The Effects of the Spatial Distribution of Moral Profiles in New Zealand on Community
Cohesion and Civic Participation

By
Caitlin L Davies

The Effects of the Spatial Distribution of Moral Profiles in New Zealand on Community
Cohesion and Civic Participation

By
Caitlin L Davies

A Thesis Submitted to
Victoria University of Wellington
in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Cross-Cultural Psychology

29 May 2014

Abstract

There is substantial evidence that individuals who share ideological beliefs tend to become geographically clustered in space (see Bishop, 2009; Haidt, 2012). The present studies were the first to assess the spatial distributions of people who share the same moral profiles in a New Zealand (NZ) general population sample. Geographic visualisation analysis was used to map the distributions of moral profiles and identify patterns of spatial clustering of these profiles. High Moralists were found to be overrepresented in rural electorates whereas Individuators were more visible in urban electorates. The spatial patterns of Moderates were less clear and require further studies. We also tested the effects of different distributions of moral profiles within NZ general electorates and our hypotheses that more clustered electorates would exhibit higher feelings of sense of community, group-based political participation, trust in community members, satisfaction with life, and desire to move, were generally not supported. At the individual level, when Moderates were in the majority in their electorates they had higher sense of community scores, and the moral profile that was in the outright minority had lower perceptions that their neighbours shared their values and beliefs. Implications for community cohesion and political conflict are discussed along with suggestions for future research in the area of space and social psychology.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor Professor James Liu for his guidance and support throughout this journey. I would also like to acknowledge Dr Chris Sibley for his generosity in allowing me access to his data and for providing some valuable feedback during the design and analysis stages of my research.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

The Effects of the Spatial Distribution of Moral Profiles in New Zealand on Community

Cohesion and Civic Participation

Social scientists have shown a renewed interest in the study of ideology during the

past decade (Jost, Nosek & Gosling, 2008). Recent work in this area has led researchers to

the understanding that there are meaningful psychological differences in the types of people

who identify with liberal and conservative ideologies (Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2008). Key

differences between liberals and conservatives have been identified in multiple domains such

as; personality, genetics, values, psychological drives and motivations, and situational factors

(for a review see Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2008). One major area of difference found within this

literature is the variance in the most fundamental views and beliefs about morality between

ideological groups (Hunter, 1991; Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009).

Hunter (1991) argues that individuals possess an impulse towards one of two world

views about morality. Some people are thought to hold a progressive (or relativist) world

view whereby morality is viewed as subjective, rational, and able to change as society

progresses. In contrast, others are more inclined towards an orthodox (or absolutist) world

view in which the moral domain is seen as fixed, social change is resisted, and order and

stability are highly valued (Baker, 2005; Hunter, 1991). Hunter (1991) theorizes that the

presence of these conflicting world views within a society can lead to political and cultural

conflict that is rooted in these competing understandings of morality and its role in communal

life.

For Hunter (1991), the root cause of political conflict between liberals and

conservatives is their disagreement over what constitutes the moral universe, and whether or

not morality can be redefined according to the prevailing ideas of the time. The conflict

created by this disagreement has the propensity to become hostile as it is not merely a conflict

over changeable attitudes on political issues, rather, it is a disagreement over these groups'

most fundamental, and non-negotiable, assumptions about reality and the role of morality in the world (Hunter, 1991).

Whilst Hunter (1991) provides an initial understanding of the unique moral viewpoints underlying liberal and conservative ideologies, his description of these differences is at an abstract level. In order to get a better empirical understanding of moral differences between ideological groups, and to further pinpoint the specific moral beliefs of liberals and conservatives, we can turn to the more recent Moral Foundations Theory (MFT: Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004).

Moral Foundations Theory

MFT posits that there are five innate moral foundations that all individuals are born with. These foundations have been labelled Care/harm, Fairness/cheating, Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and Sanctity/degradation (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Joseph, 2007). The core thesis of MFT is that while everyone possess all five of these moral foundations, the extent to which each foundation is seen as important or is emphasised depends on what virtues and behaviours are most needed to adapt to social problems prominent within specific cultural contexts (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Joseph, 2007). That is, people that grow up in different cultural settings, such as living in different nations, belonging to different ethnic or religious groups, or living in an urban versus a rural environment, all face diverse social challenges which require emphasis on different configurations of the five moral foundations.

MFT adds to earlier understandings of the types of people who identify with certain ideological groups as it allows us to move beyond the abstract realm of worldviews to isolate the specific differences in the values that ideological groups hold sacred. Graham and colleagues (2009) found that self-identified liberals and conservatives meaningfully differ in their endorsement of each of the five foundations. Conservatives tend to rate all five foundations as important, indicating that they think morals relating to both the autonomous

individual (the Care/harm and Fairness/cheating foundations) and those related to the

functioning of groups and communities (Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and

Sanctity/degradation foundations) are important. This emphasis on the group-based binding

foundations is consistent with Hunter's (1991) understanding of conservative ideology as an

orthodox way of living where tradition and hierarchical social structures are valued. Liberals,

on the other hand, tend only to rate the two individualizing foundations (Care/harm and

Fairness/cheating) as relevant to moral judgements and they appear to be ambivalent towards,

or even outright reject, the group-based foundations as relevant to communal life (Graham et

al., 2009).

Given the similarities and differences between liberals and conservatives in the

importance ascribed to each of the moral foundations, conflict between these groups can be

understood as a debate over the three group-based (binding) foundations (Haidt, 2012).

Liberals and conservatives agree that it is important to not harm one another and that

individuals should be treated fairly (although liberals rate these foundations as slightly more

important than conservatives), but they disagree over the legitimacy of the values based on

loyalty to the ingroup, respect for authority, and keeping oneself pure.

As MFT provides a framework in which political conflict between liberals and

conservatives can be understood, it allows us to understand why ideological groups tend to

vote similarly on a range of, seemingly unrelated, issues (Haidt, 2012; Koleva, Graham, Iyer,

Ditto & Haidt, 2012). In other words, knowing the moral foundations that ideological groups

hold most sacred allows researchers to predict the attitudes these groups hold on a diverse set

of moral and political issues by identifying what moral foundations such issues emphasize. A

study by Koleva et al. (2012) did find that individuals' scores on the Moral Foundations

Questionnaire (MFQ: Graham et al., 2011) predicted attitudes on a range of political issues

that have historically divided liberals and conservatives (e.g. abortion, the use of torture in

interrogation, flag burning, and gay marriage). Knowing the moral foundations that are most developed and pronounced in individuals can therefore help us understand what is driving the formation of coherent political attitudes within specific ideological groups (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2005; Hunter, 1991; Koleva et al., 2012). It is the moral underpinning of these individuals that is driving them to form political groups with a coherent set of moral and political attitudes.

McAdams and colleagues (2008) found further support for ideological groups having unique and meaningful moral underpinnings in their analysis of how liberals and conservatives narrate their lives. The researchers found that liberals focus on stories of harm and fairness whereas conservatives focus on the binding morals when discussing the most important and influential events in their lives (McAdams et al., 2008). This evidence seems to converge with the idea that liberals and conservatives have different configurations of the five moral foundations which affect how these groups view and interpret the world around them.

Although most of this research based on MFT and political cultures has been conducted in the US, Graham et al. (2011) replicated these findings in an internet sample across multiple world regions indicating the liberal-conservative differences in the emphasis placed on the moral foundations is consistent across cultures. We also conducted an independent analysis of the factor structure of the MFQ in a large New Zealand (NZ) general population sample. We found that the five factor structure replicated, as did the differences in the emphasis on the binding foundations between self-reported political liberals and conservatives (Davies, Sibley & Liu, in press). The NZ sample did, however, diverge from the US and world region samples of Graham et al. (2011) in that we did not find the expected positive correlation between liberalism and the two individualizing foundations. This suggests that whilst the pattern of differences between liberals and conservatives on the moral

foundations appears consistent across cultures, there may be variation in the scale of those differences (Davies et al., in press).

Kim, Kang, and Yun (2012) reached a similar conclusion in their comparative study of South Korean and American students where they found the magnitude of the liberal-conservative divide on the moral foundations was more pronounced in the US than in the South Korean sample. The most conservative Koreans also rated the individualizing foundations of highest importance whereas in the US sample the strongest conservatives placed more importance on the binding foundations than the individualizing foundations (Kim et al., 2012).

Moving Beyond a Dualistic Account of Moral Person-Types

A further qualification to the current literature is that although the focus of research has been the moral differences between self-identified liberals and conservatives (Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2008), a large proportion of individuals fall in the middle of the two sides, while others do not fit in either of these two dominant ideologies (Fiorina. Abrams, & Pope, 2004; Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009; Hunter, 1991). This criticism has begun to be addressed through researchers expanding their focus to include the moral profiles of a wider range of ideological groups (Haidt et al., 2009; Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012; Milojev et al., in press; Weber & Federico, 2013).

Haidt et al. (2009) conducted a cluster analysis of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire in which they identified four ideological clusters of Americans with distinct moral profiles. Two of these four profiles are indicative of the moral make-up of the liberals (labelled Secular Liberals) and conservatives (labelled Conservatives) that were identified by Graham et al. (2009). A third cluster, labelled Libertarians, was also identified and represented somewhat of a mix between the Secular Liberals and Conservatives clusters in that they scored slightly lower on the individualizing foundations than the Secular Liberals

(similar to the Conservatives), yet they scored lower than the Conservatives on the three

binding foundations (similar to the Secular Liberals). Moreover, most of the individuals who

self-identified as libertarian fell into this cluster indicating it is a unique and coherent

ideological group. Similarly, the final cluster was a hybrid of the earlier two clusters in that

they tended to rate the individualizing foundations highly, like the Liberals, yet they also

thought the binding foundations were somewhat important, like the Conservatives. This final

cluster was called the Religious Left as the majority of them place themselves to the centre or

left of the liberal-conservative ideological spectrum but they are similar to conservatives in

their levels of religious attendance (Haidt et al., 2009).

Other researchers have also worked to identify the multiple moral person types

prevalent in specific political cultures. In a rare, non-US, sample Milojev et al. (in press)

utilized latent class analysis (LCA) to identify four types of New Zealanders that possessed

unique configurations of the five moral foundations. These person types were labelled;

Individuators (similar to Secular Liberals), High Moralists (similar to Conservatives),

Moderates (somewhat similar to the Religious Left), and Neutrals (who score low on all

foundations). Individuators consisted of 19.2 percent of the sample, High Moralists were

20.1 percent, Moderates were the largest class with 49.4 percent, and the Neutrals were the

smallest class at 11.3 percent (Milojev et al., in press).

The classes found by Milojev and colleagues (in press) indicate that the moral person

types in New Zealand are similar to those found in the US as the four classes are somewhat

similar to the clusters identified by Haidt et al. (2009). Where the samples differ are in the

proportions of people that fit into each of the classes (or clusters). In the non-representative

US sample, the Secular Liberals, Religious Left, and the Libertarians were similarly

distributed with around 30 percent of individuals falling into each of these classes. The

Conservatives were the smallest group with less than half the amount of individuals as each

of the other three person types (Haidt et al., 2009). In contrast, the Moderates identified in

the NZ sample were by far the largest class and they constituted almost half of the

population. The two classes made up of the two moral person-types who have the propensity

to engage in cultural conflict constituted just 40 percent of the population combined (Milojev

et al., in press).

      The few studies conducted on ideology and moral person types outside of the US

indicate that the difference between liberals and conservatives in their ratings of the moral

foundations, especially the binding foundations, is consistent across cultures although the size

of these differences may be subject to contextual influences within nations (Davies et al., in

press; Kim et al., 2012). Moreover, the proportion of the population that fit in to each of the

moral person-types may also differ across cultures and have effects on the prevalence of

political and cultural conflict between ideological groups (Milojev et al., in press).

      Given the cross-cultural variability in the magnitude of the liberal-conservative

differences in moral profiles (e.g. Kim et al., 2012), and the findings that there are moral

profiles beyond the typical liberal and conservative person-types (e.g. Milojev et al., in

press), it is important for researchers to move towards a culturally informed, pluralistic

account of the moral domain. Most of the current literature has focused on the two moral

person-types that have the most conflicting understandings of the moral universe. Whilst this

focus is understandable, given the current culture wars political climate of the US (Hunter,

1991), confining our understanding of a nation's political psychology to the two most

conflicting types of moral people has led to an emphasis on inter-group conflict at the

expense of the study of inter-group cooperation and harmony.

      Both the cluster analysis by Graham and colleagues (2011) in the US and the latent

class analysis drawn from a nationally representative NZ sample (Milojev et al., in press)

indicate that the typical liberal and typical conservative profiles may not be the dominant

profiles in either of these two nations. This was especially true of the NZ sample where just under half of the individuals' surveyed fell into the Moderates cluster (Milojev et al., in press). Even though large proportions of individuals have moral profiles that are outside of the traditional liberal or conservative profiles, there is barely any research on these moral-person types. This is particularly the case for research on stereotypes, prejudices, and relations between these understudied moral person-types.

Increasing the study of moral person-types to include a wider range of profiles present within political cultures will be beneficial for multiple reasons. First, it will provide us with a more realistic representation of the types of people within political cultures. We cannot claim to have a thorough understanding of a nation's political psychology if we are not aware of, or do not understand, the multiple types of moral people that exist within the national political climate. Second, it could allow researchers to expand their focus beyond investigating the profiles that may polarize nations/communities to also include research on the profiles that may help bridge the liberal-conservative gap, and may bind communities together. Finally, exploring the prevalence of multiple moral profiles within nations that have unique political climates with different levels of political conflict (or polarization) may shed some light on what configurations and types of profiles within political cultures could increase the likelihood of conflict such as the culture wars, and what configurations may work to bridge gaps and promote political cohesiveness.

In sum, MFT provides knowledge of the types of people who exhibit unique moral profiles in Western democratic nations (Haidt, 2012; Milojev et al., in press). Its key contribution to the political psychology literature is that liberals and conservatives (as well as other ideological groups like libertarians) differ in the importance they ascribe to each of the five moral foundations when making moral judgements, and it is on the basis of these differences that political conflict can begin to be explained (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2012;

Koleva et al., 2012). More research is needed, however, into the multiple moral profiles

present within political cultures and the consequences of individuals and groups with these

moral profiles co-existing within such cultures.

Moral Profiles and Space

One significant factor that is thought to influence the nature of interactions between

groups and individuals with different moral profiles is the clustering of these moral person-

types in geographic space. The spatial distribution of these moral profiles has been theorized

to have effects on individual, community, and national/political wellbeing (Haidt, 2012; Iyer,

2012; Motyl, Iyer, Oishi, Trawalter & Nosek, 2014; Motyl, in press). Whilst this area of

investigation is still in its infancy, researchers have found that; individuals who feel they are

in the moral minority are more likely to want to move (Motyl et al., 2014; Motyl, in press),

ideological groups hold unique preferences for the features and moral signs in communities

they would like to live in (Iyer, 2012), and geographic variation in the moral foundations in

the US predicts citizen voting and also how representatives from specific areas behave and

vote in Congress (Jones, 2011).

What's noticeable about this early research on the spatial distributions of the moral

foundations is that all these studies have either used liberal-conservative ideology as a proxy

indicator of moral profiles (e.g. Motyl et al., 2014), or they have looked at each of the five

foundations separately (e.g. Jones, 2011). So far, no studies have observed the spatial

distribution of actual moral profiles or the effects of the moral make up of certain area units.

Examining the spatial distribution of moral profiles instead of just looking at liberal-

conservative ideology, or focusing on each of the foundations separately is important for a

number or reasons.

First, as detailed earlier, there are multiple moral profiles within Western democratic

political cultures, thus simplifying spatial analysis to a one-dimensional liberal-conservative

viewpoint means we may miss important nuances that occur when multiple types of people are clustered in space. In other words, the liberal-conservative approach is too simplistic and does not provide a realistic portrayal of the social and political world it is trying to explain.

Second, the key unit of analysis in this research is the person; thus it is important to take a holistic viewpoint of the moral realities underlying each of the person types rather than looking at each foundation in turn. Individuals do not make moral judgements on one moral concern; rather, they must consider all the morals that they ascribe importance to in order to make decisions. Humans are complex creatures and when we make political and moral decisions we draw upon all our available knowledge, experiences, and assumptions about the moral universe. Limiting our analysis to singular foundations means compromising our understanding of the person as a complex moral being.

Finally, examining moral person types will allow us to gain unique insight into the consequences of different configurations of moral profiles occupying the same geographic space. That is, it allows us to theorize about the effects of specific profiles coexisting in certain communities and to find out if there are any spatial moral configurations that could be potentially problematic. It may be that some profiles can coexist peacefully in the same space while others may be more prone to conflict. Alternatively, the proportion of each of the moral types within a specific location may prove to be a key variable in predicting community harmony or conflict. More homogenous communities (areas with large proportions of a specific moral type) could show different levels of community cohesion and group harmony than communities with a more diverse make up of moral profiles, especially if those profiles have especially conflicting moral foundations configurations.

Current Research on Spatial Clustering

One of the most fundamental concepts in social psychology is the idea that people are attracted to, and want to form close relationships with, those who are similar to themselves

(Byrne, 1971; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001; Singh & Ho, 2000). This has been

labelled the law of attraction (or the homophily principle in network research) and the basic

premise of these theories is that contact between individuals who are similar happens more

frequently than contact between people who are dissimilar (McPherson et al., 2001). In

political science literature, the homophily principle has been used to explain how individuals

that share ideologies, and basic moral beliefs, become clustered in space (See Bishop, 2009;

Motyl et al., 2014).

Bishop (2009) argues that both economic prosperity and a nation's move towards a

post materialistic society whereby self-expression is increasingly valued can lead to increased

mobility within a nation. This rise in mobility can then result in the creation of

neighbourhoods and communities that are increasingly more homogenous demographically,

occupationally, ideologically, and morally (Bishop, 2009). In fact, multiple researchers have

found that in the US, geographic polarization along ideological lines has increased

substantially as the nation has increasingly adopted post-materialistic values (Abramowitz &

Saunders, 2005; Bishop, 2009; Iyer, 2012; Stolberg, 2011 cited in Haidt, 2012).

Focusing on ideological and moral segregation, Motyl et al. (2014) found that when

an individual felt that their values did not fit with the dominant values of their electoral

district, or even university, that person was more likely to express the desire to move to a

different community. In a related study, Motyl (2014) discovered that after the 2012

presidential elections, people who supported the conservative Republican Party were more

likely to threaten to move to another country and again, this effect was attributed to an

individual's desire to belong. Finally, not only do individuals who perceive that they are in

the moral minority possess the desire to move, they also tend to move to communities who

are more similar to the person's values than the one they left (see Bishop, 2009; Haidt, 2012;

Iyer, 2012; Motyl et al., 2014).

The above evidence suggests that as nations move towards a post-materialistic values society whereby individual expression is emphasised, they are more likely to exhibit higher levels of clustering of moral person types in space (Bishop, 2009). The large majority of this research has been conducted in the US although many other nations, especially Western nations, are also high on post-materialistic values (Welzel & Inglehart, 2010), and the psychological need to belong is considered a universal trait (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Therefore, it holds that geographic segregation of ideological person types may be present in multiple post materialistic societies, such as New Zealand.

Effects of the Spatial Distribution of Moral Profiles

Given the similarities between Western democratic nations in their values and economic prosperity, we can make predictions of the effects of different spatial distributions of moral profiles in New Zealand using findings from US research. Moreover, as ideology and moral profiles are closely linked, and as much of the current research in geographic segregation has used voting patterns and ideology as the measure for spatial clustering, we can use the present knowledge as a starting point for our predictions of the effects of moral profile clustering. Effects of living in ideologically homogenous communities already identified in the literature include; increased sense of community (Anderson, 2009), more social capital and trust (Putnam, 2007), increased feelings of belonging (Motyl, 2014; Motyl et al., 2014), higher subjective wellbeing (Fulmer et al., 2010; Putnam, 2007), and increased levels of political participation (Huckfeldt, 1979; Mutz, 2002; Putnam, 2007).

Sense of community. One effect of like-minded people clustering into homogenous communities is that it has a positive effect on an individual's sense of community (Anderson, 2009; Bishop, 2009). Sense of community is defined as "a feeling that members have of belonging, a feeling that members matter to one another and to the group, and a shared faith that members' needs will be met through their commitment together," (McMillan & Chavis,

1986, p.9). The creation of a community requires a relational (or social-bonding) aspect

whereby its members share common goals, interests, and/or attitudes and beliefs. A second

way a community can be created is through a group of people sharing a common territory.

Proximity cannot, however, be the sole prerequisite to the formation of a community, the

relational aspect must also be present (Gusfield, 1975; Riger & Lavrakas, 1981).

For individuals to feel a sense of belonging to, participate in, and identify with the

community they live in, they must perceive that the community shares key values, priorities,

and commitments to particular goals (McMillan & Chavis, 1986). Given these criterion for

the creation of a community, it is evident that people living within ideologically homogenous

communities should exhibit a greater feeling of sense of community than those living in more

diverse communities where members do not share core morals and beliefs

In morally homogenous communities, individuals should have an increased likelihood

of feeling that; their local community meets the needs of its members, its members have

created and experience shared emotional connections, members recognize one another, and

members feel that they have some sort of influence over the community whilst also feeling

that the community has some influence over its members. These four facets of sense of

community have been labelled reinforcement of needs, shared emotional connection,

membership, and influence, and they are measured using the Sense of Community Index II

(SCI-II: Chavis, Lee, & Acosta, 2008). Communities that are more morally homogenous

should therefore have higher mean scores on these four facets of sense of community than

communities that are more diverse. At an individual level however, individuals who are not

in the majority of these homogenous communities should be more likely to feel like they do

not belong and are not a contributing member of their community so these people should

show the lowest scores on the four subscales of sense of community.

Social capital/trust. Living in morally homogenous communities does not only have positive effects on people's sense of community, it also can have positive effects on social capital (see Putnam, 2007). Social capital refers to the institutions and relational norms that work to create and maintain social networks within a society (Putnam, 2007). Trust and reciprocity are key indicators of a society's social capital in that the social networks created promote inter-personal trust and facilitate norms of reciprocity (Putnam, 2007). Social capital can be viewed as the glue holding societies together.

In a number of studies Putnam (2007) found that as communities became more ethnically diverse, social capital decreased. That is, the levels of in-group, out-group, and institutional trust decreased, as did the likelihood of community members working on community projects or volunteering, and lower reported feelings of political efficacy. These findings led Putnam to conclude that diversity does not lead to inter-ethnic conflict, instead it produces social isolation. As diversity increases Putnam (2007) argues that people begin to withdraw from public life meaning that have less community involvement, less commitment to neighbours and the community as a whole, and they also tend to trust other people (include members of their own ethnic group) less. Diversity then, may have negative effects on social capital.

Although studies of social capital and community diversity have focused on ethnic diversity (Putnam, 2007), it is highly plausible that same principles apply to ideologically diverse communities. That is, we can hypothesize that in morally homogenous communities indicators of social capital such as trust should be higher than in more morally diverse communities. Morally diverse communities should be characterized by lower levels of community involvement and less trust of neighbours and institutions.

Political and civic engagement. Levels of political participation and civic engagement can also be influenced by the moral and ideological profile of one's community

(Anderson, 2009). Huckfeldt (1979) argues that whilst individual factors such as social status can reliably predict political participation, contextual factors also play a role. That is, political participation is affected by the diversity levels within an individual's community. At an individual level, being in the majority or minority will also affect the extent to which an individual participates in civic tasks (Huckfeldt, 1979; McClurg, 2006; Mutz, 2002).

It has been theorized that the link between living in homogenous communities and increased civic engagement is due to the reduced exposure to dissonant viewpoints that people in these communities experience (McClurg, 2006; Mutz, 2002). Mutz (2002) argues that exposure to conflicting political views leads to political ambivalence which then results in increased uncertainty in, and a longer timeframe to make, political judgments. This process acts as a barrier to political participation, especially in campaign-related activities; as individuals tend to wait to the last minute to decide who to vote for meaning there are fewer opportunities to get involved in political campaigns (Mutz, 2002).

A second effect of exposure to conflicting viewpoints is the threat it poses to inter-personal relationships and group harmony (Mutz, 2002). In diverse settings where individuals do not agree on political issues there is no way of making decisions that everyone agrees with so people in these contexts tend to not participate, especially in acts performed in public, in an attempt to avoid conflict and maintain inter-group harmony (Mutz, 2002). When confronted with conflicting views individuals do not tend to engage in political debate rather, it appears they attempt to diminish the importance of the issue and engage in tactics to avoid making a decision (Mutz, 2002).

Residing in a homogenous community where the majority of one's neighbours share political beliefs should therefore work to protect the negative effects of exposure to dissonant viewpoints on political participation. As the proportion of individuals within a community that share the same values and political beliefs increases, self-reported levels of political

participation should also increase. Political acts performed in public such as participating in political protests, attending community meetings, and campaigning, should be most affected by the contextual factors of one's environment. Despite acts performed alone (e.g. voting or signing a petition) being less affected by the social environment, researchers have found that private acts are also strongly affected by the diversity levels of specific communities (Mutz, 2002; Putnam, 2007). Subsequently, morally homogenous communities should report higher levels of both public and private political acts. In contrast, people residing in morally diverse communities should exhibit lower levels of political participation.

Finally, individuals who perceive that they are in the minority of a community are theorized to be deterred from participating in political acts thus individuals in the minority should show lower levels of participation. This effect should be especially pronounced in the most homogenous communities where the likelihood of community members sharing a minority members views is at its lowest. It is less clear if participation will differ between minority and majority group members in communities that are less homogenous as we know from conformity studies that if a minority group member has support, even if it is not majority support, they are less influenced by the majority viewpoint (see Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; McClurg, 2006).

Desire to move. As previously mentioned, one of the most fundamental human needs is the need to feel that one belongs and when someone perceives that they do not belong in their current community, they are more likely to express a desire to move (Motyl, 2014; Motyl et al., 2014). Subsequently, the less one feels that they fit in with the dominant ideological viewpoint of their community they should report a greater desire to live somewhere else. This effect should be larger in people who are minorities in the most homogenous moral communities as these individuals should express the lowest feelings of belonging.

Wellbeing. Finally, the ideological landscape of a community can impact on the wellbeing of its members. Putnam (2007) found that perceived quality of life and levels of happiness were lower in more ethnically diverse communities. People in these communities also had fewer close friends. Huckfeldt (1979) also found that wellbeing and life satisfaction were linked with diverse communities through the relationship between diversity and sense of community. The general consensus in the literature is that when an individual's personality, values, and/or beliefs match the cultural norm, then people tend to have higher levels of wellbeing (Fulmer et al., 2010; Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005).

People living in more morally diverse communities should therefore report lower levels of life satisfaction and subjective wellbeing due to their lower levels of sense of community. Individuals that are in the moral minority within more homogenous communities should also report lower satisfaction with life and subjective wellbeing as their fundamental moral values and beliefs should be perceived to be incongruent with the community's cultural norm.

The Present Studies

Given the effects of living in ideologically homogenous communities that have previously been found in the literature, the current studies aim to replicate these findings in the New Zealand context. The present studies further extend the current literature through identifying, and studying, the spatial distributions of moral profiles (instead of the traditionally studied liberal-conservative/Democratic-Republican distribution). Whilst academics have theorized about the clustering of different moral person-types, the previous literature has used clustering of liberals and conservatives as a proxy indicator of moral clustering (e.g. Motyl et al.,2014). The current studies will be the first to assess the clustering of actual moral person-types identified in a national sample.

The present studies will add to the current US-centric literature on ideological

clustering and its effects on community cohesion, and political and individual wellbeing,

through studying the effects of spatial distributions of moral profiles in New Zealand

samples. Whilst the political landscape of NZ has many similarities to that of the US (and

other Western Democratic nations), there may be unique aspects about NZ that influence the

prevalence of moral conflict within morally clustered communities. Alternatively, taking the

study of moral clustering out of the US may shed some light on any unique aspects of the US

that may be contributing to the current culture wars climate of American political and

national life. If the findings from the US literature hold in a NZ sample it would strengthen

the theories of the effects of clustering as a possible global, or Western, phenomenon.

To test whether the previous US-centric findings as to the effects of spatial clustering

of ideological profiles hold in a NZ sample we will conduct two studies. The objective of

Study 1 is to identify whether there is spatial clustering of moral profiles in New Zealand. It

is expected that different electoral districts will be characterized by unique configurations of

the moral profiles. There should be some electorates that show evidence of clustering of the

High Moralist moral profile whereas others should show clustering of the Individuator moral

profile. It is less clear if the Moderates will be clustered in space[1]. The clustering of profiles

will be assessed using a number of techniques. First, we will calculate the proportion of each

of the moral profiles in each electoral district using a large general population sample of New

Zealanders. We will then perform a cluster analysis on the proportion of people with each of

the moral profiles within electoral districts to examine whether there are identifiable patterns

of distributions among the electorates. Finally, we will use the novel method of visually

mapping the proportion of the moral person-types by electorate. This visual representation

may convey unique information as to the patterns of spatial distributions of moral profiles in

---

[1] Note: Neutrals were excluded from the analysis due to low sample sizes thus they are not theorized about.

NZ (e.g. whether electorates close together, or with similar attributes such as urban or rural based).

Finally, Study1 will provide an initial test of our hypothesis that electorates in which a moral profile is more prevalent should show higher levels of sense of community than electorates with a more even distribution of the moral profiles. This effect is theorized to be due to more community cohesion in morally clustered electorates as there should be a dominant understanding of what the moral profile of that community is, whilst in more evenly distributed electorates there should be more debate (and perhaps conflict) between the moral profile groups over which moral profile's identity the community should adopt. These effects should be especially noticeable in electorates where one of the two most conflicting profiles (Individuators and High Moralists) is clusters and dominates the other. Again, it is less clear whether the distribution of Moderates (the largest class) will affect community cohesion. At the individual level, those in the moral minority (the non-clustered conflicting moral profile) should show lower levels of sense of community as the dominant moral identity of the community should be at odds with their own moral profile.

Following on from Study 1, Study 2 aims to assess a broader range of hypotheses about the effects of the spatial clustering of moral profiles in NZ. Study 2 will use a smaller, general population sample to assess whether the electorates with unique moral profile distributions identified in Study 1, have effects on community cohesion, trust, participation, and wellbeing. As in Study 1, it is hypothesised that electorates that are characterized by spatial clustering of one of the two conflicting moral profiles should report higher sense of community, trust in their neighbours and most people, satisfaction with life, perceived social support, political participation (especially group-based participation activities), felt belongingness in their community, and they should exhibit a lower desire to move, than those

in electorates with a more even distribution of these moral profile types. At the individual level, the minority moral profile group should score the lowest on all of these variables.

As the majority of the current literature focuses on the liberal-conservative ideological differences, we are less clear of how the proportion of moral Moderates in an electoral district will affect our variables. As Moderates are the largest class in NZ (Milojev et al., in press), we expect them to be the largest class in all the electorates but there may be some electorates with more Moderates than others. We would expect that the more Moderates in a community, the more people with this profile will report higher levels of community cohesion, participation, and wellbeing. The effects of the distribution of Moderates at the community level however, will be more of an exploratory study, as there is limited literature to base any predictions on. It may be that the Moderates act as a neutralizer, or damper, on potential conflict between the two conflicting profiles. Alternatively, Moderates may be less politically active as they have less extreme moral views, and may not be as visible in their communities meaning they have limited effect on levels of community cohesion. Finally, as Moderates are somewhat in-between the two conflicting classes, individuals in the two conflicting moral profiles may both perceive that these individuals share their own class therefore the more Moderates in the community the more they may perceive that people share their moral profile. The current studies should allow us to shed some light on the role, and effect, of Moderates in their electoral districts, and thus aid in our understanding of relations between these three moral profiles on community cohesion – something that has not been previously studied.

Study 1

The objective of Study 1 is to determine if there is evidence of clustering of moral profiles in New Zealand. This is the first study to look at spatial clustering of moral profiles in a New Zealand sample, and it is also the first study to produce a visual representation of

the distributions of moral profiles in space through mapping the prevalence of the moral

profiles within each electoral district. We expect to find some electorates where the High

Moralist class are clustered and some where the Individuators are clustered. It is less clear

whether the Moderates will be clustered in space, or if they will be more evenly distributed

across the nation. Finally, we may find some electorates in which there is a more even

distribution of the Individuators and High Moralists (the two most conflicting moral person-

types).

Assuming we find electorates with unique distributions of moral profiles, a second

objective of Study 1 is to gain preliminary insight into the effects of living in these unique

moral environments at both the individual and the community level. Specifically, we are

going to test the hypothesis that electorates that exhibit clustering of either the Individuators

or High Moralists should show higher levels of identification with their community than

electorates with a more even distribution of Individuators and High Moralists. It is expected

that this effect will be due to one of those two classes dominating the other in those

electorates meaning there is a lower likelihood of political conflict.

Finally, we expect that, at an individual level, the more people in an electorate that

share an individual's moral profile, they should identify with that community more so these

individuals should have higher scores on the Identification With All of Humanity-

Community subscale. This effect may be especially pronounced for Moderates as they may

show effects of being in the outright majority compared with constituting less than half of the

individuals in their electoral districts.

Method

Participants. Data was analysed from the 3994 participants who completed the 2012

online mid-year wave of the NZ Attitudes and Values Survey (NZAVS). The NZAVS is a

longitudinal national probability sample, although the mid-year data collected here was

supplementary and completed only by participants who provided an email address in the full

sample from the previous wave (roughly 60% of the initial sample size). Women were over

represented in the sample (63.5%), with ages ranging from 14 to 92 years (*M*=49.15,

SD=15.72). The majority of the sample identified as NZ European (90.6%), with Maori

(4%), Pacific Nations (1.8%), and Asian (3.5%) also represented. Analysis was limited to

participants who provided their address and resided in general electoral districts that had data

available from 40 or more participants. Our final sample size was 3303.

Measures.

General Electoral District. We were able to use each participant's current living

address to gain a range of geographic location details about them. We choose to use general

electoral districts for two reasons. First, electoral districts are politically meaningful area

units and each election cycle provides feedback as to the ideological make-up of the

community. Also, using electoral districts provided the smallest meaningful area measure

possible to analyse within the constraints of our limited sample size.

Moral Foundations Questionnaire. Participants completed the 30-item Moral

Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) which is split into two 15-item subscales measuring the

five moral foundations (Graham et al., 2011). The first subscale measures the relevance

individuals ascribe to each of the foundations on a 7-point response scale (anchored by 1=*not

at all relevant* and 7= *extremely relevant*). An example item is "whether or not some people

were treated differently than others."

The second subscale is made up of the more concrete moral judgement items where

participants indicate the degree to which they agree or disagree with a range of moral

statements. An example item is "Chasity is an important and valuable virtue." Cronbach's α

for the five subscales were: Care/harm (α = .65), Fairness/cheating (α = .61), Loyalty/betrayal

(α = .71), Authority/subversion (α = .75), and Sanctity/degradation (α = .84).

We used the four moral profiles (Neutrals, Moderates, Individuators, and High

Moralists) obtained from the latent class analysis of the MFQ by Milojev et al. (in press) to

identify the moral profiles of each of the participants in our sample. Due to low sample sizes

of the Neutrals class (11.3%), and lack of meaningful hypotheses about this class politically,

we excluded these individuals from the analysis.

Identification With All of Humanity (IWAH) Scale. Participants also completed the

IWAH scale (McFarland, Webb & Brown, 2012). The IWAH is a 27-item scale (most items

are anchored by 1=*not at all* and 5=*very much*) that measures how closely people identify

with all of humanity, the national group (e.g. New Zealanders), and people within their

community. For this study only the identification with community members subscale was

used (9-items). Example items in this scale include; "how close do you feel to people in your

community," and "how much do you identify with (that is, feel a part of, feel love toward,

have concern for) people in your community." Cronbach's alpha for this scale was α = .87.

Sample sizes for all the analysis groups used in this study are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Sample sizes of groups used for analyses in Study 1

Analysis	Group	*N*	Analysis	Group	*N*
Moral Profile Group	Individuators	757	Electoral Cluster	Individuator Leaning	775
	High Moralists	1695		High Moralist Leaning	786
	Moderates	780		High Moderates	1579
+1/-1 SD of Moderates in Electorate	-1	502	+1/-1 SD of Moderates for Moderate class only	-1	224
	Within 1 SD	2162		Within 1 SD	1164
	+ 1	476		+1	307

Results

Mapping the Moral Profiles. First we calculated the proportion of individuals in each of the moral profiles by electoral district. These distributions of moral profiles are presented in Table 2. We then mapped these proportions using Quantum GIS (QGIS)

Table 2.
Proportion of individuals in each class by electoral district

Electorate	N	Neutrals	Moderates	High Moralists	Individuators	Cluster
Auckland Central	102	0.137	0.422	0.078	0.363	Indiv Leaning
Bay of Plenty	48	0.063	0.646	0.25	0.042	High Moderates
Botany	51	0.098	0.569	0.314	0.02	HM Leaning
Christchurch Central	65	0.123	0.523	0.123	0.231	High Moderates
Christchurch East	37	0.027	0.541	0.297	0.135	HM Leaning
Clutha-Southland	38	0.105	0.553	0.211	0.132	High Moderates
Coromandel	49	0.082	0.571	0.163	0.184	High Moderates
Dunedin North	54	0.037	0.463	0.148	0.352	Indiv Leaning
Dunedin South	66	0.136	0.47	0.258	0.136	HM Leaning
East Coast	41	0.122	0.439	0.341	0.098	HM Leaning
East Coast Bays	58	0.172	0.466	0.172	0.19	High Moderates
Epsom	56	0.093	0.477	0.105	0.326	Indiv Leaning
Hamilton East	55	0.055	0.564	0.164	0.218	High Moderates
Hamilton West	49	0.224	0.367	0.224	0.13	HM Leaning
Helensville	58	0.121	0.569	0.155	0.155	High Moderates
Hunua	57	0.088	0.491	0.316	0.105	HM Leaning
Hutt South	79	0.114	0.557	0.139	0.19	High Moderates
Ilam	91	0.044	0.582	0.242	0.132	High Moderates
Invercargill	40	0.175	0.575	0.15	0.1	High Moderates
Kaikoura	64	0.172	0.5	0.281	0.047	HM Leaning
Mana	102	0.108	0.51	0.118	0.265	Indiv Leaning
Mangere	23	0.13	0.304	0.348	0.217	HM Leaning
Manukau East	26	0	0.462	0.385	0.154	HM Leaning
Manurewa	23	0.087	0.565	0.261	0.087	High Moderates
Maungakiekie	64	0.109	0.516	0.172	0.203	High Moderates
Mt Albert	94	0.096	0.362	0.128	0.415	Indiv Leaning
Mt Roskill	54	0.074	0.5	0.204	0.222	High Moderates
Napier	43	0.07	0.558	0.302	0.07	HM Leaning
Nelson	79	0.114	0.582	0.203	0.101	High Moderates
New Lynn	63	0.095	0.444	0.159	0.302	Indiv Leaning
New Plymouth	41	0.146	0.585	0.122	0.146	High Moderates
North Shore	98	0.112	0.531	0.173	0.184	High Moderates
Northcote	58	0.172	0.552	0.103	0.172	High Moderates
Northland	38	0.053	0.526	0.316	0.105	HM Leaning

Ohariu	118	0.144	0.568	0.102	0.186	High Moderates
Otaki	72	0.069	0.5	0.264	0.167	HM Leaning
Pakuranga	82	0.061	0.561	0.244	0.134	High Moderates
Palmerston North	65	0.154	0.569	0.169	0.108	High Moderates
Papakura	46	0.109	0.435	0.326	0.13	HM Leaning
Port Hills	69	0.043	0.536	0.217	0.203	High Moderates
Rangitata	43	0.023	0.581	0.233	0.163	High Moderates
Rangitikei	43	0.093	0.465	0.326	0.116	HM Leaning
Rimutaka	85	0.153	0.494	0.165	0.188	High Moderates
Rodney	67	0.09	0.522	0.239	0.149	High Moderates
Rongotai	112	0.143	0.42	0.071	0.366	Indiv Leaning
Rotorua	35	0.057	0.457	0.229	0.257	Indiv Leaning
Selwyn	59	0.085	0.576	0.186	0.153	High Moderates
Tamaki	84	0.119	0.548	0.167	0.167	High Moderates
Taranaki-King Country	29	0.207	0.345	0.241	0.207	HM Leaning
Taupo	34	0.029	0.559	0.235	0.176	High Moderates
Tauranga	59	0.085	0.576	0.288	0.051	HM Leaning
Te Atatu	39	0.051	0.538	0.359	0.051	HM Leaning
Tukituki	47	0.106	0.532	0.298	0.064	HM Leaning
Waikato	32	0.156	0.469	0.188	0.188	High Moderates
Waimakariri	58	0.034	0.638	0.224	0.103	High Moderates
Wairarapa	55	0.164	0.418	0.273	0.145	HM Leaning
Waitakere	54	0.074	0.519	0.148	0.259	Indiv Leaning
Waitaki	47	0.17	0.511	0.213	0.106	High Moderates
Wellington Central	154	0.201	0.383	0.032	0.383	Indiv Leaning
West Coast-Tasman	34	0.147	0.441	0.265	0.147	HM Leaning
Whanganui	49	0.041	0.49	0.327	0.143	HM Leaning
Whangarei	38	0.079	0.526	0.263	0.132	HM Leaning
Wigram	56	0.125	0.5	0.286	0.089	HM Leaning

Note: N = number of observations for each electorate, Indiv Leaning = Individuator Leaning cluster, HM Leaning = High Moralist Leaning cluster

software the proportions of Moderates, Individuators, and High Moralists, in each NZ electoral district are presented in Figures 1 to 3; darker shadings indicate a greater proportion of the moral profile in question in a given electorate. Figure 4 represents a melding of the Individuators and High Moralists maps in that the proportion of Individuators was subtracted from the proportion of High Moralists. This map allows for a visual representation of the distribution of the two most conflicting moral profiles. In this map the electorates with darker shadings showed higher proportions of High Moralists compared to Individuators whilst electorates with the lightest/no shading had higher proportions of Individuators

compared to High Moralists. Electorates in the middle of the colour scale showed a more

even proportion of these two classes.

Figure 1: Proportion of Moderates by Electorate

Figure 2: Proportion of High Moralists by Electorate

**Figure 3: Proportion of Individuators by Electorate**

Figure 4: Proportion of High Moralists Minus Individuators by Electorate

All four maps show that the moral profiles are not evenly distributed across the nation. High Moralists appear to be by clustered in the larger, more rural electorates (Figures 2 and 4) whereas Individuators appear to be concentrated in the major cities (Figures 3 and 4). It is less clear if there are any unique characteristics of the types of electorates that Moderates are overrepresented in. The results from this geographic analysis of the moral profiles in NZ indicate that there are differences in the moral composition of electoral districts thus we can compare these districts to see if the moral make-up of a district affects community spirit, political participation, wellbeing, desire to move, and trust.

Cluster Analysis. A two-step cluster analysis to determine the optimal number of clusters of the distribution of moral profiles within the electoral districts was computed using SPSS. This analysis identified three unique clusters of electorates. The mean proportion of each of the three moral profiles in these three clusters is presented in Figure 5. Cluster 1 represents electorates with a similar amount of Individuators ($M = .16$, $SD = .05$) and High Moralists ($M = .19$, $SD = .04$) whilst also exhibiting the highest average proportion of Moderates ($M = .55$, $SD = .04$). This cluster was named the High Moderate cluster.

Cluster 2 was labelled the Individuator Leaning cluster as these electorates are characterized by a large proportion of Individuators ($M = .33$, $SD = .06$) compared with High Moralists ($M = .12$, $SD = .05$). This cluster had the lowest average proportion of Moderates ($M = .45$, $SD = .05$). The final cluster was labelled the High Moralist Leaning cluster as, in contrast to cluster 2, this cluster had a disproportionally high mean proportion of High Moralists ($M = .30$, $SD = .04$). This cluster also had the lowest proportion of Individuators ($M = .12$, $SD = .05$), and a similar proportion of Moderates ($M = .48$, $SD = .07$) to cluster 2.

This cluster analysis identified three unique clusters of electorates in NZ with different distributions of moral profiles. Two of these clusters (High Moralist Leaning and

Figure 5: Mean proportion of individuals with each moral profile by electoral cluster type.

Individuator Leaning) showed a disproportionate number of individuals with the two competing moral profiles. That is, the High Moralist Leaning cluster electorates show signs of clustering of High Moralists into these geographic areas, whereas the Individuators tend to cluster in the Individuator Leaning electorates. In contrast, the High Moderates cluster is unique in its more even distribution of Individuators and High Moralists within these electorates. These electorates were also characterized by a slightly larger number of Moderates, on average, than the other two clusters.

ANOVA of the Electoral Clusters. To determine if the configuration of the moral profiles within participants' electoral districts impacts on their identification with their community, a one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted with cluster as the independent variable with three levels (High Moderates, Individuator Leaning, and High Moralist Leaning), and scores on the IWAH community subscale as the dependent variable.

It was hypothesised that due to the almost equal number of ideologically opposed Individuators and Moralists in the High Moderates electoral cluster, these electorates would show lower levels of identification with the community. The other two clusters should show similar levels of identification with community as there should be less moral and political disagreement due to the dominance of one of these moral profile types over the other in these two clusters.

The one-way ANOVA yielded a significant difference in identification with community scores between clusters, $F(2,3136) = 8.88$, p=.001, *partial η^2 = .006*, however our hypotheses were not supported. People in the Individuator Leaning electorate cluster ($M =$ 3.52, $SD = .67$) showed slightly lower mean scores on the identification with community subscale than people in the High Moralist Leaning ($M = 3.66$, $SD = .60$) and the High Moderate ($M = 3.60$, $SD = .65$) electorate clusters.

ANOVA of the Three Moral Profiles. To test whether the higher mean scores on the IWAH-community subscale for the High Moralist Leaning cluster was due to a larger proportion of High Moralists in these communities, we did a one-way ANOVA using an individual's class membership as the independent measure (Moderates, High Moralists, and Individuators), and IWAH-community mean scores as the dependent measure. We predicted that due to the High Moralist Leaning cluster being characterized by their high scores on the group-based, communal living morals, as well as being clustered in more rural areas, these individuals may have higher identification with community to begin with. In other words, the results from our ANOVA of the clusters may be an artefact of the already high IWAH-community scores of the High Moralists which are overrepresented in the High Moralist Leaning Cluster.

Our one-way ANOVA found that there was a significant difference in the IWAH-community mean scores across the three classes, $F(2, 3445) = 53.10$, p $= .001$, *partial η²* $=.03$. As expected the High Moralist moral profile group scored significantly higher ($M = 3.79$, $SD = .62$) on the IWAH-community subscale than the Individuator profile group ($M = 3.49$, $SD = .69$) and the Moderate moral profile group ($M = 3.54$, $SD = .62$). These findings indicate that High Moralists have higher mean levels of identification with their community than the other two moral profile groups, regardless of the distribution of the moral profiles within their electorates.

To test whether the electorate-level differences on the IWAH-community scale were due to High Moralists being overrepresented in these electorates we conducted a multiple regression analysis in which we controlled for the effects of the High Moralist class having the highest overall IWAH-community scores. As expected, when controlling for the effects of the High Moralist class, the High Moralist Leaning electorates no longer had significant effects on identification with community scores ($β = .014$, p $= .45$). This finding suggests that it was the overrepresentation of High Moralist in the High Moralist Leaning cluster of electorates that was driving the significantly higher IWAH-community scores in these electorates.

Effects of Moderates in a Community. Whilst the slightly higher IWAH-community scores for the High Moderates and High Moralist Leaning clusters appear to be due to High Moralists being over represented in these two clusters, an alternative (or co-occurring) explanation for these differences may be that these electorates also have higher proportions of Moderates in these electorates. It may be that the proportion of Moderates in a community may impact the relations between the other two classes (e.g. they may damper conflict and disagreement between the two most conflicting moral classes). It may also be that Moderates

may be affected by the proportion of like-minded individuals in their electorate. When they are the dominant group they may feel more secure in their community which may lead to an increase in their IWAH-community scores.

To test this, we conducted an ANOVA with the independent variable being the proportion of Moderates in an electorate. We split the electorates into ones that had less than 1 standard deviation from the mean (less than 50.8 percent), more than 1 standard deviation (more than 57.8%), and within 1 standard deviation of the mean number of Moderates by electorate. Electorates that had the most Moderates scored significantly higher on the IWAH-community subscale ($M = 3.66$, $SD = .60$) than the electorates that had an average number (within 1 SD: $M = 3.58$, $SD = .64$) of Moderates ($F(2. 3136) = 3.43$, $p < .05$, *partial η^2* $=.002$). Whilst the difference between the plus 1 SD electorates and the minus 1 SD electorates ($M = 3.58$, $SD = .68$) was not significant, there was very little difference in the mean scores for the within and minus 1 electorates, and they were both lower than the plus 1 SD electorates. This indicates that when the Moderates are the large majority in an electorate, that community has significantly higher feelings of identification with their community. These mean differences were, however, quite small in scale.

We also computed this ANOVA separately for individuals in each of the three classes. The only significant finding was found for the Moderates class, $F(2, 1692) = 4.83$, $P = < .05$, *partial η^2* $= .006$. For people in the Moderates class, when they were in the large majority (greater than 57.8%) they expressed higher feelings of identification with their community ($M = 3.64$, $SD = .58$), than Moderates in electorates with average levels of Moderates (within 1 SD: $M = 3.52$, $SD = .62$). This indicates that the geographical distribution of Moderates

within an electorate has positive effects on people in this class and their scores on the IWAH-community subscale.[2]

Correlation analyses. We also conducted correlational analysis of the difference in the proportion of High Moralists and Individuators in an individual's electorate with their score on the IWAH-community subscale. It was hypothesised that electorates with larger differences in the proportion of these two classes should have higher IWAH community scores due to a theorized lower amount of contact and conflict between these two conflict moral person-types in these electorates. The more clustered electorates were hypothesised to have higher levels of community cohesion. This hypothesis was also not supported as the correlation was non-significant indicating that the difference in the proportions of individuals within an electorate with the two most conflicting moral profiles is not related to scores on the IWAH community subscale.

Discussion

Findings from Study 1 showed that there are patterns of spatial clustering of moral profiles in New Zealand. This clustering is especially noticeable for the High Moralist Leaning and Individuator Leaning clusters in which these individuals tend to cluster in more rural and urban areas respectively. There were some electorates, however, that had a more even distribution of these two moral person-types and this allowed us to test whether clustering of moral profiles can predict scores on the IWAH-community subscale.

Using a cluster analysis we identified three distinct types of electorates with unique configurations of moral profiles. The key features of these clusters were that these groups of

---

[2] Note: we did the same analyses for all classes but the Moderates class was the only significant finding. We also conducted a correlational analysis of the proportion of individuals in an electorate that share that individuals moral profiles but again this finding was non-significant.

electorates showed either clustering of the High Moralists or Individuators, or a more even

distribution of these two profiles. We then used these clusters to test our predictions about

geographic profiles affecting how an individual feels towards their community. Our

hypothesis was not supported indicating that the type of electoral district that individuals live

in does not affect their IWAH-community scores. The electorates in the High Moralist

Leaning cluster did show slightly higher mean IWAH-community scores but regression

analysis indicated that this may be an artefact of the High Moralist class of people exhibiting

higher IWAH-community scores than the other two classes.

Alternatively, our cluster ANOVA findings may be an artefact of there being, on

average, more moderates in these electorates. That is, our results found that when Moderates

were in electorates where there were a large proportion of people that shared their moral

profile, they exhibited higher levels of identification with their community than Moderates in

electorates with an average number of Moderates. These findings indicate that the

distribution of moral profiles in a community may have effects on individual's feelings about

their community. These findings may, however, be limited to certain moral profiles (e.g.

Moderates), or they may be limited to electorates wherein an individual's moral profile is the

outright, dominant profile.

Study 1 demonstrated that there are unique patterns of geographic clustering of moral

profiles in New Zealand. It also provides initial evidence that the High Moralist class have

higher identification with community than the other 2 moral profile classes. Finally, the

hypothesised effects between clustered and more evenly distributed electorates were not

found. Identification with the community, however, is only one of the variables previously

found to be influenced by spatial clustering in the political psychology literature. Other

variables such as trust, desire to move, wellbeing, and felt belongingness were not measured

in this study. Also, the IWAH scale may not be the best measure of people's feelings towards their communities as it mainly focuses on how much one identifies with their community. Other scales that assess a wider range of factors involved in feeling a sense of community may be better measures of how people feel towards their community and other community members. We conducted a second study to address some of these limitations of study 1.

Study 2

Study 2 builds on the first study in that we collected more data from a general population sample to test a wider range of variables and hypotheses about the effects of the spatial distribution of moral profiles. It is hypothesised that people living in High Moralist Leaning or Individuator Leaning electorates should report higher feelings of sense of community, political participation (especially group based participation), trust in their neighbours, feelings of belonging in their community, satisfaction with life, perceived social support, and they should have less desire to move, than those in the High Moderates cluster. We expect these results as, in these electorates, one of the two most conflicting moral profile groups (Individuator and High Moralist) dominate the other meaning there is less likelihood of political conflict. In electorates where there is a more even distribution of these two profiles, these two groups may be more likely to be engaged in disagreement over whose moral values should take precedent.

At the individual level, it is hypothesised that the more people in an individual's electorate that share their moral profile, the higher they will score on all of the variables mentioned above. Alternatively, when individuals are in the smallest group in their electorate (e.g. High Moralists in Individuator Leaning electorates), they should report the lowest sense of community, wellbeing, participation, trust, perceived social support, and perception that

neighbours share values, scores. These individuals should also show the highest desire to move.

Method.

Participants. We analysed data from a general population sample of 390 participants who completed the majority of the survey items. Participants were recruited via an online snowball sampling method. Females were overrepresented in this sample (71.9%) and ages ranged from 16 to 83 ($M = 40.11$, $SD = 14.33$). The majority of the sample identified as New Zealand European (80.7%) and Maori made up 9.5% of the sample. Participants had resided in NZ for an average of 36.79 years ($SD = 15.83$), and the sample had a slight liberal bias ($M = 3.50$, $SD = 1.30$ on a 7 point liberal-conservative scale).

Measures.

Demographics. Participants completed a range of demographic items including; age, gender, self-identified political ideology, ethnicity, education levels, years lived in NZ, and the suburb that they currently live in (and longest lived if different from current). We were then able to use this geographic information to compute the general electoral district that each participant lived in.

Political Participation. Participants identified which political activities they had completed in the past 3 years (1 election cycle) from a list of 7 activities. Four of these activities (Voted in the last general election, voted in a local election, contacted an elected official, and signed a petition) constituted our individual-based participation measure whilst the other three activities made up our group-based participation measure (participated in a political protest, attended a community meeting, and volunteered for a political campaign).

All seven of these activities were also combined to create an overall political participation measure (α = .55).

Moral Foundations Questionnaire. Participants also completed the 15-item relevance subscale of the MFQ. We then used their mean scores for each of the moral foundations to add to the latent class analysis from the participants used in the first study (see Milojev et al., in press for details of the LCA), and obtain the moral profiles of each of our participants. Cronbach's alpha for each of the five foundations were: Harm/care (α = .75), Fairness/reciprocity (α = .77), Loyalty/betrayal (α = .76), Authority/subversion (α = .75), and Sanctity/degradation (α = .58).

Sense of Community Index II (SCI-II). For this study we used the SCI-II (Chavis et al., 2008) which consists of 24 items on a 4-point likert scale (anchored by 0 = not at all and 3 = completely) and is broken up into 4 subscales. The four subscales are reinforcement of needs (α = .82), membership (α = .84), influence (α = .84), and shared emotional connection (α = .89), with each subscale consisting of 6 items. Participants were instructed to state the degree to which each statement in the scale represented how they felt about the neighbourhood/suburb in which they live. Example items in this scale include; "Community members and I value the same things," and "I put a lot of time and effort into being part of this community." There was also a single, scale validation, sense of community item asking how important it is for participants to feel a sense of community with others in the neighbourhood/suburb that they currently live.

Trust. To measure trust, participants were asked to indicate how much they trust people in their neighbourhood on a 4-point scale (anchored by 1 = trust completely and 4 = do not trust at all).

Desire to move and felt belongingness. We used the same items as Motyl et al. (2014) to assess participants desire to move and their feelings of belonging to their community. Participants were asked to rate their level of agreement (1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree) with three statements. These statements were "I feel like I belong in my current city," "I feel like I belong in my current neighbourhood," and "I would like to live somewhere else." The first two statements were used to assess participants feelings of belonging to their current city and neighbourhood whilst the final question was our measure of desire to move.

Perceived social support. Perceived social support was measured using three items. These items are "there are people I can depend on to help me if I really need it," "There is no one I can turn to for guidance in times of stress," (reverse coded) and "I know there are people I can turn to when I need help." These items were measured on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree). Cronbach's alpha for this scale was $\alpha = .83$.

Satisfaction with life. Satisfaction with life was measured using the same two items as the NZAVS-2011. These two items are "I am satisfied with my life," and "in most ways my life is close to my ideal." These two items were measured on the same 7-point likert scale as the previous items.

Perception of neighbours sharing similar values and political beliefs. Finally, we asked participants the extent to which they agreed that most of their neighbours share the same values/beliefs, and political beliefs as themselves. These two items were also measured on the same 7-point scale.

Procedure. Participants completed this study online using qualtrics survey software. They were told the survey would take around 15 to 20 minutes to complete and were

informed they could stop the survey at any time. Participants first read an information sheet

about the survey and by clicking through to the survey; they were giving informed consent

for their data to be used in this study. Data was kept anonymous, and at the end of the survey

participants were given the option of filling in their email addresses in order to go in the prize

draw for 1 of 5 $100 grocery vouchers. These email addresses were kept separate from their

responses. This study was granted ethics approval by the Victoria University School of

Psychology Human Ethics Committee.

Sample sizes for all the analysis groups used in this study are presented in Table 3.

Results

ANOVA of Moral Profiles. First, we conducted a one-way ANOVA with the three

moral profiles as the independent measure and all our outcome measures separately.[3] As in

Study 1, we found significant differences between the three moral profiles. Individuators

reported significantly higher levels of group-based political participation ($M = .92$, $SD =$

1.08) than both the High Moralist ($M = .46$, $SD = .78$), and the Moderate ($M = .40$, $SD = .63$)

groups, $F(2, 300) = 10.76$, $p = .001$, *partial* $\eta^2 = .067$. This finding indicates that overall,

Individuators have higher average levels of participation in group-based political activities

than Moderates and High Moralists.

Individuators also showed higher levels of distrust in people from their

neighbourhood ($M = 2.34$, $SD = .72$) than High Moralists ($M = 2.06$, $SD = .52$), $F(2, 288) =$

4.31, $p < .05$, *partial* $\eta^2 = .029$. These results indicate that the Individuators, in general, have

lower levels of trust in people in their neighbourhood than High Moralists.

---

[3] We included all the outcome measures outlined in the *Measures* section but we only include the significant
findings in our results.

Finally, similar to Study 1, the High Moralists had higher mean sense of community scores ($M = 1.16$, $SD = .66$), than the Individuator moral profile group ($M = .82$, $SD = .59$). This difference was statistically significant, $F(2, 289) = 6.37$, p $< .01$, *partial $\eta^2 = .042$*. This finding was consistent with Study 1, although a more comprehensive measure of sense of community (SCI-II) was used in this study.[4]

Table 3: Sample sizes of groups used for analysis in Study 2

Analysis	Group	N	Analysis	Group	N
Moral Profile Group	Individuators	73	Electoral Cluster	Individuator Leaning	96
	High Moralists	91		High Moralist Leaning	75
	Moderates	139		High Moderates	132
Urban and Rural Electorates	Rural	44	High Moralist and Individuators Community Position	More than 10% Minority	41
	Mid-Sized	53		Within 10%	30
	Urban	206		More than 10% Dominant	93
Moderates in Majority in Electorate	Not in Majority	60			
	In Majority	79			

Effects of the distribution of moral profiles within electorates.

ANOVA of the electoral clusters. We used the electoral clusters identified in Study 1 to compute a one-way ANOVA of scores on all our dependent measures. As in Study 1, the High Moralist Leaning electoral districts exhibited higher mean sense of community scores ($M = 1.19$, $SD = .66$) than the Individuator Leaning electoral districts ($M = .82$, $SD = .49$), $F(2, 289) = 8.43$, p $= .001$, *partial $\eta^2 = .055$*. These results do not support our prediction that the High Moderate electorates should show lower sense of community scores than the other two types of electoral districts. These findings do, however, point to the High Moralists being the driver of these electoral level differences as individuals with this moral profile are most prevalent in the High Moralist Leaning districts. If the Moderates were contributing to this difference then we may have expected the High Moderates districts to also score higher

---

[4] This result was also found across all 4 subscales of the SCI-II (membership, influence, shared emotional connection, and reinforcement of needs). When all 4 subscales show similar results we only report the overall sense of community results.

on the SCI-II than the Individuator-leaning electorates in which the Moderates are the least

prevalent but this was not the case.

The only other outcome variable in which significant differences between electoral

clusters were obtained was in participants desire to move, $F(2, 287) = 3.66$, p $< .05$, *partial η^2*

$= .025$. People living in the Individuator Leaning clusters reported a higher desire to move

($M = 4.41$, $SD = 1.79$) than individuals living in High Moralist Leaning clusters ($M = 3.59$,

$SD = 2.11$). Again, these results do not support our predictions of which clusters should

differ and the findings may be due to High Moralists having higher sense of community

which may lead to a decreased desire to move.

Effects of the proportion of Moderates. To separate out the effects of each of the

three moral profiles on electoral districts scores on our outcome measures we first looked at

the effect of the proportion of Moderates within a district. Using the same method as Study

1, we split the electoral districts into those that had below 1 standard deviation from the mean

(less than 50.8%), within 1 standard deviation, and greater than 1 standard deviation (more

than 57.8%) of Moderates. We then used these three groups of electorates as our levels in a

one-way ANOVA. We found significant differences for overall sense of community, desire

to move, perception that neighbours share ones values/beliefs, and trust in neighbours, but

these effects disappeared when we controlled for the effects of the Moderate class differences

across these communities.[5]

To examine the effects of more like-minded individuals in their community for the

Moderates class we split Moderates in our sample into two groups. The first group were

Moderates living in electorates where they were the outright majority (50% proportion of

---

[5] When Moderates were excluded from the analysis these significant results disappeared indicating they were driven by the effects of more like-minded individuals for Moderates in these communities.

Moderates or more), and the second group were Moderates in electorates where they were not the outright majority.[6] It was expected that Moderates in electorates where they are the outright majority should report higher sense of community, trust, satisfaction with life, perceived social support, felt belongingness, perception that neighbours share values/beliefs, and lower desire to move, than Moderates where they are not in the outright Majority.

In our analysis only two of these predictions were supported. Moderates living in the moral majority reported higher feelings of shared emotional connection (subscale of SCI-II; $M = 1.16$, $SD = .68$), than those not in the majority ($M = .93$, $SD = .62$), $F(1, 135) = 4.13$, p < .05, *partial η^2* = .03.   Additionally, Moderates in the moral majority reported less desire to move ($M = 3.59$, $SD = 2.05$), than Moderates not in the moral majority ($M = 4.31$, $SD = 1.77$), $F(1, 135) = 4.57$, p < .05, *partial η^2* = .033.

Effects of distribution of the two conflicting moral profiles by electoral district. To test the effects of the distribution of the Individuator and High Moralist profiles on our outcome variables, we coded whether the High Moralists and Individuators were the minority group (smallest proportion of the 3 profiles), the clustered group (at least 10 percent more than the other conflicting moral profile e.g. 10% more High Moralists than Individuators), or whether there was a more even distribution of these profiles (within 10% difference). We then conducted a one-way ANOVA using these three groups for all individuals and then again for just individuals in these two conflicting moral profile groups[7].

There were no significant differences found when all classes were included in the analysis. The only significant difference found was for an individuals perception that their

---

[6] We split the file this way as splitting Moderates into the 3 *SD* groups yielded too small of a sample size for the plus 1 SD group (*N* = 9).
[7] We also did a correlation of the difference in the proportion of these two classes in an electorate but found no significant results. Additionally, we conducted a correlation with the proportion of people that share an individual's class in their electorate but again found no significant results.

neighbours share their values/beliefs, $F(1, 169) = 3.56$, p < .05, *partial η^2* = .04. For High

Moralists and Individuators, when they were in the clustered profile in their electorate (10%

or more higher proportion of like-minded individuals than individuals in the competing moral

profile group), they reported a higher perception that their neighbours shared their

values/beliefs ($M = 4.14$, $SD = 1.57$), than those who were in the minority moral profile

group ($M = 3.42$, $SD = 1.32$). This supports our hypothesis that individuals in the minority

moral profile group in their electorate would perceive that their neighbours share their values

and beliefs less. This finding was, however, our only significant result indicating that our

other hypotheses were not supported.

Urban-Rural Effects. Given that the majority of our hypotheses were not supported

and few differences were found between individuals in electorates with different distributions

of moral profiles, we decided to test whether, in New Zealand, the traditional urban-rural

divide would provide a better predictor of electoral differences in our outcome variables.

Further, as the mapping of the moral profiles by electorates seemed to show a clear urban-

rural divide underlying unique moral profile distributions, it holds that this may be the factor

underlying electoral differences.

We coded each electorate as being either urban (consisting of a major city/district

within a major city), rural (electorates with a dominant rural population), and mid-sized

(electorates consisting of mid-sized towns e.g. Invercargill, and not a large rural population).

We found there were significant differences between the type of electorate and sense of

community ($F(2, 289) = 10.30$, p = .001, *partial η^2* = .067), desire to move ($F(2, 287) = 6.30$,

p < .01, *partial η^2* = .042), trust of people in the neighbourhood ($F(2, 288) = 8.43$, p = .001,

partial η^2 = .055), and perceptions that one's neighbours share their values and beliefs ($F(2,$

$289) = 9.74$, p <.01, *partial η^2* = .034).

Individuals living in rural electorates had higher mean scores on the SCI-II ($M = 1.33$, $SD = .59$) than those in the urban electorates ($M = .90$, $SD = .58$) indicating that people in urban electorates tend to have higher overall sense of community than those in more urban electorates. Those in rural electorates also had higher mean scores on their perception of neighbours sharing their values ($M = 4.50$, $SD = 1.35$) than those in urban electorates ($M = 3.76$, $SD = 1.36$).

People in urban electorates reported higher desire to move ($M = 4.24$, $SD = 2.02$) than those in both the mid-sized electorates ($M = 3.41$, $SD = 2.15$) and those in urban electorates ($M = 3.22$, $SD = 2.10$). Finally, those in rural electorates reported less distrust in people in their neighbourhood ($M = 1.86$, $SD = .35$) than those in the mid-sized ($M = 2.24$, $SD = .59$) and urban ($M = 2.26$, $SD = .62$) electorates. These findings indicate that people in rural electorates have higher levels of sense of community, trust in their neighbours, perception that their neighbours share their values, and they have a lower desire to move than those in more urban/city-based electorates.

Discussion.

The aim of Study 2 was to expand Study 1 beyond just looking at individuals sense of community to include multiple other variables hypothesised to be affected by the distribution of moral profiles within a community. Consistent with Study 1, we found that the High Moralists had higher overall levels of sense of community than the other classes. High Moralists also showed higher levels of trust in their neighbours than Individuators, whilst Individuators tended to participate in group-based political activities more than the High Moralists.

We also conducted multiple other analyses of the effects of the distribution of moral profiles in one's community on their scores on our dependent measures. Overall, we did not find the hypothesised results. As in Study 1, comparing the three electoral clusters found that

the High Moralist leaning clusters tended to have higher sense of community scores than the other two, but this effect may be due to High Moralists being overrepresented in these electorates. We also examined the effects of the proportion of Moderates in an electorate, as well as the effects of the distributions of the High Moralists and Individuators within electorates.

Our results indicate that the positive effects on sense of community, and decreased desire to move, in electorates where the Moderates are the majority, only apply to the Moderates themselves. In other words, the proportion of Moderates in an electorate only had effects on Moderates scores on these two indicators. We also examined the effects of being in the outright minority (the smallest group) and, again, the effects found only held for those in the two most competing, and minority, moral profile groups. The only significant effects we found in this analysis was that when High Moralists and Individuators were in the dominant class in their electorate (disregarding the Moderates), they had a higher perception that their neighbours shared their values and beliefs.

Finally, given our lack of significant findings and the results from our visualisation analysis of the profiles in Study 1, we decided to test the effects of living in urban, mid-sized, and rural electorates. It is in this analysis that we found the biggest differences between electorates. People in rural electorates tended to reported higher levels of sense of community, trust in people in their neighbourhood, perceptions that neighbours share their values, and lower desire to move, than those in more urban electorates. These findings indicate that the traditional urban-rural political divide in New Zealand may be a better predictor of community, political, and individual, wellbeing and participation, than the distribution of moral profiles in one's community. These findings may also underlie the higher sense of community exhibited by High Moralists as High Moralists tend to cluster in more rural electorates.

General Discussion

Overall, our findings suggest that space does matter. We used both cluster analysis and geographic visualisation techniques to examine the distribution of moral profiles by NZ electoral district and found unique distributions of moral person-types. We found that there were patterns of spatial clustering of moral profiles in NZ with the most notable pattern being that Individuators tended to cluster in urban areas and High Moralists tended to cluster in more rural areas. The Moderates did show some evidence of clustering, as they were not evenly distributed throughout the nation, but it is unclear what their specific patterns of clustering are. As there was evidence of spatial clustering of moral profiles, our hypothesis that moral profiles would be clustered in space was supported.

We also found that the distribution of profiles in an individual's electorate does have some effects on their sense of community. Although the overall moral profile of an electorate did not appear to affect that entire electorate's sense of community, participation, satisfaction with life, desire to move, or trust, we did find significant effects when examining the effects of an individual's position in their community. That is, at the individual level, we found that when the Moderates were in the outright majority in their electorate they exhibited higher feelings of sense of community, and expressed lower desire to move than Moderates in electorates where they were not in the outright majority. For the two smaller, but more conflicting, moral profile groups, when they were in the minority (10% less individuals from their own class than that of the conflicting class) in their electorate, they perceived their neighbours shared their values/beliefs less indicating that these individuals have accurate perceptions of the values of their neighbours. This result, however, was the only significant effects found of being in the minority group.

In sum, our community-level hypotheses relating to the effects of the moral make-up electorates were not supported. The more rural electorates, as well as the cluster of

electorates, where High Moralists were overrepresented and Individuators underrepresented did exhibit higher feelings of sense of community but this effect was most likely due to the High Moralists having higher overall sense of community. We found more support for our individual-level hypotheses as we found some effects of being in the outright majority (Moderates) or dominating the conflicting moral profile group (Individuator and High Moralist groups) on sense of community and perception that neighbours share one's values and beliefs. Most of our hypotheses were, however, unsupported as we did find significant results for many of our outcome variables, and even when we did find effects they were usually quite small in magnitude. Space does seem to have some effect, but not as big of an effect as we hypothesised.

Implications

The lack of significant findings in our studies has multiple implications for the study of morality, moral profiles, community cohesion, and space. First, using multiple moral profiles rather than focusing on just self- identified liberals and conservatives, or people who vote for the two major political parties, allowed us to examine the effects of previously unstudied moral profile groups. The focus of previous studies on the two most polarizing person-types (liberals and conservatives; e.g. Anderson, 2009; Bishop, 2009; McMillian & Chavis, 1986; Motyl et al., 2014), may have led to an overstatement of conflict in the literature. If we had limited our study of spatial clustering of moral profiles to the two most conflicting moral classes, we would have missed the Moderates class which constituted almost half of the sample population. Including the Moderates in our analysis allowed us to examine the effects of the proportion of Moderates in an electorate on both the community, and individuals within electorates, as well as get more information on the Moderates themselves. Moderates provided some of the most interesting theoretical findings in our studies as we found this moral profile group differed in their sense of community and desire

to move depending on whether or not they were in the outright majority in their electorate. This is a unique addition to the literature.

A further addition to the literature gained from studying multiple moral profile groups is that it shifts some of the focus of research away from conflict between liberals and conservatives. That is, with the addition of the Moderates moral profile, most of the hypothesised effects of clustering of liberals and conservatives were not found. It may be that being the dominant group, as well as possessing a moral profile somewhat in between the conflicting High Moralist and Individuator profiles, Moderates may act as a buffer to potential conflict in their communities. Although we were unable to ascertain whether Moderates have this effect, our lack of significant findings appears to indicate that further study on the role of Moderates, and their interactions with other moral profile groups in their community is necessary.

A second implication of our research is that our studies show that clustering provides some positive benefits for the group that is clustered. Much of the previous literature (e.g. Bishop, 2009; Hunter, 1991) has focused on the negative effects of clustering of like-minded individuals on intergroup relations, but our findings suggest that there may also be positive effects. Specifically, the Moderates showed positive effects of being in the outright majority indicating that the more individuals that shared their moral profile in their community, the more positive they felt towards their community, and the less desire they had to move. The two smaller classes also showed effects of being in the minority compared with being the larger of these two moral profile groups in their electorate. Again, the more individuals in these communities that shared their class, and the more secure they felt in relation to potential threats from the conflicting class, the more positive they felt towards their community. These results show that there are positive aspects of clustering for the clustered groups in an

electorate, and this may increase clustering in the future if individuals are seeking out these

positive effects when choosing where to live.

Our findings that there are positive effects of Moderates being in the majority, and

also of the High Moralists and Individuators not being in the outright minority, in their

electorates has practical implications for policy makers and community leaders. As

individuals appear to want to cluster with other like-minded people, this may mean that in the

future communities may become more clustered in space due to self-selection of the moral

profiles types. Whilst this clustering appears to have positive effects for the moral profile

group that is clustered, it could, concurrently, have negative effects on the minority moral

profile group(s) in the community. Policy makers and community leaders will therefore need

to work to balance out the positive effects on community cohesion of the clustered group

with trying to reduce any possible negative effects of this clustering on other moral profile

groups. If positive interactions can be encouraged between the different moral profile

groups, some of the negative effects of being in the ideological minority previously reported

in the literature (e.g. Bishop, 2009; Huckfeldt, 1979; Putnam, 2007) may be able to lessened.

Another theoretical implication of our research is that it highlights the importance of

space as a predictor, or mediating, variable in social science research. Whilst some

researchers have emphasised the importance of space in social relations (e.g. Latane, Liu,

Nowak, Bonevento & Zheng, 1995), it has been a largely understudied area in social

psychology. Although we did not find the hypothesised effects of clustering of moral profiles

on community cohesion, wellbeing, and political participation, we did find that moral profile

groups do appear to cluster. We also found electorates differed in their distributions of the

moral profiles and these differences appeared especially meaningful between urban and rural

electorates. As electorates differed in the proportion of each of the moral profiles, further

studies should be conducted to get a better understanding of the effects of these electoral

profiles on community cohesion, conflict, and individual wellbeing. Our study provides an initial exploration into this area but much more research is needed before we have a good understanding of the effects of community profiles.

Given the differences in the electoral profiles of urban and rural electorates in NZ, researchers should take into consideration geographic location when selecting samples, especially for social science research. As NZ universities and research institutions are almost exclusively based in cities, effort should be made to include samples beyond the immediate, and more convenient, city population available to researchers. If we only sampled city populations, Individuators would be overrepresented in these samples and High Moralists would be underrepresented meaning our findings may not generalize to the wider population. High Moralists have different understandings of the moral and political world than Individuators therefore if we don't sample areas in which they live, our understanding of the NZ psyche, and groups values may not be representative. Social scientists should therefore aim to include geography when considering sample selection.

A final theoretical implication of the current research is that our findings do not support the findings found in previous US-centric literature. Previous studies on the impact of clustering of ideological groups has almost exclusively focused on the US thus taking these theories outside of the cultural context in which they were formed allows us to test the universality of some of their claims. Whilst NZ is a Western, democratic, English speaking nation, whose politics can be sorted along a liberal-conservative (or left-right) dimension, it also differs from the US in important ways. NZ is a much smaller nation, has a multiparty political system, and has a different historical and political background than the US, thus testing theories of spatial clustering in NZ provides unique insight into cultural-variability in the clustering of moral profiles in space.

One possible explanation for our lack of significant findings is that NZ is much smaller than the US. With its much larger land mass, the US provides opportunities for its population to geographically separate themselves from dissimilar others. The US can be divided into numerous geographic regions with unique political sub-cultures (Lieske, 2010; Miller, Barker & Carman, 2006) thus if individuals, or groups, perceive that their morals and values do not fit with their current community, they can move to a new region that better fits their values.

In contrast, NZ is made up of a much smaller population and land mass therefore opportunities to move and segregate yourself from dissimilar others are much more limited. Individuals may choose to move between urban and rural areas depending on how well their values fit with these areas but moving between cities, or from one rural region to another, will probably not change how well your moral profile fits with the community norm. That is, as all the major cities in NZ are disproportionality filled with Individuators and rural areas are characterized by large proportions of High Moralists, moving between these two area types will not change the degree to which your moral profile is represented. Further, other factors such as education and job opportunities are likely to be driving moves from rural to urban areas thus individuals in NZ are more likely to have to interact with dissimilar others whereas in the US, there are more liberal and conservative major cities and universities allowing for more moral/ideological segregation. Even if New Zealanders wanted to geographically segregate themselves, it is not plausible to do this, unless perhaps they wanted to move overseas. NZ is just too small and compact to achieve the degree of spatial separation that the US enables.

A second explanation for NZ not producing the expected results is due to the nature of the NZ political system. In the US, there is a clear two-party system with the Democratic Party representing liberal world views and the Republican Party is aligned with more

conservative values (Abramowitz, & Saunders, 2005). NZ, on the other hand, still has two

dominant political parties with the Labour Party being to the left of the political spectrum and

the National Party falling to the right, but the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral

system allows for multiple parties to be represented, and has forced coalition governments.

The NZ electoral system is therefore much less defined by ideological lines, with many of the

smaller parties (e.g. The Maori Party, The Greens, and NZ First), harder to place on a liberal-

conservative spectrum as they tend to represent certain interest groups (e.g. the Maori

population) rather than a specific liberal-conservative ideological viewpoint. The salience of

the liberal-conservative divide evident in American politics is thus much smaller in the MMP

NZ political system.

      New Zealanders are not forced to choose between two polarized parties representing

the two liberal and conservative world views (see Hunter, 1991). Rather, NZ voters choose

between the major political parties that are much more centrist than their US counterparts

(but still fall along the liberal-conservative spectrum), or smaller, parties that represent a

wider range of special interests. This means that ideology and morality may not be the

dominant determinant of how the NZ public votes. As the NZ political spectrum is less

definable along clear moral and ideological lines, voters are subject to much less political

conflict along highly partisan and moralized lines, and it is harder for individuals to clearly

classify the morals that people who vote for different political parties hold. In the US,

knowing if someone is a Democrat or Republican tells you a lot about their moral world view

and their position on a range of issues (see Bishop, 2009; Hunter, 1991) whereas in NZ you

may not be able to do the same. In fact, it is not yet known whether people with different

moral profiles meaningfully differ in who they support in elections. Future research should

therefore assess the degree to which NZ voting can be explained by the moral profiles

individuals have, and whether members of the public can accurately identify people with

different moral profiles in their community. With the lower salience of moral and ideological divides in NZ, New Zealanders may not be as good as Americans at discerning the moral profiles of others, and knowing who they vote for may not give as much information. In sum, the moral profile groups in NZ may not be as coherently articulated, understood, and visible, as they are in the US, and this may be affecting how New Zealanders feel about others in their community.

Our findings suggest that whilst ideology, and moral world views, may be a good predictor of community conflict in the US, there may be differences that affect the relationship between space and community cohesion across nations. Some cultures may be more prone to solve conflict through spatial segregation whereas others may not have the capacity to do this. Further, moral profiles and world views may be more salient, and form distinct and identifiable political groups, in some nations more than others. Future research should therefore work to determine how meaningful moral profile groups are within nations, and how good the general population are at distinguishing between individuals in each of the groups. This would give us a better understanding as to why we did not find the hypothesised effects in our NZ sample. It could just be that moral profiles are not salient, or important, parts of our identity thus we do not judge people and our community based on these configurations of the moral foundations.

Limitations/Future Directions

Whilst our studies provide an initial insight into the spatial distribution of moral profiles in NZ, there are a number of limitations and potential reasons why our studies may not have yielded our expected results. First, we may not have chosen the most meaningful measure of space or clustering in our studies. Also, our sample sizes may have been too small, we did not include measures of community conflict, and we did not look at institutional or community-level indicators of political and community health.

A major area of consideration for both the current study and future studies is what is the best, most meaningful, unit of space to use to measure community cohesion? In the present studies we were limited to electoral district by our sample size, but we also theorized that electoral level districts may be a meaningful unit of space given its political implications and use in previous research. Our lack of significant findings may be due to using too large of an area unit (especially in regards to rural electorates). Also, the electoral unit may not always be meaningful to our NZ participants.

One issue with our studies related to our spatial unit of analysis is that whilst we used electoral district to classify individuals that lived in different types of moral electorates, our dependent measures were not specifically related to the electoral community. In other words, the measures we used to assess trust, desire to move, feeling of belonging, and sense of community, for example, did not specify electoral district as the measure of community. Some of our questions asked specifically about neighbours, people in the neighbourhood, people in your town/city, or just "community" in general. Our measures and area unit variable therefore do not match up as most of the electoral districts are larger in size (approximately $N = 60\,000$) than the communities participants would have had in mind when answering the questionnaire. The distributions of profiles by electorates may therefore not be an accurate representation of the distribution of profiles within an individual's immediate neighbourhood/community.

Using electoral districts as the unit of analysis may also not provide a meaningful measure of community in the New Zealand context. In NZ, people do not tend to define their community by electoral district as these are only really used during elections to vote for an electorate representative. More commonly used measures of community in NZ would be neighbourhoods (or suburbs) in the bigger cities, towns/cities, and possibly provincial areas (especially in rural areas). These more commonly used ways of defining community would

provide a better measure of meaningful communities that participants actually relate to thus future studies should look into these different levels of community.

Using smaller, more meaningful measures of community would also account for the possible confounding factor of minorities clustering within larger area units. Previous research has found the minorities tend to cluster within communities (Putnam, 2007), thus the clustering of minorities within electorates may dampen the negative effects of being in the electoral minority. Our studies did not allow us to look into smaller-scale distributions and clustering thus we cannot ascertain whether minorities are clustering within cities and/or neighbourhoods. Future research should therefore focus on gaining a more nuanced understanding of these smaller-scale clustering patterns of the moral profiles. Further, decreasing the size of the area unit may also yield some communities where the Moderates are not in the majority, or at least do not dominant the other two profiles by so much. Further, it would allow us to add Neutrals to our analysis as our sample was too small to include these individuals in our analyses.

Whilst our initial findings did not support our hypotheses at the electorate level, future research should not abandon this unit of analysis altogether. Future work in the field should aim to integrate studies of clustering at the more micro neighbourhood levels, as well as the bigger electorate and provincial levels. This would give us a comprehensive understanding of the clustering of moral profiles at a number of levels and we would be able to examine the effects of clustering on multiple scales. Also, although the electorate level may not be very meaningful at present, it could become more meaningful in the future. If electorates do become more polarized, and elections become more closely fought out within electorates, it could cause conflict within electorates, especially when the winner gets have a say in defining the core values and symbols in that electorate. This is not presently an issue in NZ, and the electoral system in NZ may prevent this from becoming an issue in the future, but in

other nations with more zero-sum style electoral systems (e.g. the US) the electorate level of analysis may be, or become, especially meaningful depending on the national politics.

A second limitation of our study was that we did not include measures of conflict between the moral profiles groups. Our measures allowed us to examine our participants' feelings of community cohesion, political participation, wellbeing, and trust in people in their community, we did not include any specific measures of conflict between moral profile types. Future research needs to assess how people perceive relations between the moral profile groups in their communities and whether levels of trust and community spirit apply to all people in their community or just to people who share their moral profile type. That is, whilst communities may show feelings of community cohesion, we cannot conclude that these communities do not also experience conflict, especially between people and groups with different moral profiles. It should be a priority of future research to look into the presence, and effects, of conflict between moral profile groups within communities.

Related to the lack of conflict measures in our study, another limitation is that we did not include indicators of community cohesion and conflict at the public level. One of Hunter's (1991) key claims about the culture wars in the US is that it is most prominent in the public realm. He argues that individual differences in attitudes are smallest at the individual level, but in the public realm there is clear cultural conflict between individuals with different world views. Given Hunter's (1991) argument about the influence of the public realm in cultural conflict, it is important for researchers to consider public realm indicators of community conflict. That is, our studies may have understated the degree of disagreement, and negative effects of clustering, as we did not study any public indicators of cultural conflict. Although we are not aware of any available indicators of conflict in the public realm, future researchers could use conflict between elites (e.g. church leaders, community leaders, politicians) within communities, or analysis of community media (e.g. Newspapers)

to get initial indicators of conflict within the public realm and allow us to have a better understanding of conflict within communities.

Whilst our studies provide an understanding of the distribution of moral profiles in NZ at the current time, we are not able to ascertain whether or not NZ is trending towards increased spatial segregation of moral profiles. Longitudinal studies will be needed to assess the migration patterns of the moral profiles types and to measure whether NZ is becoming increasingly clustered. Our findings suggest that the more people that share your moral profile in your electorate, the less desire you will have to move, thus these people may be the least likely to move, and individuals who are in the minority may move more. If these migration patterns do occur, NZ will become more spatially organised by moral profile type and we will be able to determine the effects of this increased clustering. NZ may not appear to be in a state of culture wars now, but if these migration patterns are occurring, we may be moving towards a future of cultural and political conflict.

Although we can theorize about cultural differences in the effects of spatial distributions of moral profiles between NZ and the US, further research is needed to more directly address these differences. Whilst our hypotheses were formulated from US findings, our studies differed from previous research in our use of moral profiles instead of the liberal-conservative divide, and our methods and analyses differed from those used previously. To get a more realistic portrayal of the similarities and differences between the US and NZ, we would need to repeat the study in a US context, using moral profiles as our participant variable. This would allow us to directly compare the proportion of individuals in each of the profile types, find out if there are any unique moral profiles in either culture, and more accurately determine the differences in the effects of clustering of the profiles between the two nations. Using profiles obtained from LCA may show that the US is similar in its proportion of Moderates to NZ indicating that these cultures are similar and that the US

literature may have overstated the degree of moral polarization through using just liberal and conservative ideologies to group participants. Alternatively, different distributions of the moral profiles in the US may give unique insight into the role and functioning of Moderates within communities (especially if they are not as large a group in the US), and also the interactions between all the moral profile groups.

Finally, a key area for future research in this area should be to obtain better conceptualisations/definitions of morally homogenous/clustered communities. With the addition of a third moral profile group in our analysis, we could not simply look at the differences in proportions of liberals and conservatives in our sample; we had to include multiple moral profiles. Including multiple moral profiles made it difficult to determine which electorates were clustered, and which were not, especially with the finding that Moderates were the largest group in all of our electorates. This means that the more homogenous communities were those where Moderates were in the majority and this limited our ability to test for the effects of homogenous communities with the other moral profiles. To address this issue we used multiple methods of analyses in our studies such as comparing the difference in the number of the two conflicting moral profile groups, looking at the effects of more or less of each of the profile groups in electorates, and coding who was in the outright majority and minority within electorates. These methods may not be the best ways to assess homogeneity of communities with multiple moral profiles therefore future researchers may be able to provide better ways of = analysing the clustering of moral profiles within communities.

Conclusion

The present studies provided an initial exploration in to the distribution of moral profiles in a New Zealand sample, and the effects of these distributions at both the electorate (community) level, and at the individual level. We found that there were patterns of spatial

distribution but future researchers should work to gain a better, more nuanced, understanding of these patterns at a smaller unit of space in which the specific community is meaningful, and has social functionality, to the individuals in it. Researchers should especially focus on the Moderates moral profile group as we understand very little about them, their patterns of clustering, and the effects they have within their communities. We know slightly more about the Individuators and High Moralists in that they seem to distribute themselves according to the traditional urban-rural divide but much more, in-depth research is needed to gain a realistic picture of the clustering of these profiles, what happens when they interact, and their feelings when they are in the minority or a more majority group within their community.

Further we found limited effects of an individual's position in their community relative to the proportion of their own, and other, moral profiles present but future research should look to incorporate measures of community conflict, and institutional indicators of community conflict/dominance of one group's values within meaningful community areas. Finally, our findings suggest that space is an important variable in social psychological research thus researchers should consider it as a potential causal, or mediating, variable in their research whilst also taking into consideration spatial distributions of person-types when collecting representative samples.

References

Abramowitz, A., & Saunders, K. (2005). Why Can't We All Just Get Along? The Reality of a Polarized America. *The Forum*, *3*. doi:10.2202/1540-8884.1076.

Anderson, M. R. (2009). Beyond Membership: A Sense of Community and Political Behavior. *Political Behavior*, *31*, 603–627. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11109-009-9089-x.

Baker, W. (2005). Social Science in the Public Interest: To What Extent Did the Media Cover "Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America"? *The Forum*, *3*. doi:10.2202/1540-8884.1077.

Baumeister, R., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation. *Psychological Bulletin, 117,* 497-529. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.117.3.497.

Bishop, B. (2009). *The big sort: why the clustering of like-minded America is tearing us apart* (1st Mariner Books ed.). Boston: Mariner Books.

Byrne (1971). *The Attraction Paradigm.* New York: Academic Press.

Chavis, K M., Lee, K S., & Acosta, J D. (2008). The Sense of Community (SCI) revised: The reliability and validity of the SCI-2. Presented at the 2nd International Community Psychology Conference, Lisbon, Portugal.

Cialdini, R. B., & Goldstein, N. J. (2004). Social influence: Compliance and conformity. *Annual Review of Psychology, 55,* 591-621. doi: 10.1146/annuarev.psych.55.090902.142015.

Davies, C. L., Sibley, C. G., & Liu, J. H. (in press). Confirmatory factor analysis of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire: Independent scale validation in a New Zealand Sample. *Social Psychology.* doi:10.1027/1864-9335/a000201.

Fiorina, M. P., Abrams, S. L., & Pope, J. C. (2004). *Culture War? The myth of a polarized America.* London: Longman.

Fulmer, C. A., Gelfand, M. J., Kruglanski, A. W., Kim-Prieto, C., Diener, E., Pierro, A., & Higgins, E. T. (2010). On "Feeling Right" in Cultural Contexts How Person-Culture Match Affects Self-Esteem and Subjective Well-Being. *Psychological Science*, *21*, 1563–1569. doi:10.1177/0956797610384742.

Graham, J., Haidt, J., Koleva, S., Motyl, M., Iyer, R., Wojcik, S. P., & Ditto, P. H. (2013). Moral Foundations Theory: The pragmatic validity of moral pluralism. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 47,* 55-130. doi: 10.1016/B978-0-12-407236-7.00002-4.

Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Liberals and Conservatives rely on different sets of Moral Foundations. *Personality Processes and Individual Differences, 96,* 1029-1046. doi: 10.10337/a0015141.

Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2011). Mapping the moral domain. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *101*, 366–385. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0021847.

Gusfield, J. R. (1975). *The community: A critical response.* New York: Harper Colophion.

Haidt, J. (2012). *The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion.* New York: Pantheon.

Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2007). When morality opposes justice: Conservatives have moral intuitions that liberals may not recognize. *Social Justice Research, 20,* 98-116. doi: 10.1007/s11211-007-0034-z.

Haidt, J., Graham, J., & Joseph, C. (2009). Above and below left-right: Ideological narratives and moral foundations. *Psychological Inquiry, 20,* 110-119. doi: 10.1080/10478400903028573.

Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2004). Intuitive ethics: How innately prepared intuitions generate

      culturally variable virtues. *Daedalus*, 133, 55-66. doi:10.1162/0011526042365555.

Huckfeldt, R. R. (1979). Political Participation and the Neighborhood Social Context.

      American Journal of Political Science, *23*, 579–592. doi:10.2307/2111030.

Hunter, J. D. (1991). *Culture wars: the struggle to define America*. New York: Basic Books.

Iyer, R. (2012, July 13). Where to live? Liberal, conservative, & libertarian criteria differ.

      YourMorals Blog. Retrieved from http://www.yourmorals.org/blog/2012/07/where-to-

      live-liberal-conservative-libertarian-criteria-differ/

Iyer, R., Koleva, S., Graham, J., Ditto, P., & Haidt, J. (2012). Understanding libertarian

      morality: The psychological dispositions of self- identified libertarians. *PLoS ONE, 7,*

      e42366. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0042366.

Jones, B. (2011). Mapping Morality: Congressional District-level Measures of the Moral

      Foundations, 1–34. Presented at the American Politics Workshop, UW-Madison, WI.

Jost, J. T. (2006). The end of the end of ideology. *American Psychologist*, *61*, 651–670.

      doi:http://dx.doi.org.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/10.1037/0003-066X.61.7.651.

Jost, J. T., Nosek, B. A., & Gosling, S. D. (2008). Ideology: Its resurgence in social,

      personality, and political psychology. *Perspectives of Psychological Science, 3,* 126-

      136. doi: 10.1111/j.17456916.2008.00070.x.

Kim, K. R., Kang, J.-S., & Yun, S. (2012). Moral Intuitions and Political Orientation:

      Similarities and Differences Between South Korea and the United States.

      Psychological Reports, *111*, 173–185. doi:10.2466/17.09.21.PR0.111.4.173-185.

Koleva, S. P., Graham, J., Iyer, R., Ditto, P. H., & Haidt, J. (2012). Tracing the threads: How

      five moral concerns (especially Purity) help explain culture war attitudes. *Journal of

      Research in Personality*, *46*, 184–194. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2012.01.006.

Kristof-Brown, A. L., Zimmerman, R. D., & Johnson, E. C. (2005). Consequences of

individuals' fit at work: A meta-analysis of person-job, person-organization, person-

group, and person-supervisor fit. *Personnel Psychology, 58,* 281-342. doi:

MacPherson, L. (2013, October 7). *Number of Electorates and Electoral Populations: 2013

Census.* Retrieved from

http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/population/census_counts/NumberofElecto

ratesandElectoralPopulations_MR2013Census.aspx.

McAdams, D. P., Albaugh, M., Farber, E., Daniels, J., Logan, R. L., & Olson, B. (2008).

Family metaphors and moral intuitions: How conservatives and liberals narrate their

lives. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *95*, 978–990.

doi:http://dx.doi.org.helicon.vuw.ac.nz/10.1037/a0012650.

McClurg, S. D. (2006). Political Disagreement in Context: The Conditional Effect of

Neighborhood Context, Disagreement and Political Talk on Electoral Participation.

Political Behavior, *28*, 349–366. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11109-006-9015-4.

McFarland, S., Webb., & Brown, D. (2012). All humanity is my ingroup: A measure and

studies of identification with all humanity. *Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology, 103,* 830-853. doi: 10.1037/a0028724.

McMillian, D. W., & Chavis, D. M. (1986). Sense of community: A definition and theory.

Journal of Community Psychology, 14, 6-23. doi: 10.1002/1520-6629.

McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Cook, J. M. (2001). Birds of a feather: Homophily in

social networks. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *27*, 415–444. doi:

10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.415.

Milojev, P., Osbourne, D., Greaves, L., Bulbulia, J., Wilson, M. S., Davies, C. L.,…Sibley,

C. G. (in press). Right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation predict

different moral signatures. *Social Justice Research.*

Motyl, M. (in press). If he wins, I'm moving to Canada: How Obama's re-election increased Romney supporters migration desires. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy.*

Motyl, M., Iyer, R., Trawalter, S., & Nosek, B. A. (2014). How Ideological Migration Geographically Segregates Groups. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 51,* 1-14. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2013.10.010.

Mutz, D. C. (2002b). The Consequences of Cross-Cutting Networks for Political Participation. *American Journal of Political Science*, *46*, 838–855. doi:10.2307/3088437.

Putnam, R. D. (2007). E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, *30*, 137–174. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9477.2007.00176.x.

Riger, S., & Lavrakas, P. (1981). Community ties patterns of attachment and social interaction in urban neighbourhoods. *American Journal of Community Psychology, 9*, 55-66. doi: 10.1007/BF00896360.

Singh, R., & Ho, S. Y. (2000). Attitudes and attraction: A new test of the attraction, repulsion and similarity-dissimilarity asymmetry hypotheses. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 39,* 197-211. doi: 10.1348/014466600164426.

Stolberg, S. G. (2011). You want compromise? sure you do: News analysis. *New York Times,* pp. SR.5.

Weber, C. R., & Federico, C. M. (2013). Moral Foundations and heterogeneity in ideological preferences. *Political Psychology, 34,* 107-126. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9921.2012.00922.x.

Welzel, C., & Inglehart, R. F. (2010). Changing mass priorities: The link between modernization and democracy. *Perspectives of Politics, 8,* 551-567. doi: 10.1017/S1537592710001258.