

# **Small Arms and Armed Violence in Papua New Guinea**

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Developing a demand-reduction agenda

By

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The Papua New Guinea government has adopted a range of measures aimed at reducing the supply of illicit small arms and light weapons in response to persistent problems with their use in inter-communal fighting and crime. However, these measures have been largely ineffective at reducing the level of armed violence in PNG, in part because of the failure to also address the demand that exists for these weapons. A nascent demand reduction agenda has emerged at the local level throughout Papua New Guinea in response to the failure of the national government to adequately address small arms and armed violence problems. This thesis provides a detailed overview of national, regional and international initiatives to address small arms issues and examines how they have been implemented in PNG. It then examines initiatives by local community groups and NGOs that are aimed at reducing small arms and armed violence and considers how successful they have been.

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## Abbreviations

**ABG** – Autonomous Bougainville Government  
**AFP** – Australian Federal Police  
**ATT** – Arms Trade Treaty  
**DDR** – Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration  
**FFZ** – Firearms-free zone  
**FRSC** – Forum Regional Security Committee  
**GCC** – Guns Control Committee  
**GFSA** – Gun-free South Africa  
**GFZ** – Gun-free zone  
**KWP** – Kup Women for Peace  
**LJSWG** – Law and Justice Sector Working Group  
**MANPAD** – Man-portable surface-to-air missile  
**MP** – Member of Parliament  
**NCD** – National Capital District  
**NCDC** – National Capital District Commission  
**NGO** – Non-governmental organisation  
**OCO** – Oceania Customs Organisation  
**PIF** – Pacific Islands Forum  
**PM** – Prime Minister  
**PNG** – Papua New Guinea  
**PNGDF** – Papua New Guinea Defence Force  
**PSAAG** – Pacific Small Arms Action Group  
**QUNO** – Quaker United Nations Office  
**RPNGC** – Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary  
**SALW** – Small arms and light weapons  
**SPCPC** – South Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference  
**SHP** – Southern Highlands Province  
**SLR** – Self-loading rifle  
**UN** – United Nations  
**UNDP** – United Nations Development Programme  
**UNIDIR** – United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research  
**UN PoA** – United Nations Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons  
**YLM** – Yumi Lukautim Mosbi

## Chapter One – Introduction

Papua New Guinea has been affected by armed violence for many years, with high rates of death and injury inflicted upon people and communities. One contributing factor to this armed violence is the proliferation of small arms throughout the country over the last twenty five years. While there have been efforts at addressing the issues of SALW and armed violence in PNG, most have focused on the supply side of arms control in order to restrict access to SALW by PNG residents. This thesis examines these efforts and also measures designed to reduce demand for weapons. It does so against the backdrop of a growing global interest in the prevention of violence. This analysis takes place in three parts. First, the nature of SALW and armed violence issues globally and in PNG is examined in order to establish the context of this analysis. Second, the instruments that have been adopted and applied in PNG in response to these issues are examined and their effectiveness is also evaluated. Third, the concept of demand reduction is analysed in order to demonstrate how it works, the role it has played in programmes aimed at reducing SALW and armed violence in other locations around the world and in PNG, and how effective it has been in reducing demand for SALW. This thesis concludes with a discussion of how demand reduction might be better applied in PNG to prevent the spread of SALW and armed violence as well as some lessons that may be taken out of these findings.

### Methodology

The methodology that will be used in this analysis is a detailed single case study. This case study will draw on the wider literature on demand reduction and explore its relevance to Papua New Guinea. The data that will be used for this analysis will be gathered from official documents from the likes of government sources, regional bodies like the Pacific Islands Forum and national submissions to international bodies like the UN, international treaties, NGO reports and news articles. A problem encountered with the data is that it is based entirely on secondary sources. This lack of primary source data is due to two factors. The first of these is that due to economic and time constraints, having only one year to complete the thesis and only limited resources at hand, making the expensive trip to Papua New Guinea to conduct field research was not an option. The second factor that has influenced the reliance upon secondary sources for gathering data is

that I was not able to conduct interviews, for several reasons. I attempted to conduct three interviews via email but did not receive a reply to my initial email from one recipient, was forwarded onto the PNG office of another and heard nothing back, and the third was unable to be completed in time, due to the subject's busy travel schedule. It is for these two reasons that the data used in this analysis is entirely obtained from secondary sources.

In order for this thesis to proceed, there are terms that require defining. These are small arms and light weapons and armed violence. When defining SALW, the Oxford International Encyclopaedia of Peace defines it as revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and light machine guns under the small arms umbrella, and heavy machines guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifles, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft missile launchers and mortars smaller than 100mm calibre are among the weapons categorised as light weapons.<sup>1</sup> A more general definition of SALW is described as weapons that are manned and operated by a single person or a small crew of two or three people.<sup>2</sup> In order to define the term armed violence, Krause and Muggah use the World Health Organisation's definition of violence, which states that violence is "The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation".<sup>3</sup> When it comes to *armed* violence, the involvement of a weapon (in this case SALW) in the violence definition is implied. Krause and Muggah also categorise armed violence into five sections, inter-personal violence (involving domestic or social violence); collective violence (social or political violence, pre or post-conflict); criminal violence (economic violence committed by individuals or groups); conflict (described as 'intense political violence'); and institutional violence (violence that is committed by the state).<sup>4</sup> It is within the context of these definitions that the rest of the analysis within this thesis will proceed.

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<sup>1</sup> Young, Nigel J., "Small Arms." *The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace*, 2010, <http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195334685.001.0001/acref-9780195334685-e-659?rskey=dBJvM&result=1&q=small%20arms>, (accessed 4 December 2012)

<sup>2</sup> United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, "Frequently Asked Questions", 2006, <http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/faq.html>, (accessed 4 December 2012)

<sup>3</sup> Krause, Keith. & Muggah, Robert., "Measuring the Scale and Distribution of Armed Violence", 2007 <http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/regional-publications/Measuring-the-Scale-and-Distribution-of-Armed-Violence.pdf>, (accessed 4 December 2012), p.1

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*

## Chapter Two – Small arms as a global issue

This chapter will examine how SALW and armed violence has become a global issue. It will do this by examining the recent growth in the small arms trade, both legal and illicit, and how arms enter and are circulated within the SALW trade. Following this, the impact of SALW on armed violence will be explored further. How the SALW trade has been addressed globally through international instruments will be examined along with an evaluation of their effectiveness. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the context and scale in which the problems of SALW and armed violence are experienced around the world, in order to then examine the extent to which these problems are also experienced in Papua New Guinea in particular.

### **The rise of small arms proliferation as an issue**

#### *Small arms trade*

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union reduced the importance of large-scale stockpiling of many types of conventional arms. This meant that the trade in larger conventional arms such as tanks, artillery and aircraft declined in the two decades following the end of the Cold War. In contrast, the trade in SALW continued to grow unabated over this same period.<sup>5</sup> In 2006, the legal trade in small arms was estimated by the Small Arms Survey to be worth \$1.58 billion.<sup>6</sup> This trade was dominated by a relatively small group of states, with the top SALW-exporting states for the period 2001-08 being the United States, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Germany, Italy, Russia and China, all exceeding \$US 100 million in exports.<sup>7</sup> At the next level down, there were a further thirty one states who exported between \$US 10 and 99 million of SALW during the same period.<sup>8</sup> Many of these exporting states also featured prominently among the largest importers of SALW at this time. The six largest arms importers (in excess of \$US 100 million) were the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Saudi Arabia and the United

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<sup>5</sup> Boutwell, J., and M.T. Klare, 'A Scourge of Small Arms', 2000, <http://www.amacad.org/news/scourge.aspx> (accessed 21 May 2012)

<sup>6</sup> Stohl, R. & Hogendoorn, E.J., 'Stopping the Destructive Spread of Small Arms: How Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation Undermines Security and Development', 2010, [http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/03/small\\_arms.html](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/03/small_arms.html) (accessed 28 May 2012), p. 5

<sup>7</sup> Small Arms Survey, 'Small Arms Transfers: Exporting States', 2011, [http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research\\_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-11.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-11.pdf) (accessed 30 May 2012), p. 1

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*



Kingdom. In addition to this, there were thirty two states who imported between \$US 10 and 99 million worth of SALW.<sup>9</sup> Most of the legal small arms trade has been found to be made up of arms manufacturers selling their products on the open market. In 2010 it was estimated that there were 875 million small arms in circulation throughout the world, with 226 million of these in the stockpiles of state security forces.<sup>10</sup> The rest of these arms were in the possession of non-state actors and private citizens.

Occurring alongside the legal trade in SALW is an illicit market where weapons are illegally trafficked within and across state borders. Rachel Stohl contends that this illicit network for small arms can be traced back to the Cold War, where major powers employed private arms dealers to coordinate the covert supply of arms to allies. When the Cold War ended these agents simply continued to deal arms illicitly.<sup>11</sup> Most of the illicit trade in SALW can be found at the regional or local level, with very small numbers being trafficked between continents.<sup>12</sup> Related to this is the 'ant trade' in small arms, which has been viewed by the Small Arms Survey as one of the most significant forms of illicit trafficking because it is made up of numerous small consignments of weapons that eventually build up to significant levels in an area.<sup>13</sup> In a 2004 report, the illicit trafficking of SALW was estimated to be a \$1 billion a year global industry.<sup>14</sup> Stohl has highlighted seven ways in which SALW leak into the illicit market.<sup>15</sup> The first means of leakage is that SALW can be leaked from the legal market into the illicit trade by states doing so or permitting shipment through their territory directly to the recipient. The second way SALW leak into the illicit trade is via lax security of state arms stockpiles, which often makes them a target for theft or accidental loss. The third leakage source is during periods of conflict or other instability, when stockpiles are vulnerable to being raided. The fourth means of leakage highlighted by Stohl is that significant numbers of SALW end up being lost by the state every year. The fifth way in which SALW are said to leak into the illicit market is that they have been known to be sold by state security forces, often as a result of

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<sup>9</sup> Small Arms Survey, 'Small Arms Transfers: Importing States', 2011, [http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research\\_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-12.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-12.pdf) (accessed 30 May 2012), p. 1

<sup>10</sup> Stohl, R. & Hogendoorn, E.J., 'Stopping the Destructive Spread of Small Arms: How Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation Undermines Security and Development', p. 5

<sup>11</sup> Stohl, R., 'The Tangled Web of Illicit Arms Trafficking', 2004, <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/10/b217737.html> (accessed 28 May 2012), p. 23

<sup>12</sup> Small Arms Survey, 'Illicit Trafficking', Small Arms Survey, 2011, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/de/weapons-and-markets/transfers/illicit-trafficking.html> (accessed 30 May 2012)

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>14</sup> Stohl, R., 'The Tangled Web of Illicit Arms Trafficking', p. 21

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid*, p. 22

poor pay or allegiance to another group. The sixth leakage source of SALW is that civilian owners of both legal and illegal small arms are often the targets of theft, and are viewed as 'soft' targets. The seventh and final means of SALW leakage into the illicit market highlighted by Stohl are disparities in domestic purchasing laws which enable the leaking of legal arms into the illicit market, whereby some states allow the purchase of multiple weapons which are then on-sold illegally, frequently within neighbouring states. In addition to leakage from legal supplies to illicit markets, there is also an illicit manufacturing industry. While the numbers of weapons that are illegally manufactured are comparatively small, they still have a similar impact, in terms of contributing to violence and instability, as weapons leaked from legal stocks.<sup>16</sup> The illicit trade in SALW forms but one part of a wider black market, which deals in the likes of drugs, timber, diamonds and people. It is in this way that the legal and illicit trades in SALW combine to form the global small arms trade. The impact of small arms, both legal and illicit, will be explored further in the next section.

### *Effects of small arms*

The trafficking and proliferation of SALW affects states and people in a number of ways. One of the most obvious is the contribution they make to armed violence. Following the end of the Cold War, the dynamics of global conflict shifted so that intra-state conflict became the major form of conflict, with a marked decline in inter-state conflict. Intra-state conflict has typically been found to be dominated by SALW rather than the large weapons that are prominent in conflict between states. These two factors have meant that the relationship between small arms proliferation, armed violence and development has been viewed with increasing concern.<sup>17</sup> Deaths sustained as a result of armed violence can be separated into two categories, direct conflict deaths and non-conflict violent deaths. The risk assessment for death from direct conflict is substantially lower than the risk of death from non-conflict violence. According to the Geneva Declaration Secretariat, direct conflict deaths make up only ten to twenty per cent of all deaths from armed violence with the remainder being from non-conflict violence.<sup>18</sup> It has been reported by the Secretariat

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<sup>16</sup> Stohl, Rachel, 'Fighting the Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms', *The SAIS Review of International Affairs*, vol. 25, no. 1, 2005, p. 63

<sup>17</sup> Capie, D., *Under the Gun: The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific*, (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2003), p. 15.

<sup>18</sup> Geneva Declaration Secretariat, "Global Burden of Armed Violence", 2008, <http://www.genevadeclaration.org/measurability/global-burden-of-armed-violence/global-burden-of-armed-violence-2008.html> (accessed 28 May 2012), p. 9

that in the years 2004 to 2007, an average of fifty two thousand direct conflict deaths were recorded every year, though this figure is believed to be relatively modest in comparison to the total figures that include those that go unrecorded.<sup>19</sup> As mentioned previously, the numbers of non-conflict violent deaths have historically been found to significantly outnumber direct conflict deaths. From 2004 to 2007, on average there were around 2.0 violent deaths from direct conflict per one hundred thousand people compared to 7.6 per one hundred thousand for non-conflict violent deaths.<sup>20</sup> In 2004, it was estimated that there were 490,000 non-conflict violent deaths. Of these deaths, it has been estimated that sixty percent were firearm related.<sup>21</sup> In post-conflict environments, the continuing presence of small arms perpetuates the cycle of violence by contributing to the likes of homicide, assault, extortion, gang violence and kidnapping, which negatively affects populations. Boutwell and Klare state that “years of internal conflict are followed by high rates of social and criminal violence made possible by the easy access to small arms and light weapons.”<sup>22</sup> It is in this way that SALW directly contribute to armed violence and specifically armed violence-related deaths, through both direct conflict deaths and non-conflict violent deaths.

The second significant effect of the trafficking and proliferation of SALW (and associated armed violence issues) is their impact on development. Because small arms proliferation and armed violence disproportionately affects poor states, this often impedes development efforts that may be occurring within the state. Stohl and Hogendoorn state that “at the United Nations Millennium summit in 2000, states acknowledged that the availability and misuse of illicit small arms and light weapons undermined efforts to alleviate poverty and promote economic growth.”<sup>23</sup> Armed violence can force internal migration, destroy infrastructure, enable corruption, weaken state structures, increase crime and use up valuable financial resources that states have at their disposal.<sup>24</sup> The use of small arms in armed violence imposes significant costs on a state, by undermining the most productive sections of the labour force, increasing costs on the health sector and other such issues. In addition to this, armed violence also reduces the likelihood of states achieving

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<sup>19</sup> Geneva Declaration Secretariat, "Global Burden of Armed Violence", p. 9

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid*, p. 26

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*, p. 67

<sup>22</sup> Boutwell, J., and M.T. Klare, 'A Scourge of Small Arms'

<sup>23</sup> Stohl, R. & Hogendoorn, E.J., "Stopping the Destructive Spread of Small Arms: How Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation Undermines Security and Development", p. 13

<sup>24</sup> Small Arms Survey, "Impact on Development", <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/armed-violence/social-and-economic-costs/impact-on-development.html> (accessed 6 June 2012)

their Millennium Development Goals.<sup>25</sup> The global economic cost of armed violence is estimated to be hundreds of billions of dollars every year.<sup>26</sup> In addition to these direct costs that SALW and armed violence impose, they can also serve to divert resources away from significant avenues such as social welfare programmes towards the likes of further arms purchases. Key infrastructure and other development projects can be threatened by instability and foreign donors are more likely to be discouraged while conflict or other armed violence is occurring.<sup>27</sup> As well as the short term effects of small arms and armed violence upon development, much of the economic and social effects can last for years to come. Small arms and armed violence can serve to perpetuate underdevelopment in poorer states, and prolong poverty among civilian populations within these states.

### **Global responses to small arms proliferation**

There have been a number of global initiatives over the last two decades that are aimed at addressing the trade in and proliferation of small arms. This section seeks to examine these global initiatives in greater detail. The UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (UN PoA), Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (Wassenaar Arrangement), UN Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol), the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the Arms Trade Treaty will all be examined.

#### ***UN PoA***

The purpose of the UN PoA is to establish a range of politically binding measures for states to take at the national, regional and international levels in order to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW. The UN PoA sets out ten pillars to be implemented in order to achieve this goal.<sup>28</sup> The first of these measures for implementation is for governmental bodies to be established with the responsibility for drafting policy

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<sup>25</sup> Geneva Declaration Secretariat, "Armed Violence Prevention and Reduction: A Challenge for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals", 2008, <http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/Geneva-Declaration-Millennium-Development-Goals.pdf> (accessed 6 June 2012)

<sup>26</sup> Geneva Declaration Secretariat, "Global Burden of Armed Violence", p. 89

<sup>27</sup> Muggah, R., "Globalisation and Insecurity the Direct and Indirect Effects of Small Arms Availability", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2001, p. 75

<sup>28</sup> Schroeder, M. & Stohl, R., "Small Arms, Large Problem: The International Threat of Small Arms Proliferation and Misuse", 2006 [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006\\_06/SmallArmsFeature](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_06/SmallArmsFeature) (accessed 30 May 2012)

aimed at addressing the illicit small arms trade and facilitate communication between these organisations in different countries. The second of these is that states must enact national legislation that regulates the manufacture, transport, storage, transfer and disposal of small arms. The third measure for implementation is that states must establish laws that criminalise the unauthorised manufacture, possession, stockpiling and trade in SALW. The fourth measure that states are required to implement is to ensure that national arms stockpiles have effective security and management. The fifth measure for implementation of the UN PoA is that those stocks of small arms that are surplus to requirement are to be collected and destroyed by the state to prevent their leakage into the illicit trade. The sixth measure required of states to implement is that they must ensure that effective measures are in place to regulate the import, export, transit, retransfer and end use of small arms, and their enforcement. The seventh measure for implementation is legislation to effectively regulate arms brokering, including the likes of end user certificates, are required to be established by the state. For the eighth implementation requirement, the state must put in place a regime that enables the marking and tracing of small arms, so that their movement can be monitored to determine whether they are leaked into the illicit market. The ninth measure for implementation is that states are required to establish disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes in order to remove small arms from circulation following conflict, disband armed groups and ensure combatants are successfully reintegrated into civil society. The tenth and final implementation measure of the UN PoA is that it recommends that states work together at national, regional and international levels to achieve these goals and eliminate the illicit trafficking of SALW. States are required to submit national reports on implementation of the UN PoA, which help to monitor its progress around the world. Kytomaki and Yankey-Wayne have reported that an encouraging number of countries are fulfilling the reporting obligation which suggests that the problem of illicit small arms trafficking is growing in importance throughout the world.<sup>29</sup> When evaluating the significance of the UN PoA, Stohl and Hogendoorn have stated that “the Programme of Action is seen and used as a global small arms framework in the absence of a comprehensive legally binding treaty.”<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Kytomaki, E. & Yankey-Wayne, V., "Five Years of Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons", 2006, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/E-Co-Publications/SAS-UNIDIR-2006-5-years-impl-UN-PoA.pdf> (accessed 30 May 2012) p. xvii

<sup>30</sup> Stohl, R. & Hogendoorn, E.J., "Stopping the Destructive Spread of Small Arms: How Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation Undermines Security and Development", p. 26  
The passing the legally-binding Arms Trade Treaty in the UN General Assembly occurred following the completion of this thesis

Despite the positive effect that the UN PoA has had, it also suffers from a number of weaknesses and criticisms. Because of the voluntary nature of national reporting, the level of reporting provided by states has varied considerably, particularly between regions. While some states report their activities in full, others are more limited in their reporting. In the Asia and Pacific-Oceania regions, a little over half of states have submitted at least one national report.<sup>31</sup> When this is broken down further to include only the Pacific-Oceania region, the results are worse. For the years 2002 to 2005, there were one, three, four and four national reports submitted respectively. At the same time, there were no reports received from eight Pacific-Oceania states and no reports at all from the Cook Islands and Niue, which may be a result of NZ handling much of their foreign affairs.<sup>32</sup> This is compared to seventy two per cent of states in Africa and ninety one per cent in Europe submitting reports.<sup>33</sup> When reporting is made, some pillars of the UN PoA are more reported upon than others. The national legislation and export, import and transit controls pillars are most widely reported upon with the brokering and public awareness pillars least reported on.<sup>34</sup> The UN Programme of Action has experienced some success in promoting the issue of illicit trafficking of small arms throughout the world along with the implementation of some of its pillars. Despite this, there is still work to be done to improve implementation of all its aspects and gain increased uniformity of implementation throughout the world.

### ***Wassenaar Arrangement***

The objective of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is to bring the transfer of conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies further out into the open in order to bolster security and stability throughout the world. When Wassenaar members undertake such arms transfers, they are required to only do so if they are assured that such action will not contribute to 'destabilising accumulations'.<sup>35</sup> Transparency of transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies is increased by making it easier for members to exchange information related to the import and export of these items. The Wassenaar

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<sup>31</sup> Kytomaki, E. & Yankey-Wayne, V., "Five Years of Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons", p. xviii

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid*, p. 221

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*, p. xviii

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>35</sup> Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat, 2012, "Introduction", Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat, <http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/index.html> (accessed 1 June 2012)

Arrangement group was responsible for creating the Best Practices Guidelines for Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons, which sets out the standards required for declining a small arms export license. These guidelines include the possibility of arms fuelling terrorism or being supplied to terrorists, undermining another states' security, infringing upon existing arms control agreements, fuelling on-going conflict, threatening peace or regional security, being forwarded or on-sold without export license, use for repression or human rights abuses, enabling organised crime and use outside of the legitimate defence or security needs of the recipient state.<sup>36</sup> Six of the biggest arms exporters and importers within Wassenaar, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and US, have additional meetings between themselves outside the normal Wassenaar arrangements which are in more depth and involve the exchange of more extensive information.<sup>37</sup>

The Wassenaar Arrangement has experienced some weaknesses. These include a lack of consensus between members around expanding the scope beyond information gathering and exchange, some members limiting the information they exchange, lack of consensus around which states to label 'states of concern' or the definition of a 'destabilising transfer', and the absence of significant arms exporting states, including Belarus, China and Israel.<sup>38</sup> Agreements such as Wassenaar are often criticised by those who seek to obtain the items they cover as "basically cartels with a common interest not merely in preventing the spread of destabilising arms and technologies, but in restricting supply to raise prices."<sup>39</sup> These groups are also often seen as an attempt by Western elites to protect their dominance within these industries.<sup>40</sup> Wassenaar has attempted to mitigate these views by bringing recipient states into the fold and trying to facilitate measures aimed at the demand side to further restrict the spread of small arms. The Wassenaar Arrangement has served to increase transparency of SALW transfers and strengthen export controls between its forty one members. Its limited membership reduces its effectiveness, particularly because of the absence of several prominent arms exporters, but it has been reasonably effective in increasing transparency around arms transfers.

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<sup>36</sup> Stohl, R. & Hogendoorn, E.J., "Stopping the Destructive Spread of Small Arms: How Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation Undermines Security and Development", p. 28

<sup>37</sup> Smith, R., and B. Udis., "New Challenges to Arms Export Control: Whither Wassenaar?", *The Nonproliferation Review* Vol. 8, No. 2, 2001, p. 88

<sup>38</sup> Arms Control Association, "The Wassenaar Arrangement at a Glance", Arms Control Association, <http://armscontrol.org/factsheets/wassenaar> (accessed 1 June 2012)

<sup>39</sup> Smith, R., and B. Udis., "New Challenges to Arms Export Control: Whither Wassenaar?", p. 88

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid*



### ***UN Firearms Protocol***

The UN Firearms Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition requires members to enact measures, including legislation, in order to criminalise the illicit manufacture, trafficking and modification of markings on firearms, and is legally binding upon states.<sup>41</sup> States are required to store information relating to firearms, their components and ammunition and the markings that are on the weapons. The weapons are required to be marked at the point of manufacture, import and transfer. States are also required to assist one another in tracing illicit arms, parts and ammunition. It requires states to establish import and export licensing regimes for these weapons. To ensure the prevention of leakage of legal arms into the illicit market and illicit manufacturing of arms, components and ammunition, states are required to ensure their security at the point of manufacture, import, export and transit and to strengthen border security and inter-agency cooperation between police and customs. The Firearms Protocol requires the verified destruction of deactivated firearms. The Firearms Protocol also facilitates the exchange of information between states relating to illicit arms traffickers, how arms are being concealed during illicit manufacture and trafficking, trafficking routes, practices of traffickers and their own legislative activities aimed at illicit manufacture and trafficking. States are also encouraged to impose regulation upon arms brokers and their activities. As at June of 2009, seventy nine states had signed and ratified the Firearms Protocol with a further fifty two having signed but not ratified, with the United States and Russia not having joined.<sup>42</sup> The UN Firearms Protocol directly addresses the illicit trafficking and manufacture of small arms and, unlike many of its fellow international agreements, is legally binding upon its membership. But, in a similar vein to its contemporaries, it suffers from only a small number of states having signed and an even smaller number fully ratifying, with some of the largest arms producers not involved.

### ***UN Register of Conventional Arms***

The aim of the UN Conventional Arms Register is to promote security and stability and reduce tensions by seeking to prevent large scale build-ups of arms. The Register is a reflection of the era in which it was created, with the prospect of war between states being

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<sup>41</sup> United Nations, "UN General Assembly Resolution 55/255 ", 2001, <http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/pdf/FirearmsProtocol.pdf> (accessed 2 June 2012)

<sup>42</sup> Stohl, R. & Hogendoorn, E.J., "Stopping the Destructive Spread of Small Arms: How Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation Undermines Security and Development", p. 27



perceived as the greatest danger felt by states in 1991.<sup>43</sup> As a result of this, the range of conventional arms that it encompasses are those that feature most prominently in inter-state conflict. Its seven major categories are battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships and missiles and missile launchers. In addition to these seven major categories, however, there is also a category of 'voluntary additional background information' in which states can report on their SALW holdings. The details that states are invited to provide include where the arms are exported to and imported from, the size of transfers, their destination or source, local stockpiles and numbers manufactured within the state and imports and exports of SALW.<sup>44</sup> In the two decades since the Register's creation, questions have been raised about its relevance in an era where the primary threat is no longer from inter-state conflict. The UN Office of Disarmament Affairs has stated that "since the end of the twentieth century, front warfare and large-scale battle, which depend on major conventional weapons systems, have all but ceased to be the manifestations of conflict."<sup>45</sup> Because of the shift of conflict from primarily inter-state military campaigns to intra-state insurgent conflicts and from professional armed forces to rebels, terrorists and other unprofessional forces, this has meant that SALW are the main category of weapon used in conflict today. The UN Register of Conventional Arms is a valuable resource for increasing the transparency around conventional arms stockpiles, but the voluntary nature of the reporting of SALW stockpiles and transfers means that it is largely inadequate in this area.

### *Arms Trade Treaty*

Finally, the Arms Trade Treaty is designed to regulate the global arms trade. This treaty was adopted by the UN General Assembly in April 2013 and is currently open for ratification, but the movement in support of a global arms trade treaty began as a civil society campaign for legally binding regulation of the arms trade in the early 1990s.<sup>46</sup> The desire for this treaty was based upon a number of problems surrounding the legal sales of SALW. This included their sale to states where they are likely to threaten peace and

<sup>43</sup> UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, "Assessing the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms", 2009, <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/ODAPublications/OccasionalPapers/PDF/OP16.pdf> (accessed 2 June 2012), p. 1

<sup>44</sup> Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute, "UN Register", 2012, [http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/un\\_register](http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/un_register) (accessed 5 June 2012)

<sup>45</sup> UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, "Assessing the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms", p. 1

<sup>46</sup> Reaching Critical Will, "Arms Trade Treaty", 2012, <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/att> (accessed 6 June 2012)

security at the national, regional or international level, their use in violating international humanitarian or human rights law, use in carrying out genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, the possibility of their leakage to organised crime or terrorists, their potential to undermine development and the unapproved re-export by the buyer. When the ATT is ratified, it is hoped that it would further bolster efforts at addressing the illicit trade in SALW, through measures such as strengthening national trade controls to a minimum required standard in order to achieve a uniform standard between states.<sup>47</sup> The final version of the ATT passed with the support of 154 states, 3 opposed and 23 abstentions. It covers tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile launchers, and SALW, their parts and components as well as ammunition. It excludes hand grenades and land mines. The treaty does not explicit ban arms transfers to non-state actors; however it is argued by some that this is covered by aspects of the UN Charter.<sup>48</sup> Prior to adopting the ATT, one of the most controversial aspects of the proposed Arms Trade Treaty was that any agreement which rules when a state is forbidden from allowing an arms sale to proceed is viewed by some as infringing upon their own state sovereignty and that it is the sovereign right of states to make such decisions. It is in this way that the concept of the Arms Trade Treaty evolved from a concept put forward by civil society into a fully-fledged treaty that gained the support and approval of the UN General Assembly.

This chapter has illustrated the extent of both the global legal trade and illicit trade in SALW at the global level as well as some of the effects that these weapons have been found to have in conflict and non-conflict zones around the world. In addition, the measures that have been enacted at the international level in response to these issues have also been illustrated in addition to a brief examination of how effective they have been at addressing SALW globally. These international measures that have been looked at are the UN PoA, Wassenaar Arrangement, UN Firearms Protocol, UN Register of Conventional Arms and the Arms Trade Treaty.

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<sup>47</sup> Arms Control Association, "The Arms Trade Treaty at a Glance"

<sup>48</sup> Casey-Maslen, Stuart, "The Arms Trade Treaty: A major achievement", 2013, <http://blog.oup.com/2013/04/un-arms-trade-treaty-pil/>, (accessed 11 April 2013)

### Chapter Three – Small arms and armed violence in Papua New Guinea

This chapter will establish the context of the SALW and armed violence problems that are experienced in PNG specifically, in order to gain a clear picture of the extent of these issues that require addressing. This chapter will illustrate the specific SALW and armed violence issues experienced within PNG. It will discuss the legal and illicit transfers of SALW both into and within PNG, including the sources and kinds of weapons involved. Following this, the chapter will outline the role of SALW in armed violence in PNG, particularly its role in inter-group fighting, assorted crime and political violence. When writing on issues relating to SALW in PNG, there are some issues around gathering data that are faced by the researcher. Much of this relates to issues around what we know and the nature of reporting on PNG. Like many problems with state functions in PNG, the official data that is available on SALW and armed violence is often incomplete or inadequate in that the reporting capability in different parts of the country varies. In addition to this, much of the media reporting on SALW and violence in PNG often focuses on occurrences of gun violence, giving a distinct impression of PNG as a ‘Wild West’ of the Pacific. These occurrences are then frequently used to generalise the extent of armed violence across the country. Despite this ‘Wild West’ impression, there is a dearth of clear, generalisable evidence with which to draw precise conclusions about SALW and armed violence in PNG. Capie states that “while PNG’s ‘gun problem’ is often discussed, a lack of reliable statistical information makes it difficult to make categorical statements about the scale and nature of the challenge.”<sup>49</sup> This thesis has to work within the limits of the data available to researchers and problems that exist around reporting on PNG.

#### *Legal small arms*

Papua New Guinea contains some of the highest levels of legal and illicit small arms and light weapons in the Pacific. In 2012 it was reported that there are 3.1 million SALW in the possession of civilians in the Pacific region.<sup>50</sup> This equates to a ratio of one firearm per ten people in the region, a figure that is almost fifty per cent greater than the rest of the world. Additionally, it was also reported that there are fourteen civilian-held

<sup>49</sup> Capie, D., "Small Arms, Violence and Gender in Papua New Guinea: Towards a Research Agenda", *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* Vol. 52, No. 1, 2011, p. 44

<sup>50</sup> Wilson, Catherine, "Gun Violence a Growing Concern in Papua New Guinea", 2012, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/09/gun-violence-a-growing-concern-in-papua-new-guinea/>, (accessed 4 September 2012)

firearms in the Pacific region for every one military or police firearm.<sup>51</sup> When it comes to PNG in particular, it features as having the highest rate of civilian firearm possession in the Melanesian sub-region. The total number of SALW in civilian possession has been estimated at 72,000, a rate of 1.2 firearms for every 100 people. This is compared to the number of SALW in the possession of the military and police, who hold 19,000 SALW.<sup>52</sup> When compared to the rest of the world, it was found in 2003 that arms exports to PNG and the wider Pacific region were small. During the period 1998 to 2000, the value of export licenses from the United States (which is among the most openly recorded globally) to PNG was \$US 325,769 for the period.<sup>53</sup> In the year 2000, PNG declared total SALW imports worth \$160,000, which came from both Australia and the US.<sup>54</sup> Such shipments to state stockpiles have included the likes of a consignment of eighteen 'military machine guns' in 1996, 450 rifles and 8 carbines worth \$99,250 in 1998 and four grenade launchers in 1998/99.<sup>55</sup> Private firearms retailers in PNG have received similar consignments in the past. This has included the likes of six hundred handguns and six hundred shotguns that were received between 1994 and 1998.<sup>56</sup> It can be seen that the position of PNG within the legal trade of SALW has historically been small when compared to the rest of the world; however they still possess the highest levels of civilian-held firearms in the Melanesian region.<sup>57</sup>

In the decades following PNG gaining independence from Australia in 1975, the security forces of PNG acquired a wide array of SALW from a number of different sources, prior to a period of reform in the mid-2000s. By the 21<sup>st</sup> century, this wide array of small arms ranged in both age and state of repair. Among these were large numbers of Self-Loading Rifles (SLR) and M16A2 assault rifles in addition to smaller numbers of others like Heckler & Koch G3 assault rifles, Singaporean Ultimax-100 light machine guns, 9mm Sterling sub-machine guns, the Colt M60 and others.<sup>58</sup> During a 2004 audit of PNGDF firearm stocks, the audit head stated that they had nine thousand SALW recorded as the official starting inventory figure for the audit, but that it could potentially have been

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<sup>51</sup> Wilson, Catherine, "Gun Violence a Growing Concern in Papua New Guinea"

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>53</sup> Alpers, P., & Twyford, C., "Small Arms in the Pacific", p. 4

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid*, p. 5

<sup>55</sup> Capie, D., *Under the Gun: The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific*, p. 69

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid*, p. 73

<sup>57</sup> Wilson, Catherine, "Gun Violence a Growing Concern in Papua New Guinea"

<sup>58</sup> Capie, D., *Under the Gun: The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific*, p.64

up to a thousand more than that.<sup>59</sup> This audit revealed that of these nine thousand SALW, 1,501 were missing. This was revised to 694 several months later.<sup>60</sup> Between the 2004 stocktake and 2007, PNGDF holdings were reduced from 5,700 to 2,300, representing a sixty per cent reduction in the number of arms.<sup>61</sup> This reduction included reducing the number of 'weapons systems' maintained by the PNGDF from fifty eight to just eleven. When compared with police forces of other Pacific nations, the RPNGC maintains large stocks of SALW. In 2002, police firearms stockpiles were estimated to contain approximately 4,400 firearms for its 5,311 sworn police officers.<sup>62</sup> These weapons included AR15 and SLR assault rifles, MP5 sub-machines, Ultimax-100 light machine guns and various others.<sup>63</sup> It is in this way that there are substantial legal stocks of SALW within PNG, particularly amongst the PNGDF, RPNGC and license-holding private citizens.

### *Illicit small arms*

While illicit SALW have been sourced through a variety of means, the largest numbers of illicit SALW in PNG have been found to be obtained through leakage from legal stocks. Following decolonisation and the subsequent exit of Australian personnel, the security of PNG's weapons stockpiles began to deteriorate as increasing numbers of arms went missing as a result of lax management and interference from political elites like MPs.<sup>64</sup> The destination for many of these weapons was the five Highlands provinces of PNG. The first reports of firearms deaths emerged in 1987, and what began as a relative trickle of SALW leaking grew substantially following the 1992 national elections when state stockpiles of SALW were raided by new members of parliament in order to gift to their constituents.<sup>65</sup> This triggered local arms races by influencing neighbouring clans and tribes to also acquire SALW. Historically, it has been easier for people to acquire SALW from state stockpiles, whether through theft or otherwise, than it is to smuggle them from outside PNG. Much of the leakage of SALW from state stockpiles has historically been

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<sup>59</sup> Alpers, P., "Papua New Guinea: Small Numbers, Big Fuss, Real Results", *Contemporary Security Policy* Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008, p. 155

<sup>60</sup> Alpers, P., "Papua New Guinea: Small Numbers, Big Fuss, Real Results", *Contemporary Security Policy* Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008, p. 155

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid*, p. 165

<sup>62</sup> Alpers, P., & Twyford, C., "Small Arms in the Pacific", 2003, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP08-Pacific.pdf>, (accessed 9 July 2012) p.15

<sup>63</sup> Capie, D., *Under the Gun: The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific*, p. 65

<sup>64</sup> Alpers, P., "Papua New Guinea: Small Numbers, Big Fuss, Real Results", p. 152

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid*

facilitated by dilapidated infrastructure housing them and the poor management of these stockpiles, which preceded the reform of stockpile management in the likes of the PNGDF.<sup>66</sup> The most common leakage from state stockpiles has come in the form of individual thefts of single weapons, although large scale thefts have occurred. Of the SLR and M16 assault rifles that had been sold to PNG following independence, the 2004 audit found that there was a seventy four per cent attrition rate, a significant proportion of which had been stolen.<sup>67</sup> This stream of SALW leaking from PNGDF stockpiles has slowed considerably following an Australian-assisted programme of reform of PNG armouries in the mid-2000s. Capie stated in 2011 that current estimates were that the PNGDF were missing three hundred weapons from its stockpile.<sup>68</sup> Despite the success of the PNGDF at bolstering its armoury security, the RPNGC continues to leak SALW from its numerous police stations across the country.<sup>69</sup> In 2001, the RPNGC conducted an audit that concluded that up to six hundred firearms were unaccounted for, yet three years later the deputy commissioner conceded that it could be much higher. In 2004 it was settled upon that the RPNGC had 4,800 firearms on their books with 1,440 having leaked from their stockpiles.<sup>70</sup> The RPNGC has also been known to leak firearms that they have seized as part of their duties, often for a profit. In addition to the PNGDF and RPNGC, the heavily-armed PNG Correctional Services have also been known to leak SALW.<sup>71</sup> It has been claimed in a 2008 report from ABC News that “Over the years, PNG’s armoury has been plundered to such an extent, no one really knows how many guns are in criminal hands.”<sup>72</sup>

Following the end of the decade-long conflict in Bougainville, a large number of illicit SALW that were stockpiled during the conflict remain in circulation on the island and have also been smuggled to other areas like SHP, despite an extensive disarmament process.<sup>73</sup> This conflict was reported as claiming between twelve and fifteen thousand lives during the civil war as a result of direct combat deaths, executions and ‘disappearances’, and indirect illness and injury as a result of the conflict; however there has been some dispute over the precise numbers.<sup>74</sup> This conflict also had a number of other significant

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<sup>66</sup> Alpers, P., "Papua New Guinea: Small Numbers, Big Fuss, Real Results", p. 155

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>68</sup> Capie, D., "Small Arms, Violence and Gender in Papua New Guinea: Towards a Research Agenda", p. 44

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid*, p. 44

<sup>70</sup> Alpers, P., "Gun-Running in Papua New Guinea: From Arrows to Assault Weapons in the Southern Highlands", p. 49

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid*, p. 57

<sup>72</sup> Marshall, S., "PNG Govt Set to Toughen Gun Laws"

<sup>73</sup> Capie, D., "Small Arms, Violence and Gender in Papua New Guinea: Towards a Research Agenda", p. 44

<sup>74</sup> Alpers, P., & Twyford, C., "Small Arms in the Pacific", p. 44

impacts, including the collapse of the island's health system, destruction of infrastructure, loss of education and training and substantial economic and social damage.<sup>75</sup> The conflict also drove out the gold and copper mine operators and the other services they employ, which was the major pre-conflict employer in Bougainville, and also destroyed much of the cocoa and copra industries.<sup>76</sup> This all served to severely impact the level of post-conflict economic activity in Bougainville, which has had a substantial impact on residents living in the province in the years after the war. There has been limited progress made in the post-conflict disarmament programme in Bougainville which has contributed to the continuing presence of SALW. The continuing presence of SALW remains a major issue in Bougainville, with the Director of the National Coordination Office for Bougainville Affairs saying that "I believe we have more guns on the island than when we signed [the peace agreement] in 2001."<sup>77</sup> It has been reported by the UNDP in 2008 that there were at least three thousand SALW remaining on the island that were used by combatants in the conflict and left out of the peace process.<sup>78</sup> The continuing presence of significant quantities of illicit SALW in Bougainville has contributed to the growth of internal SALW trafficking in PNG, with one civil society group director stating that "We also see that guns are being traded between Bougainville and other parts of Papua New Guinea and across borders. People from the Highlands often come here to buy guns".<sup>79</sup>

While it is often rumoured that large scale cross-border smuggling of SALW into PNG is occurring, the available evidence suggests that this is greatly exaggerated and that smuggling is small and infrequent. Many of these rumours have focused upon a large-scale 'guns-for-drugs' trade across the Torres Strait separating PNG and Australia. Capie stated in 2003 that "while there is agreement that the trade exists and consensus about the general area where smuggling takes place, there are major differences of opinion about the scale and sophistication of the operations."<sup>80</sup> As a result of these rumours, the AFP joined with the RPNGC to investigate the validity of these rumours, concluding that a small number of

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<sup>75</sup> Alpers, P., & Twyford, C., "Small Arms in the Pacific", p. 44

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid*, p. 50

<sup>77</sup> Maze, K. & Issar, Y., 2009, "International Assistance for Implementing the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects: Case Study of the South Pacific", <http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/international-assistance-for-implementing-the-un-poa-on-the-illicit-trade-in-small-arms-and-light-weapons-in-all-its-aspects-case-study-of-the-south-pacific-en-256.pdf>, (18 April 2013), p. 13

<sup>78</sup> Capie, D., "Small Arms, Violence and Gender in Papua New Guinea: Towards a Research Agenda", p. 44

<sup>79</sup> Wilson, Catherine, "Gun Violence a Growing Concern in Papua New Guinea"

<sup>80</sup> Capie, D., *Under the Gun: The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific*, p. 78

guns were found to have crossed the Torres Strait over eight years.<sup>81</sup> There are small-scale instances of the exchange of guns for drugs across the Torres Strait, involving the transfer of small quantities of the likes of handguns, rifles and shotguns.<sup>82</sup> There have also been substantial rumours surrounding alleged arms trafficking across the border separating PNG and West Papua, with the absence of monitoring of the border by PNG meaning that the best conclusion surrounding these claims has been that only small amounts of arms are smuggled across the border.<sup>83</sup> This was reinforced by Capie when he stated in 2003 that “The consensus opinion in PNG is that while transborder shipments take place between PNG and Indonesia, they are not in sizeable quantities.”<sup>84</sup> Despite this, claims surrounding the trafficking of SALW across this border still arise. One such instance of this occurred in March 2012 when PNG Customs claimed that there are SALW illegally entering PNG from Indonesia at five points on their shared border, which were then transported to SHP.<sup>85</sup> There have also been claims that foreign logging companies have been bringing arms into PNG on board their vessels but the lack of monitoring of their activities have prevented verification of these claims.<sup>86</sup>

Homemade weapons are relatively common throughout PNG, with a report in 2011 stating that the spread of homemade weapons in PNG is ‘out of control’, according to local NGOs. The Pacific Small Arms Action Group has stated that there is an abundance of the parts required for these homemade weapons in PNG, particularly in the Southern Highlands.<sup>87</sup> The importance of these weapons when compared to factory-made firearms is greatly reduced by issues such as the threat they pose to the user, inaccuracy and reliability, with factory-made firearms being favoured by citizens in PNG. While these weapons have been located throughout PNG, Alpers and Twyford have stated that “Though it is difficult to pinpoint the main centres of production or volumes being produced, the Highlands have in the past been a centre of both demand and supply.”<sup>88</sup>

While the numbers of small arms in illicit possession in Papua New Guinea are small when compared to those in many other parts of the world, they are still found in

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<sup>81</sup> Capie, D., *Under the Gun: The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific*, p. 59

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid*, p. 61

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid*, p. 63

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid*, p. 81

<sup>85</sup> The National, "PNG Border Official Says Arms Building Up", 2012, <http://www.pina.com.fj/?p=pacnews&m=read&o=11553669474f668f06474ffec463d9>, (accessed 14 August 2012)

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid*, p. 64

<sup>87</sup> Radio New Zealand, "Proliferation of Home-Made Guns out of Control in PNG", 2011, <http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=64089>, (accessed 14 August 2012)

<sup>88</sup> Capie, D., *Under the Gun: The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific*, p. 20



substantial quantities in parts of PNG. There have been varying estimates as to the precise number of illicit firearms in illicit possession in PNG. It was reported in 2008 that the extent of the leakage of SALW from PNG armouries was so great that no one could accurately establish just how many were in civilian possession throughout PNG.<sup>89</sup> Despite this, a 2011 report highlighted the contribution of firearms to the formation of what has been called a 'national gun culture' in the country, with one politician estimating that "Every household now owns a gun illegally... Some of the most modern weapons fetch \$US500-1000. It's a lucrative business".<sup>90</sup> Much of the scholarship on illicit firearms over the past few years has focused on Southern Highlands Province (SHP), where there are large numbers of guns when compared with the rest of PNG, and also Port Moresby to a lesser extent. In a 2008 study, substantial concentrations of illicit SALW were found in the Southern Highlands Province of PNG. SHP was found to contain the highest levels of firearm possession in PNG, with estimates of 2,450 factory-made SALW being held in SHP with five hundred to a thousand of these being assault rifles.<sup>91</sup> In Haley and Muggah's 2005 survey of residents of SHP and NCD districts on their perceptions of arms and armed violence, it found that most SHP residents surveyed felt that the number of firearms there was stable or rising while in NCD nearly three quarters felt that they were stable or rising and a third felt that they were decreasing.<sup>92</sup> Interviews conducted by Alpers with SHP residents tallied a total of 120 M16s and 58 SLRs that were witnessed by these subjects, which contributed to estimates of between 150 and 350 and 10 and 150 respectively of these illicit weapons being present in SHP at the time.<sup>93</sup> It is also estimated that there were between 15 and 25 AK-47 and variant models present in SHP, but the limited ammunition available significantly inhibited their acquisition and use.<sup>94</sup> There have also been found to be small numbers of various other rifles in SHP, including Singaporean, German, Israeli, British and French made weapons, and rifles from the Second World War. Perhaps the

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<sup>89</sup> Marshall, S., "PNG Govt Set to Toughen Gun Laws", *ABC News*, 2008, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-10-12/png-govt-set-to-toughen-gun-laws/538914>, (accessed 14 August 2012)

<sup>90</sup> IRIN, "Papua New Guinea: Gun Culture Threatens Security Ahead of 2012 Elections", 2011, <http://www.irinnews.org/Report/92374/PAPUA-NEW-GUINEA-Gun-culture-threatens-security-ahead-of-2012-elections>, (accessed 14 August 2012)

<sup>91</sup> Alpers, P., "Papua New Guinea: Small Numbers, Big Fuss, Real Results", p. 153

<sup>92</sup> Haley, N. & Muggah, R., "The Scourge of the Gun: Armed Violence in Papua New Guinea", 2006, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2006/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2006-Chapter-07-EN.pdf>, (accessed 9 July 2012), p. 176

<sup>93</sup> Alpers, P., "Gun-Running in Papua New Guinea: From Arrows to Assault Weapons in the Southern Highlands", 2005, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/C-Special-reports/SAS-SR05-Papua-New-Guinea.pdf>, (accessed 8 July 2012), p. 37

<sup>94</sup> Alpers, P., "Gun-Running in Papua New Guinea: From Arrows to Assault Weapons in the Southern Highlands", p. 38

most prevalent weapon present in SHP is the 12-gauge shotgun, with the PNGDF reporting 180 missing following their 2004 national audit and the RPNGC also have acknowledged that they are missing a large amount from their national stocks.<sup>95</sup> It has been estimated that more than one hundred illicit machine guns of assorted type are loose in SHP, but their use has been limited by ammunition shortages, the mountings they require and the varying states of disrepair that they are in.<sup>96</sup> The handgun is among the least common type of weapon witnessed in SHP, as they are said to be largely held by local prominent figures. In addition to these commercial small arms, there have also been found to be significant stocks of home-made firearms with local claims that there is “one for every man”.<sup>97</sup> The survey in SHP found that the most-sighted weapons were factory-made shotguns, M16/AR15s, hand guns, pump action shotguns and SLRs respectively. This compares to NCD, where factory-made shotguns, handguns, pump-action shotguns, M16/AR15s and SLRs were most-sighted respectively.<sup>98</sup> This suggests that illicit SALW are a prominent feature within many communities throughout PNG, especially those in SHP.

## **Forms of armed violence prevalent in Papua New Guinea**

### ***Inter-group fighting***

Much of the armed violence that occurs in PNG centres upon tribal fighting which is most prevalent in the Highlands provinces. Tribal fighting has formed a significant part of PNG society for centuries and prior to the late 1980s and early ‘90s was dominated by traditional weapons like bows and arrows. The first reports of the use of firearms in tribal fighting arose in 1987, with their use taking off from around 1992 when firearms began to flow into these regions. This altered the dynamics of traditional tribal fighting, because these traditional weapons had low levels of mortality but with the introduction of firearms the lethality of inter-group fighting increased considerably. Alpers has stated that while the numbers of SALW in PNG are small in comparison with other countries, the key difference is that the primary reason for acquiring a firearm in PNG is the intent to use it to harm another person.<sup>99</sup> It was highlighted in 2008 that, when compared to countries such as

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<sup>95</sup> Alpers, P., "Gun-Running in Papua New Guinea: From Arrows to Assault Weapons in the Southern Highlands", p. 40

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid*, p. 41

<sup>97</sup> Alpers, P., "Gun-Running in Papua New Guinea: From Arrows to Assault Weapons in the Southern Highlands", p. 45

<sup>98</sup> Haley, N. & Muggah, R., "The Scourge of the Gun: Armed Violence in Papua New Guinea", p. 175

<sup>99</sup> Alpers, P., "Papua New Guinea: Small Numbers, Big Fuss, Real Results", p. 153

Ecuador, Jamaica, Colombia and South Africa which also experience high levels of firearm violence, illicit factory-made firearms in the Southern Highlands were two to five times more likely to be used for the purpose of murder.<sup>100</sup> Alpers stated that “It is perhaps the intensity of their misuse of each firearm, rather than the raw number of guns available, that is the Highlanders’ point of difference.”<sup>101</sup> The important role now played by firearms in traditional tribal fighting has meant that firearms possessed by tribes are accorded high status, with significant protection given to the weapon and the tribesman in possession of it. Gathering precise data pertaining to deaths from armed violence in parts of PNG, particularly Southern Highlands Province, is extremely difficult as it has previously been estimated that up to an estimated 98% of deaths in SHP are not reported.<sup>102</sup> Alpers and Twyford stated that it was estimated in a 1997 report that two hundred people were killed each year over a five year period as a result of tribal fighting in the Highlands.<sup>103</sup> One of the few investigations into death and injury from firearms was conducted by a surgeon at the only hospital in SHP, covering the first five years of the 1990s. It revealed that from 1990-92 there were no patients requiring treatment for gunshot wounds at Mendi hospital as a result of tribal fighting, but in 1993 (when guns first began to flow into SHP) this figure increased to eighteen per cent of admissions and increased again to thirty three per cent in 1994.<sup>104</sup> Another study in 2003 revealed that the rate of firearm-related hospital admissions in SHP was 9.06 per 100,000 people, compared to a figure of 2.51 per 100,000 in Australia.<sup>105</sup> When Haley and Muggah surveyed households in SHP and NCD prior to the 2005 National Gun Summit, it found that eighteen per cent of households of NCD, which traditionally has not been thought to experience tribal fighting, had been victims of tribal clashes and a further twenty seven per cent contained at least one member who had participated in tribal fighting.<sup>106</sup> Firearms in SHP have served to inflame tribal fighting, with perhaps the most prominent example being the Ujamap-Wogia tribal war that lasted three years and killed over one hundred people, ending in 2003.<sup>107</sup> While there is little doubt that armed violence in PNG is at significant levels, there are also issues with the armed violence data that is available. This primarily centres upon whether the instances of

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<sup>100</sup> Alpers, P., "Papua New Guinea: Small Numbers, Big Fuss, Real Results", p. 153

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid*, p. 81

<sup>103</sup> Alpers, P., & Twyford, C., "Small Arms in the Pacific", p. 52

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid*, p. 82

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid*, p. 83

<sup>106</sup> Haley, N. & Muggah, R., "Jumping the Gun? Reflections on Armed Violence in Papua New Guinea", *African Security Studies* Vol. 15, No. 2, 2006, p. 44

<sup>107</sup> Alpers, P., & Twyford, C., "Small Arms in the Pacific", p. 53

tribal fighting and the deaths it results in has improved or worsened. There have been many conflicting reports stating that it is getting worse and alternately getting better.<sup>108</sup> This shows that while the armed violence threat is clear, the precise extent of inter-group fighting remains unclear. Tribal fighting has been a large part of PNG society for many years, particularly in the SHP province, and the presence of SALW has served to significantly increase the lethality of this fighting and the costs imposed upon residents of these PNG communities.

### ***Crime – homicide, robbery, assault, sexual violence***

Firearms also feature prominently in the commission of crime in PNG. In a similar vein to death and injury records in SHP, accurate statistics for firearm-related crime in PNG is also hard to come by because of disparities in record-keeping between urban centres and rural areas. Additionally, compiling statistics on violent crime is made more difficult by the fact that record-keeping for crime statistics do not include the type of weapon used. When ‘firearms offences’ are recorded, they include only crimes that fall within the bounds of the Firearms Act, so do not include the likes of robbery and homicide.<sup>109</sup> In spite of this, it was reported in 2012 that SALW are used in over sixty per cent of ‘major crimes’, including the likes of homicide, armed robbery and domestic violence.<sup>110</sup> This report found that the murder rate in Port Moresby equates to 54 murders per 100,000 people, out of its population of 450,000, which compares to the global murder rate of 7 per 100,000 people.<sup>111</sup> Research from SHP suggests that there is a firearms victimisation rate of 23% of households in the province. Additionally, a 2004 study on violent crime in PNG found that violent crime occurred at a rate of 2,000 instances per 100,000 people, which was ten-fold higher than the rate found in Australia.<sup>112</sup> In 2003, the UN found that, when PNG is compared to other countries, the urban centres of Port Moresby, Lae and Goroka experienced violent crime rates twice that of Johannesburg and Rio de Janeiro, and Port Moresby itself had four times as much violent crime as Manila in the Philippines.<sup>113</sup> The 2005 armed violence assessment found that armed assault and armed robbery were two of the most commonly experienced violent crimes by residents in SHP and NCD, with 13% and 8% of SHP residents experiencing armed assault and armed

<sup>108</sup> Capie, D., "Small Arms, Violence and Gender in Papua New Guinea: Towards a Research Agenda", p. 47

<sup>109</sup> Alpers, P., & Twyford, C., "Small Arms in the Pacific", p. 51

<sup>110</sup> Wilson, Catherine, "Gun Violence a Growing Concern in Papua New Guinea"

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>112</sup> Capie, D., *Under the Gun: The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific*, p. 90

<sup>113</sup> Alpers, P., & Twyford, C., "Small Arms in the Pacific", p. 51

robbery respectively and 12% and 15% respectively in NCP.<sup>114</sup> When surveying the experiences of residents in relation to murder and attempted murder in 2005, it was found that in SHP the western region of Hela had the highest experiences of murder and attempted murder with 7% and 15% respectively experiencing it, compared to 3% and 1% of residents in eastern SHP.<sup>115</sup> The rates of murder and attempted murder experienced in NCD were at similar levels to those in the east of SHP. Instances of sexual violence also frequently feature firearms, carried out both by other citizens and the police themselves. Firearms have historically been found to serve to exacerbate crimes against women and children, with Alpers stating that “In particular, violence perpetrated with firearms commonly causes more severe injury, exerts a disproportionate effect on women and children, exacerbates unequal power relationships between the sexes, and highlights the damaging effects of linking guns with masculinity.”<sup>116</sup> In 2008, the UNDP stated that, outside of armed conflict, the most non-conflict armed violence occurred in the home and local community with domestic violence being among the most common.<sup>117</sup> In the early to mid-2000s, some reports recorded that crime rates fluctuated throughout the period. Overall crime rates were found to have decreased between 2000 and 2004, while murder rates decreased through 2006 and 2007 before rising again in 2008.<sup>118</sup> This shows that despite much of the focus on perceived increasing violent crime, data suggests that over certain periods the opposite may have been occurring. PNG experiences significant rates of violent crime; this violent crime is further exacerbated by the proliferation of SALW throughout PNG, particularly in the commission of crimes like assault, robbery and sexual violence.

### ***Political violence***

Coinciding with the growing spread of SALW over the last three decades, guns and politics have been seen to be increasingly intertwined. Historically, violence in PNG has increased during election periods, particularly in rural areas. Election intimidation

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<sup>114</sup> Haley, N. & Muggah, R., "Jumping the Gun? Reflections on Armed Violence in Papua New Guinea", p. 45

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>116</sup> Alpers, P., "Gun-Running in Papua New Guinea: From Arrows to Assault Weapons in the Southern Highlands", p. 91

<sup>117</sup> United Nations Development Programme, "Armed Violence in Asia and the Pacific: An Overview of the Causes, Costs and Consequences", 2008 <http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/regional-publications/Causes-Costs-and-Consequences-Armed-Violence-Asia-Pacific.pdf>, (accessed 15 July 2012), p. 14

<sup>118</sup> Capie, D., "Small Arms, Violence and Gender in Papua New Guinea: Towards a Research Agenda", p. 45

involving SALW has been reported since the 1992 elections, with threats and violence being committed at polling stations. This electoral violence in PNG has also included candidates being kidnapped at gunpoint by supporters of rival candidates and threats against state officials that run elections, including one threat made by an SHP civil servant to shoot down any government helicopters seen in the area during the election period.<sup>119</sup> Guns have been used by supporters of candidates to gain access to voting papers and other electoral infrastructure in order to tamper with results. PNGDF soldiers have also been found to have assisted electoral candidates in contravention of electoral laws, including being linked to raids on ballot boxes.<sup>120</sup> When discussing electoral violence in SHP, Alpers has stated that “By the time of the 2002 national election, firearms and the willingness to use them were firmly enmeshed in the politics of the province.”<sup>121</sup> Elections in PNG not only involve electoral intimidation with guns, but also successful electoral candidates have been found to supply small arms to their electorates and tribes. Similarly, candidates in elections have been found to build their own arms stockpiles in the lead up to an election, in order to arm their supporters.<sup>122</sup> One example of this stockpiling of weapons occurred during the 2012 national election, when a candidate for election in the Western Highlands was arrested after being found to have a stockpile of weapons and ammunition at his house.<sup>123</sup> This electoral violence was prominent during the 2002 national election, which resulted in the deaths of thirty people, a significant proportion of which were by firearms. After conducting a review of the 2002 election, a Commonwealth Expert Group highlighted substantial voter intimidation, a widespread gun culture and a fearful atmosphere, and they recommended that future elections would require a large security presence.<sup>124</sup> SALW have served to inflame existing problems in the PNG electoral system, with Alpers stating that “Small arms, as always, were not the cause of this lethal violence, merely its enabler.”<sup>125</sup> This violence during elections discourages PNG citizens from voting for fear for their safety. Democracy in PNG is afflicted by an underlying culture of

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<sup>119</sup> Alpers, P., "Gun-Running in Papua New Guinea: From Arrows to Assault Weapons in the Southern Highlands", p. 100

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid*, p. 101

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>122</sup> Capie, D., *Under the Gun: The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific*, p. 94

<sup>123</sup> Radio New Zealand, "PNG Election Candidate in Custody", 2012, <http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=68854>, (accessed 14 August 2012)

<sup>124</sup> Alpers, P., & Twyford, C., "Small Arms in the Pacific", p. 54

<sup>125</sup> Alpers, P., "Gun-Running in Papua New Guinea: From Arrows to Assault Weapons in the Southern Highlands", p. 101

violence throughout much of the country during election time; this means that a great deal of campaigning is carried out at the barrel of a gun.

It is in this way that the issues of SALW and armed violence in PNG have been made apparent. This chapter has illustrated the role of PNG in the global legal SALW trade with the quantities being transferred and some of the types involved, the illicit SALW trade in PNG including the sources of weapons and some of the quantities involved, and finally their use in the likes of inter-group fighting, other violent crime and political violence. This has highlighted the context within which the evaluation of the SALW and armed violence responses within PNG will take place in the next section, examining measures at the national, regional and international levels.

## Chapter Four – Policy responses to armed violence in Papua New Guinea

As discussed in the previous chapter, the proliferation of SALW and their use in armed violence is a significant problem that has been affecting communities in PNG for a number of years. In this time there have been many policy initiatives adopted to reduce the numbers of SALW in circulation throughout the country and reduce the armed violence that frequently accompanies their presence. This chapter will analyse these measures that have been adopted by PNG, which have taken place at the national, regional and international level. In order to achieve this, the policies will be examined and their objectives will be outlined along with how effective they have proven to be at addressing the proliferation of SALW and armed violence throughout PNG.

### National measures

This section will analyse the national measures that have been implemented in PNG to try and address the proliferation of SALW and the armed violence they contribute to. It will examine measures that have been implemented by the state and its various subsidiaries. The specific initiatives that this section will be analysing include the Firearms Act, the National Gun Summit and Guns Control Committee, the PNGDF reform process and the Bougainville Peace Process.

#### *PNG Firearms Act 1978*

The major piece of legislation that makes up the firearms law in PNG is the Firearms Act 1978. The Firearms Act covers a large number of areas related to SALW. One of the major principles underlying the Firearms Act is that, unlike in a number of other states, citizens of PNG are not guaranteed the right to own firearms under the law. The Firearms Act gives the PNG Police Commissioner the role of registrar and the responsibility for enforcement of the law.<sup>126</sup> Restrictions or prohibitions on types of firearms and areas that they may be held or used in can be put under a moratorium at any time and for any length of time. Additionally, new licences and permits for types of firearms can be put under moratorium at any time and for any length of time. For example,

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<sup>126</sup> National Parliament of Papua New Guinea, "Firearms Act 1978", 1978, [https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/Papua\\_New\\_Guinea\\_Firearms\\_Act\\_1978.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/Papua_New_Guinea_Firearms_Act_1978.pdf), (accessed 7 August 2012), p. 5



a moratorium was placed on new firearms licences for shotguns, pistols and high-powered firearms in 2000.<sup>127</sup> Possession of a firearm in PNG requires a firearms licence, and the Firearms Act outlaws possession without one, punishable by fine or short imprisonment.<sup>128</sup> In order to obtain a firearm licence, there is a 'genuine reason' standard within the Act that applicants must meet in order to be approved, and PNG is one of the few Pacific states that include self-defence within this clause.<sup>129</sup> This 'genuine reason' standard includes use in gun clubs, defence of life and property, underwater hunting, veterinary purposes, scientific research, hunting for business, culling of stock, sports, subsistence hunting and any other reason that may receive approval from the Registrar. The ownership and/or possession of a pistol or high-powered firearm requires its own special licence, as the possession of these without this special licence is outlawed by the Act.<sup>130</sup> When firearms licences are issued, the details of those who are issued with one are entered into a national register. The accuracy of the firearms register in PNG is undermined by insufficient resources to enable police outside of Port Moresby to regularly ensure that their records are accurate or to send their records on to headquarters.<sup>131</sup> In a 2003 analysis, Capie concluded that "It also seems likely that remote police stations have difficulties keeping registrations up to date and reporting information to Port Moresby."<sup>132</sup> Those licenced firearms holders are required to ensure that their weapons are stored securely. While the Firearms Act does not specify how and where firearms should be stored, it requires licence holders to take 'all reasonable steps' when it comes to safe firearms storage.<sup>133</sup> In addition to licencing for the possession of firearms, a licence is also required for the sale of firearms and their ammunition.<sup>134</sup> Permits are also required to be held prior to the purchase of a firearm and when carrying one.<sup>135</sup> The manufacture of firearms is an outlawed industry in PNG.<sup>136</sup> Import and export controls in PNG are minimal, with no export controls at all and the only import control being a requirement for the approval of the Police Commissioner for arms imports.<sup>137</sup> The Act outlaws the illicit transfer of firearms. There is also a blanket ban placed upon the use

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<sup>127</sup> Alpers, P., & Twyford, C., "Small Arms in the Pacific", p.59

<sup>128</sup> National Parliament of Papua New Guinea, "Firearms Act 1978", p. 6

<sup>129</sup> Alpers, P., & Twyford, C., "Small Arms in the Pacific", p. 62

<sup>130</sup> National Parliament of Papua New Guinea, "Firearms Act 1978", p. 17

<sup>131</sup> Alpers, P., & Twyford, C., "Small Arms in the Pacific", p.65

<sup>132</sup> Capie, D., *Under the Gun: The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific*, p. 37

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid*, p. 41

<sup>134</sup> National Parliament of Papua New Guinea, "Firearms Act 1978", p. 27

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid*, p.15

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid*, p. 7

<sup>137</sup> Alpers, P., & Twyford, C., "Small Arms in the Pacific", p. 69

and possession of machine guns.<sup>138</sup> It is these aspects that make up the body of the Firearms Act 1978 and the government's attempts to control firearms possession and their spread in PNG.

There has been considerable analysis of the Firearms Act 1978 and its effectiveness in addressing SALW and gun crimes. Alpers and Twyford lauded the Firearms Act in 2003, stating that the firearms legislation in PNG is among the most comprehensive in the region. They went on to say that "it is one of the few developing states in the Pacific to have extensively revised and adapted its small arms legislation in recent years."<sup>139</sup> Alpers also noted the comprehensiveness of the Firearms Act when he referred to a UN comparison of gun law throughout the Pacific, which found that PNG's legislation more closely matched the global standard for SALW legislation than any of its neighbours in the region.<sup>140</sup> Despite the apparent comprehensiveness of the Firearms Act in PNG, its effectiveness has been limited by regular breaches of the law and calls for it to be strengthened in the face of continuing high levels of illicit firearms and armed violence. One such notable breach of the Firearms Act occurred in late 2009 when the PNG Customs service seized four assault rifles and a pistol from a man entering the country at the airport in Port Moresby, on suspicions relating to the documentation he had for the weapons.<sup>141</sup> The documentation stated that he was bringing the weapons into the country for a licenced dealer, however records held by Customs claimed that he was no longer in the employment of this dealer, despite having since been rehired. The major dispute related to ownership of the weapons and whether they had been transported in for the state as had been suggested, or whether they belonged to the licenced dealer or the agent of the dealer. The import permit that was among the documentation in their possession had been approved and signed by the Police Commissioner, with the disputed ownership of the weapons and the position of the person holding them raising issues around the legitimacy of the import permit and its issuance.<sup>142</sup> In addition to these questions, PNG law also requires an import permit to be signed by the head of the Customs Service, but in this case it had not been.<sup>143</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> National Parliament of Papua New Guinea, "Firearms Act 1978", p. 35

<sup>139</sup> Alpers, P., & Twyford, C., "Small Arms in the Pacific", p. 58

<sup>140</sup> Alpers, P., "Gun-Running in Papua New Guinea: From Arrows to Assault Weapons in the Southern Highlands", p. 110

<sup>141</sup> Barnabas Orere Pondros, "Baki Admits Signing for Import of 'Seized' Guns", *The National*, 2009, <http://www.thenational.com.pg/?q=node/2330>, (accessed 27 August 2012)

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>143</sup> The National, "Careless Attitude to a Serious Problem", 2009, <http://www.thenational.com.pg/?q=node/2366>, (accessed 11 October 2012)

This event has raised significant questions as to the enforcement of laws relating to SALW transfers and the like in PNG, transfers involving both arms dealers and the state.

As noted earlier, there are regular calls for strengthening of the Firearms Act despite it being rated as relatively strong. One such example of this was a call from the head of the Guns Control Committee, which was established to recommend measures to address the SALW problem in PNG, who stated in 2008 that PNG firearms law needed to be bolstered, particularly around the firearms registry and the ability to track who owns guns, in order to try and stem the spread of SALW and their use in violent crime.<sup>144</sup> In addition to this, the PM called for the amendment of the Firearms Act in 2005 to include mandatory sentences for gun crime and limiting firearm possession to disciplined forces, in order to fight SALW and violent crime.<sup>145</sup> Because of this relative comprehensiveness of the Firearms Act, the ineffectiveness of it in addressing illicit SALW and armed violence has frequently been attributed to weak enforcement of the law. In highlighting the difficulties PNG faces in improving the efficacy of its SALW legislation around reducing SALW levels and armed violence, Alpers has previously stated that no matter how much money is spent on the issue or how many new laws are passed, armed violence will continue unabated if citizens have little faith in the laws or justice system of PNG that are responsible for the enforcement of laws like the Firearms Act.<sup>146</sup> This is highlighted when Alpers stated that “As numerous commentators have remarked in a myriad of reports spanning several decades, before any meaningful improvement to human security for its citizens can occur, the Government of PNG must first reform the law and justice sector, and regain the trust of those who have turned to guns.”<sup>147</sup>

It is in this way that the Firearms Act 1978 was designed and implemented to regulate firearms possession and trade in PNG in order to restrict the proliferation of SALW into the illicit market and their use in armed violence. It has been concluded by many that, while it is amongst the most strict legislation in the region, it suffers from weak implementation and has therefore only had limited effectiveness at addressing SALW and armed violence. It is these issues surrounding the weak implementation of the Firearms Act that highlight one of the major issues that exacerbates SALW proliferation and armed

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<sup>144</sup> ABC Radio Australia, "Calls for Tougher PNG Gun Control Laws", *ABC Radio Australia*, 2008, <http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/2008-10-09/calls-for-tougher-png-gun-control-laws/33816>

<sup>145</sup> Bonsella, Bonney., "Papua New Guinea Premier Moots Tougher Gun Laws", *The National*, 2005, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/>

<sup>146</sup> Alpers, P., "Gun-Running in Papua New Guinea: From Arrows to Assault Weapons in the Southern Highlands", p. 111

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid*

violence in PNG, and thus reflects much of the dysfunction within the law and order and justice sectors in the country. Much of this dysfunction is based on lack of resources and also stems from the culture of the police force, where corruption and other such issues are chronic.

### ***Guns Control Committee and the National Gun Summit***

The Guns Control Committee was established in 2005 as part of a review of firearms legislation and other controls initiated by the government, with the task of investigating and addressing the SALW problem in PNG and recommending measures to address this. In conjunction with this, a National Gun Summit was also held later in 2005 following a national road-show that travelled around the country talking with local populations about SALW problems and other issues relating to the gun culture.<sup>148</sup> The Guns Control Committee was instructed to specifically focus on areas including the role of the Firearms Act, jurisdictional issues and the judiciary's role in sentencing and monitoring and enforcement of the Firearms Act.<sup>149</sup> Following the Summit, a report was compiled which included a number of recommendations for the government to implement. The major recommendation was the establishment of a centralised body with the task of finding a way to address the issue of SALW in PNG that involved a whole-of-government approach across a number of sectors, in order to fill a void in the current efforts at addressing SALW.<sup>150</sup> Another central recommendation was a national gun buyback or amnesty programme. In addition to this recommendation, a province-wide gun amnesty was proposed in SHP following the Gun Summit in order to get citizens there to surrender their illegal firearms, with a request for cooperation from the national government.<sup>151</sup> This approach was criticised as ignoring the opinion of groups and communities that are closely involved with and affected by the problem of SALW, as well as academic work that has found that such programmes do not form a part of effective strategies at addressing

<sup>148</sup> Haley, N. & Muggah, R., "The Scourge of the Gun: Armed Violence in Papua New Guinea", p. 165

<sup>149</sup> PNG Post-Courier, "New Committee to Control Guns Approved in Papua New Guinea", *PNG Post-Courier*, 2004,

[http://www.lexisnexis.com/lvacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21\\_T15420284952&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29\\_T15420284956&cisb=22\\_T15420284955&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=8](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lvacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T15420284952&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T15420284956&cisb=22_T15420284955&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=8) (accessed 15 August 2012)

<sup>150</sup> Cowley, Daniell, "Developing a Culture of Disarmament: Building Community Level Support for Small Arms Reduction in Papua New Guinea", 2009, <http://www.undp.org/documents/cpr/PNG%20Baseline%20Study%20Community%20Security.pdf>, (accessed 10 August 2012), p. 10

<sup>151</sup> Korimbao, Daniel., "Leaders in PNG's Southern Highlands Keen to Remove Illegal Guns", *The National*, 2005, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/?> (accessed 15 August 2012)

SALW.<sup>152</sup> Another shortcoming of gun amnesties or buybacks in PNG, and the Southern Highlands in particular, is that the firearms that locals hand in are generally only homemade weapons, while they retain their better, factory-made weapons.<sup>153</sup> Despite the criticism of a number of the recommendations made, following the Summit the government committed to ensuring that the recommendations made would be implemented. To this effect, Internal Security Minister Bire Kimisopa stated in 2005 that “I have a simple job to do and that is to implement the recommendations of the Guns Control Committee. It will get the full support it deserves”.<sup>154</sup> In 2007, two years after the Summit, the head of the Guns Control Committee, Major General (ret’d) Jerry Singirok, claimed that its report was being ignored by the government and that the number of SALW present in PNG had increased and had been causing more harm in the years since the Summit.<sup>155</sup> The GCC report on the Summit took nearly four years to be introduced to the PNG parliament, eventually being tabled in August of 2009, despite being submitted to the PM in September 2005. Despite the Somare government’s acceptance of the report along with the recommendations it made, nothing had been done to implement any of its recommendations or findings by the time it was tabled in parliament in 2009.<sup>156</sup> Three years later, in 2012, it was reported that none of the recommendations made in the Committee’s report had been implemented.<sup>157</sup> In evaluating the impact of both the Guns Control Committee and the National Gun Summit, the UNDP has concluded that they have been largely ineffective, saying that “while these two initiatives have generated significant levels of public support for addressing armed violence, both processes have fallen short in producing any significant follow-up action.”<sup>158</sup> Despite the lofty rhetoric that came from the PNG government during and after the Gun Summit, they appear to have little appetite for undertaking major changes in order to address SALW problems in PNG. It is because

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<sup>152</sup> Cowley, Daniell, "Developing a Culture of Disarmament: Building Community Level Support for Small Arms Reduction in Papua New Guinea", p. 10

<sup>153</sup> Alpers, P., "Gun-Running in Papua New Guinea: From Arrows to Assault Weapons in the Southern Highlands", p. 115

<sup>154</sup> Per, Zachary, "PNG Minister Promises to Implement Gun Summit Recommendations", *The National*, 2005, <http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/> (accessed 12 August 2012)

<sup>155</sup> Radio New Zealand, "PNG Government Called on to Show Political Will over Illegal Gun Issue", *Radio New Zealand*, 2007, <http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=35032> (accessed 18 August 2012)

<sup>156</sup> Philemon, Oseah, "At Long Last...Govt Gun Committee Report Tabled", *Islands Business*, 2009, [http://www.islandsbusiness.com/islands\\_business/index\\_dynamic/containerNameToReplace=MiddleMiddle/focusModuleID=18815/overrideSkinName=issueArticle-full.tpl](http://www.islandsbusiness.com/islands_business/index_dynamic/containerNameToReplace=MiddleMiddle/focusModuleID=18815/overrideSkinName=issueArticle-full.tpl) (accessed 28 August 2012)

<sup>157</sup> Wilson, Catherine, "Gun Violence a Growing Concern in Papua New Guinea"

<sup>158</sup> Cowley, Daniell, "Developing a Culture of Disarmament: Building Community Level Support for Small Arms Reduction in Papua New Guinea", p. 7

of these issues that it has largely been ineffective at addressing SALW and armed violence issues in PNG.

### *PNGDF reform process*

As a result of the steady leakage of SALW from the armouries of the PNGDF, a reform programme was launched to overhaul both the forces and stockpiles of the PNGDF. Following the 2002 audit of PNGDF armouries, which was carried out in conjunction with the Australian Defence Force, the large-scale theft of SALW from defence force stockpiles was revealed. As a result of this, a programme of surplus weapons destruction was launched. This programme involved the destruction of around four thousand SALW and related items, which were mainly firearms, ammunition and explosives that were no longer in serviceable condition or had exceeded their use-by date.<sup>159</sup> This surplus weapons destruction programme received no opposition, with positive media coverage afforded to it by news media. In addition to this targeting of surplus weapons, the PNGDF also undertook a programme of rationalisation in order to downsize its forces and increase efficiency. This process began with the publishing of the Defence White Paper in 1999, which stated the need for significant reform of the PNGDF and recommended “a significant reduction in the overall size of our forces but an increase in their combat power and effectiveness.”<sup>160</sup> The White Paper made limited mention of reducing PNGDF weapons holdings, or SALW at all, with the only mention of it being the need for standardisation of weapons systems used by the defence force. Despite this limited reference, it was generally accepted by those involved in the reform process that surplus weapon destruction had to form an integral part of the process.<sup>161</sup> As part of this rationalisation process, the PNG government commissioned the Commonwealth Secretariat to advise on the reform process, which resulted in the publication of a report from their Eminent Persons Group entitled ‘Review of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force’. This report proved highly controversial in PNG, with the most contentious aspect of it being the reduction in size of the PNGDF to 1,900, a loss of 4,400 soldiers.<sup>162</sup> Opposition to the report escalated to include a raid on a PNGDF armoury by around one hundred soldiers who stole significant quantities of M16 assault rifles and ammunition and occupied their barracks until the government agreed to their demands and reneged on the

<sup>159</sup> Alpers, P., "Papua New Guinea: Small Numbers, Big Fuss, Real Results", p. 158

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid*, p. 159

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>162</sup> Alpers, P., "Papua New Guinea: Small Numbers, Big Fuss, Real Results", p. 160

report's recommendations. One of the major reasons cited for the failure of this programme was that it was associated with external powers (in the form of the Commonwealth Secretariat) which raised significant concerns around foreign interference throughout PNG and raised the spectre of historic colonialism.<sup>163</sup>

While this strategy failed, soon after another reform programme was initiated and led by the PNGDF itself which faced much less opposition. This home-grown process spanned a five year period during which the PNGDF shed more than 4,000 of its staff in two phases, with financial and practical assistance from Australia, free from controversy.<sup>164</sup> The PNGDF faced another major controversy as part of its reform process, when they proceeded with down-sizing arms stockpiles in order to eliminate the many different weapons systems and differing quantities of each variant, so as to bring PNGDF weapons systems into line with their regional partners. This involved a dramatic reduction in weapons systems, from 5,700 weapons within 58 weapons systems to 2,300 weapons within 11 weapons systems with the surplus being destroyed, sold or otherwise eliminated.<sup>165</sup> In much the same vein as the Commonwealth Secretariat report, there was instant anger at this decision with allegations of foreign interference once again made and claims of disarmament of the PNGDF. This time public opposition did not derail the reform process, with the programme being completed on schedule and achieving its targets by 2006, resulting in a soldier to weapon ratio of 1:1.<sup>166</sup> The rationalisation of the PNGDF has helped to stymie the leakage of SALW into the illicit trade particularly from their own stockpiles, by improving the security and management of them and increasing the efficiency of forces within the military.<sup>167</sup> Leakage of SALW from the state has by no means ceased though, with substantial numbers of SALW from RPNGC armouries leaking into the illicit market or otherwise being used illegally<sup>168</sup>. Additionally, there remain substantial numbers of SALW in circulation throughout PNG, and these SALW remain in communities for long periods of time and change hands often. This rationalisation has meant that in addition to the flow of small arms into illicit possession being significantly reduced, the PNGDF is also now more effective at managing the stock it still maintains in order to prevent the losses seen in the past. Despite this, in February 2012 the PNG

<sup>163</sup> Alpers, P., "Papua New Guinea: Small Numbers, Big Fuss, Real Results", p. 160

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid*, p. 162

<sup>165</sup> Alpers, P., "Papua New Guinea: Small Numbers, Big Fuss, Real Results", p. 160

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid*, p. 168

<sup>167</sup> Gilham, Mark, "The Spread of Arms in the Asia-Pacific." *Medical Association for the Prevention of War (Australia)*, 2008, <http://www.mapw.org.au/files/downloads/Factsheet2.pdf> (accessed 3 September 2012)

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid*

government announced its intention to increase the size of the PNGDF from a 1,900-strong force to 10,000 soldiers in addition to the purchase of new weapons, aircraft and naval vessels. If such a rapid, large-scale build-up of the PNGDF were to occur then this may again raise questions around the defence force's capability around ensuring the discipline of its forces and the security of its stockpiles, with the risk of a return to the previously-experienced leakage of SALW possible.

### ***Bougainville Peace Agreement***

As part of the 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement, a weapons disposal plan was a key element. This aspect of the peace negotiations proved to be one of the most sensitive, and was one of the last issues to be resolved. The weapons disposal programme within the Bougainville Peace Agreement was linked to a process towards greater autonomy for Bougainville and a referendum on full independence.<sup>169</sup> This proceeded in a three step process. The first step involved the collection of weapons from each of the combatant groups by their leaders and were put into sealed container storage by the UN mission in Bougainville. The second step in this process involved these containers being stored in central locations while the proposed constitutional amendments were passed upon verification that enough of these weapons had been collected. For the third step, discussions were to be held following the autonomy legislation coming into force in order to determine how the collected weapons would be dealt with and to determine whether there had been sufficient numbers collected for elections to be held. The referendum on Bougainville independence would then be held between ten and fifteen years after these elections.<sup>170</sup>

The constitutional amendments necessary for stage two of this process were passed in March 2002, with the collection of weapons continuing through this.<sup>171</sup> In January 2013 John Momis, the Bougainville president, confirmed that the referendum on independence would be held by 2020.<sup>172</sup> When this announcement was made, he warned that there are still issues around weapons disposal and good governance practices that need to be addressed to ensure Bougainville gets a desirable outcome.<sup>173</sup> When evaluating the impact

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<sup>169</sup> Alpers, P., & Twyford, C., "Small Arms in the Pacific", p.82

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid*, p. 83

<sup>172</sup> ABC News, 'Bougainville told to solve issues before referendum', 2013, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-01-24/an-bougainville-referendum-confirmed/4482558>, (accessed 18 April 2013)

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid*



of the Bougainville Peace Agreement, Maze and Issar have stated that “the first phases of implementation of the Bougainville Peace Agreement were met with success, but the situation in the south has since been deteriorating and the number of weapons that remain in circulation is unknown.”<sup>174</sup> Instances of civil war-era weapons being stored in old bunkers from the Second World War and subsequently being retrieved and then sold to rebel groups have been confirmed, which has contributed to a possible new arms build-up in the region.<sup>175</sup> This has been contributed to by reported statements from residents in 2009 that said that firearms possession amongst young people was at high levels and that trading of arms had been taking place between citizens in Bougainville.<sup>176</sup>

It is in this way that, while the Bougainville government has made progress on carrying out many of the requirements set out in the Bougainville Peace Agreement like the constitutional amendments and referendum date aspects, there have been mixed results in fulfilling the weapons disposal element and reducing the numbers of SALW present in the province more generally. This weapons disposal element of the peace agreement has focused solely on addressing the supply of SALW in Bougainville and, as has been shown, in recent years there has been growing concern around the increasing levels of SALW possession as well as a growing trade in them both within and outside the province despite the collection of large numbers of these weapons in the aftermath of the civil war.

These measures can be viewed as being effective at addressing part of the supply side of the SALW problem in PNG. While this has experienced some success, it can be seen as an indirect measure at addressing the SALW problem itself and only covers part of the problem. In order to truly effective, addressing the SALW problem in PNG requires action that is aimed at both the supply and demand sides. This need for demand side action is also addressed further in the next chapter.

### **Regional measures**

This section of the chapter takes a regional level approach to examining what activities have been carried out between states of the Pacific to address SALW and related issues in the region. This will focus upon measures initiated through the Pacific Islands Forum. The four agreements that will be analysed are the Honiara Declaration, Aitutaki Declaration, Biketawa Declaration and the Nadi Framework. This section will examine

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<sup>174</sup> Maze, K. & Issar, Y., 2009, “International Assistance for Implementing the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects: Case Study of the South Pacific”, p. 13

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid*, p. 14

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid*

what these individual agreements all seek to address and how, when they are viewed collectively, they have contributed to efforts at addressing SALW and armed violence issues in PNG.

### ***Honiara Declaration***

The catalyst for the Honiara Declaration came during the 1991 meeting of the then-South Pacific Forum (now PIF), when the threat posed by transnational crime to the region was raised. Because of this threat, action was deemed necessary in order to protect the ‘sovereignty, security and economic integrity’ of Forum members and also to prevent the undermining of development in the region.<sup>177</sup> The Honiara Declaration placed particular emphasis upon financial crime and drug trafficking, along with law enforcement measures to protect against such crime.<sup>178</sup> The Honiara Declaration set out a number of areas to be focused on in order to achieve this enhanced law enforcement cooperation. These included suspect apprehension, evidence collection, witness management, greater asset seizure ability between countries and prevention of money laundering where banking regulation is weak, uniform extradition legislation across the region, a regional customs body, a greater role in regional policing for the SPCPC, regional and international cooperation between police, customs and the Forum Secretariat to combat drug trafficking and greater centralised coordination of state law enforcement training needs.<sup>179</sup> The Honiara Declaration for improved regional law enforcement should have contributed to the prevention of SALW trafficking by creating a region-wide framework for the prevention of transnational crime and criminal networks, and ensure that law enforcement agencies across the region can adequately address these.

Despite this, Peebles has stated that the Honiara Declaration was an advance in regional security integration that Forum members were not yet ready to wholeheartedly accept. He goes on to say that, “Implementing the Honiara Declaration proved problematic. Successive Forum Communiqués noted the lack of progress in implementing the Honiara Declaration and stressed its importance.”<sup>180</sup> The Honiara Declaration was the first tentative step for the countries of the Pacific Islands Forum towards a common regional framework on security matters. While there has been little progress towards

<sup>177</sup> Pacific Islands Forum, "Declaration by the South Pacific Forum on Law Enforcement Cooperation", 1992, <http://www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/HONIARA%20Declaration.pdf>, (28 August 2012), p. 1

<sup>178</sup> Peebles, Dave. *Pacific Regional Order*. (Canberra: ANU E Press & Asia Pacific Press, 2005), p. 62

<sup>179</sup> Pacific Islands Forum, "Declaration by the South Pacific Forum on Law Enforcement Cooperation", p. 2

<sup>180</sup> Peebles, Dave. *Pacific Regional Order*, p. 63

implementation of its recommendations, it demonstrated a willingness on the part of the states in the region to take a regional approach to problems afflicting states therein.

### *Aitutaki Declaration*

Following on from the Honiara Declaration came the creation of the Aitutaki Declaration in 1997, which sought to establish how Forum members could cooperate around regional security. The Aitutaki Declaration was made at a time when the Pacific Islands Forum had been found to be largely toothless when it came to addressing civil conflict in the region, after it had stayed out of the Bougainville conflict which had affected both PNG and the Solomon Islands.<sup>181</sup> Under the Aitutaki Declaration, the PIF recognised that it did not have the capacity to deal with such situations and established that such a regional security framework was necessary.<sup>182</sup> The Aitutaki Declaration emphasised the importance of cooperation around security in the region, highlighting the most significant threats as natural disasters, transnational crime and 'economic, social and environmental policies'.<sup>183</sup> The Declaration expressed the importance of a regional approach to security, while highlighting external sovereignty threats to the region, which would require rapid response capability and reinforcement of existing mechanisms, such as sub-regional groupings. It was decided that cooperation within the Forum on security issues would be based on four guiding principles. First, a commitment to a cooperative security approach in the region. Second, emphasis is placed upon good governance, sustainable development and international cooperation principles, including the importance of preventive diplomacy, in order to reinforce regional security. Third, the primacy of prevention is emphasised when it comes to deterring conflict, with a major goal being to reduce, contain and resolve conflicts by peaceful means. Fourth, in order to further support peace and security, opportunities to cooperate will be taken advantage of wherever possible.<sup>184</sup> As a result of these principles, the Declaration recommended that the ability of the Pacific Islands Forum to carry out preventive diplomacy be bolstered, further meetings of the Forum Regional Security Committee be scheduled and the establishment of a threshold at which the FRSC is required to meet to address an emergency.<sup>185</sup>

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<sup>181</sup> Peebles, Dave. *Pacific Regional Order*, p. 63

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>183</sup> Pacific Islands Forum, "Aitutaki Declaration on Regional Security Cooperation", 1997, <http://www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/AITUTAKI%20Declaration.pdf>, (accessed 28 August 2012), p. 1

<sup>184</sup> Pacific Islands Forum, "Aitutaki Declaration on Regional Security Cooperation", p. 2

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid*, p. 2

In evaluating the effectiveness of the Aitutaki Declaration, Peebles has stated that “The importance of the Aitutaki Declaration was in broadening the Forum’s interest in security matters from law enforcement cooperation (as in the Honiara Declaration), to the broader arena of ‘natural disasters, environmental damage and unlawful challenges to national integrity and independence’.”<sup>186</sup> The Aitutaki Declaration emphasised the importance of prevention in order to avoid conflict before it occurs and the importance of maintaining peace and security in the region. As has been elaborated upon previously, the accumulation of SALW is one of many factors that contribute to conflict and they are also regularly used in tribal conflict and crime within PNG. When PNG agreed to the Aitutaki Declaration as part of its membership of the PIF, this may be viewed as a tacit acknowledgement of the importance of prevention both in the region and within PNG itself along with the effects of SALW on peace and security.

### ***Biketawa Declaration***

Like the Aitutaki Declaration before it, the Biketawa Declaration also followed major instances of tension and unrest in the Pacific. The Biketawa Declaration was a regional response to the dual-coups in Fiji and the Solomon Islands in 2000. It followed on from the Aitutaki Declaration, as it also sought to reinforce regional cooperation and avoid instability and unrest through a number of principles. These involved PIF member states committing to:

“good governance principles (openness, transparency, accountability, participation, consultation, fairness and equity in government); individual, human and democratic rights for their citizens; respect for the peaceful transfer of power, rule of law and judicial independence inherent in democracy; ensuring that economic, cultural and social development is beneficial to all in society; respect for indigenous rights and local culture; awareness of factors that may threaten state security and to cooperate within the PIF to address them; and adopt a preventive agenda in order to avoid conflict and utilise peaceful means to end it.”<sup>187</sup>

The Declaration placed a particular emphasis upon adopting a regional preventive approach in order to avoid the escalation of tension into instability and conflict, with particular importance given to addressing ethnic tensions, socio-economic disparities, lack

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<sup>186</sup> Peebles, Dave. *Pacific Regional Order*, p. 63

<sup>187</sup> Pacific Islands Forum, "Biketawa" Declaration", 2000, <http://www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/BIKETAWA%20Declaration.pdf>, (accessed 28 August 2012), p. 1

of good governance, land disputes and erosion of cultural values.<sup>188</sup> In order to carry out this preventive agenda, the Declaration specified the need for monitoring of tensions so as to determine what, if any, assistance the Forum should provide. When the PIF determines that it needs to respond to a crisis or potential crisis, the Declaration specifies seven responses that are available to it. These are an official PIF statement, the establishment of a Ministerial Action Group, dispatching a fact-finding mission, formation of an Eminent Persons Group, third party mediation, Forum assistance to institutions and other mechanisms that play a role in ending a conflict, and a high level meeting of the Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC) or Forum Ministers.<sup>189</sup> If these responses prove unsuccessful, then the Biketawa Declaration specifies that the PIF should “convene a special meeting of Forum Leaders to consider other options including if necessary targeted measures.”<sup>190</sup> The response mechanisms within the Biketawa Declaration have been used by the PIF. One example occurred when the Forum formed and dispatched an Eminent Persons Group to the Solomon Islands to evaluate the situation following the coup and inform the Forum of what assistance was required.<sup>191</sup> The PIF also dispatched its first Elections Observer Mission in order to monitor and assist the elections that were occurring following the coup.<sup>192</sup> The Biketawa Declaration can be seen to have contributed to the increasing integration agenda around regional security and stability that occurred through these multiple agreements. The Declaration emphasised the responsibility of states in ensuring democratic principles, rights of citizens and respect for the law, particularly in ensuring that instability and eventually conflict does not occur. It also reinforced the importance of prevention when it comes to how to respond to crises within states and the region.

### ***Nadi Framework***

Perhaps the most significant regional agreement to come out of the PIF when it comes to issues around SALW is the 1996 Nadi Framework. The process towards a model weapons control bill was initiated during the PIF meeting in Majuro in the Marshall Islands, with the goal being to address the threat of arms trafficking through the region. The process towards a regional framework for weapons was put under the responsibility of

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<sup>188</sup> Pacific Islands Forum, "Biketawa" Declaration"

<sup>189</sup> *Ibid*, p. 2

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>191</sup> Peebles, Dave. *Pacific Regional Order*, p. 63

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid*, p. 66

the FRSC, who were tasked with determining how this might be achieved, and included the South Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference (SPCPC) and the Oceania Customs Organisation (OCO) in the process.<sup>193</sup> The initial part of this process involved a review of existing firearms laws and licencing measures by a SPCPC-OCO sub-committee, followed by the creation of a strategy for achieving a regional framework.<sup>194</sup> The Model Weapons Control Bill was the result of the Nadi Framework, which was crafted by the South Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference Working Group who had been tasked with creating a draft legal framework for a common regional approach to arms control.<sup>195</sup> In 2000, their draft legal framework was submitted to the wider SPCPC for approval before in turn being submitted to the FRSC and then the Forum Leaders and finally became the Model Weapons Control Bill. The main goal of the Model Weapons Control Bill is to ensure public safety through greater gun control measures. The bill states that its two objectives to achieve this are “to require each person who possesses or uses a weapon to have a genuine reason for possessing or using the weapon; and to provide strict requirements that must be satisfied for the importation, possession and use of firearms.”<sup>196</sup> In order to satisfy these objectives, the bill sets out a number of firearms law recommendations to strengthen legislation in states throughout the region. These include a list of banned weapons that are not to be imported, exported, held or used; stronger controls on import, export, possession and use of weapons; the establishment of a registration and licencing regime; the need for a ‘genuine reason’ to possess or use a weapon; requirement for safe and secure storage of weapons; the establishment of import, export and transfer controls; and requirements of arms dealers for record-keeping, display, labelling and repairs of weapons.<sup>197</sup> In addition to these original provisions, a segment that addresses brokering was added in 2010.<sup>198</sup> By adopting these recommendations, it would bring the existing law in Pacific states up to an adequate standard (much of which was not), and would ensure that there is uniformly strong firearms legislation across the region. When evaluating the effectiveness of regional approaches to SALW in the Pacific, especially in relation to how they assist regional implementation of the UN PoA, and specifically the Nadi Framework and Model Weapons

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<sup>193</sup> Capie, D., *Under the Gun: The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific*, p. 22

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid*, p. 22

<sup>195</sup> South Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference Working Group, "Towards a Common Approach to Weapons Control: Legal Framework for a Common Approach to Weapons Control Measures", 2000, [http://www.gunpolicy.org/documents/cat\\_view/361-public-domain-documents](http://www.gunpolicy.org/documents/cat_view/361-public-domain-documents), (accessed 22 August 2012)

<sup>196</sup> Pacific Islands Forum, "Weapons Control Bill - Explanatory Notes", 2003, [http://www.gunpolicy.org/documents/cat\\_view/361-public-domain-documents](http://www.gunpolicy.org/documents/cat_view/361-public-domain-documents), (accessed 22 August 2012)

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>198</sup> Wilson, Catherine, "Gun Violence a Growing Concern in Papua New Guinea"

Control Bill, Kytomaki states that “By developing model legislation, regional organisations can prove valuable in establishing best practices and norms on specific aspects of the PoA.”<sup>199</sup> However, in 2010, it was reported that firearms law throughout the Pacific continued to vary in strength between states.<sup>200</sup> The Model Weapons Control Bill continues to face the challenge of ensuring uniform implementation throughout the Pacific.

When it comes to the effectiveness of the Nadi Framework and the Model Weapons Control Bill in PNG specifically, as discussed in a previous section, PNG’s Firearms Act covers large parts of what is outlined in the Model Weapons Control Bill. Among the notable recommendations of the Model Weapons Control Bill that continue to be absent from PNG firearms legislation include a lack of any export controls. The Nadi Framework is a significant measure in support of addressing the issue of SALW in the Pacific but it has been seen that the government of PNG is yet to update some aspects of its firearms legislation to meet these regional standards. One of the major problems that affect the Nadi Framework is the fact that, in PNG and across the region, implementation of it remains uneven and its influence limited. The Nadi Framework has been largely ignored by states in the Pacific, with model legislation no longer being afforded the importance it once had which may be seen to be a cause of the uneven implementation it has experienced.

These four regional measures that have been adopted by Pacific states within the Pacific Islands Forum can all be seen to have contributed to increasing regional integration around security issues and a willingness to cooperate with their fellow Pacific countries in order to ensure that the causes of conflict are addressed and instability and insecurity is avoided. When discussing the benefits that regional integration has brought the Pacific around SALW issues, the PIF stated in its submission to the 2012 UN PoA review conference that “effectively addressing threats posed by SALW can pose significant challenges for small states with limited human, technical and financial resources and numerous competing policy priorities. Regional approaches have therefore proved vital to Pacific states in supporting national policies and activities.”<sup>201</sup> Despite this praise for the regional integration and focus on SALW and other security issues in the Pacific, this has not been followed by much meaningful action. Much of this can be seen to be a result of the weak language used and the non-binding nature of these agreements. This is

<sup>199</sup> Kytomaki, E., "Regional Approaches to Small Arms Control: Vital to Implementing the UN PoA.", 2005, <http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2431.pdf>, (accessed 24 August 2012), p. 57

<sup>200</sup> Kytomaki, E., "Regional Approaches to Small Arms Control: Vital to Implementing the UN PoA.", p. 57

<sup>201</sup> New Zealand Mission to the United Nations, "Statement on Behalf of the Members of the Pacific Islands Forum", 2012, [http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/salw/2012revcon/statements/27Aug\\_PIF.pdf](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/salw/2012revcon/statements/27Aug_PIF.pdf), (accessed 14 September 2012), p. 2

particularly evident within the two most recent Pacific Island Forum Communiqués in 2011 and 2012, where SALW was barely mentioned. The only SALW-related subject within the 2011 PIF Communiqué pertained to the ATT, specifically welcoming progress made at a recent PrepCom meeting and expressing a desire to formulate a common PIF position on the ATT<sup>202</sup>. SALW did not even rate a mention in the 2012 Communiqué. It might be reasonable to conclude that despite strong rhetoric from the PIF and its member states on SALW, there has been little by way of action in support with little progress being made in implementing its recommendations through the region.

### **International measures**

This final section will examine measures that are aimed at addressing SALW at the international level and analyse progress on their implementation. It will focus primarily on the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects as the major international agreement on SALW that PNG has adopted. It will also take a lesser look at the UN Firearms Protocol, UN Small Arms Register, Wassenaar Arrangement and the Arms Trade Treaty in relation to PNG.

#### ***UN PoA***

Since the creation of the UN PoA in 2001, PNG has submitted two national reports on its implementation. In these reports it has described the actions they have taken to implement the aspects of the UN PoA. In its 2005 national report, PNG stated its commitment to the UN PoA and the issue of illicit SALW when it said that “This report depicts PNG’s significant achievements and the government’s acknowledgement of the seriousness of illegal use of guns since the outcome of the 2001 conference.”<sup>203</sup> PNG reported in 2005 that their national coordination agency is made up of the law and justice sector National Coordination Mechanism, with a Law and Justice Sector Working Group (LJSWG) under its authority, who are involved in the policy process relating to SALW.

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<sup>202</sup> Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, "Forum Communiqué", 2011, <http://www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/2011%20Forum%20Communique,%20Auckland,%20New%20Zealand%207-8%20Sep1.pdf>, (accessed 11 October 2012), p. 8

<sup>203</sup> PNG, "Report of the Government of Papua New Guinea on the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects", 2005, <http://www.poa-iss.org/CASACountryProfile/PoANationalReports/2005@153@Papua%20New%20Guinea.pdf>, (accessed 29 August 2012), p. 5



The LJSWG has representatives from a number of areas of government including the RPNGC on behalf of the Ministry of Internal Security, the Ministry of Defence, the Justice Department and the Attorney General.<sup>204</sup> The PNG permanent mission to the UN is the national point of contact for UN PoA implementation matters, keeping in contact with the PNG Department of Foreign Affairs who cooperate with the LJSWG.<sup>205</sup> In the 2005 report, PNG highlighted its lack of export control legislation that is required under the UN PoA, which it attributes to the absence of an arms manufacturing sector in the country. Also in this section, the parts of the Firearms Act that regulate production, import, transit and retransfer of SALW are outlined.<sup>206</sup> The outlawing of the manufacture, possession, stockpiling and trade of illicit SALW is also reported, along with the penalties that they incur. The policies for addressing stockpile management and security were outlined as being under individual standard operating procedures of the defence force, police and any other bodies that have firearms, and surplus weapons collection and disposal was described as being undertaken on a case-by-case basis. PNG cited in the 2005 national report their lack of specific laws related to brokering, while illicit brokering is already covered by the Firearms Act. PNG also has no marking requirement for locally manufactured weapons, due to the absence of a local industry, but those imported by the state are required to be marked with the manufacturer's serial number and recorded by the state.<sup>207</sup> PNG cited their involvement in the Nadi Framework process in the section pertaining to activities they have been involved in at the regional level, as well as their participation in the establishment of Transnational Crime Centres in the region.<sup>208</sup> In addition to this, the assistance that PNG received from Australia in regards to their reform and capacity building of their defence and police forces, as well as assistance from NZ with their post-conflict recovery programme in Bougainville, was listed.<sup>209</sup> PNG cited a number of international agreements they had signed on terrorism and transnational crime, assistance they had provided their neighbours with UN PoA implementation and cooperation with

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<sup>204</sup> PNG, "Report of the Government of Papua New Guinea on the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects", p. 6

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid*, p. 8

<sup>207</sup> PNG, "Report of the Government of Papua New Guinea on the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects", p. 15

<sup>208</sup> PNG, "Report of the Government of Papua New Guinea on the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects", p. 18

<sup>209</sup> Kytomaki, E. & Yankey-Wayne, V. "Five Years of Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons", p.118

NGOs on illicit SALW within the section relating to global activities.<sup>210</sup> When PNG submitted its national report on implementation of the UN PoA in 2012, the details it provided within it were very similar to that in their 2005 report. In addition to this, PNG also requested international assistance in developing a SALW tracing regime as they had identified the lack of one as one aspect of their firearms law that required remedying in their latest report.<sup>211</sup> In the PIF's submission to the 2012 UN PoA review conference, it is stated that the Forum has scheduled two annual meetings designed to discuss how implementation of the UN PoA can be further supported throughout the region along with a number of actions in support of this.<sup>212</sup> PNG's national reports on the UN PoA, especially the 2005 report, provided an in-depth overview of their SALW law with the 2012 report providing an update on what has changed in the seven years between reports.

Implementation of the UN PoA in PNG and the Pacific has been reviewed by a number of different people. Wilson states that a major problem for Pacific states is that "in a region that, when compared to others, is hardly ravaged by the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, the challenge arises when attempting to sustain action while remaining relevant to local concerns."<sup>213</sup> It is in this regard that SALW issues often rise and fall in significance within the region, when maintaining a constant focus upon them would better serve the implementation of the UN PoA. As a result of this, many of the actions that have been taken by Pacific states within their UN PoA obligations have been directly motivated by their relevance within specific states. This has included the likes of stockpile reform, weapons collections, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, capacity building in the police, justice and prison sectors, and others.<sup>214</sup> When these specific areas of relevance have been addressed, there has been a strong feeling in Pacific states that they have solved the problem and that there is no need to maintain a continuous focus on

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<sup>210</sup> PNG, "Report of the Government of Papua New Guinea on the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects", p. 20

<sup>211</sup> PNG, "Report of the Government of Papua New Guinea on the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects", 2012 <http://www.poa-iss.org/CASACountryProfile/PoANationalReports/2012@153@Papua%20New%20Guinea-PoA-2012-E.pdf>, (accessed 29 August 2012)

<sup>212</sup> New Zealand Mission to the United Nations, "Statement on Behalf of the Members of the Pacific Islands Forum", p. 3

<sup>213</sup> Wilson, Marcus, "Pacific Paradox: Successes of PoA Implementation and the Struggles of 'Next Steps' in the Pacific", 2012, <http://smallarmsmonitor.blogspot.de/2012/09/pacific-paradox-successes-of-poa.html>, (accessed 17 September 2012)

<sup>214</sup> Wilson, Marcus, "Pacific Paradox: Successes of PoA Implementation and the Struggles of 'Next Steps' in the Pacific"

SALW issues.<sup>215</sup> Wilson states that this view within the Pacific needs to change and a regular focus on SALW issues maintained, in order to prevent the occurrence of trafficking and build-up of SALW in states in the region, with the UN PoA being an important instrument of prevention in ensuring this does not occur.<sup>216</sup> While determining statistics on SALW deaths is relatively easy, monitoring the effectiveness of the UN PoA in actually preventing deaths from SALW and armed violence is markedly more difficult. When measuring the effectiveness of the UN PoA, Goldring states that “Right now, the only resources available to governments and civil society are the country reports. It would help if more countries submitted those reports in a timely fashion, but those reports alone are insufficient.”<sup>217</sup> As a result of this, UNIDIR has evaluated national reports on the UN PoA over the five years following its creation and classified the scope of reporting in PNG’s 2005 national report as being ‘heavy’, having followed the reporting guidelines provided and completing most of the sections within the guidelines in some detail.<sup>218</sup> It is in this way that PNG can be seen to be fulfilling the reporting obligations of the UN PoA, albeit irregularly, providing in-depth detail on their firearms legislation and other required detail, along with making requests for assistance to strengthen areas where they are weak. Despite fulfilling these obligations, the PNG firearms legislation is still affected by weak implementation domestically. This means that despite meeting much of the required standard, it has been largely ineffective at the national level at addressing the illicit trafficking, accumulation and use of SALW in PNG.

### *Other international measures*

While the UN PoA forms the most significant international SALW instrument that PNG supports, there are several others that are supported by PNG to varying degrees. When it comes to the UN Firearms Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, which requires signatories to enact legislation to outlaw the illicit manufacture and transfer of illicit SALW, PNG is yet to sign or ratify this treaty despite sections of the Firearms Act

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<sup>215</sup> Wilson, Marcus, "Pacific Paradox: Successes of PoA Implementation and the Struggles of 'Next Steps' in the Pacific"

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>217</sup> Goldring, Natalie, "Measuring the Effectiveness of the PoA", 2012, <http://smallarmsmonitor.blogspot.de/2012/09/measuring-effectiveness-of-poa.html>, (accessed 17 September 2012)

<sup>218</sup> Kytomaki, E. & Yankey-Wayne, V. "Five Years of Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons", p. 109

addressing these issues.<sup>219</sup> As for the UN Register of Conventional Arms, PNG has not filed any reports relating to its arms imports or exports.<sup>220</sup> Because the Wassenaar Arrangement does not have an observer category and PNG is not an exporter of SALW, it is not a participating state in the agreement.<sup>221</sup> One of the most anticipated international events aimed at addressing SALW came in 2009 when a vote was held on UN General Assembly Resolution 64/48, which initiated negotiations towards the creation of a legally binding Arms Trade Treaty, which PNG voted in favour of. This process culminated in a conference on such a treaty in 2013, where the ATT was adopted by the UN General Assembly.<sup>222</sup> At the first meeting to agree on the ATT that took place through July 2012, both PNG and the PIF made statements to the conference. Within their statement, PNG referred to their own issues around SALW and their effects, stating that “The proliferation of these weapons pose serious challenges to the effective maintenance of law and order, development aspirations and our national security.”<sup>223</sup> They also outlined four caveats to their support for the ATT. The first caveat in the PNG’s statement was that they stated their support for the rights of states to individual or collective self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The second caveat they expressed was a desire to see clauses included that would require capacity building, national regulatory and monitoring systems and a strong legislative framework in order to ensure that implementation of such a treaty is effective.<sup>224</sup> The third caveat was their advocacy for the inclusion of provisions for international assistance to states in fulfilling their obligations and the creation of an implementation support unit in order to achieve this. The fourth and final caveat PNG included in its ATT statement was its support for individual state reporting in order to more effectively gauge how effective such a treaty is between states, in addition to regional

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<sup>219</sup> United Nations Treaty Collection, "Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime", [http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg\\_no=XVIII-12-c&chapter=18&lang=en](http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-c&chapter=18&lang=en), (1 September 2012)

<sup>220</sup> United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, "The Global Reported Arms Trade - the Un Register of Conventional Arms", <http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx?CoI=PG&year=0>, (1 September 2012)

<sup>221</sup> Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat, 2012, "Introduction", <http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/index.html>, (1 September 2012)

<sup>222</sup> United Nations General Assembly, "The Arms Trade Treaty", 2009, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/464/71/PDF/N0946471.pdf?OpenElement>, (1 September 2012)

<sup>223</sup> Aisi, Robert G., "Statement by H.E. Mr. Robert. G. Aisi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Papua New Guinea to the United Nations", 2012, [http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/statements/docs/20120710/20120710\\_PNG\\_E.pdf](http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/statements/docs/20120710/20120710_PNG_E.pdf), (accessed 17 September 2012), p.1

<sup>224</sup> Aisi, Robert G., "Statement by H.E. Mr. Robert. G. Aisi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Papua New Guinea to the United Nations", p.1

reporting.<sup>225</sup> Despite their support for the ATT, the effect that it would have on the SALW problem in PNG is unlikely to be significant. This is primarily because most of the SALW proliferation problems experienced by PNG are a result of corruption in security forces, poor stockpile security and management and craft production of arms. In contrast to this, the ATT aims to regulate the international arms trade, within which PNG is a very minor player. When compared to PNG's strong support for the ATT, they have demonstrated little willingness to show the same commitment to other significant SALW agreements like the Firearms Protocol and the UN Register of Conventional Arms, which they have to yet to sign up to or submit reports on respectively.

This chapter has argued that PNG has undertaken a number of measures that seek to address SALW and armed violence to varying degrees of effectiveness. It has covered national, regional and international measures that have been aimed at this. What is clear is that, despite their best efforts at addressing SALW through these measures, these weapons continue to spread and contribute to armed violence throughout PNG with no sign of any significant progress. The failure of these measures to address SALW problems in PNG has been attributed to a number of reasons. These have included weak implementation of existing firearms laws, dysfunction within the police force, lack of political will to implement changes proposed by the Gun Summit, the weak language and uneven implementation of regional agreements and the relevance of international agreements to the unique circumstances of PNG. Much of this can be attributed to the attitude of the PNG government and the associated security forces, who have regularly demonstrated a failure to back up what is frequently ambitious rhetoric with anything resembling action in support of it. It is within this context that this thesis will seek to find new ways to address this in the next chapter. The measures have been taken in PNG have also been largely focused on addressing the supply side of the arms trade. The next chapter will take an alternative approach to this and will instead examine the concept of demand-reduction in relation to SALW and evaluate SALW interventions globally and in PNG in relation to demand-reduction by analysing how effective they have been at reducing demand for SALW.

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<sup>225</sup> Aisi, Robert G., "Statement by H.E. Mr. Robert. G. Aisi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Papua New Guinea to the United Nations", p. 2

## **Chapter Five: Demand reduction in Papua New Guinea**

It is now evident that the proliferation of SALW and the associated armed violence are significant issues in many parts of the world, including in PNG. In addition to this, the circumstances that are specific to PNG's own problems with SALW and armed violence have been well documented. As was highlighted in previous chapters, there have been a significant number of measures taken in an attempt to address the SALW and armed violence problems in PNG to varying degrees of success. Among these are international agreements such as the UN PoA and the ATT, regional measures including the Nadi Framework and national initiatives like the Firearms Act, National Gun Summit, PNGDF reform and the Bougainville Peace Agreement. The previous chapters have shown that the effectiveness of contemporary efforts at addressing these problems in PNG has been limited. This chapter will focus on the concept of demand reduction, which is the partner of the supply-side initiatives that have been the focus of much of the efforts adopted in PNG, and analyse the role it has played in programmes targeting SALW and armed violence in PNG. This chapter seeks to provide an overview of demand reduction, analyse SALW interventions that have taken place globally and in PNG and examine the role that demand reduction has played in them. It will consider how demand reduction might facilitate new ways of addressing SALW and armed violence in PNG.

### **Overview of demand reduction**

The trade in SALW is driven by two separate but symbiotic elements. These are supply and demand, which have featured to varying degrees in the international debate surrounding SALW issues. Much of the international efforts aimed at addressing the proliferation of SALW around the world have primarily focused on the supply side of the arms trade, and this has also been particularly true of efforts within PNG. This section will examine several issues. These are: what demand is and how it applies to SALW, the nature of its relationship with supply, the types of actors that have been found to feature in demand reduction activities and in supply-side initiatives and the types of activities that make up demand reduction.

Where regions and countries are affected by the proliferation of SALW, this is frequently because a number of different factors have conspired to generate high levels of demand for them. Where significant demand for SALW exists, there are suppliers willing to sell. There are many factors that have been attributed as influencing demand for SALW;

these often fall within the likes of criminal motivations and social, economic and political factors.<sup>226</sup> The concept of demand has been defined by Atwood, Glatz and Muggah as being made up of two elements, means and motivations. The motivations element of demand is made up of both individual and group preferences, which are themselves made up of what are called deep and derived preferences. Deep preferences are those that are set and which cannot be altered, like the need for personal and socio-economic security, while derived preferences are related preferences but alternative means to achieve these deep preferences, like acquiring SALW to ensure security in the absence of an effective police force. The means aspect of demand refers to both monetary and non-monetary means, and prices relating to real and relative prices.<sup>227</sup> All of these elements of demand occur interdependently with one another, with the presence or absence of one or more influencing the acquisition decisions made. This means that whichever of these factors are present in an area determines how demand plays out if at all, such as some motivations for SALW acquisition being present, but a lack of means may prevent it from happening.

Regehr has outlined six factors of his own that influence demand at the individual and community levels. The first of these demand factors is state failure, which is when states no longer have the capability to ensure the security of their own population during civil war, which then forces individuals and communities into obtaining the means to ensure their own security.<sup>228</sup> The second demand factor is public peril, which occurs when local populations lose faith in state functions, like police forces, to protect them from the likes of rising crime and to ensure their security, which in turn can increase demand for SALW within these communities to ensure their own security.<sup>229</sup> The third demand factor is underdevelopment, with a link between under-development and armed violence evident, particularly that under-development can be a cause of armed violence and that armed violence often facilitates under-development, both of which can fuel demand for SALW.<sup>230</sup> The fourth demand factor is availability, where the higher the numbers of SALW available are, the greater the demand for SALW is when compared to areas with fewer weapons. Regehr states that “the bottom line is that the availability of guns transforms social

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<sup>226</sup> Regehr, E., "Reducing the Demand for Small Arms and Light Weapons: Priorities for the International Community", 2004, <http://www.ploughshares.ca/sites/default/files/wp042.pdf>, (accessed 24 October 2012), p. 3)

<sup>227</sup> Atwood, D.C., A.K. Glatz, and R. Muggah, *Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand*, Small Arms Survey, 2006, <http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/disarmament-peace/demanding-attention-op18-200601-English.pdf>, (accessed 25 October 2012), p. 10)

<sup>228</sup> *Ibid*, p. 6

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid*, p. 7

instability into armed violence and armed conflict, and in the process exacerbates poverty, competition over resources, and alienation.”<sup>231</sup> The fifth SALW demand factor is security sector abuses, where ineffective, unaccountable or corrupt state forces mean that communities lose faith in these forces which in turn results in difficulties in getting the public to buy into SALW reduction efforts, and can also contribute to greater demand for them.<sup>232</sup> The sixth and final demand factor outlined by Regehr is cultures of violence, where the likes of SALW become an ingrained part of local culture and their possession and use are promoted as a social norm, which serves to increase demand for them.<sup>233</sup>

When outlining what it believes increases demand for SALW, the Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO) outlines the threat of the outbreak of violence, ongoing warfare with little end in sight and being unable to ensure security against threats to personal security and livelihoods.<sup>234</sup> QUNO goes on to state that “Perceived vulnerability is exacerbated particularly by the inability of the state to provide adequate security and protection through policing, causing people to arm themselves in self-defence.”<sup>235</sup> It can now be seen that demand for SALW is made up of a number of different factors, all of which fall within the political, economic and social categories as well as criminal motivations. When these factors combine, demand for SALW increases and, as long as there are suppliers willing to sell, SALW numbers rise in these areas.

As has been discussed previously, the concept of demand is inextricably linked with the variable of supply and each cannot be discussed without acknowledging the other. How these two forces interact with one another determines the price of particular items, and this is also true when it comes to illicit SALW. For example, where demand for SALW is high but supply is low it is generally accepted that the price will increase and, alternately, where demand is low but supply is high, then prices will go down. It is in this way that to effectively address the trade in an illicit good, then both the demand for and supply must be addressed equally. Despite this, for much of the last few decades demand for SALW has not received the attention that it deserves when analysing the problem of SALW proliferation. It may be suggested that a reason for this is that, while supply

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<sup>231</sup> Atwood, D.C., A.K. Glatz, and R. Muggah, *Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand*, p. 7

<sup>232</sup> Regehr, E., "Reducing the Demand for Small Arms and Light Weapons: Priorities for the International Community", p. 8

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>234</sup> Quaker United Nations Office, "Lessening the Demand for Small Arms and Light Weapons", <http://www.quno.org/disarmament/salw/smallarmsLessDemand.htm>, (accessed 24 October 2012)

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid*



measures are not as effective, they are easier to do for states and the results are more tangible. The focus on the supply side of the trade in SALW has meant that there has been limited success in addressing the issue of illicit SALW. Despite much of the focus of efforts at combatting SALW being centred upon restricting supply and availability of SALW by further regulating manufacture and trade, the long life of SALW means that such weapons can be used many times over and bought and sold across borders as long as there is demand for them.<sup>236</sup> Weiss has cited the example of assault rifles, specifically AK-47s and M-16s that were used by combatants in the Vietnam War, which re-emerged in various other locations around the world decades later, including in Nicaragua and El Salvador, which demonstrates that these firearms can last as long as there is demand for them and that demand needs to be equally addressed.<sup>237</sup> It is in this way that the forces of supply and demand are equally important when trying to reduce the illicit trade in SALW. Failure to adequately address one or the other often results in limited success in efforts at addressing SALW.

Over much of the last few decades, there has been a clear demarcation between those groups which have sought to focus on the supply side and those which have addressed demand. As discussed in the previous section, efforts at addressing SALW have been dominated by a focus on the supply side for many years, which has been driven by states and state interests, with this state influence resulting in measures that are “typically top-down, formulaic and standardised.”<sup>238</sup> During much of the 1990s, most state actors within the disarmament debate held the supply side as the most important aspect to address, and therefore this featured centrally within much of the practical disarmament activities through this decade, with demand featuring very little.<sup>239</sup> During this time, awareness of the relationship between development and disarmament was increasing and contributed to the growing importance placed upon concepts like human security.<sup>240</sup> While this had little impact on the disarmament debate, due in large part to the obscure nature of state responsibilities that demand side action involves when compared to supply-side initiatives, the wider disarmament community soon began to realise the importance of a demand-side approach to complement the supply-side in order to effectively address

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<sup>236</sup> Weiss, T., "A Demand-Side Approach to Fighting Small Arms Proliferation", *African Security Studies* Vol. 12, no. 2. 2003, p. 2

<sup>237</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>238</sup> Atwood, D.C., A.K. Glatz, and R. Muggah, *Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand*, p. 4

<sup>239</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>240</sup> *Ibid*, p. 5

SALW issues.<sup>241</sup> While the discussion of demand issues among international disarmament practitioners is a relatively recent phenomenon, activities aimed at addressing demand have been occurring at the local level for some time. The role of civil society in demand-reduction has been highlighted by the QUNO when they state that “where states are unable or unwilling to undertake disarmament and demand-reduction activities seriously, civil society entities have frequently filled the gap, often in ingenious and innovative ways.”<sup>242</sup> It has been in this way that traditional demand reduction activities have generally been initiated and sustained at the local level, while supply-side initiatives have been focused on controls at the national, regional and international levels.<sup>243</sup> Through the 2000s, awareness of the role of demand and the development of what has been termed a demand optic has been advanced within the development and disarmament sectors. For example, the July 2005 Second Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects engaged in discussion around demand for SALW and the need to enhance ways of addressing SALW demand within the UN PoA.<sup>244</sup> The UN PoA itself contained one of the most important advances in acknowledging the importance of demand side action as it, while not formally committing specifically to demand reduction, covered areas that have been recognised as also being important to demand side action, including development, promoting cultures of peace, conflict resolution and security sector reform.<sup>245</sup> This growing demand lens promotes a security-first and development-driven approach, based largely on the increasingly evident link between security and development, which has been promoted by civil society for a number of years and was recognised in the 2004 UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.<sup>246</sup> It is in this way that many of the efforts aimed at SALW around the world have been pursued separately, divided between those who are focussed on the supply of SALW, like states and much of the disarmament community, and those who feature the demand for SALW centrally in their efforts, primarily local groups and NGOs, but there is a growing awareness of the importance of demand side action throughout the disarmament

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<sup>241</sup> Atwood, D.C., A.K. Glatz, and R. Muggah, *Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand*, p. 6

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid*, p. 7

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>245</sup> Regehr, E., "Reducing the Demand for Small Arms and Light Weapons: Priorities for the International Community", p.4

<sup>246</sup> Atwood, D.C., A.K. Glatz, and R. Muggah, *Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand*, p. 8

community. Divisions such as these are also apparent in specific countries, including PNG, which can provide opportunities for new SALW action that will be further discussed later on.

In order to effectively address the demand side of the SALW trade equation, a number of strategies have been developed. In addition to highlighting factors that increase demand for SALW, as mentioned previously, Regehr also set out six measures designed to reduce demand. The first is restoring public institutions. This involves reforming the institutions of the state, whose role it is to ensure the security of communities and prevent violence, but are not maintaining these responsibilities, in such a way that communities are able to regain trust and confidence in these institutions and the state as a whole. This can be achieved by increasing the accountability of the state, particularly through encouraging greater public participation in the activities of the state, which helps to improve confidence in governments.<sup>247</sup> The second measure to reduce demand for SALW is upholding public safety, which is based upon the responsibility of the state to utilise its monopoly on the use of force when it comes to law enforcement, to ensure that order is maintained and its population is secure. In conjunction with this, the state must also work to facilitate an environment where the social and economic conditions are such that citizens are encouraged to willingly abide by these laws, so that enforcement of the law is relied on less than maintaining this culture of peace, by providing the conditions to encourage citizens to adhere to the law.<sup>248</sup> The third demand reduction measure is promoting development, where appropriately targeted development programmes by the state can prevent the outbreak of violence by addressing conditions that lead to conflict, and therefore serve to increase the demand for SALW. Regehr states that “effectively targeted poverty reduction and development efforts as well as human rights and public safety efforts can effectively reduce violence and the demand for SALW.”<sup>249</sup> Regehr’s fourth suggestion is reducing SALW availability because, as discussed before, ready availability of SALW often also fuels demand, which means that controls on the supply of SALW are one of the necessary components of demand-reduction.<sup>250</sup> The fifth measure for demand-reduction is security sector reform. In order to ensure that populations have faith and trust in security forces there must be strong accountability within these institutions, which

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<sup>247</sup> Regehr, E., "Reducing the Demand for Small Arms and Light Weapons: Priorities for the International Community", p. 9

<sup>248</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14

occurs through a strong commitment to global human rights and humanitarian law standards.<sup>251</sup> The sixth, and final, demand-reduction measure is promoting ‘cultures of peace’, particularly through education programmes and public awareness campaigns that are focused on the problems that SALW cause and which target all parts of society. Within this, civil society must be given a prominent role, particularly around determining what causes and sustains cultures of violence, and to provide the education and training that focuses on peace education and how to manage and resolve conflict.<sup>252</sup> Weiss has also outlined measures through which demand for SALW can be reduced, which seek to change environments that are conducive to SALW acquisition and armed violence, by focusing on education, childhood development, cycles of violence and social cohesion among other such measures.<sup>253</sup> QUNO has recommended five important themes to focus on in demand reduction activities. These are conflict-sensitive development, gender mainstreaming and positive engagement of youth (to provide alternatives to armed violence, particularly for young men), governance and security sector reform, conflict prevention, resolution and reconciliation and effective DDR programmes for ex-combatants.<sup>254</sup>

It can be seen that demand-reduction targets the local environment in order create the conditions where people do not feel the need to resort to small arms. As this section has shown, demand is influenced by a number of different factors that result in different outcomes depending which factors are interacting in a certain location. It has also been seen that the forces of demand and supply are inseparable when seeking to address SALW yet they have often been pursued separately, with states traditionally focusing on the supply-side and civil society and NGOs targeting demand-reduction. The next section will focus on SALW interventions that have occurred in three countries around the world and in PNG, before analysing their impact upon demand-reduction.

### **SALW interventions and demand-reduction around the world**

All around the world, groups including central government, local government, NGOs and civil society have been involved in activities aimed at reducing the levels of SALW and armed violence in their areas. These have taken a variety of forms, targeting both supply and demand. This section will focus first on examples of countries around the

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<sup>251</sup> Regehr, E., "Reducing the Demand for Small Arms and Light Weapons: Priorities for the International Community", p. 15

<sup>252</sup> Regehr, E., "Reducing the Demand for Small Arms and Light Weapons: Priorities for the International Community", p. 16

<sup>253</sup> Weiss, T., "A Demand-Side Approach to Fighting Small Arms Proliferation", p. 4

<sup>254</sup> Quaker United Nations Office, "Lessening the Demand for Small Arms and Light Weapons"

world that have targeted their own local SALW issues and the actions they have taken, specifically in Brazil, South Africa and Colombia, before examining examples of actions that have occurred in PNG, and evaluating how successful they have been at reducing SALW demand.

### ***Brazil***

Illicit SALW have been found to be a particular problem within Brazil, especially in urban areas like Rio de Janeiro, with large numbers in circulation and their use in armed violence prevalent. In order to help to address the SALW problems experienced in Brazil, the Brazilian government passed the Disarmament Statute in 2003 which enabled them to launch a national buy-back programme with the support of a significant proportion of the population. This programme spanned an initial three month amnesty period in 2004 where financial compensation of \$US 40-120 was given for each weapon that was handed over, which resulted in the collection of over two hundred thousand weapons at the end of this period. By the halfway point of the buy-back, the projections for total guns collected had already been exceeded.<sup>255</sup> The success of this programme resulted in an extension of it for a further six months, which resulted in a total of four hundred thousand SALW being collected over the entire period of the amnesty.<sup>256</sup> The effect of the gun buy-back programme, in conjunction with other components of the Disarmament Statute, has been evaluated as potentially contributing to an eight per cent decrease in firearms-related deaths in Brazil between 2003 and 2004.<sup>257</sup> When categorising programmes such as gun buy-back programmes or amnesties, they are usually included within the scope of supply-side measures. However, such programmes can be seen to also have an impact on the demand for SALW such as by increasing the price of these weapons as the numbers available fall, and the success of amnesties and buy-backs can also be seen to demonstrate what is called 'negative' demand for these weapons.<sup>258</sup> These measures were complemented by a simultaneous increase in other costs associated with SALW possession, including fees related to registering weapons and licenses as well as penalties for illegal possession rising. Since this initial 2004 national gun buy-back, there have been

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<sup>255</sup> Chu, Henry, "Brazil Gun Buyback Exceeds Hopes", *Los Angeles Times*, 2004, <http://articles.latimes.com/2004/oct/25/world/fg-guns25>, (accessed 26 October 2012)

<sup>256</sup> Atwood, D.C., A.K. Glatz, and R. Muggah, *Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand*, p. 19

<sup>257</sup> Atwood, D.C., A.K. Glatz, and R. Muggah, *Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand*, p. 19

<sup>258</sup> *Ibid*

two others in 2009 and 2011, with the 2004 and 2009 amnesties receiving a combined 1.1 million firearms.<sup>259</sup> Despite the immediate positive effects that these measures experienced, demand for SALW in Brazil is still significant and will remain so in the absence of further demand reduction initiatives.<sup>260</sup>

One of the criticisms of the 2004 programme came from gun control proponents who criticised the reluctance of the federal police to allow civil society groups to be involved, and have remained closed to suggestions for improving efficiency. The overall impact of the 2004 programme was also questioned, with an LA Times article stating that “The number of firearms handed over is miniscule compared with the total believed to be in circulation, and daily headlines here in Rio throb with accounts of fatal street robberies, shootouts between criminals and police and wanton bloodletting among feuding drug gangs that have no intention of surrendering their stockpiles.”<sup>261</sup> When compared with the numbers of guns in Brazil at the time, said to be between eight and twenty million, the numbers of guns collected in the amnesty were only a fraction of this total and firearms deaths at the time were forty thousand a year, or one every twelve minutes.<sup>262</sup> It was found that the gun owners who were surrendering their firearms were mostly citizens aged over fifty and that the youth, who are the largest group of gun users and victims, were still largely holding their weapons.<sup>263</sup> Another issue that was found to undermine the gun buy-back programme was that public confidence in the Brazil Federal Police was very low due to corruption and other issues, which meant that many people were unwilling to surrender their weapons to the police. Additionally, because the police refused to allow civil society groups to receive surrendered weapons, any chance for greater participation was further undermined; this was because citizens trusted civil society groups more with the weapons that would be handed in and were more likely to comply.<sup>264</sup> It is in this way that the actions that were aimed at reducing SALW levels and levels of armed violence in Brazil have only had a limited effect at reducing the demand for these weapons. Much of this can be seen to come down to the fact that they have primarily been aimed at reducing supply, particularly through buy-backs, while issues that motivate the demand for SALW have been largely

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<sup>259</sup> New York Times, "Brazil: Gun Buyback Campaign Begins", *New York Times*, 2011, [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/07/world/americas/07briefs-ART-Brazil.html?\\_r=1&](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/07/world/americas/07briefs-ART-Brazil.html?_r=1&), (accessed 26 October 2012)

<sup>260</sup> Atwood, D.C., A.K. Glatz, and R. Muggah, *Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand*, p. 19

<sup>261</sup> Chu, Henry, "Brazil Gun Buyback Exceeds Hopes"

<sup>262</sup> Chu, Henry, "Brazil Gun Buyback Exceeds Hopes"

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>264</sup> Chu, Henry, "Brazil Gun Buyback Exceeds Hopes"

ignored. This was particularly evident in the unwillingness of the police to include civil society in the collection programme, which would have increased its chances of success because of the lack of trust the public has in the police, which also serves to increase demand. As a result, there are still large numbers of illicit SALW throughout Brazil.

### *Colombia*

As in Brazil, there have also been measures designed to address Colombia's SALW problem implemented at the local level, particularly in Bogota. These local measures have included greater investment from the Bogota government for police infrastructure such as improved data collection capability along with the creation of the Security and Vigilance Fund, which enabled the Bogota Municipal Police Department to increase their presence and capability for random searches for illegal arms, increased the police department's budget and provided the local government with greater influence on law enforcement policies.<sup>265</sup> Local government in Colombia also has the power to restrict the carrying of firearms within municipal boundaries which has enabled Bogota to place these restrictions on specific days, which have occurred on election days, weekends, days following payday, particular holidays, some weekdays and the Christmas/New Year holiday period.<sup>266</sup> Analysis has found that on these days homicides across Colombia were between fifteen and twenty per cent lower than normal, but further analysis concluded that the reduction found in Bogota correlated most with districts where the institutional police presence and enforcement mechanisms were strongest.<sup>267</sup> In addition to this, a voluntary gun amnesty was implemented in Bogota with anecdotal evidence suggesting that it resulted in the collection of five thousand firearms, and helped to alter how a large portion of the local population viewed gun possession and their sense of security following the amnesty, according to surveys.<sup>268</sup> A focus on crime prevention was also adopted in Bogota, which sought to increase community integration and engagement through neighbourhood watch groups, by promoting personal investment in the community and respect for the property of others by encouraging greater reporting of crime and police-facilitated conflict

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<sup>265</sup> Atwood, D.C., A.K. Glatz, and R. Muggah, *Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand*, p. 25

<sup>266</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>267</sup> Atwood, D.C., A.K. Glatz, and R. Muggah, *Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand*, p. 25

<sup>268</sup> *Ibid*, p. 26

resolution.<sup>269</sup> Atwood et al state that these national and local initiatives did make a contribution to a reduction of homicides at both levels, particularly as a result of greater cooperation between local government and police, more investment in urban development and more community participation.<sup>270</sup>

Almost twenty years later, in 2012, a Universidad del Rosario study found that there are now four times as many illegal firearms as legal ones in Colombia, equating to two million legal and eight million illegal SALW, with ninety per cent of firearms-related murders involving illegal weapons.<sup>271</sup> To combat this continuing high homicide rate and other crime, a three month ban on carrying firearms in the streets of Bogota was put in place by the city's Mayor on February 1 2012, with an eye to making it permanent depending upon its impact. Research on similar gun bans in other regions of Colombia in 2009 and 2010 concluded that they had resulted in homicide rates decreasing by an average of twenty three per cent and firearms-related injuries by fifty three per cent.<sup>272</sup> Another goal of the gun ban was to help to change how citizens of Bogota viewed firearms, with Mayor Petro stating that "It's part of a policy of laying down weapons, believing in the state's monopoly over weapons and generating a culture of tolerance and love."<sup>273</sup> This initiative was followed by a commitment from central government that it would implement legislation to put stricter controls on firearm ownership. This gun ban has so far been extended for a further two three-month periods.

Despite officials attributing a drop in homicide rates to this gun ban, other factors have been cited as having also played a role that has not been acknowledged. The first of these is the national urban security initiative that began in 2011, known as Plan Cuadrantes, which sought to divide cities into many smaller units with their own dedicated police base in order to encourage greater integration with the local community, with the police citing this plan as the major force behind the drop in crime in Bogota.<sup>274</sup> The second factor was the 2011 reform of liquor laws in Bogota, which restricted the purchase and

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<sup>269</sup> Atwood, D.C., A.K. Glatz, and R. Muggah, *Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand*, p. 26

<sup>270</sup> Atwood, D.C., A.K. Glatz, and R. Muggah, *Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand*, p. 27

<sup>271</sup> Brodzinsky, Sibylla, "Colombia Guerrilla-Turned-Mayor Bans Guns from the Streets of Bogotá", *The Guardian*, 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/31/colombia-bogota-mayor-bans-guns>, (accessed 26 October 2012)

<sup>272</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>273</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>274</sup> Ramsey, Geoffrey, "Is Bogota's Gun Ban Responsible for a Drop in Homicides?", *Christian Science Monitor*, 2012, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2012/0514/Is-Bogota-s-gun-ban-responsible-for-a-drop-in-homicides/>, (accessed 28 October 2012), p. 1



consumption of alcohol, which has been found to have been involved in ninety per cent of crime in the 2010 year.<sup>275</sup> In addition to these two factors, the time frame in which the gun ban has been in place has been cited as being too short to conclusively determine that it has been the contributing factor in the fall in homicide rates, especially when falling murder rates in other cities and declining nationwide unemployment suggest that it simply may be part of a nationwide trend.<sup>276</sup> In a critical analysis Ramsey has stated that “attempts to concretely link the availability of weapons with homicide rates elsewhere in Latin America have proved problematic, meaning that at the very least a degree of scepticism is necessary before hailing Bogota’s gun ban as a policy model for reigning in security in the region.”<sup>277</sup> This combination of measures aimed at reducing SALW and armed violence in Bogota, ranging from a new legal framework at the national level to greater police support and resourcing, gun amnesties, crime prevention and gun carrying bans at the local level, has placed a lot of focus on supply side measures but has also utilised some demand-side measures, particularly the crime prevention aspect. Following the implementation of these measures in the 1990s and second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it has been shown that there was a noticeable decrease in homicide rates in Bogota on both occasions. While the debate around the extent of the direct impact of these measures on homicide rates continues, it is generally agreed that homicide rates have decreased during this time.

### ***South Africa***

The final example of an intervention aimed at reducing demand for weapons is South Africa. Two of the most significant interventions aimed at SALW in South Africa have been carried out by civil society groups, in the form of the Gun-Free Zone (GFZ) project, and the state, in the form of Firearms-Free Zones (FFZ) that are part of the Firearms Control Act in South Africa. A gun amnesty in South Africa was one of the first actions of a fledgling gun control movement in the wake of the first democratic elections in 1994, when a day long amnesty was held by the state and civil society.<sup>278</sup> This initial effort spawned the NGO called Gun-free South Africa (GFSA) in 1995, who then created the GFZ project. The GFZ project was established with two main goals in mind, the first being to provide areas known as ‘safe spaces’ where people can have confidence in their safety

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<sup>275</sup> Ramsey, Geoffrey, "Is Bogota's Gun Ban Responsible for a Drop in Homicides?", p. 2

<sup>276</sup> *Ibid*, p. 2

<sup>277</sup> *Ibid*, p. 2

<sup>278</sup> Atwood, D.C., A.K. Glatz, and R. Muggah, *Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand*, p. 31

and security free from firearms, and the second being to alter the community's perception of SALW from viewing them as 'security enabling' to 'security threatening'.<sup>279</sup> These two goals seek "to provide individuals with alternative derived preferences to fulfil the deep preference for protection and security, as well as means to obtain individual status and group status without carrying firearms."<sup>280</sup> The GFZ project covers places like schools, hospitals, businesses, churches and other areas in the public domain, but the GFZ mechanism itself is completely voluntary. This means that compliance with GFZs is also voluntary, and there is no body that enforces it, so people have to commit themselves to abide by it. This voluntary compliance is promoted and encouraged using three principles, which are: facilitation by those individuals or groups who have a direct interest in and those affected by GFZs, participation of these individuals and groups in the process and flexible implementation of GFZs.<sup>281</sup> Any individual or group can start a GFZ, in cooperation with stakeholders (those being GFSA), and it is in this way that the GFZ concept has expanded rapidly in South Africa. The GFZ project has had two significant effects according to Atwood et al, these are that participation in the GFZ implementation process, especially by those who used to own SALW, is seen to increase citizens' social status in the community, and it has contributed to the creation of a new 'norm' whereby the compliance with the GFZ by some encourages compliance by others and is self-sustaining in that way.<sup>282</sup>

According to IRIN, one of the most significant effects that the GFZs have had in South Africa has been to change attitudes towards firearms, with IRIN quoting a leading researcher as saying that "the GFZ sign [usually prominently displayed at the entrance of a GFZ] has become an incredibly strong symbol, challenging gun-owners and letting them know guns are not socially acceptable here; they are not cool".<sup>283</sup> It is in this way that one of the goals of the GFZs has been to challenge the social acceptability of guns and the inherent 'gun culture' in South Africa, particularly the link between gun ownership and masculinity. The success of the GFZ project has been attributed by one sociologist to the

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<sup>279</sup> Atwood, D.C., A.K. Glatz, and R. Muggah, *Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand*, p. 32

<sup>280</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>281</sup> Atwood, D.C., A.K. Glatz, and R. Muggah, *Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand*, p. 32

<sup>282</sup> *Ibid*, p. 33

<sup>283</sup> IRIN, "Gun Free Zones, a New Weapon in the War on Crime", 2006, <http://www.irinnews.org/fr/Report/59105/SOUTH-AFRICA-Gun-Free-Zones-a-new-weapon-in-the-war-on-crime>, (accessed 28 October 2012)

lack of state involvement, and primarily the fact that they are community driven.<sup>284</sup> While they have had some positive effects, results have also varied between locations and it has been found that the effectiveness of GFZs is increased in areas with greater social cohesion than in those where it is lesser, especially in challenging the norms that make carrying SALW acceptable. It has been found that, even in an area where a GFZ exists, if feelings of insecurity persist then some people will still have demand for SALW to carry outside of that GFZ.<sup>285</sup> Despite some issues that have affected the success of some GFZs in South Africa, Atwood et al have concluded that the GFZ experiment has had success at reducing demand for SALW within the boundaries of GFZs. The state has taken the lead from GFZs and has included the concept of FFZs in the Firearms Control Act, which allows the Minister of Safety and Security to designate FFZ status to certain premises or categories of premises, within which the possession of firearms or ammunition is outlawed.<sup>286</sup> When it comes to the state-run FFZs set out in the Firearms Control Act, Atwood et al have stated that the FFZs were too young in their existence to be able to measure their effectiveness.<sup>287</sup> Changing attitudes and eradicating firearms in South Africa has faced some challenges however, including issues such as that, like in particularly tough areas, many people won't report the presence of a firearm until an event like a firearms-related death occurs, and intimidation is so high in some areas that it discourages people from coming forward as witnesses to crime.<sup>288</sup> While GFZs have helped to challenge the perception of insecurity, an overriding view is that by declaring your area a GFZ, residents expose themselves to increased danger despite the available evidence suggesting that this is not the case.<sup>289</sup>

It can be seen that the GFZ concept has experienced success in addressing the issue of SALW, and reducing demand for SALW, in many of the parts of South Africa where they are present. Much of this can be put down to the strong emphasis that GFSA has placed on community involvement in the creation and implementation of the GFZ project. This, in conjunction with the voluntary nature of the GFZs, means that a significant degree of community buy-in on the GFZ project is required which has meant local communities become invested in the success of the zones. This success has also been helped by the

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<sup>284</sup> IRIN, "Gun Free Zones, a New Weapon in the War on Crime"

<sup>285</sup> Atwood, D.C., A.K. Glatz, and R. Muggah, *Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand*, p. 33

<sup>286</sup> IRIN, "Gun Free Zones, a New Weapon in the War on Crime"

<sup>287</sup> Atwood, D.C., A.K. Glatz, and R. Muggah, *Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand*

<sup>288</sup> IRIN, "Gun Free Zones, a New Weapon in the War on Crime"

<sup>289</sup> *Ibid*

increased social status that has been found to come from buying into it and also from the creation of a self-sustaining norm that has allowed the GFZs to spread. Much of the success of GFZs has also been attributed to the locally-driven nature of the project, with the absence of the state being a significant asset. This has all resulted in a greater sense of safety and security for residents living and working within the GFZs than had generally been experienced before their implementation in addition to altering how many communities view SALW from positively to negatively. As a result of all of these factors, demand for SALW can be seen to be largely reduced by successful GFZs. Despite this, there still remain issues, including persistent insecurity outside of GFZs which have been found to continue to fuel SALW demand and undermine the role of community social cohesion in their success. This may be seen to indicate that further success for the GFZ project in reducing demand for SALW may be linked to expanding the number of GFZs.

The varying degrees of success of these SALW interventions in reducing demand in Brazil, Colombia and South Africa provide a number of lessons for future efforts at reducing demand for SALW around the world, including in PNG. Among the lessons that these cases provide is the importance of the state working together with civil society where necessary in order to ensure maximum effectiveness for their own activities as in Brazil, the need for a well-rounded approach to addressing both supply and demand in the arms trade rather than placing disproportionate emphasis on one or the other as in Colombia and the important role that some community driven measures, that are largely free from government involvement, have played in encouraging voluntary buy-in by members of the community which increases the chances for success as has been shown in South Africa. These lessons will inform the analysis of how demand-reduction may best be used to address the SALW problem in PNG later in the chapter.

### ***SALW interventions in PNG***

As with these international examples of SALW interventions, there have also been programmes aimed at reducing armed violence and SALW levels in PNG that have been found to have had an impact on demand. This examines some of these efforts, including the work of Kup Women for Peace (KWP), Yumi Lukautim Mosbi (YLM), Leitana Nehan Women's Development Agency, the Mendi Peace Accords and the Enga Tribal Courts. This analysis focuses on these local level initiatives because strategies at the national level, like the National Gun Summit and PNGDF reform, have had limited or no effect, with the UNDP describing them as "largely reactive, with insufficient investment in preventive

measures to stop armed violence.”<sup>290</sup> In addition, Oxfam states that when PNG is provided with international development assistance, for purposes such as good governance, it is frequently poorly directed and ineffective at addressing the underlying causes of armed violence.<sup>291</sup> As a result of this the initiatives occurring at the local level receive no government support, do not inform any national level policy and the government is even unaware of many.<sup>292</sup> It is within this environment, where effective state action is limited, that some of the more effective small arms interventions and demand reduction programmes have been organised.

### *Kup Women for Peace*

One of the most notable local initiatives aimed at addressing armed violence and SALW by civil society groups in PNG is the Kup Women for Peace. KWP was founded in response to on-going tribal violence in the Kup region, and the founders joined together across traditional tribal allegiances in order to combat the inter-group conflict and gender violence that was occurring. They established five objectives in order to achieve their goal of bringing peace to Kup and to sustain it. The first of these was “to promote peace and protect women’s human rights and to advocate against violence committed on women by individuals, tribal groups, and the state.”<sup>293</sup> The second objective was to work to defend the rights of women and improve their representation in public decision making processes. The third objective was to engage in a public awareness campaign to educate the public of the risks involved in fighting between tribes along with gender violence and violence against children, in addition to teaching skills for the resolution of conflict. The fourth objective was the reform of the law enforcement and justice sectors along with policy reform so that populations feel secure and do not feel they have to resort to violence. The fifth and final objective was to help to provide the means and tools to local communities in order for people to be able to earn a living and be self-reliant, and encourage sustainable livelihoods through this.<sup>294</sup> Oxfam, a partner of KWP, has evaluated the effectiveness of KWP’s

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<sup>290</sup> Cowley, Daniell, "Developing a Culture of Disarmament: Building Community Level Support for Small Arms Reduction in Papua New Guinea", p. 2

<sup>291</sup> Hinton, R., "Armed Violence and the Links to Human Security in Papua New Guinea", 2009, <http://www.oxfam.org.nz/resources/online-reports/oxfam%20human%20security%20paper,%20february%202009.pdf>, (accessed 29 October 2012), p. 2

<sup>292</sup> Cowley, Daniell, "Developing a Culture of Disarmament: Building Community Level Support for Small Arms Reduction in Papua New Guinea", p. 2

<sup>293</sup> Oxfam, "Our Partner: Kup Women for Peace", 2012, <http://www.oxfam.org.nz/what-we-do/where-we-work/papua-new-guinea/our-partners/kup-women-for-peace>, (accessed 30 October 2012)

<sup>294</sup> *Ibid*

actions in Kup, stating that they have been able to bring an end to fighting between tribes in the region and have also successfully promoted peaceful development. They go on to say that “They put an end to tribal fighting by travelling into enemy villages and holding meetings with men from enemy tribes where they shared stories of suffering and tears. Their accounts convinced men to lay down their arms in exchange for self-led peaceful development.”<sup>295</sup> Among the more tangible results that this success had are greater freedom of movement for locals, prompt reconciliation of conflicts between people and tribes, a reappearance of state services like law enforcement and health services to the region and a growing sense of pride and self-sufficiency within these post-conflict communities.<sup>296</sup>

Following this success, KWP turned their efforts towards reducing the prevalence of gender violence in the region and developing means of subsistence as an alternative to violence among those most prone to it, such as youth.<sup>297</sup> In addition to this, KWP and Oxfam are also collaborating in the Highlands regions to address similar issues as in Kup. They have set out to achieve this through measures such as improving basic amenities like water, sanitation and healthcare in addition to teaching new skills to improve employment prospects.<sup>298</sup> In KWP’s work on tackling the problem of violence against women in PNG, they have implemented measures such as educating communities on women’s rights, with a focus on authorities such as village magistrates and police and community development; providing training for young women to take the role of educating communities on women’s rights and community development; and to target young males with a focus on those who are known to be violent, with education and training to improve employment prospects.<sup>299</sup> In the years since its creation, KWP has expanded to provide training and education in the likes of community law and justice, youth mentoring, leadership, sustainable livelihoods, HIV care and counselling, curriculum development for schools and community health.<sup>300</sup> Despite the progress that has been made in the decade since the creation of KWP it still faces setbacks, including a flare up of tribal violence in Kup for the first time in nine years which killed a significant number of people. Violent outbursts like

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<sup>295</sup> Oxfam, "Our Partner: Kup Women for Peace"

<sup>296</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>297</sup> Oxfam, "Our Partner: Kup Women for Peace"

<sup>298</sup> Oxfam, "Building Peace in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea", 2012, <http://www.oxfam.org.nz/what-we-do/where-we-work/papua-new-guinea/building-peace>, (accessed 31 October 2012)

<sup>299</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>300</sup> Jackson, Eleanor, "Three Steps Forward, Two Steps Back - but Still Walking Onwards", 2010, <http://www.iwda.org.au/2010/04/06/three-steps-forward-two-steps-back/>, (accessed 31 October 2012)

this have undermined the work done by KWP, with those people involved in KWP's work, their families, homes, possessions and the services they provide being targets for this violence and destruction.<sup>301</sup> Despite this violence directed at themselves and rival tribes, KWP has tentatively begun to renew their efforts at addressing inter-group violence and bringing peace back to Kup, with Eleanor Jackson of the International Women's Development Agency writing that "The women of Kup remain steadfast in the face of these challenges; they are continuing to work to secure peace, to see the maintenance of a ceasefire, and to re-build Kup Women for Peace."<sup>302</sup>

This focus of KWP on education, improving the rights of women, law and justice reform, improving employment prospects and livelihoods and restorative justice has meant that the people of Kup were able to attain peace and sustain it for an extended period of time, largely free from a return to large scale violence for much of this period. KWP and the people of Kup have been able to maintain this peace over an extended period through the likes of peaceful development and conflict resolution, which may suggest that sources of insecurity and, therefore, demand for SALW in the region remained low. This is because these measures provided by KWP provided alternative outlets for addressing conflict and disagreement. That Kup remained free from large scale conflict for this extended period suggests that this may be the case. While these efforts by KWP have had success, the recent resurgence of violence in Kup shows that even where there has been peace for a number of years, violence can reappear quickly and just as violently as before and therefore requires vigilant attention to ensure that violence is avoided. It is in this way that KWP has had significant success in addressing the causes of violence, and therefore factors that influence demand for SALW, in order to maintain peace in the Kup region for an extended period of time.

### *Yumi Lukautim Mosbi*

Another civil society group that operates in PNG addressing SALW and armed violence is Yumi Lukautim Mosbi, which is based and operates in Port Moresby. YLM seeks to provide a model to enable a unified approach to addressing crime prevention and security in urban centres, by encouraging cooperation between provincial government, law and justice sectors, statute authorities, the private sector and community groups. Through this, YLM seeks to include a range of sectors with an interest in improving social cohesion

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<sup>301</sup> Jackson, Eleanor, "Three Steps Forward, Two Steps Back - but Still Walking Onwards"

<sup>302</sup> *Ibid*

in these urban environments by strengthening law and order and enhancing local communities' quality of life.<sup>303</sup> Post PNG, one of the organisations involved in YLM, in its description of YLM states that "YLM is a mindset and a methodology, which is much more than a prescribed set of activities and as such it is quite broad."<sup>304</sup> The organisations that make up the 'steering' committee of YLM include the National Capital District Commission, the Law and Justice Sector, AusAID, City Mission, NCD Provincial Youth Council, Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council, PNG Sports Foundation, Digicel Communications, CPL PNG (a retail/wholesale company) and PNG Power. The activities of YLM are guided by four major themes, these are community engagement (particularly around crime prevention); sports and youth engagement focused on community spirit; reintegration and skills development for young people who show commitment to positive community spirit; and awareness and cross-cutting issues, which involves giving publicity to examples of 'positive community change' through YLM's monthly television show.<sup>305</sup>

YLM is motivated to improve urban environments for a number of reasons. Among these are the effects of crime on the personal security and safety of all citizens, the undermining of economic development, the importance of cooperation between communities and state agencies, the importance of multi-agency and community led approaches, providing alternatives to crime like employment, encouraging positive community spirit, poverty reduction as crime prevention and others.<sup>306</sup> The cooperation between YLM and private companies like Digicel has contributed to projects like a violence hotline and free evacuation service for victims of domestic violence, safe havens for people under immediate threat of violence within businesses, government offices and public places and training centres for at risk young people among other measures.<sup>307</sup> Another initiative launched by YLM is the Yumi Lukautim Mosbi Bus Stop Safety Programme. This involved the NCDC, Law and Justice Sector, the Port Moresby Chamber of Commerce and industry bodies working together to employ local youths to provide security at bus stops in Port Moresby.<sup>308</sup> As a part of this initiative, young people have

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<sup>303</sup> Yumi Lukautim Mosbi, "About Us", Yumi 2012, <http://www.yumilukautimmosbi.org.pg/about>, (accessed 1 November 2012)

<sup>304</sup> Post PNG Ltd., "Urban Safety & Crime Prevention in Papua New Guinea", 2011, [http://www.postpng.com.pg/philatelic\\_files/stamp\\_issue\\_files/ylm\\_2011.html](http://www.postpng.com.pg/philatelic_files/stamp_issue_files/ylm_2011.html), (accessed 2 November 2012)

<sup>305</sup> Post PNG Ltd., "Urban Safety & Crime Prevention in Papua New Guinea"

<sup>306</sup> Yumi Lukautim Mosbi, "About Us"

<sup>307</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>308</sup> Laepa, Caldron, "Cop: Yumi Lukautim Mosbi", *Post Courier*, <http://www.postcourier.com.pg/20110621/news09.htm>, (accessed 1 November 2012)



worked with police and security guards to provide security at bus stops, particularly in preventing petty crime like pick-pocketing and bag-snatching especially that aimed at women.<sup>309</sup> NCD Police Superintendent Joe Tondop stated that “making the city a safe place, especially the bus stops, was something that everyone needed to do by ensuring that they do not stand and watch someone being victimised by drunkards, thieves or someone under the influence of marijuana.”<sup>310</sup> It was also stated that police hoped such programmes would help to reinforce their own efforts by providing extra support for the undermanned force.<sup>311</sup> The YLM programme has attracted interest from other parts of PNG where local governments and other groups are liaising with the NCDC leadership as to how it might work in their districts. In 2006, two years after the YLM pilot began, AusAID evaluated it and stated that “There is also anecdotal evidence that crime has reduced in at least one of the pilot areas and the Project has directly led to a significant increase in NCDC funding for Port Moresby community and social service programs in 2006 compared to 2005.”<sup>312</sup> It is in this way that YLM seeks to prevent crime and ensure the security and safety of the citizens of Port Moresby. It does this by welcoming the participation of a number of different sectors, including government, business and civil society, and facilitating cooperation between these sectors to address issues in Port Moresby that affect security. In order to prevent crime in Port Moresby, it has sought to encourage the participation of at-risk citizens, especially youth, in ensuring the security of their own community and to encourage their personal investment in making it a safer place. This has also provided Port Moresby citizens with greater employment prospects and has provided alternatives to resorting to crime. In addition to this, YLM projects have provided safe places for victims of violence and those under the threat of violence.

This focus on crime prevention and security, and the initiatives that have been used, can also be suggested to have contributed to improving the conditions that have been found to help to reduce the demand for SALW by ensuring that there are greater employment prospects and that citizens have a greater sense of security. The likes of the YLM Bus Stop Safety Programme can be suggested to contribute to a greater sense of security for residents travelling by bus, thus reducing one of the factors that have been found to influence demand for firearms. YLM’s activities aimed at crime prevention and security

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<sup>309</sup> Laepa, Caldron, "Cop: Yumi Lukautim Mosbi"

<sup>310</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>311</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>312</sup> Thomas, Margaret, "Launch of the Yumi Lukautim Mosbi Projek", 2006, <http://www.png.embassy.gov.au/pmsb/Speech060721.html>, (accessed 1 November 2012)

are designed to reduce violence, crime and improve social cohesion in Port Moresby, and all can be seen to be contributing factors towards reducing SALW demand.

### *Leitana Nehan Women's Development Agency*

The Leitana Nehan Women's Development Agency is another community group that is campaigning against violence in their part of PNG. Leitana was established during the Bougainville Civil War in response to the targeting of women and children by combatants, in order to provide support to communities during the conflict and also in the rebuilding phase following it, with a particular focus on women. Their work has included providing assistance to the rebuilding of Bougainville following the war, promoting female representation in positions of power, protests against the occurrence of rape during the conflict, conflict resolution training for communities, trying to reduce the levels of domestic violence and alcohol abuse, promoting peaceful cohabitation between the genders in Bougainville and promoting the role of women more generally.<sup>313</sup> One such example of action taken by Leitana occurred in 2012 when a number of civil society groups in North Bougainville joined forces under the leadership of the Leitana to march on the Autonomous Bougainville Government. This demonstration was organised in response to growing concerns around SALW on the island and to demand their disposal, along with a call for the ABG to take action on SALW and other law and order issues.<sup>314</sup> As a part of this demonstration, the groups involved presented a petition to the government who was represented by the Minister for Women. Among their demands within the petition were for authorities to discuss development issues rather than specifically guns, establish a clear plan for the disposal of guns and rehabilitation of ex-fighters in Bougainville, release financial information relating to any SALW disposal programme, ensure the government establishes who the ex-fighters are as many still possess their weapons, creation of laws to ensure the security of females and several others. In addition to these demands, they also called on the government to include them in government processes, as they believe they are key actors in efforts to address SALW and armed violence in Bougainville.<sup>315</sup> In a similar vein to the challenges that have been faced by KWP, Leitana has been targeted by

<sup>313</sup> International Women's Development Agency, "Sad News in Bougainville: Iwda Extends Sympathy & Solidarity to Leitana Nehan Women's Development Agency", 2010, <http://www.iwda.org.au/2010/11/09/sad-news-in-bougainville-iwda-extends-sympathy-and-solidarity-to-leitana-nehan-women%E2%80%99s-development-agency/>, (accessed 28 November 2012)

<sup>314</sup> Jimbul, Suzanne, "Women at Work: Preventing Gun Violence", 2012, [http://www.iansa-women.org/sites/default/files/newsvIEWS/iansa\\_wn\\_bulletin\\_28\\_en\\_0.pdf](http://www.iansa-women.org/sites/default/files/newsvIEWS/iansa_wn_bulletin_28_en_0.pdf), (accessed 22 August 2012), p. 1

<sup>315</sup> *Ibid*

others with their office in Buka, Bougainville being burned down and much of their equipment stolen in 2010 which affected their ability to carry out their work.<sup>316</sup>

This work by the Leitana Nehan Women's Development Agency aimed at rebuilding communities affected by war, improving the conditions of women, women's representation in positions of power, eliminating illicit firearms still in circulation in Bougainville and reintegrating ex-combatants into the community and gainful employment, can be seen to contribute to efforts at minimising the occurrence of violence. Where the causes of violence are targeted effectively, it can also be suggested that demand for SALW is also reduced as levels of insecurity are lower and sustainable income sources are available. Despite these efforts, Leitana has faced challenges to its work, particularly through the continuing presence of SALW and the destruction of its office and theft of its equipment in 2010. These efforts at reducing violence and insecurity in post-conflict Bougainville to improve the lives of the community can also be seen to be beneficial to SALW demand-reduction.

### ***Mendi Peace Commission***

Another example of a programme that has utilised measures that have been found to reduce the demand for SALW occurred elsewhere in PNG when the Mendi community came together to end the conflict that had been occurring there for several years. The peace efforts were led by faith-based groups, women's groups, business leaders and development agencies who worked together to facilitate negotiations between the warring Wogia and Unjamap tribes, which resulted in an informal peace agreement and also the establishment of the Mendi Peace Commission in 2002, which appointed local business and church leaders to lead it after the state failed to get involved to end the conflict.<sup>317</sup> When a settlement was reached that was agreeable to both of the parties, it involved each side agreeing to issue public apologies from their leaders, a pledge to cease hostilities, allow unfettered movement over lands, respect for tribal borders, ending their association with all hired shooters, storing all SALW under the authority of tribal leaders, stopping tribal members displaying weapons in public, working together with police to address drug and alcohol issues, stolen property to be surrendered to its original owners and compensation

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<sup>316</sup> International Women's Development Agency, "Sad News in Bougainville: Iwda Extends Sympathy & Solidarity to Leitana Nehan Women's Development Agency"

<sup>317</sup> Peace Building Initiative, "Small Arms & Light Weapons: Case Studies", 2008, <http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index.cfm?pageId=1865>, (accessed 2 November 2012)

payments.<sup>318</sup> This process was undertaken in order to cement the peace agreement and to try and alleviate any remaining tensions so that it had the greatest chance of succeeding. The Mendi Peace Commission couched its efforts at finding a peaceful solution to this conflict within cultural traditions that had been present in PNG for centuries, specifically the important role of reciprocity and the complex local dynamics that inform SALW demand present in Mendi. This is reflected when Atwood et al state that “The organisers of the peace agreement recognised that any programme or intervention to mitigate gun violence would have to take into account these complex sets of preferences.”<sup>319</sup>

The Peace Building Initiative reported that in the two to three years immediately following the Peace Accords, Mendi remained largely peaceful.<sup>320</sup> In the decade since the Mendi peace agreement, the province has not been completely free from violence, with flare-ups occurring particularly around elections and politics. In 2011 a number of people were injured and significant property destroyed as a result of battles between the armed supporters of provincial administrators duelling for the role, one who had been acting administrator and the other who had just been reappointed. The running battles were largely made up of weapons like sticks, stones and knives but there were also varying reports of the presence of some firearms.<sup>321</sup>

The Mendi Peace Accords have demonstrated that a return to traditional cultural values and practices can be beneficial in ending violence in PNG. Specifically, the practice of reciprocity and respect for local traditions has proven highly beneficial in ending the ongoing violence and ill-feeling between Wogia and Unjamap. The Peace Accords involved assurances that violence would cease, SALW would be given up, movement in the province would be free and compensation given so that any lingering disputes were settled. This meant that the causes of much of the violence in Mendi were effectively addressed and that the province has been free from the large-scale violence it had experienced. It can be suggested that, as a result of this peace, the factors that influence demand for SALW in Mendi may also have been reduced because much of the insecurity between the two tribes had dissipated. It is in this way that this local intervention against armed violence in Mendi provides some lessons for addressing SALW demand in PNG.

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<sup>318</sup> Atwood, D.C., A.K. Glatz, and R. Muggah, *Demanding Attention: Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand*, p. 38

<sup>319</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>320</sup> Peace Building Initiative, "Small Arms & Light Weapons: Case Studies"

<sup>321</sup> The National, "Violence Rocks Mendi in PNG", 2011, <http://www.pina.com.fj/?p=pacnews&m=read&o=10032202944e49c5d55e9fec0d2f23>, (accessed 29 November 2012)

### *Enga Tribal Courts*

The final example of a SALW and armed violence intervention within PNG is the Enga tribal courts system. Having fought with one another for centuries with traditional weapons like bows and arrows, groups in Enga province dramatically escalated the bloodshed these conflicts caused when they first acquired SALW in 1990, going on to claim the lives of almost five thousand people.<sup>322</sup> When local people grew tired of this constant bloodshed, by the mid-point of the 2000s, members of the community including tribal and religious leaders came together to find a solution. The solution they settled upon centred around a return to traditional values and practices, particularly ‘restorative justice’ carried out by village courts. This was based upon traditional practices adopted in the nineteenth century following several centuries of conflict over territory and other issues, which established a system of compensation whereby valuable commodities in the form of pigs and other such high-value items were paid to settle grievances, enhance the standing of a tribe and realign the local power structure.<sup>323</sup> An anthropologist researching Enga has been quoted as stating that “As exchange networks grew 150 to 200 years ago, people without European contact created indigenous ways of making peace so exchange could flourish.”<sup>324</sup> These traditional practices declined following the establishment of Australian rule when they were responsible for keeping the peace, but not long before independence conflict began to grow again until it ignited completely from 1990. The restorative justice that village courts are based upon involves restitution, mainly in the form of pigs as has been the case for much of the provinces history, and also what is known as being sent to ‘drink Coca Cola’, based on a historic tradition where combatants sit down together and make peace themselves.<sup>325</sup> Several factors have been cited as contributing to the decision in Enga to attain and then sustain this peace after many years of conflict. These are the lack of economic opportunities in the region caused by war, the traditional customs and practices that the village courts are based upon and the use of Christianity as an ‘ideology for peace’.<sup>326</sup>

When discussing the impact of the village courts, The Telegraph reported that “By adopting “customary justice”, which plays on a perpetrators shame, castigates him in public and forces him to pay hefty compensation (often spread over many years), villages

<sup>322</sup> Siegel, Lee. J. "How Tribal Courts Can End War", 2012. [http://unews.utah.edu/news\\_releases/how-tribal-courts-can-end-war/](http://unews.utah.edu/news_releases/how-tribal-courts-can-end-war/), (accessed 6 November 2012)

<sup>323</sup> Siegel, Lee. J. "How Tribal Courts Can End War"

<sup>324</sup> Siegel, Lee. J. "How Tribal Courts Can End War"

<sup>325</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>326</sup> *Ibid*

have almost dispensed with the need to jail, banish or kill transgressors.”<sup>327</sup> When the effect of the village courts was evaluated it was found that, while the number of wars actually increased until 2009, they were able to be brought to an end through the village courts sooner and with less bloodshed than had been possible previously. When comparing the period 1991-95 with 2006-10, the figures show an eight per cent decrease in the number of conflicts with 21-300 deaths, while there was a 51 per cent increase in conflicts with one to five deaths which has been described as a sign that conflict is being ended sooner.<sup>328</sup> In addition to these figures, a decrease in average deaths experienced during conflicts in Enga has been occurring since the early 1990s, with pre-colonial conflict deaths averaging 3.7, then 19 in the four years after the introduction of firearms between 1991-95, 17 from 1996-2000, 10 from 2001-05 and finally halving to five between 2006-10.<sup>329</sup> The greatest strength of the restorative justice system is that it allows local communities to largely resume as they were before the crime, no matter how serious the crime committed was.<sup>330</sup> Weissner has described the most significant conclusion of the Enga village courts project as being “that using indigenous means of local conflict resolution may be better for a government like Papua New Guinea than imposing Western Law.”<sup>331</sup> The success of these courts, and the traditional customs and practices that they utilise, have challenged a traditional view that primitive societies are less peaceful than more modern ones, and that it is this progress towards ‘civilisation’ that creates a more peaceful society by showing that even primitive societies have sophisticated processes that ensure peace.<sup>332</sup>

The system is not without its problems. One weakness of the village court system is that it is primarily focused on those who commit one-off crimes, which means that those who are inclined to commit serial crimes are also returned to the community, often in the face of the threat of death.<sup>333</sup> A study on Enga’s village courts concludes that if incentives around natural resources and foreign aid are provided to Enga then conflict may be even less likely in future as the community would want to safeguard these economic opportunities. However it warns that the combination of a growing generation of

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<sup>327</sup> Ahuja, Anjana, "Can't We Just Talk This over Peacefully?" *The Telegraph*, 2012.  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/science-news/9597075/Cant-we-just-talk-this-over-peacefully.html>,  
 (accessed 8 November 2012)

<sup>328</sup> Siegel, Lee. J. "How Tribal Courts Can End War"

<sup>329</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>330</sup> Ahuja, Anjana, "Can't We Just Talk This over Peacefully?"

<sup>331</sup> Siegel, Lee. J. "How Tribal Courts Can End War"

<sup>332</sup> Ahuja, Anjana, "Can't We Just Talk This over Peacefully?"

<sup>333</sup> *Ibid*

discontented youth and increasing exploitation by multinational corporations of natural resources could spark further bloodshed.<sup>334</sup> Additionally, a growing population in Enga could place an increasing strain upon the restorative justice system, due to a lack of willingness of tribe members to make compensation payments for unknown clan members. Because of this, Weissner and Pupu state that “If this happens, local institutions founded on principles of kinship, respect and restorative justice will not suffice, and the Enga may find themselves in another cycle of violence as the scale of their society increases.”<sup>335</sup> As we saw in the earlier section, the Enga village courts system has demonstrated the important role that traditional values and practices can play in PNG, particularly in addressing violence, crime and SALW issues. This is because the village courts utilise practices that have been used for centuries in order to settle disputes and address crime and violence, particularly restorative justice and restitution, which in turn allows victims to feel that they have gotten justice (especially through the provision of compensation) and it also allows for the restoration of the local balance of power. These village courts allow disputes to be settled without having to resort to violence, which had been the case for many years previously, which in turn reduces insecurity in these communities. It can be suggested that the values and practices inherent in the likes of the Enga tribal courts may also assist in reducing the local demand for SALW, because of the conflict resolution role it plays and the means it provides for preventing conflict and ensuring security. It is in this way that the experiences from Enga may provide lessons for the expansion of the tribal court concept and the ideas that underpin it into other parts of PNG.

### ***Relationship between PNG interventions and demand reduction***

This section has examined a number of interventions aimed at armed violence and SALW that have taken place throughout PNG, and have all been shown to play a role in addressing demand for SALW. These interventions share several characteristics, many of which can be seen to be significant for SALW demand reduction. The first is the local, community driven nature of the interventions. All of these initiatives began and have primarily been sustained within their own regions, such as Kup, Port Moresby, Bougainville, Mendi and Enga. The nature of this community-driven approach is that those community members who are involved have knowledge of the local dynamics and issues that are unique to the area. This local knowledge is of benefit to these bottom-up

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<sup>334</sup> Siegel, Lee. J. "How Tribal Courts Can End War"

<sup>335</sup> *Ibid*

approaches, as top-down approaches that are headquartered in faraway locations like the capital Port Moresby may not have sufficient knowledge of some of the issues unique to these regions. The second shared characteristic is their relative independence from the state. This approach brings a number of benefits. One of the major benefits is that it avoids some of the deep mistrust of the government and state services that is held in many parts of PNG, as a result of corruption, incompetence and the like, which means that civil society groups like those examined in this section have the benefit of greater public confidence which often means greater support for the initiatives they conduct in their communities. The third characteristic that these interventions share is their focus on the underlying factors that serve to facilitate armed violence and therefore serve to influence demand for SALW within their communities. This has involved seeking to improve education and employment opportunities for citizens as alternatives to crime and violence, improving the conditions for women and women's representation, crime prevention and promoting restorative justice in order to settle disputes. Much of these efforts have involved a focus on traditional values and practices which have been found to have been successful in the past, before the arrival of SALW, and have experienced success more recently. All of these factors can be seen to be important in addressing SALW demand-reduction, and require addressing in order for demand-reduction to be successful. These characteristics will form an important part of the conclusions to this thesis discussed in the next chapter.

### ***Conclusion***

This chapter has analysed programmes that have been carried out at the local level in PNG aimed at reducing SALW and armed violence levels. This has included the Kup Women for Peace, Yumi Lukautim Mosbi, Leitana Nehan Women's Development Agency, the Mendi Peace Commission and the Enga Tribal Courts. In doing this, it has looked at the extent to which the concept of demand reduction has played a role within these. This chapter has provided an analysis of demand reduction, specifically relating to what it is and how it relates to SALW, its relation to supply, some of the activities that make up demand reduction and some of the actors that have traditionally been involved. In addition to this, a number of SALW interventions both around the world and in PNG have been analysed in order to evaluate their effectiveness at reducing demand. These two sections have been designed to inform the final section, where the relationship between these activities and demand reduction has been expanded upon in more detail. This will



also play an important role in informing the findings and conclusions discussed in the next chapter.

## Chapter Six: Conclusions

This thesis has examined the role that demand reduction has played in addressing the issues of SALW and armed violence in Papua New Guinea. In order to establish the context within which this analysis has occurred, a brief overview of the global nature of the SALW problem as well as the international instruments that have been created to address this were illustrated. Following this, the nature of the SALW and armed violence issues in PNG were set out by examining the sources of small arms in PNG, both via the legal trade and illicit market, and by highlighting some of what they are most commonly used for. The responses to these problems that have been taken in PNG were analysed along with an evaluation of their effectiveness at reducing the numbers of SALW. This focused on instruments at the national level, such as the Firearms Act, National Guns Summit and PNGDF reform; instruments at the regional level, such as the Nadi Framework; and international instruments, including the UN PoA and the Arms Trade Treaty. Finally, the concept of demand reduction has been examined in order to illustrate what is involved in carrying it out before finally analysing the role it has played in local programmes aimed at SALW and armed violence in PNG and how effective they have been at reducing demand.

Several major findings have come out of this research. The first of these findings was that the measures that have been, and continue to be, undertaken in PNG by the state to address armed violence have only had limited success in stopping the spread of SALW and reducing armed violence levels. This has been the result of problems such as ineffective implementation of existing laws like the Firearms Act, unwillingness to act upon the recommendations of the National Guns Summit and lack of full commitment to regional measures like the Nadi Framework. This is despite the support PNG has shown towards the likes of reform of the PNGDF, its UN PoA reporting obligations and voting in favour of the Arms Trade Treaty. The failure of the PNG government to take meaningful action in many of these areas may be attributable to a number of factors. Many of the problems may come down to a lack of capacity and resources of the PNG government such as in ensuring police stations outside of the capital can maintain their reporting requirements, the opposition to some measures that has been experienced such as the first effort at PNGDF reform and an apparent lack of willingness to follow through on the many commitments to law reform around firearms. These measures have also been found to be heavily focused on addressing the supply side of the SALW trade in PNG. This has meant

that even when the state has been able to reduce the supply of arms into the illicit trade, such as with the PNGDF reform, they have not sufficiently addressed the factors that have been found to influence the decisions made by people to acquire firearms. This means that, because these firearms have been found to have a long life in the illicit market, as long as demand for them continues then it is unlikely that there will be a significant reduction in their numbers or impact. The second, and most important, finding that came from this research was that, in response to these ineffective state measures, local community groups and NGOs have been fighting armed violence throughout PNG by focusing on the root causes of it and have utilised strategies that have been found to reduce demand for SALW. This has included focusing on causes of insecurity like conflict, economic opportunities, youth disenfranchisement, gender inequities and others. It was found that demand reduction has been growing in importance in academia and amongst disarmament practitioners around the world when it comes to effectively addressing SALW issues. The third finding from this research is that these activities may be seen to be nascent efforts in PNG to utilise demand reduction, as a response to the predominance of state initiatives that have been and continue to be aimed at the supply side of the arms trade. These initiatives have utilised measures that have been found to reduce demand have experienced some success in reducing armed violence in PNG, such as providing alternative means to end conflict and settle disputes through traditional customs and practices and by helping to provide greater economic opportunities as alternatives to taking up arms. These bottom-up, nascent demand reduction efforts may also be seen to complement the efforts made by the state in PNG to reduce the supply of SALW, which may help to form a rounded approach necessary for effectively targeting the entirety of the illicit SALW trade and armed violence. It is these findings that have helped to form the conclusion that, in response to the failings of state efforts at addressing SALW and armed violence, local community groups and NGOs have risen to the challenge and launched a number of programmes aimed at these issues that have been found to have contributed to nascent demand reduction efforts in PNG.

There are recommendations that can be made as a result of these findings and conclusions. The first of these concerns recent events in PNG, relating to the proposed rapid expansion of the PNGDF in terms of manpower and supplies that was outlined previously. Before such a move is committed to, it is advisable to ensure that the PNG government and leadership of the PNGDF have learned from past experiences. This means that they should keep in mind the lessons that the previous PNGDF reform provided,

around ensuring that the discipline of these new forces and the management of the stockpiles where the new weapons will be stored are maintained at current levels in order to prevent a resumption of the leakage of SALW that was caused by poor force discipline and stockpile management, prior to the previous rationalisation process. Another recommendation is that some of the lessons from these SALW and armed violence initiatives and demand reduction in PNG may be applicable elsewhere in the world. These lessons may be applicable, as one example, in states that are also experiencing difficulties around persistent demand issues around SALW and reluctance to expand efforts beyond the supply side.

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