

**THE UTILITY OF CRITICAL AND HUMAN SECURITY  
APPROACHES AND PERSPECTIVES IN CONTEMPORARY SETTINGS**

**BY**

**MATTHEW IAN LYNCH**

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## THESIS ABSTRACT

*This thesis seeks to demonstrate that Critical and Human Security approaches and perspectives – under conditions associated with the ‘globalisation of security’ and the ‘bifurcation of the security environment’ – should be increasingly influential in shaping New Zealand’s contemporary approach to Security.*

‘Security’ exists as a fundamental and legitimate quest for all Humankind. It is accepted as a core organising principle within societies, states and the international system, with efforts to preserve security central to the human condition. Critically though – within contemporary settings – the idea and concept of security is increasingly proving to be so weakly developed as to be inadequate for task. In the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, insecurity not only remains, but is intensifying globally. It is becoming one of the primary development challenges of our time, while today, one-and-a-half billion people continue to live in areas affected by social fragility, unrelenting competition, conflict and violence. The persistence of such alarming degrees of insecurity is partially symptomatic, and a consequence of the continuing prevalence of traditional state-centric notions of security. Such approaches are coming to be recognised for their increasingly narrow and reductionist focus on statist calculations of power; and notions of survival, sovereignty, threat and conflict. Crucially, they are proving ill-suited or inadequate to understanding, explaining and coping with the challenges of today’s transforming security environment.

As a consequence, an increasing number of security of security scholars and practitioners are speaking to the emergence of a transformative evolution in contemporary security and insecurity. Such an evolution is founded upon a critical recognition that many of today’s security challenges are a consequence of the ‘globalisation of security’ and ‘bifurcation of the security environment.’ Under the conditions of globalisation and bifurcation, the resilience and utility of prevailing security ideas, institutions and practices can no longer be

assumed. Indeed, many of the emerging challenges to security are the result of forces outside the traditional framework of strategic analysis that have little to do with the exercise of power by competing nation-states, but everything to do with the stability of states and human survival.

While traditional state-centric security discourses continue to maintain measures of relevance, such orthodoxies – while necessary – are a not wholly complete, adequate or sufficient means by which to understand and respond to today's complex and interdependent security challenges. As this Thesis will demonstrate, profound changes in today's security environment and agenda, and the corresponding need for effective responses to such, is prompting the re-consideration of security concepts and policies adopted in the past, while also providing a window of opportunity for the development of fresh approaches and concepts. In this respect, I will advance the position that Critical approaches and perspective to security – and specifically Human Security – accord the normative scope for reconceptualising contemporary security in more openly inclusive and progressively comprehensive ways. Such an objective is testimony to our living in a world more interdependent than ever before, wherein all states, societies and individuals depend much more on the acts of omissions of others for their security and even for their survival. Importantly here, given such circumstances, there is a need for a clearer articulation of the inherent relationship between traditional state-centric and critical-human security perspectives. In this sense, the notion of the 'dialectic' and 'via media' provides potential for the progressive development of an 'ideal-type' approach to security that reconciles somewhat dissonant – if not inimical – state-centric and human-centric conceptions, while promising much in the way of addressing and alleviating insecurity and suffering. These themes, ideas and objectives will be considered through the rubric of New Zealand's contemporary approaches to security.

## GENERAL INTRODUCTION

In his presentation of the 2010 Kippenberger Lecture, before an assembly of New Zealand's Political, Defence and Foreign Affairs communities, noted scholar Muthia Alagappa was pointed in his assessment that the "world" confronting New Zealand is transforming. In reinforcing this point, Alagappa highlighted that this world is one increasingly characterised by and existence of "complex interdependence rather than the simple zero-sum geopolitical model suited to the Cold War era ... [wherein] ... the challenge today is to manage and reap the benefits of complexity, not to present simple choices that may be attractive but not grounded in reality."<sup>1</sup> Under the dynamics of such change, New Zealand – as another Kippenberger Chair, Geoffrey Till, colourfully explained – is not immune to the forces shaping today's security environment. In this era, "New Zealand's choice of national bird – the Kiwi – a charming creature that was quite defenceless since it was completely without a natural predator ... became utterly vulnerable when conditions changed."<sup>2</sup> Till's moral is that for New Zealand to maintain its sense of 'security', the nation must continually adapt to its ever changing security environment and circumstances. Adaptation, I will argue, will correspondingly require New Zealand to critically re-evaluate the theoretical and programmatic bases framing its security, and that for any formulated approach to security to be effective, this must be set in relief to the context and dynamics of the 'globalisation of security' and 'bifurcated security environment.'

To this end, Philip Zelikow has highlighted that all "security strategies start with a mental image of the world:"<sup>3</sup> the external strategic environment, and the broad issues that will shape the character of security in global,

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<sup>1</sup> M. Alagappa, 'A changing Asia-Pacific: Prospects for war, peace, cooperation and order', *Kippenberger Lecture*, Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand, Wellington, 2010, p.12.

<sup>2</sup> G. Till, 'Home and away: Defence priorities in a globalised world', *Kippenberger Lecture*, Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand, Wellington, 2008, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> P. Zelikow, 'The Transformation of National Security', in *The National Interest*, 2003, p.17.

international, state and individual 'Human' contexts.<sup>4</sup> Such an approach must necessarily serve as the starting point for any reformulation of New Zealand's conception of, and approach to security; and for my critical analysis of its security issues and requirements. In doing so, I will demonstrate that New Zealand's appreciation of security is – at best – incomplete. Of greater concern however, my analysis will serve to highlight that the nation's security considerations – at institutional levels – remain almost exclusively impelled by and towards traditional approaches to security, with their explicit emphases on geo-strategic imperatives and role of the state as the source, focus and arbiter of security. My analysis of New Zealand's *Defence White Paper 2010*, will serve as the lens through which this issue is viewed.

In comprehending the nature of today's security challenges, one must first understand the concept of *security* by situating 'it' within the environmental contexts, characteristics and dynamics that shape and frame its conception. While the security focus and role of states has not been eclipsed, security and insecurity in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century is *evolving* from established patterns and trends previously framed narrowly and almost exclusively around traditional state-centric and international calculations of power, and the notions of survival, sovereignty, threat and conflict. In this respect, I will assert that contemporary security discourses and programs should "reflect the consequences of a globalised security environment that has bifurcated between an older state-centric world ... and new [multi-centric] trans-state and sub-state strata."<sup>5</sup> In such an age there is an urgent need to reconsider and redress the security dimension and its traditional, prevailing imperatives.<sup>6</sup> In responding comprehensively to the security challenges globalisation and bifurcation present, I will develop the contention that New Zealand needs renewal in its

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<sup>4</sup> see Z. Alach, 'New Zealand's Future Defence Force: Change or Stagnation?', in *Security Challenges*, Vol 2(3), 2006, p. 63.

<sup>5</sup> M. Evans, 'Contemporary Military Operations' in R. Ayson and D. Ball (eds), *Strategy and Security in the Asia-Pacific*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2005, p.53.

<sup>6</sup> see C. Coker, 'Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risk', *Adelphi Paper No345*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p. 91.

thinking and approaches to security, and that such renewal must critically challenge many of the preconceptions about what security ‘means’ for both states *and* citizens/individuals within contemporary settings.

While renewal is necessary, in many respects, theoretical and conceptual, policy and practical evolutions in the field and pursuit of ‘security’ remains constrained by seemingly exclusivist and reductionist derived definitions and approaches to security. Such constraints are often a legacy of strategic thinking from bygone era, and due in part to the still prevailing meaning conferred upon ‘security’ that has emerged from historically and politically prior accounts of ‘what’ and/or ‘who’ is being secured. In this sense, critics contest that the prevailing meaning of, and approaches to security are static and singularly limited in understanding, explaining, and responding, to the security’s contemporary contexts and settings. Such approaches continue to focus upon a *reality* characterised by the sovereign pre-eminence of states in an international system; by binary, status-quo orientations; and by an emphasis on material power, military threats and the need for strong counters to ensure state survival. However, under conditions of globalisation and bifurcation, traditional state-centric definitions and approaches to Security form only a single dimension of today’s security equation. In this respect, I will contend that, within contemporary settings, security must be considered as a complex, multi-dimensional, and continuously adaptive conception. For contemporary security approaches to establish and maintain enduring relevance and effectiveness, we must move beyond traditional orthodoxies to address the legitimate universal challenges or the concerns of ordinary people who have rightly sought security in their daily lives.

Seeking to more precisely understand – and respond – to the complex dynamics and challenges inherently shaping security today, will require the establishment of more critically constructive, open and inclusive approaches to such. I will contend that the provision of sustainable security require perspectives that critically challenge, build upon, and go beyond the prevailing

traditional discourses of security. Critical interpretations of security provide us with more ontologically reflective and progressive bases for such action by challenging us to move beyond the idea of a single, integrated and unchanging subject of security.<sup>7</sup> Within the network of critical approaches, I will offer that 'Human Security' may provide us with the most effective means by which to realise a more 'focussed, broader, deeper' transformation of security - in theoretical, conceptual, policy and practical terms.

Responding effectively to today's security challenges will require the development of an already evolving 'dialectic' between state-centric and human-centric securities in ways that are mutually constitutive and reinforcing. Specifically, I will examine the value of Human Security as a 'bridging' and 'boundary' concept in respect to its scope for normative influence on state-centric security agendas and practice. Through my analysis of New Zealand's current approach to security and defence, and my consideration of the evolving dialectic, I will establish what I believe to be the necessary bases from which New Zealand should consider its security within contemporary settings.

In this sense, addressing the limitations of prevailing statist security approaches will require the adoption of a comprehensive concept of security. Importantly, such a notion must be inclusive, and recognise that the security of the state and international system is coterminous with that of the individual and universal Humanity. To this end, I will demonstrate that a modern comprehensive approach, that integrates all sectors of an ever-evolving security community, will be fundamental to addressing both contemporary and future security challenges. Indeed, transforming and building frameworks and institutions that provide universal security and justice is considered essential to breaking cycles of state and human insecurity, and to restoring and sustaining the confidence of populations.<sup>8</sup> Crucially, development in this direction is already underway. Indeed, within New Zealand the utility of a comprehensive

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<sup>7</sup> see K. Booth, *Theory of World Security*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p.282.

<sup>8</sup> see World Bank, *Human Development Report 2011*, Washington DC, 2011, p. xi.

approach has framed the *National Security System* concept, and is being intrinsically linked to the need to include critical perspectives, and provide a corresponding focus on the 'human dimension' within national security considerations.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> see American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand (ABCA) Armies' Program, 'Strategic Assessment of the Security Environment 2012 – 2035', *ABCA Report No 154*, Washington DC, 6 February, 2012, pp. i-ii.



## CHAPTER 1: TRANSFORMING SECURITY: THE 'GLOBALISATION OF SECURITY' AND THE BIFURCATION OF THE CONTEMPORARY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

### Introduction

Fundamentally, 'security' exists as a complex and adaptive social phenomenon. It is accepted as a core organising principle within societies and states, with efforts to preserve 'security' central to the human condition.<sup>10</sup> Certainly, "few people would deny that security, whether individual, national or international, ranks prominently among the problems facing humanity."<sup>11</sup> Yet critically, as Buzan underlines, in much of its prevailing use, the concept of security, in contemporary settings, is so weakly developed as to be inadequate for the task.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, Buzan refines this contention by suggesting that the core weakness stems from his belief "that traditional conceptions of security were (and in many minds still are) too narrowly focussed. That advance does not, however, mean that a consensus exists on what a more broadly constructed conception should look like."<sup>13</sup>

While there remains a conspicuous theoretical and practical focus upon the security of states and the international system, increasingly, security scholars and practitioners alike are speaking to the emergence of an *evolution* in 21<sup>st</sup> Century notions of 'security' and 'insecurity'. In this sense, we are beginning to explore beyond traditionally narrow and established security dogma, and doctrines framed almost exclusively around state-centric and international systemic calculations. Rather, this is an evolution founded upon an emerging consensus amongst security scholarship and bureaucracies that the contemporary security environment is presenting as an increasingly complex set of challenges and opportunities to states, the international system,

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<sup>10</sup> see S. Dalby, *Geopolitical Change and Contemporary Security Studies*, University of British Columbia, 2000, p.19; and B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for Security Studies in the post Cold War Era*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hertfordshire, 1991, p.3.

<sup>11</sup> B. Buzan, *ibid*, p.1.

<sup>12</sup> see *ibid*.

<sup>13</sup> see *ibid.*, p.14.

and global Humanity alike.<sup>14</sup> In comprehending the nature of today's security challenges therefore, we are required to first seek a clearer understanding of the concept of *security* by situating 'it' within the prevailing 'environmental' contexts, characteristics and dynamics that shape and frame its conception.

In addressing this need, Evans' contends, today's challenges are pervasively complex and volatile in character. They are both representative and a consequence of a "new multi-centric ['globalised'] environment [that] has not abolished the traditional state-centric world order; but rather ... superimposed itself upon that order creating a bifurcated or two-tier strategic environment."<sup>15</sup> Under such conditions, and within an increasingly two-track strategic world, the resilience and utility of prevailing security ideas, institutions and practices cannot be assumed. Indeed, as New Zealand's most recent *Defence Assessment* and *Defence White Paper 2010* attest, the underlying stability and predictability which characterised international relations and security throughout the latter period of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century is now being tested, the rules-based international order is under pressure, and states are confronting an increasingly uncertain and more challenging strategic outlook.<sup>16</sup>

In the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, insecurity is intensifying on a global scale. It is becoming one of the primary development challenges of our time, wherein one-and-a-half billion people continue to live in areas affected by fragility, and persistent competition, conflict and violence.<sup>17</sup> The adverse impacts of globalisation are transforming the security environment and agenda

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<sup>14</sup> For examples see United States Department of Defense (USDOD), *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Defense*, Washington DC, January 2012, p. 1; Futures Support Group, *Strategic Assessment of the Security Environment 2008-2030*, ABCA Armies Standardisation Program, Washington DC, 2008, pp. 3-16; and New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), *Future Joint Operating Concept (FJOC)*, New Zealand Government, Wellington, 2012, p. iii.

<sup>15</sup> M. Evans, 'Towards an Australian National Security Strategy: A Conceptual Analysis,' in *Security Challenges*, Vol 3(4), 2007, p. 117; and see Evans in Ayson and Ball (eds), *op.cit.*, p. 53; and B. Jenkins, 'Redefining the Enemy', in *RAND Review*, Vol 28(1), 2004, p.17.

<sup>16</sup> see New Zealand Ministry of Defence (NZMOD), *Defence White Paper 2010*, New Zealand Government, 2010, pp. 10, 23-4, 27-8.

<sup>17</sup> see World Bank, *op.cit.*, p.1.

profoundly;<sup>18</sup> and increasingly, traditional security ideas and approaches are losing much of their relevance and resonance. Crucially, they are proving ill-suited or inadequate to understanding, explaining, and coping with the security challenges of today, even when national or international interests or values have prompted action. Consequently, this will “require a substantially new manner of thinking if mankind is to survive.”<sup>19</sup> In this respect, I will assert that contemporary security discourses and programs should “reflect the consequences of a globalised security environment that has bifurcated between an older state-centric world ... and new [multi-centric] trans-state and sub-state strata.”<sup>20</sup> Indeed today’s “world is a crucible of challenges ... Global problems ... demanding comprehensive solutions.”<sup>21</sup> In such an age there is an urgent need to reconsider and redress the security dimension and its traditional, prevailing imperatives. In responding comprehensively and effectively, I will develop the contention that New Zealand needs renewal in its thinking and approaches to security, and that such renewal must critically challenge many of the preconceptions about what security ‘means’ for both states *and* citizens/individuals under contemporary conditions.

As Coker reflects, the spirit of our time – the *Zeitgeist* – is pointing us towards an ‘age of globalisation.’<sup>22</sup> The extent to which globalisation continues to underwrite the future order, and impacts on global and local affairs, is central to framing the contemporary security context. Addressing this transformational impact on security is to recognise that transnational and localised phenomena are likely to become the more prominent causes of risk, threat and insecurity, and that change – and its inherent challenges – has become the constant. Its pressures have been internalised and intensified

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<sup>18</sup> see HE C. Bisogniero, ‘NATO in a globalised world’, in *NZ International Review*, 2011, p. 10.

<sup>19</sup> see World Bank, *op. cit.*, p. xi; and United Nations ‘Human Development Report 1994’, New York, p.22.

<sup>20</sup> Evans in Ayson and Ball (eds), *op.cit.*, p.53.

<sup>21</sup> H.R. Clinton, ‘Leading through Civilian Power: redefining American Diplomacy and Development’, in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 89(6), 2010, p.13; for the impact of Globalisation on contemporary security see also: D. Richards, *Chief of the Defence Staff Address to Chatham House*, London, 2008, p. 2.

<sup>22</sup> see Coker, *op.cit.*, p. 91.

within every society trying to adapt to the quickening pace of this change.<sup>23</sup> In this respect, in the era of globalisation, people's participation is increasingly becoming the central issue of our time. "People today have an urge – an impatient urge – to participate in processes that shape their lives. And that impatience brings many dangers and opportunities."<sup>24</sup> Dangers occur when the complex and networked dynamism of human participation clashes with the hierarchical and linear inflexibility of state and international systems and regimes. In addressing this danger, globalisation has presented Humanity with the opportunity to fundamentally challenge and seek renewal within existing state-centric security paradigms.

The new security environment and transforming security agenda have provoked important public debate about security, and as Burke suggests, has contributed to some intriguing intellectual developments in mainstream (liberal and realist) security approaches. Yet these approaches continue to constrain the debate within existing assumptions, and fail to pursue more critical perspectives and questions about how we conceptualise security.<sup>25</sup> To this end, for contemporary security discourses, policies and programs to establish and maintain enduring relevance and effectiveness, I call for an end to the narrow and binary framing of security under predominantly state-centric and geo-strategic imperatives. I will show that many of the emerging challenges to security are the "result of forces outside the traditional framework of strategic analysis that have little to do with the exercise of power by competing nation-states, but everything to do with the stability of states and human survival."<sup>26</sup> In this sense, the implications for individuals and all states, including New Zealand, are profound. The security issues now shaping our world, both individually and systemically, are 'environmental' in nature and

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<sup>23</sup> see A. Dupont, 'Transnational Security' in Ayson and Ball (eds), *op.cit.*, p.103; and P. Zelikow, *op.cit.*, p.18.

<sup>24</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), *Human Development Report* (HDR93), 1993, P.1.

<sup>25</sup> see A. Burke, 'Critical approaches to security and strategy' in Ayson and Ball (eds), *op.cit.*, p. 155.

<sup>26</sup> Dupont in Ayson and Ball (eds), *op.cit.*, p.103.

increasingly universal in character. Appreciating the transformative dynamics of these environmental contexts forms the necessary basis for the re-conceptualisation of contemporary security. In understanding these contexts, we stand better prepared to positively influence and respond comprehensively – in theoretical, policy and practical terms – to the security challenges these pervasive environments present. Respectively, this element of my Thesis establishes that the contemporary security environment, characterised by the ‘globalisation of security’ and the ‘bifurcation of the security environment’, should serve as the contextual catalyst for change and the compass for evolution in our appreciations of security.

### **The Globalisation of Security and the Bifurcated Security Environment**

There is an increasing consensus that the key strategic trend shaping the millennium is a ‘globalisation of security’, which is conveying major structural changes in theoretical, programmatic and practical agency through its creation of a ‘bifurcated security environment.’<sup>27</sup> In this context, globalisation is perhaps best understood as the correlative processes of interdependence between the ‘global’ and ‘local’ that are transforming the security environment, but without eradicating traditional, coercive and exclusionary state-centrism.<sup>28</sup> Synonymously, bifurcation is representative of what Rosenau defines as the two worlds of ‘world politics’ – the symmetric, state-centric world and the asymmetric, multi-centric and networked world – that are increasingly interacting so creating volatile and unpredictable patterns of risk, threat and conflict.<sup>29</sup> In this sense, most challenges are no longer direct but indirect. They are not *specifically* geo-strategic but are projected through territory into

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<sup>27</sup> For comprehensive discussion on the ‘globalisation of security’ and the ‘bifurcated security environment’ see: C. Browning, ‘The Globalisation of Security’, in *Chatham House Briefing Paper* 05/02, London, 2005; J. Steinbrunner, *Principles of Global Security*, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, p. 96; Coker, *op.cit.*, pp. 20-21; and K. Gustafson, ‘Complex Threats: The Globalisation of Domestic and Foreign Security’, in *RUSI Journal*, Vol 155(1), 2010, pp. 72-8.

<sup>28</sup> see M. Evans, ‘The Twenty-First Century Security Environment’, in *The RUSI Journal*, Vol 154(2), 2009, p. 64; and A. Burke, *What security makes possible: Some thoughts on critical security studies*, Department of International Relations Working Paper 2007/1, Australian National University, 2007, p.3.

<sup>29</sup>see J. Rosenau, *Turbulence in world politics: a theory of change and continuity*, Princeton University Press, 1990, pp.249-271.

permeable open societies. Globalisation has created a new supraterritorial space alongside, and interrelated with, older territorial, power political determinants.<sup>30</sup>

The 'environmental' factors stimulating the globalisation and bifurcation of security are characterised by the impulses of complexity and adaptiveness, and circulation and interdependence.<sup>31</sup> In appreciating how these factors operate, it is useful to recall Rosenau's notion of 'fragmeration', in which fragmentation and integration are simultaneous and often intersecting events. We are experiencing the convergence of the manifold forces of 'localisation' and 'globalisation' and 'decentralisation' and 'centralisation', where these forces collide and can bring about profound and often violent consequences. Their dynamics are circular rather than linear, and their effects cannot be wholly evaluated through traditional security – trend focussed – lenses. They present as novel problems of analysis and response, and unless security theory, policy and practice incorporate a more comprehensive understanding of the contemporary system, we will continue to be incapable of fully comprehending and addressing many of the potential challenges the globalisation of security presents.<sup>32</sup>

If properly nurtured, these environmental factors can also serve as sources of tremendous vitality and innovation for the creation of new and more just societies. This will require integrated comprehensive programs to counter the array challenges and threats now facing Humanity. These responses must be inclusive in nature and accommodating of alternative, non-traditional security approaches and perspectives. Importantly, these responses require a critical shift beyond prevailing conceptualisations of order that remain centred on

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<sup>30</sup> see M. Evans, 'Overcoming the Creswell-Foster Divide in Australian Strategy', in *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol 61(2), 2007, p.196.

<sup>31</sup> For examples see A. Grisogono and A. Ryan, *Insights for Counterinsurgency Operations from Complex Adaptive Systems Thinking*, Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Canberra.

<sup>32</sup> see P. Liotta, 'Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security', in *Security Dialogue*, Vol 33(4), 2002, p. 485; Dupont in Ayson and Ball (eds), *op.cit.*, p.111; and M. Beeson and A. Bellamy, *Globalisation, Security and International Order after September 11*, University of Queensland, 2009, p. 3.

sovereign entities and binary distinctions between 'self and other.' The globalisation of security has demonstrated that unless the integration of marginalised elements occurs on a more equitable basis, and unless the same logic of co-dependence can be extended to the construction of new regimes of security – which recognise that security is mutually constitutive and interdependent – then security is unlikely to prove sustainable. Consequently, framing responses that will ensure the corresponding survival of the state and the emancipation of humankind require that many traditional security concepts and institutions be radically revised and renewed, or new ones created.<sup>33</sup>

### **Circulation and Interdependency**

A fundamental impact of the globalisation and bifurcation of security has been its cumulative effect in opening space in academic, policy and practical domains for new thinking about security *and* insecurity. In particular, as Newman highlights, this has resulted in critical challenges to the security orthodoxy that appear to neglect the *real* threats to humankind. The post-Cold War and post-'9/11' world has encouraged rigorous questioning about the ways of explaining and understanding conceptions of security, and the policies and institutions designed to address insecurity.<sup>34</sup>

In this conceptual sense, globalisation translates as a fundamentally human endeavour which is redefining notions of community, power and security, and socio-political interdependency on simultaneous local *and* universal scales.<sup>35</sup> Globalisation increasingly personifies a priority focus on individuals, social communities and populations in preference to states, the international system, and institutions; and it features an evolving reliance upon cellular and networked interactive communities and a diffusion of power and security. As such, power and security must now be considered heterogeneously and plurally, where '*it*' flows in all directions and whole

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<sup>33</sup> see Beeson and Bellamy, *op.cit.*, pp.26-29; and HDR93, *op.cit.*, p. 1.

<sup>34</sup> see E. Newman, *Human Security*, University of Birmingham, 2009, p. 5.

<sup>35</sup> see M. DeLarringa and M. Doucet, 'Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security', in *Security Dialogue*, vol 39(5), 2008.

populations participate in wielding it; where it is exercised over individuals rather than being legitimised at the centre; and where it is recognised as circulating through networks rather than necessarily being applied at particular traditional systemic points.<sup>36</sup>

Critically and cognitively, 'circulation' abstractly "translates the new global security problematic from a 'geo-strategic' into an ecological [Human-centred] problem characterised by the escalatory dynamics of complex interdependencies."<sup>37</sup> The coalescence of circulation and interdependence therefore, possesses a particular resonance when considered in the context of the globalisation of security. Indeed, the globalisation of security emphasises the seamless web of social (*cosmopolitan*) interdependencies and flows – and the risks, threats and opportunities they simultaneously present. This new environment necessarily challenges and critically problematises power-based models of international politics that privilege "high politics" above all else. This challenge is both empirical and normative, and emphasises the increasing utility of a range of non-traditional security approaches which expose the 'illegitimacy' of orthodox approaches.<sup>38</sup> Here, as Booth presciently highlighted, daily threats to the lives and wellbeing of individuals and the interests of *most* states are not primarily derived from "a neighbour's army but from other challenges, such as economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease."<sup>39</sup> While these broader security problems are not as "cosmically threatening" as the array of more traditional threats, they do present as problems of profound significance that if left unmitigated could have grave consequences for Humanity.<sup>40</sup> Consequently, this creates an increasingly crowded and complex security agenda, where different concerns compete for

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<sup>36</sup> see M. Foucault, *The History of sexuality, Volume 1. An Introduction*, Allen Lane, 1979(1), pp.92-102; and M. Foucault, "*Society Must be Defended*" *Lectures at the College De France*, Allen Lane, 2003, pp.27-33.

<sup>37</sup> Browning, *op.cit.*, p.2.

<sup>38</sup> see Newman, *op.cit.*, 2009, p. 3.

<sup>39</sup> K. Booth, 'Security and emancipation', in *Review of International Studies*, vol 17(4), 1991, p.318.

<sup>40</sup> see *ibid.*



local, global *and* state attention and resources. What distinguishes the new security problematic from traditional security thinking therefore is the preoccupation with complex and adaptive global/local circulations and interdependencies.

### **Complexity and 'Adaptivity'**

If circulation and interdependence frame the general challenges and problems inherent in the globalisation of security, then "complexity poses its epistemic challenge. How are we to understand how these complex systems of global circulation [and interdependence] operate and how to manage them in ways that will avoid the potential for disaster stored up within them?"<sup>41</sup> Under the dynamics of the globalisation and bifurcation of security, both traditional and non-traditional security communities and elites are now necessarily concerned with the circulation of 'everything.' In this sense, it is becoming increasingly recognised and acknowledged that the "very smallest perturbations or anomalies in one system of circulation can have the potential to cascade rapidly into large-scale crises affecting many other local and global systems of circulation."<sup>42</sup> Correspondingly, in security policy and programmatic senses, this complexity has exacerbated the problem wherein multiple objectives are competing for resources, and the pursuit of one objective can affect others in ways that are extremely difficult or impossible to predict.<sup>43</sup>

We must acknowledge that globalisation, circulation and interdependency are inherently human and social actions that expand the scope and opportunity for human development and global evolution. But we must also recognise that these actions possess the simultaneous power to exacerbate human insecurity, and societal and state vulnerability. This requires us to remain cognisant of the compounding "global social" challenge posed to prevailing notions and

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<sup>41</sup> see Browning, *op.cit.*, p. 2.

<sup>42</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> see D. Walker, 'Refining the Military Appreciation Process for Adaptive Campaigning', in *Australian Army Journal*, Vol 8(2), 2011, P.93.

modalities of security.<sup>44</sup> We must also recognise the limitations of prevailing traditional state security and military agendas framed by *predictive* and rational empiricism. This ‘compound’ is aggravated by the complex and exponentially adaptive nature of these circulations which manifests in inherently human and social forms. Complexity in this instance is characterised by many agents or elements interacting in many different and nonlinear ways that give rise to vast arrays of possible patterns of behaviour. Crucially, complexity means that knowing all the components of a network (society), and how they interact with each other – which is in itself an impossibility – does not mean that you can predict how the entire system will behave as a whole. Consequently, simple systems of binary cause and effect, (for example: ‘zero sum’ victory/defeat equations), that are often representative of narrow traditional approaches to security, cannot accurately or effectively model the networked causality of the process.<sup>45</sup>

By extension, a defining characteristic of “all complex adaptive systems is their capacity to change composition and/or behaviour in order to improve their fitness for the environments they occupy.”<sup>46</sup> Recognising that groups, communities and societies are able to exploit the power of adaptation to display resilience and robustness, agility and responsiveness, and flexibility and innovation in the face of complex challenges<sup>47</sup> is critical to the formulation of effective and comprehensive security strategies required in the age of globalisation.

The adaptive complexity of contemporary security has arguably reached levels that challenge human comprehension; and its conditions – wherein challenges and opportunities are transnational and seamless, unpredictable, and in rapid flux – have the potential to pose the most serious security concerns

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<sup>44</sup> see Deuchars, *op.cit.*

<sup>45</sup> see Deuchars *op.cit.*; Grisogono and Ryan, *op.cit.*, p.1; and NZDF, *op.cit.*, p. 38.

<sup>46</sup> M. Ryan, ‘Measuring Success and Failure in an Adaptive Army’, in *Australian Army Journal*, vol6(3), 2009, p.22.

<sup>47</sup> see Australian Army, *Adaptive Campaigning: Future Land Operating Concept*, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2009, p.17.

of this millennium. Indeed, such is the significance of these emerging 'new' non-traditional issues that they are steadily moving from the periphery to the centre of the security equation for individuals, states and Humanity alike.<sup>48</sup> Collectively, they represent *the* new security agenda<sup>49</sup> that will increasingly demand security studies, programmes and practices reconcile with broader, deeper and more complex understandings derived from contemporary environmental contexts. In this respect, security, especially in its modern and globalised manifestations has become a highly complex theoretical and public policy challenge.<sup>50</sup> Correspondingly, this reinforces the imperative to adopt more comprehensive security approaches that are increasingly framed by critical perspectives, and which are cognisant of the intrinsic role of individuals in global circulations and complex adaptive 'systems.'

### **From Territoriality to 'Local-Global' connectedness**

One central phenomenon of the globalisation of security has been a shift from a state of arbitrary territoriality and sovereignty to a diffuse environment progressively characterised by connectedness and interdependency. In this change, as former United Kingdom Defence Secretary John Reid reflects, we have transitioned from

*"a relatively static world of inviolable national borders, iron curtains and concrete walls that prohibited and limited movement and controlled transport and communications networks, we now live with mass mobility of people and the knowledge*

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<sup>48</sup> see Dupont in Ayson and Ball (eds), *op.cit.*, p.103.

<sup>49</sup> Such is the complex character of contemporary security, it is not my intent to attempt to subjectively emphasise particular security issues within the agenda, other than to highlight that we have moved beyond exclusively geo-strategic considerations to include a broad array of challenges. This said, for examples of the breadth and types of both traditional, and 'non-traditional' and/or new *security* issues/dimensions being considered see: G. Evans, 'The New Global Security Agenda' in D. McDougall and P. Shearman (eds), *Australian Security After 9/11: New and Old Agendas*, Ashgate Publishing, 2006, p. 4; NZDF, *op.cit.*, pp.1-9 & 23-5; ABCA, *op.cit.*, 2011, pp. 4-19; NZMOD, *op. cit.*, pp.15-34; and UK Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, *Strategic Trends*, Ministry of Defence, Wilton, 2003.

<sup>50</sup> see A. Rathmell, 'Adapting Governments for Stabilisation and Counterinsurgency Operations', in *The RUSI Journal*, vol 154(6), 2009, p.9.

*that they produce and use in an unprecedented and growing scale. The consequences of this great change are both global and local.”*<sup>51</sup>

In a positive sense, today's security dynamics are opening new space and providing evermore opportunities for the establishment of 'emancipatory' and inclusive social and processes where the constraints of geography on political, social and cultural arrangements are receding, and people and communities are become increasingly aware that these constraints are receding.<sup>52</sup>

The effect of such change has resulted in a worldwide intensification of social relations – particularly at individual and sub-state community levels – where events in one place are shaping, and being shaped by, incidents occurring in very distant locations.<sup>53</sup> As most recently witnessed in the 'Arab spring' of 2011, the globalisation and bifurcation of security is directly confronting individuals, communities and states alike with local-global forces, while enhanced networks are provoking a stronger awareness of, and sensitivity to remote events. In this sense, we can no longer ignore what happens in distant places and retreat behind moral and physical borders.<sup>54</sup> Consequently, the processes of globalisation and bifurcation are “interacting and changing the context of the lives of people as individuals and groups.”<sup>55</sup> They are blurring the distinctions between the local and global, and are precipitating an increasing awareness of 'non-territoriality,' wherein territory and political sovereignty are losing their resonance as central organising tenets for action and interaction, and politics and security. Correspondingly globalisation and bifurcation are also weakening existing political and security institutions, such as states, while strengthening the global and international

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<sup>51</sup> J. Reid, 'Securing Critical National Infrastructure', in *RUSI Journal*, vol 152(3), 2007, p.15.

<sup>52</sup> see M. Waters, *Globalisation*, Routledge, London, 1995, p. 3.

<sup>53</sup> see A. Giddens, *Jenseits von Links und Rechts*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1997, p. 85.

<sup>54</sup> see L. Goetschel, 'Globalisation and Security: The Challenge of Collective Action in a Politically Fragmented World', in *Global Society*, Vol 14(2), 2000, pp. 260 and 272.

<sup>55</sup> Booth, *op.cit.*, p.314.

influence of other actors such as supranational and transnational organisations and individuals.<sup>56</sup>

Resultantly, the 'local-global' can no longer be considered "mutually exclusive; it is part of the development of more complex and overlapping identities which will characterise the future."<sup>57</sup> The effect of this development has been the compelling need for the adaptation of security approaches to the changing social, structural and environmental conditions highlighted here. Indeed, in the era of the 'global social' – when borders are becoming particularly permeable and notions of discrete sovereignty less sustainable – transformation is essential because traditional security practices are proving limited in comprehending or providing strategies for dealing with the types of problems encountered in a world of complex networks and 'transversal relationships.'<sup>58</sup>

### **The 'Riskscape'**

A second prominent feature of globalised security reshaping the ways in which we think about security, has been the amplification of the global 'riskscape' and rise of strategic risk analysis. In this millennium, equations of risk are occupying a commensurate standing with the more traditional calculations of security analysis (such as notions of threat). This is derived from an explicit recognition that the global era has created "a world in which risk is endless."<sup>59</sup> It is becoming commonplace to think we are subject to risks that are potentially more catastrophic because they are global; for as Gellner explains, risk has become central to our security thinking and behaviour as globalisation

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<sup>56</sup> see D. Elkins, *Beyond Sovereignty. Territory and Political Economy in the Twenty-First Century*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1995, p. 87; and J. Rosenau, 'Governance and Democracy in a Globalising World', in D. Archibugi, D. Held and M. Kohler (eds) *Re-imagining Political Community. Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 40.

<sup>57</sup> Booth, *op.cit.*, p.315.

<sup>58</sup> see R. Bleiker, *Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 2.

<sup>59</sup> W.J. (Bill) Clinton, quoted in *The New York Times*, December 1998.

draws us out of our self-contained national and local communities into a broader environment that offers none of the traditional protections.<sup>60</sup>

The imperatives 'governing' the globalisation and bifurcation of security now requires the co-consideration of traditional, power-based geo-strategic and military threats that were at once quantifiable, measurable and tangible, *and* the emerging web of 'unpredictable, immeasurable and intangible' security risks – or "vectors of harm"<sup>61</sup> – that are empowered by the dynamics of complexity, circulations, and local-global interconnectedness.<sup>62</sup> This environment is advancing the emergence of an evolving 'riskycape', and the rise of a "new risk rationality of strategy"<sup>63</sup> in which security threats and risks are identified on a comprehensive 'all-hazards' basis. In many respects, the rise of the 'riskycape' phenomenon is symbolic of broader, deeper and more fundamental structural and social changes occurring within global, international and local communities. This means that all complex and adaptive risks to security whether internal or external, human or natural, must be considered referentially as 'risks in common.'<sup>64</sup> In effect therefore, the notion of the 'riskycape' seeks to identify and address complex, interdependent security challenges that have the capacity to adversely escalate or cascade between individual and community, and state and international levels respectively.<sup>65</sup> So when we conceptualise security we increasingly do so in terms of risk, and risk is determining the discourse of contemporary security.<sup>66</sup> Correspondingly, understanding the *potential* impacts and consequences of this 'riskycape' requires us to critically challenge prevailing and increasingly inadequate state-centric discourses, and necessarily seeking broader, deeper and more comprehensive and inclusive solutions to complex challenges.

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<sup>60</sup> see E. Gellner, in M. Douglas (ed) *Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory*, Routledge, London, 1992, p.13.

<sup>61</sup> NZDPMC, *op.cit.*, p.21.

<sup>62</sup> see M. Rasmussen, *The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006.

<sup>63</sup> NZDPMC, *ibid.*, p.2.

<sup>64</sup> see NZDPMC, *op.cit.*, p.5.

<sup>65</sup> see NZDPMC *op.cit.*, p.9.

<sup>66</sup> see Coker, *op.cit.*, p.60.

## Conclusions

In a world being shaped by the dynamics and imperatives of the globalisation and bifurcation of security, 'challenges' (risks, threats and vulnerability) are seamlessly interrelated. A challenge to one is a challenge to all, and vulnerability is a mutually-constitutive condition.<sup>67</sup> This plight flows from the new reality of circulation that "ties local life to global structures, processes and events,"<sup>68</sup> and from the multi-centric manifestation of interactive, complex and adaptive networks. The transformative nature of globalisation and the volatility of its dangers is having a profound effect the comprehension of contemporary security; and is conspiring to heighten senses of uncertainty, insecurity and political and social anxiety in what Rosenau calls a turbulent world.<sup>69</sup> In many respects, these tensions spring from an increasing recognition that prevailing "security [approaches] which assume a world of unchanging objective variables cannot recognise, let alone address the sorts of [challenges] that are emerging."<sup>70</sup>

Prevailing security discourses are very much 'reductionist' in that they reduce globalisation's security dimension to threats posed exclusively to state security. Such a circumstance, as I will discuss, stems from a somewhat unreflective attitude in prevailing security scholarship and policy-making. In doing so, I will contend that traditional security approaches, and their basic assumptions do, not allow for a comprehensive conceptualisation of globalisation and bifurcation's impacts on security; whereas critical and human-centric approaches and their deeper and broader concentration on change, norms, and values have the capacity to provide more relevant and

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<sup>67</sup> see Office of the Secretary-General, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, United Nations, 2009, p.14.

<sup>68</sup> Coker, *op.cit.*, p. 19.

<sup>69</sup> see J. Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997.

<sup>70</sup> M. Beeson and A. Bellamy, *op.cit.*, pp.24 – 25.

meaningful theoretic bases for security analyses and programmatic development and practice.<sup>71</sup>

I will argue that the core challenges to individual, state and broader systemic securities – and our responses to them – are dialectic, and must be considered analogously and in accord, rather than through inimical approaches and frames. By considering security comprehensively, and in the larger context of contemporary environmental change “allows one to better understand both the current state of the field and its place in the academy, and to make suggestions as to how practitioners might rethink ... the policy advice they suggest to the powerful.”<sup>72</sup> As follows, the necessary starting point for an analysis of New Zealand’s future security programmatic and structural requirements is the contemporary security environment shaped by the bifurcation and globalisation of security.<sup>73</sup> In this respect, the transformative dynamics of the contemporary security environment are conspiring to generate new contexts by which states such as New Zealand must understand and respond to contemporary security imperatives. Accordingly, this will require a refocus of New Zealand’s “political logic of strategy, balancing a global-local nexus and blending the networked challenges of [bifurcated and] globalised security into a new policy calculus for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.”<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> see Goetschel, *op.cit.*, p. 277.

<sup>72</sup> Dalby, *op.cit.*, pp. 2-3.

<sup>73</sup> see Alach, *op.cit.*, p. 63.

<sup>74</sup> M. Evans, 2007, *op.cit.*, p. 114.



## Chapter 2: SECURITY DISCOURSES AND THE EVOLVING DIALECTIC

### Introduction

Whether considered on an individual basis, or focussed at community, state, international systemic or 'global social' levels, security is a legitimate quest for all.<sup>75</sup> But what do we mean by 'security'? In many respects, the answer is at once vague and equivocal – obscured by its inherently subjective nature as both a politically *and* socially derived conception. In this sense, the idea of security – like notions of power, justice, peace, equality, love and freedom – is an essentially contested concept; and such concepts “necessarily generate unsolvable debates about their meaning, because ... they contain ideological elements which render empirical evidence irrelevant as a means of resolving dispute.”<sup>76</sup>

Under globalised and bifurcated conditions that are diffuse and manifold in both cause and effect, the notion of 'security' defies the imposition of a singular, agreed and non-contested general definition. Under such circumstances however, one would consider that unique opportunities are present to develop a more normatively open, inclusive and universal understanding of, and approach to security. Doing so would ensure that we stand better prepared to respond comprehensively to the mosaic of traditional and emerging security challenges we now face. Indeed, as Indonesia's Foreign Minister Natalegawa recently pronounced, under such transformative conditions “it is possible to accentuate the norms and procedures for common stability. It [can no longer] be security 'against'.”<sup>77</sup>

In many respects however, the 'security' field remains constrained by seemingly exclusivist, reductionist and linearly derived definitions and approaches. Indeed, as Booth contends, prevailing security orthodoxies have “operated as such an iron cage in world politics; [they have] created a prison of

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<sup>75</sup> see Deuchars, *op.cit.*, 2010.

<sup>76</sup> Buzan, *op.cit.*, 1991, p. 7.

<sup>77</sup> M. Natalegawa, cited in P. Hartcher, 'Indonesia urges calm over rise of China', in *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 16 March 2012.

categories and assumptions that have worked to create a world that does not work for most of its inhabitants.”<sup>78</sup> Christie expands on this theme arguing that “the nature of security discourse and practice itself is too sedimented, and that struggles over defining security, and setting security practice, occur within a system in which particular actors are able to dictate the terms of the debate.”<sup>79</sup>

Such constraints are often symptomatic of legacy strategic thinking, and due in part to the still prevailing meaning conferred upon ‘security’ that has emerged from historically and politically prior accounts of ‘what’ and/or ‘who’ is being secured. In this sense, critics contest that prevailing, traditional approaches to security are too static and limited in understanding, explaining, and responding to today’s security challenges. This critique is based on an emerging belief that these security discourses, policies and practices are constrained by their “claim to have discerned laws of world politics which transcend time, and personality; [... in which states assume the central responsibility and authority for confronting] the immediacy and necessity of a ‘real’ and threatening anarchical world marked by an endemic struggle for power and survival over others in an effort to maintain order and security.”<sup>80</sup> Such a point, and its universally negative impacts, are reinforced by Australian Foreign Minister Carr’s belief that when “we make the anarchical assumption, everyone will behave according to the worst-case scenario.”<sup>81</sup>

As will be considered, prevailing state approaches to security continue to focus on an almost singular, and hence, narrow image of ‘reality’ buttressed by rational, predefined national, and specifically, military strategic *solutions* to key global challenges.<sup>82</sup> Such approaches continue to focus upon a *reality* characterised by the sovereign pre-eminence of states in an international

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<sup>78</sup> K. Booth, ‘Critical Explorations’, in K. Booth (ed), *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, Lynne Rienner, Colorado, 2005, p.4.

<sup>79</sup> R. Christie, ‘Critical Voices and Human Security’, in *Security Challenges*, Vol 41(2), 2010, p.184.

<sup>80</sup> W. Bain, ‘Deconfusing Morgenthau: moral inquiry and classical realism’, in *Review of International Studies*, Vol 26, 2000, p.448.

<sup>81</sup> R. Carr, cited in Hartcher, *op.cit.*

<sup>82</sup> see K. Booth, ‘Security and emancipation’, in *Review of International Studies*, Vol 17, 1991, p.318.

system; by binary, status-quo orientations; and by an emphasis on material power, military threats and the need for strong counters to ensure state survival. Consequently, states and their interests continue to assume prominence as the near exclusive referents of and for security. Such a central position has hitherto remained effectively unchallenged, particularly in policy and practical senses. Indeed, states continue to perpetuate this unrivalled status by conceptualising and framing security around the notion that “one of the most important responsibilities of any Government is to ensure the security and territorial integrity of the nation.”<sup>83</sup>

Given the enduring existence of Rosenau’s “symmetric, state-centric world”<sup>84</sup>, and the array of strategic uncertainty and challenges these conditions present, traditional approaches to security and state-centric discourses do continue to maintain measures of relevance. However, as I will demonstrate, such orthodoxies – while necessary – are not a wholly complete, adequate or sufficient means by which to understand the security challenges now facing humankind. We must seek to move beyond an exclusively state-centric lexicon and all that such entails. As illustrated, under conditions of bifurcation and globalisation, traditional – state-centric – definitions and approaches to security form only a single dimension of today’s security equation. In this respect, I will contend that, within contemporary settings, security must be considered as a complex, multi-dimensional, and continuously adaptive conception.

To this end, it is becoming increasingly apparent that some of the “conceptual certainties of earlier periods are simply incapable of providing either plausible explanations of how an increasingly interconnected, multi-actor world works, or providing a basis for public [security] policy.”<sup>85</sup> For contemporary security approaches to establish and maintain relevance and effectiveness, we must move beyond traditional orthodoxies that have for too long been interpreted narrowly: conceptions which have related more to the

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<sup>83</sup> NZDPMC, *op.cit.*, p.3.

<sup>84</sup> Rosenau, *op.cit.*, p.196.

<sup>85</sup> Beeson and Bellamy, *op.cit.*, pp.1-2.

base survival of nation-states than to addressing legitimate universal challenges or the concerns of ordinary people who have rightly sought security in their daily lives (though, it must be said, the objective of state survival and the need to address universal and individual security issues are not always, or necessarily incompatible). Such a move requires us to recognise that 'security' is not exclusive, but rather, it should be considered and understood as a 'derivative' concept. Essentially, this means that security's agency as a concept is subject to the complex and ever-changing realities and assumptions of the different contexts (theoretical, political, social, physical, material, and so on) in which it is situated.

In these respects, the "profound changes in [today's] strategic scene are prompting the re-examination of security concepts and policies adopted in the past. The prevailing strategic outlook offers a window of opportunity for the review and development of fresh approaches and concepts."<sup>86</sup> Consequently, in seeking to more precisely understand, and respond to the complex dynamics and challenges shaping security today, will require the establishment of more critically constructive, open and inclusive approaches to such. I will contend that the provision of sustainable security require approaches that critically challenge, build upon, and go beyond the prevailing traditional discourses of security. Critical interpretations of security have the capacity to provide us with more ontologically reflective and progressive bases for such action by challenging us to move beyond the idea single, integrated and unchanging subject of security.<sup>87</sup>

The importance of such transformation cannot be understated. This is particularly so when measured against inflexibly limited – and limiting – security orthodoxies that perpetuate "high levels of insecurity in the world and the dire conditions in which many people live ... because it leaves political, economic and social power where it is ... [and constructs] a politics that fails to

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<sup>86</sup> Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, *The Concepts of Comprehensive Security and Cooperative Security*, 2010, p.1.

<sup>87</sup> see K. Booth, *Theory of World Security*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p.282.

provide security for the vast majority of people in the world.”<sup>88</sup> As I will demonstrate, Critical approaches seek the transformation of security’s meaning, understanding and practice through processes of ‘focussing’, ‘deepening’ and ‘broadening’, and by standing ‘outside’ and transcending prevailing ideologies, interests, structures, and systems. Such approaches contend that security is not a static, stable or objective condition, nor do they seek to apply their own objective, singular reality or *truth*. Rather critical approaches recognise that (in)security must be discursively deconstructed, analysed and understood in terms of its derivative origins, and through each of its relative, complex and adaptive contexts and subjective variables. In doing so, Critical approaches seek the subsequent ‘reconstruction’ of security in a manner that more legitimately reflects and effectively responds to the realities of globalisation and bifurcation. They do so with a view that develops more promising ideas by which to overcome structural and contingent insecurities at all levels and in most – if not all – circumstances.<sup>89</sup>

Within the network of Critical approaches, I will offer that the notion of Human Security may provide us with the most effective means by which to realise a focussed, deeper, and broader transformation of security – in theoretical, conceptual, policy and practical terms. In this sense, a defining characteristic of human security is its scope for, and engagement with policy, and its desire to transform traditional security policies in normatively progressive, open and inclusive ways. A principal objective of Human Security is to encourage security providers, and specifically the state, to invest the attention and resources required to address not only traditional, but also today’s complex, ‘non-traditional’ security challenges. Indeed, one of the core strengths of human security is that it “enhances state security by invigorating and creating a more holistic understanding of security ... that accommodates

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<sup>88</sup> see Booth in Booth (ed), *op.cit*, 2005, p.7.

<sup>89</sup> see Booth in Booth (ed), *op.cit*, 2005, p.7.

the vulnerabilities of both the individual and the state.”<sup>90</sup> Of fundamental importance to this Thesis however, is an understanding that what follows does not attempt to revolutionise our understanding of security. Rather, I seek a form of cooperative evolution through the inclusion and consideration of ‘non-traditional’ – in this case critical and human security – **perspectives** in addressing today’s challenges. Bridging the divide between orthodox and non-traditional perspectives though, must necessarily start with a substantive engagement between Critical and Human Security approaches. Such an engagement must appreciate that Human Security is fundamentally ‘critical’; and in doing so, overcome the chasm that exists between these approaches, which has thus far limited their respective ability to gain any relative mainstream resonance and traction.

In analysing the relevance and utility of these non-traditional (Critical-Human security) approaches I will consider such in respect to New Zealand’s *Defence White Paper 2010*. I will contend that despite the opportunity to create innovative and transformational policy that understands and responds effectively to the dynamics and challenges of today’s security environment, New Zealand’s security and defence policy and thinking remains structurally and philosophically fixed, and continues to be framed in overly orthodox terms. In this sense, the prevailing political discourse on security continues centre upon an economically and territorially safe and secure New Zealand; and it talks in terms of hard power national interests, national values and national security and defence. In all respects, the ‘state’ remains the fundamental and naturalised referent of Wellington’s security narratives to the near-exclusion of all other ‘constituencies’.<sup>91</sup> In this respect, New Zealand’s persistence with a traditional and narrowly focussed state-centric approach to security risks the reinforcement of policies and practices that are increasingly

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<sup>90</sup> M. Smith and G. Whelan, ‘Advancing Human Security: New Strategic Thinking for Australia’, in *Security Challenges*, Vol 2(4), 2008, pp.1 and 5; and see E. Newman, ‘Critical human security studies’, in *Review of International Studies*, Vol 36, 2010, p.80.

<sup>91</sup> see N. Ritchie, ‘Rethinking security: a critical analysis of the Strategic Defence and Security Review’, in *International Affairs*, Vol 87(2), 2011, p.357.

limited, limiting and ineffectual. This is particularly so in *Defence White Paper 2010's* (lack of) understanding and treatment of those security dynamics outlined in Chapter One. For *its* security to have contemporary relevance, and positive meaning and effect, New Zealand must 'open space' and embrace a more holistic, inclusive and comprehensively integrated approach to security. Fundamentally, this will require Wellington's security policy community to overcome its seeming conceptual and institutional myopia and intransigence towards acknowledging that utility can be derived from alternative and non-traditional security approaches when considered in complimentary – rather than dissonant and polarising – senses to State Security.

Understanding security more holistically, and considering it in normatively progressive, open and inclusive ways, is to recognise – and mobilise – its universally transcendent and interdependent qualities. In this respect, I will further the contention that both state-centric and human-centric security approaches are necessary but not sufficient when considered exclusively. Rather, responding effectively to the complex challenges posed by the globalisation of security and the bifurcated security environment will require the development of an already evolving 'dialectic' between state-centric and human-centric securities that is mutually constitutive and reinforcing. Specifically, I will examine the value of Human Security as a 'bridging' and 'boundary' concept in respect to its scope for normative influence on state security agendas and practice.

### **State-centric Security**

The need for state-centric security is not contested. What is challenged however, is the scope and form that prevailing state-centric approaches take in their understanding of, and response to contemporary challenges. It is widely acknowledged that the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century are, in many respects, broader in scope and range, and more complex than the traditional national and international security institutions designed to *manage* them. New Zealand's *Defence White Paper 2010* tacitly acknowledged these structural,

policy and programmatic deficiencies, and the requirement to “magnify the national security effort” to deal with the realities of an increasingly heterogeneous security environment.<sup>92</sup> Yet, while Rosenau suggests that a defining feature of this environment and contemporary security “will be the constant tension between greater interdependence and intensifying competition between individuals, communities and states,”<sup>93</sup> there appears little empirical evidence to suggest that states are adapting their security approaches in more accommodating, open and inclusive ways. Rather, through their continuing primacy as policy-maker – and in spite of today’s diffuse and manifold security dynamics – states continue to assume and regulate the status of subjective *referent*, and hence, occupy the singular site of prominence, privilege and self interest within contemporary security equations.

As a sign of Rosenau’s sense of “greater interdependence”, and notwithstanding its inherently contested nature as a conception, one measure of apparent consensus is that security exists, above all, as the human pursuit of and for ‘freedom.’ However, while security is increasingly viewed as a transcendent, universal and interdependent objective for all, the state – as *the* dominant ‘unit’ of order and organisation in an otherwise unregulated, anarchic world – continues to hold the somewhat privileged and exclusive status as the “natural focus of security concern.”<sup>94</sup> This status, and the aggrandised role of the state in providing security, is further amplified when considered within an environment characterised by increasing strategic uncertainty, pressure and risk.<sup>95</sup> Indeed, under such conditions, it is apparent that security “will remain [partly] dependent on nationally defined central actors, which are states.”<sup>96</sup> Consequently, the state will continue to act as the principal agent for addressing (in)security, and the notion of State Security

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<sup>92</sup> NZMOD, *op.cit.*, 2011, p.20.

<sup>93</sup> Rosenau, *op.cit.*, p. 231.

<sup>94</sup> Buzan, *op.cit.*, 1991, p. 7.

<sup>95</sup> see NZMOD, *op.cit.*, 2011, p.23.

<sup>96</sup> Goetschel, *op.cit.*, p. 262.



retains an enduring – albeit diminished – sense of contemporary resonance and relevance.

As noted, security is one of the ‘elementary or primary goals’ of social life, [for] without security ... there can be no society.”<sup>97</sup> As such, as I will later make clear, security must make sense at the basic individual level for it make sense in state, and broader international and global contexts.<sup>98</sup> In seeking ‘freedom’ however, the idea of security is often reduced to traditional *realpolitik* concerns: the sharply defined and absolute ability of states to maintain their independent sovereign identity and functional integrity – ultimately through the use of military power and force, deterrence and coercion. Correspondingly, this ‘absolute’ forms the core, almost exclusive and politically self-reflective focus of state security agendas and practices, wherein the most important – perceived – responsibility “of any Government is to ensure the security and territorial integrity of the nation, including protecting the institutions that sustain confidence, good governance, and prosperity.”<sup>99</sup>

Such a limited and limiting focus is reaffirmed and buttressed through prevailing theoretical orthodoxies which posit that the most important actors are sovereign states, which are rational and operate in an inherently competitive, anarchic and self-help environment. They present a distinctively narrow and linear – trend derived – security picture that consists of “the dominating significance of sovereign states, the drive of states to survive and maximise power, the expectation of interstate [competition], struggles crises, and war, and the sanctioning of military force as an instrument of policy.”<sup>100</sup> In these respects, the notion of security is intrinsically fused to state centrality and sovereign survival, and thus, the maximisation of state security through the strategic pursuit of ‘national interests.’ Key to the centrality and survival of the

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<sup>97</sup> H. Bull, cited in P. Williams, ‘Critical Security Studies’, in A. Bellamy (ed), *International Society and its Critics*, Oxford university Press, 2005, p.136.

<sup>98</sup> see B. McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p.16; and Booth in Booth (ed), *op.cit.*, 2005

<sup>99</sup> NZDPMC, *op.cit.*, p.3.

<sup>100</sup> Booth in Booth (ed), *op.cit.*, 2005, p.5.

state, and the shaping of prevailing approaches to State Security, has been the notion of Sovereignty. This notion “has come to signify, in the Westphalian context, the legal identity of a state ... It is a concept which provides order, stability and predictability in international relations; ... [and] internally, sovereignty signifies the capacity to make authoritative with regard to people and resources within the territory of the state.”<sup>101</sup> In a classical sense therefore, the orthodox notion of sovereignty has effectively legitimised the referent centrality and pre-eminent existence of the state; and in doing so, it has enabled the consolidation of power, security and politics at the level of the state.

The inherent risk associated with such a reductionist consolidation at the level of the state however, is that it has the potential to perpetuate insecurity. This can occur through the marginalisation, or indeed exclusion or subjugation, of individuals and/or communities in deference to the state (and often state-based regimes) – both within societies and states, and when ‘others’ are affected by states engaged in situations of competition or conflict. In this sense, orthodox state-centric approaches are proving increasingly limited, ineffectual and discordant with the realities of today’s security agenda. This becomes particularly evident when considered in the context of the range of diverse political, social and human security pressures that popular movements such as the “Arab awakening”<sup>102</sup> and ‘Occupy Movement’ protests are highlighting. Importantly, it further serves to reinforce that – in the era of bifurcation and globalisation – people’s focussed, broader and deeper participation in the processes governing their lives is increasingly becoming a central issue of our time.

Faith in a state’s ability to normatively provide for the security of its people is being steadily eroded by the persistence of exclusivist framed State

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<sup>101</sup> International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Responsibility to Protect*, International Development Research Centre, Government of the Commonwealth of Canada, 2001, p.12.

<sup>102</sup> see H. Clinton, *Remarks on International Freedom*, United States Department of State, Washington DC, 11 September 2011.

Security approaches; particularly as the globalisation and bifurcation of security continue to diverge from, and outpace the rate of change in state security policies and programmes. This evident loss of faith will have serious implications for the social 'compact' between the state and its citizens, and in our ability to continue to find common cause between *the* state and *its* people. Increasingly, people "have an urge – an impatient urge – to participate in processes that shape their lives. And that impatience brings many dangers and opportunities;"<sup>103</sup> and dangers occur when the irresistible urge for human participation clashes with the seeming inflexibility of states, state-based regimes and international systems. Any determined resistance on the part of states to accommodate these new social and security dynamics could have potentially devastating impacts on *its* domestic constituency and existence, on its behaviour, and how it is perceived within the international system. Under these circumstances, as Booth contends, traditional – realist-derived – state security approaches

*"must be considered a failed project when judged by the high levels of insecurity in the world and the dire conditions in which many people live ... As a political practice, [these approaches have] helped to construct and perpetuate a world politics that fails to provide security for the vast majority of people in the world."*<sup>104</sup>

In addressing this most fundamental of risks – and its consequences – the need to deepen our understanding of, and broaden our approaches to contemporary security becomes evermore apparent. This is particularly so given the bifurcation and globalisation of security, and in the corresponding acknowledgement that 'power' is increasingly less consolidated at the level of the state, and is becoming "more diffused, both vertically and horizontally."<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (UNOCHA), *Human Development Report (HDR93)*, New York, 1993, p.1.

<sup>104</sup> Booth in Booth (ed), *op.cit.*, 2005, p.7.

<sup>105</sup> T. Ash, 'Power isn't what it used to be', in *The Guardian*, 24 January 2007; viewed on 14 July 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/jan/24/davos07/haspowershifted>.

With these factors in mind, and in returning to my point that security should be viewed as a transcendent, universal and interdependent objective for all, it becomes imperative that contemporary approaches reasonably include a critical regard to a substantial range of concerns about conditions of existence across all levels of human, social and political life. This requirement becomes particularly evident in light of the paradox wherein “the state remains the fundamental purveyor of security. Yet it often fails to fulfil its security obligations – and at times has even become a source of threat to its own [and other] people.”<sup>106</sup> In many respects though, this paradox – and the litany of other limitations inherent in State Security approaches – could be addressed by the state’s recognition of its normative responsibility not just to provide for welfare, or representation, but principally, to ensure the security of their citizens.<sup>107</sup> This is arguably the basic contract that establishes the security of the state, its citizens, and humanity in general in a mutually constitutive, albeit still relatively tacit compact. Though, in contemporary settings, the utility of this security compact continues to realise increasing relevance and resonance wherein a

*“state that protects its citizens and respects their rights is ultimately one that enjoys legitimacy and support ... it is based on the idea that security – indeed politics and political debate as we know it – cannot flourish without first evacuating the threat of force and violence from public space. This is, arguably, true for all political, social and economic interactions, since where the threat of force and violence is omnipresent, society cannot flourish, politics cannot be democratic and representative, and markets cannot function.”*<sup>108</sup>

Under these conditions therefore, a focal objective of contemporary security must be to overcome the corrosive impacts that materialise with the persistence of objectively narrow, concentrated, and unchanging state-centric approaches.

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<sup>106</sup> Booth, *op.cit.*, 2007, p.321.

<sup>107</sup> see K. Krause, *Towards a practical Human Security Agenda*, Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2007, p.13.

<sup>108</sup> Krause, *op.cit.*, 2007, p. 7.

In responding in more subjectively open and inclusive ways, I will contend that this objective can be more precisely addressed through the consideration and integration of more comprehensive and critical, human-centred approaches to security. In this sense, as Burke surmises, “we are well into the ‘broadening and deepening’ phase of conceptualising security;”<sup>109</sup> a phase which requires an approach that understands and responds to the bifurcation and globalisation of security, and the underlying dynamics and influences – as outlined in Chapter 1 – that are shaping the security challenges of today.

### **A basis for evolution: Reconciling Critical approaches to Security and Human Security**

Both Critical approaches to Security and Human Security seek to challenge the state-centric orthodoxy of prevailing traditional security dialogues. They do so predominantly through their shared privileging of the ‘individual’ as the referent and beneficiary of security analysis and practice, and by “de-essentialising and deconstructing prevailing claims about security.”<sup>110</sup> Ultimately though, the binding factor is each approach’s commitment to the core objective of understanding and resolving the (in)security of real people in real places.<sup>111</sup> Importantly, the cumulative impact of these non-traditional approaches, working together, has been to “open up space in the academic and policy worlds for new thinking about [contemporary security and insecurity].”<sup>112</sup> Yet, despite their respective normative and utilitarian appeal, and similarities as non-traditional approaches to security, there has not yet been any measure of substantive engagement between Critical and Human security discourses. Indeed, as I will highlight, there exists what could be described as an active dissonance between the approaches that must be overcome if their same core objective is to be truly realised. To do so will

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<sup>109</sup> Burke, *op.cit.*, 2007, p.4.

<sup>110</sup> M. Williams and K. Krause, ‘Preface: Towards Critical Security Studies’, in Krause and Williams (eds), *Critical Security Studies. Concepts and Cases*, UCL Press, London, 1997, p.111.

<sup>111</sup> see Booth in Booth(ed), *op.cit.*, 2005, p.275.

<sup>112</sup> Newman, *op. cit.*, 2007, p.5.

require Critical and Human Security proponents alike to seek opportunities for mutual recognition and cooperative engagement; while not remaining “overburdened by distant ideal structures, but [rather] concentrate on reformist steps to make a better world somewhat more likely.”<sup>113</sup>

As an underlying theme of this Thesis – in the interests of achieving more inclusive and positive security outcomes for ‘All’ – I will advance the position that traditional and non-traditional approaches to security should no longer be viewed as inimical. Rather, we must seek to establish a common ground in ways that transcend ‘disciplinary’ boundaries by understanding and bridging the philosophical and conceptual divides that persist between these, often disparate, groupings. To do so however, first requires that a pragmatic intellectual and practical reconciliation of sorts occurs within the non-traditional security stream as a basis for evolution.

In this sense, before any meaningful discussion can be had on the utility of Critical and Human Security approaches in positively influencing and transforming the contemporary security agenda, it is first necessary to understand and reconcile the tensions that exist between these approaches. To do so is to recognise the intrinsic relationship between Critical and Human Security. As Newman presciently observed, Human security is in itself fundamentally ‘critical’, albeit with an emphasis on a pragmatic policy-oriented approach which attempts to improve the human condition and welfare within the political, legal and practical parameters of the ‘real world.’ Correspondingly, most Critical approaches – with the exception of anti-foundational and some postmodernist conceptions – claim to be practical in effect, and in their engagement with ‘real world’ security issues.<sup>114</sup>

The limiting sense of dissonance between Critical and Human Security approaches can be attributed to a number of key factors that explain such a lack

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<sup>113</sup> Booth, *op.cit.*, 1991, p.324.

<sup>114</sup> see Newman, *op. cit.*, 2010, p.89; Newman, *op. cit.*, 2009, p.22; Booth, *op.cit.*, 2005, p.260; and M. Sheehan, *International Security: An Analytical Survey*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005, p.159.

of engagement. A core distinction between the approaches stems from the Critical view that Human Security, while normatively attractive, is both theoretically unsophisticated and analytically weak. Detractors argue that the expansive approach to human security has the potential to undermine its effectiveness, and that this expansiveness “renders the concept analytically incoherent and robs it of [any theoretical and practical precision and] utility.”<sup>115</sup> This broad approach has attracted the greatest degree of criticism for as Paris and Acharya observe:

*“existing definitions of human security tend to be extraordinarily expansive and vague, encompassing everything from physical security to psychological wellbeing, which provides policymakers with little guidance in the prioritisation of competing policy goals and academics with little sense of what, exactly, is to be studied.”*<sup>116</sup>

In this context, such alleged conceptual underdevelopments and analytical limitations within Human Security have underpinned the Critical claims of theoretical weakness, and in turn can contribute to explaining the failure of Human Security to make a more significant impact on Security theory.

Exacerbating the delta between Critical and Human Security – and the factor that could paradoxically draw the two approaches closer – is Human Security’s policy and problem-solving orientation. Human Security scholarship, generally, does not seek to engage with the epistemological, ontological or methodological issues and debates surrounding security that seem to preoccupy their Critical Security contemporaries. Whereas Critical approaches explicitly question – and deconstruct – the ideas of ‘security’ and ‘reality’, and directly challenge the legitimacy of prevailing constructions of power, privilege, interest and knowledge, Human Security approaches tend to be more pragmatic in finding solutions to today’s security challenges.

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<sup>115</sup> S. MacFarlane and Y.F. Khong, *Human security and the UN: A Critical History*, Indiana University Press, 2006, p.43.

<sup>116</sup> A. Acharya and R. Paris, ‘Human Security’, in J. Bayliss and J. Smith (eds), *The Globalization of World Politics*, (4<sup>th</sup> Ed), Oxford University Press, 2008, p.494.

Human Security scholars and practitioners – while challenging prevailing notions of security – do not tend to *fundamentally* question existing structures and institutions. Rather, they have adopted a practical policy-oriented and problem-solving basis that takes “prevailing social relationships, and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given and inevitable framework for action.”<sup>117</sup> Many within the Human Security community prioritise practical progress in human welfare above the objective of critical deconstruction; indeed, practitioners the like of Sadako Ogata, have been adamant that human security should be focussed on practical security impacts rather than pure theorising. In this sense, and as will be discussed in detail, Human Security approaches seek to remain policy relevant and influential, and accessible to prevailing national and international security policy circles and institutions. As a result, such approaches have been “reluctant to explore overtly ‘critical’ themes, either because they feel they are unnecessary, or because they fear that such theoretical pursuits will alienate them – and their message – from the policy world.”<sup>118</sup> At the same time, Critical approaches have been circumspect towards engaging with human security ideas and approaches because they are considered to be theoretically lacking in coherence, statist and hence ‘uncritical.’ Thus, any “dialogue would inevitable amount to replicating old ways of thinking and undermine the integrity of the critical security agenda. [Consequently], the claim of critical security approaches to be practical and policy relevant is problematic because of this reluctance to engage in problem-solving dialogue.”<sup>119</sup>

As the Buddhist proverb proclaims “together we can accomplish more than each of us”, so Critical and Human Security approaches could learn and leverage more from one another. Human Security could benefit from developing theoretically and conceptually, whereas Critical approaches must

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<sup>117</sup> see Newman, *op. cit.*, 2010, p.89.

<sup>118</sup> *ibid.*, p.90; and see Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, New York, 2003, p.xii.

<sup>119</sup> Newman, *op.cit.*, 2009, p.23.



seek opportunities to realise and maximise their practical potential and impact on 'real world' security challenges. In exploring and promoting this idea, Human Security, given its problem solving basis and likely policy relevance, could be used as a conduit or 'bridge' for advancing critical and other non-traditional perspectives. To have any enduring and positively meaningful effect however, Human Security conceptions must acknowledge and address the inherent weaknesses within their own policy-oriented, problem solving approaches. Notably, Human Security must evolve from being primarily 'consequentialist' in effect – an outcome that has the potential to promote and exacerbate insecurity and human suffering by replicating and reinforcing the pathological, structural and institutional sources of such. In overcoming this risk, I will advocate Human Security must learn from and accommodate 'critical' methodologies that are more 'revisionist' in their analysis and understanding of the 'true' origins of insecurity.<sup>120</sup> Specifically, I will contend that addressing today's array of security challenges requires the consideration of critical perspectives, and that Human Security could serve as the most effective agency by which to realise transformative influence upon the contemporary security agenda, and within prevailing state-centric security approaches.

### **Transforming the Agenda: A Critically informed approach to Security**

As the twenty-first Century unfolds, all states continue to be challenged by a diverse array of geo-strategic imperatives and risks. For New Zealand, these conditions are likely to amplify and intensify in the era of the 'Asia-Pacific Century.' But increasingly, and unavoidably, New Zealand is also confronting a relatively new class of complex and adaptive security challenges. These challenges are pervasive and cross-cutting, simultaneously engaging the nation's social, economic and political systems and linkages, both domestically and internationally. These 'traditional' and 'non-traditional' challenges present risks to collective (state) and individual (human) securities. Ominously, many are projected to proliferate and converge, thus posing an intricate web with

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<sup>120</sup> see Newman, *op. cit.*, 2010, pp. 90 and 92.

potentially catastrophic outcomes.<sup>121</sup> Indeed, the United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change has framed this millennium's global security agenda around a nexus of threats and risks to both state *and* human security. Broadly conceived, these risks and threats include: violent conflict between and within states, including civil wars, large-scale human rights abuses and genocide; poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation; the continued proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; and the increasingly pervasive influence of non-state actors in the form of terrorism and transnational crime.<sup>122</sup>

Addressing these realities demands New Zealand embrace a comprehensive and inclusive reconceptualisation of security that is fit for today's settings. In this sense, "it is almost no longer controversial to say that traditional [state-centric] conceptions of security were (and in many minds still are) too narrowly focussed."<sup>123</sup> Indeed, even ardent realists and committed proponents of traditional approaches to security, such as Henry Kissinger, acknowledge the contemporary limitations of parochial State Security discourses in "no longer defin[ing] our perils or our possibilities."<sup>124</sup>

In many respects however, the continued prevalence of old thinking about politics, power and security risks the replication of old practices; the means recommended by traditional theories have the potential to ensure that the end will be the same old world with the same old dangers – and perhaps worse.<sup>125</sup> Consequently, establishing a precise and unbiased understanding of our contemporary security challenges – and their complex dynamics and interdependencies – is essential to the formulation of effective policies and programmes. This sense of 'understanding' must necessarily form the foundation of, and for any relevant reconceptualisation of security in

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<sup>121</sup> see ABCA, *op.cit.*, 2008, p. 1.

<sup>122</sup> see G. Evans in McDougall and Shearman (eds), *op.cit.*, p. 4.

<sup>123</sup> B. Buzan, *op.cit.*, 1991, p.14.

<sup>124</sup> H. Kissinger cited in Dupont in Ayson and Ball (eds), *op.cit.*, p.106.

<sup>125</sup> see Booth in Booth (ed), *op.cit.*, 2005, p.273.

universally open, indivisibly inclusive, and progressive ways. In today's world, unless there is a greater consideration and integration of *marginalised* security conceptions, and unless the same logic "can be extended to the construction of new regimes of security, which recognise that security is mutually constitutive and interdependent, then security is unlikely to prove sustainable."<sup>126</sup> In this respect, an approach to security that is more critical in its perspectives, has the potential to provide New Zealand – and all states – with a sound basis for conceiving this 'understanding', and for realising greater measures of political and social inclusion and progress.

Critically informed approaches to security stand "outside and questions the political and social phenomena it is examining. It avoids, as far as possible, the negative consequences of ... legitimising and replicating the regressive aspect of prevailing situations normally associated with traditional and prevailing approaches to security."<sup>127</sup> Rather, the utility of, and positive value derived from critical approaches stem from their emancipatory potential and capacity to unlock the notion from the orthodoxy's imposed image of a singular, static and limiting state-centric 'reality'. Accordingly, more critically **informed** approaches assume an "instrumental value that enables people(s) some opportunity to choose how to live. It is a means by which individuals and collectivities can invent and reinvent different ideas about [security, and ultimately,] being human."<sup>128</sup> Importantly though, critically informed perspectives should be viewed as more than an alternatives to, or arguments against the prevailing orthodoxy; rather, in a more integrative and inclusive sense, they ask "deeper questions about the basic categories we use to think about, and conceptualise, security issues."<sup>129</sup>

As the term "critical" implies, by standing outside the 'given' frameworks and units of analysis they are exploring, critical approaches first seek to

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<sup>126</sup> Beeson and Bellamy, *op.cit.*, p. 29.

<sup>127</sup> Booth in Booth (ed), *op.cit*, 2005, p.263.

<sup>128</sup> *ibid*, p.23.

<sup>129</sup> Burke in Ayson and Ball (eds), *op.cit.*, p.152.

appraise and understand these frameworks and units in terms of their origins, complex properties and dynamics. This understanding provides the basis for the development of more objectively “realistic” accounts of the phenomena associated with the globalisation and bifurcation of security, and ultimately, for the formulation of effective responses to them. Importantly, here, Critical approaches understand that contemporary “security is not an objective condition, that threats to it are not simply a matter of correctly perceiving a constellation of material forces, and that the object of security is neither stable nor unchanging.”<sup>130</sup> Rather, Critical approaches highlight that contemporary security conceptions should be context contingent. In doing so, these approaches directly challenge orthodox security notions that narrow their inquiry towards the exclusive privileging of state-centric views.

Critical approaches interrogate such narrow views by directly challenging the underlying assumptions that continue to frame mainstream security discourse by highlighting the contradictions and limitations of traditional security orthodoxies. They achieve this “by asking questions that shift the focus of concern away from the specifications of [state] security preoccupied with states as the only, or most important, actors in matters of security.”<sup>131</sup> Consequently, in seeking a more meaningful, transparent and relevant appreciation of security today, the objective of such *critique* is to move the notion beyond its prevailing strictures in ways that allow both security *and* insecurity to be understood and addressed more directly.

Understanding security within contemporary settings requires us to acknowledge the fundamental need to critically focus, broaden and deepen our perspectives. Indeed, such calls – both tacitly and explicitly – are realising increasing measures of resonance and traction. By example, the ‘Copenhagen’ and ‘Welsh’ schools have both argued – albeit from differing vantage points – of the need to expand *and* compliment mainstream conceptions from their

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<sup>130</sup> K. Krause and M. Williams, ‘Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods’, in *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol 40, 1996, p.242.

<sup>131</sup> Dalby, *op.cit.*, pp.20-21.

limits and limitations of parochial state-centrism, by including a range of broader and interdependent local and global systemic connections. Indeed, Headley Bull, during his lifetime, argued for broader common perspectives that would transcend the narrow notions of security by looking to a deeper logic of human, social and systemic interdependence.<sup>132</sup>

Notably, against the backdrop of transformations in the Asia-Pacific's geo-strategic outlook, United States President Obama normatively broadened his nation's perspective to include the "security and dignity of people around the world."<sup>133</sup> This is a position subsequently buttressed within the context of the most recent strategic guidance in which Obama seeks the recognition of the duality and dialectic that should, and must exist between state and critical-human security approaches. In doing so, he explicitly understands that for security to have legitimate relevance and meaning, it must be dialectically founded upon "a just and sustainable international order where the rights and responsibilities of nations and peoples are upheld, especially the fundamental rights of every human being."<sup>134</sup> From Critical and Human Security perspectives – analytical 'optimism' notwithstanding – Obama's address and statement could be considered *normatively* significant for a range of reasons. Foremost, his comments can be viewed as marker in his nation's reconceptualisation of security via a normative reaffirmation of the compact that should exist between a state and its people. While noting that "every nation will chart its own course", Obama caveats and cautions that states which fail in their duty to provide security and universal freedoms for their citizenry – pillars of Critical and Human Security approaches – risk ultimate failure as states; and failure will result where states "ignore the ultimate source of their

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<sup>132</sup> Bull cited in Buzan, *op.cit.*, 1991, p.6.

<sup>133</sup> B.H. Obama, Presidential Address to the Joint Sitting of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 17 November 2011, Canberra, viewed on 18 November 2011, <http://www.smh.com.au/national/text-of-obamas-speech-to-parliament-20111117-1nkcw.html>.

<sup>134</sup> B.H. Obama, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Defense*, United States Department of Defence (USDOD), Washington D.C., 2012, p.2.

power and legitimacy – the will of the people.”<sup>135</sup> Correspondingly, in understanding the inherent and normative role of the state in providing security to individuals, Obama also recognised, in the era of globalisation and bifurcation, that any state “efforts to advance security, prosperity and human dignity” must necessarily be situated in the context of “an interconnected world, [wherein] we all rise and fall together.”<sup>136</sup> This initial shift in the meaning and understanding that is ascribed to security could be considered as signifying a crucial first – but furtive – step on the part of the statist orthodoxy to acknowledge the need to embrace focussed, broader, deeper, comprehensive and more critically reflective conceptions that are attuned to the security challenges and opportunities of today. Understanding such, is to critically – and fundamentally – recognise the emancipatory “aspirations and rights of all peoples.”<sup>137</sup>

In overcoming systemic and relational imbalances and limitations, a hallmark of Critical approaches is that they seek “escape [from] the confines of privileged referents by embracing no static interest save that of the primordial human being and the species in nature.”<sup>138</sup> Correspondingly, Critical approaches conceive security by comprehensive measures and in comprehensive ways. These approaches do so, generally, by embracing multiple levels of society – from the individual, to the state, to all humankind – with a view to developing more promising ideas by which to overcome oppressive circumstances, and structural and contingent human wrongs.<sup>139</sup> As agents of structural, social and political emancipation, Critical approaches derive much of their value by drawing from a progressive and inclusive agenda that is at once broader, deeper, and more focussed than traditional state-centric security conceptions.

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<sup>135</sup> Obama, *op.cit.*, 2011.

<sup>136</sup> Obama, *op.cit.*, 2011.

<sup>137</sup> B.H. Obama in M. Sainsbury, ‘First Steps in Meeting of Equals’, in *The Australian*, 15 February 2012.

<sup>138</sup> Booth in Booth (ed), *op.cit.*, 2005, p.7

<sup>139</sup> see *ibid.*

In contrast to mainstream security theory, concept and practice – derived from a “combination of statist, militarised, masculinised, top-down, methodologically positivist, and philosophically realist thinking”<sup>140</sup> – critical conceptions aim to develop approaches that are dedicated to the promotion of human, social and political ‘emancipation’. Such approaches have led to the critical analysis of contemporary forms of domination, subjugation, marginalisation and insecurity that have either been ignored or have fallen outside the philosophical and/or theoretical domains of narrow statist security traditions and agendas. Indeed it is hoped that opening up security in this way will result in the construction of a more comprehensive and critically informed approach to security that is reflective of, and responsive to today’s security realities; and an approach in which the notions of emancipation and security are viewed holistically and as “two sides of the same coin.”<sup>141</sup>.

Realising this objective necessarily involves a reconceptualisation of security that is (a) *Focussed*: seeking a theory and practice of security that promotes emancipatory politics, policies and programmes; (b) *Deeper*: interrogating the attitudes and behaviours that shape our respective understanding and conception(s) of security; recognising that these are derivative of underlying and contested theories about the nature of security; and appreciating that different perspectives will *naturally* deliver different conceptions of what security means – or should mean – in social, political and socio-political contexts and forms; and (c) *Broader*: understanding – particularly in contemporary settings – the need to expand the agenda of security beyond that of the prevailing statist, militarised orthodoxy wherein threat and the use of material force is neither the only (or necessarily most exigent) threat to security, nor the only means of providing security. Rather, broadening requires the concordat exploration of common humanity and emancipation *and* sovereignty and power.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>140</sup>Booth in Booth (ed), *op.cit.*, 2005, pp.13-15.

<sup>141</sup> Burke in Ayson and Ball (eds), *op.cit.*, p.156.

<sup>142</sup> see Williams in Bellamy(ed), *op.cit.*, 2004, p. 136; and see Booth in Booth (ed), *op.cit.*, 2005, pp. 13-15.

Importantly here, it should be understood that such a critically-based reconceptualisation is derived from the development of more ontologically and epistemologically reflective bodies of 'security' knowledge and understanding. Fundamentally, this reconceptualisation is based on the 'nature of being' – what really exists in the social world.<sup>143</sup> In adopting such a rationale, Critical approaches seek to objectively identify and explore the inherent weaknesses and limitations of prevailing state-centric security approaches. They do so through their application of, generally, more discursive methods of analysis and critique – rather than pointed and unreflective criticism – to challenge orthodoxies. The corresponding value of Critical approaches is derived from their exploration of the immanent potential for transformational reforms to prevailing ideas, structures and systems, rather than necessarily advocating systematic wholesale change. As such, while many Critical and Human Security approaches acknowledge the fundamental role states will continue to play within 'security'; they also recognise – via the discursive processes of focussing, broadening, deepening and reflective critique – that security must be reconceptualised in more universally inclusive and comprehensive ways if humankind is to effectively understand and address the array of complex challenges we now face.

### **Human Security**

As highlighted, contemporary security discourses and practices should realistically “reflect the consequences of a globalised security environment that has bifurcated between an older state-centric world on the one hand and between new trans-state and sub-state strata on the other hand.”<sup>144</sup> Consequently, as Newman argues, “traditional conceptions of state security – premised upon military defence of territorial integrity – are a necessary but not

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<sup>143</sup> see Booth in Booth (ed), *op.cit.*, 2005, p.7. For an appreciation of the characteristics encompassing the contemporary 'nature of being' see Chapter 1 of this Thesis.

<sup>144</sup> see Evans in Ayson and Ball (eds), *op. cit.*, p. 53.



sufficient condition of human welfare.”<sup>145</sup> In addressing this void in contemporary security thinking and practice, Critical approaches – and by extension: Human Security – are committed to understanding and resolving the (in)security of real people in real places. Their potency is in illuminating those threats and vulnerabilities which transcend geo-political borders, and structural, material notions of state power and interest. In doing so, Critical approaches and Human Security focus on identifying and understanding adverse and traumatic conditions and events in terms of their impact and influence on individuals, societies, and broader humankind; and, through understanding, addressing these issues in comprehensively open, inclusive and positively enduring ways.<sup>146</sup> Importantly though, Human Security does so by neither delegitimising the state without due cause, nor by devaluing state sovereignty and interest. Rather, the utility of Human Security is derived from placing both the state and notion of sovereignty in contemporary settings where their relative value as security referents *and* agents can be more accurately assessed and optimised. In this sense, Critical approaches, and – in particular – Human Security requires a view that places the individual, the state and society and the international system into a mutually constitutive relationship. Notwithstanding the prevailing centrality of states in the context of security, individual, domestic and international dynamics are essential to contemporary security analysis and understanding, as are the complex (inter)relationships between them.<sup>147</sup>

In many respects, Human Security has evolved as *a* transformational and normative leitmotif of non-traditional and critical approaches to security. Human Security seeks for humankind “freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these are the interrelated building blocks of human and therefore national

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<sup>145</sup> E. Newman, ‘A normatively attractive but analytically weak concept’, in *Security Dialogue*, Vol 35(30), 2004, p.358.

<sup>146</sup> see Christie, *op.cit.*, 2010, p.170.

<sup>147</sup> see Buzan, *op.cit.*, 1991, p.61.

security.”<sup>148</sup> The concept recognises and looks to positively redress old thinking about politics, power and security that guarantees the replication of old practices; wherein the means recommended by traditional theories ensure that the end could be the same old world with the same old dangers – and perhaps worse.<sup>149</sup> Consequently, many security ‘communities’, are coming to perceive and conceive contemporary security agendas and practices through the incorporation of critical and human security perspectives within prevailing approaches and frameworks. By example, some of the most salient representations of such transformation have been witnessed through the formalised recognition of Human Security by multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and ASEAN; via the establishment of a myriad of non-governmental international Human Security-focussed advocacy groups and academic institutions; and through the creation of a cooperative – state-level – Human Security network that includes Japan, Norway, Canada and Jordan amongst its membership.

As highlighted, Human Security exists as a powerful, but controversial and intensely contested idea that resonate a profound concern for human emancipation through an appreciation that ‘security’ is one of the elementary or primary goals of social life.<sup>150</sup> Indeed, many strands of Human Security thinking purports that a people-centred view of security is necessary for state and global stability. Inherently, human security seeks to focus, broaden and deepen prevailing traditional security discourses through an increasing recognition of the proposition that “security must make sense at the basic level of the individual human being for it to make sense at the international level.”<sup>151</sup> Yet, as discussed, while the Human Security “concept evokes progressive values,”<sup>152</sup> there exists inherent conceptual, policy and practical risks in expanding our notions of security through the securitisation of non-traditional

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<sup>148</sup> UN Commission on Human Security, *Human security now*, UNDP, 2003, P.4.

<sup>149</sup> see Booth in Booth(ed), *op.cit.*, 2005, p.273.

<sup>150</sup> see Williams in Bellamy(ed), *op.cit.*, p. 135.

<sup>151</sup> McSweeney, *Security*, *op.cit.*, p. 16.

<sup>152</sup> A. Suhrke, ‘Human Security and the Interests of States’, in *Security Dialogue*, Vol 30, No 3, 1999, p. 265.

domains; in the broadening of agendas beyond what is “analytically meaningful or useful as a tool of policymaking;”<sup>153</sup> and in the subsequent prioritisation and allocation of resources to treat the sources, effects and consequences of insecurity. However, as I will demonstrate, despite concerns amongst its critics that the conception is both vague and utopian, and therefore impossible to operationalise in policy, programmatic and practical senses, Human Security’s greatest potential remains in its holistic, evolutionary innovative nature, that is at once underpinned by its emancipatory, ‘bridging’ and paradigm-shifting properties.<sup>154</sup> Indeed, I will go further by supporting the contention that there does – and should – exist a dialectic between state and human-centric security approaches that offers a “promising way of addressing the cotemporary security agenda of state, trans-state and intra-state security issues and the connections between them.”<sup>155</sup>

The evolution of Human Security is an explicit acknowledgment that the “concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests. It has been related more to nation-states than to people.”<sup>156</sup> Correspondingly, the idea of human security rests on a number of core propositions where security is a both a people-centred and universal concern. Components of human security are interdependent and circulatory, wherein severe threats to human security are not confined to single communities and/or states. These approaches promote sustainable development – rather than structural violence and militarised recourses – as the foundation for peace and security within and between states.<sup>157</sup> In this sense, Human Security demonstrates its normative and transformational properties by calling into question prevailing social and

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<sup>153</sup> A. Acharya, ‘Human Security’, in J. Bayliss and J. Smith (eds), *The Globalisation of World Politics*, (4<sup>th</sup> Ed), Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 492.

<sup>154</sup> See M. Glasius, ‘Human Security: From Paradigm Shift to Operationalisation’, in *Security Dialogue*, Vol 39(1), 2008, p.32.

<sup>155</sup> P. Kerr, *The evolving dialectic between state-centric and human-centric security*, Working Paper 2003/2, Australian National University, Canberra, 2003, p.1.

<sup>156</sup> United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report*, 1994, viewed 14 September 2011, <http://www.hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/>, p. 22.

<sup>157</sup> see Newman, *op.cit.*, 2009, p.7.

power relationships and the frameworks and institutions into which they are organised.

Human Security's central concern is with the legitimisation of a substantive redefinition of the notion of 'security,' in which security is recognised as a fundamentally 'social construction.'<sup>158</sup> Human Security seeks a broadening of the contemporary security discourse by placing the individual – or people collectively – as a *referent* of security, rather than, although not necessarily in opposition to, the institution of state, and notions such as territory and sovereignty. This does not mean however that there has been a complete break with the state, with most current Human Security work in fact arguing that the state remains the most effective guarantor of people's human security needs.<sup>159</sup> In this respect, and as I will address later, for any contemporary security conception to establish and maintain any form of enduring effectiveness and relevance, it must recognise 'people' *and* states as the mutually constitutive referents of security. In doing so, such a concept must necessarily respond to "the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives ... [wherein] a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event."<sup>160</sup> Resultantly, Human Security considers a broad range of conditions that threaten survival, livelihood and dignity, and identifies thresholds below which humanity and life is intolerably and irredeemably threatened. Moreover, human security increasingly emphasises the interconnectedness of both threats and responses when addressing these insecurities.<sup>161</sup>

In response, Human Security necessarily and *naturally* seeks the realisation of individual freedoms – emancipation – through the establishment of normative institutions and *regimes*, and the resourcing of practical

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<sup>158</sup> see M. Neufeld, 'Pitfalls of Emancipation and Discourses of Security: Reflections on Canada's 'Security with a Human Face'', in *International Relations*, Vol 18, No 1, 2004, p. 109.

<sup>159</sup> see Christie, *op.cit.*, 2010, p.173.

<sup>160</sup> UNDP, *op. cit.*, p.22.

<sup>161</sup> Human Security Unit, *Human Security in Theory and Practice*, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2005, p.7.

development projects that support the fulfilment of human social emancipation and empowerment. In doing so, emancipation and empowerment entails the measured redistribution of power, and in the way that power, security and protections are conceived and exercised. Importantly, such redistribution must seek to ensure the security of individuals and communities *and* serve the interests of state and global stability. It follows therefore, that empowerment and “emancipation, empirically, [are] security.”<sup>162</sup> By extension, these fused ideas “attempt to empower the disenfranchised and to give a voice to those that have been traditionally silenced. [Emancipation and empowerment] *means* freeing people, as individuals and groups, from the social, physical, economic, political, and other constraints that stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do.”<sup>163</sup> In many respects, these normative notions are realising increased political and social resonance through the means of international and state-based human security policies and programmes, with “a defining characteristic of the human security idea being its policy relevance, its engagement with policy, and its desire to change security policy in progressive ways.”<sup>164</sup> Fundamentally though, it can be argued that the stimulants driving emancipation and empowerment – and broader human security – are the long-running transformational processes of globalisation, bifurcation and interdependence. These processes are correspondingly affecting our prevailing conceptions of the state, sovereignty, and conflict, and in doing so, they are simultaneously undermining the plausibility of traditional and exclusive state-centric notions of security.<sup>165</sup>

Human Security stands as a salient and manifest representation of, and response to such interconnected and transformational conditions. It represents an increasingly explicit acknowledgement and affirmation that for Security to make sense, it must be considered a *socially constructed* concept that realises

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<sup>162</sup> Neufield, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

<sup>163</sup> Christie, *op.cit.*, 2010, p. 181.

<sup>164</sup> Newman, *op.cit.*, 2009, p.11.

<sup>165</sup> see S. James, *Human Security: Key Drivers, Antecedents and Conceptualisations*, Centre for Dialogue and Institute for Human Security, 2010, p. 5.

specific meaning within a specific social context.<sup>166</sup> The profound implication here being, as Hedley Bull noted, that security “is one of the ‘elementary or primary goals’ of social life – [for] without security ... there can be no society.”<sup>167</sup> Critically, such a contention (re)establishes the symbiotic relationship between notions of state and human security, and necessarily emphasises the proposition that “security must make sense at the basic level of the individual human being for it to make sense at the international level.”<sup>168</sup> In this respect, there exists an inherent dialectic and duality between state and human security values, ideals and aspirations.

Security, in terms of the state, society and the individual, singularly implies *survival* and *freedom* as their ultimate criteria. In this respect, a “state that loses its sovereignty does not survive as a state; a society [– and the individuals within –] that loses its identity fears that it will no longer be able to live *as itself*.”<sup>169</sup> As Bajpai recognises:

*“if sovereignty of the state is at the heart of the traditional national security conception, so sovereignty of the individual is at the heart of human security. If national security is, at base, about territorial integrity or protection of the body politic, so human security is, at base, about physical integrity or protection of the individual human body from harm. If national security is also about political freedom of a state to chose its diplomatic partners/adversaries and to regulate its internal affairs, so also human security is about political freedom of an individual to associate with others (civic freedom) as well as the freedom to live private life without undue interference from fellow citizens and state authorities.”*<sup>170</sup>

Human Security therefore, *naturally* connects several kinds of individual freedoms. As discussed, the concept necessarily situates the notion of human

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<sup>166</sup> see A. Schneider and H. Ingram, ‘Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy’, in *American Political Science Review*, No 87(2), 1993, pp. 334-347.

<sup>167</sup> *ibid.*, p. 135.

<sup>168</sup> McSweeney, *op.cit.*, p. 16.

<sup>169</sup> O. Waever, ‘Securitisation and Desecuritisation’, in R. Lipschutz (ed), *On Security*, Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 67.

<sup>170</sup> K. Bajpai, *Human security: Concept and Measurement*, Kroc Institute, 2000, pp. 23-24.

'emancipation and empowerment' at its core. The fused ideas attempt to empower the disenfranchised and to give a voice to those that have traditionally been silenced. From this, in its broadest sense, Human Security seeks to sanctify the individual – or people collectively – as a legitimate *referent* of security in a mutually constitutive relationship with the state. However, for such a relationship to exist necessarily implies the state – when its instruments of power are applied in comprehensive, cooperative, moral, ethical and humane ways – *can* and *should* remain the most effective guarantors of human security. Further, the causes, characteristics and effects of the globalisation and bifurcation of security would seem to demand holistic and integrated perspectives which recognise that "[state] security is influenced in important ways by *dynamics* at the level of individual and the global system."<sup>171</sup>

A useful explanation of this normative idea of state and human security interdependence, and its harmonising and transformational qualities, is framed in the redefining notion of 'sovereignty as responsibility.' "Although more people today are threatened by their own state than by other peoples', that does not mean that the state cannot fulfil a positive role in pursuing human security."<sup>172</sup> 'Sovereignty as Responsibility' and the attendant 'Responsibility to Protect' represent the first influential attempt at state and policy levels to recognise and codify the 'universal nature of survival' and thus, the unified compact that *should* exist between state and human securities. These notions imply the re-characterisation of the absolute and exclusivist Westphalian interpretation, from *sovereignty as control* to *sovereignty as responsibility* in both internal functions and external duties. In this sense, thinking of (state) sovereignty as a responsibility, and primary responsibility for the protection of its citizens, assumes a positively compounding significance:

*"First, it implies that the state authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that*

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<sup>171</sup> Bajpai, *op.cit.*, p. 49.

<sup>172</sup> A. Bellamy and M. McDonald, "The Utility of Human Security': Which Humans? What Security? A Reply to Thomas and Tow', in *Security Dialogue*, Vol 33(3), 2002, p. 376.

*the national political authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and to the international community through the UN. And thirdly, it means that the agents of state are responsible for their actions; that is to say, they are accountable for their acts of commission and omission. The case for thinking of sovereignty in these terms is strengthened by the ever-increasing impact of human rights norms, and the increasing impact in international discourse of the concept of human security.*"<sup>173</sup>

It is becoming increasingly recognised therefore, that the "human impact of [state and] international actions cannot be regarded as collateral to other actions, but must be a central preoccupation for all concerned."<sup>174</sup>

Despite the normative appeal of Human Security, Sovereignty as Responsibility, the Responsibility to Protect, and the allied resolve at the international systemic level to embrace these conceptions, they remain, in many respects, theoretically and structurally problematic, socio-politically divisive and aspirational at best. "For some, [Sovereignty as Responsibility] heralds a new world in which human rights trumps state sovereignty; for others, it ushers in a world in which big powers ride roughshod over the smaller ones, manipulating the rhetoric of humanitarianism and human rights."<sup>175</sup> In this sense, the controversy highlights the basic divisions within the international community and security theory and practice, while reinforcing the predominance of state-centrism. In such circumstances, the essence of Human security remains bound to the willingness or otherwise of states and their narrow *rationalised* interests and "siloes" institutions, in either adopting or ratifying the principles which it engenders.

In a critical sense, the co-option of human security into a state-focussed framework is dubious, in that such conceptions remain largely inconsistent with the normative concerns inherent in the human security agenda.<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>173</sup> Bellamy and McDonald *op.cit.*, p. 376.

<sup>174</sup> *ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>175</sup> ICISS, *op.cit.*, p. 2.

<sup>176</sup> see Bellamy and McDonald, *op.cit.*, p.373.



Through a broadening and deepening of the security discourse, where security must be decoupled from the 'national interests' and tied to 'universal concerns' of all people,<sup>177</sup> a defining feature of human security is its capacity to identify and interrogate what makes people insecure. However, 'co-option' in this instance assumes the politicisation of the notion. This risks limiting the emancipatory potential of Human Security, and threatens to "re-legitimise the very social structures (states and international society) that create insecurity and limit the potential for alleviating suffering, wherever it may be."<sup>178</sup>

Further exacerbating the dilemmas facing Human Security, is the claim that such an expansive approach renders the concept analytically incoherent and robs it of any practical and policy utility.<sup>179</sup> In this context, conceptual overstretch engenders three critical problems: it has the potential to generate and represent false security hopes, priorities and consequences; it can establish confusion about the epistemological and ontological origins and causes of insecurity; and it can paradoxically contribute to the adoption of narrow – rather than comprehensive – 'solutions' to security challenges. The most difficult task in this respect becomes therefore, the operationalising of strategies to protect persons against physical violence in all circumstances and situations of conflict.<sup>180</sup> Exploring these security dynamics of security demonstrates the complexity and tensions of attempting to synthesise normative human security approaches with and within traditional public policy frameworks. However, despite the legitimate concerns surrounding Human security's conceptual and practical limitations, the notion's value and utility is derived from its critically self-reflective, transformational, bridging and emancipatory properties. Normatively speaking, in its setting of a broader – more comprehensive – agenda than traditional approaches, Human Security has the potential to offer more ethical, and socially and politically progressive and inclusive perspectives

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<sup>177</sup> see UNOCHA, *United Nations Development Plan*, United Nations Publishing, 1994, p.22.

<sup>178</sup> Bellamy and McDonald, *op.cit.*, p.374.

<sup>179</sup> see S. MacFarlane and Y.F. Khong, *Human Security and the UN: A Critical History*, Indiana University Press, 2006, p.228.

<sup>180</sup> Suhrke, *op.cit.*, p.274.

in a fractious era. Resultantly, Human Security – given its fundamentally critical basis – offers a more self-conscious and sophisticated form of analysis than prevailing security approaches, and so promises to be more “realistic” in accounting for and addressing contemporary political and security phenomena.<sup>181</sup>

Ultimately, Human Security’s true value stems from its goal centred on the progressive freeing of individuals and groups from structural and contingent human wrongs. Yet, within contemporary settings and particularly in the post ‘9/11’ era, there is a growing recognition amongst the citizenries of states – particularly in the developed world – that their respective ways of life, and the specific liberties to which they had been accustomed are now increasingly vulnerable to state exploitation, manipulation and control in the name and interests of ‘security’. By example, this circumstance has become increasingly apparent as a result of the negative processes of political ‘securitisation.’<sup>182</sup> Such a process frames an issue/group/individual as an existential threat – predicated upon an “‘us’ against ‘them’ distinction and logic of threat”<sup>183</sup> – and has the dangerous capacity to “place an issue above the rules of normal liberal democratic politics, and hence *justify* emergency action to do whatever is necessary to remedy the situation.”<sup>184</sup> Practically speaking, ‘emergency actions’ can, and have, included the implementation of questionable – if not illiberal – laws, policies and processes that limit, suspend, or result in a basic forfeiture of fundamental human security, freedoms and rights in the name of state-centred security interests.<sup>185</sup> Exploring the dynamics

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<sup>181</sup> see Booth in Booth (ed), *op.cit.*, 2005, p.7.

<sup>182</sup> For a comprehensive discussion of “Securitisation” see O. Waever in Lipschutz (ed), *op.cit.*

<sup>183</sup> R. Abrahamsen, ‘Blair’s Africa: The Politics of Securitization and Fear’, in *Alternatives*, Vol30, 2005, p.60.

<sup>184</sup> R. Abrahamsen, *op.cit.*, p.60.

<sup>185</sup> Political securitisation has been used to effect, particularly in the post-9/11 ‘West’, to buttress ‘security against *others*’ distinctions, and to ‘legitimise’ the suppression of individual rights and limiting of social freedoms. For examples see New Zealand’s contentious ‘Operation 8’ anti-terror raids (discussed later in this Chapter); the 2001 ‘Tampa Crisis’ and Australia’s treatment of asylum seekers in A. Burke, *Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety*, Cambridge University Press, 2008; and the United Kingdom’s intention to implement the ‘Communications Data Bill’ legislation which “will require service providers to record all internet and phone activity, [and will in effect] allow Britain’s police and security services to

of this isolated security issue speaks to an array of broader polemic complexities and challenges associated with establishing what Martin Wight has termed a 'via media', or broad accord between differing traditions of state-centred and human-centred security thought and practice.<sup>186</sup> Critically, despite the increasing focus on civil societies/communities and the individual – underpinned by the pervasive influences associated with the globalisation and bifurcation of security – states, the international system and predominant international relations theory and practice fail to adequately consider, accommodate contemporary security realities. The case of the 2010 New Zealand Defence White Paper demonstrates these complexities and challenges, and the attendant institutional myopia and intransigence that appear as key inhibitors to recognising the utility of alternative security approaches and perspectives, and ultimately the emancipation of broader humanity.

The New Zealand case study is the most recent contemporary representation of opportunities missed or simply ignored in critically harmonising state and human securities. In maintaining a traditional and narrow security focus on the material defence of national interests, I will demonstrate that the *Defence White Paper 2010* has failed in its duty to fully comprehend and comprehensively respond to the 'realities' of the contemporary security environment, and its attendant sources of threat and insecurity. In doing so, the strategic risk New Zealand faces is the establishment of discordant security and defence policies and programmes that are singularly ineffectual and irrelevant. Consequently, in failing to understand and effectively address today's security dynamics, *Defence White Paper 2010* conversely risks perpetuating elevated levels of state and human insecurity, and the further marginalisation of already disenfranchised individuals and communities. In this sense, I will argue that *Defence White Paper 2010* exhibits a troubling and increasing delta that exists between statist

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monitor every email, phone call and visit to a website" in 'The Age', 'Snooping' divides UK coalition, viewed on 12 June 2012.

<sup>186</sup> see M. Wight, *International theory: The three traditions*, Leicester University Press, London, 1991, p.14.

conceptions of security at the strategy and policy level, and the contrasted realities of the contemporary security environment that are shaping practical and operational/program level doctrines and responses which, in turn, are being increasingly influenced by critical and human security considerations.<sup>187</sup>

For its defence and security policies to have an enduringly positive and relevant purpose, I will contend that New Zealand's security 'elite' must move beyond its traditional geostrategic and hard power considerations, and embrace more 'focussed, broader and deeper' conceptual and policy pragmatics which are comprehensive in their objectives and effects, and that appropriately reflect today's security realities. In doing so, I will demonstrate that that a most appropriate basis for realising these security outcomes for New Zealand, rests upon a recognition of the interdependence, and albeit, presently tense dialectic that exists between state and critical-human approaches to security. Correspondingly, recognition and understanding of this complex relationship, forms the necessary starting point for the establishment of a security 'via media', centred upon the critical utilisation of Human Security as a 'boundary' conception. The adoption of such an approach has the normative capacity to more effectively address the security interests of New Zealand *and* New Zealanders, while delivering more relevant and universally inclusive security outcomes for all humanity.

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<sup>187</sup> A salient example of the increasing influence of critical and human security perspectives on state operational/program level security approaches is the 2009 Gates/McChrystal "deeds-based", "population-centric" plan applied to NATO operations in Afghanistan; see Headquarters International Security Assistance Force (HQ ISAF), *COMISAF's Initial Assessment*, United States Department of Defense, Kabul, August 2009, pp.1-1 – 1-4. Similarly, 'human-centric' perspectives are beginning to inform the operational security concepts and doctrines of many traditional, state-centric security institutions; see Australian Army, *Adaptive Campaigning: Future Land Operating Concept*, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2009; United States Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-24/1 Counterinsurgency*, USDOD, Washington DC, 2006; and NZDF, *op.cit*, 2012.

## CASE STUDY: RETHINKING NEW ZEALAND SECURITY – A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE WHITE PAPER 2010

On the morning of Saturday the 2<sup>nd</sup> of November 2011, aboard HMNZS *Canterbury* and flanked by elite of New Zealand's Security and Defence communities, Prime Minister John Key formally launched the latest official statement on the nation's defence and security outlook, imperatives and interests in the period to 2035. From a governmental perspective, *Defence White Paper 2010*, is perceived as a seminal work in the context of New Zealand security and defence, representing the first "comprehensive statement" on the field in some thirteen years, although analysts such as Ayson convincingly suggest that this White Paper "really deserves to be treated as the first of its kind in nearly two decades."<sup>188</sup> Indeed, as Ayson further observed, it "was something of an understatement then for Dr Wayne Mapp, then Minister of Defence, to inform his cabinet colleagues in March 2009 that there had "not been any substantive review of defence policy since 2001."<sup>189</sup>

The *Defence White Paper 2010* represents New Zealand's first extensive formal examination and statement on security and defence since the catalysing events of 11 September 2001 significantly – if not fundamentally – altered the global security environment. Accordingly, in launching *Defence White Paper 2010*, Dr Mapp appropriately recognised that both New Zealand's region and the broader world are experiencing a significant period of transition, and facing unprecedented challenges wherein "the past thirteen years since the last White Paper there have been immense changes in the global ... security landscape ... and the next twenty-five years will see that rate of change continue."<sup>190</sup> Indeed in this respect, as Greener affirms, "much has changed in the last decade and

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<sup>188</sup> R. Ayson, 'Strategic Objectives and Relationships in New Zealand's 2010 Defence White Paper', in *Security Challenges*, Vol.7(1), 2011, p.14; and W. Mapp, 'Launch of the Defence White Paper 2010', 2010, viewed on 11 December 2011, <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/launch-defence-white-paper-2010>.

<sup>189</sup> Ayson, *ibid.* p.15.

<sup>190</sup> Mapp, *op.cit.*

New Zealand no longer enjoys, if it ever did, a benign strategic environment.”<sup>191</sup>

In a critical sense though, it was Dr Mapp’s recognition that for the security of New Zealand and New Zealanders to have any sense of relevance, meaning and efficacy, the nation must be “honest and realistic about the world we live in, and the priorities we have as a nation.”<sup>192</sup> Such a proclamation proffered hope for a policy that would be bold, visionary and innovative, while accurately and pragmatically reflecting and responding to today’s security environment, settings and challenges. Importantly, it was a policy that needed to reflect traditional geostrategic and interstate imperatives – which had not diminished, and had, in some instances intensified – whilst also accommodating the array of contemporary and non-traditional security issues confronting New Zealand in the era of the globalisation and bifurcation of security. Indeed, *Defence White Paper 2010* presented New Zealand with the ideal and necessary opportunity to reassess and challenge many prevailing strategic preconceptions, and in doing so, realise fundamental reform through the principal adoption of a more critically informed and comprehensive approach to security – an approach that was more focussed, broader and deeper in its perspectives, and which recognised the evolving dialectic existing between state and critical/human security conceptions.

I will argue however, that the core policy likely to shape New Zealand’s security and defence over the next twenty-five years, missed this crucial imperative to critically address and affirm what security realistically means – or *should* mean – for New Zealanders and universal Humanity in the complex era of security globalisation and bifurcation. Rather, *Defence White Paper 2010* appears somewhat revisionary in relation to its core themes and foundational assumptions. This policy (re)frames the notion security firmly within the neo-realist tradition: conceived as a possession of the state, and quantified in terms

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<sup>191</sup> P. Greener, ‘Preparing for an Uncertain Future: Force Structure Implications of the New Zealand Defence White Paper 2010’, in *Security Challenges*, Vol7(1), 2011, p.31.

<sup>192</sup> Mapp, *op.cit.*

of material power maintained for the focal purposes of preserving New Zealand sovereignty and territorial integrity, safeguarding the institutions of state, while maximising state autonomy and influence.<sup>193</sup> Correspondingly, this White Paper suffers from being very much another case of 'Back to the Future' security policy formulation and practice. That this is a weakness in New Zealand's security approach should not surprise however, for as Evans and Kilcullen have noted, this is a core vulnerability common to many of the policy's international contemporaries – security approaches that have informed the development of *Defence White Paper 2010*.<sup>194</sup> These limitations are particularly evident in terms of the policy's steadfast and dogmatic adherence to the imposition of a traditional geo-strategic focus, predicated upon maintaining a "safe and secure New Zealand, including its border and approaches"<sup>195</sup>; and its emphasis on militarised – rather than comprehensive – solutions in responding to somewhat esoteric and "highly unlikely ... direct threat[s] to [New Zealand's] territory or seas by a hostile state."<sup>196</sup> Indeed, *Defence White Paper 2010* talks explicitly in terms of *national* – and *international* – values, abiding interests and securities, and in doing so, reinforces the status of the state as the fundamental and naturalised referent object of Wellington's security narratives.<sup>197</sup>

From a critical perspective, New Zealand's declared security approach and policy assertions reinforce traditional (neo-realist) status quo thinking and notions that are shaped by politicised power processes which exploit competing discourses of identity, values, interests and threats.<sup>198</sup> In applying traditional security considerations that buttresses state-centrism and the authority of the state, such an approach often comes at the expense of

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<sup>193</sup> see NZDPMC, *op.cit.*, p.3; and K. Fierke, 'Critical approaches to security studies', in *Polity*, 2007, p.4.

<sup>194</sup> see Evans, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, *op.cit.*, 2007; Evans, *Security Challenges*, *op.cit.*, 2007; and D. Kilcullen, 'Australian Statecraft: The Challenge of Aligning Policy with Strategic Culture', in *Security Challenges*, Vol 14(3), 2007.

<sup>195</sup> NZMOD, *op.cit.*, p.9.

<sup>196</sup> NZMOD, *op.cit.*, p.16.

<sup>197</sup> see Ritchie, *op.cit.*, p.357.

<sup>198</sup> see Burke, *op.cit.*, 2007.

individual and collective-social identities and liberties, and appear contra to principles that underpin universal values and freedoms. Consequently, this threatens the relegation of human security perspectives – the ‘people’, and their aspirations, needs and fears – to positions comparative inconsequence in terms of security policy and practice.

In defining security in exclusively statist terms, (underscored by New Zealand’s political and economic stability, territorial integrity, and the pre-eminence of “a rules-based international order which respects national sovereignty”<sup>199</sup>), *Defence White Paper 2010* accords no reference to, or accommodation of critical and human security imperatives, and is – in part – unreflective of today’s globalised and bifurcated security environment and dynamics. In doing so, New Zealand’s security approach risks its legitimacy and enduring relevance by continuing to distinguish ambiguous threats and *binary* orientations for ‘belonging’ upon notions of identity. Indeed, one of the most striking characteristics – and inherent risks – of *Defence White Paper 2010* is the persistence of difference and the “continuing centrality of notions of ‘we and they’ in the construction of identity, values, interests, norms and hence [security].”<sup>200</sup> Within New Zealand’s security settings, this risk becomes particularly evident in four key ways: through *Defence White Paper 2010*’s reductionist patenting of ‘referent others’, in seeking to counter the effusive challenges posed by enigmatic ‘weak and unstable states and terrorism’, and ‘unseen risks’<sup>201</sup>; when such propositions are officially buttressed within policy statements from across New Zealand’s security community<sup>202</sup>; when considered in respect to New Zealand’s on-going and externalist support for, and prosecution of the ‘Global War of Terror’ principally in Afghanistan; and notably, in respect to the strengthening of New Zealand domestic counter terrorism legislation that was subsequently employed to legally authorise, and

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<sup>199</sup> NZMOD, *op.cit.*, p.9.

<sup>200</sup> Beeson and Bellamy, *op.cit.*, 2009, p. 10.

<sup>201</sup> see NZMOD, *op.cit.*, pp.25-6 and 33.

<sup>202</sup> see New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Statement of Intent 2010-2013*, New Zealand Government, Wellington, 2010, pp.6-7, and 23.



politically *legitimise* and justify the contentious “Operation 8” raids of 15 October 2007.<sup>203</sup> These examples are reflective of classic traditional security approaches that seek to manipulate and correlate representations of identity and threat as a political tactic and/or political end; and which – in extreme circumstances – have often been exploited to “legitimate violent or repressive policies, fuel conflict, [and have] lead to a misjudgement of threats and a distortion of policy.”<sup>204</sup>

In a critical sense, the adoption of such a conventionally exclusivist, narrow, reductionist and externalist approach to New Zealand’s security paradoxically risks perpetuating human *and* state insecurities in both domestic and international contexts. *Defence White Paper 2010* continues the tradition of emphasising the pre-eminence and utility of hard (political, military, economic and diplomatic) power at the expense of critically understanding and comprehensively addressing today’s complex security dynamics and dilemmas. Indeed, the ‘end game’ for *Defence White Paper 2010* is about survival, and conditions of identity and existence. In this respect, security is primarily about the fate of human collectives and only secondarily about the personal security of individual human beings. In the prevailing system therefore, the standard unit of security is thus the sovereign and politicised territorial state.<sup>205</sup> Consequently, this focus often comes at the sacrifice of critical and human security consideration, and threatens the further erosion of ‘security’ for New Zealanders and humankind. Resultantly, in the complex post-9/11 security era, New Zealander’s could be required to critically “rethink their understanding of liberty in a democracy,”<sup>206</sup> particularly given that we have already witnessed forfeitures of basic human rights and liberties throughout the world in the name of ‘security.’

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<sup>203</sup> see Parliamentary Counsel Office, *Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 No 34*, New Zealand Government, 17 October 2002; and The Age, *Anti-Terror Raids in New Zealand*, 15 October 2007, viewed on 12 December 2011, <http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/antiterror-raids-in-new-zealand/2007/10/15/1192300647235.html?>

<sup>204</sup> Burke, in Ayson and Ball (eds), *op.cit.*, p.158.

<sup>205</sup> see Buzan, *op.cit.*, p.19.

<sup>206</sup> Burke, in Ayson and Ball (eds), *op.cit.*, p.121.

### **Identity: whose security and the Security Referent**

Perhaps existing as the most salient security challenge for New Zealand today, is the identification of the most appropriate referent of and for security; for without a referent, there can be “no discussion of security because the concept is meaningless without something to secure.”<sup>207</sup> As the Case Study demonstrates, traditional and prevailing approaches posit that the state is the most appropriate embodiment of the security referent. Such contentions are reinforced by the statist international system itself through ‘its’ consistent assertion of the primacy and efficacy of “nation-states as the most important strategic actors.”<sup>208</sup> However, in an ever globalising world, security can no longer be tied exclusively to states or state sovereignty. Anything that makes a citizen feel insecure (anything that increases personal insecurity) must now be taken into account by governments.

Today, most pressing threats to individuals arise from the fact that people find themselves embedded and coexisting in an ever integrated and interdependent environment which generates complex and unavoidable social and political pressures. Consequently, the processes of globalisation and bifurcation generally, have increased the significance of individuals as objects – referents – of security; and the international system and states are increasingly evaluated by their capacity to provide protection to individuals and humankind.<sup>209</sup>

Such contrasting approaches, and the respective meanings ascribed to traditional and non-traditional approaches to security, have emerged from politically and intellectually prior accounts and often polarising contentions as they relate to ‘who’ and/or ‘what’ is to be secured. These contentions, while acknowledging the relationship between state and human securities,

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<sup>207</sup> Williams in Bellamy (ed), *op.cit.*, p.140.

<sup>208</sup> Department of Defence, *Defence 2000 – Australia’s Defence Force*, Commonwealth of Australia, 2000, p.14.

<sup>209</sup> see Coker, *op.cit.*, p.34; Buzan, *op.cit.*, p.37; and Goetschel, *op.cit.*, p. 272.

unnecessarily establish each approach as inimical. However, normative scope does exist for the critical establishment of a *via media* between state and human security. Doing so is to discard prevailing dichotomies, and conceptually and empirically recognise the evolving dialectic emerging between these two conceptions that is producing new thinking about security within its contemporary settings.<sup>210</sup>

The dialectic is between two referent objects – the state and people – wherein these two ‘organisms’ assume the status of moral and political equivalency and indivisibility. It recognises that “although security is the objective of individuals, it can only be achieved through a collective political process.”<sup>211</sup> Correspondingly, it acknowledges that “the state must serve and support the people from which it draws its legitimacy.”<sup>212</sup> Importantly, recognition of the dialectic does not seek the radical or wholesale transformation of security, but rather – through the processes of conceptual ‘focussing, deepening and broadening’ – make sense of the more complex realities of the contemporary security environment and its various contexts. In doing so, it is hoped that this will contribute to a critical evolution in New Zealand’s understanding of, and approach to, security. This will be realised by seeking to promote a comprehensive approach that conceives security as an instrumental value that promotes a more inclusive and integrative humanity; and that correspondingly refocuses New Zealand’s security *elites* from their almost exclusive focus and continuing preoccupation with nationalist identity and statist orthodoxies which promote the idea of security *against* others.<sup>213</sup>

### **Critical inception: Evolving the dialectic between State and Human-centric Securities in New Zealand**

The globalisation and bifurcation of security is testimony to “our living in a world more interdependent than ever before. All societies depend much more

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<sup>210</sup> see Kerr, *op.cit.*, p.1.

<sup>211</sup> Williams in Bellamy (ed), *op.cit.*, p.141.

<sup>212</sup> M. Glasius, ‘Human Security from Paradigm Shift to Operationalization: Job Description for a Human Security Worker’, in *Security Dialogue*, Vol 39(1), 1999, p.36.

<sup>213</sup> see Booth, *op.cit.*, 2007, p.2.

on the acts or omissions of others for ... [their] security and even for their survival.”<sup>214</sup> Correspondingly, as Behm has recognised, as “the 21<sup>st</sup> century unfolds, and as new problems ... begin to impact on the security planning of nations, the need for a clearer articulation of the relationship between [critical and] human security concerns and strategy will become more pressing.”<sup>215</sup>

Achieving a critically informed understanding and accord that ‘bridges’ apparent theoretical, conceptual and practical divides must become a focal priority of political and security elites alike. Yet, while normative transformations in security such ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’ and ‘Responsibility to Protect’ are a welcome trend in this direction, I will demonstrate that continued dissonance, and intransigence toward change must be overcome if we are to achieve enduring sector reforms. Failure to do so risks the development of sub-optimal security theory and concept. This in turn, can lead to the establishment of limited and limiting policy, programs and practices. Ultimately and of greatest concern though, any unwillingness or failure to reform threatens to directly perpetuate and exacerbate state, societal and individual insecurity.

Overcoming the apparent binary distinctions between state and human securities is to ontologically understand that politicised – structural and philosophical – distinctions between *the* ‘state’ and ‘society’ are inherently ambiguous, and increasingly discordant with contemporary realities. Indeed, as Buzan recognised both the state and society should be considered as

*“sentient, self-regarding, behavioural units with definable physical attributes. Both exist in a social environment with units of the same type, and therefore face similar sets of problems in working out satisfactory conditions for coexistence. And both share a*

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<sup>214</sup> Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, New York, 2003, p. 12.

<sup>215</sup> A. Behm, ‘Australian Strategic policy and the age of Uncertainty’, in *Security Challenges*, Vol5(2), 2007, p.12.

*human essence, the individual by definition, and the state because it is composed of, and run by, individuals.*"<sup>216</sup>

Understanding this, particularly in the (re)construction of security regimes, is to recognise – normatively speaking – that the state and society are mutually constitutive elements. Modern states moreover, are penetrated by and integrated into multiple overlapping networks that extend into society within and beyond geospatial boundaries. Subsequently, attempts “to treat security as if it were confined to any single level or any single sector invite serious distortions of understanding.”<sup>217</sup>

In this crucial respect, the concept of security connects the state and society, the ‘international’ and ‘global’, and the ‘individual’ and universal Humanity so closely that it demands an integrative perspective.<sup>218</sup> Indeed, we are witnessing the first tentative – but welcome – steps to critically understand and explain the nature of these dynamics within New Zealand’s security contexts, wherein ‘National security’ is increasingly being viewed as the fundamental “condition which permits the citizens of a state to go about their daily business free from fear and able to make the most of opportunities to advance their way of life.”<sup>219</sup> Yet, from this perspective, *Defence White Paper 2010*’s almost myopic focus upon and reinforcement of prevailing state-centric approaches – which conceives the security of the state as an end in itself – appears paradoxical and problematic in philosophical, policy and practical terms. The continuing prevalence of the traditional approach adopted by New Zealand’s government in the form of *Defence White Paper 2010* appears symptomatic of an emerging conceptual delta in New Zealand’s *evolving* approach to security, and of the institutional dissonance between the Ministries of state responsible for “National Security.”

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<sup>216</sup> Buzan, *op.cit.*, p.62.

<sup>217</sup> see Ritchie, *op.cit.*, p.359; and see D. Held, *Political Theory Today*, Stanford University Press, 1995, pp.212-24; and Buzan, *op.cit.*, p.102.

<sup>218</sup> see Buzan, *ibid.*

<sup>219</sup> NZDPMC, *op.cit.*, p.3.

Overcoming many of these conceptual and structural limitations in New Zealand's approach to security, can be addressed through the evolution of a normative and utilitarian dialectic and via media between state and critical-human security ideas, concepts and practices. In principle, the notion of a congruent dialectic between state and human-centric imperatives provides a promising means of developing the security agenda in ways that more effectively address the diverse array of challenges and opportunities it presents.

The 'dialectic', in these circumstances, refers the potential for evolutions in contemporary security thinking and practice via the means of self-reflective critical inquiry. Intrinsically, this analysis stands outside predefined given frameworks and tests the logic and legitimacy of their origins and underlying assumptions, and challenges the 'truth of opinions' of the 'opposing social forces' it is investigating (state-centric and human-centric approaches to security in this instance).<sup>220</sup> In doing so, critical inquiry seeks to expose the inherent security problems of political and social life. It does so from a standpoint of critical distance, and then explores "the immanent potentialities in order to provide ideas and solutions that might promote emancipation ... from oppressive situations and structures."<sup>221</sup> Such a potentiality – and a core objective of the dialectic – is the establishment of a possible new synthesis, or broad consensus ('via media') between state and human securities. Indeed, as Kerr observes, such an outcome could lead to the normative formulation of an "ideal-type" conceptualisation and practice of security that is focussed, broader, deeper and inclusive in its perspectives; that understands and responds to the respective strengths and weaknesses, virtues and flaws, and causal and constitutive connections between state and human securities; and which is comprehensive in its approach and utilitarian in its effects.

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<sup>220</sup> see Kerr, *op.cit.*, p.2; and *The Oxford Concise Dictionary of Current English*, 7<sup>th</sup> Edition, 1981.

<sup>221</sup> Booth in Booth (ed), *op.cit.*, 2005, p. 7.

The development of such an “ideal-type” approach promises much in the way of addressing and alleviating insecurity and suffering. Yet, the most effective and likely means by which to realise these ideal outcomes – the dialectic and *via media* – are under challenge. The omnipresent threat to their evolution is the persistence of an apparent entrenched and trenchant separation that continues to prevail between state-centric and critical/human-centric security orthodoxies. However, addressing and overcoming this threat, is to broadly understand and recognise that the edifice of contemporary security is a modern, complex, adaptive and interdependent phenomenon that transcends traditional social, (geo-)political, and intellectual (theoretical/conceptual) divides. Consequently, as Booth elucidates

*“The challenges faced by humans at all levels demand a more effective [approach] to security: our time are far too complex and the world too varied for the reductionisms, parsimony, simplicities, regressive implications, silences and assumptions of [prevailing security orthodoxies.] ... The aim here is not to become overburdened by distant ideal structures, but to concentrate on reformist steps to make a better world somewhat more likely.”<sup>222</sup>*

Yet, in theoretical and conceptual contexts, overcoming the intransigence and resistance toward reforms, are not as insurmountable as one might first consider. Indeed the idea of an interaction, or dialectic, and common ground, or *via media*, between different security traditions is already recognised, and is realising increasing traction – tacitly *and* explicitly – within today’s security settings and disciplines. In this sense, Martin Wight has argued convincingly of the normative existence of this interaction and interdependence, wherein the traditions “are streams, with eddies and cross-current, sometimes interlacing and never for long confined to their own river bed ... they influence and cross-fertilise one another and they change without, I think, losing their inner identity.”<sup>223</sup>

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<sup>222</sup> Booth in Booth (ed), *op.cit.*, 2005, p.259; and Booth, *op.cit.*, 1991, p.324.

<sup>223</sup> Wight, *op.cit.*, pp.7-8.

The evidence to substantiate Wight's proposition of the existence and need for an interactive dialectic and transcendent via media – that encompasses theory, concept and practice – can be found within the DNA of the traditions themselves. For instance, Human Security approaches tend “to be pragmatic about finding solutions. It challenges the primacy of the state but is willing to concede the reality of state power and to work within the state to find solutions. Indeed, human security [approaches] tend to be essentially open-minded in a liberal sense regarding the state; it believes that the state, if properly constituted, *can* work in the interests of people.”<sup>224</sup> In a similar vein, we are increasingly witnessing the use of “elastic interpretations by state leaders of the more traditional concept of territorial sovereignty and vital interests. In the real world, it seems more sensible to consider human security and state security as being complimentary and mutually reinforcing, rather than as competing concepts.”<sup>225</sup> Consequently, Wight's rationale of, and for the dialectic and via media, is representative of an increasingly recognised and on-going need for innovation within the security field. Embracing this opportunity is to accede to the ultimate *moralpolitikal* and utilitarian viewpoint that “Humanity after all is indivisible ... In the context of many of the challenges facing humanity today, the collective interest is the national interest.”<sup>226</sup>

The apparent promise therefore, is that the conceptual and practical utility inherent in, and derived from the dialectic and via media, might then lead to the possibility of positive transformations within our security thinking and frameworks. At best, it might lead to a new normative synthesis of critical understanding and comprehensive cooperation between state and human-centric approaches to security. Such an affirmation supports the contention that state defence and security agendas *should* be increasingly influenced, if not shaped, by normative critical-human security considerations. Accordingly, harmonisation of these respective agendas is required. In this sense, both conceptions should necessarily be considered as complementary rather than

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<sup>224</sup> Newman *op.cit.*, 2010, p.88.

<sup>225</sup> Smith and Whelan, *op.cit.*, 2008, p.5.

<sup>226</sup> *The Economist*, 18 September 1999, pp.49-50.



incongruous. The realisation of the dialectic and via media therefore, must be based on the inclusive broadening of state security agendas and the correlative narrowing of human security approaches.

Certainly, corresponding transformations in each security rubric is considered imperative to realising effective theoretical, conceptual reconciliation and thus the accrual of universal analytical and policy value within contemporary settings. This will then enable subsequent development of more effective practical response programmes that operate at the level of chronic insecurities. Today's security approaches must envision comprehensive, integrated and inclusive solutions that remedy the array of complex and adaptive, traditional and emerging challenges that exist on an ever crowded security agenda. The realisation of this requires concerted efforts to develop norms, processes and institutions, which address insecurity in ways that are systematic not makeshift, comprehensive not compartmentalised, preventive not reactive. Consequently, the operation of the dialectic and via media between state and human securities is considered imperative to the development of relevant and purposive security infrastructures that strengthen individual and collective resilience, and which improves universal security and the quality of life for all.<sup>227</sup>

### **Bridging and Boundary Paradigms**

Importantly, from both practical and conceptual perspectives, seminal 'bridging' and 'boundary' paradigms have evolved that could be utilised to facilitate the state-human security dialectic and via media. Such paradigms are predicated upon a relational understanding in which the

*"state becomes, and is recognised as the mechanism by which people seek to achieve adequate levels of security against social threats. As the symbiosis between the state, society and the individual develops along more complex and productive lines, it necessarily leads to an interpretation of a harmonised concept of security in which the*

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<sup>227</sup> see Commission on Human Security, *op.cit.*, p. 11.

*state places great emphasis on values derived directly from the interests of the individual citizens."*<sup>228</sup>

In many respects, human security has *advanced* in responsive measure to the evolution of this state-citizen relationship. This evolution also addresses a critical conceptual void in our critical appreciation of today's diffuse and manifold security dynamics, challenges and opportunities, and in the analogous requirement for comprehensive approaches and responses to such. Consequently, the utility of human security stems from its 'privileged' location as an influential bridging paradigm between traditional state-centric and broader critical approaches to security.

Fundamentally, human-centred approaches to security seek to impact people's lives constructive and progressive ways. Yet unlike other critical strands – wary of co-option within prevailing security strictures and structures – Human Security seeks positive influence through a proactive engagement with state security agendas and policies. In this respect, normative 'critical' strands, which claim to seek in change the world for the better, could therefore employ human security as a conceptual bridge between critical and statist approaches to security.<sup>229</sup>

As a problem-solving conception which engages with policymaking, Human Security provides scope for non-traditional security ideas to influence and gain traction within policy and practical program settings. Human Security, given its policy and practical relevance, can therefore serve as a conduit for advancing critical perspectives within prevailing security structures and institutions. Importantly though, human security does so by appropriately interrogating state security frames, wherein the concept operates less as policy agenda within existing political structures and discourses, but more as a

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<sup>228</sup> Buzan, *op.cit.*, pp.38-39.

<sup>229</sup> see Newman, *op.cit.*, 2010, p.92.

necessary critique to those practices.<sup>230</sup> Human Security's value in this sense is derived directly from its *uncompromised* 'shaping' properties, and its capacity to demonstrate the indivisibility between sources of insecurity. In effect, human security links the emancipatory aspirations and needs of the individual (and universal Humanity) to the security of the state, and so affirms Waever's proposition that state "security is influenced in important ways by *dynamics* at the level of the individual."<sup>231</sup>

Correspondingly, in the context of normatively influencing state security agendas, Human Security has been appropriately described as a 'boundary object.' The boundary concept remains flexible enough to be used by diverse parties, while robust enough to retain shared meaning across this range of users. It must be more than a general idea like equity or freedom; "it should span between ideals, life situations and actions."<sup>232</sup> In this sense, Human Security can establish its policy resonance and practical efficacy "when treated as an *ethos* rather than an agenda to be slotted into existing security paradigms. Used in this way, the narratives of human security are understood to have the potential to open discussions of security to public debates about the nature of policies towards foreign states and the demand that decisions are made first and foremost with the 'Other' in mind."<sup>233</sup>

## Conclusions

In 2012, against the backdrop of an era framed by the globalisation and bifurcation, our estimation and understanding of security stands at a theoretical, conceptual, and practical crossroad. Indeed, the nature of contemporary security is testimony to "our living in a world more interdependent than ever before. Individuals, societies, states and all Humanity depend much more on the acts or omissions of 'others' for their security and

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<sup>230</sup> see Glasius, *op.cit.*, p. 39.

<sup>231</sup> Waever, *op.cit.*, p. 49.

<sup>232</sup> D. Gasper, 'Securing Humanity: Situating "Human Security" as Concept and Discourse', in *Journal of Human Development*, Vol 6(2), 2005, pp.236-237.

<sup>233</sup> Christie, *op.cit.*, p. 184.

even for their survival.”<sup>234</sup> Under such conditions, we face crucial choices – individually *and* collectively – about the meaning(s) we ascribe to security, and in relation to what makes security meaningful. As a fundamental basis for consideration, this requires us to understand that “security *is* a legitimate quest for all;”<sup>235</sup> and that the provision of sustainable security would appear to require approaches that critically challenge, co-exist with, and – where necessary – go beyond prevailing realist-inspired discourses. In this sense, one could rightly assume that such choice would proffer hope for bold, innovative and critical thinking about the continued relevance, utility and legitimacy of our current approaches to security. Certainly, while the pervasive aspects of globalisation and bifurcation have generated more intensive questioning about contemporary security – in light of the Human tragedies in Africa and the Balkans throughout the 1990s, and particularly in the wake of the September 11 attacks – it is apparent that traditional statist approaches continue to prevail and shape mainstream academic, political and policy interpretations of today’s security dynamics.<sup>236</sup>

In acknowledging that the continuing primacy of the state in world affairs seems a firm reality for the foreseeable future, and appreciating that the state will remain the principle agent for addressing insecurity, this thesis understands that traditional conceptions of state security are a necessary – but not wholly sufficient – condition of human welfare within today’s settings.<sup>237</sup> Indeed, since the end of the Cold War there has been a “growing unease with the traditional concept of security, which privileges the state and emphasises material power.”<sup>238</sup> In this respect, it is increasingly recognised that the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century are, in many respects, broader in scope, range and consequence, and more complex than the traditional state and

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<sup>234</sup> see Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, New York, 2003, p. 12.

<sup>235</sup> A. Westing, ‘The Environmental Component of Comprehensive security’, in *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol 20(2), 1989, p.129.

<sup>236</sup> see P. Bilgin and A. Morton, ‘Rethinking State Failure’, in D. Lambach and T. Dibel (eds), *State Failure Revisited: Globalisation of Security and Neighbourhood Effects*, Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisberg-Essen, 2007, p.16.

<sup>237</sup> see Buzan, *op.cit.*, p.371; and Newman, *op.cit.*, 2009, p.9.

<sup>238</sup> Booth, *op.cit.*, 1991, p.317.

international security institutions and policies designed to address them. In this profoundly changing environment therefore, the requirement to rethink politics and power, and specifically the purpose and role of what might be called 'state security', has become both necessary and unavoidable.

Yet, while security is increasingly viewed as a universally indivisible objective for all, the state – as the dominant unit of order and organisation – continues to occupy the privileged site as the *natural* focus of security. In this respect, security's eminent concern is with state sovereignty, centrality and survival; and the maximisation of security through strategic pursuit of national interests that consolidates power at the level of the state. The New Zealand approach to security – as articulated in the *Defence White Paper 2010* – is reflective of the persistence of state-centrism, and symptomatic of this form of consolidation. However, as I have demonstrated, the most inherent risk of such a narrow and reductionist consolidation, is its potential to perpetuate and exacerbate insecurity and suffering through the marginalisation, exclusion or subjugation of individuals, communities, and/or universal 'freedoms' in deference to the state. In such instances – and in its most extreme and repressive of forms – this consolidation threatens to perpetuate the paradoxical condition by which the state becomes the focal cause of insecurity, rather than the primary source of security. As a consequence, state-centric security approaches are proving increasingly limited, limiting, ineffectual and discordant with the security realities of today.

Addressing these limitations, and the resulting void in our contemporary security thinking and practice, must therefore be a focal objective in any reconceptualisation of security. In doing so, we must seek to overcome the corrosive impacts that materialise with the persistence of objectively narrow and static statist approaches that are at once reductionist, and have imposed just one image of a state-centric, geo-strategically framed *reality*. Achieving more positive, openly subjective and inclusive outcomes in this sense, can be realised through the integration of more critical, human-centric perspectives

and approaches that normatively progress our consideration and understanding of security and insecurity.

As I have argued, understanding and addressing (in)security within contemporary settings, requires us to critically focus, broaden and deepen our perspectives. Indeed, in the “strategic action undertaken to bring about change, there is no sounder basis than *immanent critique* to discover the latent potentials in situations on which to build political and social progress.”<sup>239</sup> To this end, Critical approaches to security, such as Human Security – through processes of political and social emancipation – are committed to understanding and resolving the (in)security of real people in real places. Such approaches do so through the means of ‘critique’, which entails the exploration of what is ‘real’, and what is reliable knowledge. In applying critique, Critical approaches stand outside the given frameworks and units of analysis they are exploring, and engage with concrete social and political issues, with the aim of maximising and optimising opportunities for enhancing security, community and emancipation, at all levels of existence, and in the interests of universal Humanity. In this sense, as agents of structural, social and political emancipation, Critical approaches derive much of their value and utility by drawing on a progressive and inclusive agenda that is at once broader, deeper and more focussed than state-centric security conceptions.

The potency of Critical approaches such as Human Security stems from the ability to illuminate those threat and vulnerability concerns which transcend geopolitical borders, and structural, material notions of state power and interest. The argument here is that human security narratives not only provide space for the inclusion of a wider range of issues, [but they] allow us to focus on issues that have been occluded by previous state-centric security practices.<sup>240</sup> Importantly though, unlike other critical conceptions, Human Security does so by neither delegitimizing nor devaluing the state without due

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<sup>239</sup> Booth in Booth (ed), *op.cit.*, 2005, p.263.

<sup>240</sup> see Christie, *op.cit.*, 2010, pp.177-178.

cause or justification. Rather, the critical utility of Human Security is derived from situating the state in contemporary settings where its relative value and relevance as a security referent and agent can be more accurately assessed and optimised.

In broader settings, the relevance Human Security lies in its exploration of the network of connections and contradictions between personal security and the security of the state. The state is a major source of both threats to and security for individuals. Individuals provide much of the reason for, and some of the limits to, the security-seeking activities of the state. This leads directly to questions about the basic nature of the state, and the relationship between states, their citizens, and individuals.<sup>241</sup> Critically speaking, in understanding the constitutive and causal dynamics of this relationship, Human Security seeks to sanctify the individual – or people collectively – as a legitimate *referent* of security in a mutually constitutive relationship with the state. However, for such a relationship to exist necessarily implies the state – when its instruments of power are applied in comprehensive, cooperative, moral, ethical and humane ways – *can* and *should* remain the most effective guarantors of human security.

In many respects, the increasing recognition of the existence of this normative state-citizen (human) security compact, is reflective of the emergence of a utilitarian dialectic and *via media* between state-centric and human-centric security approaches which have been cast as hitherto inimical. The dialectic is between two referent objects – the state and people – wherein these two ‘organisms’ assume the status moral and political equivalency and indivisibility. It recognises that although security is the objective of individuals, it can only be achieved through collective political and social processes. Correspondingly, it acknowledges that the state – and state sovereignty – must serve and support the people from which it draws its legitimacy. The apparent promise therefore, is that the conceptual and practical utility inherent in, and

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<sup>241</sup> see Buzan, *op.cit.*, 1991, p.35.

derived from the notions of dialectic and via media, might then lead to positive transformations within our security thinking and frameworks. At best, it might result in a new normative synthesis of critical understanding and comprehensive cooperation between state and human approaches to security through the establishment of a dynamic via media that adjusts subject to the relative security context or need.

Such affirmations support the contention that state defence and security agendas *should* be increasingly influenced, if not shaped, by critical perspectives and human security considerations. Accordingly, harmonisation of these respective agendas is required. To this end, from both practical and conceptual perspectives, seminal 'bridging' and 'boundary' paradigms could be utilised to facilitate an integration, or cooperation between, state and human securities. Indeed, as I have demonstrated, the situation of human security, as a 'pluralising' bridging and boundary concept fulfils a furtive but *tactile* significance. Human security represents a normative and utilitarian step towards the potential realisation of a comprehensive security compact that conceptually reconciles, practically integrates and philosophically recognises an 'ideal-type' duality of state *and* individual. Importantly, in doing so, it is hoped that security conceived in such a way, will contribute to a critical evolution in New Zealand's understanding of, and approach to, security. This will be realised by seeking to promote a truly comprehensive – national – approach that conceives security as an instrumental value which promotes a more inclusive and integrative humanity; and that correspondingly refocuses New Zealand's security *elites* from their almost exclusive focus and continuing preoccupation with state-centric orthodoxies which promote the somewhat binary idea of security *against* others. This objective will form the basis for exploration and discussion in Chapter Three of this Thesis.



### Chapter 3: TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO SECURITY

#### Introduction

Because the condition of security is of such importance to 'All' – because it is primordial and deeply politicised – to have something labelled security is to give it priority on the agenda. Security, above all, is a powerful social and political concept; it is the sort of word that energises opinion and moves material power.<sup>242</sup> Yet, as this Thesis has highlighted, it is becoming increasingly acknowledged that the global strategic contours are shifting, and the mosaic of security challenges confronting the 21<sup>st</sup> Century are broader, more complex, and interdependent than the prevailing – national and international – security frameworks and institutions designed to *manage* them. Multi-dimensional and interconnected, these non-traditional security issues are moving from the periphery to the centre of security concerns of both states and individuals. Collectively, and concordant with the persistence of traditional strategic threats, they represent the emergence of a new security agenda that has the capacity to challenge the security of states and human survival in ways that will demand the renewed attention of security elites and policymakers everywhere.<sup>243</sup> To this end, as United States Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton observed

*"To meet these 21<sup>st</sup> Century challenges, we need to use new tools, the new 21<sup>st</sup> Century statecraft. And we've begun to do that. We have seen the possibilities of what can happen when ordinary citizens are empowered."*<sup>244</sup>

Indeed, as I have demonstrated, the key conclusion to be drawn from my analysis of the limitations of prevailing statist security approaches is that a more comprehensive concept of security is required. As I have argued, such a concept should be normatively informed by critical – focussed, broader deeper, and inclusive – perspectives, and *could* utilise Human Security as a 'bridge' to,

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<sup>242</sup> see Booth, in Booth (ed), *op.cit.*, p.23.

<sup>243</sup> see Dupont, *op.cit.*, p. 103.

<sup>244</sup> H. Clinton, *op.cit.*

and means of gaining traction within 'real world' policy circles. Such an option, I believe, **must** be pragmatically considered by proponents of a critical approach, particularly if we are to accept their claims of being committed to understanding and resolving the (in)security real people in real places by engaging "with concrete issues in world politics, with the aim of maximising opportunities for enhancing security, community, and emancipation in the human interest."<sup>245</sup> With this in mind, such a concept must understand and acknowledge that the security of the state and international system is both complimentary to, and coterminous with that of the individual and universal Humanity. Importantly this requires a form of philosophical and theoretical harmony, and conceptual and practical accord between critical and human security approaches, *and* prevailing state-centric security approaches. To do so is to recognise that these non-traditional and state security approaches are complimentary and mutually reinforcing, and have the capacity to "strengthen the institutional policies that link individuals and the state – and the state with a global world."<sup>246</sup>

While recognising that the existing (inter)national security system is not optimally designed to prevent and deal effectively with new types of security threats, overcoming these limitations necessarily require the understanding that 'weak' institutions are a common factor in explaining repeated cycles of insecurity and violence. In this respect, given our moral obligation to others, and our 'enlightened' self-interests – and those of states – we need to establish new frameworks that allow us to meet our responsibilities to others in today's interdependent world, while also being able to deal with an increasingly heterogeneous security environment.<sup>247</sup>

To this end, at institutional, policy and operational levels, it is increasingly understood that a modern comprehensive approach, that integrates all sectors of an ever evolving security community, will be fundamental to addressing

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<sup>245</sup> Booth in Booth (ed), *op.cit.*, 2005, p.275.

<sup>246</sup> Commission on Human Security (CHS), *Human Security Now*, New York, 2003, p.2.

<sup>247</sup> see World Bank, *op.cit.*, pp. 8 – 10; CHS, *op.cit.*, p.12; and Ungerer, *op.cit.*, p.1.

both contemporary and future security challenges. Indeed, transforming and building frameworks and institutions that provide comprehensive, universal security and justice is considered essential to breaking cycles of state and human insecurity, and to restoring, ensuring and sustaining the confidence of populations.<sup>248</sup> In this respect, Buzan is correct in his dialectical assessment that

*“some sense can be made of individual, [state] and international security, and of [human], military, political, societal, economic and environmental security as ideas in their own right. But a full [and comprehensive] understanding of each can only be gained if it is related to the others. Attempts to treat security as if it was confined to any single level or any single sector invite serious distortions of understanding.”*<sup>249</sup>

In a crucial development in this direction, the utility of a comprehensive approach is being intrinsically linked to a critically influenced security understanding of the policy and operational need for an emphasis on the ‘human dimension’ within national security considerations.<sup>250</sup> Consequently, in seeking to address today’s security agenda, states such as New Zealand are coming to acknowledge – in both tactic and explicit terms – that their current national security architectures and systems are limited in design, and increasingly misaligned with dynamic and rapidly changing global and national security environments.<sup>251</sup>

In acknowledging the limitations of its existing structures, and in seeking to reform its contemporary approach to security, New Zealand has taken this first crucial and profound step forward and towards “magnifying the national security effort; [wherein] work on developing a comprehensive national security framework, led by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, is already underway.”<sup>252</sup> To date, this resulted in the issuing of New Zealand’s

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<sup>248</sup> see World Bank, *op.cit.*, p. xi.

<sup>249</sup> Buzan, *op.cit.*, 1991, p.102.

<sup>250</sup> see ABCA, *op.cit.*, 2012, pp. i-ii.

<sup>251</sup> for examples see C. Ungerer, ‘Australia’s national security institutions: Reform and renewal’, *Special Report – Issue 34*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), 2010, p.1.

<sup>252</sup> NZMOD, *op.cit.*, p.20.

first comprehensive appraisal of, and statement on 'National Security' in the form of *New Zealand's National Security System*. Importantly, this publication has the potential to be viewed as normative progress towards the accommodation – and possible formal recognition – of the state-human security dialectic and via media. In this sense, it is hoped that New Zealand's *National Security System* can be viewed as an opportunity to 'open space' for the consideration of critical, and more particularly, human security perspectives within the nation's security policy and academic settings. Such an accommodation could lead to the eventual establishment of a National Security Strategy, and the development of a truly comprehensive Approach to Security that is normatively informed and complimented by critical and human security imperatives. Yet, while such advancements have been important and positive, I will contend that any enduring utility derived from these reforms, risks being undermined by the persistence of increasingly dissonant and discordant institutional influences seemingly resistant to such change.

As my Thesis has demonstrated throughout, obstacles to developing open, integrated and inclusive comprehensive approaches to security are, "in the first instance, conceptual and revolve around contested definitional parameters and ambiguous relationships between theory and practice."<sup>253</sup> In this respect, despite an increasing practical pragmatism in security programmatic and operational senses, New Zealand's state-centric strategic doctrine, policy and culture have been slow and dogmatically resistant in adjusting to the challenges of a new bifurcated and globalised security environment. Indeed, in a contemporary security sense, the disjunction between New Zealand's strategic rationale and institutional frameworks, and security practice have become sharp, creating what can be styled a 'Tyranny of Dissonance.'

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<sup>253</sup> Evans, *op.cit.*, 2007, p.113.

Understanding and addressing this sense of dissonance has been a core theme and focal objective of this Thesis. The character of today's globalised and bifurcated security environment is too expansive and complex for mastery by any single Ministry of State. The combination of 'global social' networks "challenge not simply the traditional defence of the state, but increasingly the security of society and its citizens."<sup>254</sup> This deeper reality has led observers such as Behm, Fruhling, Korski, Brenchly and Forrest to recognise the inherent need for reform within prevailing security approaches and institutions.<sup>255</sup> I argue that such reform should occur in ways that are comprehensive in nature; open, inclusive and integrated in practice; normative and utilitarian in effect and outcome; and underwritten by a conception that is focussed, broader and deeper in its perspectives. As this Chapter will establish, coherently and cohesively reconceptualising security in this way, for use in a New Zealand milieu, can be accomplished around the central notion of advancing the social compact between the state, society, and the citizen; while accommodating the vulnerabilities of the state, the individual, and encompassing Humanity.

### **A New Security Agenda: New Zealand's National Security System**

In April 2011, the New Zealand Government – through the medium of *New Zealand's National Security System (NSS)* – committed itself to a reconceptualisation of the nation's contemporary approach to security. The NSS establishes, for the first time, a comprehensive view of New Zealand's security; and frames a "comprehensive concept of national security."<sup>256</sup> In doing so, the NSS has – somewhat tacitly – established a normative basis that that could eventually lead to a formal recognition of human security imperatives, the existence of the state-human security dialectic, and the corresponding realisation of a more open, inclusive and balanced accord (via

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<sup>254</sup> Evans, *op.cit.*, 2007, p.113.

<sup>255</sup> for examples see Behm, *op.cit.*, 2007; F. Brenchley, 'False Sense of Security', in *The Diplomat*, 2006; S. Forrest, 'Towards a National Security Strategy for Australia', in *Australian Army Journal*, Vol 5(1), 2007; S. Fruhling, 'Balancing Australia's Strategic Commitments', in *Security Challenges*, Vol 3(3), 2007; and D. Korski, 'British Civil-Military Integration: The History and Next Steps', in *The RUSI Journal*, Vol 154(6), 2009.

<sup>256</sup> NZDPMC, *op.cit.*, p.3.

media) within New Zealand's security policy settings. The NSS does so by defining New Zealand's national security as

*"the condition which permits the citizens of a state to go about their daily business confidently free from fear and able to make the most of opportunities to advance their way of life ...National security goals should be pursued in an accountable way, which meets the Government's responsibility to protect New Zealand, its people, and its interests, while respecting civil liberties and the rule of law."*<sup>257</sup>

Such a transformation within New Zealand's security understanding must be considered a crucial development and breakthrough opportunity for increasing the consideration of critical, and particularly, human security imperatives. Indeed, the above statement is reflective of the human security proposition of 'Sovereignty as Responsibility', wherein human security and state security are mutually constitutive, for a "state that protects its citizens and respects their rights is ultimately one that enjoys legitimacy and support."<sup>258</sup> In doing so, New Zealand's adoption of the comprehensive concept of national security has necessarily (re)established the compact between state and citizen. Resultantly, it has also, somewhat unintentionally, critically '*focussed*' and elevated human security imperatives – "New Zealanders": their needs and aspirations, vulnerabilities and fears – to a status of comparative consequence in the state's thinking. In this respect and in a normative sense, the NSS can be viewed as recognising the fundamental importance of "all activities in the national security arena [being] examined for their collective effects on core values – justice, freedom, legitimate and accountable government, the rule of law, tolerance, opportunity for all, and human rights."<sup>259</sup> Such an approach represent both an important break from exclusive state-centric calculations like those which persist in *Defence White Paper 2010*; while increasingly opening our eyes to the all-too-real security issues of people.

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<sup>257</sup> NZDPMC, *op.cit.*, p.3.

<sup>258</sup> Krause, *op.cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>259</sup> NZDPMC, *op.cit.*, p.16.

Yet, while New Zealand's steps to reconceptualise security represents quantum normative progress, one can argue in a critical sense, that it remains somewhat limited and limiting by its failure to address the utilitarian imperatives of universal Humanity. It does so in ways fail to fully appreciate the dynamics of the globalisation and bifurcation of security; that frames human security as an instrumentally exclusive condition reserved for the recognised 'citizens of a state'; and which reinforces binary distinctions between human beings and the notion of 'other' as discussed in Chapter 2 of this Thesis. In order to realise a truly open and inclusive conception of security, redressing such fundamental limitations within the NSS is essential. Indeed, such an outcome could be achieved wherein human security considerations should be explicitly acknowledged and explained as an integrated, and integrative, element of New Zealand's comprehensive approach to national security. To this end, the formulation of a National Security Strategy for New Zealand that is more critically focussed, broader and deeper in its perspectives, accords such an opportunity. In doing so, to realise any sense of enduring relevance, utility and legitimacy, this strategy must allow New Zealand to meet its moral obligations and responsibilities to others in today's interdependent world, and must necessarily include "positions about fundamentally universal principles and common values."<sup>260</sup>

As Chapter 1 explained, our era is destined to be marked by complexity and deep change. Indeed major social change, underwritten by people's desire to participate in processes that shape their lives, is accelerating at a rate fast enough to challenge the adaptive capacities of most state polities and societies.<sup>261</sup> Consequently, under such conditions it is becoming increasingly "dangerous to make policy in the short term or to arbitrarily diminish the universe of possibilities by ideologically limiting policy choices."<sup>262</sup> Increasingly, New Zealand is recognising that today's challenges are complex and crosscutting: simultaneously engaging social, political and security

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<sup>260</sup> Zelikow, *op.cit.*, 2003, p.20.

<sup>261</sup> see L. Fuerth, 'Operationalizing Anticipatory Governance', in *Prism*, Vol 2(4), 2010, p. 31.

<sup>262</sup> Feurth, *op.cit.*

systems in ways which “inevitably has the effect of eroding the customary boundaries that differentiate bureaucratic concepts and missions that are based on them.”<sup>263</sup>

In the adoption of a comprehensive concept and approach as its security *leit-motif*, New Zealand has purposefully sought to broaden security beyond its traditional emphasis of “protecting the State against military threats or political violence.”<sup>264</sup> As the NSS describes, New Zealand is transitioning to an idea of security that transcends purely physical, material and power-oriented dimensions. As the NSS recognises

*“National security policies were traditionally focused on protecting the State against military threats or political violence. While responding to such threats remains a fundamental responsibility of government, modern concepts of national security manage civil contingencies and societal risks alongside these traditional priorities. [Importantly, the NSS understands] that the risks faced by modern societies extend well beyond national borders.”*<sup>265</sup>

In this sense the release of the NSS is representative of New Zealand entering “the ‘broadening and deepening’ phase of conceptualising security.”<sup>266</sup> Today, in the practical construction and application of its comprehensive concept, New Zealand identifies and understands its security challenges – and those confronting New Zealanders and common Humanity – on a broader and deeper “‘riskscape’ ... [and] ‘all-hazards’ basis.”<sup>267</sup>

As I have demonstrated, the contemporary security environment has been routinely defined as uncertain, complex and proliferated with multidimensional, interdependent security risks. ‘Risk’ in this context, as Ritchie explains,

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<sup>263</sup> Feurth, *op.cit.*, p.33.

<sup>264</sup> NZDPMC, *op.cit.*, p.4.

<sup>265</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>266</sup> Burke, *op.cit.*, 2007, p.4.

<sup>267</sup> NZDPMC, *op.cit.*, pp.5 and 21-23.



*“can be defined as a product of the integration of [people], states and societies into globalised economic, social, military and political processes and relationships, and the ensuing vulnerability to system changes and shocks. Vulnerability generates risk, which fosters insecurity.”*<sup>268</sup>

Such an appreciation is shaping New Zealand’s *deeper* understanding of the contemporary riskscape. In New Zealand’s case, the notion of security now seeks to address “a mix of traditional and newly emerging risks [in which ...] a number of new vectors of harm are emerging that have the potential to affect security at the personal as well as state level.”<sup>269</sup> Under such conditions, New Zealand citizens can be considered enmeshed within interdependent global-social networks of opportunity and vulnerability, which have the correlative capacity to generate security and insecurity across multiple indices of state and human security.<sup>270</sup> In effectively confronting the challenges the contemporary riskscape presents, while maximising opportunities to enhance state and human security and resilience, New Zealand has recognised that its security institutions and practices need to change.

As the *Human Development Report 2011* attests, ‘weak’ institutions are a common factor in explaining repeated cycles of insecurity and violence.<sup>271</sup> Transforming and building strong and legitimate institutions that provide security and justice for ‘All’ is therefore central to breaking cycles of insecurity; and to restoring, ensuring, and sustaining the confidence and trust of populations. This requires all states to continually re-evaluate their security institutions to ensure their operations are effectively – legally and morally – ensuring state and individual security. In this respect, New Zealand’s adoption of an expanded “approach to risk identification and risk response, [and the development of] a more open and transparent national security

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<sup>268</sup> see Ritchie, *op.cit.*, p.364.

<sup>269</sup> NZDPMC, *op.cit.*, p.21.

<sup>270</sup> Ritchie, *op.cit.*, p.364.

<sup>271</sup> see World Bank, *op.cit.*, pp. 8 – 10.

architecture”<sup>272</sup>, is normatively representative of such utilitarian and transformational change. Indeed, fostering a contemporary culture of institutional ‘openness’ and ‘transparency’, will serve to support the emergence of a New Zealand state-human security dialectic; while contributing to the evolution of ‘stronger’ and perceptibly more legitimate institutions that are capable of effectively addressing today’s security challenges.

Correspondingly, in seeking to address state and human insecurity in practically meaningful and worthwhile ways, the NSS somewhat tacitly recognises that the New Zealand state *and* society must now necessarily comprise a reformed national security community. Importantly, it must be a community that operates “in an integrated and networked [manner, and] works together to manage and respond to national security issues.”<sup>273</sup> To this end, the NSS has the capacity to serve as the conceptual and practical catalyst for both reconciling the state with its citizens, and binding the detailed and diverse operations of New Zealand’s security institutions into a coherent, coordinated and integrated network. In this respect, the NSS contributing to the realisation of a more comprehensive, and ‘focussed, broader deeper, and inclusive’ appreciation of New Zealand’s security than ever before. In doing so it further affirms the utility of the state-human security dialectic and via media by recognising that New Zealand’s “capacity to deal with the full range of national security challenges requires the system to be integrated, [and] able to leverage partnerships between government agencies ... and individuals.”<sup>274</sup>

### **The Tyranny of Dissonance**

For New Zealand, addressing the type of complex security conditions outlined in Chapter 1, does not lend itself to the single-dimensioned strategic approaches that are characteristic of the traditional state-centric security paradigm. Yet, although more ‘comprehensive’ – and critically attuned – ideas are increasingly influencing New Zealand’s contemporary conception of

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<sup>272</sup> NZDPMC, *op.cit.*, p.5.

<sup>273</sup> NZDPMC, *op.cit.*, pp.3-4.

<sup>274</sup> *ibid.*, p.5.

security, there is explicit recognition that some of the nation's security "institutions and practices have remained compartmentalised or narrowly focussed."<sup>275</sup> While there have been centralised efforts to transition New Zealand to a comprehensive approach to security, and in doing so establish a truly integrated and cohesive 'Security System', overcoming apparent and persistent cultural, conceptual and operational dissonance within and between the nation's security agencies remains a somewhat aspirational reform objective.

As Lasswell presciently observed in 1950, there "are no experts in national security, there are only experts in aspects of the problem."<sup>276</sup> In responding to the security challenges of today, it is becoming increasingly recognised therefore that effective statecraft – Clinton's normative notion of "*new 21<sup>st</sup> Century statecraft*" – should be based upon the comprehensive and utilitarian interplay of all sources of legitimate national power. To this end, Kilcullen argues that patterns of statecraft are shaped by a nation's strategic culture, which drives national strategy, national approaches to security and policy pragmatism. However, like other forms of culture, strategic culture changes slowly, if at all. Therefore, even a perfect security approach, and policy such as the NSS, is likely to fail if it is incongruous with New Zealand's strategic culture, and the – often entrenched – processes of national statecraft.<sup>277</sup> In this respect, particularly at the institutional level, this sense of cultural, conceptual and practical dissonance continues to pervade New Zealand's contemporary security system.

The release of the NSS, clearly defines the parameters of New Zealand's comprehensive approach security, and the corresponding requirement for an integrated national security community that engages all elements of both the state and society, and at all levels. In doing so, the NSS has sought to realise the somewhat normative and utilitarian establishment of a cohesive and truly

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<sup>275</sup> NZDPMC, *op.cit.*, p.10.

<sup>276</sup> H. Lasswell, *National Security and Individual Freedom*, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1950.

<sup>277</sup> see Kilcullen, *op.cit.*, p.46.

national security culture. Yet problematically, the notion of a unified 'national security culture' remains, as yet, undefined and unquantifiable – and potentially unattainable given the persistence of somewhat fragmented and often compartmentalised relationships between New Zealand's security institutions. Indeed, as Ungerer highlights, within emerging national communities "it may be possible to identify loose affiliations across government ... but these sub-cultural groupings don't often talk to each other. Sometimes, they are in direct disagreement. None could be said to be fully cohesive, in the sense of working towards a shared purpose or goal."<sup>278</sup> Within New Zealand's security community Burnett affirms this view where he considers the delivery of security outcomes is achieved predominantly by the actions of agencies operating independently without a common strategic security context, and without a central decision-making authority for directing the delivery of the national security agenda. Burnett goes further by contending that New Zealand's view of, and approach to security is both limited and fragmented, with the most obvious shortcoming remaining the lack of a national Security Strategy that is relevant, coherent and congruent with the realities of the contemporary security environment.<sup>279</sup>

Intrinsically linked to such expressions of dissonance, is a pervading sense of institutional inertia and approaching obsolescence that stems from the resistance to reform and undertake renewal. New Zealand's national security institutions and frameworks that were principally designed to respond to relatively predictable geo-strategic patterns and threat-based trends, are appearing increasingly insufficient to manage the complexities of the modern bifurcated and globalised security environment. Indeed, as Ungerer further observes security institutions designed for another era "now seem slow and cumbersome in the face of new security challenges. Large departments of state

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<sup>278</sup> Ungerer, *op.cit.*, June 2010, p. 3.

<sup>279</sup> see K. Burnett, *Strategic Management of National Security in the New Zealand State Services*, Research Report, Massey University, 2010, pp.4-5; 15; 55-59; and 62-3.

are often inward looking and fail to adapt quickly to the changes in the external security environment.”<sup>280</sup>

The persistence of these conditions at the functional level within New Zealand’s security community is, again, culturally reflective of the narrow and somewhat dysfunctional and myopic *institutional* relationship between the ministries and agencies of state. To this end, if New Zealand is to determine its security requirements adequately over the next couple of decades, it must understand the forces driving strategic change. This will then enable the development of comprehensive and integrated policies that translate into sensible and sustainable security approaches. This requires innovative approaches to policy making, and also necessitates an end to the compartmentalised ‘silos’ within which much of New Zealand’s security policy is developed.<sup>281</sup> This stands as further evidence of state-centrism and circumscribed policies which demonstrate institutional intransigence and prejudice, and an ‘opaque’ appreciation of the changed character and nuances of the contemporary security environment. It also underpins an institutional reluctance or unwillingness to consider and/or embrace alternative, increasingly relevant and ‘emancipatory’ security paradigms.

### **A National Security Strategy for New Zealand**

While the *National Security System* provides a meaningful and worthwhile frame for conceptualisation of, and approach to security, addressing fundamental strategic culture and institutional limitations could be achieved through the establishment of a formalised and cohesive National Security Strategy for New Zealand. Any future New Zealand security strategy should reflect the state-human security dialectic, while seeking the coordination and integration of instruments of state and society, and correlate these with a seamless understanding of the contemporary security environment in which they should be contextually situated.

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<sup>280</sup> Ungerer, *op.cit.*, September 2010, p. 2.

<sup>281</sup> see Behm, *op.cit.*, p. 20.

Necessarily, any such strategy must be comprehensive in its 'means' and 'ways' and utilitarian in its 'ends' – understanding and accommodating the security needs of the state, individual and universal Humanity. Realising such an outcome, should necessarily focus on developing a holistic approach that strikes a balanced accord between respective 'means, ways and ends' equations applied to specific security incidents, issues or underlying themes. A unifying conception of this nature, and a unified understanding and vision of New Zealand's security environment would facilitate interagency and 'all-of-government' networks that engender institutional and cultural synergy and a truly national strategic focus. This would allow the New Zealand government to arrive at a more accurate assessment of the risks – and threats – to which both priority and resources must be afforded.<sup>282</sup> Importantly, such outcomes should be derived from a sense of 'shared understanding' wherein each entity/institution engaged within New Zealand's security system contributes a distinctive set of professional, technical, and cultural disciplines, values and perceptions. This broad basis of talent and perspective is central to realising a critical appreciation of security by providing breadth, depth and resilience to policy and program analysis, planning, execution and assessment; while contributing to the development of a common baseline on which risk assessments, judgements and decisions can be made. 'Shared understanding' in this respect, must be derived from a single, unambiguous and achievable touchstone for all security activity – the National Security Strategy.

"The new security game for the 21<sup>st</sup> century requires a comprehensive approach and a long-term perspective if it is to begin to cope with the expanding security agenda."<sup>283</sup> Therefore, the realisation of a truly effective National Security Strategy for New Zealand will require fundamental reform of the nation's approach to governance. As highlighted, addressing today's array of security challenges requires governance techniques that are 'anticipatory' in

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<sup>282</sup> see Evans, *op.cit.*, 2007, p.127.

<sup>283</sup> K. Booth, *op.cit.*, 1991, p.322.

nature. To this end, the notion of 'Anticipatory Governance' as proposed by Feurth, may provide a sound basis for the cultural and institutional change required within New Zealand security. As Feurth describes,

*"Anticipatory governance is a system of institutional networks, rules, and norms that provides a way to use ... networks ... for the purpose of reducing risk and increasing capacity to respond to events at earlier rather than later stages of development."*<sup>284</sup>

Indeed, so imperative is such a reform considered to understanding and addressing today's security challenges, Ungerer argues persuasively that better coordination, inclusion and integration within national security communities could be achieved by making such networks the main functional design feature of national security strategies.<sup>285</sup> Anticipatory Governance (AG) would provide New Zealand with the capacity to identify, understand and monitor complex security events and dynamics as they presented on the 'horizon.' Importantly, it would provide New Zealand's security institutions with the ability to adjust rapidly to the interactions between security policy and problem. This sense of inherent agility within the AG system allows it to more effectively understand, interact and operate within complex and adaptive security environments and events, rather than traditional linear and threat-based frames. Presently, New Zealand's prevailing security framework represents a legacy entrenched within increasingly outmoded 20<sup>th</sup> century concepts for organisation. This vertical mode of organisation (silos) is predicated on a traditional understanding of events and problems as linear rather than complex, adaptive and interactive. This form of governance significantly impedes a nation's ability to deal with today's complex challenges. As Feurth further contends

*"We have left a period when our most serious security problems were by nature stovepiped, when information about these problems was linear, and hierarchical management was sufficient. We have entered a period when the problems we face are*

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<sup>284</sup> Feurth, *op.cit.*, p.36

<sup>285</sup> see Ungerer, *op.cit.*, September 2010, p.9.

*themselves networked: information about them is marked by complex interaction, and organization for dealing with them must be flattened and integrated*<sup>286</sup>.

The networking focus of AG offers New Zealand an alternative and more comprehensive way to organise its security governance. Networking deepens the sense of empowerment and broadens the mandate of operational levels to act in working towards broadly, but clearly stated strategy goals. In other words, a strategy-led networked approach seeks to achieve its security policy outcomes through a process of centralised coordination and control, and decentralised execution that is focussed towards responding to the security needs of the state and the individual. By adopting a networked approach – that reflects the same complex attributes and dynamics as the security environment it is interacting with – AG facilitates the establishment of a more precise understanding of each security challenge or risk, and allows for the formulation of more critically attuned and mature treatments that are appropriately resourced for success. Importantly, it should be acknowledged here that the NSS is not an explicit attempt to change from a completely silo-based approach to security governance. Indeed, before the release of the NSS, cross-agency cooperation, even if imperfect and limited, has been a feature of New Zealand's approach to security. The value of the NSS however, is derived from its establishment of a basis for normative conceptual and structural change - reforms that could be potentially delivered through the means of a formal National Security Strategy.

## **Conclusions**

Creating a National Security Strategy and truly national approach to security for New Zealand is a daunting task, but it represents vital progress in understanding how to respond to today's complex security challenges, while providing normative opportunity for conceiving of security in more critically meaningful and utilitarian ways for states, individuals and all humankind. In

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<sup>286</sup> Feurth, *op.cit.*, p.38



addressing today's security challenges, the need to understand, accommodate and reconcile the views, issues and needs of a mosaic of complex constituencies is itself, and intimidating challenge. Yet, deferring the problem is not an option for "we can be sure of one thing: the bifurcated security environment ... will not disappear in the future. On the contrary, it is only likely to grow more complex and demanding."<sup>287</sup>

As this Chapter has highlighted, the continued absence of an integrated National Security Strategy for New Zealand risks a future of further institutional fragmentation, and a lack of policy, programmatic and operational coherence. Indeed, failure to achieve sound levels of community integration and coherence, underscored by a centralised strategy and control mechanism – potentially achieved through the adoption of a networked anticipatory governance approach – ultimately risks exacerbating measures of insecurity for the people and state of New Zealand. For, as Bell explains:

*"Without a broad understanding or overarching strategy, individual strategies will fail to be compatible with – and the capabilities acquired will fail to be interoperable with – other elements, both vertically with central government strategy and horizontally with other vulnerability and consequence management elements."*<sup>288</sup>

While the NSS released in April 2011 represents key normative progress in New Zealand's conception of, and approach to security, a formalised National Security Strategy – that necessarily reflects the state-human security dialectic, and critical and human security perspectives – must remain a compelling objective. The realisation of such a strategy is considered vital to ensuring that New Zealand is optimally prepared to confront the challenges of today's bifurcated and globalised security environment; while reinforcing the ability and capacity of Government to fulfil its most fundamental of responsibilities –

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<sup>287</sup> see Evans, *op.cit.*, 2007, p.128.

<sup>288</sup> S. Bell, 'The UK's Risk Management Approach to National Security', in *RUSI Journal*, Vol 152(3), 2007, p. 21.

safeguarding the compact between state and society, the individual citizen, and broader Humanity.

## GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The 20<sup>th</sup> Century was an age dominated by the legacy of devastating global wars, colonial and polarised ideological struggles and conflicts, and by efforts to establish international and local systems that would foster – liberal – peace, prosperity and security. Yet insecurity not only remains, it has become a primary development challenge of our time. Today, approximately one-and-a-half billion people experience a life characterised by a combined range of traditional and truly modern security challenges that intensify human vulnerability and the fragility of societies and states, and international and ‘global-social’ systems.<sup>289</sup>

As Chapter 1 of this Thesis mapped out, today’s compounding security challenges are increasingly multidimensional, complex and adaptive, and inherently ‘social’ in character. Indeed, so expansive is the nature of the contemporary security environment and agenda that it is “stretching the boundaries of conventional thinking about security.”<sup>290</sup> As a consequence, traditional security structures, systems and agencies are losing their relevance and resonance within contemporary settings. Crucially, they are proving ill-suited or inadequate in understanding, explaining, and coping with the challenges of today’s transforming security environment, even when national or international interests or values have prompted action; and this will “require a substantially new manner of thinking if mankind is to survive.”<sup>291</sup> In this respect, as I have demonstrated, effective contemporary approaches to security should necessarily “reflect the consequences of a globalised security environment that has bifurcated between an older state-centric world ... and new [multi-centric] trans-state and sub-state strata.”<sup>292</sup>

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<sup>289</sup> see World Bank, *op.cit.*, p.1.

<sup>290</sup> Dupont, *op.cit.*, p.103.

<sup>291</sup> see World Bank, *op. cit.*, p. xi; and United Nations ‘Human Development Report 1994’, New York, p.22.

<sup>292</sup> Evans in Ayson and Ball (eds), *op.cit.*, p.53.

The extent to which these conditions underwrite the future will be central to framing security contexts of states and the international system, and individuals and universal humanity alike. Addressing the transformation of security is to recognise that transnational and localised phenomena are likely to become the more prominent causes of insecurity. The pressures of globalisation and bifurcation have instead been internalised and intensified within every society trying to adapt to the increasing rate of this change. Accordingly, the globalisation of security and bifurcation of the security environment have presented Humanity with the opportunity to fundamentally challenge and seek renewal within traditional security paradigms that necessarily requires an end to the narrow and binary framing of security within exclusively state-centric terms.

In this respect, as I have argued: the core challenges at all levels of security – and our responses to them – are dialectic, and must be considered analogously and in accord, rather than through inimical approaches and frames. By considering security comprehensively, and in the larger context of contemporary environmental change “allows one to better understand both the current state of the field and its place in the academy, and to make suggestions as to how practitioners might rethink ... the policy advice they suggest to the powerful.”<sup>293</sup> To this end, my Thesis has demonstrated that the necessary starting point for an analysis of New Zealand’s future security programmatic and structural requirements is the external security environment shaped by the bifurcation and globalisation of security.<sup>294</sup> In this respect, the transformative dynamics of the contemporary security environment and the effects of globalisation are conspiring to generate new contexts by which states such as New Zealand must understand, assess and respond to contemporary security imperatives. Accordingly, this will require a refocus of New Zealand’s “political logic of strategy, balancing a global-local nexus and blending the networked challenges of [bifurcated and] globalised security into a new policy

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<sup>293</sup> Dalby, *op.cit.*, pp. 2-3.

<sup>294</sup> see Alach, *op.cit.*, p. 63.

calculus for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.”<sup>295</sup> Therefore, in the era of the globalisation of security; within the context of the bifurcated security environment; and in our enduring search for ‘security’ and its meaning, we must continuously and critically retest and challenge the continued relevance and utility of prevailing theoretical and programmatic assumptions that shape our understanding and actions.

In seeking to address the realities of the contemporary security environment, this Thesis has offered the idea that understanding and addressing (in)security within contemporary settings, requires us to critically focus, broaden and deepen our perspectives. Indeed, in the “strategic action undertaken to bring about change, there is no sounder basis than *immanent critique* to discover the latent potentials in situations on which to build political and social progress.”<sup>296</sup> To this end, critical approaches to security, such as human security – through processes of political and social emancipation – are committed to understanding and resolving the (in)security of real people in real places. Such approaches do so through the means of ‘critique’, which entails the exploration of what is ‘real’, and what is reliable knowledge. In applying critique, critical approaches stand outside the given frameworks and units of analysis they are exploring, and engage with concrete social and political issues, with the aim of maximising and optimising opportunities for enhancing security, community and emancipation, at individual and societal and state and international levels, and in the interests of universal Humanity. In this sense, as agents of structural, social and political emancipation, critical approaches derive much of their value and utility by drawing on a progressive and inclusive agenda that is at once broader, deeper and more focussed than state-centric security conceptions.

The potency of critical approaches such as human security stems from the ability to illuminate those threat and vulnerability concerns which transcend

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<sup>295</sup> Evans, 2007, *op.cit.*, p. 114.

<sup>296</sup> Booth in Booth (ed), *op.cit.*, 2005, p.263.

geopolitical borders, and structural, material notions of state power and interest. The argument here is that human security narratives not only provide space for the inclusion of a wider range of issues, [but they] allow us to focus on issues that have been occluded by previous state-centric security practices.<sup>297</sup> Importantly though, unlike other critical conceptions, Human Security does so by neither delegitimizing nor devaluing the state. Rather, the critical utility of Human Security is derived from situating the state in contemporary settings where its relative value and relevance as a security referent and agent can be more accurately assessed and optimised.

In many respects, the increasing recognition of the existence of this normative state-citizen (human) security compact, is reflective of the emergence of a utilitarian dialectic and *via media* between state and human security approaches which had been cast as hitherto inimical. The dialectic is between two referent objects – the state and people – wherein these two ‘organisms’ assume the status moral and political equivalency and indivisibility. It recognises that although security is the objective of individuals, it can only be achieved through collective political and social processes. Correspondingly, it acknowledges that the state – and state sovereignty – must serve and support the people from which it draws its legitimacy.

The apparent promise therefore, is that the conceptual and practical utility inherent in, and derived from the notions of dialectic and *via media*, might then lead to positive transformations within our security thinking and frameworks. At best, it might result in a new normative synthesis of critical understanding and comprehensive cooperation between state and human approaches to security through the establishment of a dynamic *via media* that adjusts subject to the relative security context or need. Importantly, in doing so, it is hoped that security conceived in such a way, will contribute to an on-going critical evolution in New Zealand’s understanding of, and approach to, security. This will be realised by promoting a truly comprehensive approach

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<sup>297</sup> see Christie, *op.cit.*, 2010, pp.177-178.

that conceives security as an instrumental value which promotes a more inclusive and integrative humanity; and that correspondingly refocuses New Zealand's security institutions from their almost exclusive focus and continuing preoccupation with nationalist identity and statist orthodoxies which promote the somewhat binary idea of security *against* others.

Consequently, in April of 2011, New Zealand released its first truly comprehensive and 'national' statement on security for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, and within an era marked by the bifurcation and globalisation of security. The document is, in many respects, an expression of the nation's vision, values and aspirations for the ensuing millennium. It represents the emergence of a somewhat normative and critically inspired transformation in contemporary thinking, understanding and practice within New Zealand's security community. Crucially though, the statement (re)establishes – in both tacit and explicit ways – the fundamental compact between the state, society and individual, and the emerging dialectic between state and human securities. Crucially, it establishes a critical basis from which New Zealand's security community can overcome its cultural and institutional 'tyranny of dissonance'. Yet, while the NSS represents quantum progress in New Zealand's conception of, and approach to security, particularly in respect to its increasing consideration and accommodation of critical and human security perspectives, a formalised National Security Strategy must remain a compelling objective. The realisation of such a strategy is considered vital to ensuring that New Zealand is optimally prepared to confront the challenges of today's bifurcated and globalised security environment.

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