

# INFELICITIES IN AGRARIA

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## Abstract

In his study *Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities: Utopias of the Pali Imaginaire*, Steven Collins aptly argues that as society transitioned from the nomadic to the agrarian, *imaginaires* were constructed to provide ideological buttresses for the new political order. Such an *imaginaire* revolved around a set of felicities, that is to say, supplementary imaginary worlds, that promised post-mortem rewards which compensated for worldly injustice. Collins takes as his paradigmatic case study the Pali Buddhist world, and in this case, the *imaginaire* constituted centres on *nirvana*. As working parts of this *imaginaire*, the various felicities provided an incentive for adhering to socially acceptable behavior, and thus helped maintain stability by compensating those who suffered the costs of the agrarian social arrangement.

Collins argues that similar systems of felicities could be found in other agrarian states. In a previous paper, I applied Collins's theory to Latinate Christianity, with surprising results. Collins's theory was correct, in that Latinate Christianity did share a similar felicity structure; however, Latinate Christianity was also greatly preoccupied by Hell, and often contrasted felicities with infelicities. In Collins's schema, by contrast, there is little room for infelicities.

In this thesis, I intend to re-examine Collins's argument for the Buddhist case, expanding his vision of the Buddhist *imaginaire* to include a set of infelicities and the structures they constitute. Thus, this study will compare infelicities from both the Buddhist *imaginaire* and the Latinate Christian *imaginaire*. A comparative study presents the potential to create a hypothetical structure of infelicities, that may be applicable to infelicities presented in religions outside of Buddhism.

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## Introduction

During the second semester of my final year, I was required to read *Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities: Utopias of the Pali Imaginaire* by Steven Collins. As prescribed reading, this text presented a daunting task; even more daunting was unravelling Collins's seemingly complex argument. However, instead of experiencing the confusion I feared, I found myself being drawn into Collins's well-written and thought-provoking study, and this prompted me to write my final essay for that course on the topic of 'Imagining Heaven in Agraria'. This was my first attempt to apply Collins's argument regarding felicities to Latinate Christianity, in agrarian Europe. Even after completing this essay, however, I still had many questions that required further investigation in relation to Collins's argument. I was particularly interested in how Collins's argument could be expanded or altered to include hells and other infelicities post-mortem fates in the Buddhist and Latinate Christian *imaginaires*. The present thesis is the result of my enquiries into Collins's argument, and of my interest in Buddhist cosmology and imagined worlds, inclusive of the beings that exist in such worlds. In this thesis, I will argue for the expansion of Collins's proposed *imaginaire* to include infelicities.

Before I further discuss my intentions, I will outline the limitations and scope of this thesis. First, I will address the geographical regions and time-frames covered by my study. Second, I will address the limitations of my own academic abilities. I turn first to the geographic and chronological scope of this work.

In this thesis, I frequently use the term 'Agraria' to talk of a place. However, Agraria is not a place; rather, it is a term that can be applied to the geographical regions of Asia and Europe. My study of Buddhist infelicities spreads from Southern India and Sri Lanka across to Thailand and

up into China and Japan. This may seem an impossibly broad scope for a project of this size. However, it is my intention to survey Buddhist infelicities broadly, as opposed to focusing on a particular region. In doing this I hope to create a study that is useful to the study of religion, as opposed to just the study of Buddhism.

Part of this study is also comparative, and set in the Latinate Christian world, which geographically stretches in my study from the Middle East (the origination point of Christianity), across to Turkey and up into continental Europe and across even to Ireland. Once again, this is broad geographical area of study, which attempts to survey the range of infelicities offered by the Christian *imaginaire*, rather than focus on the specifics of a particular culture's interpretation of infelicities. Not only is my study broad geographically, it also covers a wide expanse of time, given that Agraria is not time specific, but refers to a period that humanity entered globally. However, it should be noted that humanity did not all enter Agraria at the same, and therefore, we cannot use Western constructs relating to time or history to analyse it. Therefore, this thesis will not be defined by dates.

This thesis is also limited by my own academic abilities, particularly in terms of languages and research resources available for this study. I am only able to read in English and French, neither of which are primary languages in the area of my study. As a result, I have primarily relied on translations or secondary sources that reference primary texts. The study of Buddhism also poses a challenge in that a very large quantity of texts is available, and I was thus only able to survey a very small selection of texts.

I will give fuller definitions of terms later in this Introduction, but first, I will provide an immediate, brief definition here of two words that will appear frequently throughout the

Introduction itself. The term ‘Agraria’ refers to a specific time period, defined not by dates but by certain civilizational features.<sup>1</sup> *Imaginaire* refers to any texts and ideas that create, discuss or propagate any imaginary supplementary world or worlds.<sup>2</sup>

When I examined Collins’s argument in *Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities: Utopias of the Pali Imaginaire* (henceforth referred to as ‘Nirvana...’), I uncovered what I argue are two significant flaws. First, Collins does not discuss unfortunate rebirth destinies, such as rebirth in hell. I therefore asked where and how unfortunate rebirth fates constituted and contributed to the *imaginaire* proposed by Collins. Collins makes a robust argument that the felicity system and the Pali *imaginaire* acted as a stabilising force throughout the South East Asian Buddhist world. However, against Collins, I argue in this thesis that the Buddhist *imaginaire* is not constituted only by felicities. Further, Collins argues that felicity-type structures and *imaginaires* are found in all Agrarian societies. This being the case, his argument also requires alterations to allow for the fact that infelicities, in addition to felicities, feature in *imaginaires* throughout the Agrarian world.

The felicities of the Buddhist *imaginaire* are primarily preoccupied with eudemonia—human happiness or flourishing in both worldly life and post-mortem fates. Happiness in the felicitous realms reflects types of happiness and prosperity experienced on earth, but on an exorbitant scale, as well as types of special happiness not available on earth. In contrast, infelicities are primarily concerned with states of ill-being, predominantly in the afterlife as punishment for past sins. Although some of these punishments do reflect tortures and types of violence encountered on earth, many represent a special type of violence or a dramatic increase in the level of violence over those found or even physically possible in earthly human existence.

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<sup>1</sup> Steven Collins, *Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities, Utopias of the Pali imaginaire* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1998), 6-7.

<sup>2</sup> Collins, *Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities*, 1.

A second flaw in Collins's argument (albeit a less important one) is that Collins, I argue, implies that elite belief in supplementary post-mortem worlds was weak.<sup>3</sup> Based upon my previous study of Christian elite belief in felicities, I argue that Collins perhaps over-simplified the complexities of elite beliefs. In this thesis, I will examine texts and other ancient narratives in order to argue that the Pali Buddhist and Christian elite maintained belief in both felicities and infelicities.

In this thesis, I will discuss characteristics of Buddhist infelicities, in order to provide an insight into the rich and complex worlds of Buddhist infelicities, while expanding and improving upon Collins's hypothesis. In addition, I will take up Collins's hint that his structure of felicities applies to other, non-Buddhist Agrarian societies. I hope that my twofold expansion of Collins's argument to encompass infelicities, and non-Buddhist cases will create a more general and applicable structure of felicities and infelicities, with broader use in Religious Studies as a whole.

My study will be structured as follows.

First, I will begin with an overall assessment and summary of Collins's argument. I will provide a detailed summary of his definitions, his minor and major arguments, and the weaknesses I detect in those arguments. This summary section will also include a short summary of my previous thesis 'Imagining Heaven in Agraria', which will pave the way for my critique and subsequent argument for correctives and supplements to Collins's theory.

I will then begin my argument for the inclusion of infelicities into the schema of imaginary supplementary worlds found throughout Agraria. I will first describe the infelicities of the Buddhist *imaginaire*. Here, I will define and discuss three infelicitous post-mortem fates in all. However, the primary focus of my study of Buddhist infelicities will be the Buddhist hells. I have chosen to

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 6.

focus on the hells because they constitute the most significant part of the Buddhist *imaginaire*, although that is not to say other infelicitous states are not important. Buddhist hells also serve as a useful point of comparison to Latinate Christianity, thus preparing us for the comparative section of my study. My aim in providing detailed descriptions of the infelicities in the Buddhist *imaginaire* is to suggest that the complex world of infelicities may have constituted a larger part of the Buddhist *imaginaire* than the felicities.

In the second section of this thesis, I will provide a contrast to the Buddhist *imaginaire* by outlining infelicities in the Latinate Christian *imaginaire*. This *imaginaire* is limited to pre-Reformation Christianity, and will serve my larger argument as an instance of another Agrarian society in which infelicities arguably also constituted a large part of the *imaginaire*. Due to the historical context surrounding Christianity and its descent from Judaism, this section will include references to early Judaic imaginings of the underworld that later informed Christian visions. As stated above, Collins envisages his hypothesis to apply to multiple Agrarian societies. In the comparative component of this thesis, I hope to sketch a typology that will be potentially broad enough to encompass all infelicities found in Agrarian societies.

I will conclude my study with a more general discussion of the ways we think about infelicitous post-mortem fates, and how both Buddhist and Christian societies have structured such worlds. A large part of this final section will consider how infelicities contribute to maintaining stability through violent means, and what could be broadly described 'scare tactics'. This discussion will thus expose another significant flaw in Collins's argument, which is that in only discussing felicities, he presents felicities as the only factor motivating the maintenance of social order. I argue that when we include infelicities into the schema of imaginary supplementary worlds, we see that the social order in Agrarian systems of government was in fact more complex



than Collins proposes. In this section, I hope to explore how cosmology affects this world social order, showing that while other worlds seem separate from our world, in Agrarian societies they had great affect not only on the governing systems of that particular society, but on the realities of daily life.

### Summary of Collins's argument and key terms

For the purposes of this thesis, I will define 'Agraria' as it is described by Steven Collins in 'Nirvana...' The Agrarian period is characterised by the transition of traditionally nomadic hunter-gatherer groups towards settled agricultural societies.<sup>4</sup> This transition required a coordinated and cooperative effort, as food and other resources such as land were claimed by particular groups, as opposed to previous conditions in which land was occupied periodically by various nomadic groups.<sup>5</sup> 'Ownership' brought about conditions such as poverty and servitude, and arguably, this can be considered as a type of feudalism, broadly defined, which is found throughout the Agrarian period.<sup>6</sup>

The advent of Agraria resulted in the restructuring of society into larger groups outside of the immediate and extended family traditions of nomadic culture.<sup>7</sup> This restructuring resulted in disparity and disadvantaged many, while elevating a minority to elite status. Agraria re-organized society into increasingly large-scale groupings, i.e., 'Big Men' systems or chiefdoms, which

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

operated under kingdoms, which operated in turn under empires, as regional and transregional regimes spread throughout India, Sri Lanka and across to South East Asia.<sup>8</sup> Large expansive territories were governed by 'Big Men', and such territories, and various smaller chiefdoms, extended outward from the central main polity of the 'Wheel-turning King' or Emperor (such rulers are referred to as *cakkavattis*).<sup>9</sup> Agrarian societies and their governing bodies can be characterised by power oscillating between a strong central power base and a weaker external power base.<sup>10</sup>

Agraria was dynamic and ever-changing, containing sprawling urban centres, villages and the countryside, while encompassing civilians of all backgrounds under a central ruling power. In order for such large polities to function, some form of governing body was required. Collins argues that stability was maintained by 'some mixture of routinized and bureaucratized military and/or political power'.<sup>11</sup> The political power base of the Agrarian state tended to dominate the region through violent means, taxation and the right to draft labour and form militia.<sup>12</sup> Through these means, the elite were able to enforce the law—arguably, laws which were most beneficial to the elite—and ensure that their rule continued. Collins argues that an ideology is often employed by the elite which 'justifies' or 'legitimizes' the social status quo (though he concedes that this point is debatable).<sup>13</sup> The elite class extract resources and goods from those referred to as the non-elite, who offered up such resources as tribute to the elite and the state. Another term for this particular governing system is 'tributary state'.<sup>14</sup> This term is used in reference to the divide between the tribute-givers and the tribute-takers, and at times, it also refers to subsidiary states of a particular

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

empire, who offer up resources in order to maintain peace.

The notion of the 'Agrarian' is particularly key in this study, as this is the period in which humanity arguably entered civilization. Collins argues that it is during this period that complex *imaginaires* were created and transmitted across cultures. Agraria is not confined to a specific time frame, in the sense that it cannot be set by dates. Collins argues that *imaginaires* remained conceptually static throughout the Agrarian period. However, I will argue that over time and across different cultures, *imaginaires* did in fact evolve, and became increasingly more complex and detailed.

Collins employs another unusual but useful term, which I have already mentioned, the concept of the *imaginaire*. Jacques Le Goff provides the initial foundation for Collins's use of the term *imaginaire*. His definition is this:

Where it has a slightly more precise sense of a non-material, imaginative world, constituted by texts, especially works of art and literature...such worlds are by definition not the same as the material world, but in so far as the material is thought and experienced in part through them, they are imaginary in the sense of being false, entirely made up.<sup>15</sup>

Hubert and Mauss provide a further argument for the concept of the *imaginaire* in their statement: 'Religious ideas exist, because they are believed; they exist objectively, as social facts.'<sup>16</sup> An *imaginaire* is a sphere that operates within a civilization, which is constituted by texts and other forms of media, such as architecture and art, that communicate ideas or concepts to the

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>16</sup> Steven Collins, *Nirvana: Concept, Imagery, Narrative*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 4.

citizens of the state.<sup>17</sup> *Imaginaires* are constructed, maintained and instantiated by the ruling elite, which is composed of two sub-groups: the political elite, made up of kings, emperors and chiefs; and the religious elite, i.e., priests and the wider monastic community.<sup>18</sup> Collins argues that it is 'a plausible hypothesis to suggest that [the *imaginaire*] provided a 'discursive arena for ruling elites to both propagate the Grand Narratives of society and soteriology which articulated their power, and to exclude others from that arena...'.<sup>19</sup> *Imaginaires* and the space they created allowed for a limited power base that was exclusive of a large percentage of the populace, but also provided an arena in which both types of elites were able to criticise one another.

*Imaginaires* emerged amid the Agrarian elite and filtered downwards and outwards to the non-elite classes. 'Nirvana...' refers only to the Pali Buddhist *imaginaire*, 'a discursive textual world available to the imagination of elites, and gradually others, in the pre-modern Agrarian societies of Southern Asia.'<sup>20</sup> Collins argues that the discourse of felicity, along with Pali Buddhist ideology in the general sense 'helped justify the extraction of tribute by ruling elites'.<sup>21</sup>

In this thesis, I will follow Collins's definitions of the terms, as well Collins's general argument that felicities served the ruling elite to maintain social order. However, I will go beyond Collins in applying this argument to infelicities, and to both the Buddhist and Christian *imaginaires*. As I have stated, I intend to challenge Collins's argument, but I mean to do only in the sense that it does not include infelicities and is therefore incomplete.

Above I have outlined the key terms and concepts required for this thesis along with a summary of Steven Collins's argument. This has provided the basis for my study and the extension of Collins's proposed theory of felicity. I now turn to the second part of my thesis in

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<sup>17</sup> Collins, *Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities*, 18.

<sup>18</sup> Collins, *Nirvana: Concept, Imagery, Narrative*, 5.

<sup>19</sup> Collins, *Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities*, 16.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

which I will survey a series of infelicitous rebirth destinies found in the Buddhist *imaginaire* which will provide evidence for my claim that infelicities were a part of the Buddhist *imaginaire*.

## Part I

### Buddhist Infelicities

## Introduction: Some doctrinal background to the Buddhist infelicities

The first Chapter of this thesis will focus on infelicities of the Buddhist *imaginaire*. In order to discuss these Buddhist infelicities, it is necessary to have an understanding of how karma (*kamma*), rebirth and *puñña* (sometimes known in English as ‘merit’) work in the Buddhist mind, as these three concepts affect one’s rebirth and whether they experience a felicitous or infelicitous rebirth. The first section of this Chapter will define and discuss how each concept is vital to understanding the Buddhist infelicity structure. Following this section, I will discuss each infelicitous fate in detail, describing the state in which one exists, how one comes to be reborn in such a state, focusing on the types of sin and behaviours that lead to rebirth as an animal, *peta* or in hell. I will also discuss how each infelicity has developed over time and culture, as arguably, there is variance across the geographical region that I have surveyed. This Chapter on Buddhist infelicities intends to demonstrate that infelicities inhabit a very large, complex and detailed world that must be considered when discussing the Buddhist *imaginaire*. The spread of infelicities and their constant presence in Buddhist doctrine amongst the multiple Buddhist traditions is another marker of their importance in the overall *imaginaire*. I will discuss each rebirth fate in hierarchical order from least terrifying fate to the absolute worst possible rebirth. This set of descriptions will provide the basis for my later discussion of infelicities, and the impact they have on governing systems in Agaria.

As I stated above, infelicities are the opposite of felicities, in that infelicity is a general term that denotes any and all forms of unhappiness, ill-health or suffering. Buddhist cosmology

envisions that each being experiences an infinite number of rebirths and redeaths. As a result multiple infelicities exist in the Buddhist *imaginaire*. Infelicities in the Buddhist *imaginaire* are all unfortunate or even ‘evil’ rebirth destinies. The three evil rebirth destinies found in the Buddhist *imaginaire* are rebirth as an animal—or, more aptly, ‘beast’; rebirth as a *peta*—sometimes referred to as a hungry ghost; or rebirth in hell as a hell-being.<sup>22</sup> There is some debate as to whether a fourth rebirth fate known as an *asura* exists; this is a demon or titan-like being. Due to the contestability of this destiny, I will not discuss this rebirth in my study of Buddhist infelicities.

Rebirth, *kamma* and *puñña*, are all terms and concepts that are important to define in the study of felicitous and infelicitous post-mortem experiences in the Buddhist *imaginaire*. I will provide definitions for each in turn.

### Rebirth

Wendy O’Flaherty claims the ‘theory of rebirth is based on the moral quality of previous lives’.<sup>23</sup> The theory of rebirth affirms that life is cyclical and constant, death followed by (re)-birth, repeated until nirvana is attained. Nirvana thus can be understood as ‘the transcendence of both life and death’.<sup>24</sup> All beings in the Buddhist cosmos are subject to *samsara*—transmigration between life and death through one of the five or six rebirth destinies. The five or six destinies and realms are: hell-being, *peta*, animal, *asura* (titan, warring gods), human or *deva* (heavenly gods).<sup>25</sup> Rebirth is complicated by the addition of *kamma*, which can be considered a moralising system. I now turn to the description of that concept.

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<sup>22</sup> Richard F. Gombrich, *How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teachings* (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), 83.

<sup>23</sup> Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty, *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Tradition*, Berkley, California: University of California Press, 1980), xi.

<sup>24</sup> Collins, *Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities*, xi.

<sup>25</sup> Collins, *Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities*, 299.



## Karma

*Kamma* is best understood as actions that affect potentials in the inner unconscious life which manifest in future results.<sup>26</sup> Actions that create *kamma* are physical, verbal or mental; one's thoughts and speech can directly impact one's *kamma*.<sup>27</sup> *Kamma* operates on a law of causality, in which actions from one's past affect one's present, and actions in one's present affect one's future.<sup>28</sup> *Kamma* then affects one's birth and individual status in life, as defined by one's previous actions. This is in opposition to society determining one's social status, such as the caste system of Vedaism, the other prevalent belief system present at the advent of Buddhism. *Kamma* can be divided into two types, fixed and unfixed. Fixed *kamma* is that which is effectual in the present, in contrast unfixed *kamma* may present results at any time, in the present or in future rebirths.

Below are two descriptions of *kamma* by A. K Ramaniya and Charles Keyes

A. K Ramaniya

1. Causality (ethical or non-ethical in relation to previous lives)
2. Ethicization (belief that good or bad acts result in actions in this life or future life)
3. Rebirth.<sup>29</sup>

Charles Keyes

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<sup>26</sup> Doniger O'Flaherty, *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Tradition*, xix.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. xi.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Doniger O'Flaherty, *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Tradition*, xi.

1. Explanation of present circumstances with reference to previous actions. (inclusive of actions prior to birth)
2. Orientation of present actions towards future ends.
3. Moral basis on which actions both past and present is predicated.<sup>30</sup>

The above listings or descriptions of *kamma* demonstrate how *kamma* has been ethicized and that all *kamma* relates to all actions, be they moral or immoral. By ethicizing *kamma*, rebirth provides an explanation of the personal circumstances of each individual, while placing the blame firmly on the individual for their circumstances. This then orientates future behaviour towards that which is considered socially acceptable thus preventing socially corrosive behaviour and maintaining stability.

### *Puñña*

In addition to *kamma*, special types of action are able to generate *puñña* or merit.<sup>31</sup> Tommi Lehtonen claims that *puñña* is part of a moral or 'social system which uses sanctions for enforcing and reinforcing social discipline and conformity'.<sup>32</sup> *Puñña* is received when one partakes in actions that are 'in accordance with social standards', or specific religious acts or rituals.<sup>33</sup> In particular, giving to the *sangha*, the Buddhist monastic order, or engaging in particular ritual, meditation and/or prayers, are actions that are able to generate *puñña*. At this point I will not expand as to

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., xix.

<sup>31</sup> Tommi Lehtonen, "The Notion of Merit in Indian Religions," *Asian Philosophy* 10 (2000): 189.

<sup>32</sup> Lehtonen, "The Notion of Merit in Indian Religions," 190.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

how this affects the structure of Agrarian society. In my discussion of *peta*, I will argue that *puñña* and gift giving constitutes a significant part of stabilising society. In exchange, the participant receives *puñña*, and *puñña*, like *kamma* is non-transferable.<sup>34</sup> *Puñña* is the reward received by those who adhere to ‘prescribed behaviour’ thus *puñña* alongside *kamma* can be considered a moralising system employed by the elite to maintain political power and social stability.

As I have described, all infelicities in the Buddhist *imaginaire* are rebirth destinies which are determined by an individual’s *kamma* and *puñña*. Understanding *kamma*, rebirth and *puñña* are key to thinking about Buddhist infelicities as it is these three concepts that influence an individual’s rebirth fate. In discussing rebirth, *kamma* and *puñña* I hope to have also provided some insight into the type of society that the Buddhist *imaginaire* existed in. This is especially relevant in thinking about how the elite manipulated religious concepts for their gain and for the maintenance of society. Arguably, the ethicization of *kamma* and the introduction of *puñña* that encouraged gift giving provided material gain to the elite allowed for them to promote certain behaviours and abhor others that may be considered socially corrosive.

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 189.

## Chapter 1: Animals in Buddhism

### Rebirth as an animal

Rebirth as an animal is arguably the least terrifying prospect of the three infelicitous rebirths, but also the most challenging destiny to the Western thinker, due to our own perceptions of animals. It must also be stated that researching this section proved to be challenging, as very little research concerning rebirth as an animal has been conducted in the study of Buddhism. I will begin this section by discussing the Buddhist perspective on animals, as there are varying perspectives on the status of animals in Buddhism. Following this introduction to Buddhist thought on animals, I will discuss the realm that animals exist in known as *tiracchānayoṇi*. The final point of this chapter on rebirth as an animal will be a section on the types of suffering one may experience as an animal. Part of this final section will consider the types of behaviour that lead to rebirth as an animal.

### Buddhist perspectives on animals and rebirth as an animal

In order to understand why rebirth as animal is infelicitous an understanding of Buddhist perspectives on animals is required. Lambert Schmithausen is one the few academics to write extensively on the subject of animals in Buddhism. Schmithausen categorizes Buddhist perspectives regarding animals into two categories, the 'doctrinal perspective' and the 'popular' or

hermitage perspective.<sup>35</sup> Throughout this chapter I will refer to the second perspective as the ‘popular’ perspective, which will include what Schmithausen refers to as the ‘hermitage’ perspective, as I claim that there is significant crossover between the two perspectives. The doctrinal perspective refers to dogmatic views of animals, in contrast to the popular perspective which refer to Buddhist folk and hermitage tales in which animals interact with monastic or other spiritual leaders.<sup>36</sup> Buddhism preaches compassion for all sentient beings, and for those who are not well acquainted with Buddhism, it may appear that Buddhism is a religion in which animals are considered equal to man. Shakyamuni Buddha’s teachings express compassion towards animals and wholeheartedly express that animals should not be harmed for the benefit of humankind. However, in this chapter, the conversation regarding animals will express Buddhist perspectives that do not reflect the above belief that Buddhists believe animals to be equal to man. The two perspectives I will present are not in any way the full range of Buddhist beliefs concerning animals. The compassion that Buddhists showed towards animals, as well as the later development of vegetarianism, initially distinguished Buddhism from other Indic religions of its time. Arguably, as the Buddhist cosmological structure expanded and grew, Buddhist attitudes towards animals became more complex.<sup>37</sup>

The doctrinal perspective, Schmithausen argues, is more normative than the opposing popular perspective.<sup>38</sup> The doctrinal perspective is primarily based upon Buddhist scripture, and adheres to strict Buddhist cosmological doctrine that animals are lesser beings and therefore rebirth as an animal is infelicitous.<sup>39</sup> Animals are considered lesser beings than humans because

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<sup>35</sup> Lambert Schmithausen, “Attitudes towards Animals in Indian Buddhism,” in *Penser, dire et représenter l’animal dans le monde Indien*, ed. Nalini Balbir and G. J. Pinault (Paris: Champion, 2009), 4.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 106-107.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 50.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*

they behave in a manner that is considered unethical and immoral.<sup>40</sup> It should be noted, however, that Buddhist doctrine, in stating that animals do not behave in a moral and ethical manner, base morality and ethics which the Buddhist order prescribes for humans. Because of this, those reborn in the animal realm are unlikely to encounter a human rebirth immediately after their birth in the animal realm. This is due to the fact that they will likely accumulate significant quantities of undesirable *kamma* and will be unable to generate any *puñña* that may potentially affect and improve their next rebirth. This primarily negative view of animals can be extended to an ideal in which, for the most devout Buddhists, a world without animals would be considered a type of utopia.<sup>41</sup> A world without animals is considered a type of utopia, as the absence of animals would present a world in which all sentient beings are at a stage of enlightenment in which they only exist in a human or *deva* state.

The popular perspective is in opposition to the doctrinal perspective. This perspective presents a more positive attitude towards animals and rebirth as an animal. Schmithausen states this perspective is primarily based upon what can be categorized as folk Buddhism.<sup>42</sup> This perspective originates in the folk religious traditions that existed prior to the advent and arrival of Buddhism. As a result, we cannot be certain what is ‘original’ Buddhism and what is a cultural bi-product specific to that region and time prior to Buddhism. The popular perspective utilises folk and fairy tales that tend to have similar perspectives, or are similar to the morality-based tales known as the *jātaka*’s that often feature heroic animals.<sup>43</sup> Schmithausen notes that it is likely that many of the *jātakasa* tales were not part of early Buddhist literature, and it is reasonable to think

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 86.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 88.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 100-104.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 104.

that they are tales that have been adapted for Buddhism.<sup>44</sup> As a result, perhaps the popular or hermitage perspective is not a Buddhist perspective, but rather, a cultural perspective.

Narratives such as the *jātakas* tend to anthropomorphise animals, emphasizing that they can be moral beings.<sup>45</sup> This literature tends to illustrate types of specific ritual behaviours that one should aspire to, even as an animal. Literature of this kind was popular entertainment for laity and was utilised by the monastic order as preaching material. Another set of tales that are part of the popular perspective, are stories Schmithausen refers to as hermitage tales. These tales emphasize that, when in the presence of an advanced spiritual being i.e., *bodhisattvas* or *arhats* animals are able to behave in a moral manner.<sup>46</sup> In the presence of a spiritual teacher, animals are able to deny their natural instincts as evidenced by the tale of tigers refusing to kill other animals following an encounter with a spiritual figure.<sup>47</sup> This above tale states that with the influence and moral guidance of a spiritual leader, the tigers spend the rest of their lives subsisting on grass.<sup>48</sup> Other animals featured in hermitage stories are those that tend to have a discordant relationship with one another, such as mongooses and snakes. However, in the presence of a spiritual being, these animals will be able to co-exist in harmony.<sup>49</sup>

The two narratives I have discussed above provide a positive perspective on the nature of 'beasts' or animals. However, this cannot be considered a true positive perspective on animals. I claim this, as it is frequently noted that the 'special' animals of these tales are the reincarnations of particularly enlightened sentient beings.<sup>50</sup> Positive perspectives on animals in Buddhism can be considered a result of certain traditions with doctrines that emphasize Buddha-nature, and that

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 107.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 109.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 107

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 110.

Buddha-nature can be awoken in animals.<sup>51</sup> Particular Buddhist traditions may have stronger positive perspectives on animals than others due to doctrinal beliefs, such as the concept of Buddha-nature, which is prevalent in only some Buddhist traditions.

Given that the popular literature is not entirely Buddhist in ‘origin’, it is not limited by Buddhist dogma located in complex cosmology. The result of this is it is able to portray animals and rebirth as an animal in a more positive light. However, even though popular literature is not entirely Buddhist, it was arguably influential in emphasizing that all sentient beings are victims of their own *kamma*. Negative literature about animals provided a disincentive for undesirable behaviour, while popular tales provided stories in which the anthropomorphizations of animals express compassion for befallen relatives, and for other sentient beings, who at some point in the cycle of *samsara* would have been a family member.

#### *Tiracchānāyoni* and the realm of beasts

*Tiracchānāyoni* is the realm of beasts, while it seems somewhat illogical or strange that animals inhabit a realm outside of *jambudvīpa*, our realm and world, I will try to express how *tiracchānāyoni* operates both separately and as part of this realm. Animals in our world appear in all forms, and all species we encounter are part of *tiracchānāyoni*, whether they are wild or domesticated or even on our tables as meals. However, *tiracchānāyoni* when depicted in Buddhist imagery appears very different from the animal kingdom experienced in *jambudvīpa*. Images of *tiracchānāyoni* often feature illustrations of ‘beasts’ and hybrids of animals and humans; most

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 109.



often the body is animal, with the head human or vice versa.<sup>52</sup> Images like those I have described above appear in a set of images known as the *Kumano Mind Maṇḍala*, a *maṇḍala* utilised by the Japanese monastic community as a preaching tool during the 15th-17th centuries.<sup>53</sup> Hybrid creatures of this kind are not limited to *tiracchānayani* as a realm present in our physical world, as animals are present in the Buddhist heavens and hells.<sup>54</sup>

The presence of animals in heaven and hell is useful in the study of Buddhist perspectives on animals and understanding what I perceive to be a hierarchy of animals in Buddhism. The presence of animals in Buddhist heavens has been a topic of debate amongst the various Buddhist schools, as particular traditions envision a world without animals as a type of utopia. Animals can be found in certain heavens, and other realms such as the land of *Uttakuru*. However, an example of this debate is the *Sabbatthivāda school* claims that animals do not exist in heaven or any other sacred or holy land.<sup>55</sup> Animals found in heaven tend to be anthropomorphized and therefore embody specific human traits or characteristics which elevate their status.<sup>56</sup> Elephants, horses and birds, other beatific and noble animals are the type of animals found in the Buddhist heavens.<sup>57</sup> Creatures that are considered repulsive, such as maggots, snakes, moths, other reptiles and invertebrates are not permitted in heaven.<sup>58</sup> In the many Buddhist hells, 'hybrid' beasts exist; these tend to be imagined or mythical creatures. Animals found in hell are species which are considered lesser on *jambudvīpa*, such as dogs, crows and maggots.<sup>59</sup> These animals are made all the more terrifying and repulsive in hell by the addition of unusual and terrifying features such as the dogs

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<sup>52</sup> R. Keller Kimbrough, "Preaching the Animal Realm in Late Medieval Japan," *Asian Folklore Studies* 65 (2006): 181.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 180.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> Schmithausen, "Attitudes towards Animals in Indian Buddhism," 89.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 89-90.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

being rabid, the crows given iron beaks with which they torture sinners and the maggots having minute teeth to consume sinners' bodies.<sup>60</sup> Such abominations add to the already frightening nature of Buddhist hells, and arguably cement the status of particular animals as lesser, while animals found in heaven are considered worthy of the presence of humans and *devas*.

Animals inhabit many realms in the Buddhist cosmos, be it here on *jambudvīpa* and the overlapping realm of *Tiracchāyāni*, or in *Uttakuru*. It has been debated whether animals physically exist in the Buddhist heavens and hells. This debate further supports my claim that the Buddhist *imaginaire* is primarily concerned with eudemonia and how other existences in the cosmos relate to humankind, as opposed to the experiences of all sentient beings

### Understanding the types of suffering in *Tiracchāyāni*

It may be difficult to understand what exactly is so sufferable about rebirth as an animal. In this section I will discuss the sufferings of those reborn as animals. Understanding the suffering conditions of an animal is particularly difficult in our present Western world, as a prevalent pop-culture opinion suggests that rebirth as an animal is pleasant compared to human suffering.

Buddhists view those reborn as animals as foolish, although to some extent Buddhists empathize with the plight of those who are reborn as animals. However, given my above discussion of Buddhist perspectives on animals, it should be clear that Buddhists are not entirely sympathetic towards animals, and animals are considered lesser beings.<sup>61</sup> Following my discussion

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<sup>60</sup> Daigan Matsunaga and Alicia Matsunaga. *The Buddhist Concept of Hell*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1972), 83.

<sup>61</sup> Schmithausen, "Attitudes towards Animals in Indian Buddhism," 84.

on suffering as an animal, I will describe the actions that result in rebirth as an animal.

Before my case study on the *Kumano Mind Contemplation Ten Worlds mandala*, I will introduce some customary reasons as to why one is reborn as an animal. The primary reason for rebirth as an animal are types of undesirable behaviour, or personality traits that are associated with animals.<sup>62</sup> Particular animals serve as representatives for certain sins or unsavoury personality traits, like greed, envy or anger.<sup>63</sup> An example of this is those who express ill will or hatred towards others are often reborn as snakes.<sup>64</sup> Another reason for rebirth as an animal is violence towards animals, as a result the sinner is reborn as the animal they mistreated, and made to suffer the same treatment.<sup>65</sup> Buddhist literature frequently claims that farmers abuse or overwork their oxen, even when urged by passing monks to treat their working animals with compassion. It is these men who are destined to suffer the fate of their oxen in a future life. The most unusual and seemingly illogical reason given for rebirth as an animal is the sin of seduction of the monastic order.<sup>66</sup> Sentient beings who attempt seduce anyone in the monastic order, it is claimed, will be reborn as an 'ignorant horse' or 'stupid ox'.<sup>67</sup>

*The Kumano Mind Contemplation Ten Worlds Mandala* is a particular case study I am using as an example of animals in the Buddhist *imaginaire*. *The Kumano Mind Contemplation Ten Worlds mandala* is a significant piece of evidence in my study of rebirth as an animal, as it is a very complex and richly detailed Japanese Buddhist artefact. The particular sin that emerges in *The Kumano Mind Contemplation Ten Worlds mandala* for rebirth as an animal is the sin of too

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<sup>62</sup> Richard F. Gombrich, *How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teachings* (London: New York: Routledge, 2006), 83.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Kimbrough, "Preaching the Animal Realm in Late Medieval Japan," 182.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

much attachment to family members.<sup>68</sup> Unrelenting emotional attachment to one's parents or children is a reason given for rebirth as an animal.<sup>69</sup> This, I argue, is very unusual in the case of Japanese Buddhism, which it has been argued has a stronger tendency for filial piety than other types of Buddhism.<sup>70</sup> *The Kumano Mind Contemplation Ten Worlds Maṇḍala* presents an example in which the Buddhist *imaginaire* and types of behaviour ascribed as desirable and undesirable undergo transformation over culture and time. In this section, I have considered a variety of Buddhist literature and secondary sources on the subject of rebirth as an animal, and the particular actions or behaviours that result in rebirth as an animal, here I will discuss the sort of suffering one encounters when reborn as an animal. As stated, comparatively, being reborn as an animal is a much less infelicitous rebirth destiny than rebirth as a *peta* or in one of the Buddhist hells. However, rebirth as an animal is considered infelicitous for the following reasons. The major reason as to why being reborn as an animal is infelicitous, is because as an animal once is unable to be enlightened. It is also very unlikely that as an animal, a being would be able to receive the *dhamma*, and even if they did, they would likely be powerless to create a better rebirth fate by generating *puñña*. As for actual suffering, being reborn as an animal is infelicitous, as it is claimed that animals live in constant fear, because they are hunted by other animals or man. Animals are likely to live short lives because they are often prey, if they are not hunted due to being domesticated, they will likely suffer mistreatment at the hands of their human masters. Rebirth as an animal is not one of the worst rebirth destinies in the Buddhist *imaginaire*. However, it is infelicitous because one experiences suffering and is unable to be enlightened in this form.

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 196.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Arthur F. Wright, "Buddhism and Chinese Culture: Phases of Interaction" *Journal of Asian Studies* 16 (1957): 18.

## Conclusion

As I stated at the beginning of this chapter, there is a very little academic literature on the subject of animals, and given my own language limitations, I am unable to determine how prevalent literature on the topic of animals was in the Buddhist canon. However, given the subject material I was able to collect for this Chapter, rebirth as an animal was arguably an infelicitous fate that constituted part of the Buddhist *imaginaire*. In understanding how infelicitous constituted part of the *imaginaire* it is particularly important to look at how felicitous were utilised by the monastic community and by the governing body to maintain order. *The Kumano Mind Contemplation Ten Worlds Maṇḍala* provides an example as to how rebirth as an animal was utilised by the monastic order to spread the *imaginaire*. *The Kumano Mind Contemplation Ten Worlds Maṇḍala* further provided incentives and disincentives for certain behaviour types, and thereby was utilised by the elite in maintaining the social order. The itinerant monastic order used the images of the *maṇḍala* as well as performances to the word of the Buddha while serving the interests of the ruling elite. The fear this imagery instilled in the lay audiences was arguably enough to encourage behaviour that was considered socially acceptable while providing an apt disincentive for socially corrosive behaviour.

## Chapter 2: *Petas*

### Rebirth as a *peta*

Rebirth as an animal presents a challenge to a Western audience. However, even more unusual is rebirth as a *peta*. *Peta* are a type of creature which can be described as semi-human and ghost-like. There is substantial academic research on *peta* and their various incarnations throughout Asia, partially I believe because they are so unusual and as a result have fascinated the West. I will begin this section by describing *peta* and how *peta* vary across Asia, as a result defining *peta* can be challenging especially given within some texts *peta* appear in different forms. *Peta* have their own realm known as the *peta-loka*, which I will consider briefly when discussing what I consider to be a history of *peta*. *Peta* have a diverse history as they are a Vedic product which has been transformed by Buddhism, and the following history will also consider how *peta* have developed over the course of Buddhist history. As the primary purpose of this chapter to illustrate that infelicities were a significant part of the Buddhist *imaginaire*, a section of this chapter will consider the literature and other Buddhist artefacts that feature *peta*. The final section of my study of *peta* will be a section titled ‘The Function of *Peta*’. Steven Collins claims that felicities were used as motivation for adhering to socially acceptable behaviour in ‘The Function of *Peta*’ I will argue that *peta* served a similar function and show how *peta* in relation to *puñña* were utilised to maintain stability in Buddhist Agrarian society. My Chapter on *peta* will further illustrate another Buddhist infelicity and further my claim that infelicities were a significant part of

the Buddhist *imaginaire*.

### What is a peta?

Of the three evil rebirths, rebirth as a *peta* or *peta*, a ghost like being, is perhaps the most unusual and fascinating rebirth fate to the non-Buddhist. *Peta* literally translates as ‘departed one’, though it tends to refer to the ‘unhappy’.<sup>71</sup> *Pitr* or *peta* as they are known in the Buddhist world are more commonly known in Western academic literature as ‘hungry ghosts’. Another term for *peta* is ‘hungry ghost’, this term is based off the translation of the Chinese word for *peta*, *egui* 餓鬼.<sup>72</sup>

The earliest description of *peta* is found in Henri-Léon Feer’s 1884 article ‘Etudes Bouddhiques: comment on devient *preta*’. Feer claims that *petas* are creatures who are described as ‘having a mouth like a needle’, a distended stomach or belly the size of a mountain, they appear to be covered in long hair that covers their bodies like clothing, are on fire, and smell putrid.<sup>73</sup> *Petas* are often described as skeletal, though they typically have a distended stomach, perhaps suggesting their malnourished state.<sup>74</sup> Feer states that *petas* are so tormented by their hunger and thirst that they constantly cry ‘I’m hungry, my friends, I’m thirsty, my friends’.<sup>75</sup> *Petas* are unable to eat or drink due to their mouths being like a needle, those that do attempt to consume any food or water must watch this food burst into flames or turn into bodily fluids such as blood or pus.<sup>76</sup>

*Preta* retain their gender from their previous life, with female *petas* known as *preti*.<sup>77</sup> Women who are reborn as *preti* are worse off than their male counterparts and unlikely to

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<sup>71</sup> Robert DeCaroli, *Haunting the Buddha: Indian Popular Religions and the Formation of Buddhism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 95.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid. Chinese characters supplied by Michael Radich.

<sup>73</sup> Leon Feer, “Etudes bouddhiques: comment on devient *peta*,” *Journal Asiatique* 8 (1884): 113.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> DeCaroli, “Haunting the Buddha,” 51.

<sup>77</sup> Jeffrey C. Shirkey “The Moral Economy of the *Petavatthu*: Hungry Ghosts and Theravada Buddhist Cosmology.” PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2008, 83.

encounter a human rebirth in the near future. *Preti* who are reborn as women again, it is claimed, will suffer as ugly women, who must beg in the streets, and are beaten and ridiculed by all.<sup>78</sup> A peculiar characteristic of *peta* is they are able to recall the misdeeds that led to their present state.<sup>79</sup> I will discuss this unusual characteristic in my section which considers narratives and depictions of *peta* in Buddhist literature.

The above description is a typical description of a *peta* which is repeated throughout scholarly work, including Robert DeCaroli's *Haunting The Buddha*, Jeffrey Shirkey's 'The Moral Economy of the *Petavatthu*: Hungry Ghosts and Theravada Buddhist Cosmology,' as well as Stephen Teiser's articles on hungry ghosts.

However, *petas* do not always conform to the above description. The *Petavatthu*, an early Buddhist text, concerning *peta* and its later 6th C.E. commentary, provides evidence of *petas* proving to be much more complex than the above standard typology.<sup>80</sup> In this text, *petas* often do not share any similarities to the above description, and at times are not even referred to as *petas* and are at times mistaken for other non-human beings', including *devas*.<sup>81</sup> DeCaroli argues that, in defining *peta*, we should not rely on physical descriptions, but rather, distinguish between *peta* and other non-human beings based upon the emotional state of the being.<sup>82</sup>

Despite DeCaroli's method offering a better indicator as to whether a being is a *peta*, there are certain types of *peta* that could be described as 'bipolar' or 'schizoid' *petas* who inhabit varying emotional states. These types of *peta* cannot be identified using DeCaroli's method. In stating that types of *peta* are 'bipolar', I refer to the cyclic states and very disparate experiences these particular *petas* experience both extreme pleasure and tortuous suffering, in a sense they are

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 52.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>81</sup> DeCaroli, "Haunting the Buddha," 95.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., 94.



manic. ‘Bipolar’ *petas*, even in *peta* form experience happiness and pleasure periodically experience as well as immense unhappiness and suffering. This is the result of a combination of good and bad deeds. An example is the story of a hunter made a vow to a monk that he would no longer hunt at night. Because the hunter did not intentionally kill animals at night he is ‘rewarded’ with pleasures such as a beautiful mansion and female consorts.<sup>83</sup> Come day, the hunter suffers and is distinctly unhappy, as he is punished for harming and killing animals during the day.<sup>84</sup> *Peta* are unable to experience lasting pleasure and any pleasure they experience is fleeting or quickly replaced by suffering.

#### The realm of *peta* (*petaloka*)

The *petaloka* is the realm of the departed. It is said to be located five hundred *yojanas* below our world, Jambudvīpa, and just above *niraya* [hells].<sup>85</sup> While the *petaloka* is a realm in itself, *petas* are not restricted to this realm. Most Buddhist knowledge concerning *peta* is based on the travels of monastic order to the *peta-loka* or encounters between *petas* and the laity. Tales of monks visiting the *petaloka* are usually tales which are told to the laity to demonstrate the spiritual power of the monastic order. The monastic’s who travel to the *petaloka* tend to be particularly spiritually advanced as an inordinately advanced state of meditation is often required to travel to other realms. Encounters between *peta* and the laity tend to take place in unusual circumstances, most often in places on the periphery of humanity, such as in the deep forest or in the dead of the night.

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 96.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Xue Yu, “Merit Transfer and Life after Death in Buddhism,” *Ching Feng* 4.1 (2003): 32.

### A history of *peta*, from *pitr* to *egui*

As stated in my introduction, *peta* have a long and complex history that perhaps offers some clue as to the variance of descriptions of *peta*. In my brief definition of the term *peta*, I stated that *peta* refers to the departed and descends from the term *pitr* found in the *Rg Veda* and later Hindu texts.<sup>86</sup> In the Vedic tradition it is inferred that *pitr* as a term is used only in reference to parents or ancestors of the previous three generations.<sup>87</sup> Ian Kesarcodi-Watson claims that the *petaloka*, or the world of the departed, descends from the Vedic *pitrloka*.<sup>88</sup> Etymology alone suggests they are related. However, Kesarcodi-Watson claims that while we can understand the *petaloka* as descending from the *pitrloka*, the two realms and beings that inhabit them are very different.<sup>89</sup> First *pitr*s as a being differs from *petas* in that they are not unhappy or suffering; rather, they are content and to an extent are superior to men.<sup>90</sup> *Pitr* are able to aid men, unlike *petas*, who are helpless in their own suffering, though Kesarcodi-Watson notes that *pitr* must not be confused with *devas*.<sup>91</sup> *Pitr* are lesser beings than *deva*, as they have remaining *kamma*, therefore they suffer embodiment again.<sup>92</sup> Although *pitr* are able to aid men, *pitr* also require appeasement and care from family members providing 'appropriate offerings and oblations', for

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<sup>86</sup> Rajan, K. W. Soundhara, "Rites (*Samskaras*) Connected With Death (*Peta*) and After (*Pitr*)," *Superintendent: Archaeological Survey of India* (1966): 259.

<sup>87</sup> Ian Kesarcodi-Watson, "Pitrs," *Journal of the Oriental Society of Australia* 11 (1976): 108.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Kesarcodi-Watson, "Pitrs," 110.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

which they ‘hunger’.<sup>93</sup> It is suggested in the *Bhagavadgita* that if *pitṛs* are not appeased *pitṛs* will fall into *niraya*, an early form of hell.<sup>94</sup>

As described above *pitṛ* cannot be considered the same as *peta*. The relation of *petas* to *pitṛs* may provide an explanation for the ‘bipolar’ *petas* who at times live like *devas* before returning to the unhappy and sufferable state of *petas*.

Despite the above standardised description, *peta* have undergone significant development from the *pitṛ* state. As Buddhism has transcended multiple cultures and spread throughout Asia, *petas* continue to undergo development. Throughout the Asian continent, many elaborate descriptions of *peta* exist. The limitations of this thesis do not allow me to discuss *peta* in all Buddhist traditions, let alone *peta* throughout the Buddhist world. However, I will make an example of Chinese *peta* to demonstrate how *peta* have changed over culture and time.

As I have mentioned above, *peta* are known as *egui* in Chinese. Egui have very particular and peculiar characteristics which are in contrast to my earlier descriptions of *peta*. The most unusual trait of Chinese *peta* is in images they are always presented as hanging upside down.<sup>95</sup> It is likely that this trait is based on the popular tale of Mulian, which is the origin tale for the ritual known as *yü-lan-p'en*.<sup>96</sup> *Yü-lan-p'en* is popularly understood to mean ‘the bowl (*p'en*) filled with offerings to save ancestors from hanging upside-down (*Yü'lan*) in purgatory’.<sup>97</sup> The tale of Mulian is not unique to China; in India, Mulian is known as Maudgalyāyana. However, the popularity of the tale seems to have soared in China.

Mulian was an accomplished monk who during meditation witnessed his mother suffering

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Stephen F. Teiser, “Ghosts and Ancestors in Medieval Chinese Religions: The *Yu-lan-p'en* Festival as Mortuary Ritual.” *History of Religions* 26 (1986): 48.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

<sup>97</sup> Teiser, “Ghosts and Ancestors in Medieval Chinese Religions,” 47.

in the *peta-loka* realm.<sup>98</sup> Mulian attempted to ease his mother's hunger by offering her a bowl of rice.<sup>99</sup> Unfortunately Mulian's mother was unable to eat the rice, as it turned into flames before she could consume it.<sup>100</sup> Mulian asked [the] Buddha how he could help his mother, to which [the] Buddha replied 'Your mother's sins are grave; there is nothing that you as a single individual can do about it. You must rely on the mighty spiritual power of the assembled monks of the ten directions: for the sake of seven generations of ancestors and those in distress, you should gather [food] of the one hundred flavours and five kinds of fruit, place it in a bowl, and offer it to those of great virtue of the ten directions.'<sup>101</sup> '[The] Buddha then decreed that an assembly of monks should chant prayers on behalf of seven generations of ancestors of the donor, that they should practice meditation and concentrate their thoughts and then receive the food.'<sup>102</sup> With the aid of the monastic order, Mulian was able to release his mother from the *petaloka* realm.<sup>103</sup>

It has been argued that *yü-lan-p'en* as a ritual has origins in or can be linked with Chinese filial piety.<sup>104</sup> Literary evidence suggests that *yü-lan-p'en* was popularised during the Tang dynasty, and became a significant ritual in the Chinese religious calendar. It has been argued the aspect of filial piety in Chinese interpretations of *peta* took on a new or greater meaning than it previously had in Buddhism.<sup>105</sup> The rise of the ancestral cult, Teiser notes, was not unique to China 'It shares many affinities with Korean ritual for lost souls, *manghon-il*'.<sup>106</sup> Japan's celebration of Obon is very similar to *yü-lan-p'en*, and it too has undergone significant changes since its transference from

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Teiser, "Ghosts and Ancestors in Medieval Chinese Religions," 48.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Wright, "Buddhism and Chinese Culture: Phases of Interaction" 18.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Teiser, "Ghosts and Ancestors in Medieval Chinese Religions," 51.

China in the seventh century.<sup>107</sup> Teiser and Shirkey both argue that one of the distinctive features of rituals like *yü-lan-p'en* or other rituals pertaining to *peta* is that they bring the deceased relative back into the world, albeit temporarily.<sup>108</sup> This in turn propagates the connection between the living and the deceased, which may then increase offerings gifted to the *sangha*, this further connects the monastic order and the community.<sup>109</sup>

In the view of some academics, *yü-lan-p'en* is a phenomenon unique to Chinese Buddhism, due to the prominence of filial piety and the ancestral cult prior to the arrival of Buddhism. The cult of the ancestor is not unique to East Asian Buddhism. Ancestral cults have roots in India; however, the form that ancestral cults took in China was different and unusual. Pre-Buddhist ancestral cults tended to focus on filial piety towards the father, specifically sons caring for fathers in the afterlife.<sup>110</sup> According to some studies, Buddhism filled the void for post-mortem care for mothers, with the tale of Mulian's descent to the *peta-loka* to save his mother. As a result, this type of Buddhism holds the family semi-responsible for the fate and salvation of one's ancestors.<sup>111</sup> I claim that like many post-mortem rituals or acts of care for the dead, *Yü-lan-p'en* encourages Buddhist practitioners to express compassion for all beings, while recognizing the potential fates of their family members and their own potential rebirth.

#### The presence of *peta* in the Buddhist world

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid. (*Yu-lan-p'en* is a festival in \* Japan that takes place on the fifteenth day of the seventh lunar month (July-August) in which offerings are made to the spirits of the deceased. The ceremony originated in \* China around the 6th century C.E. and over the centuries has absorbed elements of non-Buddhist beliefs and practices.)

<sup>108</sup> Teiser, "Ghosts and Ancestors in Medieval Chinese Religions," 56.

<sup>109</sup> Shirkey, "Moral Economy."

<sup>110</sup> Wright, "Buddhism and Chinese Culture: Phases of Interaction", 18.

<sup>111</sup> Teiser, "Ghosts and Ancestors in Medieval Chinese Religions,"

The *Petavatthu* or Stories of the *Peta* contains fifty-one individual stories of *peta*.<sup>112</sup> The *Petavatthu* is similar to the *Jātaka* tales, as I argue its primary function is as a set of moralising tales. The *Jātakasa* tales describe actions committed by the Buddha that elevate him, and thus serves as a set of teaching tales as to how one should behave. In contrast, the *Petavatthu* tales describe immoral actions committed by those who have been reborn in the *peta* realm. The *Petavatthu* is primarily a teaching tool, providing the laity with the methods and knowledge required to prevent rebirth as a *peta* and how to aid those who have been reborn as a *peta*. Stories in the *Petavatthu* follow a structured narrative, which usually begins with a person encountering a *peta*. Often this encounter is on the outer rims of society and the person who encounters the *peta* is a relation or has some past connection to the *peta*. It is very common that the *peta* is a familial member of the person the *peta* seeks out. Occasionally monks or other spiritually elevated persons encounter *peta*. In all stories, the *peta* pleads for help from their family member or members, asking them to ease their suffering. Often the person who encountered the *peta* will seek out help from the monastic community. The main purpose of the monastic community is to identify the past sins of the *peta* that resulted in this infelicitous rebirth. The cause for rebirth as *peta* is always identified in the story, as this is necessary for the *Petavatthu* to act as a moralising ideological tool. Once the cause of the infelicitous rebirth has been established, a method of aiding the *peta* is prescribed, which usually involves a ritual like or similar to *yū-lan-p'en*, that involves making offerings to the *sangha* who in return perform rites to aid the suffering *peta*.

The *Petavatthu* serves as an ideological tool that was a source of both entertainment, in the drama it creates while being read aloud to the laity, and as a set of terrifying tales which acted as a disincentive for types of behaviour that was considered socially corrosive. The *Petavatthu*

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<sup>112</sup> Dhammapāla, *Elucidation of the intrinsic Meaning So Named: The Commentary on the Peta-stories = Paramatthadīpanī nāma Petavatthu-aṭṭhakathā*, trans. Uba Kyaw, ed. Peter Masefield (London: Pali Text Society, 1999 1980), vii.

provides incentives for other types of more desirable behaviours, specifically types of behaviour which benefit the *sangha*. Given that one of the primary aims of the *Petavatthu* is to provide preventative methods to avoid rebirth as a *peta*, it places particular emphasis on giving to the *sangha* in order to generate merit for *petas*.<sup>113</sup>

The Buddhist canon and folk literature are not the only artefacts in which images of *peta* can be found. Images of *peta* can be found in temples and other venues across Asia. Illustrations of *peta* tend to depict methods to help *peta* or the specifics of *peta* suffering. Sculptural depictions of *peta*, such as those found on the Borobudur temple in Indonesia, depict *peta* as skeletal beings praying to the Buddha for deliverance.<sup>114</sup> Later Chinese and Japanese artistic depictions of *peta* tend to illustrate scenarios in which *peta* are aided, such as the 'Hungry Ghosts Scroll' found in the Kyoto National Museum.<sup>115</sup> The 'Hungry Ghosts Scroll' illustrates a scene in which the *peta* come begging to their relatives for help, and their relatives, being devout and compassionate Buddhists act out the required rituals in order to aid and release the *petas* from their suffering.

In this brief section regarding evidence of *peta*, I have shown that *peta* make up a significant part of the Buddhist *imaginaire* concerning infelicities. The *Petavatthu* as one of the primary texts on *peta* is incredibly detailed in the fifty one tales it tells of *peta* and their misfortunes. The *Petavatthu* and other images of *peta* such as sculptures or paintings serve an ideological purpose, in that like pictorials depicting rebirth as an animal, such images frighten the audience into behaving in a way that is socially acceptable and does not pose a threat to the ruling elite and society as a whole.

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<sup>113</sup> Shirkey, "Moral Economy," 40.

<sup>114</sup> Virtual Collection of Masterpieces 'The Hidden Base of Borobudur', Last Modified 28 January 2014, <http://masterpieces.asemus.museum/borobudur/map-home.html>.

<sup>115</sup> Kyoto National Museum 'Gaki-zoshi (Scroll of the Hungry Ghosts),' Last Modified 29 January 2014, <http://www.kyohaku.go.jp/eng/syuzou/meihin/kaiga/emaki/item03.html>.

## The function of *peta* in the Pali Buddhist *imaginaire*

Jeffrey Shirkey argues that *peta* serve three purposes. As a result the Buddhist monastic community utilise *peta* to encourage ‘gift’ giving, while offering a set of preventative means to avoid rebirth as a *peta*, and consoling the grieving family of the recent dead.<sup>116</sup> As *peta* are aided by family members, they at times can sometimes achieve a more felicitous rebirth with the merit, generated by their family. I believe that with the evidence I have presented, I have significant reason to claim that rebirth as a *peta* like rebirth as animal, constitutes a significant part of the Buddhist *imaginaire*.

Academic literature on *peta* is extensive, as the nature of *peta* is unusual and fascinating to both the Buddhist and the non-Buddhist. *Peta* are found throughout the Buddhist world, and exist in varying forms. *Peta* have changed over culture and time, and taken on new symbolism. My evidence of the varying rituals for *peta* or *egui* in China, Korea and Japan demonstrates the various roles and cultures that *peta* have inhabited. However, *peta* were already a prolific part of the Pali Buddhist *imaginaire*, arguably one of the earliest forms of the Buddhist *imaginaire*. The *Petavatthu* is a one example of the significance of *peta* in the Pali Buddhist *imaginaire*, as it is a text dedicated entirely to telling stories of *peta*, and describing *peta*. The *Petavatthu* serves as a moralising text, which is arguably an important part of maintaining stability through the *imaginaire*, by frightening the laity with a fate they may encounter if they do not adhere to socially acceptable behaviour. Images of *peta* are found throughout Asia, from the temple of Borobudur in Indonesia to 17th century Japanese paintings of *peta*. Not only is there extensive literature on *peta*s, but the literature and images of *peta* we have access to are incredibly detailed. The evidence

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<sup>116</sup> Shirkey, “Moral Economy,” 72.



I have provided asserts that *peta* as an infelicitous rebirth constituted a significant part of the Buddhist *imaginaire*. I further claim that *peta* served a similar function to rebirth as an animal, in that *peta* and literature on *peta* served as a moralising tool which arguably helped maintain the Buddhist *imaginaire*, and stability throughout the region.

## Conclusion

*Peta*, unlike animals, can easily be seen to suffer an infelicitous fate, and scholarly literature from Henri-Léon Feer's 1884 description of *peta* to later images of *peta* portray the intense suffering of this rebirth destiny. *Peta* are a ghost-like semi-human being who are often associated with greed. However, as I have discussed above, *peta* are not easily defined as they have varying forms, some *peta* even experience fleeting pleasure amidst their suffering. Over time and culture *peta* have been developed and expanded upon. However, they have been a permanent fixture in the *imaginaire* of infelicitous Buddhist rebirth destinies. *Peta* are present in Buddhist literature and art, which I have discussed as evidence for my claim that *peta* made up a significant part of this *imaginaire*.

In this thesis, my two major claims are that infelicitous made up a substantial part of the Buddhist *imaginaire*, and that they were instrumental in providing social stability. I have argued following Shirkey that *peta* further serve the function of 'gift' giving, while offering a set of preventative means or procedures to avoid rebirth as a *peta*, and consoling the grieving family of the recent dead'. Essentially, *peta* and all literature and art pertaining to *peta* are moralising tools and part of a set of 'scare tactics' utilised by the elite to maintain society. In the same sense that rebirth as an animal would've been frightening, *peta* rebirth presents another frightening post-

mortem destiny that served as a motivator for socially acceptable behaviour and as a disincentive for socially corrosive behaviour.

## Chapter 3: Buddhist Hells

### Rebirth in hell, as a hell-being

The final infelicity in the set of Buddhist infelicities that I will consider is rebirth in one of the hells, as a hell-being. This fate is by far the worst and most torturous of the three rebirth destinies I have presented. This section will be the most detailed infelicity presented in this thesis, primarily for the reason that it is the most comparable with the Christian infelicity of Hell. I will begin this chapter with a discussion of the origin of Buddhist hells, and a consideration of Jens Braarvig's claim that Buddhist hells developed from the Vedic tradition to a complex system of Buddhist hells. Following this section, I will continue the history of Buddhist hells with a study of the various hell systems that emerged prior to the standardised system that I will present in the following section. Based on the *Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra* I will provide a sketch of the eight Buddhist hells based on this *sūtra*. However, in order to further my claim I will follow my sketch of the *Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra*, with a brief discussion of hells outside of this *sūtra* particularly the presence of cold hells in certain hell systems and the bureaucratic system of Chinese Buddhist hells. It is my intention to present a discussion of Buddhist hells that furthers my claim that infelicities were important and served a purpose to the ruling elite in maintaining society.

### The origins of Buddhist hells.

Hell is not a concept unique to Buddhism, or to Asia as a geographical region. Hell and places similar to hell are present in other Asian religions, such as early Vedic and later Hindu concepts of the afterlife. I argue that in the Buddhist cosmological view, the multiple hells are the most important of the infelicitous discussed in this thesis, as hell is the most infelicitous realm.

It has been claimed that Buddhist hells have roots in the early Vedic and later Hindu tradition. Jens Braarvig argues that prior to the acceptance of the system of hells or multiple hells into the Buddhist cosmological worldview, hell or a region similar to hell was ruled by Yama, King of the Underworld.<sup>117</sup> It appears, however, that the realm Yama presided over was not in fact hellish, but rather, was a singular post-mortem realm that was more heavenly than hellish. This realm was not heavenly, in the sense it was lavish and filled with all the wonder one could want, but rather, was a place of contentment for the dead. Peace in the afterlife and the guarantee of a heavenly existence was dependent upon living relatives practicing particular rituals and making offerings, often gifting items to the dead, such as balls of rice, incense and other items to ease the suffering of the dead in the afterlife.<sup>118</sup>

Braarvig argues that ethicization is the primary reason for the division of the underworld into at minimum two separate post-mortem realms.<sup>119</sup> One being felicitous and the other infelicitous.

Yama as a deity was reinvented as the ruler of hell. As the ruler of hell, Yama's responsibility was to weigh each individual's karmic debt.<sup>120</sup>

Hell, as an infelicitous post-mortem realm, is first mentioned in the Buddhist Canon in

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<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, 258.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*

approximately 100 B.C.E., in a set of recorded debates known as the *Kathāvatthu* debates.<sup>121</sup>

Braarvig argues that perhaps the concept of hell in Buddhism can be dated earlier than 100 B.C.E., and makes this claim based on the dating of the *Kathāvatthu* debates, which are considered to be from the period in which Ashoka reigned 268-232 B.C.E. Hell as a topic of debate may have first appeared in 300 B.C.E.<sup>122</sup>

The *Kathāvatthu* debate concerning hell centres on *kamma*, and whether that which is reborn actually experiences the suffering caused by the previous self's *kamma*, in the sense that matter of a person prior to this rebirth experiences suffering post rebirth.<sup>123</sup> A portion of this debate summarizes the outcome of an argument as to whether hell is a physical place or if particular actions and mindsets constitute as hell.<sup>124</sup> The orthodox view prevails in this set of debates, and states that hell is a physical place in which one experiences great suffering.<sup>125</sup> It is this view that has taken primary place in the Buddhist *imaginaire*.

#### A brief history of Buddhist hells

The history of Buddhist hells is much more complex and does not end with the agreement made at the *Kathāvatthu* debates. Rather, Buddhist hells, like many if not all Buddhist concepts transformed and expanded of overtime as Buddhism spread across Asia. Prior to discussing the

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<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, 260.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*

various images and portrayals of hell in the Buddhist world, I will first provide an outline of the standard formation of Buddhist hells. Similar to my previous Chapter on *peta*, in this section I will provide examples as to how Buddhist hells have transformed throughout the Buddhist world. To list all anomalies and variations on Buddhist hells would be impossible given the limitations of this thesis. However, it must be noted that there are many variations on hell throughout the Buddhist world.

The transformation of the Vedic underworld into a complex system of hells was a centuries long process. However, hell and the later hells have always been located beneath *Jambudvīpa*.<sup>126</sup> The earliest descriptions of hell claim that hell was an iron square, with the minor hells inside this square.<sup>127</sup> The number of hells fluctuated before settling on eight major hells, though earlier texts suggest that there were up to ten major hells.<sup>128</sup> The eight major hells are known by the punishments administered in each hell, or by the action that caused such punishment. I will describe the eight major hells based upon the *Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra*, known as: *Samjīva*—hell of repetition; *Kālā-sūtra*—black rope hell; *Samghata*—crowded hell; *Raurava*—screaming hell; *Māhā-raurava*—great screaming hell; *Tapana*—hell of burning heat; *Pratapana*—hell of great burning heat; and *Avīci*—hell of no-interval.<sup>129</sup> The geographical position and status of each hell has also fluctuated. *Avīci* is now known to be the most terrible of all the hells has occupied a multitude of places in the spectrum of hells.<sup>130</sup>

This ongoing shifting and ordering of hells provides evidence that the Buddhist hells were a concept that developed and expanded over time and culture. Conceptually, Buddhist hells have

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<sup>126</sup> Ineke Van Put, "The Names of Buddhist hells in East Asian Buddhism," *Pacific World Journal* 9 (2007): 208.

<sup>127</sup> Van Put, "The Names of Buddhist Hells," 205.

<sup>128</sup> Matsunaga and Matsunaga, *The Buddhist Concept of Hell*, 75.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.

<sup>130</sup> Yumiko Onozawa, "An Analysis of Hell-narratives in Early Hinduism and Theravada Buddhism." MA diss., University of Saskatchewan, 2002, 25.

retained the key infelicitous element of post-mortem suffering. I have chosen to provide details of the tortures encountered to emphasize the incredibly complex and detailed world of Buddhist hells, illuminating the importance of hells in the structure of infelicities and Buddhist *imaginaire*. I have chosen to order the Buddhist hells based upon sin, as this provides insight into Buddhist morality and how *kamma* theoretically works. It is also useful to categorize the Buddhist hells in this manner, as it may illuminate the type of society that constituted and partook in this *imaginaire*. Following this section, I will elaborate on the cultural transformation of Buddhist hells.

### The Buddhist hells

In order to describe the hells of the Buddhist *imaginaire* I will also discuss the sins relating to them and how the Buddhist hell system works. There are multiple hells and the Buddhist cosmological system orders them based upon sins committed, tortures suffered and the time spent suffering. While a rebirth in a particular hell is based on sin, the Buddhist hell system is somewhat accumulative, in that sin after sin after sin results in a quantity of *kamma* and leads to rebirth in a particular hell.

#### **Physical crimes:**

##### Samjīva—hell of repetition: killing

Samjīva is the first hell. It bears the lightest retribution, which is unusual given other religious traditions tend to emphasize killing as a particularly terrible sin. This hell is for those who intentionally kill, and do not place any value on the victim's life, or have no regret for

killing.<sup>131</sup> As part of the standardised system of hells, Samjīva contains sixteen minor hells. An example of one of these hells is the 'Place of Excrement'.<sup>132</sup> This minor hell is for those that have killed animals and do not experience remorse.<sup>133</sup> In this minor hell, the inhabitants are tortured by having to stumble through 'hot bitter dung mixed with molten copper'.<sup>134</sup> They are forced to consume the filth they wade through, while 'sharp-beaked maggots inhabiting the dung enter into their bodies and consume their lips, teeth, tongue and everything in sight until the entire sinner is devoured'.<sup>135</sup> Those that have taken the lives of others are in turn consumed and killed themselves. Another method of torture found in Samjīva is sinners are pierced by flying shards of a diamond mountain.<sup>136</sup> As discussed the types of torture experienced by the sinner directly relate to the being that was intentionally killed.

Whilst Samjīva is a terrifying and tortuous place, in the spectrum of Buddhist hells it is not the worst, partially due to the tortures experienced, but primarily because the time spent in Samjīva is very little in comparison to time spent in *avīci*.

#### Kālā-sūtra—black rope hell: stealing

Kālā-sūtra is the hell that one is destined to be reborn in, for not only mercilessly killing another being, but also for stealing.<sup>137</sup> In this hell, demons tie the sinners to the burning ground, and then proceed to mark the sinners' body with ink-blackened rope before slicing the body into hundreds and thousands of pieces.<sup>138</sup> Another description of this hell claims that sinners are forced

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<sup>131</sup> Matsunaga and Matsunaga, *The Buddhist Concept of Hell*, 83

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid*,

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, 83.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, 86.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid*.



by demons to carry heavy bundles across ink-blackened rope above boiling cauldrons which, they inevitably fall into.<sup>139</sup> Suffering in this hell is specific to those that take objects or items that are not theirs to take, or they take more than necessary; simply speaking, those that are greedy and selfish.<sup>140</sup>

#### Samghata—crowded hell: sexual indulgence or misconduct

Samghata is for those who have committed the above two sins, along with the sin of sexual indulgence or misconduct.<sup>141</sup> In this hell, sinners are tormented by beautiful women who tempt them into climbing ‘sword trees’. The leaves of these trees are razor-sharp blades which shred the flesh of those foolish enough to climb them.<sup>142</sup> Upon reaching the top of these sword trees, the sinner sees that the object of their affections is now on the ground below them. In order to continue this pursuit, the sinner must have their flesh shredded again as they clamber up and down the tree.<sup>143</sup>

It is interesting to note that the temptress is able to manipulate her appearance so that the sinner does not remember the suffering caused by the previous subject of his desire.<sup>144</sup> It is almost always women in this realm who act as temptresses, as opposed to men tempting women. Morally, Samghata teaches that love and lust are selfish, as they create attachment, thus creating suffering.<sup>145</sup> Samghata is named after its fifteenth minor hell, a place where sinners are trapped in

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<sup>139</sup> Ineke Van Put, “Some Remarks on the Eight Great Hells in the Northern Buddhist Tradition,” *The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies* 1 (2000): 209.

<sup>140</sup> Matsunaga and Matsunaga, *The Buddhist Concept of Hell*, 86.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, 88.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, 89.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*, 88.

a ‘fire-jar’.<sup>146</sup> In this minor hell, countless small fires burn all over the sinners’ bodies until the flames enter their bodies and consume the sinner from the inside.<sup>147</sup> Daigan and Alicia Matsunaga argue that the Samghata is related to the *Fire Sermon Discourse* or the *Ādittapariyāya Sutta*, in which the Buddha relates the five *skandas* to burning with desire or attachment.<sup>148</sup>

#### Raurava—screaming hell: intoxicants

Raurava strictly speaking is the hell for those that abuse intoxicants, such as alcohol or other mind-altering substances.<sup>149</sup> Arguably, this hell is primarily aimed at the monastic order, who must abstain from liquor and other indulgences.<sup>150</sup> This hell is for all who indulge in intoxicants. To reflect the pleasure they experience from such illicit indulgences, the sinners are claimed to be ‘chortling’ as they are captured by demons and dragged to hell.<sup>151</sup> Raurava is not only reserved for those are indulgent, but for those that facilitate such indulgences such as those who sell liquor.<sup>152</sup> Raurava even has a space reserved for those who use liquor to manipulate others. This hell, the ‘Hell of Complete Darkness’ is particularly terrifying.<sup>153</sup> This hell is a place of psychological terror, in which sinners are pursued and tormented in complete darkness by demons.<sup>154</sup>

#### **Vocal crimes:**

#### Māhā-raurava, great screaming hell: lying

Māhā-raurava is the only hell strictly related to vocal crimes, particularly lying. Those that

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<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., 89.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., 90.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., 91.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid., 90.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid., 92.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid.

suffer in this hell do so for the improper use of words.<sup>155</sup> I have already claimed sins relate directly to punishment, as fitting, the sinners in Māhā-raurava tend to suffer punishments on the tongue or lips.<sup>156</sup> Māhā-raurava is one of the hells in which imagined animals appear due to the sinners' *kamma*. One of the minor hells, the 'Hell of Unbearable Pain', utilises snakes as a torture device, as the inhabitants have snakes born inside their bodies.<sup>157</sup> This symbolises ill-will and anger towards others as well as a tendency for lying. Buddhism is a religion primarily concerned with salvation through truth, almost all beings will fall into this hell at some point, due to man's nature to deny the truth, given what Buddhism proposes to be truths and the correct manner in which to live, provide a challenge to the everyday person.

### **Mental Crimes:**

#### Tapana, hell of burning heat: false views

Tapana is the first hell for 'mental' sins and is primarily for those with ill thoughts. The image of Tapana reflects a fairly common narrative and set of images concerning the Abrahamic imaginings of Hell. In Tapana, sinners' bodies are consumed by a raging inferno. Onozawa states 'the general condition of Hell: dark and hot, blazing flames, worms and insects crawl everywhere, vultures and iron beaked birds devour hell's inhabitants, in relation to this Tapana.'<sup>158</sup> The views considered to be most damaging, and result in rebirth in Tapana, are the following:

'1. Denial of the law of cause and effect (or *kamma*)'

'2. Denial of the existence of good and evil'

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<sup>155</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

<sup>158</sup> Onozawa, "Analysis of Hell-narratives," 67.

‘3. Denial of *dāna*, which in its broadest implication covers spiritual as well as material giving in all phases of human life.’

‘4. Belief in abolishing all forms of meeting [in the sense of forming groups that may pose a threat to the governing body], ranging from the family to the national level.’<sup>159</sup>

It is likely that during the writing of the *Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra*, such views and ideas were prevalent or common enough in India and proved to be the most damaging and dangerous to Buddhism and the Buddhist community, given hells tend to operate as moral guidelines.<sup>160</sup> Other false views include belief in deterministic astrology and fortune telling. Minor hells exist for these beliefs and superstitions. Daigan and Alicia Matsunaga provide detailed descriptions of all the minor hells in Tapanā. However, I will describe only the most unusual hell, in order to show as to how much thought and detail Buddhist thinkers invested in hell.

This unusual hell is known as ‘The Diamond-beak Hornet Hell’. In this hell, sinners are tormented by demons, who pluck the sinners’ heads bald one strand at a time.<sup>161</sup> The hair from the sinners’ heads is then stuffed into the sinners’ mouths, while diamond-beaked hornets sting the sinners, causing wounds from which they extract blood.<sup>162</sup> The sinners are made to consume blood extracted by the hornets, which is extremely bitter to drink, yet the more they consume the hungrier they become.<sup>163</sup> This hunger consumes and deceives the sinners, until they began to consume their own flesh.<sup>164</sup>

The above discussion of this particular minor hell demonstrates Buddhist thinkers were

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<sup>159</sup> Matsunaga and Matsunaga, *The Buddhist Concept of Hell*, 94.

<sup>160</sup> Onozawa, “Analysis of Hell-narratives,” 2.

<sup>161</sup> Matsunaga and Matsunaga, *The Buddhist Concept of Hell*, 95.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid.

<sup>163</sup> Jonathan A. Silk, “Good and Evil in Indian Buddhism: The Five Sins of Immediate Retribution,” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 35 (2007): 255.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid., 95.

very inventive in imagining post-mortem punishments. It is interesting to further note, as already briefly mentioned, that almost all punishments relate back to the sin committed in order to be reborn in the said hell. This particular punishment is so unusual that it is difficult to imagine how it relates back to the sin of lying. However, it likely makes sense metaphorically in the sense of the consumption of hair is symbolic of false truths leads to further false truths or wrong beliefs, symbolic in the sense that the sinners consume their own flesh after being tricked by the bitter blood they are made to consume.

Pratapana—hell of great burning heat: sexual misconduct in relation to religion

Pratapana is specifically for those who sexually defile religion or the religious community.<sup>165</sup> This hell is primarily for those who tempt monks, nuns or virtuous laywomen.<sup>166</sup> Women appear to make up the majority of the sinners in Pratapana, as evidenced by the following description of a minor hell known as ‘The Place of Painful Hair’.<sup>167</sup>

The Place of Painful Hair is described in a tale of a woman who seduces a virtuous monk, and makes threats that if the monk does not engage in a relationship with her, she will publicly announce that he raped her.<sup>168</sup> This woman is punished in The Place of Painful Hair by having her skin pared off by demons with a sharp-bladed knife until merely bone remains and as new soft flesh grows in the process is repeated.<sup>169</sup> At other times the demons amuse themselves by peeling off small sections of flesh and then roasting the exposed portion.<sup>170</sup> As she runs to escape from

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<sup>165</sup> Matsunaga and Matsunaga, *The Buddhist Concept of Hell*, 97.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*

such torment she beholds the monk that she tempted approaching her.<sup>171</sup> Rushing into his arms to embrace him, the moment she touches him, the vision transforms into searing flames<sup>172</sup>

As a result of her sins, she suffers until her *kamma* is exhausted, but this is not the end of her misery. It is almost impossible for a woman to be reborn as a human again in the unlikely case that a woman takes human form again, she will be handicapped by the loss of an eye or ear, have a hare lip and an ugly complexion.<sup>173</sup> During her lifetime she will be forced to spend her time cleaning excrement, know only subservience, and be beaten even by children.<sup>174</sup>

#### Avīci, no interval hell: one of the five sins of Buddhism

Avīci is the final hell in the set of eight Buddhist hells, and is for those that have committed one of the five immediate sins of Buddhism, known as *ānantaraya-karmā*. ‘These crimes are so heinous that their inevitable karmic result of descent into hell will take place immediately and necessarily in the next life, rather than at some unspecified vague point in the future, as is usual for generic karmic results...’<sup>175</sup>

Buddhism has five ‘immediate’ sins, they are the following:

- ‘1. Premeditated murder of one’s natural mother.’
- ‘2. Premeditated murder of one’s natural father.’
- ‘3. Premeditated evil intention to harm the Enlightened One and rejoicing in such an action.’

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<sup>171</sup> Ibid.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid., 98.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid.

<sup>175</sup> Silk, “Good and Evil in Indian Buddhism,” 253-254.

‘4. With premeditated evil intention to destroy the Buddhist community.’

‘5. Premeditated murder of Arhats.’<sup>176</sup>

It must be noted that Jonathan Silk points out that these actions must be committed with deliberate intention or premeditation as emphasized by the use of the word murder; as such they are not considered mere acts of killing, like those found in *Samjīva*.<sup>177</sup> The five immediate sins are found in various Buddhist *sūtras*, the Theravada *Aṅguttaranikāya* (The Gradual Sayings of the Buddha) and the scholastic Sarvāstivāda *Abhidhamma-kośa* are just two primary sources in which the five immediate sins are mentioned.<sup>178</sup>

The five sins, like almost all other Buddhist concepts, are elaborated and expanded upon in a Chinese *sūtra* known as the *Brahmajāla-sūtra*, adding the murder of an *upādhyāya* and *acariya*, monastic mentors.<sup>179</sup>

Sufferings in Avīci are said to be a thousand times more intense than those found in previous hells, the mere journey to Avīci alone lasts 2,000 years.<sup>180</sup> Sufferings in Avīci are so terrible that were a *deva* to smell the stench of Avīci they would instantly perish, while the sounds of those being tortured are said to be so terrifying any person who encountered Avīci would instantly die from fear.<sup>181</sup> One of the minor hells in Avīci is known as the ‘Hell of Rapid Pain’, this hell is for sinners who have destroyed images or words of the Buddha, and have committed the sin of destroying the *dharmma* body.<sup>182</sup> The destruction of the *dharmma* body denies other beings the opportunity to learn the *dharmma*, and thus prevents others from being enlightened.

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<sup>176</sup> Matsunaga and Matsunaga, *The Buddhist Concept of Hell*, 100.

<sup>177</sup> Silk, “Good and Evil in Indian Buddhism,” 255.

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*, 254-255.

<sup>180</sup> Matsunaga and Matsunaga, *The Buddhist Concept of Hell*, 99.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>182</sup> Silk, “Good and Evil in Indian Buddhism,” 261.

The punishment for this sin is having molten copper and hot sand poured in one's eyes, while one's hands are sliced by demons. One spends aeons in Avīci before one is able to be reborn, and even then, the chance of being reborn in another infelicitous realm is high. However, salvation is found in the even the darkest depths of hell, through the missions of compassionate Bodhisattvas, who go to offer help and teach the *dhamma*. At times they are even able to personally rescue individuals from hell.

Based upon one *sūtra*, the *Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra*, there is enough literary evidence that hell as a concept was prevalent and prominent in the mind of the Buddhist. This *sūtra* was popularized throughout the Buddhist world, and as I have described above, is detailed on various realms of hell and the sins committed in order to be reborn in hell. However, hell imagery exists through the Buddhist world as well in the following section I shall provide details of other literature and images of hell.

#### Hells outside of the *Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra*

Hells like *peta* and the rebirth as an animal developed and expanded over time and culture. To demonstrate the prominence of hell in the Buddhist *imaginaire*, I will further my argument by discussing the expansion of hell doctrine and the various forms that hell has taken over Buddhist history.

Ineke van Put discusses hells broadly speaking in 'East Asian Buddhism', in her two articles 'Some Remarks on the Eight Great Hells in the Northern Buddhist Tradition' and 'The



Names of Buddhist hells in East Asian Buddhism'. Van Put addresses the changes in Buddhist cosmology as Buddhism spread to China and Japan. The first change van Put addresses is the development of a cosmology known as the Chinese *Dirghagama*; this cosmology expands upon the *Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra* and mentions a second series of hells, that van Put states may have been called the *Arbuda* series.<sup>183</sup> Van Put argues that the Arbuda series can be traced to the *Kokalika-sūtra*, and that these sets of secondary hells are known as the cold hells of the Northern tradition.<sup>184</sup> The cold hells are not a new feature in the academic study of Buddhist cosmology as Przyluski argued in 1923 that the Buddhist cold hells were not a unique development to Buddhism, but rather, developed concurrently with or had origins in Iran with Mazdeism and Zoroastrianism, given that Iran was a bridge between East and West.<sup>185</sup> It has also been suggested that the cold hells developed as Buddhism moved north and entered the cold regions of India and Tibet. The development of the Kokalika originally just changed the time sinners spent in hell, but later developed into a second series independent of the Eight Hot Hells, by later texts such as the Mahaprajna and Kosa, these hells become known as the Cold hells<sup>186</sup>

Van Put also addresses the issue of the hierarchy of hells shifting before settling the structure I discussed above in relation to *Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra*. Van Put argues that it is likely that the structure developed and settled based on opposition to the Buddhist heavens.<sup>187</sup> This structure known as the Mahaniraya structure was replaced by six heavens and six hells, Avīci as the hell of hells become the opposite of Paranirmoittavasavartin.<sup>188</sup>

The elaboration of hells is not the only change to Buddhist hells over time and culture.

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<sup>183</sup> Van Put, "Some Remarks on the Eight Great Hells in the Northern Buddhist Tradition," 205.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid.

<sup>185</sup> Angela Falco Howard, *The Imagery of the Cosmological Buddha* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986), 9.

<sup>186</sup> Van Put, "Some Remarks on the Eight Great Hells in the Northern Buddhist Tradition," 212.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid., 209.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid., 210.

China provides a particular rich case study as to how hells developed. China is especially unique in that hell was administered and governed by a set of Ten Kings.<sup>189</sup> This governing system mirrored the earthly bureaucracy of China.<sup>190</sup> These kings were not immortal deities in the sense that Yama was, as the presiding Lord of Hell. Rather, they were a succession of Kings who occupied these ten bureaucratic post-mortem roles.<sup>191</sup> Unlike in early India, Yama does not occupy the role of ruler in Chinese depictions of hell; rather, he is considered to be the fifth king.<sup>192</sup> Chinese Buddhism embraced hell imagery wholeheartedly, pictorials of hell were found in markets and it is thought that such images were utilised by ‘itinerant storytellers’ in performances across China and Central Asia.<sup>193</sup> Other representations of hell in China include the story known as “The Record of a Returned Soul” a *sūtra* known as ‘*The Sūtra Spoken by the Buddha on the Prophecy to the Four Orders on King Yama Concerning the Seven Feasts to be Practiced Preparatory to Rebirth in Pure Land*’.<sup>194</sup> In this brief section I have attempted to demonstrate how hell developed over time and culture, particular in the development of cold hells in particular traditions as well as the unique Chinese bureaucratic take on hells.

## Conclusion

The system of Buddhist hells is the final infelicity in the structure and hierarchy of Buddhist infelicities and arguably the worst fate of all three. Buddhist hells are not a recent

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<sup>189</sup> Stephen F. Teiser, “‘Having Once Died and Returned to Life:’ Representations of Hell in Medieval China,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 48 (1988): 433.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, 434.

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*, 433.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, 445.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*, 446.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*, 450.

development but can be dated back to 300 B.C.E. Over time the Vedic concept of the afterlife was transformed into an infelicitous post-mortem fate that at its inception was not standardised system. I have chronicled the systemization of Buddhist hells into the set of eight major hells based upon the *Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra*, in doing this I have presented the complexity and detail that Buddhist thinkers undertook in the creation of hells. I provided further evidence for the complexity of Buddhist hells by sketching the *Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra* with details and descriptions of the specifics of some of the minor hells. The Buddhist *imaginaire*, however, is much more varied and complex than one *sūtra*, and I have attempted to counter this by providing a brief discussion as to how hells have undergone transformation whether it be through the development of another set of hells or through the bureaucratization of hell in the Chinese case. Hells in the set of Buddhist infelicities made up a significant if not the most significant portion of this set of post-mortem fates. Buddhist hells are complex and extremely detailed, though literature is the primary source of hells, visual images of hell also circulated throughout the Buddhist world, providing a frightening prospect to those who did not adhere to socially acceptable behaviour. As a result hells provided another infelicity that could be employed by the ruling elite to maintain society through the propagation of hell and the idea that if one acted in a manner that was socially corrosive one would suffer immense pain following rebirth if not immediately.

## Appendix to Chapter 3: *Ichchantikas*: a complication of the Buddhist cosmos

The final fate I will discuss is that of the *icchantika*. This fate cannot entirely be considered a felicity as it is not a state one is reborn into, but rather, a state one creates through their own ignorance and actions. I have chosen to discuss this state as I believe it offers insight into how Buddhists thought about soteriology, which arguably is the foundation of Buddhism, given it is a religion that states all will eventually achieve nirvana. Thinking about *icchantikas* also provides a point of comparison for the Christian concept of eternal damnation, and therefore, is useful in forming an overall typology of infelicity that may be applicable to multiple religious *imaginaires*.

Buddhist texts tell not only of rebirth destinies as a result of *kamma*, but of a particular special fate for those particularly evil, or ignorant of the *dhamma*. This special fate is that of the *icchantika*, a being or perhaps more apt though incorrect soul that is some sense damned. Those who are *icchantikas* have committed the four *parajikas* or rules relating to expulsion from the *sangha* i.e.: engaging in sexual intercourse and have also committed the five sins of immediate retribution.<sup>195</sup> Jonathan Silk argues that *icchantikas* are the closest to eternal damnation in the Buddhist mindset, as it is said that *icchantikas* are unable to be awoken to the *dhamma* and therefore suffer endless rebirth.<sup>196</sup> *Ichchantikas* essentially abandon all goodness and cannot attain nirvana as they have ‘cast aside scriptures of *Bodhisattvas*, and has professed the calumny that these [scriptures] do not conform to the liberation [taught] in the canonical scriptures and

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<sup>195</sup> Silk, “Good and Evil in Indian Buddhism,” 269.

<sup>196</sup> Ibid.

*vinaya*.<sup>197</sup> *Icchantikas* are mentioned in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* as those ‘the most wicked being’, and ‘devoid of good roots’.<sup>198</sup> It must be noted, however, that while *icchantikas* are considered to be damned, they are not permanent residents of hell, as stated earlier on in my discussion of *kamma* and rebirth; all rebirth destinies are considered suffering so *icchantikas* experience the various realms for eternity.<sup>199</sup>

*Icchantikas*, however, present a complication in the soteriology of the Buddhist world, Buddhism as Silk argues is ‘overwhelming positive’, in that it believes that all beings will attain nirvana.<sup>200</sup> The presence of *icchantikas* in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* is particularly problematic. Ming-Wood Liu argues due to the emphasis placed on Buddha-nature in this particular *sūtra*.<sup>201</sup> Buddha-nature is the concept that all sentient beings are imbued with special ‘seed’ that destines all being for Buddhahood.<sup>202</sup>

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<sup>197</sup> Silk, “Good and Evil in Indian Buddhism,” 270.

<sup>198</sup> Ming-Wood Liu, “The Problem of the *Icchantika* in the Mahayana *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*,” *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 7 (1984): 58.

<sup>199</sup> Silk, “Good and Evil in Indian Buddhism,” 274.

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*, 282.

<sup>201</sup> Liu, “The Problem of the *Icchantika*,” 59.

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.*

## Conclusion to Part I

I have outlined above are the three infelicitous post-mortem fates of the Buddhist *imaginaire*, in providing descriptions and histories of Buddhist infelicities, I have argued that infelicities were a significant part of the Buddhist *imaginaire*. Given not only their sheer existence, but their prominence in Buddhist literature, the infelicities arguably constituted a significant part of the *imaginaire* proposed by Collins. There is significant literary evidence for rebirth as an animal, rebirth as a *peta* and rebirth in one of the many hells. Not only does such literature exist, but it is extremely detailed and complex. The literature on *petas* and Buddhist hells serves as particularly strong evidence for the existence and prominence of infelicities in the Buddhist *imaginaire*, as the *Petavatthu* which I have discussed above, is an early Buddhist text detailing the lives of *peta*. Buddhist hells feature in many *sūtras*, which I have listed above. However, my case study of the *Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra sūtra* illuminates the incredibly complex and detailed world of Buddhist hells.

The last point of interest in the study of Buddhist infelicities is not only how detailed they are in describing the particular tortures of such realms, but they also include significant details as to what types of behaviour result in an infelicitous rebirth. I believe that the linking of specific sins with specific post-mortem tortures serves as a particularly strong indicator that infelicities served as a religious tool to discourage socially corrosive behaviour. Such tales such as the *Petavatthu* also serve a similar purpose, in that they were both entertainment and educational to the laity as to how not to behave. Literature is not the only form in which infelicities were presented, other images such as paintings also provided education for the laity.

Literary evidence and the detail of infelicities also provides significant material to make the argument: infelicities in opposition to felicities served as disincentives for socially corrosive behaviour, and thus were a stabilizing tool utilised by the elite to maintain power. Stephen Teiser in his article “‘Having Once Died and Returned to Life:’ Representations of Hell in Medieval China,” states:

For an uneducated, non-monastic audience, representations of hell are used as an ethical lure: the tortures of the underworld are intended to scare the unwitting layperson into a Buddhist way of life. Representations of hell serve a different purpose for monks: for them, the torments of hell are used to illustrate to mediators the power of their own mental fabrications, the manner in which they are responsible for constructing the world around them and for filling that world not just with the tortures of hell but also with *yaksas*, ogres, and less corporeal forms of self-doubt and delusion.<sup>203</sup>

He goes on to state:

Yet it is precisely these extra-canonical representations of hell that were determinative for the vast majority of people in the Buddhist-influenced cultures of Asia.<sup>204</sup>

I argue that these two statements can be extended to all infelicities of the Buddhist *imaginaire*. Rebirth as an animal, *peta* or in hell were used as ‘ethical lures’ that scared the layperson into the Buddhist tradition, which benefited both the Buddhist order and the ruling elite. Such fear

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<sup>203</sup> Teiser, “‘Having Once Died and Returned to Life,” 437.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid.

discouraged socially corrosive behaviour, while felicities provided the reward for acting in a manner that was beneficial to society. In being the manipulators of such worlds the monastic order continued to stake their claim as 'legitimizers' amongst the ruling elite.

Infelicities of the Buddhist *imaginaire* are complex set of post-mortem fates, evidence of which can be found throughout the Buddhist world, be it in literature or visual imagery. Infelicities were an important part of this *imaginaire* in the sense that they constituted it, but also in the function they provided in maintaining society.



## Part II

### Comparison with Christianity, and a General Model

## Chapter 5: Christian Infelicities

### Imagining infelicities in the Christian *imaginaire*

In contrast to Buddhism (as seen from a Western perspective), Christianity has been identified as a religion which has concerns or concepts relating to post-mortem punishment. Infelicities in the Christian *imaginaire* are limited in a sense to ‘Hell proper’ and the somewhat semi-infelicitous realm of Purgatory .

In this section, I will begin by giving a history of the Christian concept of Hell, as I did in my chapter on Buddhist infelicities. The history and the formation of Christian Hell and literature concerning Hell will provide a reference against the Buddhist infelicities. This survey will hopefully offer further insight into how *imaginaires* in Agraria were developed and elaborated upon. Following my introductory history, I will survey the particular tortures and sins referenced in Christian Hell. This survey will provide further evidence towards a discussion as to how infelicities may operate throughout Agraria. As part of my section on Christian literature concerning Hell, I will discuss Dante’s imagining of Hell in *Inferno*. Upon the publication of *Inferno*, Hell was arguably upon the minds of medieval thinkers, and Dante’s *Inferno* presents the epitome of Christian Hell literature. The final section on Hell will consider the concept of eternal damnation, which is particularly important in thinking about a how Hell or other infelicities operate in Agraria. In writing a comparative chapter, I intend for Collins’s model to be made more applicable.

In this introduction, I have stated that Purgatory can be considered to be semi-infelicitous post-mortem realm. However I will argue for Purgatory to be considered an infelicity in the Christian *imaginaire*. I will make this argument by first providing a history of Purgatory and debates concerning Purgatory prior to its acceptance in the canon. My main claim for Purgatory to be considered an infelicity is the function of Purgatory. I will consider the function, along with the issue of the sale of indulgences, and then conclude the chapter.

### History of Christian Hells

Dimitris J. Kyratas argues that the concept of Christian Hell should be considered a development of the Christian *imaginaire* and particularly a development outside of Christian doctrine.<sup>205</sup> Christian Hell was thought about extensively by Christian thinkers who were not contributors to the Bible.<sup>206</sup> Hell, as a concept, was already present in the Jewish *imaginaire* and N. Wyatt claims that perhaps we can even consider Hell as a pan-Mediterranean tradition.<sup>207</sup> Early Christian visions of eternal life after death were of a place of contentment, not entirely heavenly, and a place that we would most certainly not think of as hellish. These early visions are similar to visions of the afterworld in the early Buddhist and Vedic *imaginaires*. Those that did not believe in God, it is claimed, go to *Gehenna*, not an entirely horrific place, but a place where both body

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<sup>205</sup> Dimitris J. Kyratas, "The Origins of Christian Hell," *Numen* 56 (2009): 282.

<sup>206</sup> Kyratas, "The Origins of Christian Hell," 282.

<sup>207</sup> N. Wyatt, "The Concept and Purpose of Hell: Its Nature and Development in West Semitic Thought," *Numen* 56 (2009): 162.

and *soul* resided, in death.<sup>208</sup> Even in the earliest post-mortem visions of Christianity, not being with Christ or having some kind of existence after death was a fate so awful in itself that additional post-mortem punishment was unnecessary.<sup>209</sup> Early forms of eternal punishment were eternal death, or eternal fire, in the sense *Gehenna* is the extinction of life, as it is only with Christ that one can enjoy eternal life.<sup>210</sup>

Kyrtatas argues that the Christian transformation of *Gehenna* and early imaginings of eternal punishment and Hell emerged due to ethicization, similar to Jens Braarvig's argument concerning the ethicization of the Vedic afterlife into a system of Hells.<sup>211</sup> The Book of Revelation envisages another post-mortem fate, or more sinister vision of *Gehenna*, in which souls experience two deaths and two resurrections.<sup>212</sup> After first death, in which the actual corpse physically dies, all 'good' souls reside underneath the temple altar, where they await resurrection. These souls who experience first resurrection are a type of special dead or 'martyrs'.<sup>213</sup> After 1,000 years, all dead are resurrected and judged according to their deeds.<sup>214</sup> Those who are judged to be guilty of sin are hurled into 'the burning lake of fire and sulphur' along with death and Hades, to meet their second death. At second death, both body and soul are completely annihilated; second death is final.<sup>215</sup> However, Satan endures eternal torture in the lake of fire and sulphur, due to his immortality.<sup>216</sup>

Christian Hell further undergoes 'popular' exploration and transformation with the Apocalypse of Peter, an early but vital piece of Christian literature that expounds upon the idea of

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<sup>208</sup> Kyrtatas, "The Origins of Christian Hell," 284.

<sup>209</sup> *Ibid.*, 286.

<sup>210</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>212</sup> *Ibid.*, 287.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*

post-mortem punishment.<sup>217</sup> The Apocalypse of Peter envisages all resurrected sinners being tortured according to their past crimes, and the lake of fire and sulphur and worms become instruments of torture, instead of consumption.<sup>218</sup> Eternal damnation remained a point of controversy within the Church during its formative years. Augustine's *City of God*, written in the 5th century, 'championed' eternal damnation, and the belief that after death, there were two primary fates, one felicitous, and the other infelicitous.<sup>219</sup> Those that fell into Hell were tortured for eternity, and further suffered an even more horrific loss, that of being forbidden from the Kingdom of God.<sup>220</sup>

Augustine's vision of Hell was popularised during the Renaissance, a period in which the Church rapidly elaborated and maintained belief in Hell. The highly educated religious elite such as the Pope and his cardinals tended not to expound on the actualities of Hell, though Priests and other religious figures who were the primary contacts with the laity had a tendency to invoke hellscapes in their sermons.<sup>221</sup> During this period, Bernstein argues a 'rapid proliferation during the Renaissance of detailed vernacular tracts on Hell reflects an expanding grassroots belief in punishment after death', as evidenced by texts such as Dante Alighieri's *Inferno*.<sup>222</sup> A surge in Hell literature and belief in Hell increased up until the 15th C.E., in which the construction of Hell stagnated and belief in Hell was wholly normalized.<sup>223</sup>

I have not considered the histories of the precedents of Christian imaginings of Hell from early Jewish and Hellenistic visions of the afterlife, partially because the limitations of this study, and due to ongoing debates regarding the lineage of Christian Hell. Next will be an examination of

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<sup>217</sup> Alan E. Bernstein "Thinking About Hell," *The Wilson Quarterly*, 10 ( 1986): 84.

<sup>218</sup> Kyratas, "The Origins of Christian Hell," 288.

<sup>219</sup> Bernstein "Thinking About Hell," 86.

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.*, 87.

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>223</sup> *Ibid.*

the types of infelicity, or specific types of punishment imagined in Jewish and Christian texts.

### Ancient punishments in Christian Hell

Martha Himmelfarb's *Tours of Hell: An Apocalyptic Form in Jewish and Christian Literature* utilises tables which chart lists of tortures and the sins relating to them. In this section I will discuss some of the punishments encountered in Jewish and Christian Hell(s). The geography of the Buddhist hells correlates directly to the sins committed and the tortures suffered. However, early Christian imaginings of Hell were not so structured. Geographically, Jewish imaginings of Sheol, another post-mortem realm in the Jewish *imaginaire*, are similar to early Vedic images of the afterlife, in that Sheol and the *pitr-loka*, are unspecified regions in which the dead exist, where they neither suffer nor enjoy unworldly heavenly pleasures. Rather, this place appears to be a void that the dead inhabit. However, Sheol did contain regions for those that had committed particular sins or behaved in a manner that was considered immoral.<sup>224</sup> Sheol is unlike later models of post-mortem infelicity, which were structured geographically, at times centred on or arranged in a hierarchy, demonstrating or categorising sins or behaviour that was socially corrosive.

The most prevalent torture in early models of Christian Hell is hanging.<sup>225</sup> The limb most active in the sin committed is the limb which is hung, though this often extended to other parts of the body, such as hair and breasts for women.<sup>226</sup>

Reference to punishments suffered in Hell are elusive within the Gospels, as is the subject

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<sup>224</sup> Martha Himmelfarb, *Tours of Hell: An Apocalyptic Form in Jewish and Christian Literature* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 78.

<sup>225</sup> Himmelfarb, *Tours of Hell*, 169.

<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.*, 87.

of eternal damnation, a topic I will discuss at length later. References to post-mortem punishment are at best difficult to find in Paul and other early Christian writings.<sup>227</sup> Paul makes reference to 'evildoers', though it is unknown what punishment those who are referred to as 'evildoers' will suffer. However, it is stated that evildoers will receive 'wrath and fury...tribulation and distress.'<sup>228</sup> This statement may refer to ultimate death, rather than eternal life in the Kingdom of God.

Later passages in the synoptic Gospels imagined a larger more detailed and structured Hell.<sup>229</sup> It must be noted that throughout Mark 9.43-48 and Matthew 25.31-46 Hell is referred to as *Gehenna*, whereas in Luke 16.19-31, Hell is referred to as Hades or Sheol.<sup>230</sup> The Gospel of Mark is the first and earliest gospel to make reference to fire as a torture device in Hell. He states that it is best for the sinner to sacrifice the sinful limb, than to burn in the unquenchable fire of *Gehenna*.<sup>231</sup> Matthew describes Hell as a place where 'Servants who do not prepare for the return of their master will be punished with banishment to 'the outer darkness; there men will weep and gnash their teeth' (25.30; cf 24.51).<sup>232</sup>

The Book of Revelation expands further on the concept of Hell, and brings in imagery such as that of the dragon, and of Satan taking form as a beast.<sup>233</sup> Those that do not believe in God further suffer the wrath of God, as He sends out plagues and curses evildoers with illness, though once again it is emphasized that it is only Satan, the false prophet and beast, who is cursed to suffer and burn eternally.<sup>234</sup>

As mentioned, Bernstein argues that images of Hell began to multiply and became

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<sup>227</sup> Alan E. Bernstein, *The Formation of Hell: Death and Retribution in the Ancient and Early Christian Worlds* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 207.

<sup>228</sup> Bernstein, *The Formation of Hell*, 218-219.

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*, 228.

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*, 231.

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.*, 256.

<sup>234</sup> *Ibid.*

increasingly elaborate from 1000 A.D onwards.<sup>235</sup> Prior to my study of the imagery found in Dante Alighieri's *Inferno*, arguably one of the most complex images of Hell, I will survey earlier Hell imagery outside the Bible.

### Punishments in Christian Hell from St. Peter's Apocalypse and other Pre-Dante visions

Almost all visions of Hell include the image of fire, frequently an unquenchable fire that burns forever. Hanging also becomes increasingly common as a post-mortem punishment.<sup>236</sup> St. Peter's Apocalypse claims that murderers will be tortured by terrifying and venomous beasts, while their victims watch on. Fetuses who were aborted are able to take the form of children and pierce their mothers with lightning bolts from their eyes.<sup>237</sup> Those who deceive others will have their lips cut off. Persecutors are made to suffer the endless pain of having a worm constantly eat their entrails, and idol worshippers are driven to madness by devils who pursue them.<sup>238</sup>

To list further tortures from St. Peter's Apocalypse is not productive nor conducive to this study, although it is useful to survey several Hell-tours, in order to assess whether similar tortures for particular sins are repeated. St. Paul's Apocalypse contains varying tortures, though there are similar patterns of torture found in this vision, especially for those that speak ill, or false truths, tortures of the lips and tongue are common.<sup>239</sup> Sorcerers or witches are made to suffer in great pits or pools of blood, while a frequent punishment for women who defiled their virginity is to be led

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<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.

<sup>236</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>237</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>238</sup> *Ibid.*, 7-9.

<sup>239</sup> *Ibid.*, 38.



away to darkness by angels.<sup>240</sup> St. Paul's Apocalypse elaborates and expands upon on the Apocalypse of St. Peter. I argue that it is an elaboration on St. Peter's Apocalypse, as St. Paul introduces regions of Hell, and begins to create a hierarchy of sin. It is useful to this study to examine the changes made to Hell imagery over time, as this may illuminate the social conditions of the time.<sup>241</sup>

A 12th C.E religious text on an Irish knight known as *Visio Thugdali* or Tundale's vision expands upon the concept of regional or geographically mapped Hell, in which sins are arranged hierarchically, with the worst sins found at greater depths or in the deepest valleys of Hell.<sup>242</sup> Tundale's vision is unusual as it presents a set of imagined beasts which previously had not appeared in earlier visions or tours of Hell.<sup>243</sup> Imagined or mythical creatures are prominent in this vision, though the beast, Acheron, is the most terrifying of all creatures in Tundale's Hell.<sup>244</sup> Acheron is a monstrous beast, and in his mouth live two giants, Fergusus and Conallus. Acheron belches fire towards sinners while 'unworldly' souls force sinners to enter his putrid mouth.<sup>245</sup> The sinners are those accused of greed.

Tundale's journey through the various realms of Hell and eventually meets Lucifer in the deepest part of Hell.<sup>246</sup> Other earlier visions of Hell provide descriptions of Lucifer, though Tundale's is the first in which the journeyman actually encounters Lucifer and is able to describe both Lucifer and his realm. Lucifer is described as a beast with one thousand hands, each hand with twenty fingers, and he has a long sharp tail and an iron beak for a mouth.<sup>247</sup>

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<sup>240</sup> Ibid., 39.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid., 42-43.

<sup>242</sup> Gardiner, *Visions of Heaven & Hell*, 157.

<sup>243</sup> Ibid., 158.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid.

<sup>245</sup> Ibid.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid., 177.

<sup>247</sup> Ibid., 177-178.

Tundale's vision is useful for the study of pre-Dante visions of Hell, as it offers a new detailed vision of Hell, and builds on the Apocalypses of St. Peter and St. Paul. Although Tundale's vision retains similar themes, and continues the tradition that the sin being directly related to post-mortem torture, Tundale's vision expands upon earlier visions of Hell.

### Dante's Hell

Dante's Hell, like many Christian images of Hell takes literary licence in envisioning Hell how the author encounters or imagines Hell. Of interest to my thesis in Dante's *Inferno* is the transformation of particular imagery and motifs, which gave rise to new symbols of Hell. Dante's vision first diverges from earlier versions, as this tale begins in a region known as the Dark Forest before Dante is led to the Gate of Hell. At the Gate of Hell, Acheron appears.<sup>248</sup> However, unlike Tundale's vision, in which Acheron is a monstrous giant, in Dante's vision Acheron is a river, which those who have sinned are forced to cross to reach Hell.<sup>249</sup> Acheron is the geographical boundary which divides the cowardly souls, those not holy or faithful enough for Heaven nor sinful enough for Hell.<sup>250</sup> After crossing Acheron, Dante enters Limbo, the first circle in his narrative of Hell this circle is for those that are virtuous but did not know of or accept Christ.<sup>251</sup>

The characterisation of each realm is not unique. However, in *Inferno*, I claim, Dante's narrative is particularly focused on personality traits, as opposed to specific sins, which I consider unusual given the very detailed vision Dante writes. Such traits are usually represented by

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<sup>248</sup> Dante Alighieri, *The Portable Dante*, ed. Mark Musa (U.S.A: Penguin Books, 2003), 16.

<sup>249</sup> Musa, *The Portable Dante*, 16.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid.

<sup>251</sup> Ibid., 41.

historical characters who appear as the embodiment of a particular behaviour or sin. The first realm of Hell, characterised by Lust, in this realm Dante encounters Cleopatra; Dido; Helen of Troy; and Paris her lover and abductor.<sup>252</sup> Dante's Hell is unusual as it draws upon classical Greek and Roman mythology, particularly characters and creatures of the classics. *Inferno* is at times political and very personal, this is another unusual feature of Dante's Hell. Because of the political and personal nature of Dante's Hell, at times it cannot be considered part of the generalised Christian *imaginaire*, as it is specific to the period in which it was written and published as well as the geographical regions of Dante's life. Outside of the period in which *Inferno* was written and published, *Inferno* may have presented a challenge to its readers. The detailed nature of *Inferno* is not unique, as many other *imaginaires* including the Buddhist *imaginaire* contain narratives of Hell that are specific to a particular region and period. However, Dante's Hell remains important, and is arguably the pinnacle of the Latinate Christian *imaginaire* in regards to infelicitous post-mortem existences. I make this claim as *Inferno* presents a complex vision that provides a summary of all Christian concepts relating to Hell.

In discussing the Christian infelicity of Hell, I have shown that infelicities share similarities across a broad expanse of time, culture and religion. Infelicities in both the Buddhist and Christian cases underwent a series of transformations prior to settling on a system of post-mortem fates, whether they be separate worlds or regions found in a particular place, like the Christian Hell. Dante's imagining of Hell provides insight into the final development of Christian Hell doctrine, and particularly the society that the Christian *imaginaire* occupied.

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<sup>252</sup>Ibid. 26.

## Understanding sin in Christianity

In this thesis, I have argued that there is correlation between certain sins and particular tortures, as evidenced by my survey of the *Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra* and infelicities in the Buddhist *imaginaire*. In the following section, I will argue that the Christian *imaginaire* is similar, in that the above sections concerning punishment in the Christian *imaginaire* demonstrate that there is a link between sin and particular tortures. The link between sins and tortures is fascinating, and while we cannot rely on the condemnation of certain behaviours to tell us of the particular concerns of the society of this study, it is useful to consider what may have informed an *imaginaire*. This is particularly true in understanding why the elite would want to discourage certain behaviours.

Martha Himmelfarb's study is particularly useful in looking at interest in or particular emphasis on behaviours that were not conducive to community growth. Himmelfarb's study covers both Judaism and Christianity and offers an insight into both communities' histories.

Himmelfarb notes that early Christian understandings of Hell, were usually in reference to sins such as abortion, adultery and fornication all of these are mentioned in both St. Peter's and Paul's Apocalypses.<sup>253</sup> As Hell literature was elaborated over time and culture, additional sins are mentioned in such tours and visions, and Dante's *Inferno* as the peak of Hell literature contains regions for both particular or more generalised behaviours: Lust; Gluttony; Avarice & Prodigality; Wrath & Sullenness; Heresy; Murder; Suicide; Blasphemy; Sodomy & Usury; Fraud; Pimping & Seducing, Flattery, Simony and Sorcery, Political Corruption, Hypocrisy, More Fraud; Theft, Fraudulent Rhetoric; Divisiveness & Falsification and lastly Caina, Antenora, Ptolmea & Judecca.

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<sup>253</sup> Himmelfarb, *Tours of Hell*, 87.

The expansion of sin allows for some insight into the type of society that required such an *imaginaire*, and more specifically Agraria as a global phenomena. Many of the sins or types of behaviours that are considered socially corrosive in the Buddhist *imaginaire* are also found in Christian *imaginaire*. If this study was extended, it would be useful to create a table of categorizations that was able to link sins with particular punishments, and even dating the appearance of sin in relation to particular histories. This study is speculative, but it would appear that in both the Latinate Christian and Buddhist *imaginaire*, sin exists in relation to the elaboration of Hell literature and the development the Agrarian political elite. I argue that this is particularly evident in the hierarchy of sins, and the development of sins in Latinate Christian doctrine, as there is a shift from active or particularly violent sins that directly affect human life, i.e., abortion, murder towards socially divisive behaviour, such as fraud, political corruption etc. However, it must be noted Dante's *Inferno* as a pinnacle of medieval Hell literature, still emphasizes fratricide and patricide, with Caina and Ptolmea part of the final ninth circle of Dante's Hell.

#### Eternal damnation: a debate

Earlier in this study, I have mentioned the issue of eternal damnation, which is particularly relevant in thinking about how my final typology will look. Eternal damnation is unique to the Christian *imaginaire* in that the Buddhist world of infelicities asserts that no state is permanent. Early Christian discussions of Hell seem to have not viewed Hell and its inhabitants as permanently damned; rather, this seems to be later development that I will discuss in this section.

This discussion of eternal damnation and the issue of *icchantikas* will provide further complexities to the final typology of this thesis, damnation as a concept is further fascinating in that they offer a particular insight into both societies and particular histories they may have undergone in order to develop such beliefs.

Augustine's *City of God* championed eternal damnation in the 5th century, with the belief that the spiritually damned suffered both physical and spiritual tortures.<sup>254</sup> Eternal damnation was considered standard Hell doctrine by the medieval period, and many of the Hell tours or visions that I have discussed state that the spiritually damned suffer eternally. I argue that, in thinking about eternal damnation, an insight into the limits of a religion's soteriology can be considered as religions elaborate and expand. This is arguably the most fascinating insight into the differences between the Buddhist and Christian *imaginaires*.

I will survey various understandings of eternal damnation and the debate surrounding this belief, before discussing at length the potential differences this may make for my typology of infelicities. Augustine's characterisation of eternal damnation is arguably one of the most important Christian theological pieces of literature concerning eternal damnation. Augustine imagines that the damned, though they suffer unbearable pain at the hand of God, are still nonetheless blessed, in the sense that existence itself is preferable to non-existence.<sup>255</sup> Augustine argues that the damned in their suffering only wish for their pain to cease, rather than for their entire existence to cease altogether.<sup>256</sup> This belief is etched in the following quote 'And truly the very fact of existing is by some natural spell so pleasant, that even that they are wretched wish not that they themselves be annihilated, but that their misery be so.' (Augustine, *City of God*, XI, 27.)

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<sup>254</sup> Kelly James Clark, "God is Great, God is Good: Medieval Conceptions of Divine Goodness and The Problem of Hell," *Religious Studies* 1 (2001): 16.

<sup>255</sup> Clark, "God is Great, God is Good," 21.

<sup>256</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

This argument appears to draw on the limited post-mortem imaginings of The Bible, particularly the fact that existence draws precedent over total annihilation and death. This pre-disposition towards immortality at all costs is particularly interesting in the way that it restructures the *imaginaire*. Augustine is not the only theologian to expound on the issue of eternal damnation, Thomas Aquinas argued that eternal damnation was justified, and for multiple tortures to be employed against the damned.<sup>257</sup> Aquinas, like Augustine, believed that Hell was the creation of God, and even that Hell is sustained by the breath of God himself.<sup>258</sup>

Although eternal damnation was accepted amongst medieval thinkers, it was a topic of debate up until the fifth century and a debate that has continued, with scholars questioning the greatness and goodness of a God who is unable to forgive all his children. Eternal damnation and thus ultimate salvation, eternal life in Heaven, are the primary differences between the Buddhist and Latinate Christian *imaginaires* resulting in limitations on how many potential post-mortem fates can exist. The issue of eternal damnation questions the limitations of the soteriological basis of a religion, as well as the limits of a world saviour, like Shakyamuni Buddha and Jesus Christ.

### Purgatory; infelicity or felicity

In my introduction to this chapter on Christian infelicities I made mention of the issue of Purgatory and whether it can be considered a proper infelicity. Given I have argued that the post-mortem fates of the Buddhist *imaginaire* are infelicitous, I will argue that Purgatory is an infelicitous state based not only on the actual fact and tortures of Purgatory but also on its place and purpose in the Christian *imaginaire*. I will give a brief summary of the history of Purgatory

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<sup>257</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>258</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

prior to discussing how it fits in the Christian *imaginaire*. Purgatory I believe will be very important to my discussion of how we think and discuss infelicities in Agraria. I argue this because it is unusual in the Christian narrative of post-mortem fates.

Purgatory was conceived much later than Heaven or Hell, and its origins are at best murky. However, it is similar to Hell in the sense that it is not referenced explicitly in the Bible. References to a 'refining fire' are found in the Book of Malachi, and in the Second book of the Maccabees, it is said that sins can be forgiven by God even after death, if the living offer prayers.<sup>259</sup> Other Biblical references are the following quotes and tales. The first statement in the New Testament by Christ himself states:

'Therefore I tell you, people will be forgiven for every sin and blasphemy, but blasphemy against the Spirit will not be forgiven. Whoever speaks a word against the Son of Man will be forgiven, but whoever speaks against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven, either in this age or in the age to come.'<sup>260</sup>

Another story that Walls argues has given credence to Purgatory is 'the story of the rich man and Lazarus, which depicts those in Hell as aware of those in the bosom of Abraham, and vice-versa. This text inspired not only speculation about different regions between Heaven and Hell that may be occupied by the departed dead as they await final judgment, but also suggested the possibility that at least some of those in Hell might be able to ameliorate their condition.'<sup>261</sup>

However, Purgatory really emerges as concept amongst Greek thinkers and theologians. Previous visions such as that of Perpetua's contributed to the early doctrine of Purgatory, as did

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<sup>259</sup> Jerry L Walls, *Purgatory: The Logic of Total Transformation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 12.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid.

<sup>261</sup> Ibid., 13.



Cyprian of Carthage's belief that weak believers could still be admitted to communion, after they paid penance. Such thinkers such as Origen and Augustine debated the salvative powers of God, considering what happened to those that had acted morally but had little faith.<sup>262</sup> Thoughts on the classification of sin led to categorizations of persons prior to death which determined their post-mortem fate. Origen distinguished between the righteous, those guilty of lesser sins and mortal sinners.<sup>263</sup> Augustine expanded on this categorization by determining two categories that are parallel to those guilty of lesser sins that are known as those who are neither good and those that are neither bad.<sup>264</sup> By the 12th century, Augustine's fourfold class was reduced to a threefold class that matched up with geography of the post-mortem Christian world, as the doctrine of Purgatory was well on its way to affirmation by the Roman Catholic Church in 1439.<sup>265</sup>

A major issue in the formation and affirmation of Purgatory was the actual location of Purgatory: Was it beneath or above this world, heavenly or hellish a place of punishment or place of rest before entering the Kingdom of Heaven? Augustine affirmed that prayers for the dead were able to offer salvation. However, he was reluctant to agree with Origen in that all souls would eventually be saved, it is likely that due to this perspective that Augustine placed Purgatory closer to Hell and emphasized its tortures.<sup>266</sup> Purgatory was considered closer to Hell up until the publication of Dante's *Purgatoria*, the Church emphasized that Purgatory was closer to Hell, as this encouraged reform in prior to death and encouraged the sale of indulgences which I shall discuss in an upcoming section on the economics of Purgatory. Dante as with his other insights into the post-mortem Christian world offered a new perspective on Purgatory, and viewed

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<sup>262</sup> Ibid., 14-15.

<sup>263</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>264</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>265</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>266</sup> Ibid., 15.

Purgatory as a place of hope, rather than punishment.<sup>267</sup> Dante like previous theologians before him imagines Purgatory as a mountain that one must climb in order to be cleansed of sin.<sup>268</sup> Dorothy Sayers argues that Dante is the supreme poet of joy, in that he creates an overriding mood of hope in *Purgatoria*. However, this arguably did not wholly agree with the Church's stance on Purgatory as a post-mortem fate.<sup>269</sup> But for many believers it offered hope that their prayers were able to aid familial members who may have been suffering in Purgatory.

Purgatory's geographical location not only was of debate but the actual nature and physicality of Purgatory was up for debate. Purgatory in artistic depictions appears similar to Hell in the sense that it is often filled with fire and punishments to emphasize the post-mortem purging of sin.<sup>270</sup> Fire was not the only motif used in describing Purgatory, as it times it was also considered to be a cold pit in which sinners were not punished but did not enjoy the luxury of Heaven, as evidenced by Tundale's vision.<sup>271</sup> Jacques Le Goff states that common motives of medieval Purgatory, at a point where Purgatory had been affirmed by the Roman Catholic Church, were: darkness, fire, torture, the bridge as ordeal and passageway, mountains and rivers to be crossed.<sup>272</sup> By the time Purgatory was affirmed in 1439, images of Purgatory came to resemble Hell; often the only difference in the portrayal of Purgatory was the inclusion of angels offering salvation. Other images portrayed Purgatory as a wide expanse at which one end lay a pit in which sinners fell to Hell, and at the other was a 'flowery place where you see these fair people so happy and resplendent, is where souls who are received who die having done good, but are not so perfect

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<sup>267</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>268</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>269</sup> Ibid.

<sup>270</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>271</sup> Gardiner, *Visions of Heaven & Hell*, 157.

<sup>272</sup> Jacques Le Goff, *The Birth of Purgatory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 11.

as to merit immediate entry into the Kingdom of Heaven.’<sup>273</sup> Oft of most importance and always emphasized throughout the development and affirmation of Purgatory was the need to emphasize that any post-mortem punishment would be much worse than anything suffered on this earth. Therefore, it was best to reform prior to death.

As stated above, a major change in the Church was the division between mortal or willful sins and ignorant sins. In my sections pertaining to Hell as a Christian infelicity I discussed some of the sins that were considered mortal sins, to give a general idea as to the function of Purgatory I will make a brief list behaviours that were ignorant sins as listed by Jacques Le Goff:

‘Constant gossiping, immoderate laughter and excessive attachment to private property . . . idle use of legitimate marriage, overindulgence in eating, taking excessive pleasure in things, anger leading to abusive language, exaggerated interest in personal affairs, inattentiveness during prayers, late sleeping, undue bursts of laughter, overindulgence in sleep, holding back the truth, gossiping, sticking stubbornly to error, hold the false to be true in matters involving faith, neglect of duty, disorderly attire’.<sup>274</sup>

The above types of behaviours are fairly common human interactions, and therefore were useful in encouraging the purchase of indulgences for remission of these particular behaviours and creating fear in the non-elite. It is also of interest to consider why such behaviours were detrimental to society. In some cases, the reasons are fairly obvious: gossiping, for instance, could arguably also refer to politically subversive behaviour; idle use of legitimate marriage might result in the failure to produce children and thus new members for the Church. Immoderate laughter, on the other

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<sup>273</sup> Ibid., 114

<sup>274</sup> Le Goff, *The Birth of Purgatory*, 99-100.

hand, seems to be no threat to either the ruling elite or the Church. In highlighting ignorant sins, I have shown how Purgatory functions as a stabilising and reforming tool utilised by the Church to maintain society.

The final issue of Purgatory to discuss prior to conclusion are the socio-economic conditions that led to the creation and maintenance of the doctrine of Purgatory. In this final section I would also like to highlight the changes that Purgatory brought about for the Church particularly concerning indulgences and finance. Jerry Walls and Jacques Le Goff both consider factors that led to the creation and maintenance of Purgatory. Jerry Walls argues that there are five primary reasons as to why Purgatory emerged and was maintained by the Church. The first change Jerry Walls argues based on Jacques Le Goff's study is the increase of tripartite models of ideology, which were already popular in the Middle East.<sup>275</sup> Arguably, this change affected the way in which society understood time, space and numbers which led to thinking of sin as quantity.<sup>276</sup> This change in thinking and the understanding of sin as a quantity will be of importance in my typology as I attempt to write how we can see how *imaginaires* developed over time and what social changes were influential in reforming *imaginaires* to reflect society. The second change was Walls states is he believes the Church began to place emphasis on understanding sin and penance, given its need to discern between wilful sin and ignorant sin, and thus justice became a primary concern of the Church.<sup>277</sup> Early Christianity was arguably not as concerned with the fate of the dead, given they believed Jesus Christ would return to earth in the near future and all souls would be judged at second death.<sup>278</sup> However, belief in the imminent return of Christ was not nearly as prevalent at the inception of Purgatory, this change in belief led to further concern over the actual

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<sup>275</sup> Walls, *Purgatory*, 20.

<sup>276</sup> *Ibid*, 20.

<sup>277</sup> *Ibid.*, 20-21.

<sup>278</sup> Kyratas, "The Origins of Christian Hell," 287.

state and location of the dead.<sup>279</sup> Arguably, this also created conditions not just for the elaboration of the doctrine of Purgatory, but also led to the exploration and further descriptions of those who were received in Heaven or sent to Hell. During this period of development, the Church also began to explore penance and reform prior to death, and had a new appreciation for pain as a tool for personal and moral formation, ‘the development of Purgatory is tightly connected with the emergence of a new positive understanding of the productive potential of physical suffering to forge identity and meaning’.<sup>280</sup> Walls and Le Goff both argue that the 12th century was ‘an era of creative foment’, in which the above changes took place, the 13th century then became an era in which the geography of the afterlife was organized and systematized.<sup>281</sup>

So what effect did the inception and affirmation of Purgatory have on the Church and society?

The main change the advent of Purgatory had on society was the sale of indulgences, which became one of the primary sources of income for the Church. Indulgences were a particular type of penance that could be brought as a remission for past sins, be they one’s own or a family member who was believed to be suffering in Purgatory. Indulgences tended to be brought for ignorant sins, those that could result in Purgatory, given that ignorant sins tended to be committed by most given the fairly strict rules of the Church regarding ignorant sins. Jacques Le Goff states that following the affirmation of Purgatory, ‘The Church was everywhere, playing its ambiguous roles; to discipline and to save, to justify as well as to contest the established order.’ Arguably, Le Goff believed the creation and affirmation of Purgatory gave the Church more power.<sup>282</sup> I agree with Le Goff that the establishment of Purgatory and the division of sins into two categories allowed the Church to assert more power over the non-elite and the ruling elite.

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<sup>279</sup> Walls, *Purgatory*, 21.

<sup>280</sup> Ibid.

<sup>281</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>282</sup> Le Goff, *The Birth of Purgatory*, 213.

However, it was of benefit to the ruling elite for the Church to collect indulgences as indulgences provided further financial gains for the elite classes. The economic gains of the Church via indulgences allowed the Church to further assert power in that it provided the finances required to build elaborate and highly decorative cathedrals which illustrated the three post-mortem fates thereby asserting the reality of such worlds, and encouraging the sale of indulgences as a method to avoid an infelicitous afterlife.

In my introduction to this section on Purgatory, I stated that I would argue that Purgatory can be considered an infelicity, based upon the actualities of Purgatory and the function it served. As discussed above, images of Purgatory tended to be similar to Hell, and artists often only distinguished between Purgatory and Hell based on the inclusion of an image of hope i.e., featuring salvation in images of Purgatory. Prior to Dante, the Church also maintained that Purgatory was closer to Hell, and that any punishment received in Purgatory would be much worse than any earthly punishment. Because Purgatory is a place in which the soul underwent post-mortem suffering, it can be considered an infelicity, even if time spent in Purgatory eventuated to salvation and entry into the Kingdom of Heaven. The function of Purgatory I argue also serves as evidence as to why Purgatory can be considered an infelicity, given it is a terrifying place it operated on a similar level to Hell in that it was used as a metaphorical stick to Heaven's carrot. In fact, Purgatory may have even appeared more frightening than Hell given it was likely most souls would spend some time in Purgatory. Because Purgatory was for ignorant sins, it then could be used and was employed by the Church for financial gain, with the sale of indulgences that aided the ruling elite. Given the prevalence of ignorant sins committed by the populace, especially as many were somewhat unusual or common behaviours, it was easy for the church to sell indulgences providing financial gain for the ruling elite.

Purgatory in the Christian *imaginaire* provided a further infelicitous post-mortem fate that many souls arguably believed they would encounter. Because of the frightening nature and the fact it was a place of post-mortem suffering I argue Purgatory can be considered a Christian infelicity. I further argue Purgatory can be considered a post-mortem fate given that it was employed by the ruling elite to maintain society through fear, but also was beneficial to the ruling elite in that the arrival of Purgatory brought about the sale of indulgences, creating significant economic gain to the Church.

## Conclusion

Latinate Christian Hell appears to take a similar form to the Buddhist Hell or hells, in the sense that is initially a liminal place in which the dead continue to exist, but over time becomes a place of torture. Historically, we see similar developments in Buddhist and Christian hells, from their formlessness to elaborate visions that in great detail describe the multiple terrifying tortures suffered by those who have sinned. Hell literature and imagery appears to have been elaborated on sporadically throughout history, Hell literature particularly flourished in medieval Europe from 1000-1300A.D. By the publication of Dante's *Inferno* Hell was ingrained on the medieval thinkers mind. However, the existence of Hell and the condition of eternal damnation presented an ongoing debate, concerning the goodness of a God who could forsake some of his children. Eternal damnation is the main point of difference between the Buddhist and Latinate Christian *imaginaires* and will have a significant impact as to how my typology of infelicities is formed.

The advent of Purgatory created another post-mortem infelicity fate. However, this particular fate was unusual in that it was not permanent, like that of Heaven or Hell, but rather,

was a liminal place before entry into either Heaven or Hell. Like the fate of a rebirth as a *preta* or an animal, Purgatory, I believe, was a fate that many believed they would encounter, and thus it proved particularly useful in regards to maintaining Church power through economic gain. It was also a significant financial contributor to the political elite. In a sense Purgatory is very similar to Buddhist infelicities, as it not a permanent state, it also was arguably the post-mortem state that was of most benefit to the elite, in that its impermanence required methods for acceptance into Heaven, and the purchase of indulgences was one method propagated extensively by the Church.

Another significant discovery to emerge in this comparative study is the parallelism of sins. I argue that this is particularly important in asking or examining the question of Agraria, and particularly the types of behaviour that Agrarian societies condoned. A survey of such behaviours is likely to be able to provide us with evidence as to how the Agrarian elite maintained power, and the previous and present societal threats they perceived to be destabilising. The above discussion of Hell in the Latinate Christian *imaginaire* has provided a wider context for the construction of a typology of infelicities in Agraria, which is the task I turn to next.



## Chapter 6: Infelicities in Agraria

### Thinking about infelicities and how we talk about infelicities

In this Chapter, I would like to consider a few terms or categories which I argue can be useful in thinking about infelicities in Agrarian societies. In this chapter I will discuss how the comparative component of this thesis leads to a typology in the loosest sense of the word about infelicities in Agraria. Collins in 'Nirvana...' claims his study is of use to Religious Studies outside of the field of Buddhology, and he intended for his typology to be applicable to other Agrarian models of felicity. This chapter will discuss ways in which scholarship can think and talk about infelicities, based on my study of the Buddhist and Christian *imaginaires*. The terms and concepts I will discuss are hierarchy, time, dystopia and symbolic violence which will lead to a series of discussions on whether we should reconsider the governing structure outlined by Collins as more complex than he planned out in 'Nirvana...'. The final section in this discussion will consider historical violence in the Buddhist tradition and whether this violence is a result of the symbolic violence found in the imagery of the Buddhist rebirth destinies. This section is somewhat speculative, and aims mainly to consider one of the possible applications of this thesis.

#### Hierarchy

Initially, I began this thesis by considering Buddhist infelicities in the Agrarian period. In my first chapter I stated that perhaps the easiest manner in which to think about infelicities of the Buddhist *imaginaire*, is as a hierarchy. I argue hierarchy is one of the key concepts for thinking about infelicities but also for the entire Agrarian system.

Sin or types of behaviour that lead to post-mortem suffering are hierarchically arranged, based on their potential to be corrosive to society and the stabilisation of that society. Behaviour that is considered more destabilising or corrosive to society arguably resulted in more significant post-mortem punishment.

I further argue a mirror exists in the Buddhist and Christian cosmoses, as almost every sin found in Buddhist literature pertaining to Hell is found in Christian literature. To an extent that it may be argued that these two societies had similar characteristics, particularly in reference to post-mortem fates. Particular behaviours and characters are located in particular post-mortem fates which compose the entire geography of the cosmos. Behaviours or characteristics are almost always hierarchically arranged, starting from the most minor of sins, at times known as ignorant sins to the absolute worst sins, known as mortal or immediate sins.

The Buddhist *imaginaire* presents three infelicitous rebirth destinies. However, as I have argued, there is a hierarchy to these rebirths: rebirth as an animal is the least infelicitous, whereas rebirth in Hell is a very infelicitous fate. In my description of the three infelicitous rebirths, I described the types of behaviours or actions listed in Buddhist literature. Both the animal and *peta* realms are associated with 'personality traits', as opposed to actual actions which are more detrimental to society. The animal realm tends to be associated with people who have strong attachments to their family, or display personality traits that can be characterised by a particular animal. Sentient beings who suffer being reborn *peta* do so primarily for being greedy, or for

failing to provide charity. What is evident about these first two rebirth destinies is they are concerned with behaviours that are considered unsavoury rather than damaging to society or the ruling elite. Those who are reborn in the Buddhist hells suffer because their sins are divisive or likely to cause great harm to others, or society. An example of this is 'Raurava', or Great Screaming Hell which is for those that use intoxicants to manipulate others.<sup>283</sup> As the Buddhist hells descend, they are for more divisive actions such as lying, or having false views. The Buddhist hells conclude with the five sins of immediate retribution that lead to rebirth in Avīci. These five sins are all related to the premeditated murder of specific persons i.e., parents, *arhats* etc. I argue that the sins that result in the most severe punishment are sins that are socially divisive and disruptive to the ruling structure of the elite. In both the Buddhist and Christian cases the most significant of sins are those which are destructive to the family unit, the religious community, or both units. Both *imaginaires* list the premeditated murder of one's parents and religious figures as a sin that results in post-mortem punishment in the deepest realms of Hell(s). Harming doctrine and the destruction of religious artefacts along with the slander of a prophet features as one of the worst sins, in both the Buddhist and Christian traditions.

The Christian *imaginaire* presents two infelicitous post-mortem fates, Hell proper and Purgatory. In this study, I have only been able to consider Hell proper in detail. However, what I initially observed is because the Christian *imaginaire* is limited in its range of infelicities, it does not seem to punish minor sins to the extent that Buddhism does, or rather, its solution for minor sins is Purgatory. By minor sins, I refer to undesirable behaviours, or personality traits such as greed. That is not to say that Christianity does not punish behavioural traits like greed, but rather, that because there is a limited range of infelicities, perhaps more minor acts do not receive as

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<sup>283</sup> Matsunaga and Matsunaga, *The Buddhist Concept of Hell*, 90.

severe post-mortem punishment. In contrast, descriptions of the Buddhist infelicitous realms always provide explanations for the sinners suffering. Often the sins described seem very minor in comparison to the punishment, for example one off offences of stealing or the sale of intoxicants still result in severe punishments in the Buddhist *imaginaire*. While one cannot rely solely on the literary evidence of the time, as the consensus of belief amongst the populace, I argue that the hierarchical system of sins is able to be expanded and condensed, based upon the multiplicity of infelicities. Perhaps the expansion of an *imaginaire* and hierarchy of sin occurs in correlation, with new tortures thought up as new post-mortem threats in the form of socially corrosive behaviour appear.

Hierarchy is not only a feature in the 'geography' of Hell when thinking about punishments and how sins are arranged relating to punishment. Hierarchy, I argue, further serves as a feature which separates elite and non-elite. This is not a particularly strong feature in Christian and Buddhist infelicities. However, I think that in understanding the structure of Agrarian societies as bipartite or tripartite class systems, hierarchy is an important identifier of power in the post-mortem rebirths or fates. This thesis has focused on infelicities in the Buddhist and Christian *imaginaires*. However, I believe it is likely this power dynamic also exists in the felicitous post-mortem realms. I argue this is a feature, as throughout accounts of the post-mortem infelicitous worlds, there is evidence of specific places for kings and other elites. It would seem that it is particularly bad to be a bad king, more so than it is to be a bad commoner. This is evident especially in the Christian context as Tundale's vision exemplifies terrible kings and their fates, it would seem then that division between the elite and non-elite does exist to in the afterlife. I think this is a particularly interesting feature, as often afterlife descriptions tend to emphasize equality after death, with judgement resting on actions rather than status. I argue that perhaps

social status does matter, not only in that certain literary accounts were aimed at the elite or non-elite, or that particular places existed for the elite, especially for those that had failed to do their duty.

Another way in which social status and hierarchy in life affects one's post-mortem fate is that actions are not the sole determiner for one's post-mortem fate. I make this claim based on the presence of *puñña* and the sale and purchase of indulgences. Wealth and leisure time that was unique to the elite, was an advantage in determining an individual's post-mortem fate, as they were able to purchase *puñña* and indulgences, and spend time engaging in religious acts that were able to improve their post-mortem fate.

Arguably, amongst all *imaginaires*, a type of hierarchy exists, and this hierarchy likely expands as the *imaginaire* grows. As the hierarchy of punishments and ranking of sins have a symbiotic relationship, both determine the other, which in turn can be considered a mirror of Agrarian societies, albeit a somewhat distorted one. In a society in which hierarchy and a class system emerged, it seems likely that such hierarchies would be found throughout Agraria not only in the physical structure, but in the imaginings of other worlds.

### Time (and soteriology)

Another key feature of the Buddhist and Christian *imaginaires* is how time is conceptualised and particularly thoughts about those that cannot be saved, whether it is the Buddhist *icchantikas* or the concept of eternal damnation in Christianity.

The best way to conceptualise how time fits into the narrative of post-mortem infelicities

in the Buddhist and Christian *imaginaires* is to think about punishment and time spent being punished as erasing or removing sin. This works particularly well in thinking about the Buddhist system of hells and Christian Purgatory. However, early Christian imaginings of Hell often offered methods in which relatives were able to save family members from Hell, or penance resulted in future entry into the Kingdom of Heaven.

In the Buddhist case, this proposed equation is particularly evident, as many descriptions of the Buddhist hells describe in some detail the amount of time each sinner must be punished for in order to atone for their sins. There is a particular sense of cleansing through post-mortem punishment and time in Buddhism, which is dictated by the Buddhist world order. This is in contrast to Christianity, which appears to have alternative and conflicting ideas concerning time spent in Hell for sins. In some sense Christianity does not have an as clear hierarchy of sins, given that all sinners in Hell are punished for eternity. Rather, the Christian *imaginaire* relies on torture as its primary method of punishment. However, at times, punishments arguably become more severe in the Christian *imaginaire*. Therefore, it seems the equation of time plus punishment does not result in the cleansing of sin in the Christian *imaginaire*.

Time is also a key concept in understanding the limits of soteriology in a religion. Time also offers insight into the particular narratives that restrain the limits of felicity and infelicity type structures. As Collins argues in '*Nirvana...*' the Pali Buddhist *imaginaire* is centered on Nirvana as the ultimate felicity. As I have discussed above, Nirvana is a closure point and the only place of permanence in the Buddhist *imaginaire*. Having only one end point, which is arguably very difficult to achieve, allows for an infinite number of rebirths and the potential for an infinite number of post-mortem fates opening up the cosmos for continued expansion of the felicity and infelicity structure. The Christian *imaginaire* has two closure points, both of which are final: the

felicitous fate of Heaven, in which one enjoys the pleasures of Heaven and the grace of God eternally; and the infelicitous fate of Hell and being tortured eternally. Because the Christian *imaginaire* has two closure points, both which are final, it is limited in its range of post-mortem fates. As both closure points are eternal, the Christian *imaginaire* places limitations on an individual's reality. As a result, I argue that narrative in the Christian *imaginaire* is very limited, while details of felicity and infelicity can be developed, there is little potential for new post-mortem fates to be added to the Christian *imaginaire*. Arguably, the fact that there is limit of only one life on earth, and eternal life either in Heaven or Hell places a particularly narrative on an individual's life, and I argue this divides people into 'good' and 'bad'.

Due to the constraints of time on an *imaginaire*, infelicitous post-mortem fates may have become significantly prominent in the Christian and Buddhist *imaginaires*. I argue that this is perhaps more likely in the Christian *imaginaire*. I make this claim based upon the fact that eternal damnation created more terror than any earthly punishment, and therefore, was likely useful as a tool in stabilizing society by providing a very real and frightening disincentive for socially corrosive behaviour.

The final implication of time for the concept of the *imaginaire* and Agrarian felicity and infelicity structures is that the concept of eternity, I believe, places limits on the abilities of a saviour. Eternal damnation and the beings known as *icchantikas* are examples of the limitations of a religions soteriology. In stating that some beings are unable to be saved, both Christianity and Buddhism state that their saviours are limited. I believe this suggests that there were perhaps groups within the Christian and Buddhist society that were so outside of society that they could not be included in the *imaginaire* and thus were banished or exiled. It may be of use in further studies to consider the potential histories of such societies which led to concepts like *icchantikas*

or eternal damnation, and whether significant events occurred during these histories that led to the development of such ideas.

Overall, time does appear to be part of the equation in understanding infelicity systems in Agraria, as it is a signifier of sin given we can understand the severity of sin based on punishment and time. However, the concept of time is largely defined by the narrative of a religion, whether it is closed or open. We must also consider concepts like that of the *icchantika* and eternal damnation when discussing time in relation to infelicities. Time, however, is not something that can be asserted as the norm as its function in relation to infelicities, as permanent and impermanent infelicity states exist in the Buddhist and Christian *imaginaires*.

### Symbolic Violence

Steven Collins argues in 'Nirvana...' that violence was a tool used by the elite to maintain power in the Agrarian system. However, I argue that the violence of post-mortem infelicities is a particular type of violence that serves the elite in maintaining power. The violence committed in the infelicitous post-mortem realms is often of a level unseen or done in this world. In this section on symbolic violence, I intend to discuss two features of symbolic violence, how it serves a maintenance tool, and also how symbolic violence reconfigures Collins's model of governance in Agraria.

Violence is difficult to define and we often only consider violence to be physical acts. However, Mary Jackman's definition of violence, I argue, is much more useful in thinking about violence, particularly violence undertaken by the state. Mary Jackman argues that 'violence encompasses actions that inflict, threaten, or cause injury'. Violent actions, she continues, may be



‘corporal, written or verbal and the injuries may be corporal, psychological, material or social.’<sup>284</sup>

John R. Hall further suggests that perhaps we should consider violence ‘as a larger panoply of antagonistic and aggressive actions’.<sup>285</sup> Arguably, the violent imagery of post-mortem realms serves a purpose in the maintenance of the social order, in that it discourages socially corrosive behaviour through symbolic violence. The violent imagery of the post-mortem realms poses a significant threat to those that are subject to the Buddhist and Christian *imaginaires*. This symbolic violence arguably causes psychological injury in the sense that it is frightening to the viewer and as a result impacts their behaviour. This would have been particularly true of children who were introduced to such imagery, or perhaps even the illiterate who had limited understanding of post-mortem fates outside of what they saw or was read to them. Georges Sorel argued in 1950 that an ‘established social order marshals considerable capacities for the exercise of authority, force and violence’ as such we can understand the founding and maintenance of Agraria as based on violence, be it actual or symbolic.<sup>286</sup> The capacity for violence, and the need of the ruling elite to maintain society as class divisions and poverty increased created the perfect arena for symbolic violence to be utilised by the elite to maintain authority.

Symbolic violence was not only useful in the maintenance of society through psychological warfare, but was also able to legitimize actual violence.<sup>287</sup> In the case of the Buddhist and Christian *imaginaires*, governing bodies were legitimated and sanctified by the religious order. In supporting regimes that employ violence not against just their own people but against other nation-states, the religious order is supporting violence regardless of its own beliefs concerning violence.<sup>288</sup> Hall

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<sup>284</sup> John R. Hall, “Religion and Violence: Social Processes in Comparative Perspective” (Chapter prepared for the *Handbook for Sociology of Religion*, Michele Dillion, editor, forthcoming, Cambridge University Press), 4.

<sup>285</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>286</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>287</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>288</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

claims that ideology is used to either explain away violence or to abhor violence as a deviant aberration.<sup>289</sup> This is a very interesting claim regarding the legitimisation of violence in both the Buddhist and Christian *imaginaires*. In the case of the Buddhist *imaginaire*, I argue that the religious elite, while they do sanctify and legitimate state violence through their support for the governing body and symbolic violence, still are able to distance themselves from violence. In distancing themselves from real-world violence, the religious elite appear to abhor violence, and in a sense cloak Buddhism as the 'peaceful religion' it has often been viewed as. However, as I argue in the following section, on re-imagining of the governance of Agraria that symbolic violence was more threatening than the actual violence committed by the state. Christianity in contrast to Buddhism has historically been more explicit in its threat of violence or perhaps more apt in its justification of violence in the name of Christ as a method for conquest and organization of society. However, I do believe in some sense the Christian religious orders still managed to segregate themselves from violence and maintain a gentle image for the Church.

In another direction, I would like to consider whether symbolic violence or violence found in the post-mortem worlds can be considered more legitimate given the fact it is divine. In a sense it may be more *just* than actual worldly violence, given that all will suffer the same punishment for the same sin. The violence of the post-mortem worlds in a sense provided justice for those who felt they had been wronged by the worldly justice system, and perhaps is another way in which symbolic violence served as a stabiliser of society. The violence of the infelicitous post-mortem realms provided ultimate justice in a manner that governing bodies could not, therefore equalising the populace through the divine and thus maintaining society.

Symbolic violence in the post mortem worlds served three purposes in the governance of

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<sup>289</sup> Ibid., 12.

Agraria. The first function of symbolic violence was an ongoing threat to the populace, which I argue likely caused enough psychological injury to believers that as a result influenced their behaviour towards that which was socially acceptable. A secondary function of symbolic violence, I argue, is that symbolic violence legitimates state violence, in that violent imagery can lead too and legitimate violence. The last function of symbolic violence I have considered in this section is whether symbolic violence may have been considered more just, given its divine nature and as a result may have also acted as a stabiliser for the maintenance of society.

#### Re-imagining the governance of Agraria

In 'Nirvana...' Collins argues there are two major groups that make up the ruling elite, 'legitimators', who are the religious elite, and the 'thugs', the ruling elite. In this structure, the 'thugs' or the ruling elite are those who wield the hypothetical sticks, in that they are the ones who preside over the earthly courts and employ violence against the populace. In contrast to the ruling elite, the 'legitimators', the religious elite composed of the monastic order, the priestly caste and other religious figures hold the so-called carrots. The carrots are the felicities of the Buddhist and Christian *imaginaires*. According to Collins the religious elite, controlled the felicities and to an extent granted them, based on their specific knowledge which they shared with the non-elite, to enable them to access post-mortem reward. Based upon Collins's model, each group presides over only one set of stabilisers. However, in this thesis I have considered infelicities, and I argue that the proposed model of governance of Agraria requires alteration.

The Buddhist religious elite and Buddhism itself appear not to be connected to real-world

violence. However, the religious elite in the Buddhist world, and, arguably, of the Christian world, are very much connected with symbolic violence. The legitimators of Agraria, as the creators and maintainers of symbolic violence in the infelicities, commit violence on the populace. It may not be direct physical violence, but rather, symbolic violence which is a serious type of violence spread through violent speech and ongoing psychological violence. Symbolic violence is particularly unusual, because of its creators and position and connection with the divine or governing world order it is a type of legitimated violence utilised by the state. Symbolic violence can be employed by the state for political control, and arguably infelicities can be considered a type of ideological violence which is used as an instrument of control in the maintenance of society. Not only does the study of Buddhist infelicities re-imagine Collins's governance of Agraria as a much more complex structure in which the labels of legitimators and thugs must be abandoned due to each group controlling both incentives and disincentives, one of the earthly kind, the other divine. The study of Buddhist infelicities also illuminates Buddhism's history of violence, which may have implications for other studies concerning Buddhist violence. Below is a small section on the potential implications of this connection.

#### A history of violence

It is evident from my study that Buddhism has a long history with violent imagery, even if not with physical violence, although throughout its history and in the present Buddhism has engaged in violence, e.g. in the anti-Tamil case. Buddhism has a history of symbolic and psychological violence in the form of infelicities, given Buddhist infelicities are incredibly violent

and were utilised as a tool in maintaining society. Violent infelicities have long been a fundamental part of Buddhism, as evidenced by the *Kathāvatthu* debates concerning hell in the 2nd century and the publication of the *Petavatthu*. Due to Buddhism's longstanding involvement in political and symbolic violence, it seems that at times Buddhism has engaged with real-world political violence on the basis of textual violence. The Buddhist religious elite's connection with symbolic violence that they are able to manipulate allows them on occasion to engage in real-world political violence, on the grounds that such violence serves Buddhism.

## Conclusion

In summary, in this thesis, I have argued that a set of infelicities constituted a significant part of the Buddhist *imaginaire*, and that the infelicitous dimension of the Buddhist *imaginaire* was instrumental in maintaining society. I have further expanded upon this initial argument to include another *imaginaire*, the Latinate Christian *imaginaire*. In this case, too, I focused upon the inclusion of a rich set of infelicities, to argue that it is likely that all Agrarian *imaginaires* contained a set of infelicities.

Part I outlined a set of three Buddhist infelicities: all post-mortem fates: rebirth as animal; rebirth as a *peta*; and rebirth in the Buddhist hells.

In Chapter 1, I argued that rebirth as an animal was the least infelicitous of these three rebirth destinies. However, it was still frightening enough to act as a disincentive for socially corrosive behaviour. I argued that animal rebirth was the least infelicitous infelicity, because the type of suffering that occurs in the animal realm is much less severe than in the other rebirth destinies; and because of the behaviour or sins that result in rebirth as an animal. Those reborn as animals were guilty of particularly unsavoury personality traits, as opposed to particular actions, as exemplified by those reborn as snakes due to anger.

In Chapter 2, I surveyed rebirth as *peta*. *Peta* are perhaps the most fascinating rebirth fate to the non-Buddhist, as they are a particularly unusual, half-human, ghost-like creature. *Petas* have been a source of interest to academics since Feer's description in 1884. However, as I have shown, *petas* are not as simple as Feer's early description, and ongoing studies have shown that even

images of *peta* are complex. In my study of *peta* rebirth, I attempted to describe the various forms of *peta*, which I argued may be linked to their origin in Vedic cosmology. I first examined basic questions: What or who are *peta*? Where do they exist? I then used literary evidence, particularly the *Petavatthu*, as well as images of *peta*, to demonstrate that rebirth as a *peta* was a significant part of the Buddhist *imaginaire*. Finally, I discussed the work of Jeffrey Shirkey on *peta* and ‘moral economy’, particularly the way in which the ruling elite have employed the notion of *peta* for financial gain, as an incentive for gifts to the *sangha*. *Peta*, I argued, presented a very frightening post-mortem fate to the Buddhist laity, and that threat was very real to the majority of Buddhist believers. I also observed that like rebirth as animal, rebirth as a *peta* was occasioned primarily by unsavoury character traits, rather than specific acts.

In Chapter 3, I examined the final and most infelicitous of the Buddhist rebirths, rebirth in one of the many Buddhist hells as a hell-being. After discussing the origin and complex history of Buddhist hells, I sketched out the standard system of eight hells, based on the *Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra*. This shows how complex the system of hells was, and the amount of detail that Buddhist thinkers went into when imagining such post-mortem fates. The evidence of this section shows that Buddhist infelicities have a long and complex history. This supports one of the central claims of this thesis as a whole, namely, that the Buddhist infelicities always constituted a significant part of the Buddhist *imaginaire* as a whole. To support even further my claim that hell played a significant part in the system of infelicities, I also briefly discussed how hells have been transformed over culture and time.

In a brief Appendix to Chapter 3, I conducted a small study of the beings known as *icchantikas*. Arguably, although *icchantika* status is not a rebirth destiny, it is an infelicitous state. *Ikchantikas* also provide a point of comparison with the Christian concept of eternal damnation

and the problem of those who cannot be saved.

My survey of the Buddhist infelicities concludes that infelicities were a significant feature of the Buddhist *imaginaire*. Infelicities were not only present in the Buddhist *imaginaire* but constituted a portion of literature and other media which was available and often regularly presented to the laity by the monastics. As a result, I argue that not only were Buddhist infelicities a significant part of the *imaginaire*, but that like felicities they served a purpose of maintaining Agrarian society.

In the section concerning each of these rebirth destinies, I provided substantial evidence as to why they must be considered part of the Buddhist *imaginaire*. I hope to have shown that infelicities in the Buddhist *imaginaire* constitute a rich and complex system, and have been a significant part of Buddhist cosmologies since the beginnings of Buddhism, as is demonstrated by debates concerning hell, and texts like the *Petavatthu*. The infelicities of the Buddhist *imaginaire* have flourished and expanded over time and culture, providing evidence that they were not a minor part of particular Buddhist traditions, but were found throughout the Buddhist world. My detailed discussions of the Buddhist infelicities provide ample evidence that they should be included in Collins's proposed theory of the Agrarian *imaginaire*. Infelicities constituted a significant part of Buddhist literature, and images of such rebirth destinies are also found throughout the Buddhist world, be they paintings, carvings or other architectural features.

The tradition thus contained a wealth of information on Buddhist infelicities, and much of this information was available to the laity, not only in visual form, but also in spoken form, as in the tales of the *Petavatthu*, and other popular tales of hell such as the classic Mulian. I have argued that infelicities were used in the Buddhist *imaginaire* as a device to achieve and maintain social stability, based upon the prevalence of information on Buddhist infelicities; the fact that



they were discussed in relation to socially corrosive behaviours; and the fact that they were presented to the laity in stories and images. All of the infelicitous fates in the Buddhist *imaginaire* are linked to a particular undesirable behaviour or personality trait. Given the prevalence of Buddhist infelicities, the incredibly detailed and complex worldview they constitute, and their purpose as a moralising tool, there is strong reason to include them in Collins's proposed theory of the Buddhist *imaginaire*.

In Part II, I undertook a comparative study of Christian infelicities, during what I classified as the Latinate period, or pre-Reformation Christianity. In this section, I argued that much like Buddhist infelicities, Christian infelicities should be considered an integral part of the Christian *imaginaire*, serving a similar function to the Buddhist infelicities in that they provided a disincentive for socially corrosive behaviour. In this section, it was also my intention to show that similarities exist between the infelicities of two very differing religious systems, so that the theory of the religious *imaginaire* may be of more general use to analyses of religion.

I argued that the Christian system is smaller and slightly less complex than the Buddhist system, and the primary infelicity identified in the Christian *imaginaire* is Hell proper. As with Buddhist hells, I began my section on Christian Hell by sketching the history of Christian Hell, and its emergence from the Jewish *Gehenna*. I then considered the punishments found in Christian Hell and the reasons for such punishments, and in order to make the claim that infelicities functioned as a disincentive or socially corrosive behaviour; any unsavoury behaviour must be linked to an infelicity. This section provided insight into the types of sin that resulted in post-mortem punishment, and led to the observation that the Buddhist and Christian *imaginaires* shared many similarities in regards to sin. In order to claim that Hell was a significant part of the Christian *imaginaire* that continued to evolve over time and culture, I also briefly surveyed a

variety of visions of Hell, beginning with St. Peter's Apocalypse and ending with Dante's *Inferno*. This section demonstrated that various images of Hell developed over the centuries, and showed the elaborate detail Christian thinkers went into when creating images of Hell.

The final two sections of my study of Christian Hell attempted to understand two specifically Christian concepts: first, sin; and second, eternal damnation. I surveyed the range of sins listed in the Christian *imaginaire* and how they developed and shifted status over time. This also led to a consideration of whether Hell and sin expand together, as part of the same larger dynamic. The second of these concepts, that of eternal damnation, presented a significant challenge. My survey of the notion of eternal damnation led to the conclusion that narrative and time are extremely important in thinking about infelicities. I utilised this survey, and my earlier discussion of *icchantikas* from Chapter 3, in a later section of this thesis concerning time and soteriology.

Hell proper in the Christian sense, much like the infelicities of the Buddhist *imaginaire*, is a complex and multifaceted place. Over the centuries, Hell underwent significant changes, as Christian thinkers dreamt ever-more terrifying post-mortem punishments. Not only was Hell a significant part of the Christian *imaginaire*, it also served the same function as the Buddhist infelicities, in that Hell served as a disincentive for socially corrosive behaviour. I argued this point on the basis of the correlation between particular sins and punishments found in Hell.

The second infelicity that I considered in my study of Christian infelicities was Purgatory, though it is not entirely infelicitous. Purgatory is secondary to Hell, as it is only a temporary state. I began my study of Purgatory with a brief history and an investigation into the origins and the way Christian thinkers rationalised the inclusion of Purgatory given it is a recent development in comparison to Hell. Because of this, Purgatory was surrounded by debates, from its geographical

location to the actualities of Purgatory. Over the development of Purgatory it was affirmed that Purgatory was closer to Hell and much the same of Hell in regard to punishments. Purgatory also served a very useful function through the sale of indulgences which provided significant economic gain for the ruling elite. Indulgences were able to be readily sold, as Purgatory much like rebirth as an animal or rebirth as a *peta* was a very real threat, in that it was likely that almost every person would experience Purgatory. In some sense I argue that perhaps rebirth as a *peta* and Purgatory can be thought of as very similar in the sense that both frightened the populace into behaving in a way that was not only socially acceptable but also beneficial to the ruling elite. Purgatory like Hell proper provided a very real threat to the Christian laity, and was instrumental in maintaining stability in the Christian Agrarian world.

Hell and Purgatory as infelicities of the Christian *imaginaire* like Buddhist infelicities constituted a significant part of the Christian *imaginaire*. The complexity and the detail of such infelicities as well as the debates surrounding them shows the length that Christian thinkers went to in order to create such worlds. Therefore, Christian infelicities were not only a significant part of the Christian *imaginaire*, but they served the same function as Buddhist infelicities in providing a disincentive for socially corrosive behaviour; they were also instrumental in maintaining society.

The final section of this thesis discussed ways in which I think it can be useful to think about infelicities, or similarities that I have identified in both the Buddhist and Christian *imaginaires*.

I began this section by reflecting on hierarchy, as hierarchy I argue is the point most central to infelicities in the sense that they are hierarchically ranked. I have claimed that hierarchy is determinative in the study of infelicities, as infelicities, behaviour or sins and even the geography of infelicities is ordered by a hierarchy. I made the further claim that hierarchy in the

post-mortem infelicitous worlds is perhaps a reflection of the hierarchies found in Agraria, and it makes sense that this would occur given our tendency to construct what we know.

As stated above, my studies of *icchantikas* and the Christian concept of eternal damnation provided the basis for a discussion of time and soteriology. My first consideration of time, is that time is very useful in thinking about sin and punishment particular how time can lead to an understanding of severity of sin, though in the Christian case, this is arguably complicated somewhat by the doctrine of eternal damnation. Following this, I made the claim that time is key in understanding the narrative and soteriology of a religion, in the sense that only one closed ending leads to multiple paths whereas two closed ends constrain the *imaginaire*. Time also provides a consideration of the limits of a saviour, and I argue that perhaps an important next step in such research would be to look at how narrative, time and history alter a saviour's ability and the post-mortem fates of believers.

In another direction, I considered symbolic violence, particularly when thinking about an *imaginaire's* function of managing the Agrarian populace through fear of post-mortem retribution. I argued that we need to think of violence as much more complex than that of just the physical violence of the state and that the infelicitous realms and the propagation of such worlds did a psychological violence on the populace. Thinking about symbolic violence also opens up discussion as to how a religious group legitimates actual violence through symbolic violence and the support of a regime's violence. The last claim I made in relation to symbolic violence was that perhaps symbolic violence and the violence of the post-mortem realms was considered justified because it was divine and administered by the religious authority.

Symbolic violence and the administration of such violence by the monastic order requires a reconfiguration of the proposed Agrarian structure Collins argued for in 'Nirvana...'. I claim in this

section that perhaps we should consider the system more complex than just ‘legitimizers’ and ‘thugs’. The ruling elite, composed of the priestly and the dynastic offer both hypothetical ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ to the populace, neither body holds precedence over one or another.

My last consideration in this section on how we can think about infelicities is whether symbolic violence has any significance on actual Buddhist violence. I claimed in this section that due to Buddhism’s long history with violence, in the sense of symbolic violence, that the Buddhist monastic order is in fact engaging in violence and in a sense condoning it.

Although I have already considered ways in which this thesis and the study of infelicities can be expanded, the following two points I was not able to elaborate on due to the limitations of this thesis.

In future studies, it would be of interest to consider the advent of infelicities by date, to hypothesize as Jens Braarvig suggests whether Buddhist hells can be considered the first hells. Based upon my study of Buddhist and Christian hells, it is arguable that Buddhist hells emerged prior to the advent of Christianity. In other words, we should investigate whether Hell is a Buddhist or Eastern concept that spread across the Middle East, where it was reimagined in Christianity as a Christian concept. A history of hells throughout the religious world would offer an insight into societies and the similarities and differences they shared as they developed over history.

I would also like to state that there was no room in this thesis to prove that infelicities were more important than felicities in the governance of Agraria. In this study I merely sought to illustrate that infelicities were a significant part of both the Buddhist and Christian *imaginaires*. In further studies it may be of use to consider how Agrarian societies utilised both felicities and infelicities as stabilisers, and whether one set was more effective than the other.

In sum, I have claimed that infelicities of the Buddhist and Christian *imaginaires* constituted a significant part of each religion's ideology. Steven Collins's argument should be revised to include infelicities as part of the *imaginaire*, not only due to the mere fact that ideas about these infelicities exist, but also because infelicities served the same purpose as that which he proposed for felicities. Infelicities exist alongside felicities, providing a set of imagined post-mortem fates that provide a stabilizer for Agrarian society.

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