journal of Educational Development*, 33(2), 139-148.
- Little, I.M.D., & Clifford, J.M. (1966). *International Aid. The Flow of Public Resources From Rich to Poor Countries*. New Jersey, USA: Transaction Publishers.
- Macalister, J. (2012). Language policies, Language Planning and Linguistic Landscapes in Timor-Leste. *Language Problems & Language Planning*, 36(1), 25-45.
- Manor, J. (2007). *Aid That Works: Successful Development in Fragile State*. (J. Manor, Ed.)
- MEC (Ministry of Education and Culture). (2005). *Strategic Plan for Universal Primary Completion by 2015*. Dili: Ministry of Education and Culture.
- Millo, Y., & Barnett, J. (2004). Educational Development in East Timor. *International Journal of Educational Development*, 24(6), 721-737.
- Ministerio Da Educacao. (2012). *As Bases Legais Do Sistema Da Educacao De Timor-Leste*. Dili, Timor-Leste: Ministerio Da Educacao, Timor-Leste.
- Ministerio Finansas. (2014). *Development Report 2013*. Dili: Ministerio Finansas Timor-Leste.
- MoF (Ministry of Finance). (2013). *Republic Democratic De Timor-Leste's State Budget 2013 Development Partners. Book 5*. Dili: Ministry of Finance of Timor-Leste.



- MoF (Ministry of Finance). (2014). *State Budget 2014, Development Partners: Book 5*. Dili: Ministry of Finance, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste.
- MoF. (Ministry of Finance). (2014b). *Aid Portal Transparency*. Retrieved from [www.aidtransparency.gov.tl](http://www.aidtransparency.gov.tl)
- Nautilus Institute. (2009). *Australia and Timor's Oil*. Retrieved from East Timor: <http://nautilus.org/publications/books/australian-forces-abroad/east-timor/australia-and-timors-oil/>
- Nicolai, S. (2004). *Rebuilding Timor-Leste's Education System*. International Institute for Education.
- OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development). (n.d.). *Official Development Assistance – Definition and Coverage*. Retrieved February 10, 2015, from OECD Home: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistance/definitionandcoverage.htm>
- OECD. (2005). *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*. OECD.
- OECD. (2006). *DAC Peer Review of Portugal*. Retrieved from <http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/36780494.pdf>
- Pereira, A. (2015). *Portugal Boosts Cooperation in the Education Sector*. Dili: Media Release: Republica Democrati de Timor-Leste (RDTL).
- Pinheiro, M. F. (2014). *Timor-Leste's Road to ASEAN*. Retrieved from The Asia Foundation: <http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2014/02/12/timor-lestes-road-to-asean/>
- Pires, A. (2014). Interview with the Author conducted in Timor-Leste on Educational Aid by Australia and Portugal to Timor-Leste. (N. Correia De Almeida, Interviewer) Dili, Timor-Leste.
- Riddell, A. (2012). *The Effectiveness of Foreign Aid to Education: What Can be Learned? WIDER Working Paper*.
- Riddell, R. (2007). *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?*. Oxford University Press.
- Savage, V. (2012). *Timor-Leste Language Policy: the Boulder on the Shoe*. RSIS Commentaries: 064-12.

- Secretariat of State of the Council of Ministers. (2011). *PRESS RELEASE: Council of Ministers Meeting*. Dili: Secretariat of State of the Council of Ministers, Timor-Leste.
- Shah, R. (2012). It Takes Two or More to Tango: Partnership Within the Education Sector in Timor-Leste. *International Education Journal: Comparative Perspectives*, 10(2), 71-85. Retrieved from <http://ojs-prod.library.usyd.edu.au/index.php/IEJ/article/view/6751/7396>
- Shah, R., & Quinn, M. (2014). Mind the gap: global quality norms, national policy interpretations and local praxis in Timor-Leste. *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and*. doi:10.1080/03057925.2014.952930
- Simoës, P. A. (2014). Interviewed with the Author in Timor-Leste on Foreign Aid in Timor-Leste. (N. Correia de Almeida, Interviewer)
- Taylor-Leech, K. (2005). The Ecology of Language Planning in Timor-Leste. *Development Bulletin 68, Griffith University*.
- Taylor-Leech, K. (2007). The Ecology of Language Planning in Timor-Leste: A Study of Language Policy, Planning and Practice in Identity Construction. *Unpublished PhD Dissertation. Griffith University*.
- Taylor-Leech, K. (2011). Timor-Leste: Sustaining and Maintaining the National Languages in Education. *Current Issues in Language Planning*,. doi:10.1080/14664208.2011.589108
- Taylor-Leech, K. (2013). Finding Space for Non-dominant languages in Education: Language Policy and Medium of Instruction in Timor-Leste 2000-2012. *Griffith Institute for Educational Research, Griffith University, Queensland, Australia*.
- The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin. (2002). *Analyzing Australian Assistance to East Timor*. Dili, Timor-Leste: The Lao Hamutuk.
- The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin. (2007). *Australia Aid Should Support Timor-Leste Not Australia's Political Interests*. Retrieved from <http://www.laohamutuk.org/reports/AusAID/FTM.html>

- The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin. (2007b). Vocational Education in Timor-Leste. Dili, Timor-Leste.
- The Lao Hamutuk Bulletin. (2009). *Timor Sea Maritime Boundary: Still Not Settled*. A Briefing Paper. Retrieved from [www.laohamutuk.org](http://www.laohamutuk.org)
- The World Bank. (n.d.). *Timor-Leste: World Development Indicators*. Retrieved February 15, 2015, from The World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/country/timor-leste>
- Thiong'O, N. W. (1986). *Decolonizing the Mind: the Politics of Language in African Literature*. London: James Currey.
- Tilak, J. (1988). Foreign Aif for Education. *International Review for Education*, 34(3), 313-335.
- Timor-Leste NGO Forum. (2014). Presentation on Economic Strategic Sector. *2014 Timor-Leste and Development Partners Meeting*. Dili: Timor-Leste NGO Forum. Retrieved from Presentation on Economic Strategic Sector.
- Turrent, V., & Oketch, M. (2009). Financing Universal Primary Education: An Analysis of Official Development Assistance in Fragile States. *International Journal of Educational Development*, 29(4), 357-365.
- Universities Australia. (2012). *Australia University Engagement with Timor-Leste*. Retrieved from [www.universitiesaustralia.edu.au](http://www.universitiesaustralia.edu.au)
- Werden, C. (2009). *Australia Foreign Aid to East Timor Wasted*. Retrieved from ABC Radio Australia: <http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/onairhighlights/australian-foreign-aid-to-east-timor-wasted>
- Winthrop, R. & Matsui, E. (2013). A New Agenda for Education in Fragile States. *Working Paper 10. Center for Universal Education*.
- Wong, V. (2014). Interviewed with the Author in Timor-Leste on Australian Education Aid in Timor-Leste. (N. Correia de Almeida, Interviewer)
- World Bank. (2004). *Timor-Leste Education Since Independence from Reconstruction to Sustainable Improvement (Report No. 29784-TP)*. The World Bank.

World Bank. (2014). *Education*. Retrieved from Education For All:  
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/education/brief/education-for-all>.