

SARAH MEAD

PROTECTING POPULAR CONSTITUENT POWER

EXAMINING NEW ZEALAND'S ROLE IN THE
CONSTITUTION-MAKING EPISODES OF THE
COOK ISLANDS AND NIUE

LLB (HONS) RESEARCH PAPER

LAWS 526: CONSTITUTIONALISM COMPARED

FACULTY OF LAW

TE WHARE WĀNANGA O TE ŪPOKO O TE IKA A MĀUI



VICTORIA
UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON

2014

Contents

| | | |
|-----|--|----|
| I | INTRODUCTION | 4 |
| II | DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND CONSTITUENT POWER..... | 6 |
| III | THE CASE STUDIES: THE COOK ISLANDS AND NIUE | 8 |
| A | Background | 8 |
| B | The Constitution-Making Processes..... | 10 |
| 1 | The Colonial Administration..... | 10 |
| 2 | The Cook Islands | 11 |
| 3 | Niue..... | 13 |
| C | The Constitutions | 14 |
| IV | EXTERNAL INFLUENCE AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY | 16 |
| A | Classical (Strict) Conception of Constituent Power..... | 16 |
| B | Enlarged (Loose) Conception of Constituent Power..... | 18 |
| C | A Flexible Conception of Constituent Power: Towards a New Analytical Framework | 19 |
| V | ANALYSING THE CASE STUDIES | 24 |
| A | Cook Islands..... | 24 |
| B | Niue | 28 |
| VI | A BETTER APPROACH: A TWO-STAGE MODEL..... | 32 |
| VII | CONCLUSION..... | 38 |

Abstract

This paper assesses the democratic legitimacy of the constitution-making processes that brought into being the Constitutions of the Cook Islands and Niue. New Zealand's role in the decolonisation of its former colonies has generally been seen as quite benign. New Zealand's status as an external actor however raises questions regarding the effect its influence had on the democratic legitimacy of the respective constitution-making processes.

Constituent power theory demands that a constitution is the product of the popular political will; an act of self-determination undertaken by the people, for the people. This paper argues that the existence of external influence in the constitution-making process is not necessarily at odds with this. The democratic legitimacy of the constitution-making process is dependent on the constitution being a manifestation of the people's constituent power. Insofar as external actors do not displace the people's constituent power but rather enhances it, there is no reason to exclude such influence; there may even be reason to encourage it.

By drawing on New Zealand's experience in decolonisation, this paper ultimately advances a two-stage model for constitution-making in the context of small, dependent non-self-governing island-states. As on-going political ties with an external state are often sought, the aim of the model is to provide an avenue for that external state to participate in or contribute to the constitution-making process while maintaining the process' democratic legitimacy.

Word length

The text of this paper is approximately 14,663 words (excluding footnotes not including substantive material, abstract, table of contents, and bibliography).

Key words

Constitution-making, Decolonisation, Constituent Power, The Cook Islands, Niue.

I Introduction

During the 1960s and 1970s, a wave of constitution-making washed across the Pacific region as several of the world's remaining colonised territories welcomed in a new era of independence in some form. Two such countries were the Cook Islands and Niue which, in 1965 and 1974 respectively, became self-governing states in free association with New Zealand. In both cases, this significant political shift was accompanied by the coming into force of national constitutions.

This paper will explore the processes that brought into being the Constitutions of the Cook Islands and Niue. At decolonisation, both states rejected full independence and explicitly sought on-going political ties with New Zealand as a condition to their advancement towards self-government. As a result, New Zealand recognised a role for itself in the constitution-making processes and exerted significant influence throughout. Though New Zealand's role in this regard has generally been seen as quite benign, its status as an external actor raises questions regarding the effect its influence had on the democratic legitimacy of the resulting constitutional regimes.

Classical constitutional theory locates constituent power - that is, the power to frame a constitution - in the people or the nation. By making those who will be bound by the constitution the source of its authority, the democratic legitimacy of the constitution is ensured. A democratically legitimate constitution is one that the people 'give to themselves'. For some states, the implicit exclusion of external actors in this classical notion of constituent power is unproblematic - constitution-making will proceed as an exclusively national exercise with nominal regard for external actors or states. For small dependent states such as the Cook Islands and Niue however, external actors simply cannot be ignored in the constitution-making process. For these states, the importance of their ties with an external state require recognition; their fragile political, economic and social realities demand a more flexible and responsive conception of constituent power.

This paper aims to assess the democratic legitimacy of the constitution-making processes behind the Constitutions of the Cook Islands and Niue, taking account of New Zealand's role. While this paper accepts that the processes may have lacked democratic legitimacy, it will challenge the assumption behind classical constituent power theory that this is the inevitable result of New Zealand's influence. A strict conceptualisation of constituent power fundamentally limits analysis of constitution-making and fails to recognise the potential for external influence to enhance popular constituent power.

With a view to establishing a more nuanced (and helpful) approach to assessing the effect of external influence, this paper will explore the possibility of reconciling the theory of constituent power with the reality of external influence in constitution-making. Ultimately it

will argue that reconciliation *is* possible – but that external influence must be carefully managed to maintain the democratic legitimacy of the process. An analytical framework aimed at identifying democratically legitimate external intervention in the constitution-making process will be advanced, and it is on this basis that the constitutional experiences of the Cook Islands and Niue will be assessed.

Though critiquing New Zealand's role in the decolonisation process of its former colonies is a key component of this paper, it is by no means the primary aim. In 2010, the United Nations General Assembly declared 2011-2020 the *Third International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism*.¹ Despite the best efforts of the United Nations and the Committee of 24 (Special Committee on Decolonization), there remain 15 non-self-governing island-states.² Though these island-states do not appear to be getting closer to completing the decolonisation process,³ in the instance that they do, it is likely that this will be on the condition that political ties with the colonial power will continue into the future.⁴ For constitution-making, this presents a challenge. By seeking ongoing ties with an external state – careful attention must be paid to ensure that the constitution is the product of a *popular* exercise of constituent power. Towards addressing this challenge, this paper will explore how constitution-making in the context of small, dependent non-self-governing island-states can include a role for an external power, while maintaining the process' democratic legitimacy.

This paper proceeds as follows. Following an account of the procedurally normative conception of *democratic legitimacy* on which this paper is based, a background to the processes behind the Constitutions of the Cook Islands and Niue is given. In the first instance, the processes undertaken are analysed with recourse to classical and contemporary conceptions of constituent power in constitutional theory. In light of the difficulties presented by these conceptions, the paper goes on to advance a more flexible conception of constituent power which is considered more appropriate to assess the effect of external influence on the democratic legitimacy of a constitution-making process. The constitutional experiences in the

¹ *Third International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism* GA Res 65/119, A/Res/ 65/119 (2011). The first international decade was proclaimed by *International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism* GA Res 43/47, A/Res/43/47 (1988). The second international decade was proclaimed by *Second International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism* GA Res 55/146, A/Res/55/146 (2000).

² The remaining non-self-governing island-states are: American Samoa, Guam, Pitcairn, Tokelau, Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, US Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Montserrat, and Turks and Caicos, St Helena, French Polynesia and New Caledonia. Gibraltar and Western Sahara are also non-self-governing territories, but are excluded from the scope of this paper – the focus of which is island-states. See: United Nations "United Nations List of Non-Self-Governing Territories" <http://www.un.org/en/events/nonselfgoverning/nonselfgoverning.shtml>.

³ Perhaps with the exception of New Caledonia: under the 1998 Noumea Accord, a referendum will be held between 2014 and 2019 to decide the future status of the territory. See Nic MacLellan "The Noumea Accord and Decolonisation in New Caledonia" (1999) 34 *The Journal of Pacific History* 245. With regards to the Falkland Islands, decolonisation is hampered by a territorial dispute.

⁴ Since 1984, the only small territories to struggle and obtain *full* independence have been East Timor, Montenegro and Kosovo. See Godfrey Baldacchino "'Upside Down Decolonization' in Subnational Island Jurisdictions: Questioning the 'Post' in Postcolonialism" (2010) 13(2) *Space and Culture* 188 at 192.

Cook Islands and Niue are analysed according to this conception. Taking the conclusions from this analysis, the final part of this paper proposes a model of constitution-making that is considered more appropriate for dependent non-self-governing island-states wishing to undergo constitutional change, while retaining ties with a larger external state.

II Democratic Legitimacy and Constituent Power

This paper defends a procedurally normative conception of democratic legitimacy in constitution-making - the criterion for which is the concept of popular constituent power.

Constituent power, or constitution-making power, “is the political will, whose power or authority is capable of making the concrete, comprehensive decision over the type and form of its own political existence”.⁵ Writing during the French Revolution, Sieyès identified ‘the people’ or ‘the nation’ as the subjects of constituent power (*le pouvoir constituant*).⁶ In doing so, he heralded an important shift in constitutional theory. Where previously public power had relied on external sources of authority (ie religion) for legitimation, Sieyès demanded that the conscious willing of the people could provide that authority, stating that “[t]he national will ... never needs anything but its own existence to be legal. It is the source of all legality”.⁷

Constitutional theory rests on an important distinction between constituent (constitution-making) power and constituted (law-making) power. Constituted power (which includes executive, legislative and judicial authority) remains permanently subordinate to constituent power, which conversely can never be constrained nor exhausted. As explained by Schmitt:⁸

All constitutionally constituted powers and competencies are based on the constitution-making power. However it can never constitute itself in terms of constitutional law. *The people, the nation, remains the origin of all political action, the source of all power...*

The connection between constituent power and democracy can be readily identified. Democracy requires that all citizens in a *demos* participate equally towards the creation of the laws to which they are subject. Popular constituent power demands that the collective citizenry be the authors of the institutions and rules that regulate their society – their constitution. By permanently locating the constitution-making power in those people bound by the constitution, the democratic nature of the constitutional regime is guaranteed. As explained by Kalyvas, “precisely because the concept of the constituent sovereign resituates

⁵ Carl Schmitt *Constitutional Theory* (Duke University Press, Durham, 2007) at 125.

⁶ Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès *What is the Third Estate?* (Pall Mall Press, London, 1963) at 58.

⁷ At 126.

⁸ Schmitt, above n 5, at 128 (emphasis added).

the normative ideals of political freedom and collective autonomy at the centre of democratic theory, it points at a distinctive theory of democratic legitimacy”.⁹

Democratic legitimacy in constitution-making will therefore be assessed in this paper according to the extent to which a constitution can be seen as the manifestation of the political will of the people it purports to bind – or in other words, the manifestation of an exercise of popular constituent power.¹⁰ Popular constituent power “represents an ideal and pure type of democratic constitutional making.”¹¹ Constitution-making however rarely occurs in ideal ‘textbook’ conditions, rather “the call for a new constitution usually arises in turbulent circumstances.”¹² Reality thus demands that democratic legitimacy in constitution-making be treated as a matter of degree.

The conception of constitutional legitimacy advanced in this paper must be distinguished from other popular conceptions of legitimacy.¹³ A sociological conception judges the legitimacy of a constitution according to the extent to which the people it purports to bind *perceive* that the constitution is binding on them, and act accordingly.¹⁴ This conception is based on a Weberian understanding of legitimacy. Aside from the practical difficulties presented by assessing constitutional legitimacy on this conception, more importantly it is at odds with the idea of *democratic* legitimacy.¹⁵ A constitution imposed by an external power or dictatorial leader may be dutifully acquiesced to and even respected by the citizenry, but such a constitutional regime cannot be considered democratically legitimate.

A moral conception of legitimacy would judge a constitution as legitimate insofar as its content accords with a set of morally acceptable principles. On a Rawlsian approach, such principles would be those “which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse”.¹⁶ At least to the extent that its assessment is based on the *substance* of a constitution, assessing legitimacy according to a set of principles is susceptible to the same democratic shortcoming as a sociological conception. If the constitution accords with a set of

⁹ Andreas Kalyvas “Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power” (2005) 12(5) *Constellations* 223 at 237.

¹⁰ The scope of this paper is limited to those instances of constitution-making where ‘the people’ is an already recognised entity (so it would not realistically apply to the Falkland Islands). Popular constituent power as a criterion for assessing democratic constitution-making presupposes a people or a nation. Where this is not already established (eg where a state’s borders are disputed), this criterion is of limited utility as it is difficult to identify ‘a people’ to give to themselves a constitution. The problem of ‘democratic beginnings’ arises. See generally Hans Agné “Democratic founding: We the people and the others” (2012) 10 *Int J Const L* 836; and Zoran Oklopčić “Constitutional (Re)Vision: Sovereign Peoples, New Constituent Powers, and the Formation of Constitutional Orders in the Balkans” (2012) 19(1) *Constellations* 81.

¹¹ Kalyvas, above n 9, at 238.

¹² Jon Elster “Forces and Mechanisms in Constitution-Making” (1995) 45 *Duke LJ* 123 at 138.

¹³ See generally David Beetham *The Legitimation of Power* (MacMillan Press, Hong Kong, 1991).

¹⁴ Richard H Fallon Jr “Legitimacy and the Constitution” (2005) 118(6) *Harvard Law Review* 1787 at 1795-1796.

¹⁵ Joel Colón-Ríos “The Legitimacy of the Juridical: Constituent Power, Democracy, and the Limits of Constitutional Reform” (2010) 48 *Osgoode Hall Law Journal* 199 at 214.

¹⁶ John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2005) at 224.

acceptable principles, it would be democratically legitimate regardless of the process by which it came into being.

In contrast, the concern of this paper is procedure at the level of constitution-making. It proceeds on the understanding that the founding of a political order is democratically legitimate if it is based on a constitutional regime which reflects the political will of the people, or is the result of a popular exercise of constituent power. It supports the contention, as advanced by Colón-Ríos, that “the basic condition for democratic legitimacy is the realization of democracy at the level of the fundamental law”.¹⁷ As ordinary laws draw their authority from fundamental law, a deficit of democracy with regards to the latter brings into question the democratic legitimacy of the whole constitutional order.¹⁸

Though careful attention has been made here to distinguish between democracy at the level of constitution-making and democracy at the level a constitution’s operation, academics have repeatedly recognised the interlinked nature of these factors. As noted by Yash Ghai, “the capacity of the constitution to confer legitimacy upon the new system depends in considerable part on the process of its making and in particular the extent of the popular consultation and consensus on which it was based.”¹⁹

III The Case Studies: The Cook Islands and Niue

A Background

The Cook Islands and Niue are two island states located in the South Pacific Ocean. By proclamation dated 10 June 1901 both were formally included within the boundaries of the “Colony of New Zealand”.²⁰ Though the Cook Islands and Niue accepted a shift towards self-government (with varying degrees of enthusiasm), it was New Zealand, not the colonies, that pushed for the latter to become self-governing following pressure from the United Nations (UN).²¹

In 1960, New Zealand signed the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (‘the Declaration’). The Declaration recognised that “all peoples have the right to ... freely determine their political status”,²² and was based on an

¹⁷Colón-Ríos, above n 5, at 214.

¹⁸ Joel Colón-Ríos “The Second Dimension of Democracy: The People and Their Constitution” (2009) 2(2) *Baltic Journal of Law & Politics* 1 at 9.

¹⁹ Yash Ghai (ed) *Law, Politics and Government in the Pacific Island States* (Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, Suva, 1988) at 6.

²⁰ Cook Islands Boundaries and Inclusion in New Zealand Proclamation 1901.

²¹ Godfrey Baldacchino “‘Upside Down Decolonization’ in Subnational Island Jurisdictions: Questioning the ‘Post’ in Postcolonialism” (2010) 13(2) *Space and Culture* 188 at 190.

²² *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples* GA Res 1514, XV A/Res/1514 (1960) at art 2.

assumption that full independence, if given the option, would be the desired option of the world's remaining colonies. It stated that:²³

immediate steps shall be taken, in United Nations Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories.

The Declaration left colonial powers little room to manoeuvre, stating that “inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence”.²⁴

Having signed the Declaration, New Zealand felt an acute sense of pressure to comply with its terms as soon as possible.²⁵ The local people of the Cook Islands and Niue did not however, as suggested in the Declaration, display an apparent “yearning for freedom”, nor was there any suggestion of a threat of “conflict resulting from the denial” of their freedom.²⁶ Rather, they explicitly demanded the maintenance of strong ties with New Zealand.

To take account of this reality, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution later in 1960 recognising alternative political arrangements (aside from full independence) that would afford the decolonising state the requisite full measure of self-government.²⁷ On this basis, the New Zealand Minister of Island Territories presented a speech to the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly (CILA) in 1962 (which was later sent to the Niue Island Assembly (NIA)), on the colonies' constitutional futures. The Assemblies were presented with four options: (1) full independence, (2) Polynesian federation, (3) integration with New Zealand or (4) internal self-government.²⁸ The Minister expressed the view “that it would be in the best interests of the Cook Islands [and Niuean] people to keep the present link with New Zealand, but to have full internal self-government.”²⁹

In 1962, the CILA and NIA passed resolutions stating that internal self-government, rather than full independence, was their preference. Towards the attainment of that goal, the New Zealand government prepared “a programme for the future” – which included a timetable mapping out a careful transfer of power over the course of three years towards self-

²³ Article 5.

²⁴ Article 3.

²⁵ Terry Chapman *The Decolonisation of Niue* (Victoria University Press and NZ Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, 1976) at 19.

²⁶ *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*, above n 22.

²⁷ The resolution recognised three decolonisation options: “A Non-Self-Governing Territory can be said to have reached a full measure of self-government by: (a) Emergence as a sovereign independent state; (b) Free association with an independent State; or (c) Integration with an independent State.” *Principles which should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73e of the Charter* GA Res 1541, XV (1960).

²⁸ Sir Leon Gotz, Minister of Island Territories “Future Political Development” (speech to Cook Islands Legislative Assembly, Cook Islands, 11 July 1962). As reported in *The Proceedings of the Fifth Session of the Legislative Assembly of the Cook Islands* (1962) at 101-108.

²⁹ At 105.

government.³⁰ The Cook Islands went ahead with constitutional change loosely according to New Zealand's proposal. Niue, however, accepted internal self-government in principle, but demanded a more gradual approach.

Pragmatic reasons ultimately informed the respective Assemblies' rejection of full independence. At the time of decolonisation, both countries had very small populations which persist today.³¹ Niue, with just one island and a land mass of 260 square kilometres, has a total population of 1,600 people. The Cook Islands has a larger population of about 15,000 people – but this population is spread throughout 15 islands scattered over approximately two million square kilometres of ocean. The small size, lack of natural resources and geographical isolation of these island-states at decolonisation meant that economic development was severely limited. Owing to heavy subsidies from the New Zealand government along with remittances from family in New Zealand however, neither countries' living standards reflected this reality. When constitutional change was suggested in 1962 therefore, it is not surprising that the island-states' future relationship with New Zealand was the main concern of the local people.

B The Constitution-Making Processes

1 The Colonial Administration

Constitution-making in the Cook Islands and Niue were exercises in decolonisation.³² New Zealand, like its British counterparts, was less wed to constitutionalist ideas and treated the creation of a constitution as a practical way of transferring power over the institutions of a modern state to the local people.³³ Decolonisation in both the Cook Islands and Niue was therefore characterised by careful transfers of executive and legislative power from the New Zealand government to the respective Cabinets formed from the newly constituted Assemblies. The implementation of policies to this end, however, preceded any formal steps toward self-government.

From as early as 1956, the New Zealand government was invested in a programme of constitutional development.³⁴ The policy was “directed towards equipping the Maoris with technical skills and administrative and political experience”.³⁵ As the locals were seen to “have neither the political maturity nor the experience in modern government” to take full

³⁰ “Future Political Development” *Cook Islands Legislative Assembly Paper No 18* (1963) (Presented by the President of the CILA “by direction of the Hon Minister of Island Territories”).

³¹ The populations have changed little since decolonisation. Cook Islands: 14,974 (2011 resident) Niue: 1,625 (2006 census). See: New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade “Pacific” <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Pacific/index.php>.

³² See Dietmar Rothermund “Constitution Making and Decolonization” (2006) 53 *Diogenes* 9.

³³ Viktor Mayer-Schönberger “Into the Heart of the State: Intervention through Constitution-Making” (1994) 8 *Temp Intl & Comp LJ* 315 at 331; and Sara Kendall “Constitutional Technicity”: Displacing Politics through Expert Knowledge” (2013) *Law, Culture and the Humanities* 1.

³⁴ This was consistent with the obligation on New Zealand under art 73 of the UN Charter to “develop self-government” in its dependent territories.

³⁵ Colin Aikman “First Report on Constitutional Survey of the Cook Islands” 1 October 1956 at [6].

responsibility,³⁶ the process was to be gradual. As such, legislation leading up to the offer of decolonisation was passed to incrementally decrease the authority of the Resident Commissioner,³⁷ while increasing the authority of the local legislative assemblies and the representation of elected members in them.³⁸ As a result, Larmour explains:³⁹

Transfers at independence were generally a continuation of a process already underway. Almost everywhere, there were colonial bureaucracies and legislatures already in place. The constitution simply reframed the relationship between them, and added new elements to it.

Further, as a result of years of policy pursued by the New Zealand government towards preparing the countries for self-government, the constituent power in these countries could be seen as ‘moulded’, or at least altered. The local people had been educated under the Administration in such a way that, at decolonisation, the colonial form of governance was seen as superior to former local systems. As a result, the resulting constitutions, even if the manifestation of popular constituent power, could be viewed as products of *colonised* popular constituent powers. This suggestion reflects a broader conclusion made by Yash Ghai that the independence constitutions of the Pacific can be seen as “recording and consolidating the final victory of the westernised, Christianised, urbanised elites, in control of the restructured formal state, distinguished by their increasing repudiation of traditional institutions.”⁴⁰

Every country has an inescapable history informing its political structure which, even if initially imposed, at some point must be treated as its own. The formative influence exerted by New Zealand as the administering power however, is important to understanding the latter constitutional developments in the Cook Islands and Niue.

2 *The Cook Islands*

The constitution-making process in the Cook Islands was, by all accounts, rapid – taking effect a mere three years after constitutional change was first suggested by the New Zealand government.⁴¹

As already noted, the Minister of Island Territories presented the CILA with a speech concerning the country’s constitutional future in 1962. Though the Minister was clear that “the final decision will have to be made by the people of the Cook Islands”,⁴² he cited a

³⁶ At [48].

³⁷ The chief executive officer of the colony.

³⁸ For example, the Cook Islands Amendment Act 1957 gave the respective legislative assemblies greater legislative authority, more seats for elected members, and control over revenue collected in the colony.

³⁹ Peter Larmour “Westminster Constitutions in the South Pacific: A “Policy Transfer” Approach” (2002) 10(1) *Asian Journal of Political Science* 39 at 47.

⁴⁰ Ghai, above n 19, at 49.

⁴¹ Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964, sch 1.

⁴² Sir Leon Gotz, Minister of Island Territories “Future Political Development” (speech to Cook Islands Legislative Assembly, Cook Islands, 11 July 1962), above n 28, at 106.

desire to “cooperate with the United Nations”⁴³ and a feeling on the part of the Government “not to postpone matters too long.”⁴⁴ Two days later, the CILA passed a resolution in favour of self-government.⁴⁵

After accepting the timetable prepared by the New Zealand government, the CILA requested expert assistance. Three advisers were chosen: Professor Aikman, Professor Davidson and Mr Wright.⁴⁶ The advisers made one visit of nine days to the Cook Islands to assist in the constitutional discussions with the CILA. During these discussions, the Assembly suspended its standing orders to allow for the advisers to take part in the constitutional deliberations and enable longer sessions. The discussions between the CILA members and the advisers were broadcast on the radio and reported in detail in the *Cook Islands News*.⁴⁷

Following their visit, the three advisers prepared a report comprising 44 recommendations for constitutional change.⁴⁸ The report stated that, as far as the advisers could judge, “the recommendations ... for constitutional development are in full accordance with the wishes of the Cook Islands people, as expressed by ... their elected representatives.”⁴⁹ The CILA subsequently approved the recommendations in the report, with only minor modifications.⁵⁰

This report formed the basis of the Constitution which was drafted in New Zealand in collaboration with the advisers. It was drafted in English and has never been translated into Cook Islands Māori. After passing its first reading in the New Zealand Parliament, the proposed Constitution was sent to the Select Committee on Island Territories sitting in Wellington.⁵¹ The Committee heard submissions from Cook Islanders resident in New Zealand and from the recently established Cook Islands (New Zealand) Society led by to-be Premier Mr Albert Henry. It also welcomed a delegation of four CILA members accompanied by the Resident Commissioner and two of the constitutional advisers.⁵²

⁴³ At 104.

⁴⁴ At 106.

⁴⁵ *Resolution of the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly*, 13 July 1962.

⁴⁶ Professor Aikman was Professor of Constitutional Law at Victoria University. Professor Davidson was Professor of Pacific History at Australia National University and had acted as adviser to the Government of Western Samoa preceding independence. Mr Wright had acted as High Commissioner for New Zealand in Western Samoa and Secretary of Island Territories.

⁴⁷ CC Aikman, JW Davidson and JB Wright “Report to the Members of the Legislative Assembly of the Cook Islands on Constitutional Development” (1999) 30 VUWLR 519 at 520.

⁴⁸ At 522.

⁴⁹ At 522.

⁵⁰ *Cook Islands Legislative Assembly Paper* No 45 (1963).

⁵¹ The Select Committee, established on 10 August, 1964 met eleven times over period of a week, and recorded 196 pages of typescript in the questioning of witnesses. The members included the Prime-Minister, the leader of the Opposition and Minister of Island Territories. *Report of Evidence Given before Island Territories Committee, Island Territories Committee – Cook Islands Constitution Bill*, Wednesday 23 Sept 1964.

⁵² The delegation consisted of Hon D C Brown, Hon Makea Nui Teremoana Ariki, Hon David Hosking, Hon Naine Rere, and was accompanied by Mr Dare, the Resident Commissioner. Professor Aikman and Mr Wright were also in attendance.

The Cook Islands Constitution Act was passed by the New Zealand Parliament on 17 November 1964. It was not subject to a referendum, but as stipulated in the Act, the Constitution was to come into force following the election of a new CILA.⁵³ At the first meeting of the newly elected CILA, three resolutions were passed requesting that the New Zealand Parliament amend the Constitution.⁵⁴ Having given effect to the requested amendments,⁵⁵ self-government in the Cook Islands was proclaimed on 27 July 1965, to come into effect on 4 August 1965.⁵⁶

3 Niue

The Constitution of Niue was the result of a much slower constitution-making process than that in the Cook Islands.⁵⁷ Despite passing a resolution in 1962 accepting that self-government was best for Niue (and asking that the other three alternatives be “buried forever”),⁵⁸ the NIA demanded a “piecemeal” approach to constitutional development.⁵⁹

On receiving the timetable prepared by the New Zealand government outlining the steps to attaining self-government in 1963, the NIA requested expert assistance. In response, Professor Aikman and Mr McEwen travelled to Niue in 1965.⁶⁰ During their stay, the advisers met with the Resident Commissioner, the NIA and 55 Niueans regarding constitutional development.⁶¹ It became apparent to them early on that the short time frames proposed in the timetable had created “a great deal of concern”.⁶² The advisers’ first report therefore suggested that any formal constitutional developments be set aside.⁶³

In 1969, the Assembly passed a motion to reconsider New Zealand’s proposal for constitutional change. To assist in this regard, Professor Quentin-Baxter took over as adviser to the NIA.⁶⁴ At the outset, he made clear to the NIA that he “had not come to express a New Zealand viewpoint, or to tell the people of Niue what course they should follow” – he was rather to be “the Assembly’s man.”⁶⁵

⁵³ Cook Islands Constitution Act, s 1. The relevant election was held on 20 April 1965.

⁵⁴ The amendments included a change to the candidature rules for election to the CILA, a change to the number of Cabinet Ministers from five to seven, the establishment of a House of Arikis (to function as a consultative body), and changes to the role of the New Zealand High Commissioner to include acting as the representative of the Queen. See Cook Islands Constitution Amendment Act 1965.

⁵⁵ Cook Islands Constitution Amendment Act 1965 (passed on 7 June 1965).

⁵⁶ Cook Islands Constitution Act Commencement Order 1965, 1965/128.

⁵⁷ Niue Constitution Act 1974.

⁵⁸ *Minutes from the Niue Island Assembly* 23 August, 1962 at 12 [20].

⁵⁹ Chapman, above n 25, at 14.

⁶⁰ Professor Aikman had formerly advised the CILA on the Cook Islands Constitution (see above n 42). Mr McEwen was Secretary of Island Territories.

⁶¹ CC Aikman and JM McEwan “A Report to the Minister of Island Territories on the Constitutional Development of Niue” 1965.

⁶² At 2[5].

⁶³ At 2[6].

⁶⁴ RQ Quentin Baxter was a Professor of Law at Victoria University of Wellington.

⁶⁵ RQ Quentin-Baxter “Report to the Niue Island Assembly on the Constitutional Development of Niue” [1971] AJHR A4 at 5 [1].

During his stay, Professor Quentin-Baxter met with members of the NIA, the Executive Committee, the Niue Development Board, representative groups from the Public Service, the Resident Commissioner and locals through “well-attended village meetings in all parts of the island.”⁶⁶ Again, the people’s fears were made clear. The NIA reiterated that “the Assembly itself was by no means committed to the view that there should be any further constitutional changes in the immediate future.”⁶⁷ In light of this, the first report by Professor Quentin-Baxter recommended that the New Zealand government “change nothing which might undermine the confidence of the Niuean people.”⁶⁸ Formal constitutional development was again put on hold.

Professor Quentin-Baxter’s second report of 1974 however expressed a changed atmosphere. Since his first visit, several developments had occurred in Niue that had contributed to a sense of confidence and positivity on the island. In June 1972, Niue received a UN Visiting Mission. As a direct result of this visit, the Select Committee on Constitutional Development, which had been set up in 1971, sprang into action. The Committee – comprised of all of the Executive Committee and two other members of the NIA – heard submissions from the public which informed the eventual establishment of a timetable towards self-government. This timetable went on to attain not only the approval of the New Zealand government, but that of the Fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly. Having noted that constitutional development was no longer “paralysed by the people’s deep anxiety”,⁶⁹ Professor Quentin-Baxter recommended that the constitution be prepared at the request of the NIA.

The Constitution, which was drafted in New Zealand, was informed by Professor Quentin-Baxter’s second report. After passing its first reading in the New Zealand Parliament, the Select Committee charged with receiving submissions on the proposed Constitution sat in both Wellington and Niue.⁷⁰ Following generally positive feedback, the New Zealand Parliament passed the Niue Constitution Act on 29 August 1974, to come into effect following an affirmative popular referendum. On September 3, 1974, 65.4% voted in favour of Niue’s new constitutional arrangements, with 34.6% against.⁷¹ The Constitution entered into force by Proclamation on 19 October, 1974.⁷²

C The Constitutions

The Constitutions are Schedules to Acts of the New Zealand Parliament that were made part of the law of both New Zealand and the Cook Islands and Niue respectively. The Acts

⁶⁶ At 5 [2].

⁶⁷ At 6 [6].

⁶⁸ A 20 [61].

⁶⁹ RQ Quentin-Baxter “Second Report to the Niue Island Assembly on the Constitutional Development of Niue” (1999) 30 VUWLR 577 at 580.

⁷⁰ Alison Quentin-Baxter “Making Constitutions, From the Perspective of a Constitutional Adviser” (2002) 33 VUWLR 237 at 260.

⁷¹ Voter turnout for the referendum was 97%. See *Report of the United Nations Special Mission to Observe the Act of Self-Determination in Niue* XXII A/9623/Add 5 (1974).

⁷² Niue Constitution Act Commencement Order 1974, 1974/286.

conferred plenary powers on the respective governments of the Cooks Islands and Niue. By passing these Acts, the New Zealand Parliament irrevocably removed its power to legislate for its former colonies – thereby establishing the Cook Islands and Niue as fully internally self-governing states. Though the New Zealand Parliament could amend the Acts by simple majority, such amendments would only have effect in New Zealand (and would be breach constitutional convention).⁷³ Amendments made to the Constitution Acts by the CILA or NIA are not made to the respective New Zealand Acts.

The Constitutions of the Cook Islands and Niue share, at least at a superficial level, many similarities. In both instances, what can be readily identified as the Constitution is contained in a Schedule to an Act of the New Zealand Parliament. The Constitutions provide for self-government,⁷⁴ while allowing for continued association with New Zealand under a common Head of State (the Queen in Right of the Realm of New Zealand),⁷⁵ common New Zealand citizenship,⁷⁶ and a continuing responsibility on the part of New Zealand for the states' external affairs and defence.⁷⁷ The Constitutions further establish a parliamentary system of government, with responsibility for executive authority vested in a Cabinet of Ministers chosen from a fully elected Legislative Assembly and headed by the Premier.

Owing to the island-states' unique characteristics and constitution-making processes, there are of course several notable differences between the Constitutions. The most prominent for the purposes of this paper relate to the ongoing relationship of the Cook Islands and Niue with New Zealand. The Niue Constitution Act includes a provision for ongoing “necessary economic and administrative assistance to Niue” from New Zealand,⁷⁸ and regular consultation between the two governments.⁷⁹ The Cook Islands Constitution lacks any such provisions.

⁷³ The Constitution of Niue does leave open the possibility for the New Zealand Parliament to amend its Constitution with the NIA's request and consent (art 36), but this provision has not been used for several decades. The Cook Islands Constitution originally had a similar provision, but this was repealed in 1980 – thereby removing any ability for the New Zealand Parliament to legislate for the Cook Islands.

⁷⁴ Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964 s 3, Niue Constitution Act 1974 s 3.

⁷⁵ Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964 s 2, Niue Constitution Act 1974 s 1. See Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor-General of New Zealand (28 October 1983), SR 1983/225 (as amended SR 1987/8 and SR 2006/224). See generally *Laws of New Zealand* “Pacific States and Territories: Cook Islands” (online ed) at [29]; and Elisabeth Perham “Citizenship laws in the Realm of New Zealand” (2011) 9 *The New Zealand Yearbook of International Law* 219.

⁷⁶ Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964 s 6, Niue Constitution Act 1974 s 5.

⁷⁷ Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964 s 5, Niue Constitution Act 1974 s 6.

⁷⁸ Niue Constitution Act 1974, s 7.

⁷⁹ Section 8.

IV External Influence and Democratic Legitimacy

A Classical (Strict) Conception of Constituent Power

As argued earlier in this paper, a constitutional regime is democratically legitimate insofar it can be seen as a manifestation of a popular exercise of constituent power. The “axiom of political philosophy and constitutional theory”, Preuss explains, is that “the normative force of constitutions rests upon the constituent power of the people”.⁸⁰ Strictly understood, constituent power theory dictates that, as outsiders will not be bound by the resulting constitutional regime, their involvement detracts from the process’ democratic legitimacy.

A strict conception of popular constituent power is dominant in classical constitutional theory. Sieyès, the father of constituent power theory, implicitly excludes a role for outsiders in the constitution-making process by identifying the ‘nation’ as the exclusive source of constituent power. As explained by Schmitt, in a democracy, “[t]he people are the bearer of the constitution-making power and, as such, grant themselves their constitution.”⁸¹ Kalyvas builds on this notion stating that “constituent power demands that *those who are subject to a constitutional order co-institute it*.”⁸² As explained by Agné, “the critical, though not always explicit, assumption in this literature is that *only* those can exercise legitimate constituent powers who will become citizens in the future state.”⁸³

On a strict conception of popular constituent power, it is clear that, given New Zealand’s involvement, the Constitutions of the Cook Islands and Niue would be considered (to varying degrees) the products of processes lacking in democratic legitimacy. This conclusion may be fair; there is much to criticise in relation to the constitution-making processes in the Cook Islands and Niue. To base this conclusion simply on the existence of external influence in the constitution-making process is, however, problematic.

At decolonisation, the Cook Islands and Niue attached “the highest importance” to the maintenance of their association with New Zealand.⁸⁴ They explicitly sought to retain New Zealand citizenship and assurances that they would continue receiving economic and administrative assistance. A role for New Zealand was therefore to be expected in the constitution-making episodes of the Cook Islands and Niue, not just because of the era and a possible lingering colonial mind-set, but also because of the on-going political relationship sought.

⁸⁰ Ulrich K Preuss “Perspectives on Post-Conflict Constitutionalism: Reflections on Regime Change Through External Constitutionalization” (2006/07) 51 NYL Sch L Rev 467 at 468.

⁸¹ Schmitt, above n 5, at 225.

⁸² Kalyvas, above n 9, at 238.

⁸³ Hans Agné “Democratic founding: We the people and the Others” (2012) 10 Int J Const L 836 at 852 (emphasis added).

⁸⁴ Aikman, Davidson and Wright, above n 47, at 521[5]. Similarly expressed by Quentin-Baxter regarding Niue. He notes that “the most important question for Niue will always be its relationship with New Zealand”. See RQ Quentin-Baxter, “Second Report to the Niue Island Assembly on the Constitutional Development of Niue”, above n 69, at 578.

The involvement of New Zealand in the constitution-making processes of Cook Islands and Niue could be disregarded today as something from a bygone era; as examples of the final gasps of colonisation before the world entered a more enlightened age where such intervention is considered simply inappropriate. On such a view, the existence of external influence in these processes would not be seen as challenging the applicability of a strict conception of popular constituent power. If anything, the case studies would be treated as affirming the normative value of this conception as a conclusion that the processes lacked democratic legitimacy would accord with a sense that something was amiss in these cases.

A cursory glance over the extent of external influence in *modern* constitution-making however warns against any hasty conclusions to that effect. As explained by Kendall, “contemporary constitution-making practices offer a contrasting view of the ontology of constitutions themselves, of who and what they represent, and of the symbolic relationship between the constituting power and what is constituted”.⁸⁵ The orientation of ‘constitutional civility’,⁸⁶ which informed the processes in the Cook Islands and Niue, takes a new form today as ‘democracy promotion’, ‘peacebuilding’ or ‘transitional justice’. Recent constitution-making episodes, such as those in Iraq,⁸⁷ Bosnia-Herzegovina,⁸⁸ East Timor and Sudan,⁸⁹ reveal the extent to which external actors are often involved in the process. Be it through the offering of expert advice or through the determination of the constitution’s procedural or substantive framework – external actors consistently have a part to play in modern constitution-making. This has led Dann and Al’Ali to suggest the emergence of an “internationalised *pouvoir constituant*”.⁹⁰ As explained by Preuss, no longer can state constitutions be considered (if they ever could) as “purely domestic instruments of government of a nation-bound population which exercises its right to national self-determination without concern of its regional or global surroundings.”⁹¹

The constitutional experiences of the Cook Islands and Niue are unique and alone may not demand a reconceptualization of popular constituent power. The nature of modern constitutional practice alongside these case studies however does. To accept a classical

⁸⁵ Sara Kendall, above n 33, at 2.

⁸⁶ ‘Constitutional civility’ is a constitutional orientation that often informed the creation of decolonisation/independence constitutions. A constitution is treated by a departing colonial power as a means of establishing modern state institutions in their image in the colony. See Sara Kendall, above n 33, at 2.

⁸⁷ See Noah Feldman, “Imposed Constitutionalism” (2004-2005) 37 Conn L Rev 857; Andrew Arato *Constitution Making Under Occupation: The Politics of Imposed Revolution in Iraq* (Columbia University Press, New York, 2009); and Philipp Dann and Zaid Al’Ali “The Internationalized *Pouvoir Constituant* – Constitution-Making Under External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor” (2006) 10 Max Planck UNYB 423.

⁸⁸ See Zoran Oklopčic “After the People: The Demise of Self-Determination, A New Constitutional Theory and Tradeoffs of Peoplehood” Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science, Graduate Dept of Law, University of Toronto; and Zoran Oklopčic “Constitutional (Re)Vision: Sovereign Peoples, New Constituent Powers, and the Formation of Constitutional Orders in the Balkans” (2012) 19(1) Constellations 81.

⁸⁹ See Dann and Al’Ali, above n 87.

⁹⁰ At 423.

⁹¹ Preuss “Perspectives on Post-Conflict Constitutionalism: Reflections on Regime Change Through External Constitutionalization”, above n 80, at 490.

(strict) understanding of popular constituent power requires accepting that not only the case studies, but also many examples of modern constitution-making, fall outside the analytical ambit of constitutional theory. A failure to operate as an analytical tool in reality risks rendering constitutional theory irrelevant – and thus a strict conception of constituent power must be rejected.

B Enlarged (Loose) Conception of Constituent Power

Recognising the gap between constitutional theory and the realities of constitution-making, Oklopcic has advanced an argument in favour of “enlarging” constituent power beyond the people to reflect the “multiplicity of constituent powers, not only from within, but also from without”.⁹²

Following an analysis of external actors in the constitutional experiences of the Balkan states, Oklopcic posits that the number of constituent powers involved in a constitution-making episode must be pluralised and enlarged *beyond* the people. Drawing on Loughlin’s concept of political prudence,⁹³ Oklopcic argues that enlarging the notion of constituent power to include external actors would amount to a necessary ‘prudential attunement’ of theory with reality. A re-imagining of constituent power would involve perceiving the constituent not as just the people, but as “an assemblage of political powers”.⁹⁴ The fundamental link between the people and constituent power would thus be severed.

Such an ‘attunement’ finds support in the sociological approach to understanding constituent power advanced by Thornhill.⁹⁵ Through his analysis of the theory of constituent power in the context of a perceived emergent transnational constitution, Thornhill argues that a literalistic understanding of the relation between political concepts and the political system must be abandoned to make way for a more sociologically adaptive approach. By linking classical (strict) conceptions of constituent power to a political need in the 18th century to produce constitutional legitimacy without reliance on external principles or social attachments, Thornhill explains why the concept was necessarily limited to the people and why, in view of the ‘post-state transnational order’, it need not necessarily remain so.

Constituent power *is* a political concept that ought to be capable of evolution to reflect political reality; fossilising the concept risks rendering it relevant only to academics. There is however a real risk that the normative value of popular constituent power will be hollowed out if expanded beyond the people. Oklopcic recognises that enlarging constituent power

⁹² Oklopcic “Constitutional (Re)Vision: Sovereign Peoples, New Constituent Powers, and the Formation of Constitutional Orders in the Balkans”, above n 88, at 97.

⁹³ See Martin Loughlin “The Idea of Public Law” (Oxford University Press, New York, 2004).

⁹⁴ Oklopcic “Constitutional (Re)Vision: Sovereign Peoples, New Constituent Powers, and the Formation of Constitutional Orders in the Balkans”, above n 88, at 81.

⁹⁵ Chris Thornhill “Contemporary Constitutionalism and the Dialectic of Constituent Power” (2012)1(3) Global Constitutionalism 369.

involves “an obvious and unarticulated tradeoff”.⁹⁶ He explains: “what we acquire in our prudential attunement to the realities of external constituent influence, we lose on the side of normative and rhetorical benefits stemming from the vocabulary of constituent power of the sovereign people.”⁹⁷ He argues however that a recalibration of theory with reality should not be frustrated by normative concerns – asserting that “there is no reason why constitutional theory should be invested in a particular normative programme”.⁹⁸ Contrary to this claim, there appears to be very *good* reasons for constitutional theory to be invested in some form of normative programme.

By directly connecting the citizen to the constitution, popular constituent power provides a powerful rhetoric in support of a participative and active citizenry committed to constitutional enforcement. Violations of the constitution are more likely to be challenged, rendering the constitution more effective.⁹⁹ As it always remains with the people, popular constituent power can act as a constant reminder to national leaders that they, and the *pouvoir constitué* in general, ultimately remain subject to the will of the people. At the international level, recognition that the people, the nation, are the only holders of constituent power sends a strong message to powerful states to exercise restraint before considering intervening in the constitution-making episodes of foreign countries.¹⁰⁰

Oklopcic helpfully draws our attention to a gap between theory and reality and opens the way to reconceptualise constituent power. In deeply divided and territorially unstable states, such as those in the Balkans, his argument deserves particular attention. There is a need to accept and account for the fact that external actors can strongly influence the constitution-making process. To fail to do so leaves open the potential for abuse and risks rendering constitutional literature irrelevant. By severing the link between constituent power and the people however, Oklopcic ultimately goes too far. To retain the valuable normative benefits of popular constituent power, it must remain in the hands of the people who will be bound by the resulting constitutional regime.

C A Flexible Conception of Constituent Power: Towards a New Analytical Framework

In order to recognise and make space for external actors in the constitution-making process while retaining the normative benefits of popular constituent power – a strict exclusionary conception of popular constituent power and a loose conception that severs the link between constituent power and the people must be rejected. A democratically legitimate constitutional

⁹⁶ Oklopcic “Constitutional (Re)Vision: Sovereign Peoples, New Constituent Powers, and the Formation of Constitutional Orders in the Balkans”, above n 88, at 97.

⁹⁷ At 97.

⁹⁸ At 93.

⁹⁹ Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins and Justin Blount “Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?” (2009) 5 *Annu Rev Law Soc Sci* 201 at 216.

¹⁰⁰ Oklopcic “Constitutional (Re)Vision: Sovereign Peoples, New Constituent Powers, and the Formation of Constitutional Orders in the Balkans”, above n 88, at 89.

regime requires that the people subject to that regime co-institute it. There is nothing implicit in this requirement however, that demands the exclusion of external actors. Recognising a role for external actors in constitution-making does not require departing from the fundamentals of constitutional theory. It does however require a more nuanced understanding of how constituent power is exercised.

Constitutional theory excludes external influence in the constitution-making process because it is seen as *displacing* a popular (or internal) exercise of constituent power. Where external influence is not carefully managed such a displacement will likely occur, but this will not necessarily be the case. The people's capacity to exercise constituent power is not decreased simply because an external actor has influenced the constitution-making process; the existence of one is not necessarily at the expense of the other. Agné explains:¹⁰¹

That actor A affects actor B does not by itself mean that there are fewer or less important possibilities of action available to B, nor that B is prevented from performing any particular action. The effect caused by A may indeed have been to increase B's possibilities to act freely.

Take for example the instance of a small state with limited resources, the citizens of which have expressed a desire for constitutional change. The provision of aid by an external actor to fund an information campaign, a consultation process, and a referendum will undoubtedly influence the process - but may have the positive effect of enabling public participation where it otherwise may not have been possible.

Rather than falling back on generalised verdicts, an assessment of the democratic legitimacy of external influence in constitution-making requires a particularised assessment. The focus needs to be on the effect the relevant external actor/state had on the exercise of popular constituent power. To aid in this assessment, a distinction needs to be made between cases of external *exercise of* and external *influence on* constituent power. If the intervention of an external actor amounts to an exercise of constituent power – the democratic legitimacy of the process will be compromised. If, however, an external actor simply influences a popular exercise of constituent power – the process' democratic legitimacy will be unharmed and may even be enhanced.

There is no clear point at which external influence becomes an external exercise of constituent power; the complexity of constitution-making means that it is more likely to fall somewhere along a spectrum.¹⁰² Dann and Al'Ali identify three categories of external influence along this spectrum: marginal, partial and total. 'Marginal influence' occurs when an external actor is involved but control over the process and substance remains in the hands of the people (eg when a state seeks constitutional advice). In such instances, the popular

¹⁰¹ Hans Agné, above n 83, at 858.

¹⁰² Dann and Al'Ali, above n 87, at 428.

constituent power could easily be recognised as having been *influenced*. Conversely, ‘total influence’ occurs when an external actor takes control of the constitution-making process to such a degree that the people’s constituent power is completely displaced. In such cases, the effect is a clear external *exercise* of constituent power – or imposition. In the grey area between these poles is the ‘partial influence’ of constituent power. In such cases, “the *pouvoir constituant* is neither entirely surrendered nor is it kept entirely intact. Instead, control over the constitutional process is shared.”¹⁰³ In these cases, it becomes less clear whether constituent power is exercised by an external actor or power, or simply influenced.

Adopting a more nuanced understanding of constituent power raises a fresh series of critical questions. To identify when external influence becomes an external exercise of constituent power, it is necessary to have some idea of what actually *counts* as an exercise of constituent power. There is a need to ask: what aspects of the process must be in the hands of the people to allow a conclusion that there was an exercise of popular constituent power? Or as questioned by Preuss: “what conditions must be fulfilled in order that it is ‘the people’ which we can recognise as the true author of the constitution and consequently, the source of its normative validity?”¹⁰⁴

Schmitt provides helpful guidance in this regard. In relation to the Weimar Constitution, Schmitt identifies certain “fundamental political decisions” that formed the Constitution’s basis.¹⁰⁵ Those decisions pertaining to whether Germany would be a republic or a monarchy, a federal or unitary system, or a parliamentary or presidential system – were all fundamental to the resulting constitutional regime. The determination of the Constitution’s fundamental principles was similarly so.¹⁰⁶ Together, these decisions defined the “people’s form of political existence and thus constitute[d] the fundamental prerequisites for all subsequent norms”.¹⁰⁷

For Schmitt:¹⁰⁸

[t]he political decision reached regarding the type and form of state existence, which constitutes the substance of the constitution, is valid ... because the subject of the constitution-making power determines the type and form of this existence.

Because in a democracy the subject of the constitution-making power is the people, it is them that must determine the fundamental political decisions of their constitution for it to be democratically legitimate. A popular exercise of constituent power requires that the

¹⁰³ At 430.

¹⁰⁴ Ulrich Preuss “The Exercise of Constituent Power in Central and Eastern Europe” in Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker *The Paradox of Constitutionalism* (Oxford University Press, United States, 2007) 211 at 212.

¹⁰⁵ Carl Schmitt, above n 5, at 78.

¹⁰⁶ The decision to be a *bourgeois Rechtsstaat* – imported a set of principles (such as the separation of powers, individual liberty, private property and fundamental rights) that, according to Schmitt, defined the constitution as “modern”. Schmitt, above n 5, at 169.

¹⁰⁷ At 78.

¹⁰⁸ At 136.

fundamental political decisions are determined by the people. In cases where an external actor determines one or several such decisions, an external exercise of constituent power can be said to have occurred.

Difficulty may arise, however, when determining *who* ultimately determined a constitution's fundamental political decisions. To help in this regard, the literature on constitution-making identifies certain procedures and mechanisms that are seen as necessary for the constitution to be considered a product of a popular exercise of constituent power (ie democratically legitimate).¹⁰⁹ Though academic views diverge as to the finer details, there is general consensus that democratic constitution-making requires a desire 'from below' to undergo constitutional change,¹¹⁰ open and participative constitutional deliberations led by an elected constitution-making body, and ratification by the people (state citizens) of the final proposed constitution. Where these procedures are followed, it becomes possible to conclude that the fundamental political decisions encapsulated in the final constitution reflect the political will of the people. Conversely, their absence leaves open the possibility of an external exercise of constituent power.

A general mainstay for the popular exercise of constituent power is that the people, in exercising their constituent power, have choice. An external actor that decides what is best for another state and proceeds to impose that displaces the people's constitution-making power – regardless of the virtue of what is imposed. As explained by Preuss, “[i]mposition means degrading the people to a thoroughly passive and subaltern status which is exactly what constitutionalism is supposed to overcome in the first place.”¹¹¹

If it is found that external influence did *not* amount to an exercise of constituent power, but rather just an influence – the effect this influence had on the process overall still requires attention. Given that constitution-making ought to be a national exercise (and the risks associated with external actors exercising constituent power), unless external influence enhances a popular exercise of constituent power it ought to be discouraged.

Agné explains how external intervention in constitution-making can “enhance internal abilities”. By defining autonomy as the “capacity of individuals to reflect on, and to choose among, alternative and widely different courses of action in their individual as well as

¹⁰⁹ See generally Ginsburg, Elkins and Blount, above n 99; Andrew Arato “Forms of Constitution Making and Theories of Democracy” (1995) 17 *Cardozo L Rev* 191; Joel Colón-Ríos “Notes on Democracy and Constitution-Making” (2011) 9 *NZJPIL* 17; Elster, above n 12; and Jonathan Wheatley and Fernando Mendez (eds) *Patterns of Constitutional Design: The Role of Citizens and Elites in Constitution-Making* (Ashgate Publishing, England, 2013).

¹¹⁰ Colón-Ríos “Notes on Democracy and Constitution-Making”, above n 109, at 36.

¹¹¹ Preuss “Perspectives on Post-Conflict Constitutionalism: Reflections on Regime Change Through External Constitutionalization”, above n 80, at 470.

collective life”,¹¹² Agné argues that an external actor enhances their constituent power by contributing to the range of constitutional alternatives available to the people.¹¹³ Take for example the external adviser who offers alternative political models that accord with the people’s desired political order. The adviser’s input can be seen as having enhanced the people’s autonomy by making available to them a greater range of constitutional options they may not otherwise have considered. In turn, the people are better able to contribute to the making of the constitution’s fundamental political decisions – and thus to exercise their constituent power.

Finally, an assessment of the democratic legitimacy of the constitution should not be limited to the initial constitution-making episode. Even under a constitution initially created by an external exercise of constituent power, a people could reclaim its constituent power by amending the constitution (or by deciding not to amend it while having the power to do so). An analysis of democratic legitimacy in constitution-making should therefore extend to whether the people have subsequently “*become* authors of their constitution, even if they were not so when the constitution was originally created.”¹¹⁴ This is based on the understanding that the “constitution-making power is not thereby expended and eliminated, because it was exercised once.”¹¹⁵

There are several benefits to accepting a more nuanced conception of popular constituent power that underpins the analytical framework advanced above. There is the obvious advantage that it is more responsive to reality. By recognising that external influence is not necessarily democratically attenuating - a more insightful analysis of the external influence and the effect that it had on the process becomes possible. It further allows for recognition of the value that can be added to the constitution-making process by involving outsiders.

There are however negatives associated with rejecting a strict conception of popular constituent power. By maintaining that constituent power must be exercised by the people to be democratically legitimate, the approach is more restrictive than that advanced by the likes of Oklopcic. In fact, it is true that on this approach it is likely that most external interventions will be considered damaging to the democratic legitimacy of the constitution-making process. This simply reflects the reality that democracy requires that people ought to have the power to determine the constitutional regime under which they live. There is still value in an approach which invites external and internal actors alike to interrogate the effect of any external influence before this conclusion is made.

¹¹² Agné, above n 83, at 856.

¹¹³ At 860.

¹¹⁴ Colón-Ríos “The Legitimacy of the Juridical: Constituent Power, Democracy, and the Limits of Constitutional Reform”, above n 15, at 201.

¹¹⁵ Schmitt, above n 5, at 125.

A more compelling critique is that a flexible conception introduces ambiguity to the role of external actors in the constitution-making process. A clear-cut approach like that provided for by a strict conception of popular constituent power makes it easier to identify inappropriate (democratically damaging) input (ie any external influence). The practical consequence of such an approach is that it sends a stronger message to outsiders not to get involved in what should be a national and citizen-driven exercise. Though this is a valid concern, strict rules are incompatible with the fundamentally political exercise that is constitution-making.

V Analysing the Case Studies

Based on the discussion in the preceding section, the analytical framework on which the case studies will be assessed involves asking two key questions in the alternative. *Firstly: were the people of the Cook Islands and Niue responsible for the fundamental political decisions in the respective constitution-making processes? If so, did New Zealand's role in the processes enhance the people's capacity to make those decisions – and thus their constituent power? If not, have the people subsequently reclaimed their constituent power?*

The circumstances surrounding the constitutional experiences of the Cook Islands and Niue raise issues of partial influence. New Zealand did not unilaterally write the respective Constitutions, nor did it remain completely absent from the processes. It did however recognise a role for itself in the constitution-making process of its colonies. Alison Quentin-Baxter, assistant to the NIA's constitutional adviser, explains:¹¹⁶

As administering authority, the New Zealand Government saw itself as having a responsibility and a right to contribute to the decision-making. The people of Niue wished to remain New Zealand citizens, and were seeking a relationship of free association with New Zealand. As a term of this relationship, New Zealand would have a continuing responsibility to provide necessary economic and administrative assistance to Niue.

Because of the dependent nature of the relationship and the on-going political ties sought - there was considerable scope for New Zealand to wield significant influence, directly or indirectly, over the constitutional deliberations of the Cook Islands and Niue.

To ascertain what effect New Zealand did have, it is necessary to return to the constitution-making processes in the Cook Islands and Niue.

A Cook Islands

The Cook Islands was generally enthusiastic about the prospect of self-government. There was certainly concern regarding what self-government meant for the states' future relationship with New Zealand. However following assurances that assistance would

¹¹⁶ Alison Quentin-Baxter "Making Constitutions, From the Perspective of a Constitutional Adviser", above n 70, at 248.

continue, the people embraced constitutional change much more readily than Niue. Somewhat paradoxically, this resulted in the people of the Cook Islands having less control over the constitution-making process and its corresponding fundamental political decisions. The substantive and procedural limitations placed on the constitutional deliberations by accepting the New Zealand government's timetable for self-government, coupled with lack of public participation throughout, led to outsiders being able to take the lead in the process and ultimately determining key fundamental political decisions.

Having instigated the constitution-making process in the Cook Islands, New Zealand proceeded to exert significant influence throughout the process by providing what became the framework for constitutional development and deliberations. After the CILA passed a resolution requesting "that the New Zealand Government proceed with its plan for giving the Cook Islands the fullest (possible degree of) internal self-government",¹¹⁷ New Zealand prepared a timetable "for future political development".¹¹⁸ The timetable set out steps for a gradual handover of power – accounting for a withdrawal of the official members in the Legislative Assembly (1964), the establishment of a Cabinet (1964), the appointment of the Resident Commissioner as constitutional Head of State (1965), the establishment of an Executive Council (1965) and a final increase in legislative powers (1965).

By choosing to base the CILA constitutional deliberations on this timetable, the issues discussed ultimately revolved around these proposals.¹¹⁹ The proposals were only intended to guide discussion, but given that the advisers only had five days to discuss the constitution with the CILA, there was not sufficient time to fully explore alternatives. In addition, the advisers' tended to lead the discussions. For each step, they described the proposal, the possible alternatives and often, at this point, their own view on the matter. The advisers undoubtedly sought to advance the Cook Islanders' interests by offering their considered opinion. However, in addition to the (somewhat unavoidable) limitations stemming from an adviser's background,¹²⁰ their lack of interaction with the local people significantly limited the degree to which their advice can be seen as responsive the political will of the people.

Throughout the constitution-making process, there was little opportunity for the people of the Cook Islands to be directly involved. The geography of the Cook Islands made this a

¹¹⁷ *Resolution of the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly* 13 July 1962.

¹¹⁸ "Future Political Development" *Cook Islands Legislative Assembly Paper No 18* (1963) at 3.

¹¹⁹ *Minutes from the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly* 23 August, 1963.

¹²⁰ As explained by Alison Quentin-Baxter, "a constitutional adviser's proposals are likely to be circumscribed by his or her own background, knowledge, and personal philosophy." See Alison Quentin-Baxter "Making Constitutions, From the Perspective of a Constitutional Adviser", above n 70, at 273. This was accepted by Professor Aikman, when he explained that "[i]t was expected that constitutional change in the territories for which New Zealand is responsible should be seen in terms of the parliamentary or Westminster system of government. That is the system with which we were familiar and from the earliest days of constitutional changes in Western Samoa and the Cook Islands the advisers involved have looked at British colonial precedents." See CC Aikman "Recent Constitutional Changes in The South—West Pacific" in *The New Zealand Yearbook* (1968) (online ed) <http://www3.stats.govt.nz/New_Zealand_Official_Yearbooks/1968/NZOYB_1968.html>.

particular challenge - the distance between the 15 islands is immense and transport at the time was infrequent. Being aware of these constraints, efforts were made by the Cook Islands Government to ensure that the islanders were informed of the constitutional developments. The discussions in the CILA were recorded and subsequently broadcast on the radio and reported in considerable detail in the *Cook Islands News*.¹²¹ Further, the advisers' report (which formed the basis of the draft Constitution) was translated into Māori and delivered to each island.¹²² The problem however lay in the lack of opportunity for the people to communicate their views *back* to the constitution-making body. As conceded by the Resident Commissioner at the time, at no point were the villagers invited to make submissions on the advisers' report or any later draft constitution.¹²³ The proposed Constitution was considered by a Select Committee in Wellington (at which no interpreters were present).¹²⁴ And though a delegation of CILA Members travelled to attend the Committee hearing, the advisers answered many of the questions put to the delegates because of their "technical" nature.¹²⁵

Finally, despite the New Zealand Government's having indicated in 1962 that once a plan for self-government had been prepared, "a plebiscite would be arranged to see if the plan was acceptable to the people as a whole",¹²⁶ the Constitution was never subject to a popular referendum. When asked about this in the New Zealand Parliament, the Prime Minister explained that, while the Government had no objection to a referendum, the people of the Cook Islands had not requested one.¹²⁷ The problem with this approach is that there was not much opportunity for the people *to* ask.

¹²¹ Aikman, Davidson and Wright, above n 47 at 520.

¹²² Aikman, Davidson and Wright, above n 47 at 520. The report noted that as a result of the Government's efforts, "a significant section of the people throughout the Cook Islands became acquainted with the various problems under consideration."

¹²³ Mr Rata (Select Committee member): "There was no provision for the Assembly to hear opinions on that Report?" Mr Dare (Resident Commissioner): "We have never advertised that anybody could come along and make submissions to the Assembly or any special committee." See *Report of Evidence Given before Island Territories Committee, Island Territories Committee – Cook Islands Constitution Bill*, Wednesday 23 September 1964 at 89.

¹²⁴ David Stone "Self-Determination in the Cook Islands: A Reply" (1965) 74(3) *The Journal of the Polynesian Society* 360 at 364.

¹²⁵ This prompted Sir Leslie Munro (member of the Select Committee) to ask about the meaning in the constitution's clause referring to the making of laws having extra-territorial operation. Professor Aikman (adviser) replied, "With respect, I wonder whether that is a fair question. I doubt if many members of this committee really understand what is meant by this highly technical question of extra-territorial jurisdiction." To which Sir Leslie Munro explained: "I asked it as a very general question because I want to know whether these good and important people have an idea of what the Constitution Bill really means. I know perfectly well that Mr Dare, Professor Aikman and Mr Wright can explain this Bill." *Report of Evidence Given before Island Territories Committee, Island Territories Committee – Cook Islands Constitution Bill*, Wednesday 23 September 1964 at 17.

¹²⁶ Sir Leon Gotz, Minister of Island Territories "Future Political Development" (speech to Cook Islands Legislative Assembly, Cook Islands, 11 July 1962), above n 28, at 106.

¹²⁷ *New Zealand Parliamentary Debates*, 1964, No 23 at 2836.

To satisfy the UN requirement that associated status was “the result of a free and voluntary choice”,¹²⁸ a general election was arranged to be held before the Constitution came into force in place of a referendum.¹²⁹ The idea was that, as the Constitution was to be a central election issue, electors would have the chance to vote for candidates according to whether they supported the Constitution or not. Whether the election can be said to have had an effect similar to that of a referendum is however far from clear. The candidates who campaigned in support of a different variation of the proposed Constitution were defeated, but this was only 7 out of the 66.¹³⁰ Furthermore, being a general election, the Constitution was not the only issue informing voters’ choices.¹³¹

It is clear from the minutes of CILA’s constitutional deliberations that certain fundamental political decisions were made by its Members. That the Cook Islands was to operate as a democracy with the Queen as the Head of State – was firmly supported in the discussions.¹³² Other decisions on proposals that the CILA were less familiar with, however, can be less clearly attributed to the Members owing to the advisers’ approach. In discussions relating to the functioning of Cabinet government, what the advisers expressed “was the best way”, or the option “they ought to take”, were eventually agreed upon by the members.¹³³

What was clearly not fully determined by the CILA, however, was the initial decision to become a self-governing state in free association with New Zealand. When the CILA was first presented with four options for constitutional change in 1962, the decision to become self-governing in free association with New Zealand was swiftly made by the Members of the Assembly, without consulting their constituents.¹³⁴ The CILA was fully elected, and on that basis the people could be seen as having made this decision indirectly. As became subsequently apparent however, the Members themselves did not fully understand what they were voting in favour of. When the advisers arrived at the CILA the following year, one member sought clarification as to what internal self-government actually meant. Joining in on

¹²⁸ *Principles which should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73e of the Charter* GA Res 1541, XV (1960), Annex, Principle VII(a).

¹²⁹ *Report of Evidence Given before Island Territories Committee, Island Territories Committee – Cook Islands Constitution Bill*, Wednesday 23 Sept 1964 at 92-93. See also David J Stone “Self-Rule in the Cook Islands: The Government and Politics of a New Micro-State” (PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 1971).

¹³⁰ Stone “Self-Determination in the Cook Islands: A Reply” above n 124, at 368.

¹³¹ The UN subcommittee was, however, of the opinion that the general election (to be observed by the UN) and the subsequent decision in the CILA, would constitute an “identifiable act of self-determination.” *Report of Subcommittee II of the Special Committee of 24*, 1964 at 9.

¹³² *Minutes from the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly* 29 August, 1963.

¹³³ For example, the advisers advised adopting the Cabinet system instead of the Committee system, having the Premier select Cabinet members instead of having a voting system, and having a smaller Cabinet (five members) instead of the preferred larger membership. In each instance, the CILA went on to agree with the advisers. Even in the instance that they did not (in relation to the number of Cabinet members), the advisers’ view was that which was encapsulated in the report. See *Minutes of the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly* 19, 26 and 27 August, 1963.

¹³⁴ Angus Ross (ed) *New Zealand’s Record in the Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century* (Longman Paul Ltd, Auckland, 1969) at 108.

this question, another member noted that: "It is true the people do not truly understand the four doors [options] - there is a need for explanation."¹³⁵

The procedural and substantive constraints on the constitutional deliberations in the Cook Islands, coupled with the lack of public participation at *every* stage of the process, resulted in fundamental political decisions being overly influenced by New Zealand officials and advisers. As a result, New Zealand can be seen as having exercised a degree of constituent power in the Cook Islands – at the expense of the people's.

Before concluding on the democratic legitimacy of the constitution-making processes in the Cook Islands – it is necessary to consider its constitutional experience following the creation of the Constitution. Before the Constitution even entered into force, the CILA requested that the New Zealand Parliament make several amendments. The impetus for the hasty request was that the to-be Premier, Mr Albert Henry, was excluded from running for election due to the candidate rules. Along with amending the candidature rules, the amendment also provided for the creation of a consultative body of traditional leaders – the 'House of Arikis', which had been largely excluded from the initial Constitution.¹³⁶ Since then, the Cook Islands Constitution has been amended 30 times, and "*now differs* markedly from the version enacted in 1965."¹³⁷ Amendments have included those to remove the power of the New Zealand Parliament to make laws for the Cook Islands altogether,¹³⁸ patriate the court system,¹³⁹ provide for a bill of rights,¹⁴⁰ and give recognition to custom.¹⁴¹ Several of these amendments were passed explicitly to convince the international community that the Cook Islands was a State at international law;¹⁴² to remove what the Minister of Justice at the time described as perceived "vestiges of the Colonial System".¹⁴³ The result has been a Constitution with a real 'separate identity'.¹⁴⁴ On this basis, it must be concluded that at least some of the 'lost' constituent power has been regained as the people have reasserted their constituent power.

B Niue

Niue's constitutional experience is a 'rags to riches' tale – starting out poorly, it eventually proved to be an enriching experience for the Niuean people.

¹³⁵ *Report of the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly* Friday 23 August 1963 (Quote of Hon T Roi).

¹³⁶ The Constitution of the Cook Islands, art 8.

¹³⁷ *Laws of New Zealand*, above n 75, at [8].

¹³⁸ Cook Islands Constitution (Amendment No 9) Act 1980-81, s 5.

¹³⁹ Section 7.

¹⁴⁰ Section 8.

¹⁴¹ Cook Islands Constitution (Amendment No 17) Act 1994-5, s 7.

¹⁴² *Laws of New Zealand*, above n 75, at [15].

¹⁴³ Press statement made by Cook Islands Minister of Justice at time of introduction of Constitution Amendment (No 9) Bill. As quoted in CC Aikman "Constitutional Developments in the Cook Islands" in Peter Sack (ed) *Pacific Constitutions* (ANU Printing, Canberra, 1982) 87 at 89.

¹⁴⁴ Aikman, "Constitutional Developments in the Cook Islands", above n 143, at 89.

At the outset, New Zealand has been accused of “resort[ing] to an approach which strongly implied desperation in dealing with the Niue situation.”¹⁴⁵ As was the case in the Cook Islands, New Zealand wanted Niue to rapidly shift from a colony to a fully self-governing state. Niue however did not desire any such rapid change. By initially overlooking the concerns of the Niuean people, New Zealand risked making decisions on Niue’s behalf and displacing the people’s constituent power.

Before New Zealand presented the CILA and the NIA with four options for constitutional change, the New Zealand Cabinet had already approved a timetable towards self-government.¹⁴⁶ “Whether the Cook Islands and Niue Assemblies were implicitly aware that these four alternatives did not offer any real choice did not seem to concern New Zealand”, explains Chapman.¹⁴⁷ New Zealand’s unilateral approach to dealing with Niue however continued. In 1962, after the NIA had cautiously accepted self-government in principle, New Zealand proceeded to present a timetable for Niue’s shift to self-government to the UN, *before* having discussed any such timetable with the NIA.

Behind New Zealand’s hasty approach was clear pressure from the UN which was committed to “bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations”.¹⁴⁸ Though purporting to champion the Niuean people’s rights - the UN’s doctrinaire approach was not appreciated by the people of Niue. They felt like the UN, an organisation of which they knew little of, was forcing Niue apart from New Zealand and trying to push them into making a decision that vitally concerned them. One member of the public said: “We have been told some time ago that self-government was first suggested by New Zealand in connection with the wish of the United Nations. It is the wish of New Zealand or the United Nations, but they do not know much about Niue, what Niue can produce, how well off Niue is or how badly off financially.”¹⁴⁹

Despite the pressure placed on Niue to decolonise, the NIA refused to be rushed into self-government. Owing to its fear of change, Niue resisted the pressure from New Zealand and in doing so took its constitutional development into its own hands. After consulting the people,¹⁵⁰ the NIA rejected the timetable offered by New Zealand (that would have seen it attain self-government by 1966), and instead passed a resolution stating that the “people should be asked by secret ballot” to determine the pace of constitutional developments.¹⁵¹ The NIA then went on to inform advisers twice that Niue was not ready for constitutional change. Eventually, Niue took responsibility for creating its *own* timetable – informed by

¹⁴⁵ Chapman, above n 25, at 17.

¹⁴⁶ Confidential Telegram No 276 from Mr McEwan (20 June 1962). Confirmed in a letter to the Resident Commissioner of Niue: McEwan “Future Policy in New Zealand’s Island Territories” 22 June 1962.

¹⁴⁷ Chapman, above n 25, at 12.

¹⁴⁸ *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*, above n 22.

¹⁴⁹ *Minutes from the Niue Island Legislative Assembly* 21 January 1965 (with Aikman and McEwen) at 5.

¹⁵⁰ *Minutes from the Niue Island Legislative Assembly* 13-14 August 1963. The Ministers’ reports to the NIA were that the people’s views on self-government were very mixed.

¹⁵¹ *Minutes from the Niue Island Legislative Assembly* 9 October 1963.

consultation with the local people – according to which it eventually attained self-government. Once the constitution was drafted, copies were sent to each household before the people were asked to vote on it in a UN observed referendum. As reported in the UN Report on the Referendum – “the Mission gained the impression that everything possible had been done to associate the people of Niue with the issues involved and with the provisions of the draft constitution.”¹⁵²

Public participation did not render Niue immune to the influence of New Zealand officials and advisers, but the potentially undemocratic effect of that influence was significantly attenuated because of it. By seeking the people’s opinion on constitutional change, there was an unspoken obligation on the New Zealand officials and advisers alike to listen to and be guided by those opinions. Professor Quentin-Baxter visited each village, and spoke to countless local individuals. His reports and subsequent constitutional recommendations were guided by this extensive consultation.¹⁵³ As the NIA’s adviser, he was clear that his “first responsibility is to ensure that every decision does reflect [the Niuean people’s] will, arrived at without any outside constraint, and after they have understood the choices and implications.”¹⁵⁴

New Zealand attempted to push Niue along and pre-empt decisions that ultimately were Niue’s to make. Assisted by the adviser however, Niue managed to resist that pressure to a considerable extent and avoid an otherwise likely external exercise of constituent power. As it turned out, it was Niue that retained primary control over its fundamental political decisions. As in the Cook Islands, the people were always clear that it would function as a democracy with the Queen in Right of New Zealand as its Head of State. Unlike in the Cook Islands however, the decision to become self-governing was one made by the people of Niue – on their own terms, when they were ready. As Hon R Rex made clear to the UN Visiting Mission - “it is self-government we want, we will decide when that will be – not when mother New Zealand says and certainly not when the United Nations says.”¹⁵⁵

It could be said that there is intrinsic value in encouraging a country to decolonise and take control of its own affairs. Indeed, under certain conditions such encouragement could be seen as enhancing the people’s constituent power by offering them a broader range of constitutional options. New Zealand’s approach however, at least at the outset, was informed by its own interests to get itself off ‘the colonial hook’ and cannot be said to have had this effect. Only one of the four ‘options’ (self-government) offered to the Niuean people for

¹⁵²*Report of the United Nations Special Mission to Observe the Act of Self-Determination in Niue* A/9623/Add 5 (Part V) Chap XXII (1974) at 25 [81].

¹⁵³ For example, responding to the persistent concerns expressed to him by the people regarding Niue’s economic future – Professor Quentin-Baxter recommended the inclusion of a section in the Constitution Act that New Zealand would continue to provide “necessary economic and administrative assistance to Niue” (s 7).

¹⁵⁴ RQ Quentin-Baxter, Telegram (20 June 1974) from Geneva to Wellington. As quoted in Alison Quentin-Baxter “Making Constitutions, From the Perspective of a Constitutional Adviser”, above n 70, at 273.

¹⁵⁵ *Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Niue, 1972* A/AC 109/L 810/Rev 1, Annex 2 (Statement by Leader of Government, 21 June 1972).

constitutional change in 1962 appear to have ever been treated as a real option by the New Zealand government. And though the New Zealand government accepted that it was Niue that had to decide when it would become self-governing, the general feeling was that the option was *when*, not *if*. Explaining why many Niuean people were concerned about constitutional change, Professor Quentin-Baxter noted in his first report that there “lay a fear that the fixed timetable for constitutional development had never really been withdrawn. It had, they felt, continued to tick away while the people were wrapped in a sense of false security – until now they found themselves unwillingly on the very brink of self-determination.”¹⁵⁶ Allowing the status quo to continue while expecting that the desired constitutional change will inevitably occur does not amount to enhancing the Niuean people’s constitutional options – it rather limits them. While New Zealand’s influence in the constitution-making process in Niue therefore may not have amounted to an exercise of constituent power, it did not have the positive effect of enhancing a popular exercise.

It is interesting to note that Niue’s Constitution has only ever been amended once.¹⁵⁷ The Constitution’s stringent amendment procedure has undoubtedly contributed to its lack of amendments. Every proposed amendment, along with attaining the requisite parliamentary majority,¹⁵⁸ must be submitted to a popular referendum. For most amendments a simple majority will suffice. For certain provisions however, including those relating to Niue’s political relationship with New Zealand,¹⁵⁹ two thirds support for the amendment is required. The Constitution has unsurprisingly been described as a “rigid” constitution.¹⁶⁰ This has been credited with its stability, but it raises concerns that the people’s constituent power is being constrained. It was at the insistence of the local people however that these provisions were included. The people did not want the Constitution, and in particular those provisions relating to Niue’s on-going relationship with New Zealand, to be subject to the whim of politicians.¹⁶¹ As such, the very provisions in the Niue Constitution which restrict amendments by the popular constituent power are themselves a former expression of that same power. These considerations go towards a conclusion that, though constituent power may not have been reclaimed, it does not appear that it was ever lost in the first place.

¹⁵⁶ RQ Quentin-Baxter “Report to the Niue Island Assembly on the Constitutional Development of Niue”, above n 65, at 6[8].

¹⁵⁷ Constitution Amendment (No 1) Act 1992. This was an omnibus bill comprising three amendments for which voters could vote in favour of all or none. Amendments included those to patriate the court system and make the specialist Lands Courts a division of the High Court (s 4), change the qualifications for electors and candidates (s 2), and repeal the special provisions for proposed legislation relating to criminal law or status of persons (s 3).

¹⁵⁸ The proposed amendment must have the support of two thirds of the NIA members evidenced in two votes taken at least 13 weeks apart. Niue Constitution Act 1974, art 35.

¹⁵⁹ Sections 2-9, and arts 1 and 69.

¹⁶⁰ AH Angelo “The Niue Constitution” (2009) 15 *Revue Juridique Polynésienne* 157 at 179.

¹⁶¹ RQ Quentin-Baxter “Second Report to the Niue Island Assembly on the Constitutional Development of Niue”, above n 69, at 583.

VI A Better Approach: A Two-Stage Model

Constitution-making ought to be a national exercise – one in which the people come together and map out their future political order. For a range of reasons however,¹⁶² an external state will often play a key role in the future political order of small, dependent non-self-governing island-states. Any model for constitution-making for such island-states would best recognise this fact and be modelled accordingly.

This section will propose a model of constitution-making that expressly recognises a role for an external state (or several). It is designed with the remaining non-self-governing island-states in mind: American Samoa, Guam, Pitcairn, French Polynesia, New Caledonia and Tokelau in the Pacific, and Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, US Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Turks and Caicos Islands and St Helena in the Caribbean and Atlantic.¹⁶³ The model would apply in the instance that these island-states sought to shift towards a formal self-governing status of some description (as opposed to full integration with an external state, or full independence) as was the case in the Cook Islands and Niue.¹⁶⁴ The model proceeds on the view, as defended in the previous sections of this paper, that it is possible to have an exercise of popular constituent power while involving an external state in the constitution-making process. The key object of the proposed model is to provide an avenue for the external state to participate in or contribute to the process *while ensuring that this does not impinge on the people's exercise of constituent power*. It is ultimately aimed at enhancing the democratic legitimacy of external influence in constitution-making.

Before the proposed model is outlined, the constitutional experience of Tokelau, New Zealand's last remaining dependent territory,¹⁶⁵ will be discussed in brief. In 2006 and 2007, the people of Tokelau were asked to vote in referenda to determine whether Tokelau would become self-governing in free association with New Zealand. Though the requisite proportion of votes to decolonise was not met, the pre-referendum processes offer insight into a unique approach to constitution-making for small dependent island-states seeking to decolonise.

¹⁶² There are several reasons why a non-self-governing territory would choose some form of associated statehood over full independence. An associated political status normally entails significant administrative and economic benefits, social welfare assistance, higher quality health and education assistance, natural disaster relief, and the provision of costly external defence. Further, there are significant employment and material benefits that comes with retaining shared citizenship. Overall, the empirical data has shown that island-states that are not fully independent enjoy a higher living standard than independent states. See generally G Bertram "On the Convergence of Small Island Economies with their metropolitan powers" (2004) 32 World Development 343 at 353; and Godfrey Baldacchino, above n 4, at 193.

¹⁶³ Elements of the model may be relevant to self-governing states (like the Cook Islands and Niue) that wish to undergo further constitutional change while retaining ties with an external state.

¹⁶⁴ While the non-self-governing island-states share characteristics, the particular features of each island-state would need to be carefully considered.

¹⁶⁵ The Tokelau Act 1948 established Tokelau as "part of New Zealand". Having rejected self-government, Tokelau remains a dependent territory of New Zealand. It is still on the UN list of non-self-governing territories. See Andrew Townend "Tokelau's 2006 Referendum on Self-Government" (2007) 5 NZJPIL 127; and AH Angelo "The Constitution of Tokelau (2009) 15 Revue Juridique Polynésienne 181.

The referenda to decide on the future status of Tokelau proceeded on the basis of two documents: the draft Treaty of Free Association and the draft Constitution. These documents were to provide the legal framework for Tokelau if it were to become self-governing. The documents were related but designed to serve two distinct purposes: the draft Treaty outlined the terms of the relationship of free association between the two states, while the draft Constitution set the rules for Tokelau's self-government. In light of the distinct functions, the documents were the products of distinct processes: the Treaty was a "collaborative effort between Tokelau and New Zealand," while the draft Constitution was a "Tokelauan effort throughout".¹⁶⁶

The initiative to record Tokelau's prospective relationship with New Zealand in a treaty was proposed by the constitutional adviser, Professor Tony Angelo. There was a general fear in Tokelau that support would decrease if self-government was attained, as had been observed in the Cook Islands and Niue. It was considered that, by binding the parties at the international level, stronger protection would be afforded to the relationship while also placing the parties on an equal footing in the instance that obligations were breached or sought to be modified.¹⁶⁷

For Tokelau, the result of the pre-referendum effort was a fully autochthonous draft Constitution.¹⁶⁸ Its substance was an articulation of a political order that had emerged, for the most part, internally – and reflected a 'coral-up' approach. To come into force, the Constitution was "to spring forth", not by a positive act by the New Zealand Parliament, but by its withdrawal.¹⁶⁹ At the same time, by virtue of the draft Treaty, Tokelau was to maintain its New Zealand citizenship and was assured on-going economic and administrative support "to maintain and improve the quality of life of the people of Tokelau".¹⁷⁰

Looking back at the constitutional experiences of the Cook Islands and Niue, it is clear that there were problems stemming from tying the decision regarding the states' political status (and hence the future relationship with New Zealand) with the constitution-making process.¹⁷¹ The uncertainty regarding New Zealand's intentions throughout consistently

¹⁶⁶ Townend, above n 165, at 144.

¹⁶⁷ Compare this position with that of the Cook Islands and Niue. New Zealand can alter the terms of the relationship by amending the relevant Acts by a simple majority in the New Zealand Parliament. The Cook Islands and Niue can only change the terms of the relationship according to the amendment provisions in the respective Constitutions – which for Niue especially, presents a significant hurdle.

¹⁶⁸ Had the referenda been successful, the draft Constitution would have become the supreme law of Tokelau. As this did not happen, it remains in place as a consolidation of key constitutional rules already in force. See Angelo "The Constitution of Tokelau", above n 165, at 182.

¹⁶⁹ Andrew Townend, above n 165, at 149.

¹⁷⁰ Draft Treaty of Free Association between New Zealand and Tokelau, New Zealand-Tokelau, art 4.

¹⁷¹ Interestingly, there is an implicit distinction between the two stages in the Constitutions. As explained by Professor Angelo, "[t]he physical and terminological distinction in the Constitution of Niue between its sections and its articles ... reflects two sides of the coin: the relationship of free association with New Zealand and the self-governing state." Angelo "The Niue Constitution", above n 160, at 159.

overshadowed the constitutional deliberations – diverting attention away from matters of constitutional design.¹⁷² Further, by not clearly delineating at what stage New Zealand’s involvement was appropriate, its influence permeated the entirety of the constitution-making process. In both cases, New Zealand’s role failed to enhance the constituent power of the people, and in the case of the Cook Islands, it ultimately led to an external exercise of constituent power.

The approach taken in Tokelau largely avoided the issues faced in the Cook Islands and Niue by procedurally separating out the processes pertaining to the states’ future political status and the constitution. Building on Tokelau’s experience, the proposed model therefore consists of two stages. To reduce the risk of undemocratic external influence in the constitution-making process to the greatest extent possible, it will further propose *temporally* separating the processes regarding a non-self-governing state’s political status and constitutional regime – with a recognised interim period in between.¹⁷³

The first stage of the proposed model would centre on determining the future political status of the non-self-governing state. As any proposed change in the state’s political status would likely involve on-going relations with an external state (eg in the form of a relationship of free association), the external state would enjoy a recognised role during this stage. Representatives of both states would convene to negotiate the terms of the states’ future relationship and the on-going obligations on each. Though this stage may take the form of negotiations between political powers, there is nothing preventing a high level of public consultation throughout. Some aspects of the negotiations may indeed have to be closed,¹⁷⁴ but to ensure that the respective parties are fully aware of the relevant considerations and interests at stake, the public should be informed of the issues and given a forum through which to communicate their views.

¹⁷² This was picked up by Sir Leslie Munro during the Select Committee. He noted: “When I was there about three months ago I do not think anybody approached me and spoke to me about this constitution. All I had were questions as to whether the people would have the right to come to NZ whenever they liked. Do you agree that this is a pretty common approach?” Mr Dare (Resident Commissioner): “Yes, I think so.” See *Report of Evidence Given before Island Territories Committee, Island Territories Committee – Cook Islands Constitution Bill*, Wednesday 23 September 1964 at 82.

¹⁷³ This model draws on Arato’s two-stage ‘democratic constitution-making’ model, but departs from his model in several key ways. Arato perceives two instances that play a fundamental role in the drafting process: an “instance that drafts the interim constitution, typically a round table of major political forces, and an instance that drafts the final document, always a freely elected body...” The former instance creates constitution-making rules that are binding on the latter. For post-conflict states, this process provides promise – but it is rejected for application in the context of small dependent states. Procedurally, it is over complicated for such small jurisdictions, and substantively, it clashes with the position defended in this paper that constituent power should not be limited or constrained. The general thrust of Arato’s recognition of “the importance of state building in the first stage and regime creation dominating in the second stage” is picked up in the proposed model. See Andrew Arato “Redeeming the Still Redeemable: Post Sovereign Constitution Making” (2009) 22 Int J Polit Cult Soc 427.

¹⁷⁴ As is the case with constitution-making. See Elster, above n 12, at 388.

Once the parties have agreed on the nature and form of the states' future relationship, the outcome of the negotiations would be encapsulated in a treaty.¹⁷⁵ As proposed by Alison Quentin-Baxter in her 'sustained autonomy' model, the international community would thereby become "the guarantor of the continuation of the necessary support for small autonomous islands". It would be on the basis of this treaty that the people would vote in a referendum to determine their future political status. If rejected, no change would occur – the status quo would continue.¹⁷⁶ If the proposed change is accepted however, the treaty would subsequently be signed by the respective parties and enter into force. Regardless of what they choose, the people in the island-state would retain the power to change their political status at any point in the future.¹⁷⁷

A successful referendum, in which the requisite proportion of people voted in favour of the proposed new political status, would constitute an internationally recognised act of self-determination. The former territory's status, under which its international personality was severely limited,¹⁷⁸ would come to an end. This is made clear in Resolution 2625 of the General Assembly, which states:¹⁷⁹

The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Governing Territory has under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it; and such separate and distinct status under the Charter shall exist *until the people of the colony or Non-Self-Governing Territory have exercised their right of self-determination* in accordance with the Charter, and particularly its purposes and principles.

By exercising its right to self-determination in a fair and free referendum, the newly self-governing state would attain the capacity to enter into treaties – such as that between it and the external state. Article 6 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties declares that

¹⁷⁵ Alison Quentin-Baxter "Sustained Autonomy: An Alternative Political Status for Small Islands" (1994) 24 VUWLJ 1 at 17. In her model, the external state would enter into a treaty with an international organisation, though it seems more appropriate that the primary state itself be a party to the treaty as was to be the case in Tokelau.

¹⁷⁶ For an argument in favour of the UN General Assembly recognising the status quo see Elisabeth Perham "A Solution for the Third International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism: A 'Fourth' Option to Obviate the Need for a Fourth Decade?" (LLB (Hons) Dissertation, Victoria University of Wellington, 2013) at 32.

¹⁷⁷ This is required under the General Assembly Resolution 1541, Principle VII(a). See *Principles which should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73e of the Charter* GA Res 1541, XV (1960).

¹⁷⁸ For example, although Tokelau is substantially self-governing in practice, as a dependent territory of New Zealand, it does not have a separate international legal personality. For the most part, the New Zealand Government undertakes any treaty making in respect of on the basis of consultation with the Government of Tokelau. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs "International Treaty Making: Guidance for government agencies on practice and procedures for concluding international treaties and arrangements" (September 2012) <<http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/treaties-and-international-law/International-Treaty-Making-Guide-2012.pdf>>. For comments of the Special Rapporteur on the treaty-making capacity of protectorates and other dependent States, see generally Sir Humphrey Waldock "First Report on the Law of Treaties" *Yearbook of the International Law Commission* [1962] vol 2 YILC at 37.

¹⁷⁹ *Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations* GA Res 2625, XXV A/RES/2625 (1970) (emphasis added).

"every State" has the capacity to conclude treaties.¹⁸⁰ The international statehood of associated States has not always been recognised. When the Cook Islands and Niue became self-governing, it was not considered possible for them to enter into international treaties. As evidenced by the range of multilateral and bilateral treaties that the Cook Islands and Niue have entered into since decolonisation,¹⁸¹ it is clear that it is now possible for associated States to be recognised as 'States' for the purpose of international law.¹⁸² Furthermore, "there is a clear tendency", explains Igarashi, "to recognize the international personality of Associated States as much as possible, once the right of self-determination has been established."¹⁸³

If the island-state chooses to become self-governing, it would proceed to the second stage of the model to define a new constitutional regime. Unlike the first stage, this process would be the sole domain of the newly self-governing state (or more precisely, its constituent or legislative assembly). There would be no direct role for the external state - though external advice or funding voluntarily sought may be appropriate. Following a participative and open constitution-making process, the people would be invited to vote on the proposed constitution in a second referendum. If affirmed, the proposed Constitution would become supreme law by an action of the newly self-governing states' legislative assembly.

The question remaining regarding this proposed model is: if a state accepts a change in political status, in what form and under what authority does the political regime operate in the interim before a new constitution passes into force? In order to keep the process as simple as possible, it is desirable that the states' former governance structures continue to operate as per normal. For most former territories this would pose no problem as they function at the

¹⁸⁰ Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS, 331 (23 May 1969). The Convention does not define the term 'State', but commentary of the International Law Commission on the draft article that became article 6 explains that "[t]he term 'State' ... means a State for the purposes of international law." *Yearbook of the International Law Commission* [1966] vol 2 YILC at 192. See generally Daniel Turp and Francois Roch "Article 6: Capacity of States to Conclude Treaties" in Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein (eds) *The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) at 107.

¹⁸¹ This path was forged by the Cook Islands. After the World Health Organisation accepted the Cook Islands' membership application in 1984, and its subsequent admittance to the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (1985), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (1985) and International Civil Aviation Organization (1986), the Secretary-General recognised it as a full member without any specifications or limitations in 1992 with full treaty-making capacity. The full treaty-making capacity of Niue was recognised by the Secretary-General in 1994. See *Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral treaties* UN Doc ST/LEG/7/Rev 1 (1994) at [82]-[87]. The treaty-making capacity of the Cook Islands was made further clear in the Joint Declaration between the Cook Islands and New Zealand, which stipulates that "[t]he Government of the Cook Islands possesses the capacity to enter into treaties and other international agreements in its own right with governments and regional and international organisations." *Joint Centenary Declaration of the Principles of the Relationship between New Zealand and the Cook Islands* (Rarotonga, 11 June 2001) at cl 5. See generally *Laws of New Zealand*, above n 75, at [34].

¹⁸² The focus is on the competence of the particular associated State. Alison Quentin-Baxter explains: "the test is whether the associated State is competent to exercise, and does in fact exercise, responsibility for the conduct of its external relations in its own right and not as an organ of its partner State". See *Laws of New Zealand*, above n 75, at [34].

¹⁸³ Masahiro Igarashi *Associated Statehood in International Law* (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2002) at 300.

day-to-day level as self-governing states already. Where this is not the case, a basic interim constitution may need to be considered.¹⁸⁴

In relation to constitution-making in small dependent states - several benefits flow from fully separating the decision regarding the political relationship with the external state from the constitutional deliberations. For an external (former colonising) state, this model offers a means to engage in the decolonisation process so to discharge its “obligation to promote to the utmost ... the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories”,¹⁸⁵ while ensuring that such involvement does not detract from the democratic legitimacy of the process overall. It also ensures that Principle VII(b) of GA Res 1541 which states that an “associated territory should have the right to determine its internal constitution without outside interference, in accordance with due constitutional processes and the freely expressed wishes of the people” - is afforded respect.¹⁸⁶

For the island-state, by clearly delineating the stage at which the external state has a role, its influence can be contained and channelled so as to avoid a potential external exercise of constituent power. Further, by determining the political status and future relationship with the external state *prior* to constitutional deliberations, the people can focus their attention on their future constitutional regime and properly assess their options. Finally, the risk that the people may feel pressure to acquiesce to the external state’s suggestions, or are in some way beholden to it, is significantly reduced. The two latter benefits in particular flow from a temporal separating out of the two stages.

For both states, providing a democratically legitimate avenue for the external state to be involved in the constitution-making process of the island-state ultimately fosters an enhancement of the latter’s constituent power. For the most part, it is the non-self-governing state that wishes to maintain on-going ties with an external state. To wholly exclude a role an external state in the constitution-making process would limit the options available for non-self-governing island-states. So that such island-states can fully explore what model of continued association suits their particular needs and aspirations – it is important to provide a democratically legitimate means for an external state to be involved in the constitution-making process.

¹⁸⁴ Interim Constitutions have been widely used, particularly in post-conflict situations, for example in South Africa (1993), Nepal (2007), and Iraq (2004). See generally Michele Brandt, Jill Cottrell, Yash Ghai and Anthony Regan *Constitution-making and Reform: Options for the Process* (Interpeace, Switzerland, 2011) at 2.1.9.

¹⁸⁵ Charter of the United Nations, art 73.

¹⁸⁶ *Principles which should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73e of the Charter* GA Res 1541, XV (1960).

VII Conclusion

Reflecting on the persistence of colonialism in the Pacific, Alison Quentin-Baxter makes the following comment:¹⁸⁷

In very small islands that are still non-self-governing, the concern is not the continuation of colonial status. It is the possible ending of that status and with it the ending or substantial reduction of the administering power's present support. The real enemy is not present exploitation. It is future neglect.

Classical constituent power theory demands that a constitution be the product of a popular exercise of constituent power; an act of self-determination undertaken by the people, for the people. This paper has argued that the existence of external influence in the constitution-making process is not necessarily at odds with this. The democratic legitimacy of the constitution-making process is dependent on the constitution being a manifestation of the people's constituent power. Insofar as external actors do not displace the people's constituent power but rather enhance it however, there is no reason to exclude such influence; there may even be reason to encourage it.

This paper has rejected generalised verdicts regarding external influence and advocated in favour of a particularised assessment that takes as its focus the effect of external influence on the exercise of constituent power. A constitution ought to be authored by the people, for the people. External influence that assists the people in this regard is welcome. External influence that amounts to authoring the constitution on the people's behalf however amounts to an external exercise of constituent power, which in turn harms the process' democratic legitimacy.

The Cook Islands and Niue, like many former non-self-governing territories, did not desire full independence at decolonisation. By seeking a relationship of free association with New Zealand that included shared citizenship and financial assistance, a role for New Zealand was expected and largely welcome throughout the respective island-states' constitution-making processes. As has been shown however, in neither instance did New Zealand enhance the people's constituent power, and in the case of the Cook Islands, New Zealand exercised a degree of constituent power.

New Zealand's more recent decolonising experience with Tokelau points towards a more promising approach to constitution-making in non-self-governing island-states. Tokelau ultimately chose not to become an associated state. By drawing on its experience however, this paper has advanced a two-stage model for constitution-making designed with the remaining 15 non-self-governing island-states in mind. As on-going political ties with an

¹⁸⁷ Alison Quentin-Baxter "Sustained Autonomy: An Alternative Political Status for Small Islands", above n 175, at 3.

external state are often sought at decolonisation by such island-states, the aim of the model is to provide an avenue for that external state to participate in or contribute to the constitution-making process while maintaining the process' democratic legitimacy.

The persistence of colonialism into the 21st century has not overall been a tale of oppression, but rather a purposeful act of self-determination. Non-self-governing communities continue to respond to their political and social realities as best they can, with an aim of ensuring the brightest possible future for their future generations. For some, this has meant retaining colonial ties with an external actor. This paper has not attempted to propose a model relationship of political association for such small dependent island-states – but it has presented a model for constitution-making in the instance that they wish to go down that path.

“Listen and observe, assist when asked, find and smooth the way forward to a viable self-governing future for the territory – that is the role for those outside. The advisors will not live in the decolonised territory, the United Nations Committee of 24 will not live there, the colonial governors or administrators will not live there – but, if Tokelau is the example, Tokelauans will.”¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁸ AH Angelo, Constitutional Adviser to Tokelau “Statement by the Constitutional Adviser to the United Nations Committee of 24” (Pacific Regional Seminar, Nadi, 14-16 May 2002) in AH Angelo and A Townend *Tokelau: A Collection of Documents and References Relating to Constitutional Development* (ed 4, Law Publications, Wellington, 2003) at 193.

VIII Bibliography

A Legislation

1 New Zealand

Cook Islands Boundaries and Inclusion in New Zealand Proclamation 1901.

Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964.

Cook Islands Constitution Amendment Act 1965

Cook Islands Constitution Act Commencement Order 1965, 1965/128.

Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor-General of New Zealand (28 October 1983), SR 1983/225 (as amended SR 1987/8 and SR 2006/224).

Niue Constitution Act 1974.

Niue Constitution Act Commencement Order 1974, 1974/286.

Tokelau Act 1948.

2 The Cook Islands

Cook Islands Constitution (Amendment No 9) Act 1980-81.

Cook Islands Constitution (Amendment No 17) Act 1994-5.

3 Niue

Niue Constitution Amendment (No 1) Act 1992.

B Books

AH Angelo and A Townend *Tokelau: A Collection of Documents and References Relating to Constitutional Development* (ed 4, Law Publications, Wellington, 2003) at 193.

AH Angelo and Talei Pasikale *Tokelau: A History of Government: The Constitutional History and Legal Development of Tokelau* (Council for the Ongoing Government of Tokelau, Apia, 2008).

Andrew Arato *Constitution Making Under Occupation: The Politics of Imposed Revolution in Iraq* (Colombia University Press, New York, 2009).

Angus Ross (ed) *New Zealand's Record in the Pacific Islands in the twentieth century* (Longman Paul Ltd, Auckland, 1969).

Anita Jowitt and Tess Newton Cain (eds) *Passage of Change: Law, Society and Governance in the Pacific* (Pandanus Books, Australia, 2003).

Carl Schmitt *Constitutional Theory* (Duke University Press, Durham, 2007).

Daniel Turp and Francois Roch “Article 6: Capacity of States to Conclude Treaties” in Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein (eds) *The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) at 107.

David Beetham *The Legitimation of Power* (MacMillan Press, Hong Kong, 1991).

Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès *What is the Third Estate?* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963) at 58.

Graham Hassall and Cheryl Saunders *Asia-Pacific Constitutional Systems* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002).

Michele Brandt, Jill Cottrell, Yash Ghai and Anthony Regan *Constitution-making and Reform: Options for the Process* (Interpeace, Switzerland, 2011)

James Tully *Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an age of diversity* (Cambridge University press, United Kingdom, 1995).

John Rawls *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

Jonathan Wheatley and Fernando Mendez (eds) *Patterns of Constitutional Design: The Role of Citizens and Elites in Constitution-Making* (Ashgate Publishing, England, 2013).

Martin Loughlin “The Idea of Public Law” (Oxford University Press, New York, 2004).

Masahiro Igarashi *Associated Statehood in International Law* (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2002).

Peter Sack (ed) *Pacific Constitutions* (ANU Printing, Canberra, 1982).

Terry Chapman *The Decolonisation of Niue* (Victoria University Press and NZ Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, 1976).

Yash Ghai (ed) *Law, Politics and Government in the Pacific Island States* (Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, Suva, 1988).

C Journal Articles

AH Angelo “Tokelau Constitutional Development” (1995) 8(3) Otago Law Review 413.

AH Angelo “The Constitution of Tokelau (2009) 15 Revue Juridique Polynésienne 181.

AH Angelo “The Cook Islands / New Zealand” (Kreddha Autonomy Mapping Project, December 2007).

AH Angelo “The Niue Constitution” (2009) 15 Revue Juridique Polynésienne 157 .

- AH Angelo "Tokelau: The Last Colony" (1997) *New Zealand Studies* 8.
- Tony Angelo and Andrew Townend "Pitcairn: A Contemporary Comment" (2003) 1 *NZJPIL* 229.
- Alex Frame 'Lawyers and the Making of Constitutions: Making Constitutions in the South Pacific: Architects and Excavators' (2002) 33 *VUWLR* 275.
- Alison Quentin-Baxter "Making Constitutions, From the Perspective of a Constitutional Adviser" (2002) 33 *VUWLR* 237.
- Alison Quentin-Baxter "Niue's Relationship of Free Association with New Zealand" (1999) 30 *VUWLR* 589.
- Alison Quentin-Baxter "Sustained Autonomy: An Alternative Political Status for Small Islands" (1994) 24 *VUWLR* 1.
- Andres Kalyvas "Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power" (2005) 12(5) *Constellations* 223.
- Andrew Arato "Forms of Constitution Making and Theories of Democracy" (1995) 17 *Cardozo L Rev* 191.
- Andrew Arato "Redeeming the Still Redeemable: Post Sovereign Constitution Making" (2009) 22 *Int J Polit Cult Soc* 427.
- Andrew Townend "Tokelau's 2006 Referendum on Self-Government" (2007) 5 *NZJPIL* 127.
- Antony Hooper "Tokelau" (2008) 43(3) *The Journal of Pacific History* 331.
- Chris Thornhill "Contemporary constitutionalism and the dialectic of constituent power" (2012) 1(3) *Global Constitutionalism* 369.
- David Landau "Constitution-Making Gone Wrong" *Alabama Law Review* (forthcoming, 2013).
- David Stone "Self-Determination in the Cook Islands: A Reply" (1965) 74(3) *The Journal of the Polynesian Society* 360.
- David Dyzenhaus "Constitutionalism in an old key: Legality and constituent power" (2012) 1(2) *Global Constitutionalism* 229.
- Dietmar Rothermund "Constitution Making and Decolonization" (2006) 53 *Diogenes* 9.
- Ernest Beaglehole "Social and Political Changes in the Cook Islands" (1948) 21(4) *Pacific Affairs* 384.

G Bertram “On the Convergence of Small Island Economies with their metropolitan powers” (2004) 32 *World Development* 343 at 353

Godfrey Baldacchino and David Milne “Exploring Sub-National Island Jurisdictions” in Godfrey Baldacchino and David Milne (eds) *The Case for Non-Sovereignty: Lessons from Sub-National Island Jurisdictions* (Routledge, London, 2009) at 4.

Godfrey Baldacchino “‘Upside Down Decolonization’ in Subnational Island Jurisdictions: Questioning the ‘Post’ in Postcolonialism” (2010) 13(2) *Space and Culture* 188.

Hans Agné “Democratic founding: We the people and the others” (2012) 10 *Int J Const. L.*

Howard L Hills “Free Association for Micronesia and the Marshall Islands: A Transitional Political Status Model (2004-2005) 27(1) *U Haw L Rev* 1.

J F Northey “Self-Determination in the Cook Islands” (1965) 74(1) *The Journal of the Polynesian Society* 112.

Joel Colón-Ríos “Notes on Democracy and Constitution-Making” (2011) 9 *NZJPIL* 17.

Joel “The Legitimacy of the Juridical: Constituent Power, Democracy, and the Limits of Constitutional Reform” (2010) 48 *Osgoode Hall Law Journal* 199.

Joel Colón-Ríos “The Second Dimension of Democracy: The People and Their Constitution” (2009) 2(2) *Baltic Journal of Law & Politics* 1.

Jon Elster “Forces and Mechanisms in Constitution-Making” (1995) 45 *Duke LJ* 364.

Kelihiano Kalolo “Tokelau” (2007) 19(1) *Contemporary Pacific* 256.

Louis Aucoin “The Role of International Experts in Constitution-Making” (2004) 5 *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 89.

Mark Tushnet “Constitution-Making: An Introduction” (2013) 91 *Texas Law Review* 1982.

Nic MacLellan “The Noumea Accord and Decolonisation in New Caledonia” (1999) 34 *The Journal of Pacific History* 245.

Noah Feldman, “Imposed Constitutionalism” (2004-2005) 37 *Conn L Rev* 857.

Peter Larmour “Westminster Constitutions in the South Pacific: A “policy transfer” approach” (2002) 10(1) *Asian Journal of Political Science* 39-54.

Peter MacFarlane “Interventions, Constitutions and Peace – Some South Pacific Island Experiences” (2005) 31(2) *Commw L Bull* 93.

Philipp Dann and Zaid Al’Ali “The Internationalized *Pouvoir Constituant* – Constitution-Making Under External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor” (2006) 10 *Max Planck UNYB* 423.

Richard H Fallon Jr “Legitimacy and the Constitution” (2005) 118(6) *Harvard Law Review* 1787.

Roger S Clark "Self Determination and Free Association - Should the United Nations terminate the Pacific Islands Trust?" (1980) 21 *Harv Int'l LJ* 1.

Sara Kendall "Constitutional Technicity": Displacing Politics through Expert Knowledge” (2013) *Law, Culture and the Humanities* 1.

Simon Chesterman “You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building” (2004) Published to Oxford Scholarship Online.

Sujit Choudhry “Old Imperial Dilemmas and the New Nation-Building: Constitutive Constitutional Politics in Multinational Politics” (2004-2005) 37 *Conn L Rev* 933.

Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins and Justin Blount “Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?” (2009) 5 *Annu Rev Law Soc Sci* 201.

Ulrich K Preuss “Perspectives on Post-Conflict Constitutionalism: Reflections on Regime Change Through External Constitutionalization” (2006/07) 51 *NYL Sch L Rev* 467.

Ulrich Preuss “The Exercise of Constituent Power in Central and Eastern Europe” in Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker *The Paradox of Constitutionalism* (Oxford University Press, United States, 2007) 211.

Viktor Mayer-Schönberger “Into the Heart of the State: Intervention through Constitution-Making” (1994) 8 *Temp Intl & Comp LJ* 315.

Zachery Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton “Baghdad, Tokyo, Kabul...: Constitution Making in Occupied States” (2008) 49 *William and Mary Law Review* 1 at 1139.

Zoran Oklopcic “Constitutional (Re)Vision: Sovereign Peoples, New Constituent Powers, and the Formation of Constitutional Orders in the Balkans” (2012) 19(1) *Constellations* 81.

D *Thesis*

David J Stone “Self-Rule in the Cook Islands: The Government and Politics of a New Micro-State” (PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 1971).

Elisabeth Perham “A Solution for the Third International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism: A ‘Fourth’ Option to Obviate the Need for a Fourth Decade?” (LLB (Hons) Dissertation, Victoria University of Wellington, 2013) at 32.

Elisabeth Perham “Citizenship laws in the Realm of New Zealand” (2011) 9 *The New Zealand Yearbook of International Law* 219.

Zoran Oklopčič “After the People: The Demise of Self-Determination, A New Constitutional Theory and Tradeoffs of Peoplehood” Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science, Graduate Dept of Law, University of Toronto.

E *Reports*

CC Aikman “First Report on Constitutional Survey of the Cook Islands” 1 October 1956.

CC Aikman “Second Report on Constitutional Survey of the Cook Islands” Department of Island Territories, Wellington, 20 Feb 1957.

CC Aikman, JW Davidson and JB Wright “Report to the Members of the Legislative Assembly of the Cook Islands on Constitutional Development” (1999) 30 *VUWLR* 519.

CC Aikman and JM McEwan “A Report to the Minister of Island Territories on the Constitutional Development of Niue” 1965.

Pacific People’s Constitution Report (Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs, September 2000).

R Q Quentin-Baxter “Report to the Niue Island Assembly on the Constitutional Development of Niue” [1971] *AJHR* A4

R Q Quentin-Baxter “Second Report to the Niue Island Assembly on the Constitutional Development of Niue” (1999) 30 *VUWLR* 577

Report of Evidence Given before Island Territories Committee (Island Territories Committee – Cook Islands Constitution Bill, Wednesday 23 Sept 1964).

F Speeches and Presentations

AH Angelo “After the Referendum – Tokelau 2008” (Discussion Paper presented to the Pacific Regional Seminar on the Implementation of the Second International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism: Priorities for the Remainder of the Decade, Bandung, 14-16 May 2008).

AH Angelo, Constitutional Adviser to Tokelau “Statement by the Constitutional Adviser to the United Nations Committee of 24” (Pacific Regional Seminar, Nadi, 14-16 May 2002) in AH Angelo and A Townend *Tokelau: A Collection of Documents and References Relating to Constitutional Development* (ed 4, Law Publications, Wellington, 2003).

Edward P Wolfers “Decolonisation in the Pacific: Context, Issues, and Possible Options for the Third United Nations Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism” (Discussion Paper presented to the Pacific Regional Seminar on the Implementation of the Third International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism: Current Realities and Prospects, Quito, 30 May to 1 June 2012).

Keli Neemia ““New Wind, New Waters, New Sail – The Emerging Nation of Tokelau’ Statement by the Ulu o Tokelau to the UN Visiting Mission (1994)” in Andrew Townend and Tony Angelo *Tokelau: A Collection of Documents and References Relating to Constitutional Development* (4th ed, Law Publications, Wellington, 2003).

Sir Leon Gotz, Minister of Island Territories “Future Political Development” (speech to Cook Islands Legislative Assembly, Cook Islands, 11 July 1962). As reported in *The Proceedings of the Fifth Session of the Legislative Assembly of the Cook Islands* (1962).

G Internet Material

Alison Quentin-Baxter “Pacific States and Territories: Cook Islands” in *Laws of New Zealand* (online ed).

CC Aikman “Recent Constitutional Changes in The South—West Pacific” in *The New Zealand Yearbook* (1968) (online ed)
<http://www3.stats.govt.nz/New_Zealand_Official_Yearbooks/1968/NZOYB_1968.html>.

“Committee of 24 (Special Committee on Decolonization)” United Nations and Decolonization <www.un.org/en/decolonization/specialcommittee.shtml>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs “International Treaty Making: Guidance for government agencies on practice and procedures for concluding international treaties and arrangements”

(September 2012) <<http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/treaties-and-international-law/International-Treaty-Making-Guide-2012.pdf>>.

“Non-Self-Governing Territories” United Nations and Decolonization
<www.un.org/en/decolonization/nonselvgovterritories.shtml>.

“Pacific” (31 January, 2014) New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
<http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/Pacific/index.php>.

H Parliamentary Material

Cook Islands Legislative Assembly “The Proceedings of the Fifth Session of the Legislative Assembly of the Cook Islands” (1962).

Cook Islands Legislative Assembly “Paper No 18: Future Political Development” (1963).

Minutes of the Cook Islands Legislative Assembly.

Minutes from the Niue Island Assembly.

New Zealand Parliamentary Debates No 23 (1964).

I International Materials

Charter of the United Nations

Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples GA Res 1514, XV A/Res/1514 (1960).

Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations GA Res 2625, XXV (1970).

International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism GA Res 43/47, A/Res/43/47 (1988).

Joint Centenary Declaration of the Principles of the Relationship between New Zealand and the Cook Islands (Rarotonga, 11 June 2001).

Principles which should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73e of the Charter GA Res 1541, XV (1960).

Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Niue A/AC 109/L 810/Rev 1 (1972).

Report of the United Nations Special Mission to Observe the Act of Self-Determination in Niue A/9623/Add 5 (Part V) Chap XXII (1974).

Second International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism GA Res 55/146, A/Res/55/146 (2000).

Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral treaties UN Doc ST/LEG/7/Rev 1 (1994).

Sir Humphrey Waldock "First Report on the Law of Treaties" *Yearbook of the International Law Commission* [1962] vol 2 YILC at 37.

Third International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism GA Res 65/119, A/Res/65/119 (2011).

Yearbook of the International Law Commission [1966] vol 2 YILC.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.