

**DEFENCE REFORM IN BOSNIA  
AND HERZEGOVINA:  
A CASE STUDY INTO THE  
ROLE OF ETHNICITY WITHIN  
THE  
ARMED FORCES OF BOSNIA AND  
HERZEGOVINA**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Many of the conflicts fought in the world today are fought internally between rival ethnic groups. Although the cause of the conflict may differ, the violent and often brutal nature of these conflicts makes them a threat that the international community cannot ignore. This thesis will analyse the progress of defence reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina - with specific attention to the role of ethnicity within the armed forces. The thesis discusses the challenges and actions taken by the international community to establish a united, state level defence force under a single chain of command. The political situation in the Balkans highlights the fact that ethnic issues are crucial in the security of the region. The central argument of this thesis is that in ethnically divided countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, abolishing ethnically segregated defence forces in favour of one unified force is crucial to the creation of state viability. The thesis hypothesises that ethnic segregation and lack of integration within the forces today contributes to ongoing instability within Bosnia. As a serving member of the New Zealand Defence Force, the author participated in the post-conflict stabilisation process in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Having witnessed first hand the effects of ethnicity in the Bosnian defence forces and the wider community, the author now seeks to analyse the pace of defence reform within Bosnia and Herzegovina which has been challenged by ethnic phenomena since the cessation of hostilities in 1995.

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## **Chapter One - INTRODUCTION**

Many of the conflicts fought in the world today are fought internally between rival ethnic groups. Although the cause of the conflict may differ, the violent and often brutal nature of these conflicts makes them a threat that the international community cannot ignore. This thesis will analyse the progress of Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina - with specific attention to the role of ethnicity within the armed forces. The thesis discusses the challenges faced and actions taken by the international community to establish a united, state level defence force under a single chain of command. The political situation in the Balkans highlights the fact that ethnic issues are crucial in the security of the region. The central argument of this thesis is that in ethnically divided countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, abolishing ethnically segregated defence forces in favour of one unified force is crucial to the creation of state viability. The thesis hypothesises that ethnic segregation and lack of integration within the armed forces today contributes to ongoing instability within Bosnia.

Bosnia is an excellent example of the form of ethnically driven internal conflict that has challenged the international community since the end of the Cold War; the success or failure of the post-conflict nation building process in Bosnia may therefore serve as a first hand lesson for other post-conflict nation building efforts

that the international community may become involved in. Success in Bosnia is also important to the international community. The post-conflict reconciliation and nation building task in Bosnia was one of the first of its kind and continues to require close international monitoring and supervision. International supervision serves two main purposes: firstly, as Bosnia prepares itself for membership of NATO and the European Union (EU), the state will require considerable preparation and readiness. Secondly, the entire progress made in stabilizing the Balkans rests on stabilizing the most difficult countries including Bosnia. Balkan history reveals that one crisis can escalate and spread chaos and disorder across the entire Balkan region.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, the international community has invested over \$15 billion and 16 years of effort to ensure that Bosnia does not return to violence.<sup>2</sup>

## ***Thesis Outline***

In pursuing the argument related to ethnic segregation, this thesis involves a case study analysis drawing from various sources of literature and resources. The thesis is organised in the following way: first, the current chapter will continue with a literature review of the relevant literature and resources related to the Bosnian conflict and defence reform. The works of various scholars has been consulted in a bid to explore and understand the subject of this study. The

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1 [http://www.radiobergen.org/serbia/balkania-filer/petkovic-albanian\\_terrorists.htm](http://www.radiobergen.org/serbia/balkania-filer/petkovic-albanian_terrorists.htm) Accessed 4 Jan 2010)

2 Dan Bilefsky, 'Fears of New Ethnic Conflict in Bosnia', New York Times, 13 December 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/14/world/Europe/14bosnia.html> (Accessed 4 Jan 2010)

literature review within this chapter will provide an overview of these scholars, highlighting their contribution and contradictions in comparison to others.

Defence reform is always a difficult task, even more so in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina where the state has had to transition from state socialism to democracy. The country has not only had to deal with the legacy of a recent bloody conflict but also the situation whereby two separate entities are asked to serve a single state; entities that are so ethnically fragmented. Within this Chapter, the thesis will discuss Bosnia's struggle to find a suitable platform to provide physical security to its inhabitants and to reform its defence policies. NATO is seen as the main promoter of defence reform within Europe and places top priority objectives for aspiring NATO members to fulfill within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework as a prerequisite for NATO membership.

Next, Chapter Two will include an analysis of *negative ethnicity* and *democratic peace theory*. These two concepts help inform the author's analysis of Bosnia's ethnic challenges and the progress of defence reform. Even as the progress of the defence reforms in Bosnia is discussed, one critical factor that emerges is the ethnic segregation that still exists within the defence organisation. This segregation is a representation of the various constituent ethnic groups that live within Bosnia. To better understand the persistence of these ethnic boundaries within the defence force, we therefore study the concept of *negative ethnicity*.<sup>3</sup>

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3 Negative ethnicity is revealed when one ethnic group believes they are superior to other ethnic groups because their religion, food, culture, language or even their looks are better than the other.



This will involve exploring the concept of ethnicity with supporting analysis of the various models of ethnicity and how they may apply to the ethnic dilemma in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This supporting analysis offers a deeper understanding of the motivations that make it possible for people of a particular ethnic origin to be rallied behind a cause that apparently represents their common interests. The thesis will also explore the subject of ethnic conflict to seek an understanding of the *theory of democratic peace* and how elements of democratic peace theory form the backbone of the democratic reforms in Bosnia and its influence on the progress of defence reform. This will be discussed further within the Theoretical Framework in Chapter Two.

Chapter Three will examine the background to the conflict in Bosnia. This will involve tracing the history of the Bosnian people back to the former Yugoslavia. This is essential in gaining an appreciation of the current challenges that the Bosnia defence forces are facing and how they can be approached. An analysis of the governance structure of Bosnia will also be undertaken to determine how the executive and the legislature are constituted and also how they relate with one another. More importantly, how these crucial governing bodies are helping the reformation of the defence forces. Finally, the chapter will study the role that the international community has played to restore peace and stability and the steps taken to ensure that there is lasting stability in Bosnia.

Chapter Four will investigate the various factors that have caused the segregation of constituent armies within the country's defence organisation. This chapter will consider the following questions: are the segregated armies a

function of the country's history? Is it a product of political and/or social structures? Or is this merely a consequence of the provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords.<sup>4</sup>

After looking at the causes of segregation within the Defence Forces, Chapter Five will examine the following question: how has ethnic segregation within the armed forces impacted the security of Bosnia and Herzegovina? Some of the issues highlighted in this chapter are how segregation has impacted the unity of command within the defence forces; the cost of operations; the unity within the defence sector; the international standing of the defence force and finally its capacity to contribute to international peace keeping initiatives and partner with NATO and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). This analysis will help support the central argument of the thesis, which is that ethnically segregated forces exacerbate lasting instability.

Finally, Chapter Six will discuss the conclusions drawn from this study. The conclusion will reflect the concept of *negative ethnicity* in Bosnia and especially within its defence organisation; the contribution of the international community particularly in the reform of the defence forces and promoting sustainable peace; the causes of segregation amongst the defence forces and the effects of these divisions.

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<sup>4</sup> The Dayton Peace Accords is essentially a peace agreement and represents the negotiated framework that ended the war in Bosnia in 1995.

## ***The Background to Ethnic Conflict in Bosnia***

The history of Bosnia and Herzegovina is filled with cases of multiple social cleavages that often threatened social relations. In the nineteenth century for instance, the prominent social divisions included religion, urban-rural and class systems. Worth noting is that the ethnic disparities that were associated with religious tradition and practice were yet to emerge or rather be politicised until the late nineteenth century.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, the political elite in Yugoslavia employed economic experimentation, modernization, balancing, control and socialization in their quest to achieve communal cooperation.<sup>6</sup>

Prior to the conflict in the mid-1990s, the Communist Party of the former Yugoslavia had maintained stability in the region without the benefit of having democratic structures in place. This unique stability was achieved through the design of the Yugoslav federal system that purposefully regulated any conflict of national scale between the Republics and the various ethnic groups: if anything, the regime was the ultimate arbiter in the whole system.<sup>7</sup> This engendered repression that hid behind the mask of apparent equanimity.

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5 Donia, R. J., & Fine, J. V.A. (1994) *Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed*, New York: Columbia University Press. p. 84

6 Schoplin, G., (1993) 'The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia', in John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (eds), *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, London: Routledge.

7 Sabrina, R., (1992) *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia*, 2nd edn, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Through this arrangement the constitution was amended in 1974, which saw to the apparent devolution of administrative, social, economic and some political powers to the six republics and autonomous regions.<sup>8</sup> The change to the constitution in 1974 prepared the ground for political disintegration in Yugoslavia, especially after the death of Marshall Tito in 1980. Indeed, Tito had managed to centralize and maintain control in Yugoslavia but after his death, the country began to fall into pieces as a number of ethnic entities began to oppose some of the political philosophies in the country, which dated back to 1920 when Yugoslavia was formed.<sup>9</sup>

Throughout these developments the Croats viewed Yugoslavia as a decentralized federation whereas the Serbs regarded it as a highly centralized governed country.<sup>10</sup> With a sizeable number of Croats and Serbs within its borders, Bosnia and Herzegovina became a time bomb. When Bosnia later seceded from Yugoslavia in 1992, the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats suddenly found themselves isolated as ethnic minorities in a new state instead of belonging to the dominant ethnic entities within Yugoslavia. In these circumstances, the sense of security that had been guaranteed by collective

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8 Xaxier, B., (1996) 'Bosnia and Herzegovina State and Communitarianism', in David Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda (eds), *Yugoslavia and After*, London: Longman, 1996, pp.67 - 115

9 Lampe, J. R., 1999. *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

10 Noel, M., (1994) *Bosnia: A Short History*. New York: New York University Press.

identity under communism was now replaced by ethnic nationalism, which could no longer support any democratic structures of governance.<sup>11</sup>

The political alignment of the populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina along ethnic lines clearly called for an external stimulus. The delay in taking collective action by the three ethnic blocks in the country can best be explained by what is referred to as the free rider dilemma, which comes about when individuals are reluctant to invest in the cost of participating in collective action if the success of such a move is uncertain and if many others will benefit without paying the cost in the event that the action taken succeeds. This dilemma was apparently broken during the election in 1990, since the cost of not voting along ethnic blocks was far outweighed by the much greater cost to individuals supposing they didn't vote. The members of each ethnic block voted in the 1990 elections in line with their ethnic backgrounds with little regard to specific party policies. Arguably, they were motivated by fear of being politically and economically dominated by their rival ethnic communities.<sup>12</sup>

This led to the partition of Bosnia immediately after the elections: the Serbs established autonomous provinces across Bosnia whereas the Croats, who predominantly occupied the region in western Herzegovina, established their own monetary system. The Muslims who had dominated central Bosnia declined to

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11 Zoran, P (1995) 'Bosnia-Herzegovina: From Multiethnic Coexistence to "Apartheid" . . . and Back', in Payam Akhavan and Robert Howse, eds, *Yugoslavia the Former and Future*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution and Geneva: The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

12 Michael, H., Friedman, D., & Appelbaum, M., (1982) 'A Theory of Ethnic Collective Action', *International Migration Review* 16(2): 412–434.

send conscripts to the Yugoslavian National Army and the Croat Listica; they also declined the passage of army convoys through their territory and as this went on the political construction of ethnic nationalism could not be reversed.<sup>13</sup>

Andjelic argues that the perception that the recent conflict in Bosnia should be attributed to ethnic hatred collapses on the premise that the country historically demonstrated a significant degree of unity. For instance, the Bosnian military had in earlier times consisted of Muslim, Orthodox and Catholics who were referred to as Bosniaks. This goes a long way to proving that the much touted ethnic hatred was not widespread in Bosnian society and can be afforded little credence even in medieval history. Even though the existence of animosity between the different ethnic groups within Bosnia can hardly be dismissed, there were however, far more coexistence, tolerance and mutual understanding than were suppressed hatred or even open confrontation. Indeed most of the ethnic conflict in Bosnia is recorded in the twentieth century rather than the medieval period.<sup>14</sup>

Theories of ancient animosity that tend to explain the conflict in Bosnia are if anything, efforts to portray Bosnia as a failed state with no future. It is important that today's strategic leaders in the Bosnian military take into consideration the lesson that history presents and employ them in addressing the challenges in the current military of Bosnia. History has demonstrated that Bosnia was a peaceful

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13 Powers, G. F., (1996) 'Religion, Conflict and Prospects for Reconciliation in Bosnia, Croatia and Yugoslavia', *Journal of International Affairs* 50(1): 221–253.

14 Andjelic, N., *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy* (Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 6.

and a religious and ethnic tolerant country and it wasn't until the turn of the nineteenth century did ethnic hatred become to take the centre stage in the government of Bosnia.<sup>15</sup>

These ethnic and religious rivalries were not exclusive to Bosnia but are also evident in the region and across the globe. As an example, animosity between Catholics and Protestants in Western Europe remains prevalent. Bosnia is however unique in the sense that it has never been a nation state; not in the past or even today. Therefore any attempts to split Bosnia into two invariably leads to strife, a fact that is supported by the Karadjordjevo case: this case contains the resolution of a meeting held between Tudjman and Milosevic in March 1991.<sup>16</sup>

Amongst the six republics of Yugoslavia, Bosnia was the most diverse in that it neither had a majority religious community or a majority national group at the same time.<sup>17</sup> The subsequent break up of Yugoslavia invariably opened a bloody historical chapter in Bosnia. The political crisis in Yugoslavia saw to the Yugoslav People Army (JNA) adopting a neutral stand but the general ideology and ethnic composition of the JNA leadership quickly took Milosevic's side.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid, p.5.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, p.19.

<sup>17</sup> Rogel, C., *The Breakup Of Yugoslavia And War In Bosnia* (Greenwood Press, 1998), 9.

<sup>18</sup> Gow, J., *Legitimacy and Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (London: Pinter Publishers Limited, 1992), 142.

Gow provides the statistical representation of the ethnic groups in the Yugoslav national military. Sixty percent of the military personnel were Serbs, a meager 5.4 percent were the so called Yugoslavs whereas the Montenegrins were about 6.2 percent.<sup>19</sup> Despite this difference the military reflected the perspective of Yugoslavia, which matched that of the neo-Communist Serbian leadership. The ethnic distribution of the rest of the military officers consisted of 6.3 percent of Macedonians, 2.4 percent of Muslims, 12.6 percent of Croats, 2.8 percent of Slovenes, 0.6 percent of Hungarians, 0.7 percent of Albanians while other minorities too up 1.6 percent.<sup>20</sup> The political attitudes of these other military officers were generally expected to be leaning towards a communist orientation yet they were less likely to find Milosevic as being an attractive option.

In a survey that was carried out by the World Bank after the war, it was established that the most prominent social cleavages included the rural to urban heritage, war experience and ethnicity.<sup>21</sup> According to Burg and Shoup, the three constituent ethnic nationalities in Bosnia have a tradition of both conflict and accommodation that adversely conflict with each other.<sup>22</sup> As the ethnic gap

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid, p.9.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, p.9-10.

<sup>21</sup> 'A social assessment of Bosnia and Hercegovina', The World Bank, Europe and Central Asia Region, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Unit. Washington D.C.1999.

<sup>22</sup> Burg, S. L., & Shoup, P. S., (2000) The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. M.E. Sharpe Inc., 14.



widened between 1966 and 1990, the conflict between the regional political elite become more severe as they struggled for power. This environment was conducive for the breakdown of social legitimacy and regional devolution; it also encouraged economic downturn and mass frustration amongst the populace. The political elite took advantage of this situation to entrench animosity between the various ethnic entities.<sup>23</sup>

There were at least three major issues being contested in Bosnia as the nationalist leadership mobilized their communities and the republic descended into war. The most basic contest was over defining the nature of rights in Bosnia: were they to be seen as residing in individuals or in the ethnic communities as collective entities? Neither the distant Bosnian past, nor the immediate communist era past, provided any clear answer to this question. The second major contest unleashed in Bosnia by the disintegration of Yugoslavia was over the 'national' question.<sup>24</sup>

Burg and Shoup note that as commonly used in Eastern Europe the term 'national' has been applied to all aspects of inter-ethnic relations. But its most important element concerned defining the right to claim titular or state constituting status that are often a reserve of the majority ethnic groups and the definition of rights that should be accorded to the minority groups. In the

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23 Cohen, L. J., (1995) *Broken Bonds*, 2nd Edn, Boulder: Westview Press.

24 Ibid, p.6.

attainment of the state constituting status conferred superior cultural and political rights on a group, including control over the state itself.<sup>25</sup>

It can therefore be concluded that the struggle over rights and the struggle over the national questions were thus intertwined in Bosnia, as elsewhere throughout Eastern Europe. But they were of fateful significance for Bosnia, which was a multi-ethnic state that had no single group that could claim titular status on the account of numbers alone and therefore all the three members vied for the status of a state-constituting nation. Due to the fact that Bosnia was surrounded by Croats and Serbs, who were the more powerful states amongst the two of the groups contesting over these issues; this made it increasingly hard for the contest over rights and the national questions in Bosnia to be resolved without the participation of Croatia and Serbia.<sup>26</sup>

The Report by Nansen Dialogue Centre points out that Bosnia is still in the process of developing a truly democratic culture, whereby the citizens expect and demand for accountability from their political leaders and the politicians on their part risk not being re-elected if they fail to deliver on their promises. In Bosnia, this process is complicated by the ethno-political nature of its governance system. This is because the Dayton Peace Accords institutionalized ethnicity as

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25 Burg, S. L., & Shoup, P. S., (2000) *The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*. M.E. Sharpe Inc., p.4-8.

26 Further reading of Burg and Shoup, 2000, proposes the two academic approaches to these issues: the pluralist and the power sharing approaches, p.6-7.

a determinant of power and this provides the opportunity for the political class to exploit the ethnic divisions.<sup>27</sup>

The Nansen report further states that the political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina are easily identified by their ethnic affiliations rather than the positions that they hold on the left-right spectrum. Subsequently, the political class often concentrates on ethno – nationalist issues at the expense of developmental issues such as corruption and unemployment. The electorate on their part shows preference to the candidates from their own ethnic backgrounds. Whether this is motivated by the perceived lack of alternatives or the fear of other ethnic entities, the result of it all is that most elections conducted in the country have borne little, if any, dramatic change on the political landscape.<sup>28</sup>

It is worth noting that one of the key features of the Bosnian conflict was the sense of nationalism that was demonstrated by the parties during the war. For one, they identified themselves as nations and the major goal of their leaders was to marshal territorial domination over their rivals and establish a state that will be identified by ethnic domination. These ethnic leaders had envisioned dominating all areas that encompassed Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>29</sup>

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27 The Missing Peace: The need for a long term strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (August, 2010) Nansen Dialogue Centre, Sarajevo and Safer World. Available at: <http://www.humanitarianforum.org/data/files/bosnia.pdf> (Accessed on May 10, 2011)

28 Ibid.

29 See, Singer, B, J., Nationalism and Dehostilization. Quoted in: Potter, N, N., Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Local and Global Level. Rodopi. This was an invited paper at the conference on The United Nations at Fifty (1945-1995): At the Threshold of a New World Order, which was held at Hofstra University in March 16-18, 1995.

## ***Security Sector Reform in the Post-Conflict Environment***

Security sector reform is a general term used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country. Factors shaping the reform of the security sector include: history and tradition; national security environment and ideology; regional and international influence; and the type of governance.<sup>30</sup> According to the United Nations, “the overarching objective of security sector reform is to ensure that the security institutions perform their functions efficiently and effectively in an environment consistent with democratic norms and the principles of good governance and the rule of law, thereby promoting human security.”<sup>31</sup>

In post-conflict countries such as Bosnia, the restoration of stability, the acceptance of legitimacy of political government institutions and the return of the rule of law and power ceded to the government are all predicated on the ability to provide security to the people of the country. Security, both internal and external is the most important deliverable that a state government can provide its citizens. The ability to provide effective security to its citizens is a sign that the state has a monopoly or full control over the use of force within its borders. In the post conflict environment, law enforcement, criminal justice, border control and the

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<sup>30</sup> Lecture provided to the author and the NZDF Command and Staff College by Dr Roubin Azizian at the Asia Pacific Centre of Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii 21-22 November 2011.

<sup>31</sup> UN Security Council Statement, 21 February 2008.

ability to enforce security usually dissolves. Occasionally, these capabilities remain in some form but are no longer seen to be legitimate. Subsequently, these institutions are often replaced by military forces until an acknowledged and legitimate government can provide the necessary police force and legal system.

Thus security sector reform in post conflict states, including the reinforcement of diplomacy, democratic ideals and internal security often falls to military forces that have the responsibility to restore these aspects of governance to functional levels. After military intervention, the desired end state is a stable, developing and legitimate government that can ensure domestic security and state sovereignty. Citizens expect that their government will provide security and the maintenance of law and order. The ability of the state government to provide internal and external security through a monopoly on the legitimate use of force is an important feature in defining state sovereignty. In failed and failing states some of the security issues identified in the literature include: (a) war and civil strife, (b) crime and violence, (c) negative effects of police and military forces, and (d) a lack of justice within society.<sup>32</sup> Without basic security and law and order, other government functions cannot effectively be fulfilled. Research indicates that everyday public services cannot be provided if providers fear for their safety and government institutions such as parliament and courts cannot function if officials cannot be protected from harm or injury.<sup>33</sup>

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32 Guide to Rebuilding Governance in Stability Operations: A ..., <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB925.pdf> (accessed January 20, 2011).

33 Ibid

In most recent conflicts, a vacuum in security, defence and government legitimacy has emerged immediately after hostilities. Peacekeeping forces have assumed many of the responsibilities in these areas. Military forces assume responsibilities that are normally integrated into the international efforts prior to a secure environment being established such as the 1999 UN intervention in Kosovo which saw peacekeeping forces from contributing countries become imbedded in the transitional administration prior to the arrival of non governmental organisations (NGO's).<sup>34</sup> It is in these instances that the military takes on the responsibility to provide security for the population and carry out basic court and judicial functions and establishes the foundations for governmental infrastructure to be restored. It is this security that allows for the restoration of stability, which leads to acknowledged governmental legitimacy and ultimately prosperity.

The idea of security and the legitimacy of the state to provide services to its citizens are best described by Max Weber, who linked the state with the legitimate means of force.<sup>35</sup> He defined the state as the “political community which within a certain territory claims for itself (with success) a monopoly of

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34 UN Security Resolution 1244 available from <http://www.unmikonline.org/Documents/Res1244ENG.pdf> (Accessed 3 October 2011)

35 Max Weber, *Politik als Beruf*. "Gesammelte Politische Schriften, trans J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), (Tubingen, Germany, (1919) 1988), 506.

legitimate physical coercion.”<sup>36</sup> Also indicating the centrality of coercion in conceptualizing the state, Weber included “the protection of personal security and public order (police)” as one of the important functions of the state.<sup>37</sup>

The rule of law is an important element in strengthening security and security sector reform. When implemented and enforced it becomes the basis of equality and provides legitimacy to governments, security forces and citizens.<sup>38</sup> The rule of law also provides the foundation for the integration of ethnically segregated forces in order to achieve a credible defence force under a single command structure. According to Francis Fukuyama, “The rule of law was originally rooted in religion in all societies where it came to prevail, including the West. The great economist Friedrich Hayek noted that law should be prior to legislation. That is, the law should reflect a broad social consensus on the rules of justice.”<sup>39</sup> The rule of law is the principle where all persons, institutions, and entities (both public and private) as well the state itself are accountable to laws that are publically shared, enforced and independently arbitrated consistent with international human rights law and other international standards.<sup>40</sup> It is the idea that the

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 506

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 122

<sup>38</sup> Lecture provided to the author and the NZDF Command and Staff College by Dr Justin Nankivell at the Asia Pacific Centre of Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii 21-22 November 2011.

<sup>39</sup> Francis Fukuyama, “Iran, Islam and the Rule of Law,” Wall Street Journal, 27 Jul 09  
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203946904574300374086282670.html>

<sup>40</sup> Security Sector Reform Website, US Agency for International Development, US Department of Defence, and US Department of State, Security Sector Reform, Washington, DC, [pdf.usaid.gov/pdf-docs/PNADN788.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf-docs/PNADN788.pdf), 8 (accessed Jan 9, 2010)

population submit themselves to a government in exchange for basic services that include security, safety and stability; it is the contract that citizens adapt to societal norms with the expectation for normalcy. In most post-conflict countries this relationship disintegrates as the conflict and combat ends. As the security situation dissolves and legitimate governmental institutions disappear, military forces normally assume the responsibility to restore some semblance of security.

This approach represents an important link to Bosnia's defence reform efforts as the state strives to overcome the effects of ethnic tension to unite its armed forces to provide the state government with a monopoly over the use of force. As mentioned earlier, the rule of law provides the foundation for the integration of ethnically segregated forces in order to achieve a credible defence force under a single command structure and become capable of defending the sovereign state and fulfilling any future international obligations that may present itself. It is here that a significant obstacle remains.

There has been little reconciliation among the ethnic entities in Bosnia since the cessation of hostilities in 1995.<sup>41</sup> The key political parties continue to struggle over the basic issues that started the war nearly twenty years ago and international concern over the political situation in Bosnia is increasing with nationalist rhetoric encouraging ethnic division and a risk of descent into

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41 Dayton, Divisions and Constitutional Revisions: Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Crossroads, Research and Assessment Branch 978-1-905962-73-0 August 2009.



violence.<sup>42</sup> The major risk lies with a threat by Bosnian Serb Prime Minister Milord Dodik to hold a referendum on independence for the Republika Srpska.<sup>43</sup> Croatian President, Stjepan Mesic retorted that should the Republika Srpska secede from Bosnia; that he would intervene with the Croatian Armed Forces.<sup>44</sup> Bosnia has been without violence since the international intervention in 1995 but an important point here is that the end of the war did not signal the end of the conflict. Fundamental issues remain unsolved and the main issue confronting the international community today is how long intervening actors should remain in Bosnia and in what form.<sup>45</sup> The immediate question is whether to close the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and pass authority to an EU Special Representative, which will have a considerably weaker mandate.<sup>46</sup> Critics have claimed that that the international presence and the OHR in particular only

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42 Patrice C. McMahon and Jon Divisions and Constitutional Revisions: Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Crossroads, Research and Assessment Branch 978-1-905962-73-0 August 2009. Weston, 'The Death of Dayton', Foreign Affairs, vol 88, no 5, September-October 2009, pp.69-83

43 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13313857> (accessed 25 July 2011)

44 Mesic: "In Case of a Referendum, I Would Send the Army into Posavina", Radio Studio 88, January 19 2010 <http://www.studio88.ba/bh/52/bih/16617/> (accessed 7 February 2010)

45 Dayton, Divisions and Constitutional Revisions: Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Crossroads, Research and Assessment Branch 978-1-905962-73-0 August 2009.

46 "The Office of the High representative (OHR) is the chief civilian peace implementation agency in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Dayton peace Accords designated the High representative to oversee the implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace Agreement on behalf of the international community. he is also tasked with co-ordinating the activities of the civilian organisations and agencies operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina." Source: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-ifo/#1> (accessed 26 September 2011)

encourage separatism and ethnic nationalism and work against ethnic reconciliation.<sup>47</sup>

From a military perspective, a return to hostilities would result in the disintegration of the defence reforms accomplished under NATO and OSCE guidance since 2005. The Dayton Peace Accords divided Bosnia into two opposing sides with two separate armies, the Bosniak-Croat Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Army of the Republika Srpska, each with its own chain of command. This structure remained intact for ten years following the war until High Representative Paddy Ashdown set about integrating the separate armies into a single unified Bosnian Defence Force. The unity of the Bosnian Defence Force may therefore be considered the principle preventative for the resumption of hostilities. Although the defence reforms have seen impressive progress, they were more 'top down' in nature – meaning that the general staffs and multinational brigades were created, but the lower level units remained separate and are not integrated. Bosnian Serb soldiers remain in barracks located in the Republika Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat soldiers in turn, remain within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>48</sup> Full integration of the armed forces within Bosnia remains elusive, made even more difficult by the prevailing view by both politicians and much of the population who still view Bosnia as a state comprising two separate entities.

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47 Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, 'Travails of the European Raj', *Journal of Democracy*, vol 14, no. 3, July 2008, pp. 60-74.

48 Christopher Chivvis 'Back to the Brink in Bosnia', *Survival*, vol. 52 no1 February-March 2010 pp102.

The next section will introduce the reader to defence reform as a concept and why it is a critical element of any post-conflict security sector reform, this will be covered in more depth within Chapter Three. Defence reform is the essential foundation for creating modern forces and defence capabilities to meet the needs of the state and to meet its obligations internally and externally. Membership to the NATO security alliance and other European alliances underpin the defence reform efforts underway in Bosnia and provide the framework for defence reform to occur. Key elements within this process are NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP)<sup>49</sup> and the NATO Membership Action Plan.<sup>50</sup> These elements are important as they lay the foundation for the reform of the defence forces in Bosnia and support wider democratic reform efforts underway in Bosnia. The PfP and the NATO Membership Action Plan will be analysed in more depth in Chapter Three.

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49 NATO's Partnership for Peace is a program aimed at creating trust between NATO and other states in Europe and the former Soviet Union.

50 The Membership Action Plan consists of a number of reform steps that must be completed prior to any invitation to join the NATO alliance.

## ***Defence Reform***

Defence reform is an essential component of post-conflict security sector reform and is a necessary and first step in building a climate of stability. Defence reform implies a change in the ways of doing business, of mentality on defence related issues, of objectives, of resource allocations and priorities.<sup>51</sup>

The June 2005 Defence White Paper of Bosnia and Herzegovina acknowledges the importance of the reform of the defence sector, stating that “the defence reforms, as part of the overall reforms in our country, by size, content and objective significance, are the strongest mechanism for strengthening internal stability and also to support the credibility in efforts for the integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina into European and Euro-Atlantic integration structures.”<sup>52</sup> The reform of the defence forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina commenced in 2003 with the establishment of the Defence Reform Commission. The aims of the reform effort were to establish a common defence organisation with consideration given to the prevailing security environment and economic realities.

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51 Heinz Vetschera and Matthieu Damian, "Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Role of the International Community," *International Peacekeeping* Vol.13, No.1 (2006); <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdf?vid=5&hid=105&sid=e150e90e-f36a-474b-9306-e69cb200254a%40sessionmgr107> (accessed 17 November 2009).

52 Defence White Paper of Bosnia and Herzegovina, [http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Bosnia\\_English-2005.pdf](http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Bosnia_English-2005.pdf) (accessed September 1, 2011).

Prior to the start of the defence reform process, the state's defence organisation faced very complex problems and the reform efforts were therefore directed towards their resolution. The 2005 White Paper refers to the reform agenda being derived from an analysis of the following factors:<sup>53</sup>

- Inadequate State-level command and control of the Armed Forces;
- Ambiguities and inconsistencies regarding State and entity authorities in defence matters;
- Insufficient parliamentary oversight and control of the Armed Forces;
- Lack of transparency in defence matters at all levels;
- Non-compliance with international commitments, particularly politico-military aspects of relevant OSCE documents;
- The size, structure and equipment of the Armed Forces, which were not commensurate with real defence and security requirements;
- Disproportionate funding for defence activities;
- Deteriorating arms and ammunition stored at an excessive number of inappropriate locations; and
- Poor conditions of service for the full-time and conscript components of the Armed Forces.

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid, p.7

If there was one issue that all political parties in Bosnia seem to agree upon it is the commitment to join Euro-Atlantic structures, namely the EU and the NATO alliance.<sup>54</sup> Joining the NATO alliance does not just have military and political benefits; it has economic and social significance as well. However one of the key benefits of joining NATO applies to the military profession itself. NATO membership improves the professionalisation and modernisation of the armed forces of each member state. Such improved effectiveness of the armed forces implies indirect and direct benefits, such as better security perceptions of the country and its environment, as well as increasing investment in the defence sector and infrastructure.<sup>55</sup>

The government of Bosnia first expressed an interest of gaining membership to the EU and NATO in June 2001 when the NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson visited the country.<sup>56</sup> The UN Secretary General laid out a number of requirements and preconditions that Bosnia needed to undertake for the process to begin. These reforms demanded that Bosnia adopt the State Defence Law and that it guarantee democratic and parliamentary oversight of the armed forces; it was also required to form a Ministry of Defense (MoD) and ensure that there is

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54 NATO Update: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia Join NATO Partnership for Peace (Brussels: NATO, 2006); <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/12-december/e1214a.htm> (accessed 9 May 2010).

55 Denis Hadzovic, "Expenses and Benefits of Joining Bosnia and Herzegovina to NATO alliance", Centre for Security Studies-BiH, August 2009, 9 <http://www.css.ba/docs/Troskovi%20i%20beneficije%20pridruzivanja%20NATO%20BOS.doc.pdf> (accessed February 4, 2011).

56 James Staples, "Defense Reform and PfP in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *RUSI Journal* 149, no. 4 (August 2004), 34.

transparency in the military budget. Additionally, Bosnia was required to equip and offer common training across its forces to standards acceptable to other NATO member countries and also strengthen state level institutions.<sup>57</sup> Although joining the two institutions are two separate processes, meeting the criteria for entry into EU and NATO proceed in many areas side by side. Joining NATO's PfP program is an important step on the path toward Euro-Atlantic integration.<sup>58</sup> NATO introduced PfP at the Brussels Summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council in January 2004 to enhance peace, stability and security throughout Europe. Article two of the PfP framework document states that "This partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action."<sup>59</sup> The PfP also states that "protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the partnership."<sup>60</sup> In addition to these basic principles, "states subscribing to this document recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation and the maintenance of the principles of

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57 James Staples, "Defense Reform and PfP in Bosnia and Herzegovina," RUSI Journal 149, no. 4. (August 2004), 34.

58 Šajinović, Z., (January, 2007 ) Ongoing Defense Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina – Challenges and Perspectives. In Security Sector Reform in South East Europe – from a Necessary Remedy to a Global Concept. National Defence Academy.

59 NATO Handbook: PfP – Aim and Scope

60 Ibid

international law.”<sup>61</sup> This framework has established a solid basis for Bosnia to progress reform and actively builds a better security framework.

A significant element of the PfP is the Planning And Review Process (PARP) which provides a means to “identify forces and capabilities which might be available for multi-national training exercises and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces.”<sup>62</sup> The PARP provides the mechanism for Bosnia to provide detail about their ongoing reforms related to defence matters. “The information is provided in response to a ‘survey of overall PfP operability’ issued by NATO in the autumn every second year. Participating countries also provide an extensive overview of their armed forces and detailed information of the forces which they are prepared to make available for PfP cooperation.”<sup>63</sup> After a participating country has provided the relevant information, NATO provides a *Planning and Review Assessment* with clearly defined *Partnership Goals*. In order to assist the Armed Forces to become capable of participating in joint operations with other NATO member states. The *Planning and Review Assessment* and the *Interoperability Objectives* are approved by the Alliance and the partner state concerned.<sup>64</sup> The PARP provides a great deal of incentive in preparing Bosnia and other prospective countries for NATO membership. Many nations have used

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61 North Atlantic Council Communique, Partnership for Peace: Framework Document, (Brussels:, NATO, January 1994: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110b.htm> (accessed 23 May 2011)

62 NATO Handbook: The Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP) (Brussels: NATO, 2002) <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030208.htm> (accessed 23 May 2011)

63 Ibid

64 NATO Handbook: The Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP)



the PARP as a means to overcome obstacles and create modern, compatible, professional, well equipped and democratically responsible armed forces.<sup>65</sup>

NATO's PfP has been an essential element in providing the framework for Bosnia's defence reform efforts and has assisted the Bosnia armed forces unite under state level control. NATO, in recognising the progress made in reforming Bosnia's armed forces, declared in 2009 that Bosnia will progress to the next phase which is the Membership Action Plan (MAP) once further progress has been made. The MAP and the provisions within are worthy of mention as this process will play a crucial role in the future progress of Bosnia's reform efforts and its goal of joining the NATO alliance.

The MAP was established in 1999 in response to lessons learnt from the process undergone by Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to full NATO membership.<sup>66</sup> Jeffrey Simon of the US National Defence University lists four essential MAP provisions:

1. An Annual National Plan that identifies specific targets ranging political/economic, defence, resource, security and legal dimensions of NATO membership.
2. A mechanism for providing feedback in order for NATO members and the partner state to track and assess progress.

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 23

<sup>66</sup> Moore, NATO's New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World, 60-61.

3. A process for coordinating security assistance from NATO members to the partner state.
4. Comprehensive defence planning at the state level that creates and reviews progress and planning targets.<sup>67</sup>

During the MAP process, meetings between the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the aspirant country occur frequently to discuss difficulties and develop mutually agreed plans. NATO military and civilian experts are present during these meetings to discuss with representatives from the aspirant country the issues pertaining to NATO membership.<sup>68</sup> The MAP process has also made a considerable contribution to the NATO Alliance by ensuring that new NATO members are actually capable of participating and contributing to the Alliance's collective defence and peace support operations. Moore comments that "According to diplomatic representatives from those states invited to join the Alliance in Prague in 2002, MAP served to shape internal political debates over both domestic and foreign policy by providing leverage for the reformist elements of their society. One called it the 'bible' for NATO membership and observed that the process had served as a 'mirror' in front of his 'states' reform efforts."<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Simon, Roadmap to NATO Accession: Preparing for Membership, 2.

<sup>68</sup> NATO Topics: Membership Action Plan (MAP) (Brussels: NATO, 1999); <http://www.nato.int/issues/map/index.html> (accessed 12 July 2010)

<sup>69</sup> Moore, NATO's New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World, 61.

In analyzing the prospects for Bosnia to join the NATO Alliance, it must be acknowledged that Bosnia has played an active part in NATO's evolution post Cold War. The stakes in Bosnia for the future of the NATO Alliance are significant due to the considerable investment of US and allied nation's political effort to date. The former US Under Secretary of Defence for Policy commented in 1996 that "Just as the NATO-Russia relationship is being forged in Bosnia, so too is the future of NATO itself. It is in Bosnia where all sixteen members of NATO, each one making a contribution, are sending the message that NATO is the bedrock on which the future security and stability of Europe will be built. It is in Bosnia that we are demonstrating that NATO can meet new challenges."<sup>70</sup>

Noting Bosnia's key role in NATO transformation and enlargement since the early 1990's and the political-military stakes with Bosnia and Europe itself, Bosnia is expected to play a significant role in the future of NATO. The Western Balkans is a very delicate region that has the potential to ignite into violence very easily if the situation is not kept under control. This happened in 1992 and caught the international community by surprise. The NATO Enlargement Process enhances stability and security throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. By accepting Bosnia into the NATO community, NATO will be sending the message that security and stability in Bosnia and the remainder of Europe will be enhanced and kept under control.

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<sup>70</sup> Walter B Slocombe, then Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, remarks to the Atlantic Council, 14 June 1996, text furnished by the Department of Defence, p.17, quoted in Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, 227.

As discussed earlier in this section, despite the reform efforts and progress to date, key political parties within Bosnia continue to struggle over the basic issues that started the war nearly 20 years ago and this is reflected within the wider Bosnian society. There has been very little reconciliation among the ethnic communities, therefore ethnicity will continue to challenge defence reform efforts and Bosnia's journey towards NATO and EU membership.

## ***Methodology***

The method that a researcher selects to conduct a study is largely determined by the research question and nature of the social phenomenon that the researcher is investigating.<sup>71</sup> In 1998, the author served in Bosnia as a Staff Officer in the British Headquarters of the NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR), responsible for the authorisation and monitoring of the military training and movement activities of the Entity Armed Forces and ensuring that the Entities complied with the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Accord. Today, seventeen years on from the cessation of hostilities and fourteen years following the author's deployment in Bosnia, commentators continue to debate the fragility of Bosnia, as it is largely ethnic tension that continues to challenge peace in Bosnia. Recently there have been incidents that have raised ethnic tension to a level not seen for years and the western powers seem unable or unwilling to effectively deal with the rising

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71 Morgan, G., and L. Smircich, 1980. The Case for Qualitative Research. Acad. Manag. Rev., 5 (4): 491-500.

nationalist rhetoric and rising social and political tensions.<sup>72</sup> This may be explained by the western focus on Afghanistan. International officials fear that these events could threaten to unravel the progress made in security and defence reform. The author's aim therefore is to analyse the progress of defence reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with particular attention to the role of ethnicity within the armed forces.

The method selected to carry out this analyses will be by illustrative case study and will take on a descriptive approach as the author establishes to achieve the aims of the thesis.<sup>73</sup> A descriptive approach describes the natural phenomenon in narrative form. A case study is a comprehensive analysis of a single phenomenon of interest in order to offer the understandings in a particular context. The author considers the case study as a suitable method in which to reflect on the lessons learned and to analyse the impact of ethnicity in one particular case. This is also a qualitative study given the interest of the researcher who seeks insight and interpretation of the problem at hand. Qualitative studies are often employed in social sciences and they focus mainly on the process and interpretation of the research subject.<sup>74</sup>

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72 Morrison, K. Dayton, Divisions and Constitutional Revisions: Bosnia & Herzegovina at the Crossroads. Defence Academy of the United Kingdom 09/11

73 McDonough, J. and McDonough, S., (1997). Research Methods for English Language Teachers. London: Arnold.

74 Denzin, N., and Y. Lincoln, 1994. Handbook of Qualitative Research. Sage Publication, California, pp: 3-5.

The progress of the reforms of the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be analysed, seeking to understand the challenges and obstacles that impact on this process with particular attention to the unity in the defence forces and the impact of the ethnic divide within the defence forces. In order to effectively consider the impact of ethnic division and tensions within the defence forces, this study begins with consideration of the concept of ethnicity. Negative ethnicity is central to the Bosnian conflict, if not as a cause but as a catalyst; therefore the views by various scholars on this subject will be collected and analysed. This is imperative to support the central argument of this study; it is also crucial in the quest to explain the pace at which the reform of the armed forces on Bosnia has been carried out.

The available literature on the conflict preceding this process of security reform in Bosnia will be crucial in shedding additional light on the genesis of the conflict and even pointing towards a more constructive solution to the problem at hand. The research will seek to establish from the available literature the attitudes of the stakeholders and how the existing defence structures ensure that there is sustainable peace in the country.

## ***Literature Review***

A review of the literature that has shaped the understanding of the central arguments in this thesis will now be carried out. The review will provide an overview of the literature related to the conflict in Bosnia, defence reform, as well as literature related to the concept of ethnicity; the models of ethnicity; ethnic

conflict and the concept of negative ethnicity in Bosnia. The review will also examine the literature that addresses the role of the international community in the stabilization of Bosnia and also the historical perspective of the conflict in Bosnia to provide context. The literature review will then discuss what various scholars believe are the causes of segregation within the defence force and the implication that ethnic segregation of the defence organisation has on the security of the state.

### **An Overview of the Literature on the Introduction and Methodology**

Early in the first chapter of this study, the background that supports the central argument of this thesis and the research methodology adopted was discussed. Šajinović outlines the importance of defence reforms in Bosnia to the international community, while McMahony discusses the political situation in Bosnia, focusing on the ethno-centricity of the political parties and their impact on the defence reforms in particular and peace prospects in general.<sup>75</sup>

The introductory section also discusses the fragile nature of the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in light of the recent threats by President Dodik to hold a referendum to decide whether Republika Srpska should secede from Bosnia. The *Balkan Insight* provides a glimpse into the possible consequences of such action and the views of the international community.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Šajinović, Z., (January, 2007 ) Ongoing Defense Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina – Challenges and Perspectives. In Security Sector Reform in South East Europe – from a Necessary Remedy to a Global Concept. National Defence Academy.

<sup>76</sup> Balkan Insight (13, May 2011) Bosnia: Dodik Agrees to Drop the Disputed

Additionally Knaus discusses the involvement of various international organizations in Bosnia and their role in stabilizing the country through the reforms in the defence force.<sup>77</sup>

### **An Overview of the Literature on the Theoretical Framework**

Chapter Two of this study examines the theoretical framework. The theoretical framework will discuss the various concepts that arise in the process of analyzing the progress of defence reform in Bosnia and will address the concept of *negative ethnicity*. Even though the causes of the conflict in Bosnia can be regarded as being political, negative ethnicity played a key role in fueling the conflict and even ensuring that the defence forces of each entity remain separate from one another. Therefore, understanding the ethnic question in Bosnia is central in understanding the progress of defence reform and also in determining strategies that may offer long term solutions to this challenge. Kenyan politician and writer Koigi Wa Wamwere coined the term 'negative ethnicity' in an attempt to explain ethnic rivalries in Africa and how it became a popular concept used to undermine attempts at democracy. According to Wamwere, negative ethnicity is revealed when one ethnic group believes they are superior to other ethnic groups because their religion, food, culture, language or even their looks are better.<sup>78</sup> This assumed ethnic superiority is not isolated to the African continent, it is also

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Referendum. Available at: <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/catherine-ashton-to-meet-bosnian-leaders> (Accessed on July 8, 2011)

<sup>77</sup> Knaus, G., & Martin, F., 'Travails of the European Raj', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol 14, no. 3, July 2003, pp. 60-74.

<sup>78</sup> <http://amckiereads.com/2011/03/23/review-negative-ethnicity-by-koigi-wa-wamwere/> (accessed September 26, 2011).



prevalent in many western bi-cultural and multi-cultural societies where people from different ethnicities cohabitate together, an example being Northern Ireland where negative ethnicity is prevalent between Catholic and Protestants or in America between African-Americans and white Americans. In the Former Yugoslavia the author argues that negative ethnicity was key contributor to the tensions that existed between Slovenes, Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and Albanians which ultimately led to the conflict in Bosnia in the mid 1990's.

The conflict that occurred in Bosnia was fought along ethnic lines and when the international community intervened and stopped the fighting with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, it used the ethnic phenomena in the country to quell the violence. The Bosnian conflict surprised many historians because the ethnic groups had lived for decades, even centuries without resolving their differences through violent means. By discussing negative ethnicity in this study, the thesis attempts to understand the motivations behind the conflict by looking at the theoretical underpinnings behind them.

The first step in understanding negative ethnicity in Bosnia is to define the concept of ethnicity. In *Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches*, Yang points out that there need not be contention about the concept of ethnicity; that the contention on this issue is a function of the various definitions that ethnicity has been given. He ties the concept of ethnicity to the primordial bond, which he

argues, sustains ethnicity by bringing people together to protect and preserve their identity and interest.<sup>79</sup>

In the paper titled, *Ethni-political Warfare: Cause, Consequences and Possible Solutions*, Jowitt views ethnicity as a political concept that is created to mobilise ethnic blocks to pursue and protect the shared interests of a community.<sup>80</sup> This definition best supports the ethnic cleavages within Bosnia and Herzegovina and suggests that multi-ethnic states mobilise along ethnic lines to protect their respective territory. Scherrer expands on Jowitt's definition by discussing aspects such as history, culture and biological features to identify the people of particular ethnicity.<sup>81</sup> His approach is integrative and serves as an appropriate background to the politicization of ethnicity as proposed by Jowitt.

To fully understand Jowitt's definition of ethnicity and how this definition applies to the ethnic segregation in Bosnia, Chapter Two analyses the models of ethnicity, which offer an explanation as to why a people who consider themselves as belonging to a particular ethnic community are normally susceptible to the manipulation by the political elites and the ethnic entrepreneurs within their

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79 Yang, P. Q., (2000) *Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches. Theories of Ethnicity*. State University of New York Press.

80 Jowitt, K., "Ethnicity: Nice, Nasty, and Nihilistic," in *Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Consequences, and Possible Solutions*, edited by Daniel Chirot and Martin E. P. Seligman (American Psychological Association, 2001): 27.

81 Scherrer, C. P., *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Violence: Conflict Management, Human Rights, and Multilateral Regimes* 27-69.

community. Ethnic blocks are mobilized under the pretext of fighting for their political and economic interests. Through the literature covered in this chapter, it becomes clear that what is often referred to as common political and economic interests of an ethnic group is in essence a representation of a political and/or economic goal set by the politicians. This is often a personal selfish goal, sold as an ideology in order to rally the ethnic populace. But why do people succumb to this? In the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Two, the thesis presents three approaches that can be used to better understand the ethnic phenomena and provide some explanation to the ethnic motivations within Bosnian society and how the ethnic phenomena can create difficulties within society and indeed create an obstacle to the reform of the country's defence forces. There is little hope for a fully ethnically integrated defence force to exist without successful integration of the wider community. A good understanding of the ethnic phenomenon is therefore critical for Bosnia to progress in its reform efforts and to overcome its ethnic difficulties. These three approaches include the *primordial*, *instrumental* and the *constructivist* approach.

The supporters of the *primordial* approach include Fearson; Oberschall, Rabushka and Shepsle. Oberschall notes that by sharing culture, historical and biological roots, people of an ethnic group have the tendency of becoming a political entity.<sup>82</sup> But Rabushka and Shepsle refrain from labeling the definition of

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82 Oberschall, A., "From Ethnic Cooperation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia," in *Ethno-political Warfare: Causes, Consequences, and Possible Solutions*, edited by Daniel Chirot and Martin E. P. Seligman (American Psychological Association, 2001): 119-151.

ethnicity to a people sharing historical, biological and cultural roots; they argue that ethnic blocks are defined by the people sharing the similar interest in public policies.<sup>83</sup> It therefore includes people who do not necessarily share common ancestry, hence cultural and biological history. Fearson supports Rabushka and Shepsle's view by claiming that ethnic groups often have different preferences whenever it comes to the types of public goods such as education, employment and health opportunities.<sup>84</sup> This view is important as it links the conflict in the former Yugoslavia to the primordial sentiments amongst the ethnic entities. Having shared the same history, it became convenient for various ethnicities within Yugoslavia to unite and fight for their independence. This was true of the ethnic group that seceded from Yugoslavia to form the new country of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In looking at the instrumentalist approach, Fearson provides a background to this school of thought. He argues that ethnic communities are taken as instruments to be used by politicians in bargaining for power.<sup>85</sup> Fearson also introduces the question of social relevance of an ethnic group in a nation state, a factor that is closely related to the political relevance of its people. Yuri builds on this concept and reveals that social relevance has led to the formation of political parties

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83 Rabushka, A., & Shepsle, K. A., (1972) *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability*. Columbus, OH: Merrill.

84 Fearson, J. D., (1998) *Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict*. In *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict*, ed. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press pp. 107–26.

85 Ibid, 270 -300.

along ethnic lines especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where ethnicity cannot be separated from politics.<sup>86</sup>

Gagnon contributes to the constructivist approach by claiming that both religious and ethnic issues are susceptible to manipulation by the political class, he however cautions that to better understand this approach; it must be supplemented with the ethnic polarization and conflict escalation model. Herz on his part pours light on a number of short comings of this approach, citing that the persuasions by political players only work when fear of the unknown is instilled in a people. Lake and Rothchild<sup>87</sup> and Melander<sup>88</sup> expand on Herz's view, however Stein argues that whenever the state fails to protect its citizens they are left with little choice but to embrace any ethnic initiatives that promise to guarantee their protection; this happens most frequently during the political transition.<sup>89</sup>

Chapter Two discusses ethnic conflict and its cause. Brubaker and Laitin challenge the effort to attribute ethnic conflict to ethnicity. They point out that there are other pertinent factors that create ethnic conflict and that ethnicity in

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86 Yuri, S., (1994) "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism." *Slavic Review* 53(2):414–52.

87 Lake, D.A., & Rothchild, D., *Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict*, *International Security* 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 41.

88 Melander, E., "Fearful, but Not Mad – Modeling the Security Dilemma of Conventional Conflict," Working Paper, (International Studies Association, March 1998) Available at: <http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/mee01/> (accessed: June 29, 2011).

89 Stein, J. G., "Image, Identity, and the Resolution of Violent Conflict," in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of managing International Conflict* edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 193.

itself is merely used as a catalyst.<sup>90</sup> Chaim builds on the Brubaker and Laitin argument by exposing the connection between ethnicity and conflict.<sup>91</sup> This argument is rebutted by Scherrer who offers a number of reasons that lead ethnic communities to take up arms against each other.<sup>92</sup> The reasons range from political to cultural to religious to economic. Scherrer, supported by Burg and Shoup regard ethnic conflict as a class struggle within a society, as ethnic groups compete for social, political and economic power.<sup>93</sup> They cite the growth of liberal democracy following the demise of communism in Eastern Europe as the cause of the ethnic strife that was witnessed in the Balkans.

On the other hand, Wolff also refutes Brubaker and Laitin's conception of ethnic violence. Wolff bases his argument on the end results of any ethnic strife: the success and failure of such a conflict is always attributed to the affected ethnic group.<sup>94</sup> In this way, as Geisen et al., observe ethnicity has thus become a sure blueprint for determining collective action whenever circumstances dictate.<sup>95</sup>

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90 Brubaker, R. And Laitin, D. 'Ethnic and Nationalist Violence', Annual Review of Sociology vol. 24, no. 4 (1998), 423-452.

91 Chaim. K., "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars." International Security 20 (Spring 1996)

92 Scherrer, C. P., Ethnicity, Nationalism and Violence: Conflict Management, Human Rights, and Multilateral Regimes 27-69. ASHGATE, 2003.

93 Burg, S. L., & Shoup, P. S., (2000) The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention. M.E. Sharpe Inc., p.4-8.

94 Giesen, B., Schmidtke, O., & Tambini, D., Collective Identities in Action: A Sociological Approach to Ethnicity (Ashgate, January 2003), 38-39.

95 Giesen, B., Schmidtke, O., & Tambini, D., Collective Identities in Action: A

After examining the various shades of ethnicity; its models and what constitutes an ethnic conflict, this thesis explores the concept of ethnic conflict in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is important to understand the underlying causes of the conflict in Bosnia in order to encourage reconciliation between the ethnic factions and to overcome ethnic related obstacles that impede the process of defence reform. Donia<sup>96</sup> and Schoplin<sup>97</sup> offer a comprehensive background of the ethnic situation in the former Yugoslavia. Both Hodson et al.,<sup>98</sup> and Dragomir<sup>99</sup> add to the dynamics of ethnicity before and during the break out of conflict in Bosnia. Other scholars who contribute to this subject include Lampe,<sup>100</sup> Noel,<sup>101</sup> and Zoran.<sup>102</sup>

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Sociological Approach to Ethnicity (Ashgate, January 2003), 38-39.

96 Donia, R. J., & Fine, J. V.A. (1994) *Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed*, New York: Columbia University Press. p. 84.

97 Schoplin, G., (1993) 'The rise and fall of Yugoslavia', in John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (eds), *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict, Regulation*, London: Routledge.

98 Hodson, R., Dus̃ko, S., & Gart, M., (1994) 'National tolerance in the former Yugoslavia', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 99, no. 6, pp. 1534.

99 Dragomir, P., (1991) 'Nacionalna distanca gradjana', in Bacevic, et al. (eds), *Jugoslavija na kriznoj prekretnici*, Beograd: Institut Drus̃tvenih Nauka, pp. 171/84

100 Lampe, J. R., 1999. *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

101 Noel, M., (1994) *Bosnia: A Short History*. New York: New York University Press.

102 Zoran, P (1995) 'Bosnia-Herzegovina: From Multiethnic Coexistence to "Apartheid" . . . and Back', in Payam Akhavan and Robert Howse, eds, *Yugoslavia the Former and Future*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution and Geneva: The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

Michael et al. and Powers discuss the partition of Bosnia along ethnic lines.<sup>103</sup> Andjelic notes that the present ethnic divisions in the Bosnian society cannot be blamed solely on the country's history.<sup>104</sup> This is in view of the fact that the ethnic entities had previously shared a history of peaceful coexistence that had stretched back to medieval times. This argument is explained by Gow who offers the statistics in percentages of the representation of each ethnic group in the Yugoslav military.<sup>105</sup>

The World Bank report titled, '*A Social Assessment of Bosnia and Herzegovina*,' discusses the politicization of ethnicity in Bosnia. Burg and Shoup;<sup>106</sup> Dragomir and Cohen support this notion.<sup>107</sup> They concur that the political class created tension within Bosnia in order for them to achieve their political interests, which included autonomy. Further more, Burg and Shoup also raised the issue of ethnic nationalism, which was at the heart of the conflict between 1992 and 1995.

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103 Powers, G. F., (1996) 'Religion, Conflict and Prospects for Reconciliation in Bosnia, Croatia and Yugoslavia', *Journal of International Affairs* 50(1): 221–253.

104 Andjelic, N., *Bosnia-Herzegovina the End of a Legacy* (Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 6. (P5)

105 Gow, J., (1992) *Legitimacy and Military: The Yugoslav Crisis*. London: Pinter Publishers Limited. p. 142.

106 Burg, S. L., & Shoup, P. S., (2000) *The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*. M.E. Sharpe Inc., p.63.

107 Cohen, L. J., (1995) *Broken Bonds*, 2nd edn, Boulder: Westview Press.



Finally Chapter Two discusses *democratic peace theory*. Clemens provides us with the definition of the theory, which he bases from the ideas that were put forward by Kant.<sup>108</sup> Fischer demonstrates the link between liberalism and democracy; how the two work together to promote peace, which is a prerequisite to social, economic and political development.<sup>109</sup> Frank and Richmond place the theory in context by applying it into the prevailing ethnic tensions in Bosnia and regard it as a failure of the liberal peace praxis.<sup>110</sup> They too explore the nature of the relationship between the international community, the national government and the citizens of Bosnia.

### **An Overview of the Literature on Security Sector Reform**

Academics still debate the best way to effect post-conflict security sector reform. Some support the notion of 'security first' and others place priority on 'democratisation'.<sup>111</sup> Fen Osler Hampson and Davis Mendeloff claim that "establishing security and basic political stability should be the first, if not the only objective of international interventions. Such interventions in an ideal world

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108 Clemens, W. C., (2001) *Coping with Complexities: Alternative Explanation. The Baltic Transformed: Complexity Theory and European Security*. ROWMAN AND LITTLE FIELD.

109 Fischer, M., (April 2000) *The Liberal Peace: Ethical, Historical, and Philosophical Aspects*. Available at: <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/fischer.pdf> (Accessed on July1, 2011)

110 Richmond, O.P., & Franks, J., (2009) *Bosnia: Between Partition and Pluralism. Liberal Peace Transitions: Between State Building and Peace-Building*. Edinburg University Press, p. 53.

111 Security sector reform in developing and transitional countries, <http://www.tfasinternational.org/iipes/academics/cm2010/augwulf2004.pdf> (accessed October 3, 2011).

should leave viable states and have the capacity and instrumental authority to manage their own internal security affairs because the alternative – a relapse into anarchy and violence – is a far worse outcome.”<sup>112</sup> Larry Diamond adds that in post conflict environments where the state has collapsed, security is the most critical element that supports everything. Without even a minimal level of security, the state cannot conduct trade or commerce, rebuild their homes and communities or participate effectively in politics. Without security the state is left in a state of disorder and distrust. As Diamond quotes “an utterly Hobbesian situation in which fear and raw force dominates.”<sup>113</sup> In contrast, those that support democratisation as a priority argue that holding elections and passing responsibility to local authorities as quickly as possible should be the priority for the international community.<sup>114</sup>

### **An Overview of the Literature on the Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

While exploring the background of the conflict in Bosnia in Chapter Three, the thesis no longer concentrates on the ethnic issues involved but rather looks at a broad spectrum of factors that brought about the conflict and how each factor

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112 Fen Osler Hampson and David Mendeloff, “Intervention and the Nation-Building Debate,” in *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World* edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 680.

113 Larry Diamond, “What went wrong in Iraq,” *Foreign Affairs* 83 (2004): 37. and see Susan L. Woodward, “Failed States: Warlordism and “Tribal” Warfare,” *Naval War College Review* 52, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 65.

114 Sabrina P. Ramet, “A Flawed Peace: Post-Dayton Bosnia,” in *The Three Yugoslavias: State- Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005* (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), 491.

affected the other. Singer emphasizes the need to research the history of the tensions in the former Yugoslavia, since it is from here that the current Bosnian stagnation stems.<sup>115</sup> In a similar vein, Andersen and Birgit emphasize an understanding of this history, especially since the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918.<sup>116</sup>

Sriram, Martin-Ortega, and Herman provide the history of the formation of Yugoslavia early last century with the coming together of the Serb, Croats and Slovenes.<sup>117</sup> Kreimer builds on their contribution by researching deeper, even before Yugoslavia was founded in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>118</sup> Kreimer discusses the comprehensive historical developments in Bosnia to the present age. Other scholars such as Jutze also provide a dialogue of the ancient history of Yugoslavia, going as back as the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>119</sup>

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115 Singer, B. J., (2004) Nationalism and Dehostilization. Quoted in: Potter, N, N., Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Local and Global Level. Rodopi. p. 153-158.

116 Andersen, E.A., & and Birgit Lindesnes, B., (2004) Towards New Global Strategies: Public Goods and Human Rights. The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 185.

117 Sriram, C, L., Martin-Ortega, O., and Herman, J., (2010) War, Conflict and Human Rights: Theory and Practice. Contemporary Conflict: Critical Areas. Routledge, New York.

118 Kreimer, A., Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Evolution of Conflict. The World Bank Publications.

119 Jutze, K., 'a Brief History of Former Yugoslavia,' Bosnian Notebooks, ed. Kimberly Jutze (Washington D.C.: Pax World Press, 1997), p. 19.

Laura and Little,<sup>120</sup> Andersen and Lindesnes<sup>121</sup> contribute to the history of Bosnia in the early 1990s in the lead up to the 92-95 war. They also introduce the international community perspective, demonstrating how their involvement accelerated the secession of some entities from Yugoslavia. Nation<sup>122</sup> and Andersen and Wiberg<sup>123</sup> explore the methods through which the international community intervened to end the conflict in 1995 with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord. His arguments are supported by the Cecik paper titled *Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Divided Societies: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, which provide a detailed account of the process the international community went through before the warring parties could be brought to the negotiating table to end the war.<sup>124</sup> Juncos discusses the Dayton Peace Accords,

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120 Laura, S., & Little, A., *The Death of Yugoslavia*, Penguin Books, BBC Books, London, Revised version 1996.

121 Andersen, E.A., & and Birgit Lindesnes, B., (2004) *Towards New Global Strategies: Public Goods and Human Rights. The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 199.

122 Nation, R.G., "The Land of Hate: Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992-95," in *War in the Balkans, 1992 –2002* Strategic Studies Institute (2003), 195.

123 Andersen, E. A., & Wiberg, H., (eds.): *Storm Over Balkans*, C.A. Reitzel, Copenhagen 1994.

124 Cecik, A., *Post Conflict Reconstruction in Divided Societies: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Available at: [http://137.204.115.130/activities/download/XIII-CEI-ISSC/SS\\_CekikAneta\\_paper\\_3place.pdf](http://137.204.115.130/activities/download/XIII-CEI-ISSC/SS_CekikAneta_paper_3place.pdf) (Accessed on May 30, 2011)

highlighting the various effects of its implementation to the governance of Bosnia.<sup>125</sup>

After researching the course of this conflict, the thesis shifts focus to the role of the international community in stabilizing the country and more specifically the contribution it has made towards reforming the defence organisation. King, Don and Hodes discuss detail about the resources that have been committed by the international community with the sole objective of reforming the defence forces of Bosnia.<sup>126</sup> Papenkort goes further and proposes a review of the global dynamics in the quest of understanding the security challenges that Bosnia face.<sup>127</sup> These include regional challenges such as porous borders and environmental degradation and global challenges such as international crime and terrorism. Aybet explains the regional challenges, citing the geo-strategic position of the whole Balkan region which can be used to traffic drugs, arms and humans.<sup>128</sup>

Within Chapter Three, the thesis will study the Dayton Peace Accords, recognizing it as a fundamental document that has shaped Bosnia to what it is today. Frank and Richmond discuss the details of the agreement; how it

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125 Juncos, A.E., (November 2005) The EU's post-Conflict Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (re)Integrating the Balkans and/or (re)Inventing the EU? Southeast European Politics. Vol. VI, No. 2pp. 88 – 108.

126 King, J., Dorn, A.W., & Hodes, (September, 2002) An Unprecedented Experiment: Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Available at: [http://walterdorn.org/pdf/UnprecedentedExperiment\\_Dorn-King\\_Sept2002.pdf](http://walterdorn.org/pdf/UnprecedentedExperiment_Dorn-King_Sept2002.pdf) (Accessed 23 August 2011)

127 Papenkort, B., Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Long Way Towards Partnership for Peace.

128 Aybet, G., (September/October 2010) NATO Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Defense Reform and State-Building.

determined the sharing of resources in the country, the governance structures and the composition of the defence forces.<sup>129</sup> They also look at the weaknesses of the Accords, which are explained in a 1997 report by NATO titled the *NATO's Role in Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia*. Another report titled *Country Report Bosnia and Herzegovina* discusses the Dayton Peace Accords, pointing out some of its structural limitations.<sup>130</sup>

Chapter Three will also explore the structure of the Bosnian government. This is in recognition of the fact that the structure and composition of the government is crucial in promoting the defence reforms and also align them to the security needs of the country. Without a robust governance structure the reforms in the defence sector cannot be considered a priority by any country. The 2009 report titled *Country Assistance for Bosnia and Herzegovina* criticizes the role of the political parties in Bosnia, which the report claims is undermining both democracy and reforms in the defence forces.<sup>131</sup>

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129 Richmond, O.P., & Franks, J., (2009) *Bosnia: Between Partition and Pluralism*. Liberal Peace Transitions: Between State Building and Peace-Building. Edinburg University Press, p. 53.

130 Governing Difference ( November 2007) *Country Report Bosnia and Herzegovina : Executive Summary*. Sanin Hasibovic. Available at: [http://typo3.univie.ac.at/uploads/media/Executive\\_Summ\\_BiH\\_02.pdf](http://typo3.univie.ac.at/uploads/media/Executive_Summ_BiH_02.pdf) (Accessed on June 28, 2011)

131 *Country Assistance Strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009-2013* (5/20/2009) Available at: [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PDACP613.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACP613.pdf)

Rajchelet et al. provides the background of the formation of the Bosnian government by exploring the Dayton Peace Accords and its provisions, which are the foundation of the Bosnian government.<sup>132</sup> Beiber on the other hand comprehensively highlights the composition of the various arms of the Bosnian government namely the presidency, the Council of Ministers and the parliament.<sup>133</sup> He looks at the relationship between these arms of the government and also gives highlights on how ethnicity impacts the composition of the government. Zupcevic and Causevic discuss democracy in Bosnia, focusing on the various political parties in the country.<sup>134</sup>

The role the international community is analysed as it strives to ensure that Bosnia remains a stable state. With the delicate nature of the situation in Bosnia, halting the bloodshed was not all the international community could do; they had to come up with ways to ensure that peace prevailed. Beiber observes that the success of the Accords is attributable to the mandate that it gave the international community through various organizations to implement the provisions of the agreements.<sup>135</sup> He offers examples of such organizations

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132 Rajchel, K., Esanu, R., MacBain, A., & Rohwerder, B., Bosnia and Herzegovina Post Conflict Reconstruction. Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies Conflict Mapping. Available at: [http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/intrel/media/Bosnia-\\_final\\_draft2.pdf](http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/intrel/media/Bosnia-_final_draft2.pdf)

133 Beiber, F., (2002) "Governing Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina," In Kingal Gal (ed.), *Minority Governance In Europe*. Budapest: LGI Books.

134 Zupcevic, M., Causevic, F., (September 2009) Case Study: Bosnia and Herzegovina. Centre for Developing Area Studies – McGill University and the World Bank.

135 Beiber, p.209.

including European Union Force (EUFOR); International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the Office of the High Representative (OHR).

Laurance and Meek<sup>136</sup> and Aybet<sup>137</sup> and King et al.,<sup>138</sup> look at the strategies that the international community has worked to strengthen the defence force of Bosnia by encouraging gradual reforms that bring the two entities together in a bid to dissolve the animosity. These strategies are also reflected in the report titled *Country Assistance for Bosnia and Herzegovina*<sup>139</sup>. Michael and Cooper state that the international community uses a two pronged strategy of either coaxing or coercion to have the entity armies take up training programs that bring them together.<sup>140</sup> In that case the invitation to join international organizations such as NATO is sufficient incentive to motivate its entity army to join inter-ethnic military programs. Zupcevic and Causevic,<sup>141</sup> Traynor<sup>142</sup> and Staples, look at the

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136 Laurance, E. J., & Meek, S., The New Field of Micro- Disarmament: Addressing the Proliferation and Buildup of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Brief 7, (Bonn International Center for Conversion, September 1996).

137 Aybet, G., (September/October 2010) NATO Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Defense Reform and State-Building.

138 King, J., Dorn, A.W., & Hodes, (September, 2002) An Unprecedented Experiment: Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Available at: [http://walterdorn.org/pdf/UnprecedentedExperiment\\_Dorn-King\\_Sept2002.pdf](http://walterdorn.org/pdf/UnprecedentedExperiment_Dorn-King_Sept2002.pdf) (Accessed 23 August 2011)

139 Governing Difference ( November 2007) Country Report Bosnia and Herzegovina : Executive Summary. Sanin Hasibovic. Available at: [http://typo3.univie.ac.at/uploads/media/Executive\\_Summ\\_BiH\\_02.pdf](http://typo3.univie.ac.at/uploads/media/Executive_Summ_BiH_02.pdf) (Accessed on June 28, 2011)

140 Michael, P., & Cooper, N., (2004), War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges of Transformation (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

141 Zupcevic, M., Causevic, F., (September 2009) Case Study: Bosnia and Herzegovina. Centre for Developing Area Studies – McGill University and the World Bank.

142 Traynor, I., (2005) cited in Gerard Toal, John O'Loughlin and Dino Djipa, "Bosnia-



various procedures that NATO has put in place in order to accommodate Bosnia in international organization structures. Morfew<sup>143</sup> and Filipov<sup>144</sup> discuss the role of the international actors in Bosnia and more specifically the Non-Governmental Organisations.

### **An Overview of the Literature on the Creation of Segregated Forces in Bosnia**

In Chapter Four the thesis critically explores the actions that led to the formation of the segregated Defence Forces in Bosnia. There are three inter-related causes that can be attributed to this phenomenon. These include the negative legacy of the former Yugoslavia governing structures; the subsequent nationalist competition within Bosnia-Herzegovina and the provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords, which were later enshrined in the constitution of the country.

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Herzegovina Ten Years After Dayton: Constitutional Change and Public Opinion," *Journal of Economic Literature* (2005), <http://www.colorado.edu/IBS/PEC/johno/pub/Dayton10yrsafter.pdf>; (accessed June 30 2011)

143 Morfew, S., (January 2007) 'Partnership for Peace and Security Sector Reform' In, *Security Sector Reform in South East Europe –from a Necessary Remedy to a Global Concept* . By, Ebnoether, A, H., Felberbauer, E, M., & Staničić, M., National Defence Academy.

144 Filipov, F., (2006) *Post-conflict Peacebuilding: Strategies and Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador and Sierra Leone*. Social Development Division, Human Rights Unit. Santiago, Chile.

Shrader; Burg and Shoup, Guab and Gow provide the insight into the developments in the former Yugoslavia which have later gone on to shape the manner in which the defence forces are currently being governed in Bosnia. Shrader highlights the rich multi-ethnic society that existed before the breakdown of Yugoslavia.<sup>145</sup> Gow highlights the extent to which Bosnia was diverse with no majority religious community or any majority national group.<sup>146</sup> This background analysis is crucial in understanding the subsequent disharmony that rocked the countries such as Bosnia, which had seceded from Yugoslavia.

Burg and Shoup discuss the relationship between the nationalist forces in Bosnia,<sup>147</sup> whereas Gaub provides an in-depth explanation of the structure and composition of the former Yugoslav army that helped to explain the nationalistic interests and the resulting segregation within the defence forces.<sup>148</sup> Shrader also links the nationalist competition to the on-going segregation within the army. Gaub on his part concurs with Shrader, proposing that the ethnic differences that

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145 Shrader, C. R., (2003) *The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military History, 1992-1994*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.

146 Gow, J., (1992) *Legitimacy and Military: The Yugoslav Crisis*. London: Pinter Publishers Limited. p. 142.

147 Burg, S. L., & Shoup, P. S., (2000) *The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*. M.E. Sharpe Inc., p.63.

148 Gaub, F., (2010) *Case Study: The Armies of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Military Integration After Civil War : Multiethnic Armies, Identity and Post* Taylor and Francis, p.6.

have brought about these divisions are better explored in the context of each entities self perception as a state.<sup>149</sup>

Thirdly, critics have insisted that the Dayton Peace Accords itself has contributed to the segregation of the Defence Forces by forcibly keeping the ethnic factions apart from one another. The report by the Foreign Ministry of Norway titled *A Bosnian Fortress: Return, Energy and the Future of Bosnia*, highlights the various achievements that have been made through the implementation of the Accords over the years. These gains however, contradict a failure that the Accords have presided over, especially by entrenching segregation in the Defence Forces of Bosnia.

The contribution by Gaub, Hadzovic, and Papenkort further build on this point: Hadzovic and Papenkort state that the Dayton Peace Accords entrenched the ethnic divisions in the constitution of Bosnia, which later spilled over to other sectors of the Bosnian society, including the military.<sup>150/151</sup> Gaub on his part discuss how politicians took advantage of these legal divisions and stirred up

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<sup>149</sup> Shrader, C. R., (2003) *The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military History, 1992-1994*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press

<sup>150</sup> Hadžović, D., (August 2009) *The Costs And Benefits Of Bosnia And Herzegovina Joining NATO Alliance*. Centre for Security Studies.

<sup>151</sup> Papenkort, B., (not dated) *Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Long Way Towards Partnership for Peace*. Available at: [se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/15228/.../19\\_Transforming.pdf](http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/15228/.../19_Transforming.pdf) (Accessed on June 10, 2011) p.207.

hatred amongst the citizens in their respective ethnic entities.<sup>152</sup> This encouraged each entity army to serve the interests of their ethnicity as a matter of priority.

### **An Overview of the literature on the Impact of Segregated Forces in the Progress of Defence Reforms in Bosnia**

Through the insights of various literature, seven major ways through which this segregation impacts on the security in the country were identified. The first is disunity amongst the defence forces. On this point, Gaub provides the background insight on how the choice by each entity defence force to remain loyal to their ethnic agenda has alienated each from the other.<sup>153</sup> Hynes concurs with him, pointing out that these divisions contradict the interests of each entity army, which is to see a more stable and peaceful Bosnia.<sup>154</sup>

The other effects of the segregation are the absence of unity of command within the national defence force. Gaub blames this on the self-ethnic ambitions that each entity defence force has, which makes them unwilling to succumb to the interests of the nation at large.<sup>155</sup> The territorial military leaders have a strong

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152 Gaub, F., (2010) Case Study: The Armies of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Military Integration After Civil War : Multiethnic Armies, Identity and Post Taylor and Francis, p.92-94

153 Gaub, F., (2010) Case Study: The Armies of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Military Integration After Civil War : Multiethnic Armies, Identity and Post Taylor and Francis Ibid, p. 102.

154 Haynes, D. F., (not dated) The Elephant in the Room: Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Deconstructing the Reconstruction: Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Postwar . . . Ashgate Publishing Ltd., p. 235 – 242.

155 Gaub, F., (2010) Case Study: The Armies of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Military Integration

hold on the entity armies. Hynes provides the details on the failure of the national military leadership to fully command and coordinate the defence activity of the army.

Segregated defence forces have also made it difficult for the Bosnian national army to be considered for military campaigns on the international platform. The views of Papenkort, Hynes, alongside the report by the European Stability Initiative support this point.

The national defence force of the Bosnian army is a reflection of the political and social dynamics of the society at large. However, if the entity forces choose not to unite by those from other ethnic groups, this sends the message to the society at large that there is still tension and people need to remain wary. Therefore segregation causes tension between the populace and this doesn't create an environment in which all the citizens can fully cooperate with the national security agendas. Chalmer<sup>156</sup> and Gaub<sup>157</sup> explore how this tension pervades all the sections of Bosnian society and impacts on the pace of the defence reforms.

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After Civil War : Multiethnic Armies, Identity and Post Taylor and Francis Ibid, p. 104

156 Chalmers, M., "Security sector reform in developing countries: an EU perspective," Saferworld Conflict Prevention Research Report, (January 2000).

157 Gaub, F., (2010) Case Study: The Armies of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Military Integration After Civil War : Multiethnic Armies, Identity and Post Taylor and Francis Ibid, p. 102.

Due to these divisions in the defence forces the integrity of the Bosnian national army is in question and this had been a major hindrance to the country in joining international organizations such as NATO. Hynes discusses the Orazo saga and how it revealed the underbelly of the defence force of Bosnia.<sup>158</sup>

The lack of unity within the defence forces has also resulted in high costs of operations. Papenkort discusses how Bosnia is coming to terms with these issues by taking measures such as reducing the number of personnel serving in the national defence force and ensuring that there are no unnecessary costs being incurred. He further identifies the loopholes that make the costs of operation to skyrocket and proposes solutions to this dilemma.<sup>159</sup>

Finally, the divisions within the defence forces had heightened the lack of transparency within the national force as each entity harbours misgivings about the others. Tagarev explores the concept of transparency and particularly how it applies to the security sector.<sup>160</sup> Tagarev also discusses ways in which transparency within the defence forces help to boost the mood of the general public in matters regarding security. His views are corroborated by Colston's argument that defence issues need to be discussed by the all the stakeholders in

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<sup>158</sup> Haynes, D. F., (not dated) *The Elephant in the Room: Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Deconstructing the Reconstruction: Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Postwar . . .* Ashgate Publishing Ltd., p. 235 – 242.

<sup>159</sup> Papenkort, B., (not dated) *Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Long Way Towards Partnership for Peace*. Available at: [se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/15228/.../19\\_Transforming.pdf](http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/15228/.../19_Transforming.pdf) (Accessed on June 10, 2011), p.208.

<sup>160</sup> Tagarev, T., "Elaborating Policy for Transparency of Defense Procurement," in *Transparency in Defense Policy, Military Budgeting and Procurement*, ed. Todor Tagarev, (Sofia: G.C. Marshall Association-Bulgaria, 2002), 85-86.

the society and should not just be left to the security actors.<sup>161</sup> This is hardly happening in Bosnia and this trend does not only make it improbable for the defence forces to come together; it makes the prospects of sustainable peace in Bosnia unlikely, particularly if the process of the defence reforms were to be left in the hands of Bosnians.

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<sup>161</sup> Colston, J., NATO'S Approach to Defence Reform in South-East Europe. Available at: [se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/44361/.../en/Ch+4+Colston.pdf](http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/44361/.../en/Ch+4+Colston.pdf) (Accessed on May 10, 2011)

## Chapter 2 – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

### *Introduction*

The theoretical framework is a conceptual model through which the researcher theorizes, makes analysis and draws conclusions on the numerous factors that have been identified as being crucial to the understanding and resolving the problem under study.<sup>162</sup> The theoretical framework chosen in this study reflects the author's attempt to seek an understanding of the phenomena at hand.

Having gained first hand practical experience of the effects of ethnicity and ethnic tension in the Balkan region, first as a member of the NATO Stabilisation Force in Bosnia in 1998, then as a UN Military Liaison Officer in Kosovo in 2008, the author now seeks to understand the theory that drives ethnicity and the subsequent effect it has on the defence reform process underway in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Chapter Two will therefore explore the concepts that arise in the process of analyzing the progress of the defence reform in Bosnia with specific attention to the role of ethnicity within the armed forces. This chapter will explore the concept of *negative ethnicity* and *democratic peace theory*. These two concepts help inform the author's analysis of Bosnia's ethnic challenges and the progress of defence reform.

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<sup>162</sup> Sekaran, U. (2000). Research methods for business. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.



## ***Negative Ethnicity***

The conflict that occurred in Bosnia in the mid 1990s was fought along ethnic lines. When the international community intervened and stopped the fighting with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, it too focused on ethnicity to quell the violence. An understanding of negative ethnicity is imperative to this study as it is useful in understanding the conflict in Bosnia and the ethnic divisions and tensions that exist within the armed forces. Negative ethnicity occurs when one ethnic group believes they are superior to other ethnic groups. It has a direct influence on the pace and progression of the defence reform efforts. Negative ethnicity not only played a key role in fueling the conflict, it has played a key role in the segregation of the armed forces in the years following the war and remains a key obstacle to the reform process. Lastly and perhaps most importantly, understanding the concept of negative ethnicity is crucial in determining strategies that may offer long term solutions to overcome the ethnic divide that continues to hamper progress in the Balkans.

By analysing negative ethnicity in this study, the author seeks an understanding of the motivations behind the ethnic conflict in Bosnia by looking at the theoretical underpinnings behind them. Bosnia is an unusually complex country in a complicated situation and cannot move forward until it resolves the deep ethnic cleavages that exist within its society and its armed forces. Understanding the complexities of ethnicity and ethnic conflict is therefore crucial not only to the progress of defence reform in Bosnia and its goal of NATO and EU integration but also to the international community who are increasingly becoming involved

in ethnic conflicts across the globe. Therefore in the section that follows, the various models of ethnicity; the causes and courses of ethnic conflict will be explored in order to gain a comprehensive theoretical understanding of ethnicity as a concept and how it influenced the ethnic conflict in Bosnia and how it affects current defence reform efforts.

There are various approaches that have been proposed by scholars, trying to explain the motivations that make it possible for people of a particular ethnic extraction to be rallied behind a cause that apparently represent their common interests. The thesis now explores those models, which are identified as the *Primordial* approach, the *Instrumental* approach and the *Constructivist* approach. A critical look will be taken of each approach, exploring the premise of each; their strengths and weaknesses. Not only is this critical analyses beneficial to the broader understanding of ethnic motivations, the analysis will also relate each approach to the Bosnian conflict in order to understand the effects of ethnicity on future defence reform efforts and to assist in the successful integration of the entity armed forces.

### **The Primordial Approach**

The politicization and discrimination along ethnic background is a phenomenon that is hampering social, political and economic development in many multi-ethnic democracies. Primordialist thinkers consider why people from a particular ethnic block have the propensity of discriminating against people from other

ethnic backgrounds.<sup>163</sup> One such thinker is Fearson who argues that ethnic groups are innately political, arguing that people who share biological roots, culture and a common history often consider these characteristics to be an unchangeable heritage of their social and political life.<sup>164</sup> In this way they invariably become a political entity as they regard themselves as sharing a political destiny: disunity in this case would spell doom to their future political prospects.

Yang supports Oberschall when he argues that ethnicity is an ascribed or assigned status that is handed down from a people's ancestors.<sup>165</sup> This means that you inherit both the physical and cultural characteristics of your forefathers. In this sense ethnicity is a deeply rooted primal bond that links one to his/her ancestors, hence kinsmen through their bloodline. In addition to the consequence of the attributed identity, the ethnic boundaries that are often used to put boundaries on who belongs to a certain ethnic community or not are normally fixed and also cannot easily be changed.<sup>166</sup>

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163 Oberschall, A., "From Ethnic Cooperation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia," in *Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Consequences, and Possible Solutions*, edited by Daniel Chirot and Martin E. P. Seligman (American Psychological Association, 2001): 119-151.

164 Fearson, J. D., (2004) Why Do Some Wars Last Long than Others. *Journal of Peace Research*. 41 (3), 270 – 300.

165 Yang, P, Q., (2000) *Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches. Theories of Ethnicity*. State University of New York Press, pp.42-43

166. Ibid.

Therefore according to the primordial approach, ethnicity is a static phenomenon of culture in societies. If a person is born a Serb, he becomes a Serb forever and cannot change their ethnic membership to another group. In this way common ancestry determines a people's ethnicity: people belong to a particular ethnic group simply because the members of that group share common biological and cultural origins. At this stage the primordial approach comes in by stressing the role of primordial factors such as identity and cultural ties in establishing a people's identity. Therefore to the primordial thinkers it is the primordial bond that gives birth and also sustains ethnicity.<sup>167</sup>

Fearson concludes that in the primordial model, the politicization of an ethnic group is the product of the assumption that polarization increases the bargaining power of an ethnic group and results in the acquisition of their preferences.<sup>168</sup> Although this may work in the short term it does not explain the concept of ethnic mobilization and politicization in all instances. This is because the argument fails to answer the question of whether ethnic groups often disagree on the types of public goods that need to be provided.

Fearson goes further to explain that in multi-ethnic states in the developing world, including African countries in particular, the access to schools, hospitals, roads and public service jobs are sought after by people from all ethnic backgrounds. The ethnic conflicts experienced in these countries have arisen when ethnic

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<sup>167</sup> Ibid., pp.42-43.

<sup>168</sup> Fearson, Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict. pp.107-127.

coalitions are formed to gain a greater share of these public goods. In this case, ethnic blocks are in themselves incapable of accessing public goods by going it alone against other communities. They therefore band together with other ethnic communities to form a larger ethnic entity that can ensure their victory at the ballot box, hence access to the preferred public goods.<sup>169</sup>

As will be illustrated in this thesis, some elements of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia can be attributed to such primordial sentiments.<sup>170</sup> In spite of the apparent cooperation between the nationalities in Yugoslavia, there was still mistrust and hatred that prevailed amongst the ethnic entities. This trend set the stage for the growing uncertainty about pertinent issues such as state boundaries and the status of the minorities. It also brought about fierce competition for political power during the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which culminated into ethnic cleansing as neighbours turned against each other and district against district in an ever expanding spiral of aggression and reprisal. For the formation of another multi-ethnic country such as Bosnia-Herzegovina to have emerged from Yugoslavia, the ethnic communities within Bosnia had to unite and fight for their independence.

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<sup>169</sup> Ibid. pp.107-127.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid. pp.107-127.

If the primordial approach was solely based on the primordial bond, then it invariably suffers some serious weaknesses especially when the case of the former Yugoslavia is taken into account. This is because there is no tangible evidence to support that there was long existing ethnic conflict between the ethnic blocks within Yugoslavia that necessitated the imminent break up. If anything, Yugoslavia had never witnessed the sort of religious wars that were recorded in Western and Central Europe earlier on. Besides, the Croats and Serbs were not involved in any conflict before the Twentieth Century and the contemporary ethnic conflict is more a function of deliberate divisive government policies than coming from traditional communal antagonism. Finally, this school of thought also fails to make sense of the variations in the politicization of ethnic groups that takes place time after time.<sup>171</sup> Given the weaknesses of this approach, it is helpful to examine other possible theories to help frame this analysis.

### **The Instrumentalist Approach**

This approach considers ethnicity as an instrument that is used by the political elite to advance their interests. Ethnic sentiments and loyalties are normally manipulated by political leaders and ethnic elite for political ends through the creation of ethnic nationalism. Fearson suggests that in many instances the social relevance of ethnicity arises when the people recognize and thereby align their actions to that of their ethnic distinctions in a particular situation or their

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171 Fearson, J. D., (2004) Why Do Some Wars Last Long than Others. *Journal of Peace Research*. 41 (3), 270 – 300.

everyday life.<sup>172</sup> Ethnicity is politicized when political allies or coalitions organize themselves along ethnic entities or rather when the access to political and/or economic gains is limited to ethnic backgrounds of a people. Notably, the extent to which ethnicity is politicized vary from one country to another over a given period of time.<sup>173</sup>

When considering the conflict in the former Yugoslavia only a small number of politically significant actors in Bosnia were committed to a balance between civil society and nationalism. None of the three nationalist parties in Bosnia were committed to the idea of civil society (although the Muslim party of Democratic Action (SDA) did support the idea of civil society in its party program in December 1992). Each of the nationalist parties pursued goals that clashed with the other parties. Of the three nationalist forces the Serbs come in for special mention; the Serbs as an ethnic nation had the goal of acquiring a greater Serbia in terms political power and pursued policies throughout the disintegration of Bosnia that provoked a great deal of anti-Serb sentiment in the West. Despite the ugliness of the Bosnian conflict, all three nationalist parties remain in power today. This is a reflection of the ethnic tension and suspicion that remain rife across all sectors of Bosnian society and until resolved will continue to challenge reconciliation and ethnic integration within Bosnian society and indeed the Bosnia armed forces.

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172 Ibid.

173 Ibid, pp144

## The Constructivist Approach

The constructivist view serves to complement the insights that are offered by the primordial and instrumentalist views. According to the constructivist view, even though ethnicity and religion are real social factors, whatever matters most during ordinary times are their several roles and identities. Ethnic and religious issues are subject to manipulation by the political class with the aim of spreading fear and insecurity.<sup>174</sup>

According to Gagnon, the constructivist view needs to be complemented with a model of ethnic polarization and conflict escalation and the accompanying failure of the resolution of such conflict. In an attempt to explain the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, this approach acknowledges the motivation behind the conflict was the incitement of the ethnic cleavages by the elite with the aim of creating a domestic political context in which ethnicity is the only politically relevant identity. In the ethnically mixed regions the people did not advocate for war; the violence was instigated from outside and took place along ethnic lines. However, the main cause was not ancient hatred but rather purposeful action by political actors who fanned and funded the violent conflict, selectively drawing on history when convenient so that they could portray it as historically inevitable.<sup>175</sup>

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174 Gagnon, V.P., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994-1995): 132.

175 Ibid, p.132.



Gagnon further adds that the constructivist view is still incomplete despite the fact that it does offer quite useful insights: the top-down interpretation needs to be adjoined to the bottom-up interpretation, which is focused on uncertainty and fear driven by the security dilemma in ethnic conflicts. The breakdown of the state and its attendant anarchy often results from a lack of trust caused by the security dilemma in ethnic conflicts. The uncertainty over the intentions of other ethnic groups makes it necessary for entities to arm themselves for protection of lives and property. This ends up in ethnic mobilization taking the form of an arms race between states.<sup>176</sup> In such cases, each ethnic entity no longer relies on the governing structures in place for protection and resorts to organised militia and fund raising within its populace to buy arms and prepare for war.

In this case, ethnic hatred does not account for the outbreak of violence but rather fear and insecurity drive the ethnic groups to turn against each other. The defensive motivated actors provoke fear and countermeasures through their efforts to beef up their own security and this brings about less security than anticipated.<sup>177</sup>

When considering all these views, which are providing the various causes of ethnic violence in context to the ethnic dilemma in Bosnia, it becomes apparent that intense conflict is in most instances caused by collective fears about the

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176 Herz, J., "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2, no. 2 (January 1950): 157-180.

177Melandar, E., "Fearful, But Not Mad – Modeling the Security Dilemma of Conventional Conflict," Working Paper, (International Studies Association, March 1998) <http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/mee01/> (Accessed on, May 23, 2011).

future. Whenever ethnic entities fear for their safety, there inevitably emerges a strategic dilemma that is difficult and even dangerous to resolve because they contain in themselves the potential to result in adverse violence. The outbreak of conflict becomes even more likely when there are problems such as information failures which further translates into questionable credibility. In this situation, the ethnic entities are filled with dread and the state invariably becomes weak as ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs take advantage of these fears to polarize the society. These fears are magnified by political memories and grievances. Eventually, this evolves into mutual mistrust that could explode into bloody violence.<sup>178</sup>

The viability of a state is invariably compromised by ethnic conflicts of this manner and more so in states that have feeble governance structures. The downside of this is that it often ends up in state failure and even anarchy (such as Somalia). When the ability of the state to provide security for its citizens becomes questionable this becomes a fertile ground for hostility and ethnic mistrust.<sup>179</sup>

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178 Lake, D.A., & Rothchild, D., Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," *International Security* 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 41.

179 Stein, J. G., "Image, Identity, and the Resolution of Violent Conflict," in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of managing International Conflict* edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 193

Arguably, this is most likely to happen when societies undergo political transitions as was the case in Yugoslavia during the period 1986 to 1991 and also in Bosnia between 1991 and 1992: immediately the Yugoslav communist state had begun disintegrating into constituent national parts, the people began asking themselves if the defence force from ethnic entities would protect them or if they will keep their job working under a boss who was not of their ethnicity.<sup>180</sup>

The weaknesses of the nation state and ethnic conflict therefore create a vicious circle. Evidently, ethnic conflict is prone to spreading even faster in a weaker state and in the same measure, the more intense the ethnic conflict the more endangered the state becomes. As polarization hold the members of an ethnic block are easily manipulated by their leaders to only identify with their ethnic group and break whatever binds them with other ethnicities. Indeed, the ethnic elites have the capacity of producing a rapid social polarization that magnifies hostility beyond proportion and instill fear amongst the populace.<sup>181</sup>

Stein believes that heightened political anxiety also alters the ethnic perceptions of each other resulting in increasing suspicion and intolerance. This can persist even after a cease fire is reached. Besides, the affected state remains weak and the different ethnic groups remain distant from each other for some time. Therefore, the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach need to be combined in order for the weaknesses in the Bosnian defence organisation to be

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<sup>180</sup> Ibid, p.193.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid, p. 193.

adequately explained. These approaches have a bi-directional causality in the sense that ethnic leaders can stir up a receptive ethnicity just as Milosevic did and this can pressure other leaders to take radical measures to act as a counter.<sup>182</sup> This results in the weakening of the common structure in favour of fragmentation. On the other hand, if ethnic conflicts are low for instance in countries in Western Europe, ethnicity as a factor cannot undermine the viability of the state and the chances of state failure are increasingly reduced.

It has been stated that the construction of ethnicity is “grounded in the shared characteristics of social agents which shape and are shaped by the objective commonalities of practice otherwise referred to as the *habitus*.”<sup>183</sup> These subliminal dispositions give the basis onto which the commonalities of sentiments and interest are recognized; they too offer the basis onto which cultural affinities and differences are perceived. As a result, the dichotomy between primordial and instrumental approaches to ethnicity can be transcended. The practices and experiences of a particular ethnic people are a reflection of their cultural practices and representation.<sup>184</sup>

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182 Stein, J. G., “Image, Identity, and the Resolution of Violent Conflict,” in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of managing International Conflict* edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), p 193

183 Jones, S., (1997) *Ethnicity and Material Culture. THE Archeology of Ethnicity: Constructing Identities in the Past and Present*. Routledge, New York. p. 128.

184 Ibid

Jones contends that ethnicity is neither structured nor directly congruent to the cultural practices and representation of a particular people. Ethnic identification largely involves the objectification of cultural practices in a bid to recognize and signify the difference of one community with another. The specifics of such objectification of cultural difference is explained by the intersection of the habitus with the prevailing conditions in particular circumstances. Due to this, “the extent to which ethnicity is entrenched in pre-existing cultural realities represented by a shared habitus is highly variable and contingent upon the cultural transformations engendered by the nature of interaction and the power relations between groups of people.”<sup>185</sup>

As a result of such contingency, Jones notes that the cultural practices and representations involved in the signification of the ‘same’ identity may vary qualitatively as well as quantitatively in different social contexts characterized by different social conditions. Thus, there is rarely a simple one to one relationship between representation of ethnicity and the range of cultural and social practices associated with a specific ethnic group.<sup>186</sup>

In summary, the constructivist considers the primordialist approach as lacking in basis and thereby not consistent with reality. They base this argument on the overwhelming empirical evidence that ethnic conflict is in most cases caused by calculated economic and political actions of human societies. They also consider

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<sup>185</sup> Ibid, p.129.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid, p.129.

ethnic identities as the creation by the elite for their own interests. Whereas they do agree with the primordial view on the mechanics of ethnic identity, particularly in terms of the use of the common identifiers. Therefore, to the constructivists, the rise of nationalist ethnic identities in the post-Cold War era has been the result of a common desire of peoples to use ethnicity as a tool for political power.<sup>187</sup>

## ***Ethnic Conflicts***

After looking at the possible motivations that drive people of particular ethnic groups to discriminate against or even fight people from rival ethnicities, the study will now look at the mechanisms of ethnic conflict. By discussing the mechanisms of ethnic conflict it is possible to identify some of the main causes of ethnic violence and mitigate the risk of future violence through measures taken within the reforms of the government and defence organisations. Ethnic differences are not limited to Bosnia alone and many states that experience ethnic difficulties of some form or another such as Canada, Belgium and France have developed measures to ensure that differences are resolved peacefully and not through violent means. In this section emphasis is placed on the realism and surrealism of ethnic conflicts; their causes, forms and structures.

It can be argued that ethnic conflict is a term that in many instances is associated with legitimate negativity and it is thus muddled in confusion. It would perhaps be

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<sup>187</sup> Foundations of Ethnic Identity. Available at [http://web1.uct.usm.maine.edu/~kuzma/security/roberts/Ethnic\\_Identity.html](http://web1.uct.usm.maine.edu/~kuzma/security/roberts/Ethnic_Identity.html) (Accessed on, July 2, 2011)

futile to make the assumption that ethnic conflicts are normally brought about by ethnicity or rather negative ethnicity. This is because ethnicity is by no means the ultimate source of violence in the case where ethnic groups fight each other.<sup>188</sup> Ethnicity has been used as the fuel that has stoked conflicts that have been started by reasons other than ethnicity: this has been achieved by inciting people's emotions and assuring them that by becoming involved in ethnic conflict they will not only be defending the interests of their kinsmen but they will reap the gains as individuals.

The argument leaves us with the question – when do conflicts become ethnic conflicts? Chaim suggests that ethnic conflict normally occurs within states between ethnic groups. They are disputes between ethnic communities, which view themselves as bearing distinct heritages over the power relations in the society. Chaim further claims that there is generally a predictable process that underlies such conflicts, which involves the construction of symbolic boundaries and the accompanying generation of collective identity.<sup>189</sup> With this in mind it then becomes safe to conclude that ethnicity is not necessarily the sole cause of ethnic conflict but rather the struggle over the power to control resources or dominate other communities in political, economic and/or cultural terms.

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188 Brubaker, R. And Laitin, D. 'Ethnic and Nationalist Violence', *Annual Review of Sociology* vol. 24, no. 4 (1998), 423-52.

189 Chaim. K., "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars." *International Security* 20 (Spring 1996)

Scherrer appears to differ with both Chaim and Brubaker et al., by claiming that there are a myriad of factors that contribute towards the emergence of ethnic conflicts. These include the history of antagonisms shared between ethnic groups; a pattern of ethnic domination and/or inequality between ethnic groups and the tendency of regarding the contemporary inter-ethnic competition as a zero-sum game. Ethnic conflicts can also be a result of an electoral triumph or other such claims that bring nationalist forces to power and the inadequacy of the existing political structure that can help to moderate or constrain such behavior; the existence of competing, exclusivist claims to authority over a particular territory; a pattern of settlement that lends itself too easily to secession or partition and the existence of foreign donors of extremist politics.<sup>190</sup>

The essence of ethnic conflict is the struggle between the mobilized identity groups in pursuit of greater social, economic and/or political power. This struggle is either aimed at achieving equality within an existing state or establishing a fully independent national state. They offer the example of the collapse of communism which resulted in the disintegration of the remaining multinational states in Europe. This development was followed by the victory of liberal democracy and the legitimization of new civil states. In this set up the older historical identities such as religion, national identity and ethnicity came out as the foundation for political mobilization and the claim to statehood. The end result was the conflict between the territorial integrity and state sovereignty on one

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190 Scherrer, "Ethnic" and Other Intra-state Conflicts: Chronic and Forgotten, p28.



hand and the power and violence of appeal to ethnicity as a basis of state formation on the other.<sup>191</sup>

This is supported by Wolff who states that one part of the conflict will have to make claim of their ethnic identity as being the reason why its members either failed or emerged victorious<sup>192</sup>. He thus defines ethnic conflict as a form of group conflict in which at least one party that is involved in the conflict interprets the conflicts, its causes and potential solutions on the basis of the existing or perceived discrimination along ethnic lines. Ethnicity is therefore one common way through which people are often organized for collective action, an initiative that at times turned into a violent tactic. In summary, ethnic conflicts reflect a situation in which two or more parties are in pursuit of incompatible goals, according to their own points of view.

In this way, ethnicity has become a sure blue print that is used to determine collective action whenever circumstances demand for it. Giesen, Schmidtke, and Tambini caution that whether attention will be given to ethnic mobilization, regionalist groups or xenophobic actions, they all develop from the specific

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191 Burg, S. L., & Shoup, P. S., (2000) *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*. M.E. Sharpe Inc., p.4-8.

192 Wolff, S., (2009) *The Regional and International Regulation of Ethnic Conflict Patterns of Success and Failure*. Centre for International Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution University of Nottingham.1.Available at:  
[http://www.fesasia.org/media/publication/Regional%20and%20International%20Conflict%20Regulation\\_Wolff.pdf](http://www.fesasia.org/media/publication/Regional%20and%20International%20Conflict%20Regulation_Wolff.pdf).  
 (Accessed on, May10, 2011)

coding of collective identity.<sup>193</sup> They too are in agreement with Scherrer by attributing the emergence of ethnic conflict to factors such as language, mobility, class system, territoriality, unequal citizenship and the backing by foreign states as was the case in the former Yugoslavia.

## ***Democratic Peace Theory***

There is general consensus in the literature available on the theory of liberal peace<sup>194</sup> that democratic states do not go to war with each other and that they are more prone to peaceful behaviour than non democratic states. It is also suggested that democratic states share the same norms and values and as a result enjoy the efficiency of inter-democratic bargaining and conflict resolution. This thesis contends that the elements of democratic peace theory should form the backbone of the democratic reforms underway in Bosnia and emphasize the importance of stable democratic governance in enhancing defence reform. In their paper titled *Democratic Civil-Military Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Herd and Tracy point out that “the accountability and transparency within democratic states, particularly in their oversight of the military, reduces corruption in the defence sector and increases the legitimacy and the efficiency of the military.”<sup>195</sup> Democratic peace underpins the reform of Bosnian society and in

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193 Giesen, B., Schmidtke, O., & Tambini, D., *Collective Identities in Action: A Sociological Approach to Ethnicity* (Ashgate, January 2003), 38-39. )

194 Also referred to as Democratic Peace Theory

195 Herd, G.P., & Tracy, T., (November, 2005 )*Democratic Civil-Military Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A New Paradigm for Protectorates?* Conflict Study Research Centre. Available at:<http://www.da.mod.uk>

the section that follows the theory of democratic peace will be defined and analyzed as it applies to the state of Bosnia and its influence on ethnicity and the progress of defence reform.

In defining *Democratic Peace Theory*, Clemens first identifies peace as a requirement that enables social, political and economic reform take place in any country.<sup>196</sup> Further, he points out that both peace and development thrive on self-organization. Clemens borrows his concept of democratic peace from Immanuel Kant who argues that the key to peace was republicanism or rather representative governance but not monarchy or even direct democracy. The republican government could be in the form of an oligarchy, consisting of a few of the elite or it can be democratic – involving many people in governance. Whichever form it may take, the republican government is synergetic in the sense that it does not only contribute but also gains from the international organization and law; the spirit of trade and the culture of mutual respect.

Democratic states are considered more likely to respect and treat with dignity citizens within their territory including those belonging to minority groups. They are more likely to seek peaceful resolution to potential conflicts and seek peaceful and constructive relations with neighbouring states. A democratic

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(Accessed on, May 27, 2011)

196 Clemens, W. C., (2001 ) *Coping with Complexities: Alternative Explanation. The Baltic Transformed: Complexity Theory and European Security.* ROWMAN AND LITTLE FIELD.p.16.

framework guarantees public involvement in state affairs and provides the mechanism to address issues that are normal within all states. Effective democratic institutions can also prevent nationalists from mobilising the population along ethnic lines however if effective democratic mechanisms are absent, the likelihood of ethnic violence increases along with the risk of being unable to contain the violence and being unable to resolve the conflict.<sup>197</sup>

Clemens agrees with this sentiment and agrees that the people who perceive each other as sharing democratic values will hardly fight one another.<sup>198</sup> In fact, the twentieth century has seen democracies coming together and prevailing against dictators. Clemens notes that Kant advocated for self-organization, since the societies that are based on self-rule are normally geared towards mutual gain. This aspect of governance is lacking in the leadership structures of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ever since the mid 1990s conflict, the country has hardly stood on its own feet, given the heavy presence of the international community that ensures that its systems are working. In essence, the democracy of Bosnia is largely a pretense, its civil society cannot salvage the situation as it is too steeped in the ethnic divide; not to mention the lack of political will by the political elite who are somewhat content to promote the status quo.

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197 Zaagman R. *Minority Questions, Human Rights and Regional Instability: The Prevention of Conflict*. P217

198 Clemens, W. C., (2001 ) *Coping with Complexities: Alternative Explanation. The Baltic Transformed: Complexity Theory and European Security*. ROWMAN AND LITTLE FIELD.p.16.

Fischer agrees that peace is mostly attributed to the democratic character of a state and the norms as was earlier on proposed by Kant. Fischer comments that in many instances policy makers often advocate for democracy for the sake of peace, rather than liberalism. He however terms this 'conflation' as insignificant because both the theorists and the practitioners invariably make reference to the liberal kind of democracy that currently prevails in the Western democracies. In spite of that, it is important to appreciate the significant differences that exist between the democratic and the liberal aspect of these regimes in order to grasp the peace that prevails among them.<sup>199</sup>

In simpler terms democracy lays out a prescription of the rule of the people: every member of an entity is given equal opportunity to decide their form and substance of their governance. In the direct democracies of past, these decisions were a preserve of assemblies in which every citizen had one vote. But in the representative democracy of modern times, the citizens have the democratic responsibility of periodically electing public officials. Accordingly, democratic institutions promote equal capacity for every citizen to determine their government through the means of open, fair and competitive elections at all levels of governance. The democratic institutions also promote equal capacity through the concentration of the supreme authority in the people and its representatives; through referendum that give the people a chance to directly

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199 Fischer, M., (April 2000) The Liberal Peace: Ethical, Historical, and Philosophical Aspects. Available at: <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/fischer.pdf> (Accessed on July1, 2011)

decide important issues. The institutions also widen taxation and welfare policies that promote equality and devise measures that are geared towards enhancing the responsiveness of the representatives to the electorate by for instance, shortening their terms of office and reducing the numbers of voters in their electoral districts.<sup>200</sup>

Democracy strives towards freeing the individual from oppression, especially from the oppressive rules and the legal structures in place.<sup>201</sup> Democracy achieves this by enshrining this freedom in a number of rights that must be observed under almost all circumstances. These rights include the right to life and/or immunity from violence; the right to express oneself; the right to free movement; the right to assemble freely; the right to abode, to acquire and to dispose of property; the right to profess and practice one's faith and even to engage in arts and commerce of one's choice.

Fischer suggests that in order to ensure that these rights are guaranteed to citizens the liberal institutions should employ a number of strategies. This includes the advocating for a constitution that lays out the basic rights of the citizens and limits the power of the government by spreading power in all the

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<sup>200</sup> Ibid.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid

three arms of governance.<sup>202</sup> They also guarantee these rights by insisting on the strict adherence to the rule of law, the separation of the state and the church, the protection of private property; an open competitive market through the free exchange of goods and services and the minimum regulations on taxation. This has resulted into the laissez faire attitude that has led to the developments of a free market society in which individuals compete for goods that satisfy their desires whereas the government provides the much needed security and procedural justice.

These two features of governance have been combined in what has come to be known as liberal democracy in the western modernity. This combination is agreeable given that a democracy must at least give its citizens the freedom to vote in order for it to function as the rule of the people. It may also allow its citizens to form parties that can compete for votes, or voice their political opinions. On the other hand, democracy acknowledges these liberties such as the right to vote, the right to assemble, the right to practice free speech and the right to associate. In summary, the liberal principle of equality before the law is in concert with the democratic quest for equality, so long as democracy does not lead to the leveling of all social and economic conditions.<sup>203</sup>

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202 Fischer, M., (April 2000) The Liberal Peace: Ethical, Historical, and Philosophical Aspects. Available at: <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/fischer.pdf> (Accessed on July1, 2011) , p.3.

203 Ibid, p.3.

So far, the international community has all along recognised the importance of democracy in Bosnia. Immediately after the Dayton Accords was signed the international community began initiating development projects in Bosnia with the aim of recovering the economy.<sup>204</sup> But shortly after, the focus expanded to include reforms in the political structures and the society at large. The European Union played a major role in this regard: it created a new developmental program in 2000 which in essence encompassed the whole Balkan region. The program was called Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilizing (CARDS) and focused on democratic stabilization, reconstruction, reconciliation and the return of the refugees. It also involved in institutional and legislative developments such harmonizing the European Union norms, human rights, and the rule of law, the civil society and the media. In summary, this program was generally aimed at promoting sustainable social-economic developments, including structural reforms and regional co-operation.

## ***Conclusion***

This chapter has discussed various theoretical issues that arise in the quest to analyse the progress of the defence reforms in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the role of ethnicity within the armed forces. For the reform of the defence forces of Bosnia to be considered as progressive, the ethnic question within the ranks and files of the military needs to be adequately addressed. In this chapter the thesis identified that negative ethnicity played a key role in the recent conflict in Bosnia

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204 Zupcevic, M., Causevic, F., (September 2009) Case Study: Bosnia and Herzegovina. Centre for Developing Area Studies – McGill University and the World Bank.



that claimed lives and decimated the states infrastructure. Therefore, in the quest to understand the ethnic question in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the study explored the concept of ethnicity and its various forms of definition. Also discussed were the various models of ethnicity. Here, there are three possible approaches that can be used to explain the phenomenon in which the people from a particular ethnic group are easily rallied behind a cause that is intended to protect their interests. This at times includes taking up arms against other ethnicities. These approaches include the primordial, modernist, instrumental and constructivist approach. While considering the Bosnian example, the analysis contends that none of these approaches on its own can adequately explain the conflict in Bosnia. However when examined in context, all approaches are helpful in providing a framework to more clearly interpret the conflict in Bosnia and assist in the mitigation of future ethnic conflict.

Also addressed in this chapter was the theory of democratic peace. The chapter looked at how liberalism is closely linked to democratic tenets; that while democracy offers the citizens the opportunity to choose their own political path, democracy ensures that the rights and freedoms guaranteed in a democracy are enforced. The study of this theory helped to bring to light the inadequacies in the governance of Bosnia. The democratic structures set in place by the Dayton Peace Accords have not provided the citizens the most that a democracy can deliver in terms of service delivery. The civil society that in most democracies

ensures the provision of democracy, is not effective in its efforts to ensure that the rights of each citizen in Bosnia are upheld.

## **Chapter 3 – BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND THE PROGRESS OF DEFENCE REFORM**

### ***Introduction***

Chapter three will not only focus on the conflict that took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the mid 1990's, it goes further to consider the situation in Bosnia today. This is important despite the fact that there is no open conflict currently occurring in Bosnia, the ethnic communities and political parties remain antagonistic and are far from harmonious. This chapter shall therefore discuss the structure of governance in Bosnia and explore how it works for or against the defence reform process. The contribution of the international community in Bosnia before, during and after the 1992-1995 war will also be discussed. The history of the progress of defence reform is inextricably bound to the history of conflict in the country. In other words, in this chapter the history of progress in the defence reform process; the gains made and the failures incurred will be highlighted.

After exploring the ethnic conflict in Bosnia, an indication of what transpired and some explanation can be offered. However, for the sake of avoiding duplicity the study moves beyond ethnicity as the historical background to the conflict is examined. To better comprehend the form and substance of the conflict in Bosnia it is imperative that the history of the war and more so the history of its mother country, Yugoslavia be analysed. On the other hand, the causes of

Yugoslavia's dissolution are easily identified by exploring the country's historical roots and by studying the more current geopolitical developments. However, even without making too much of the historical background of Yugoslavia the critical question that remains unanswered is whether the country was ever a cohesive state ever since its formation in 1918? Answering this question may perhaps shed light on the reasons that led to Yugoslavia's dissolution.

It is important to remember that Yugoslavia was a product of the unification of the Kingdom of Serb, Slovenes and Croats in 1918. This unified country became known as Yugoslavia in 1929. Even though the various ethnic groups lived across this territory and even inter-married, the Serbs were the majority and resided in what is now known as Serbia; the Croats lived in Croatia whereas the Slovenes resided in Slovenia. Therefore, what is currently known as Bosnia was a multi-ethnic nation but with the Bosnian Muslim majority.<sup>205</sup>

As discussed earlier, the history of South Yugoslavia was free from ethnic violence until the time when Croats and Serb nationalism emerged in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The distinction between the Croats and the Serbs dates back to the 7<sup>th</sup> century with the arrival of two small groups that quickly assimilated into the Slaveni majority and then gave their names to the Slaveni that lived in different areas. At that time the South Slav were situated between the Roman Catholicism

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205 Sriram, C. L., Martin-Ortega, O., and Herman, J., (2010) War, Conflict and Human Rights: Theory and Practice. Contemporary Conflict: Critical Areas. Routledge, New York.

and the Byzantine and Hapsburg and the Ottoman empires. As time went by they became easily differentiated by religion even though they still shared cultural traits such as a similar language.<sup>206</sup>

During this period there were three recognized religions within Bosnia: the Croats and the lesser minorities such as the Hungarian Slovaks, Germans and Romanians were Catholics; the Bosnians, Turks and Albanians were Muslims and the Serbs and Montenegrins were Greek Orthodox. Notably, many who had been conquered by the Turks had adopted the Turkish religion in order to avoid annihilation. Under Tito's leadership, all the ethnic and religious groups were nominally equal and in practice, all ethnic and religious affiliations were discouraged and a new identity of the atheist Yugoslav was fostered.<sup>207</sup>

All the republics within Bosnia were multi-cultural and the high rates of inter-marriages demonstrated that both the religious and ethnic boundaries were highly permeable. However, the Catholic Croats, Muslims, the Orthodox Serbs and Slovenes consisted of the majority even though they lived in different areas and there were seasons of migrations of populations and conversions from one religion to another. As a result all the areas that accommodated the majorities

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206 Kreimer, A., Muscat, R., Elwan, A., & Anold, A., (2000) Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Evolution of Conflict. The World Bank Publications.p17. Available at: [http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/OED/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/2F51C7E5E306C53D85256ED10079278A/\\$file/bosnia\\_post\\_conflict.pdf](http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/OED/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/2F51C7E5E306C53D85256ED10079278A/$file/bosnia_post_conflict.pdf) (Accessed on, June 30, 2011)

207 Ibid, p.17.

inevitably contained significant majorities, including the Hungarians and the Albanians.<sup>208</sup>

Jutze argues that considering the many jurisdictions in the Yugoslav region. Bosnia boasts the longest history as a geographically continuous entity whose independence statehood begun in the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>209</sup> But he notes that it was in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, especially with the takeover of Bosnia by Austria in 1878 that the notion that the Orthodox that lived in Bosnia was Serb and the Catholics were Croats began to gain currency. Given the protracted history of migrations, conversions and intermarriages, the ethnic identities that were newly introduced were seldom based on genealogy; thus no Bosnian of any leaning had previously deemed themselves as being either Croat or Serb.

In its desire to create a model colony, the Austro-Hungarian Empire had committed considerable resources in terms of time, money and energy striving to modernize Bosnia by developing public buildings, new schools and infrastructure. Jutze notes that with the developments in modern invention, the concept of nationalism also emerged.<sup>210</sup> Nationalism soon became the most debated issue of the day with the Serbs advocating for it largely due to the fact that they

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<sup>208</sup> Ibid, p.17.

<sup>209</sup> Jutze, K., 'A Brief History of Former Yugoslavia,' *Bosnian Notebooks*, ed. Kimberly Jutze (Washington D.C.: Pax World Press, 1997), p. 19.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid, p.19.

intended to come up with a greater Slavic state under their leadership. This idea was rebuffed by other Bosnians who favored a pluralistic, multi-ethnic society; an agenda that was derived by the fear that they would have no place in a state that would be dominated by the Serbs.

The primary motive of the Bosnian conflict was hostility towards those populations that seemed to have been culturally superior to the others (negative ethnicity).<sup>211</sup> In essence the conflict was a mechanism inspired by the need of some to want to bring down the system of ethnic co-existence that had been imposed in the era of Marshal Tito. As mentioned earlier, there was a formal recognition of the existing ethnic and religious disparities in Yugoslavia during the Tito regime and they became arranged in a new way. In summary there were six republics, which included Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Serbia that incorporated what had previously been Vojvodina and Kosovo. Cutting across these were other five South Slav nations that were granted political status; they included Slovenes, Macedonia, Croats, Serbs and Muslims. The Muslims were considered not as a religion but as a single ethnic community.

Geopolitical dynamics also played a role in shaping the Bosnian conflict. With the creation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia following the First World War, the Balkan lines were redrawn.<sup>212</sup> Initially termed as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and

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<sup>211</sup> Ibid, p.156-157.

<sup>212</sup> See, Kreimer et al., Post World War I: Creation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, p.18.

Slovenes, the newly founded Kingdom of Yugoslavia consisted also of the South Slav, for the first time bringing all these populations into one independent state. What ensued was the inter-war politics within the Kingdom that were characterized by turbulence with the dominating Croat and Serb parties failing to attain a stable *modus operandi*. The parties were eventually unable to overcome the tensions brought about by the distrust between them, which became a product of nationalistic rivalry.

Geopolitical dynamics have also influenced the Bosnian conflict up to the current date. The Second World War greatly impacted the social and political situation in Bosnia.<sup>213</sup> An example was the invasion of Yugoslavia by the Axis in 1941 which provided the Ustashe with the freedom to create a separate Croatian state. Once in power the Ustashe entrenched the policy of mass imprisonment and slaughter of the minorities within the state, targeting mainly Gypsies, Jews and Serbs.

On the other hand, as Singer points out, the greater Slavic state was dominated by the Serb, something that eventually brought about much resentment amongst other communities and this situation became worse during the occupation by German forces.<sup>214</sup> Sriram et al., notes that the German forces faced stiff

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<sup>213</sup> Ibid, p.19.

<sup>214</sup> Singer, B, J., (2004) Nationalism and Dehostilization. Quoted in: Potter, N, N., Putting Peace into Practice: Evaluating Policy on Local and Global Level. Rodopi. p. 153-158.



resistance from paramilitary groups but were also helped by the Croatian Ustashe, being the Croatian ultranationalist organization that perpetrated the ethnic cleansing and expulsion of the Gypsies, Serbs and Muslims.<sup>215</sup> With the end of the Second World War and the withdrawal of the German Army, Yugoslavia became united under Tito and his communist government. This unity endured beyond his death in 1980 and his communist rule endured by authoritarian rule rather than by the support of the Soviet Union.

With the subsequent demise of communism, the people of Bosnia began to recall the conflicts of the past. Besides aided by the fact that Yugoslavia was in fact an artificial entity, resulted in the breakup of the country and the reappearance of the pre-war ethnic awareness. In 1989, Slobodan Milosevic became president of the Serbian republic within Yugoslavia and immediately set out to promote Serb domination. This move sparked a separatism which culminated into the violent breakup of the state along ethnic lines.<sup>216</sup>

As much as geopolitical dynamics played a hand in determining the course of the conflict so did the actors in the international community, overtly and/or covertly influencing its outcome. Prior to the 1990s conflict, the EU had attempted to

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215 Sriram, C, L., Martin-Ortega, O., and Herman, J., (2010) War, Conflict and Human Rights: Theory and Practice. Contemporary Conflict: Critical Areas. Routledge, New York.

216 Ibid., p.156-157.

provide solutions to a number of problems that faced Yugoslavia in a bid to help the country remain unified.<sup>217</sup> These efforts continued until 1991 when communism disintegrated and it became clear that the West had failed to unite the ethnic populations within Yugoslavia. The EU in fact began to recognise individual republics that were seceding and declaring their independence. Germany were first to recognize Slovenia and Croatia as independent states in late 1991.

The EU gave recognition to the declaration of independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992. This took place against a backdrop of incessant warnings that kept streaming in from experts in security policy and the Serb politicians in Bosnia who flagrantly declared that they would resort to armed force to oppose living in the state of Bosnia.<sup>218</sup>

As Yugoslavia began fragmenting into small new states, other challenges began to emerge with the creation these new entities. It is due to these developments that the recognition policy had a decisive effect in tipping the fragile political and ethnic balance in Yugoslavia.<sup>219</sup> The importance of this was that the ex-Yugoslavia would be dominated by the Serbs, especially after the exit of Slovenia and Croatia, this therefore made those populations that were not Serb to feel

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<sup>217</sup> Ibid, p.200.

<sup>218</sup> Laura, S., & Little, A., *The Death of Yugoslavia*, Penguin Books, BBC Books, London, Revised version 1996.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid, p.201.

vulnerable. This was especially true for the Muslims and Bosnian Croats who were now confronted with the choice of seeking the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina or remaining in a Yugoslavia that was dominated by Serbs.

The recognition of these independent states brought about boundary conflicts. At the outset, there was no certainty that the boundaries of the existing Yugoslavia would remain as the boundaries of the new self-declared independent states. The drawing of boundaries left a larger Albanian minority in Serbia or Kosovo and the larger Serb minorities in Croatia. The revision of the borders was bound to create a precarious precedent in the Eastern Europe region, resulting in new territorial and ethnic conflicts. Therefore, the EU had little choice but to recognize the republican boundaries in order to avoid such ethnic and territorial conflicts. In Bosnia the creation of these boundaries would have been a delicate balancing act. The drawing of boundaries between the ethnic groups was not possible in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was composed of an ethnic patchwork including the Croatian, Muslim and Serbian populations that were mixed with each other alongside many other minorities<sup>220</sup>.

What followed the creation of Bosnia was the bloody civil war that began in 1992 and ended in 1995, resulting in at least 100,000 deaths and 2.2 million people displaced.<sup>221</sup> The war in Bosnia became Europe's most devastating conflict

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220 Andersen, E. A., & Wiberg, H., (eds.): *Storm Over Balkans*, C.A. Reitzel, Copenhagen 1994.

221 "Review of European Security Issues: US Department of State. 3 March 2006.

since World War Two. Through the efforts of the international community, the Dayton Peace Accords was brokered in 1995 halting the bloodshed and providing the framework of governance in Bosnian and Herzegovina. Even though the Accords have been criticized for entrenching ethnicity by recognizing the two ethnic entities, the Republika Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat Federation; an arrangement that has reinforced separatism rather than integration, it has however helped in a significant way to reform the defence system of Bosnia.<sup>222</sup> The Dayton Peace Accord will be discussed in more detail later in this paper.

## ***The Governance of Bosnia and Herzegovina***

The governance of Bosnia and Herzegovina will now be analysed because without genuine commitment and political will, the reform of the defence forces in Bosnia cannot succeed. The constitution that currently governs Bosnia was adopted from the Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Accords. The provisions of this Accord make Bosnia a federal democratic republic made up of two First Order administrative divisions. The two divisions consist of the Bosnia under the leadership of the Serb, which is otherwise referred to as the Republika Srpska. The other division consists of the Bosniak/Croat Federation of Bosnia that is also

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<sup>222</sup> Nation, R.G., "The Land of Hate: Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992-95," in War in the Balkans, 1992 –2002 Strategic Studies Institute (2003), 195.

known as Federation Bosnia Herzegovina and Brčko district, this is the first internationally supervised district.<sup>223</sup>

The Bosnian government can be defined as a semi-presidential system in which there are three presidents instead of one. Bieber points out that this presidential system of governance is not common and more so amongst multinational states.<sup>224</sup> Arguably, the presidential system is not conducive to the governance of societies that are divided. The conventional presidential or semi-presidential systems reduce the effectiveness of grand coalitions, whose salient feature is power sharing arrangements, as considerable executive power is concentrated in one hand. This ability, as was the case under Tito in Yugoslavia is limited in the Bosnian case, largely because its society is highly polarized and there also very few political players who can cut across the ethnic divide and actually gain support. The main drawback with this presidential system in such divided societies is the limitations it puts on coalition building, since the members of the presidential system are elected directly.

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223 Rajchel, K., Esanu, R., MacBain, A., & Rohwerder, B., Bosnia and Herzegovina Post Conflict Reconstruction. Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies Conflict Mapping. Available at: [http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/intrel/media/Bosnia-\\_final\\_draft2.pdf](http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/intrel/media/Bosnia-_final_draft2.pdf)

224 See Bieber, Government Structure, p.209.

Beiber claims that the system of multi-member presidency is a distinct heritage from the former Yugoslavia.<sup>225</sup> According to the constitution of Yugoslavia in 1974, there was a provision for eight presidents who were all equally representing six republics and two autonomous provinces, with a multi-member presidency. Between 1990 and 1996 the Yugoslavia presidency had seven members with two coming from each of the three nations and one for the minorities. Similarly, the Dayton Peace Accords provides for three presidents: one Bosniak, one Serb and one Croat. Additionally, the agreement incorporates an element of territoriality by requiring that the Serb President should be elected in the RS, whereas the Bosniak and the Croat members should be elected in the Federation.

The presidency of Bosnia is made up of representatives from each nation and two from one and one from the other entity. In this arrangement the twin definitions of membership means that other minorities, the non-ethnically identified citizens and the non-dominant national communities such as the Serbs in the Federation and, the Bosniak and Croats in the RS, are all precluded from being elected to the presidency. In the past most presidents acted on the behalf of their ethnic entities, thereby denying the above mentioned groups the opportunity to either run for the presidency and/or being represented by it.<sup>226</sup>

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<sup>225</sup> See Beiber, Government Structure, p.209.

<sup>226</sup> See Beiber, Government Structure,.

This arrangement also reveals a key feature of the system of power sharing in Bosnia, which is that all the national representations autonomy is territorial. This means that even if a particular position or prerogative is defined in national term, it ends up being supplemented with territorial dimensions. As a result, non-territorial or cultural autonomy is not party to the present system of power sharing in Bosnia. This development is unacceptable taking into account the tradition of non-territorial autonomy, for example the Millet system in the Ottoman Empire that had granted religious independence to communities in the empire. Similar trends were also reported in the succeeding Austro-Hungary rule.<sup>227</sup>

The presidency of Bosnia is chaired in annual rotation by one of the three members.<sup>228</sup> However, the chairmanship of the presidency does not come with additional powers. The primary role of the presidency include conducting foreign policy, which is one of the key powers vested in that joint institution. The fact that all the entities are entitled to special relations with their neighbouring states has further undermined the foreign policy leverage institution, especially towards Croatia and Serbia. Far from that, each President that has taken up the chairmanship has represented Bosnia differently, according to their national background. This has led to the weakening of the foreign policy. Generally, the presidency has been a weak institution particularly due to the lack of cooperation

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<sup>227</sup> See Beiber, Government Structure,

<sup>228</sup> See Beiber, Government Structure,

amongst its members. Despite failing to manage foreign policy of the country, the institution has been incompetent in acting as an arbiter in domestic politics, especially between entities.

When it comes to the legislature of the country, Bosnia has a two chamber parliamentary system at the state level, which reflects a federal arrangement and also the necessity of granting representation to both the three nations and the two entities.<sup>229</sup> The House of People is made up of 15 members and gives equal representation to all the three national groups. It however requires that the members should be elected from the entities where they constitute the dominant groups in the country, which are the Bosniak and Croats from the Federation and the Serb from the Republika Srpska. As opposed to being elected, the members of this chamber of parliament are rather chosen by the respective entity parliaments.

The House of Representative is composed of 42 members who are elected from the two entities. Two thirds of the seats in this house are reserved for the Federation, whereas one third of the seats go to the RS. The non-dominant groups within Bosnia are still under represented even though this arrangement favours their representation. For example, out of the 28 deputies that were elected from the Federation in 2000, about 20 of them were Bosniak candidates, while six were Croats and two were Serbs. This trend also plays out in the RS

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<sup>229</sup> See Beiber , Parliamentary Assembly, p.210.



where more representatives have excluded non-dominant groups from both entities.<sup>230</sup>

The check and balance system within the parliament has been ensured by the quorum and veto systems that have prevented the assembly from taking any decisions that conflict with the will of any of the three national ethnic entities that are represented in the parliament. It is required that at least a third from each entity supports a legislation or decisions before it can be passed in the parliament. Whenever these numbers are not raised, the Chair of the Chamber and his deputies who come from the three entities has the responsibility of securing such a majority. Apart from the veto and the quorum system, any of the three community caucuses can object to a law or decision if it threatens the vital interests of their community.<sup>231</sup>

The executive arm of the Bosnian government is also made up of the Council of Ministers. The chairperson of the council, who in essence becomes the de facto Premier is nominated by the presidency but has to be approved by the House of Representatives. This council is weak in comparison to the parliament as it is enshrined in an article under the presidency in the constitution but not separately as it is the case with the legislature. The constitution only provides for two Ministers of the joint institutions, who work under the foreign trade and the foreign ministry. Any other Ministers are created with the approval of the House

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<sup>230</sup> Ibid, p.210.

<sup>231</sup> Ibid, p.210.

of Representatives. Besides, the territorial distribution of Ministers has also been addressed in the constitution, clearly pointing out that no more than two thirds of the Ministers can come from the Federation.<sup>232</sup>

Until 2002, every Ministry had two deputy Ministers: these Ministers had two deputies who came from the other nations. As a legal requirement both the Ministerial position alongside that of their deputy are normally distributed on party basis. Previously, the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers rotated amongst the various ministries. This system was however replaced by a permanent chairperson and this has helped to do away with the conventional cabinet system. Nonetheless, the government will be strengthened to effectively discharge its duties the hurdle remains the creation of elaborate power-sharing mechanisms and the strength of each entity.<sup>233</sup>

What therefore are some of the drawbacks of this governance system and how do they affect reforms in the defence forces? Rajchel et al, argues that the Dayton Peace Accords made Bosnia a multi-national state and also the home of three ethnic groups that are otherwise referred to as the constituent people of the country.<sup>234</sup> The largest group amongst these constituent people is the Bosniaks<sup>235</sup>, followed by the Bosniak Serbs and the Bosniak Croatians. These

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<sup>232</sup> Ibid, Council of Ministers, p.211.

<sup>233</sup> Ibid, Council of Ministers, p.211.

<sup>234</sup> Ibid, Political, p. 13-16.

<sup>235</sup> Bosniaks are referred to as Bosnian Muslims.

ethnic structures of the government in Bosnia alongside the continuous presence of the international community question the sustainability of the status quo in the country; it also questions the ability of the Croats, Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks to effectively and independently run their country. Being a creation of external powers and its dependence on those external powers to sustain it, the political system within Bosnia make it difficult to adequately influence positive developments in the defence organization without international assistance.

Zupcevic and Causevic add that the political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina have over time showcased their resilience to externalities. This has ensured that the current strongest political parties are the same ones that have ruled over the political scene ever since the late 1980s. Examples of these are the Croatian Democratic Community (HZD), the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and the Bosniak Party for Democratic Action. These parties have survived the war and are presently stronger than ever. Parties such as SDA have joined forces with Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) in advocating for a united state. The SBiH, SDA and HZD are the dominating parties in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>236</sup> It should be noted that without political will, the reformation of the defence forces cannot be achieved in Bosnia. In fact, the slow pace of this progress is hampered ethno-political alignments that are impeding healing the Bosnian society. It is therefore unbecoming for the political class in the country to

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<sup>236</sup> , Domestic Political Structures and their Impact on Peacebuilding, p.7.

continue to pledge their allegiances to their ethnic interests as this does not bode well for the ongoing defence reforms in the country.

The lack of political will amongst the political players is best demonstrated by Zupcevic, Causevic's example of the SDS party that arrived on the political stage as a progressive and liberal party that has eventually turned into the strongest advocate of anti-unitary government. It rather pushes for ethnic separation in institutions, both public and private and also advocates for the dismemberment of the country along ethnic lines. Unfortunately, this school of thought is prompted by some provisions in the Dayton Accord: the leadership's invocation of the Accord, for instance, helped to secure the ethnic quota. This means that the predominant Serb entity, which incidentally has vast competencies, is regarded as a chief impediment to a more pronounced stabilization.<sup>237</sup> This point is better illustrated in the 2009 report titled *Country Assistance Strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina* who explains the opposing views of the Bosniak, Serb and Croat political parties. The Bosnian Serbs insist on a decentralised, federal structure and have been known to block initiatives to strengthen the capacity of the central Bosnian state. The Bosniak leaders have also stirred up Nationalism by referring to the Republika Srpska as a 'genocidal creation' and promoting constitutional reform that would discard many of the ethnic protections laid down within the Dayton Accords. The Croat political parties have also been promoting constitutional change that would create a third Croat dominated entity. What this

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<sup>237</sup> Ibid, Domestic Political Structures and their Impact on Peacebuilding, p.7.

highlights is the opposing views that garner support from their ethnic constituents which result in the nationalist parties winning most of the votes. Encouraged by their political leaders, allegiances remain linked to ethnic groups rather than to the central state itself.<sup>238</sup>

## ***The Role of the International Community in Bosnia's Stability***

The importance of the international involvement in the reform of the security sector in Bosnia cannot be overstated. Not since the end of the Second World War has the US and European states committed so much resources to reform a state's security sector.<sup>239</sup> In this section the study turns to the intervention from the international community by considering two elements: how the occurrences both regional and continental are shaping the reforms in the defence forces of Bosnia and also the input by the international community is assisting in this process.

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238 Country Assistance Strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009-2013. (5/20/2009) p.2. Available at: (5/20/2009)  
Available at: [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PDACP613.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACP613.pdf) (Accessed on May 17, 2011)

239 King, J., Dorn, A.W., & Hodes, (September, 2002) An Unprecedented Experiment: Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Available at: [http://www.walterdorn.org/pdf/UnprecedentedExperiment\\_Dorn-King\\_Sept2002.pdf](http://www.walterdorn.org/pdf/UnprecedentedExperiment_Dorn-King_Sept2002.pdf)  
(Accessed on July 5, 2011)

The exploration of the global geopolitical dynamics is the first crucial step to having a better grasp of the security challenges that Bosnia is currently facing.<sup>240</sup> These challenges are largely the consequence of the growing disparities in the economic and social developments of people and the ever increasing gap that exists between the rich and poor. These challenges also take the form of international terrorism fueled by religious fundamentalism to advance political goals.

There is also the constant threat to the environment due to industrial and technological development, the unregulated production and sale of weapons and the forced migration as a consequence of armed conflict, racial strife, ethnic intolerance and/or political pressures in autocratic, undemocratic regimes. Moreover, there are also security challenges that are related to the various forms of organized crimes that underpin the constant social and political instability in countries across the globe.<sup>241</sup> These security challenges are prolific across the globe and call for the efforts of individual nations and a coalition of nation states to address them.

In the same vein, the regional socio-economic and political dynamics in the Southeastern Europe invariably impacts on the security concerns of Bosnia.

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240 Papenkort, B., Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Long Way Towards Partnership for Peace. Available at: [http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf\\_pool/publikationen/10\\_wg9\\_taf\\_140.pdf](http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/10_wg9_taf_140.pdf) (Accessed on, May 14, 2011)

241 Ibid.

Notably, Southeast Europe was the stage where various inter-ethnic conflicts were waged during the mid 1990's – not only in Bosnia but also the conflict in Kosovo in 1999. These conflicts resulted in the destruction of the economic structures across the region, especially with the large death toll and displacement of the population who consisted of the people that ran the economy. The infrastructure also suffered extensively. The social and psychological consequences were considerable, exhibited by inter-ethnic hatred. The political ramifications include the witnessing of various cases of attempted secessions by ethnic nationalities in pursuit of autonomy with the region.<sup>242</sup>

Another example of regional challenges that impacts on the security of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the geo-strategic position of the region in such a manner that it provides some very important routes that connect the larger Europe continent to Asia. These routes are commonly used to facilitate commerce between the two continents by for example, transporting goods such as oil and natural gas. The routes are also used for illicit trade in human, weapons and drug trafficking. They therefore become a security threat to the region since they create an avenue for proliferation of illegal weapons that are sorely needed by ethnic entities that are determined to protect themselves. The routes can also be used by international terrorist groups to plan and carry out attacks elsewhere in

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242 Aybet, G., (September/October 2010) NATO Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Defense Reform and State-Building.

Western Europe.<sup>243</sup> In this way, the social, political and economic developments have shaped the defence reform agenda in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The second way in which the international community has influenced the reforms of the defence forces in Bosnia is through direct involvement. The international and regional organisations have come to play a significant role in the stability of Bosnia.<sup>244</sup> This however has not always been the case. In 1992 at the beginning of the Bosnian conflict the best that the United Nations, NATO and the EU could do was half-heartedly support the humanitarian situation. That changed in late 1995 when a combination of developments on the ground and the coercive diplomacy that was spear-headed by the United States resulted in the Dayton Peace Accords. Ever since then both the EU and NATO have committed funds and personnel in the various programs and policies that are aimed at integration and stabilization of Bosnia. This analysis of the involvement by the international community in Bosnia will now involve taking a critical look at the Dayton Peace Accords and what international organizations are doing to ensure there is stability in the country.

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243 Ibid.

244 Simon, J., (April 2007) Preventing Balkan Conflict: The Role of Euro Atlantic Institutions. Strategic Forum. Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University. Available at: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss> (Accessed on, July 8, 2011)



## ***The Dayton Peace Accords***

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, otherwise referred to as the Dayton Peace Accords was ratified in November 1995 and effectively brought an end to the fighting by creating two ethno-nationalist entities. These entities consisted of the Bosniak - Croat Federation, which control about 51 percent of the geographical region of the state of Bosnia and the Republic Srpska, which control the remaining 49 percent of the country.<sup>245</sup>

At first the efforts by the international community to stop the fighting and bring all the parties involved together to sign the agreement was confronted by a multiplicity of challenges. The international community was unable to stop the fighting through diplomatic pressure and ill-planned military action failed to prevent mass-murder and genocide. It was only following the Srebrenica massacre did the US become fully involved with the application of air power to force the Presidents of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia to gather in Dayton, Ohio to end the fighting and to commence negotiations for the future of Bosnia. The peace settlement was only a means to end the war and failed to resolve the underlying issues that ignited the war in the first place. The peace settlement

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245 Cecik, A., Post Conflict Reconstruction in Divided Societies: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Available at: [http://137.204.115.130/activities/download/XIII-CEI-ISSC/SS\\_CekikAneta\\_paper\\_3place.pdf](http://137.204.115.130/activities/download/XIII-CEI-ISSC/SS_CekikAneta_paper_3place.pdf) (Accessed on May 30, 2011)

divided the country in two and then created an inefficient state structure unable to cope with the process of reconciliation and reintegration.<sup>246</sup>

It is therefore argued that the governance structure of Bosnia is the product of the Dayton Agreement. The signatories to the Agreement included President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia and President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia representing the warring parties and delegates from the United Kingdom, United States, Russia, France and Germany. The negotiations resulted in the creation of the Dayton Peace Accords that amongst other things outlined the structure of the government in Bosnia and provided a mandate to the international bodies to monitor the peace building processes in the country.

In spite of its achievements, the Dayton Peace Accords has come under a degree of criticism including its failure to implement a strategy to guide national and international actors to monitor re-development and post conflict state building.<sup>247</sup> This has resulted in minimal activity and uncoordinated projects that are aimed at boosting stability in the country, but offer inadequate guidelines on military matters. The Dayton Peace Agreement was intended to be the least bad solution at the time in the hope that it would one day evolve to overcome the actual separation on the ground. The Bosnian Serbs and to a lesser degree, the

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<sup>246</sup> Ibid

<sup>247</sup> NATO, NATO's Role in Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia, NATO Basic Fact Sheet, No. 4, March 1997.

Bosnian Croats agreed at Dayton because of the decentralisation that the plan offered. The plan effectively recognised a state within a state, namely the Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serbs) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Muslim/Croat).<sup>248</sup> The international community believed that nationalist politics would in time diminish and that a more “Western-style” party system would develop in its place. However today in 2011, political life in Bosnia is still ruled by three nationalist parties. Both entities still fear each other and this feeling constitutes one of the main obstacles to the creation and consolidation of common institutions and multi-ethnic parties. Overcoming this mistrust and mutual suspicion may still take another decade, even a generation. The coming years will be crucial for this process of reconciliation.”<sup>249</sup>

Frank and Richmond agree with this analysis when they argue that the terms of the Dayton Accords and its legacy appears to be dependent on a weak and decentralized state, taking into account that power is not only divided between the two main groups but it is also spread across the ten federation cantons, 149 municipalities and the autonomous districts of Brcko.<sup>250</sup> Essentially, this has divided the governance of Bosnia in three ways: the People’s House in the Parliamentary Assembly has fifteen delegates, two thirds of which are from the

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248 Juncos, A.E.,( November 2005) The EU’s post-Conflict Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (re)Integrating the Balkans and/or (re)Inventing the EU? Southeast European Politics. Vol. VI, No. 2pp. 88 – 108

249 Ibid.

250 Ibid, Peace Beyond the State? NGOs IN Bosnia and Herzegovina, p.102-118.

Federation while a third emanate from Republic Srpska. Worse still, this constitutional arrangement is duplicated at the municipal level and is characterized by the entrenched ethnic positions that were adopted during the war and still exist today.

Despite great detail in many areas, the 90-page peace agreement left several questions unanswered and/or gave intentionally vague tasks and timelines to allow freedom of political maneuver. For instance, control of the Posavina Corridor and the Brcko district, which both the Federation and Republika Srpska claimed, was put into arbitration so that the rest of the agreements could proceed.<sup>251</sup> Other items were also intentionally vague, requiring significant adjustments over the next decade as each of the actors sought a final resolution. These items included the mechanisms by which transition from military to civilian to autonomous control would occur; and the final state of relations between the two entities.

With respect to the United Nations (UN); during the preparation of the Dayton Peace Accords, it can be deduced that the UN was not provided with a major role in the peace process because of the failures of both UN diplomacy and its peacekeeping/peacemaking efforts during the war (namely UNPROFOR). Wallander, Celeste, and Keohane state that "the ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR should remind us that when there is a disparity between institutional capabilities

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<sup>251</sup> Dayton Accords, Annex 2 November 21, 1995, <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/dayann2.html> (accessed February 17, 2010) Art. V; and Nation, War in the Balkans: 1991-2002, 192, 201.

and the mission to be completed, reliance on international organisations can be a recipe for disaster." <sup>252</sup>

The first and most important task of the Dayton implementation process was creating security. The war left Bosnia with two main security challenges: first, to ensure that the entities would not relapse into war; second, to include civilians in the cease-fire and make sure that they were no longer victims of organised violence. Both security challenges had to in some way comprise the full spectrum of potential aggressors or what Dayton termed 'anyone or organisation with military capability.' This included reservists, military police, internal security forces, national guards as well as any "foreign forces" that were to be withdrawn after the peace accord was signed. The parties were required to conduct law enforcement "in accordance with internationally recognised standards and with respect for internationally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms."<sup>253</sup>

The Dayton Peace Accord contained significant compromise, not only for the warring factions but also for the international community. As a result of the negative experience with the UN/NATO dual arrangements concerning NATO air

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252 Celeste A. Wallander, Helga Haftendorn, and Robert O. Keohane, "Introduction" in *Imperfect Unions: Security institutions over Time and Space* eds. Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane and Celeste A. Wallander (Oxford University Press, 1999): 10.

253 Elizabeth M. Cousens, "From Missed Opportunities to Overcompensation: Implementing the Dayton Agreement on Bosnia," in *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* edited by Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). 545

strikes during the conflict, the IFOR commander was given the authority and discretion to take all necessary action in order to create and sustain a safe and secure environment. The civilian authorities charged with the implementation of the Accord had no such authority or any authority to veto the military commander. It is also important to note that it was the commander on the ground who decided what constituted non-compliance, not SACEUR or the NATO Council. The military component of the Peace Accords comprised of just two annexes while the authority of the civilian component were contained in no less than ten annexes.

The majority of political commentators in Bosnia and Herzegovina agree with David Chandler's argument that the Dayton Peace Accord established peace and ended the war, but by no means resolved the underlying issues that caused the war in the first place.<sup>254</sup> The Dayton Peace Accord provided the structural and institutional framework for the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This comprised eleven annexes, in which annex 1-A and 1-B detailed the military aspects. The institutional framework of the post-conflict Bosnian state imposed by the Dayton Peace Accord consists of a consociational power sharing arrangement. Sumantra Bose writes that consociational rules and norms are incorporated into nearly every aspect of the Dayton Peace Accords. The state is more or less a confederal union between two entities. A "power-sharing

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254 David Chandler, "from Dayton to Europe," *International Peacekeeping* 12. no. 3, (Autumn, 2005): 338.

arrangement foundered on equality and parity for the federating national segments and a radically autonomous Republika Srpska."<sup>255</sup>

The most striking feature of the Accords was the division of labour between the military and civilian implementation; the military led by NATO and the civilian, led by the UN sponsored High Representative, responsible for overseeing the civilian implementation. From the onset a potentially competitive or rivalrous structure was created. The High Representative became the most visible institution in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the authority on the interpretation of the Peace Accords on the civilian implementation established in Annex 10 of the Agreement and supported by the Office of the High Representative. Hence, an inter-institution was created to manage the various players in Sarajevo and to strengthen guidance and adherence. The High Representative is appointed by the Peace Implementation Council and approved by the UN Security Council.<sup>256</sup> Following a number of political scandals and hurdles placed in the way of the democratisation process by the ethnic nationalist political elites, in 1997 the powers of the High Representative were extended to include the authority to suspend or dismiss officials for 'Anti-Dayton activities' and enforce legislation. This was referred to as the Bonn Powers.<sup>257</sup> The High Representative's

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<sup>255</sup> Sumantra Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton*, 216.

<sup>256</sup> Francine Friedman, *Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Polity on the Brink* (Routledge, 2004), 69.

<sup>257</sup> National Human Development Report 2005 (NHDR) "Better Local Governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina," Available at [http://hdr.undp.org/docs/reports/national/BIH\\_BOSNIA\\_HERZEGOVINA/bosnia\\_2005\\_en.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/docs/reports/national/BIH_BOSNIA_HERZEGOVINA/bosnia_2005_en.pdf) (accessed 25 April 2011)

mandate was therefore significantly enhanced. This subsequently became a model for the civil implementation following the conflict in Kosovo in 1999.

The Dayton Peace Accords, which is more or less a peace treaty, represents the negotiated framework of the termination of the conflict in that it brought peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under the terms of the agreement, the entities agreed to respect each others sovereignty, maintain a cease-fire in Bosnia, and withdraw military forces to agreed lines of separation, approve a new constitution and hold Presidential and legislative elections.<sup>258</sup> The Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat communities did neither negotiate nor sign the agreement, since their territories were not internationally recognised and their leaders were awaiting trial in the International War Crimes Tribunal. Only their deputies were able to attend Dayton as observers. Instead, the agreement was signed by the Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, by the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and by the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. This was important. First, it implied that Milosevic would be able to gain approval of the Serb leadership in Bosnia and in Croatia for the Dayton Accords - which he did within a few days. The critical question though was whether he would also be able to guarantee the implementation of the agreement in good faith since the Bosnian and Croat Serbs were the losers of Dayton and were supposed to do everything to spoil its implementation. Second, Milosevic and Tudjman were thus given the opportunity, albeit grudgingly, to portray themselves as the guarantors of peace

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258 UNHCR - Taking Bosnia's Temperature, 10 years after Dayton, <http://www.unhcr.org/4381e6474.html> (accessed January 18, 2011).



and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, rather than as key players in, and sponsors of the conflict during the previous three and a half years.<sup>259</sup> Milosevic, being the President of only one republic (besides Montenegro) of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) thereby also represented his entire country and this at a time when that country was still not even internationally recognised.

The Accords are composed of two distinct parts. The very first and most important part of the DPA consists of ending the conflict itself, namely, "ending the fighting, putting down the weapons and separating forces."<sup>260</sup> However this step was only the first rung on the ladder in creating a long lasting peace, because, as Francine Friedman argues, "stopping the fighting is a separate operation from making peace, removing the incentive for re-engaging in war and making the peace self-supporting. These latter steps involve permanently stopping the war by changing the critical expectation that the war could resume."<sup>261</sup> The second and more difficult mission the International Community has had to face has been understood as the point of departure to devise a functioning, viable state and assuring a lasting future of a common state for its citizens. This, however, remains a pending issue even today.

To accomplish the military part of the Agreement, the Peace Accords outlined a very detailed schedule for separating and drawing down the belligerent forces of

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259 Ethno\_politics, <http://www.stefanwolff.com/working-papers/wolffandwellerbihep.pdf> (accessed January 18, 2011).

260 Francine Friedman, 59.

261 Ibid.

the Bosnian Serbs on the one side and the Bosniak-Croat Federation on the other. In contrast, with respect to the civilian part, the only scheduled deadline was to hold national elections within nine months. The mission of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords, according to Cousens, included "a post-war constitution and a wide range of provisions to deal with such varied aspects as refugee repatriation, elections and democratisation and human rights."<sup>262</sup>

Dayton preserved the Bosnian state by creating a consociational confederation of two radically autonomous 'Entities' and three peoples, with a complicated system of power-sharing structures to be overseen by an international governor with wide-ranging authority.<sup>263</sup> It divided the country into ethno nationalist homelands, i.e., two entities, the first one populated by Bosniaks (Muslims) and Croats, the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the second populated by Serbs, the Republika Srpska, each with its own president, government, parliament, police and other bodies, and as a state of three constituent peoples - Bosniaks (Muslims), Serbs and Croats.<sup>264</sup> Cousens adds that "Bosnian Serbs got a demographically sweet deal (49 percent of Bosnia territory when they represented only 31 percent of the pre-war population) on the one hand, but a territorially disappointing one on the other"<sup>265</sup> Since their territory was split in two

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<sup>262</sup> Elizabeth M. Cousens, "From Missed Opportunities to Overcompensation, 539.

<sup>263</sup> Kirsti Samuels and Vanessa Hawkins Wyeth, "State-Building and Constitutional Design after Conflict," IPA Report, Available at: [http://www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/83/IPA\\_RPT-STATEBUILDING.pdf](http://www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/83/IPA_RPT-STATEBUILDING.pdf) 49

<sup>264</sup> David Chandler, "From Dayton to Europe," *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 3 (Autumn 2005):338.

<sup>265</sup> Cousens, 543.

halves and connected only by a small strip of land, the Brcko corridor was under separate international administration.

The two images below represent the changing ethnic environment within Bosnia and Herzegovina before the war in 1991 and three years following the war in 1998.




Figure1 BiH and Herzegovina: Ethnic composition before the war (as of 1991) <sup>266</sup>

<sup>266</sup> <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/AHAA-6KRLHT?OpenDocument&rc=4&cc=bih>




Figure Two – Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Composition in 1998<sup>267</sup>

The state has been exceptionally unbalanced and complex due to the "not less than five different levels of administration, taking into account the state, the two entities, the ten cantons of the Federation and the municipalities, as well as the district of Brcko."<sup>268</sup> The Republika Srpska maintains a highly centralised structure where the entity government directly oversees the municipalities. Thus, relations between Republika Srpska and the Federation, already tainted by

267 Relief Web, Available at <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/SKAR-64GENH?OpenDocument&rc=4&cc=bih>

268 Christopher Solioz, "Quest for Sovereignty: Bosnia and Herzegovina's Challenge," Helsinki Monitor 14, no. 2 (January 2003): 149.

ethnic tensions, are further complicated by asymmetrical governmental structures.<sup>269</sup> The consequence was that "the lack of political will and acts of blatant obstructionism on the part of elected officials have left Bosnia at times with little more than the trappings of state."<sup>270</sup>

Bosnia maintained three armies, three police forces and three intelligence networks; all without a central government.<sup>271</sup> Paddy Ashdown, the High Representative from 2002 to 2006 commented that the situation was even more complicated because Bosnia had approximately 1200 judges and prosecutors, 760 legislators, 180 Ministers, four governments and 13 Prime Ministers and three armies in May 2002."<sup>272</sup>

Despite the best efforts of the international community, achieving peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina resulted in the formation of strong ethnically defined entities and a weak administration.<sup>273</sup> The political system became divided along ethnic lines which in turn led to the creation of a weak common government. In this weak government structure most of the powers were provided to the Entities,

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269 Bosnia Report Card: Pass, Fail, or Incomplete? | United .., <http://www.usip.org/publications/bosnia-report-card-pass-fail-or-incomplete> (accessed January 18, 2011).

270 Bosnia Report Card: Pass, Fail, or Incomplete? | United <http://www.usip.org/publications/bosnia-report-card-pass-fail-or-incomplete> (accessed January 18, 2011).

271 International Crisis Group Balkans Report No. 110. No Early Exit: NATO's Continuing Challenge in Bosnia (22 May, 2001) Available <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1476&l=1>

272 Inaugural speech by Paddy Ashdown Before BiH State Parliament, 27 May, 2002. Available at [http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content\\_id=8417](http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=8417)

273 Siw Skjold Lexau, NORDEM Report 16/2004, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Adviser to the Political Department Office of the High Representative 2003-2004. 7. Available at <http://www.humanrights.uio.no/forskning/publ/nr/2004/16.pdf>

but were not specifically granted to the central government.

The differing perception of the Peace Accords among the ethnic groups also reflected further division in the thinking of the population. The Bosniaks supported a robust, unified state, whereas the Serbs and Croats likened to the idea of decentralisation. Critics of the Peace Accords predicted that Bosnia would disintegrate the moment the international military presence was withdrawn; the settlement appeared morally wrong and politically impractical; however still necessary in order to call an end to the fighting.<sup>274</sup> The power and authority passed to the entities contributed to the further destabilisation of the state, it therefore kept the secessionist flame alive. This posed significant challenges over the years in building a viable and sustainable state.

The Dayton Peace Accords created a tri-national state that offered Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks equal protection and offers political representation and power according to each groups' population strength. As a result, the central bodies of Bosnia require the participation and cooperation of all three ethnicities. However the consociational power-sharing arrangement in Bosnia has been seen as being imposed rather than a decision of the people or the political representatives of

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<sup>274</sup> Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff, "Bosnia and Herzegovina Ten Years after Dayton 1-2. and see David Chandler, "From Dayton to Europe," 338.

national groups. This is mainly because the Peace Accord did not represent any of the parties preferred end state.

The tri-person Presidency of Bosnia was based on territorial and national requirement. Decisions are made by the Presidency was by majority but the objection to a decision or policy can be made by any representative of an ethnic group on the grounds that it is against a vital interest. This can effectively veto a decision.

## ***The Journey Towards Sustainable Peace and Stability***

The countries of Southeast Europe have entered the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century having successfully completed what is referred to as the first generation reforms. These reforms include the establishment of structures, new institutions of governance and a chain of responsibilities that the security sectors must undertake. These are accompanied by appropriate structures that enable the democratic control of the actors within the security sector. These countries have established the principles and structures through which the oversight of security sector issues can be achieved. Some States have even empowered their parliaments to oversee and approve the budget of their security sectors and to help eliminate the bureaucracy in the security sector.<sup>275</sup> If anything the essence

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<sup>275</sup> Yusufi, I., (March 2004 )Understanding the Process of Security Reform in Southeastern Europe. Centre for Policy Study, Hungary.

of the first generation security sector reforms was to provide the legal structures that were needed to reform and 'professionalise' the formation of the security sector.

In Aybet's view the first generation reforms are the external state building initiatives while the second generation reforms are the internal state building initiatives. In this case, Bosnia presents a unique case of the shift from external to internal state building. The external state building is an integral part of the Dayton Peace Accords that gave the international organizations the mandate to implement the agreement and powers to intervene in internal politics should the need arise. These powers are demonstrated by the Bonn Powers that allow the Office of the High Representative to impose laws and dismiss officials.<sup>276</sup> During the reign of Paddy Ashdown as High Representative between 2002 and 2006, the Bonn Powers were implemented to the full.<sup>277</sup> But currently Bosnia needs to focus on the second generation reforms, which will reduce its dependence of international organizations and leave the reform of the security sector in its own hands.

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276 Reshaping international priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, [http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi\\_document\\_id\\_8.pdf](http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_8.pdf) (accessed October 19, 2011).

277 Pitfalls of State Building, p.21-22.



This process will involve the definition of missions, tasks and structures for the defence sector in accordance with the priorities that are laid down in the relevant legal documentation such as the country's defence laws, national security concepts, military doctrine and the State's constitution. In this regard all these reforms have been undertaken through the drafting and implementation of the constitutional and legislative provisions, which have clearly stipulated the roles and the responsibilities of the security sector.<sup>278</sup>

The current environment in Bosnia calls for more than just these first generation reforms. Judging by the prevailing international and regional circumstances, the first generation reforms are by no means adequate to cater for the security needs of Bosnia. Bosnia stagnated for well over a decade after the Dayton Peace Accord was signed. This makes it necessary for Bosnia to now seriously consider second-generation reforms that will help consolidate the democratic control of the defence forces; strengthen the procedures of transparency and accountability in the security forces; provide and enhance the manner in which structures and institutions will implement policies and also develop effectiveness and efficiency within the defence sector. These second generation reform will also include an increased engagement with civil society; create a robust civilian defence and security community and sustainment in judicial and legal reform.<sup>279</sup>

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<sup>278</sup> Ibid, p.5.

<sup>279</sup> Ibid, p.6.

Bosnia's poor performance is best demonstrated in *Country Assistance Strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina*, a report assessing the challenges and the opportunities of the Dayton Peace Accords. The report highlights that Bosnia remains one of the poorest countries in the region with its GDP still at less than pre-war levels. Economic growth sits around 6% per year and unemployment remains high at around 30%. The business and economic markets are hampered by excessive regulatory requirements and any attempts to improve the state's economic state of affairs are stymied by political gridlock and corruption at senior levels. Much needed foreign investment is scarce due to the resistance by nationalist leaders to strengthen central institutions and the creation of a single economic space.<sup>280</sup>

After the enactment of the Dayton Accords, the international community was confronted with the new task of ensuring that the peace that they had brought about was sustainable on a long term basis. The international community has taken the initiative in helping an ethnically divided Bosnia and Herzegovina implement its second generation reforms however to date participation of local actors has been limited to domestic political elites. Perdan adds that the "security sector reform process has been characterised by intense pressure from international actors such as The Office of the High Representative, the OSCE, the EU and NATO, who have used their institutional leverage, including their

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280 Country Assistance Strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009-2013  
 ((5/20/2009)Available at: [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PDACP613.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACP613.pdf)

powers as donors, to push the reform agenda forward.”<sup>281</sup> Noting this point, it is clear that security sector reform in Bosnia remains far from locally owned.

There are different views on what local ownership means in practice – from the minimalist model of simple local support for any externally generated initiative at one end of the spectrum, to locally designed, financed and fully implemented reforms at the opposite end. Security Sector Reform in Bosnia has more or less so far leant towards the minimalist policy by which locals were expected to support and eventually take ownership over an externally defined reform programme. However, in the current political setting this approach has clear limitations. It is perhaps time to think of the Security Sector Reform ownership issue in Bosnia in more ambitious terms which would involve a more inclusive reform process enabling other stakeholders, rather than just international actors and/or domestic political elites to shape reform outcomes. Widening the circle of relevant actors allowed to participate in Security Sector Reform discussions and decisions would not only lead to a genuinely locally owned Security Sector Reform process, but could also generate more sustainable solutions and provide greater legitimacy to Security Sector Reform in Bosnia. The question of legitimacy appears to be particularly important as Security Sector Reform is

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281 Perdan, S., Bosnia: SSR Under International Tutelage. Available at <http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/RESSpecNet/96778/...2BB5.../13.pdf> (Accessed on May 12, 2011)

wrapped up in a wider state building process and until the key issue of legitimacy is appropriately addressed, local ownership will remain elusive.<sup>282</sup>

Beiber points out that the peace agreement for Bosnia has been practical especially due to the powers that it has vested on the international institutions to help in the implementation process.<sup>283</sup> Indeed, there are some important distinctions that emerge when examining the degree and structure of international involvement in post-conflict Bosnia. One of these is that there are different organizations with unequal powers that are charged with the responsibility of overseeing the military and civilian aspect in the implementation of the peace agreement. For instance, the Multi-National Peacekeeping Force (IFOR), otherwise known as Implementation Force, which later became SFOR or Stabilization Force and currently referred to as the European Union Force (EUFOR) is charged with the implementation of the military aspect of the agreement.

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282 Perdan, S., Bosnia: SSR Under International Tutelage. Available at <http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/RESSpecNet/96778/...2BB5.../13.pdf> (Accesed on May 12, 2011)

283 Beiber, F., (2002) "Governing Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina," In Kingal Gal (ed.), *Minority Governance In Europe*. Budapest: LGI Books.

Beiber also identifies the International Police Task Force (IPTF), a United Nations initiative in Bosnia that was established to oversee the local police force and was replaced by the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in 2003. The Office of the High Representative on the other hand was established to supervise the civilian implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords and is supported in some aspects by the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the EU. There are also a number of foreign officials that are nominated by international organizations that were either established by international organizations or Bosnians, which form an integral part of Bosnian institutional structures at the joint level, for instance the Constitutional Court, the Human Rights Chamber and Central Bank; these institutions provide an additional layer of international involvement in post conflict Bosnia.<sup>284</sup>

At the time when the Dayton Peace Accords was signed, the Armed Forces of Bosnia were split into two distinct entities. These two entities were semi-autonomous in the sense that each had their own chain of command and also fell under the jurisdiction of one of the two defence ministries. This arrangement allowed for a total lack of accountability to a central authority by the two entity forces, as it should be in any functional military. Besides, the two entity forces were openly separated from one another and this made the control of each defence army to be an affair of their respective entity.<sup>285</sup>

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284 Ibid., p. 214.

285 Ibid, p. 232.

Often, the international community has 'imposed' some externally controlled mechanisms of governance that are geared towards sustaining peace and stability in Bosnia. The international community ensured that it laid out a framework of governance through which Bosnia would achieve social, political and economic stability. In some quarters, these sets of ideological and practical concepts that promote democracy and market sovereignty on one hand and those of conflict resolution on the other, have come to be termed as democratic peace. Therefore the international community has both helped to strengthen the structures of governance in Bosnia and has ensured that peace is sustained through reforms in the defence forces.<sup>286</sup>

This two pronged strategy is in recognition of the fact that tackling security threats should go hand in hand with underdevelopment issues that contribute to insecurity and criminalization.<sup>287</sup> However it would be futile to just set up robust defence structures and personnel without addressing social issues regarding poverty and youth unemployment, which make it easier for ethnic leaders to mobilize people along their ethnic lines to compete for public goods.<sup>288</sup> These issues should also be taken into consideration when designing the defence system of a state and resources should be allocated for their implementation.

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286 Laurance, Edward J. and Sarah Meek, *The New Field of Micro- Disarmament: Addressing the Proliferation and Buildup of Small Arms and Light Weapons*, Brief 7, (Bonn International Center for Conversion, September 1996).

288 Ibid, *Overview of the Conflicts within BiH and the Peacebuilding Efforts*, p.8-9.

The international community has laid out structures for Bosnia to enable it reform its defence system. Papenkort points out that although Parliamentary oversight of the defence issues is a pre-requisite for PfP membership, there is currently no provision in law that provides that oversight capability to the state level Parliamentary committee. Entity laws do provide for legislative oversight by the National Assembly in Republika Srpska and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina but there is insufficient exercise of this responsibility.<sup>289</sup>

Another factor that has made Bosnia willing to adhere to the benchmarks that have been established by NATO is the unmanageable cost of maintaining two entity defence forces. Even though the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had taken the initiative of downsizing military personnel in both entities, it was the effects of NATO's conditions that set in motion the defence reforms in Bosnia.<sup>290</sup>

According to the *Global Policy Forum* the significant role that Bosnia plays in NATO's transformation and enlargement since the early 1990s and, also the high political-military stakes within Bosnia and across Europe make it reasonable to

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289 Papenkort, B., Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Long Way Towards Partnership for Peace. Available at: [http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf\\_pool/publikationen/10\\_wg9\\_taf\\_140.pdf](http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/10_wg9_taf_140.pdf) (Accessed on, May 14, 2011)

290 Ibid,

conclude that Bosnia is also going to be a significant part of the future of the Alliance.<sup>291</sup> The unsuccessful efforts of the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) in conflict management in Bosnia in 1991-1995 have strongly influenced the Alliance to be supportive regarding the country's membership aspiration. The western Balkans constitutes a fragile region which could easily explode into violence if the situation is not maintained under control. The NATO enlargement process supports the Alliance's basic goal of enhancing security and extending stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. By embracing Bosnia, NATO would send the message that stability and security in this country and in the whole Euro-Atlantic area will be enhanced and maintained under control.

NATO has been at the forefront of the new developments in Bosnia, setting the pace at which the defence forces within the country will be reformed to meet the current security needs. In the paper titled *Partnership for Peace and Security Sector Reform*, Morfew succinctly lays out NATO's agenda in Bosnia. He argues that the international community has extended its focus from Defence Reform to the wider aspects of Security Sector Reform. From a NATO perspective, Security Sector Reform encompasses but is not restricted to defence reform, security service reform and border security. While many international organisations are involved in Security Sector Reform, NATO understands that in some areas, it only plays a supporting role. From a NATO perspective actors in the security

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291 "UN Gives Landmark Ruling on Bosnian genocide", Global Policy Forum, 26 February 2007.  
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icj/2007/0226cleared.htm> (accessed 18 November 2008).



sector are limited to: military and defence organisations; law enforcement agencies with military status; and, intelligence and security services. The national bodies responsible for the oversight of the security sector and therefore under the umbrella of Security Sector Reform, will include, but not necessarily be limited to government; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, and foreign affairs; financial management bodies such as finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units; and civil society organisations such as civilian review boards and public complaints commissions.<sup>292</sup>

So far Bosnia has heavily benefited by cooperating with NATO and ever since Bosnia joined the PfP Program in December 2006, the country has received cooperation from NATO partners which has gone along way to address the security concerns within mutually agreed goals.<sup>293</sup> The Bosnian government has signed the PfP Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with NATO, as required of their national legislation. Consequently, the agreement has facilitated the cooperation within the entity armies and other international militaries within the NATO partnership. Today, NATO and Bosnia are continuously improving the sharing of information in the fight against terrorism. NATO member countries are

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292 Morfew, S., (January 2007 )'Partnership for Peace and Security Sector Reform' In, Security Sector Reform in South East Europe –from a Necessary Remedy to a Global Concept. By, Ebnoether, A, H., Felberbauer, E, M., & Staničić, M., National Defence Academy.

293 Ibid, p.15.

also helping Bosnia establish capacities and provide advice to improve the existing national apparatus.

The introductory chapter introduced the reader to defence reform in Bosnia. The following section offers a more comprehensive analysis of the progress of the defence reform efforts. Defence Reform is among the principle pre-requisites for Bosnia to integrate with NATO and the EU. The pre-requisites included PfP membership which is considered an important step towards European integration. The Bosnian political leadership announced the goal of membership in the European Union and the NATO security alliance during the visit by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson in June 2001. Lord Robertson spoke of the many reforms needed for Bosnia including the adoption of a state defence law, central command over the armed forces, democratic and parliamentary oversight of the armed forces, the creation of a Bosnian Ministry of Defence (MOD), transparent military budgets, common equipping and training standards, strengthening of state level institutions and the fulfillment of obligations to the ICTY under the terms and conditions under the Dayton Peace Accords.<sup>294</sup>

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<sup>294</sup> "Riga Declaration," NATO Press Release (2006)150 (2008), <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm> (accessed 15 May 2008).<sup>5</sup>

In recognition of the commitment and progress made in the reform efforts, Bosnia was invited to join the PfP during the RIGA Summit in November 2006. The state promptly embarked on a structured course to fulfill the PfP goals. This commitment has been welcomed by NATO member countries that have proposed ambitious action plans and assistance in reform efforts to assist Bosnia towards this goal. Another milestone took place in April 2008 during the Bucharest Summit when NATO members invited Bosnia to begin an intensified dialogue which consisted of discussions on political, financial, military and security matters.<sup>295</sup> This represented another step towards NATO membership for Bosnia. In 2004, the High Representative/European Union Special Representative (HR/EUSR) in Bosnia, Paddy Ashdown, stated that: "If there was one issue that everybody in every ethnicity, every political party and every corner of the country is agreed upon, it is that Bosnia's ultimate destination is Europe"<sup>296</sup>

This high level understanding created the pre-conditions for successful Defence Reform in Bosnia. Defence Reform was among the top priorities for both NATO members and partnership countries in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/PfP community.<sup>297</sup> As the PfP document states, the reform of the defence system is a very important part of Bosnia's state structure and focuses on two key points,

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<sup>295</sup> "Bucharest Declaration," NATO Press Release (2008)049 (2008); <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html> (accessed 18 May 2010).

<sup>296</sup> Ashdown quoted in Staff of the Centre for European Security Studies, *the Western Balkan Candidates for NATO Membership and Partnership*, ed. David Greenwood (The Netherlands: Centre for European Security Studies, 2005), 83; <http://www.cess.org/publications/harmoniepapers/pdfs/HarmPap.18.colour.pdf> (accessed 11 June 2010).

<sup>297</sup> István Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler, *Post-Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States*, 1st ed. (Washington, D.C: Brassey's, 2002), 189.5

firstly, the establishment of a single defence organisation that falls under the command and control of efficient state institutions and secondly restructuring of the armed forces to enable the implementation of legitimate defence objectives of Bosnia and its foreign political aspirations in terms of security, specifically collective defence and security.<sup>298</sup>

As already mentioned several times within this paper, the end of the war saw two formal armies in Bosnia, the army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the army of the Republika Srpska. In reality however there were three as the army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided along ethnic lines; one Croat and one Muslim. This saw two separate defence systems representing the two separate entities forming the state of Bosnia.<sup>299</sup> The consequence of this was that the central state had no effective control over the armed forces neither oversight nor command and control because command was exercised at the entity level. James Locher, the former co-chairman of the Defence Reform Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Michael Donley, a former advisor to the Defence Reform Commission wrote that “The communist inheritance included highly politicised command elements, weak civilian control below the head of state, almost no connectivity or communication between the

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298 Bosnia and Herzegovina - Partnership for Peace - Presentation Document (Sarajevo: Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2006), 6; [http://www.mod.gov.ba/eng/dwn/prez\\_dokum\\_e.pdf](http://www.mod.gov.ba/eng/dwn/prez_dokum_e.pdf) (accessed 10 September 2010).

299 Merijn Hartog, “Defence Reform and PfP Aspirations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serbia and Montenegro,” in Jos Boonstra, ed., *Defence Reform Initiative for Bosnia and Herzegovina /Serbia and Montenegro*, the DRINA Project (Groningen, The Netherlands: The Centre for European Security Studies, 2005), 2; <http://www.cess.org/publications/occasionals/pdfs/occasionals2.pdf> (accessed 1 September 2010).53

Defence Ministries and general staffs, lack of transparency in budgeting and administration and weak parliamentary oversight. The post-war environment was characterised by fragmented political authority and lack of trust.”<sup>300</sup>

In September 2003 following a lengthy period of negotiation and consensus building, the Defence Reform Commission achieved unanimous agreement on the way forward.<sup>301</sup> The PfP report created a new structure for the armed forces. The structure differentiated between two chains of command, Operational and Administrative. The Operational chain of command established responsibility for the employment of military forces, whilst the administrative chain of command provided responsibility to the two entity Ministries of Defence for the organisation, manning, training and equipping their respective entity armies. This new structure was supported by the new Bosnian defence law. This was largely seen as an intermediate step in a longer term plan to consolidate the entity armed forces to a united military establishment.

The new organisational structure of the armed forces required a reduction in numbers to meet the optimal size for the political and economic realities in Bosnia. The process of downsizing began as soon as the fighting ended in 1995. By 1999 the number of military personnel had been reduced from 250,000 to 35,000 and then to 19,800 by 2002. In 2004 the Bosnian presidency decided that the two entity armed forces would have a ceiling of 12,000 troops. The

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300 James R. Locher III and Michael Donley, "Reforming Bosnia and Herzegovina's Defence Institutions," NATO Review (Winter 2004); <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue4/english/military.html> (accessed 1 September 2010).

301 Locher and Donley, *Reforming Bosnia and Herzegovina's Defense Institutions*.

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 8,000 and the Republika Srpska 4,000. Further, the number of conscripts would be reduced to 12,600 and Reservist figures were set at 60,000.<sup>302</sup> This represents a total reduction of 95% in personnel in less than a decade.

According to a Defence Reform Committee report, Bosnia's defence spending was considerably larger than other European countries of similar size, which is significant when understanding the size of Bosnia's economy. Bosnia's inability to afford and sustain a large defence force was the principle reason why the reduction of personnel and resolving personnel issues became a major priority for reform. Without real reform of the armed forces, Bosnia will continue to be unable to fulfill PfP membership requirements. Within the non-Defence Reform Commission requirements for PfP membership is full cooperation with the ICTY which has been a long standing requirement for Bosnia's acceptance into the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Nikola Radavanovic noted in 2004 that the "main obstacle towards Bosnia joining the PfP is the lack of cooperation with the ICTY."<sup>303</sup> However the arrest of former Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic in 2008 and the more recent apprehension of the former Bosnian Serb army chief, General Ratko Mladic in May 2011 will undoubtedly bring the country closer to EU membership.

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302 Vetschera and Damian, "Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Role of the International Community, " 35.

303 Staples, "Defense Reform and PFP in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 37.

To be successful, any reform requires an effective implementation plan. The Defence Reform Commission has given this considerable attention and has recommended the creation of the Transition Management Office whose responsibilities will be to support the implementation of defence reform.<sup>304</sup> Defence Reform has had to continue in order to transform into a modern, effective and affordable Defence Force.

By 2005, the entities had 'combined' (in theory only) their military forces and defence ministries and had agreed to amend their constitutions accordingly. By the end of 2005, the entity parliaments had adopted requisite laws to allow the transfer of defence capability and personnel from the two entities to the central state.<sup>305</sup>

Defence reform continued to progress throughout 2006 following the implementation of the Defence Law in 2005. This is in line with the recommendations of the Defence Reform Commission in order to meet the aim of establishing a single defence force.<sup>306</sup> By the beginning of 2006 all defence related responsibilities and personnel came under the umbrella of the central state government. Later in 2006 the state government determined the size,

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304 Defense Reform Commission, The Path to Partnership for Peace, 6.

305 International Crisis Group, Ensuring Bosnia's Future: A New International Engagement Strategy (Sarajevo: International Crisis Group,[2007]),16,,[http://doc.operationspaix.net/serv1/ICG\\_ensuring\\_bosnias\\_future\\_2007-02-15\\_.pdf](http://doc.operationspaix.net/serv1/ICG_ensuring_bosnias_future_2007-02-15_.pdf) (accessed 12 September 2010).

306 Defense Reform Commission 2005 Report, AFBiH: A Single Military Force for the 21st Century (Sarajevo: Ministry of Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2005);<http://www.mod.gov.ba/eng/dwn/2005DRCReport-English.pdf> (accessed 13 September 2010).

structure and location of the defence force.<sup>307</sup> Conscription came to an end, enabling the defence force to become an all volunteer force. From mid 2006 the structure of the armed forces was determined as 10,000 full time, professional military personnel, 5,000 reserve forces and 1,000 civilians.<sup>308</sup>

In accordance with the Bosnian constitution, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Services are comprised of all three members of the Bosnian Presidency who by law perform the responsibilities of Commander in Chief. The top to bottom command chain starts with the Presidency and flows down through the Minister of Defence, to the Chairman of the Joint Staff and down to the Commanders of the Operational and Support Command and subordinate units.<sup>309</sup> The progress of defence reform in Bosnia to this point has been impressive and progress continues towards achieving the necessary requirements for its successful implementation, the consolidation of personnel and infrastructure and the modernisation of capability in order to enable them to meet NATO standards. The author believes that full integration will only occur once the ethnic dilemma has been resolved and when the ethnic communities begin to trust one another once more. It is difficult to see progress in this area

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307 Freedom House Report, Nations in Transit 2007 - Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2007); [http://www.freedomhouse.hu/images/fdh\\_galleries/NIT2007/bosnia\\_line%20edited\\_office%20reviewed.pdf](http://www.freedomhouse.hu/images/fdh_galleries/NIT2007/bosnia_line%20edited_office%20reviewed.pdf) (accessed 13 September 2010).

308 Bosnia and Herzegovina - NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan - Presentation Document, 28.

309 Defense Reform Commission 2005 Report, AFBH: A Single Military Force for the 21st Century, 191. See also Appendix XX Organizational Structure of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces in 2005.



while the state's nationalist parties remain so influential in the leadership of Bosnia.

## ***Plans for the Future***

Despite inheriting elements of the defence structure from the former communist regime, Bosnia is still managing to meet nearly all of NATO's requirements. Major General Richard Whiteman, the NATO Commander in Sarajevo, remarked in 2008 that "Defence Reform in particular remains one of the key reform successes in Bosnia and continues to serve as an example of what can be achieved when there is unity, cooperation and dialogue amongst the people."<sup>310</sup> Defence Reform in Bosnia is now into its implementation phase and so far reform efforts have been centered more on structural (or hardware) changes to the system rather than on culture (or software) changes. A former student of the US Naval Post Graduate School, Lieutenant Colonel Janos Szonyegi from the Hungarian Army noted that "In an established democracy, with strong traditions of civilian control of the armed forces, the process of defence reform can be limited to 'a change of *hardware* like restructuring or professionalism. In post-communist societies however, the biggest challenge is arguably the 'change of *software*, namely the whole culture and mentality of the defence

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310 Wight Ian quoted in Antonio Prlenda, "General Wightman: BiH Defence Reform is a Success," Southeastern European Times (August 8, 2008); [http://balkantimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en\\_GB/features/setimes/articles/2008/08/18/reportage-01](http://balkantimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/articles/2008/08/18/reportage-01) (accessed 21 September 2010)

establishment.”<sup>311</sup> Bosnia is a country that needed a change of ‘software’ in order to prepare for the future. This is a process that requires a substantial amount of time, resources and effort.

Despite the recognised achievements to date, the shift to a unified Defence Force has been completed on paper only. The Defence Forces still operate separate doctrine; it remains politically divided; equipped differently and operationally uncoordinated and mismatched. There is not the funding or the public support to rectify the deficiencies. Janes assesses Bosnia as a “deeply divided nation, with serious implications for the armed forces.”<sup>312</sup> Jane’s claims that among the more positive moves that may enhance the transformation of the Bosnian Defence Force are the opportunities presented by entry into the PfP program. Major General Richard Whiteman commented “Defence reform also entails the obligations that Bosnia has incurred as well as the commitments that have been made within the framework of the PfP, including reform goals within the planning and review process, as well as wider security and political obligations that Bosnia will incur as the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) process develops.”<sup>313</sup>

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311 Janos Szonyegi, *The Pace of Peace on the Viability of Bosnia and Herzegovina Twelve Years After Dayton* [Electronic Resource] (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2007), 92; <http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/hyperion-image.exe/07Jun%5FSzonyegi.pdf> (accessed 21 August 2010)

312 Jane's, "Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces," (2008); [http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod\\_Name=BALK&](http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=BALK&) (accessed 14 May 2010).

313 Prlenda, "General Wightman: BiH Defence Reform is a Success."60

## ***Conclusion***

Chapter Three has explored the historical background to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the history of the former Yugoslavia. The ethnic divide in Bosnia is closely linked to the ethnic fragmentation that were brought about by the Milosevic regime. Bosnia is still suffering the effects of negative ethnicity causing Bosnia's population to seek refuge within their ethnic community.

The thesis has also studied the structure of the Bosnian government and analysed the concept of democracy in the governance of the country and how these two are crucial in the progress of defence reforms. The weakness of the Bosnian government is entrenched in the constitution of the country, which allows for ethnic presidency on a rotational basis. Most of these Presidents have no national interest at heart and therefore it is no surprise that the foreign policy of the country is such a failure. Besides, the mandate of these Presidents is compromised by the power sharing pact, which cannot allow them to be nationalists. The Council of Ministers is the most inefficient department of the executive arm for it has so far failed to assist the government of the day to fully implement policies. Due to this the international community has had to step in to ensure that the developmental agenda of the country is implemented.

Chapter Three also established that the parliament of Bosnia is true reflection of the fragmented society in the country. The constitution illustrates how each entity will be represented in terms of numbers and this has only helped to entrench

ethnic divide since the representatives from each entity are subservient to the interest of their block, not those of the nation at large. The Bosnian parliament does not fully represent its people as it pays less attention to the minorities in the country.

The role that the international community has played in stopping the violence in 1995 and laying out the foundation for sustainable peace has been analysed. Research has established that without the assistance of the international community, it is likely that Bosnia would be viewed as a failed state. The Dayton Peace Accords that later became the centre of Bosnia's constitution was crafted with the help of the international community. Additionally, the reform efforts seen within the defence forces so far is a product of the partnership between international organizations such as NATO and the Bosnian government. However also noted is the continued presence and involvement of the international community in Bosnia and how the international presence is likely to do more harm than good in the long term as it does not allow Bosnia to develop and govern itself without the assistance of the international intervention. After providing the first generation reforms the international community is now in a position to allow the state to pursue second generation reforms, the only way sustainable peace in the country will be secured.

Defence Reform is one of the key steps towards integration with the EU and the NATO Alliance. Two points are important in this respect, the first is the civilian and democratic control of all the armed forces; the second and at the same time a pre-condition for democratic control is the organisation of a ministry and a general staff at the state level of the state, which has effective control over the military organisation. A key point established within this chapter is that whilst there may be a shift to a unified defence force, the defence force continues to be ethnically and politically divided and operates separate doctrine. Clearly, although the achievements made this far have been impressive, there is still much improvement of Bosnia's armed forces in order to satisfy NATO standards. Further, with its limited military resources, it is important for Bosnia to find a niche where it can effectively contribute to the NATO alliance in support of International Peace and Stability.<sup>314</sup>

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314 Sven Alkalaj, "The Road to PfP Membership: Development and Enhanced Cooperation between BiH and NATO," in Jos Boonstra, ed., *Defense Reform Initiative for Bosnia and Herzegovina /Serbia and Montenegro*, 45; <http://www.cess.org/publications/occasionals/pdfs/occasionals2.pdf>, (accessed 21 March 2011).

## **Chapter Four – THE CREATION OF ETHNICALLY SEGREGATED FORCES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

### ***Introduction***

Chapter Three sought to understand how ethnicity linked to political dynamics and established that ethnicity in itself does not bring about conflict, with this being demonstrated by the history of Yugoslavia and its absence of resolving ethnic disputes through violent means. Rather, Bosnia's ethnic conflict of the 1990's was a product of self-serving interest by the political elite using ethnicity to trigger civil strife. In this chapter, the thesis investigates the causes of the current ethnic division within the Bosnian Defence Force, a dilemma that remains despite the fact that the entity armed forces share a common history of unity. As stated earlier in this paper, it is important to note that the armed forces of Bosnia reflect Bosnian society as a whole and therefore societal factors will inevitably impact on the culture of the armed forces. Politicians who disrespect the state convey a negative message to the military. Some political leaders act in support of demilitarization efforts which also act to undermine the legitimacy of the armed forces and reinforce ethnic separation. Political leaders are also often in a position to have a decisive influence on the appointment of the military's strategic

leadership which again influence the culture of the armed forces from the top down.<sup>315</sup>

## ***The Causes of Ethnic Segregation***

Although the current ethnic structure in Bosnia remains antagonistic at certain levels, the ethnic factions still share common basic conditions: ethnic separation; public fear and insecurity; a lack of democratic accountability; the breakdown in the rule of law; and a lack of institutions able to control illegal economic activity. By sharing a common strategic interest in maintaining these conditions, the entities work separately but in parallel to sustain ethnic conflict, while at the same time resisting the efforts of the international community to seriously unite the defence force under a single chain of command. The implication is that true ethnic reconciliation is reliant on progress of a second strand of the peace process – liberalization of the economy and society.<sup>316</sup> In this section, the thesis examines in detail at the various causes of segregation within the Bosnian defence force.

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315 Zijad Becirevic, "Is There The Court For Dodik's Vandalism?", Orbus Balkan Area, September 23, 2009 <http://www.orbus.be/aktua/arhiva/aktua2734.html#TOP> (accessed March 3 2010)

316 Reshaping International Priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, p.5.

## ***A Legacy of Failures within the Former Yugoslavia***

There has been much comment within existing literature that suggests that the ethnic rivalry found in Bosnia is a product of ancient ethnic hatred. These assertions have been disputed by objective historical appreciations as demonstrated earlier in this paper.<sup>317</sup>

Of the six republics that comprised the Former Yugoslavia; Bosnia and Herzegovina was the most diverse in that it neither had a majority religious community or a majority national group. According to the paper titled *Country Assistance Strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009-2013*, the disintegration of Yugoslavia opened a bloody historical chapter in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The political crisis in Yugoslavia saw the Yugoslav People Army (JNA) adopting a neutral stand but the general ideology and ethnic composition of the JNA leadership quickly took the side of the Bosnian Serb leader, Slobodan Milosevic.<sup>318</sup>

The segregation of the Defence Forces of Bosnia is somewhat strange noting that the entity armies had previously served alongside one another in previous times. Maybe Bosnia was not created by the Dayton Peace Accords as it appears, but rather is a product of a long rich history of inter-ethnic military

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<sup>317</sup> Ibid.

<sup>318</sup> Rogel, C., (1998) *The Breakup Of Yugoslavia And War In Bosnia*. Greenwood Press, p. 9.



heritage and experience. This military had in fact fought for two big Empires: the Ottoman Empire and the Austria-Hungarian Empire.<sup>319</sup> Despite this history, the armed forces of Bosnia today exist under very different circumstances and their loyalty to the state plays second to their loyalty to their respective ethnic block.

Bosnia was created as a state following its secession from Yugoslavia in March 1992 and has existed to date without an effective military capable of protecting its fragile independence and sovereignty.<sup>320</sup> However the formation of the country itself, ethnic oriented as it was, does not adequately explain the existence of these segregated forces. The segregation in the Bosnian defence forces is closely related to the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, from which Bosnia was founded. Following the 1990 victory of the nationalist parties, Yugoslavia entered into a state of crisis that eventually led to the secession of Slovenia and Croatia in mid 1991.<sup>321</sup> The nationalist parties within Bosnia sought to consolidate their newly attained power through cadre change that was created in a way as to favour their respective ethnic communities. There emerged the process of ethnic based inclusion and exclusion in both private and public sectors in December 1990. This process produced deep divisions within the Bosnian society. The manner in which these changes took shape is evident only

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<sup>319</sup> Ibid, p.6.

<sup>320</sup> Shrader, C. R., (2003) *The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military History, 1992-1994*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid, p.63.

in the scattered example of the process, which went on until the war ultimately broke out.<sup>322</sup>

The first step of this process consisted of the removal of all communist members from positions of responsibility at the higher levels of state administration replacing them with the three nationalist parties.<sup>323</sup> The nationalists strove to ensure that ministers and deputy ministers in each ministry came from different parties. However, each of the three national parties had serious reservations about the other two; they therefore often used their blocking powers to prevent ministries from effectively performing their normal functions. This resulted into paralysis and due to the attrition of the non-Muslim cadre in the ministries; the Sarajevo government came to be largely under the control of the SDA. Since Bosnia was a highly centralized state it became apparent that the SDA and the Muslim ethnic community would effectively prevent other ethnic communities from accessing power at least at the level of the central government.

The genesis of the segregation in the Bosnian military has its origins in the composition and structure of the Yugoslavia army, which was founded along ethnic lines. Just before the war broke out in 1992, the JNA had become an almost homogenous Serbian force that had seen the non-Serbian members of the JNA desert the force. Even though the JNA had officially withdrawn from Bosnia immediately after the country had seceded from Yugoslavia, it left behind

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322 Ibid, Nationalist Revolution, p.63.

323 Ibid, Nationalist Revolution, p.63.

a legacy that resembled the disintegrated JNA, especially with the composition of the three entities. During the war all the Bosnian armed forces experienced desertion and disintegration and reformed along ethnic divides in order to survive. After the war the army of Bosnia broached the subject of multi-ethnic co-existence but this idea was later dropped, making way for nationalistic undertones that advocated for segregated armed forces.<sup>324</sup>

The forces at play within Bosnian society are also more complex than they first appear. According to the paper titled, *Reshaping International Priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, "inter-ethnic conflict may seem to be the dominant feature and the root cause of resistance to the goals of the peace process. However, ethnic reconciliation represents only one axis of the peace process. The other axis is the transition from a communist to a free society, building an infrastructure of democratic and free-market institutions, laws and traditions from a limited base."<sup>325</sup> While each of these axes in its own right presents formidable challenges, the interaction of the two magnifies the problems immensely. Inter-ethnic hostility is a tool used by the nationalist regimes to maintain their power.<sup>326</sup> Bosnia has yet to achieve all these because the country is still hamstrung by the negative legacy that Bosnia inherited from the former Yugoslavia.

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324 Gaub, F., (2010) Case Study: The Armies of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Military Integration After Civil War : Multiethnic Armies, Identity and Post Taylor and Francis, p.92 - 94.

325 Reshaping international priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, [http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi\\_document\\_id\\_4.pdf](http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_4.pdf) (accessed October 19, 2011).

326 Ibid, p.6.

## ***Nationalist Competitions in Bosnia and Herzegovina***

Following secession from Yugoslavia in 1992, Bosnia was faced with the dilemma around the segregation of the defence forces since each of the ethnic entity already viewed each other with mutual suspicion. For instance, the formation of the Croatian Defence Council in May 1992 was a reaction by the Bosnian Croat community to the perceived threat posed by the political ambitions of the Bosnian Serbs. Notably, the Bosnian Muslim leadership was slow in recognizing this threat and as a result fell behind the Bosnian Croat community in the establishment of their respective defence forces.<sup>327</sup>

The then government of the Republic of Bosnia was reluctant to act on these divisions and the private citizens and Muslim patriotic organizations assumed the task of organizing Bosnian Muslims for defence. Although they had greater manpower resources, the Muslims were poorly led, had a less effective military force in comparison to those of others competing ethnic entities and were also ill equipped militarily.<sup>328</sup> By the time Bosnia declared its independence in March, 1992, the government of President Izetbegovic knew that there was a security threat to the new Republic, which was posed by the six corps of the JNA and their over 120 000 men in the paramilitary forces of the Serbian Democratic Party. In April, the President declared that a state of imminent threat existed and

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327 Shrader, C. R., (2003) *The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military History, 1992-1994*. CollegeStation: Texas A&M University Press.p.8.

328 Ibid, p.9.

created a new Territorial Defence organization whose personnel consisted of the district staffs. This organization was intended to incorporate the various armed forces groups, including the Patriotic League into a formal defence structure.<sup>329</sup>

As Shrader states, the structure of the newly formed Bosnia defence force primarily assumed the form of the old JNA organization, which had grouped the forces of several municipalities together on a Territorial Defence district. In early 1991, the JNA had ordered the disbandment of the Territorial Defence units in Bosnia and with the cooperation from President Izetbegovic, the JNA were permitted to disarm the Territorial units and redistribute their weapons to the Bosnian Serbs. This order was however ignored by the Bosnian Croats and the Muslim patriots who went ahead to successfully take over the existing Territorial structures, including its facilities and many of its weapons.<sup>330</sup>

At first the Territorial forces in Bosnia had included both the Croats and Muslims. But after Bosnia began to emphasize its Islamic character, the Croat members left to join the HVO, especially when it became clear that it was only the Muslim members who received promotions and positions of responsibility in that organization. In any event, the organization did not suffer a shortage of manpower: the Muslim dominated Territorial forces operated under the laws and regulations that had governed the Territorial forces of the former Yugoslavia and were mainly tied to the location where they were recruited. The influx of Muslim

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329 Ibid, The Rise and Fall of Social Republic of Yugoslavia. p.12.

330 Ibid, The Rise and Fall of Social Republic of Yugoslavia. p.13.

refugees from places such as eastern Bosnia and Bosanska-Kajrina in late 1992 provided large numbers of military personnel who were desperately needed to fill the ranks of the Territorial units and also to create new mobile units that were required for offensive operations.<sup>331</sup>

Attempts by the Bosnian Serbs to prevent any efforts that would culminate into a single defence ministry at the state level between the years 1995 to 2003 should therefore be explored in the context of their self-perception as a state. The two Bosnian armies that were previously multi-ethnic in outlook but ended up ethnically segregated demonstrate the trench mentality that came about after the war. With the war coming to an end, the three armies were well established in their tripartite ethnicities and only reflected the divisions of the society of Bosnia along ethnic lines.<sup>332</sup>

## ***The Provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords***

The Dayton Peace Accords separated the ethnic population of Bosnia in 1995 by creating a zone of separation. The concept of the zone of separation was to separate entities to limit contact between the warring factions. This would reduce the opportunity for further ethnic violence. The zone of separation created a 1000 mile line that roughly divided Bosnia in half.<sup>333</sup> The Bosnian Serbs

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<sup>331</sup> Ibid, The Rise and Fall of Social Republic of Yugoslavia. p.14.

<sup>332</sup> Ibid.

<sup>333</sup> Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 36.

occupied the area north of the line while the Bosnian Croats and Muslims occupied the territory to the south.

Imposing the Dayton Peace Accords commenced with a number of phases. The first required the Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims to withdraw their forces to positions approximately two kilometers from the agreed line of separation. This would provide a four kilometer wide demilitarized zone between the belligerent forces. In Sarajevo itself, the zone would be two kilometers wide instead of four.

Phase II required the entity forces to withdraw to a second line, which became known as the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL). The IEBL was to be the final demarcation between the Republika Srpska in the north and the Muslim Croat Federation in the south. In many areas the agreed ceasefire line and the IEBL became one of the same thing. There were however some differences; phase II provided 45 days from the IFOR deployment for the entity armed forces to withdraw at least two kilometers back, behind the IEBL. IFOR troops would occupy the four kilometer wide separation zone for 90 days and once IFOR withdrew from the area, the gaining faction were permitted to occupy their respective territory within the bounds of the IEBL.<sup>334</sup>

On December 15 1995, the United Nations Security Council authorized the NATO intervention force, known as IFOR to conduct military operations in Bosnia under the provisions specified in the Dayton Peace Accords. Unlike UNPROFOR, IFOR were not employed as a peacekeeping force, rather IFOR

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334 GFAP, Annex 1A.

was mandated with a peace enforcement role under chapter VII of the UN Charter which authorized the use of force if and when required to ensure compliance with the provisions laid down in the Dayton Peace Accords.<sup>335</sup>

IFOR deployed into Bosnia on 20 December 1995 and consisted of approximately 60,000 troops from a number of troop contributing countries.<sup>336</sup>

The structure of IFOR consisted of a headquarters located in Sarajevo and subordinate commands; Multi-National Division North, led by the US, located in the northern third of the country; Multi-National Division South West, led by the British and located in the Western third of the Country and Multi-National Division South East, led by the French, located in the Eastern third of the country. All three Multi-National Divisions occupied territory across both territories and each sector included a significant length of the IEBL that separated the opposing factions.

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335 Donald C. F. Daniel, Bradd C. Hayes, and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, *Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 75.

336 Robert F. Baumann, George W. Gawrych, and Walter E. Kretchik, *Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 120.






Figure Three – Bosnia and Herzegovina: NATO Areas of Responsibility<sup>337</sup>

Whilst IFOR performed its mission in accordance with the military provisions outlined in the Dayton Peace Accords, there were also important tasks associated with maintaining the separation of the entity armed forces. For example, IFOR had to secure routes through the IEBL to ensure freedom of movement for IFOR units, humanitarian assistance and general civilian traffic. IFOR also operated check points and daily patrols through the IEBL, not only to ensure freedom of movement but also to ensure that factions were not

<sup>337</sup> <http://www.globalresearch.ca/PrintArticle.php?articleId=6423>

attempting to cross the IEBL to occupy former positions. IFOR also established Joint Military Commissions (JMC) which were arranged meetings between senior IFOR and Entity Commanders. These meetings were held regularly in order to share information and resolve disputes. The meetings also provided IFOR the platform to report violations to the entity commanders and to warn of the consequences of non-compliance. With only a few exceptions, the factions complied with the provisions of the Peace Accords and were effectively separated by 3 Feb 1996.

With respect to the separation, the author believes that separating ethnic factions as a concept is a negative approach that leads to long-term negative consequences that outweigh the short term benefits.<sup>338</sup> Separation can be seen as legitimizing actions such as violent aggression and ethnic cleansing and risks promoting its proliferation. It also creates realities that become difficult to retract. An often heard criticism on the ground amongst the Bosniak community of the intervention in Bosnia was that the Dayton Agreement allowed the Bosnian Serbs to retain 49 percent of the Bosnian territory as the Republika Srpska even though Bosnian Serbs had only accounted for 30 percent of the pre-war population. The author suggests that some may view this as a case of the Bosnian Serbs being rewarded for their actions undertaken throughout the war. The risk here is that this may become a precedent for future interventions in countries involved in domestic ethnic conflict.

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338 Based on the authors personal observations and experience as a member of SFOR and as a UN Military Liaison Officer in post-conflict Kosovo.

Another argument against ethnic separation is that it fails to resolve the underlying reasons for the conflict. Consequently the conflict largely remains unresolved. Ethnic separation therefore only creates deeper ethnic cleavages and creates the potential for further grievances, laying the foundations for further future ethnic conflict. It can also lay responsibility for the conflict with the local population, many of whom did not take part in any of the ethnic fighting. Most importantly ethnic separation prevents the process of social integration and reconciliation between the ethnic populace.

Despite these challenges, Bosnia has experienced change, politically, socially and economically. There has been the large scale return of displaced persons, the recovery of property by the victims of the strife and a comprehensive process of demilitarization. Furthermore, the freedom of movement amongst the populations has improved and notwithstanding current tensions, inter-ethnic violence is scarce.<sup>339</sup> There has also been the formation of new institutions at the state level of government, which has seen to the expansion of an integrated single market.<sup>340</sup> Notwithstanding, these gains, the fact that segregation in the defence forces still exist is a trend that must be addressed in order to ensure that the peace within the country is sustainable.

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339 The current ethnic violence in North Kosovo (Sept 2011) is evidence that ethnic tensions in the Balkans are never far from the surface.

340 Foreign Ministry of Norway (December 2007) *A Bosnian Fortress: Return, Energy and the Future of Bosnia*. Berlin – Sarajevo. Available at: <http://www.eft-stanari.net/pdf/eft-esi.pdf>

The Dayton Peace Accords brought about a number of changes to the political and economic structure of Bosnia. It also set in motion the program through which the defence system of the country would be reformed. The agreement introduced the process of defence reform, establishing separate forces in each of the two entities within the state. However, these entity armies were established not only to safeguard the state from any possible outside aggression but to also ensure the security of the three ethnic populations.<sup>341</sup> The Accords sought to create a stable and viable Bosnian state however all the reform efforts such as common defence structure, common currencies, state insignia etc were all enforced by the international community with resistance from the ethnic entities, most notably from the Republika Srpska and most of the ruling political parties which had an interest in maintaining a weak and ethnically segregated state.<sup>342</sup> It comes as no surprise therefore that the international community has been the force behind the reform efforts within Bosnia.

The Dayton Accords helped to further the segregation in the defence forces by recognizing the divisive social structures that existed at that time. The conflict played a crucial role in disrupting the superseding political conviction of a multi-ethnic country and gave way to the fear of domination by some ethnic minorities. The population had during the conflict felt insecure and not receiving adequate

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<sup>341</sup> Ibid,p12-13.

<sup>342</sup> Governing Difference ( November 2007) Country Report Bosnia and Herzegovina : Executive Summary. Sanin Hasibovic. Available at: [http://typo3.univie.ac.at/uploads/media/Executive\\_Summ\\_BiH\\_02.pdf](http://typo3.univie.ac.at/uploads/media/Executive_Summ_BiH_02.pdf) (Accessed on June 28, 2011)

protection by the state, the people had sought refuge in their ethnic identities. In the aftermath of the conflict, the political convictions were not robust enough or rather quite clear to facilitate the rallying of support from all the ethnic groups within the military. Therefore, in choosing to recognize the three constituent ethnic groups of Bosnia and their respective defence forces, the Accords were merely using the unique characteristics of the conflict to reach a resolution.

Despite the progress made in Bosnia, the fact that the ethnic phenomena still impacts on nearly every aspect of the post war life in Bosnia and Herzegovina can hardly be ignored. For one, the country is not just divided into two geographical entities, it remains ethnically segregated. This segregation is evident not just within the defence sector but in other sectors such as education and the media, which openly cater for the interests of particular ethnic groupings. In spite of there being legal structures to discourage negative ethnicity, there still exists the discrimination of persons in employment, housing and social services on the ground of their ethnic background, a trend that is supported by the governmental systems.<sup>343</sup>

Subsequently, the individuals who are amongst the minorities in their communities, have constantly resisted this system with a significant number of refugees that were displaced during the war opting not to return home due to the fear of threats and discrimination. The youths who had spent their formative years in the post war environment that is characterized by ethnic divisions are in

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343 Available at: [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PDACP613.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACP613.pdf)

dire need of a positive model for the relations between ethnic groups.<sup>344</sup> The defence forces can hardly live out the society of Bosnia and Herzegovina; thus their desire to operate as a separate entity, by extension, mirrors the desire of their ethnic population.

Papenkort argues that before the High Representative changed the Constitution of the Republika Srpska in April 2003, the constitution had promoted the original self understanding of the entity as a sovereign state, more flagrantly than that of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is in the sense that the competencies related to defence reinforce a view of statehood, in which the framework for defence was defined with supremacy resting with entity institutions. The Republika Srpska's Constitution and Law on Defence gives the entity President the supreme command and control authority over the army and this fails to recognize the supremacy of the State for matters of defence.<sup>345</sup>

The other cause of this segregation can be considered as being structural:

*“In the Federation of Bosnia and herzegivina, the legal and constitutional provisions relating to defence matters are inconsistent. The Constitution grants command and control authority to the Entity President, whereas the Law on Defence grants it to pre-Dayton figures, with a caveat that this must be resolved once the Dayton institutions were established. Because these interim*

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344 Available at: [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PDACP613.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACP613.pdf)

345 Ibid, Entity Armies and Defence Laws, p.206-207.

*arrangements were not updated, constitutional and legal inconsistency and ambiguity remain about whether some command and control responsibilities still rest with the institutions of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.*<sup>346</sup>

## **Conclusion**

Recognising that the unification of the Defence Forces of Bosnia is critical in attaining stability of the country in the future, the causes of segregation in the Bosnian army have been analysed. This is important in the sense that by understanding this, the state will be in a position to chart the way forward towards resolving this dilemma. There are three key factors responsible for encouraging the Defence Forces to remain loyal to their ethnic entities, rather than uniting to cater for the security needs of the state of Bosnia. These causes include: the nationalist competition in Bosnia, the provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords and the negative legacy of the former Yugoslavia. Worth noting is the fact that there is a thin line delineating these causes; they all seem to be intertwined. If anything, you cannot address one cause without subtly touching on the other, largely due to the fact that they all end up creating the same problem.

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<sup>346</sup> Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina – a Long Way  
[http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf\\_pool/publikation/10\\_wg9\\_taf\\_140/pdf](http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikation/10_wg9_taf_140/pdf) (accessed Nov 28, 2011)

## **Chapter Five – THE EFFECT OF ETHNICALLY SEGREGATED FORCES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

### ***Introduction***

Chapter Four explored the causes of ethnic segregation in the Bosnian Defence Forces. While some of the causes derive from the Dayton Peace Accords and were created to appease the warring factions and the interests of bringing a swift end to the violence, the ongoing ethnic segregation continues to undermine the defence reform efforts in the country. In this chapter the author will outline the effects of ethnic segregation of the defence forces in Bosnia. These effects include: the disunity within the defence forces, the lack of unity of command within the national defence force, the inability to partner with international players, the disunity in Bosnian society, weak international standing, the high cost involved in maintaining military operations and the lack of transparency within the defence forces.

In the most recent Defence White Paper of Bosnia and Herzegovina it is stressed that the aim of the defence reform process that began in 2003 was to create a common defence force. At the time of writing, *full* ethnic integration of the Bosnia Armed Forces remains a challenge. Whilst some integration may appear at the senior levels and in the defence ministry the bulk of the armed forces remain in barracks located within their respective ethnic community, either in the Republika Srpska or within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this chapter the



thesis examines the impact that ethnic segregation has had and continues to have on the defence forces and the security of the state. The ethnic segregation of the states defence forces is an important element that needs to be addressed within Bosnia. Ethnically divided armed forces can represent a threat to the stability of the state and the region if they are not democratically controlled and accountable. Unreformed defence forces also tend to cost considerably more than reformed forces to satisfy the requirements of the state and also often develop a closed society fearing that reform will result in the loss of jobs, privileges and power. There is also the risk that unreformed elements of the defence or security sector may attempt to undermine the efforts of the government for reform.<sup>347</sup>

## ***Disunity within the Defence Forces***

One of the direct effects of the segregation of Bosnia's defence Force is the lack of unity within the national army.<sup>348</sup> Despite attempts to create a common defence force, the entity armed forces have remained largely segregated for almost 16 years. The forces have yet to accept the concept of unity, cooperation and integration. This in turn makes it difficult for the defence forces to be transformed into a vanguard of national integration as the JNA was in the days of the former Yugoslavia. Subsequently, the disunity within the national military has

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347 Colston, J., NATO's Approach to Defence Reform in South-East Europe. Available at [se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/44361/.../en/Ch+4+Colston.pdf](http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/ESDP/44361/.../en/Ch+4+Colston.pdf) (Accessed on May 10, 2011)

348 Ibid, p.104.

flowed down to the general population. The Bosnian people are finding themselves shackled to their antagonistic history and ethnic prejudices as the polarity in the military implies that their fragile society could very easily slide back into ethnic violence. This does not bode well for the states future prosperity and stability.

Rather than becoming a vehicle that would spearhead national integration within its borders, the army is busy leading the country in the opposite direction and it's less than perfect example is infecting other private and public institutions within the state.<sup>349</sup> Hynes provides another perspective to the dilemma stating that continuing to maintain ethnically segregated forces in itself contradicts the fundamental goals of the peace and stability process.<sup>350</sup> Worse still, the composition of the defence forces still reflects the intent of their creation: when the Dayton Peace Accords were being crafted, the entity armed forces were fighting each other and even long after the cease fire they still view each other as adversaries. In this environment Bosnia cannot effectively reintegrate and reduce the risk of another conflict in the future simply because it cannot effectively strengthen its state-level institutions such as the armed forces or police.

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349 Ibid, p104.

350 Ibid

## ***Lack of Unity of Command within the National Defence Force***

For any military to be efficient it needs to be truly centralized. It must possess a single authority that is in charge of its agenda and objectives. Effective authority is lacking in the national defence force of Bosnia; instead the entity armies remain decentralized, with each regarding the national security agenda as playing 'second fiddle' to those within their region. Driven by respective ethnic ambition or rather the tense relationship between the constituent people in the country; the players within the defence sector have found it increasingly difficult to maintain an effective single ministry of defence.<sup>351</sup> Each entity defence force jealously guard their autonomy and continue to resist full integration, fearing that becoming accountable to a common defence sector will invariably curtail their autonomy.

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<sup>351</sup> Ibid, p.102

The image below depicts the command and control of the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, reinforcing the ethnic division of the armed forces.




Figure Four - Command and Control of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina<sup>352</sup>

By failing to create a true and effective central office through which all the defence activities will be controlled and coordinated, the lack of command and control of the armed forces will become a bane to the country's security. Hynes believes that Bosnia lacks the ability to command the very troops that are supposed to safeguard the country in times of instability.<sup>353</sup> Theoretically Bosnia should be able to call upon the states defence forces for defence purposes in the

352 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, [http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Bosnia\\_English-2005.pdf](http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Bosnia_English-2005.pdf) (accessed September 1, 2011).

353 Hynes, p.235

event of a threat to state security. In the current climate within Bosnia, there can be no guarantee that the defence forces located in Republika Srpska or the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina would respond to that call. As a state, Bosnia is also supposed to call on the entity forces to contribute to peacekeeping missions abroad and to meet international obligations in partnership with organizations such as NATO, OSCE and/or the United Nations. However, there is no guarantee that the entity armies will be willing to cooperate and/or respond in a manner that is acceptable to the central state.

This is occurring because despite the so called unification of the armed forces within Bosnia, the entity armies have maintained separate military forces that are organized and commanded at the entity level. Hynes believes that these entity armies lack sufficient state level command, control and oversight.<sup>354</sup> As a consequence, each change made by one entity is made conditional on changes by other entities, and this has prevented Bosnia from developing its armed forces to the standards befitting its security needs. The reforms undertaken in the past have failed to address the core issue at stake: that the state is supreme and as a fundamental principle of statehood it must be empowered to command and control its armed forces so that they can have the capacity to defend their territorial integrity, political independence and sovereignty.

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<sup>354</sup> Ibid, p.235.

## ***Inability to Partner with International Players***

Bosnia is currently torn between two crucial defence reform agendas: restructuring its weak security sector and seeking to participate in international security missions undertaken by organizations such as NATO and the OSCE. NATO alongside other international security players have made it abundantly clear that the threshold through which Bosnia will qualify to gain membership to these international bodies is their demonstration of reforms in the defence sector.

Besides apparent unwillingness to contribute to the national security agenda, the entity forces as currently constituted were primarily developed to defend their territories and therefore they do not refer to the imperatives of Bosnia.<sup>355</sup> Consequently, they lack the capacities to address mission tasks other than defending territorial integrity. They therefore must address compatibility and interoperability issues with each other and NATO member states before they can undertake such operations effectively.

Hynes looks at this inability to participate in international assignments as projecting from the ineptitude of the Bosnian government to exercise command and control the armed forces within its territory.<sup>356</sup> This has brought to the fore some serious concerns on whether Bosnia is actually on the path to become a legitimate and functional state. Hynes suggests that in order for the state to assert such control it has to develop strategies that will enable it to obtain military

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<sup>355</sup> Ibid.

<sup>356</sup> Ibid, *The Elephant in the Room: Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina*.p. 235 – 242.

authority from the Republika Srpska and to address the parallel, ethnic chain of command within the Federation's civilization and the institutions of the defence ministry. Additionally, Bosnia must also address the training, doctrine and force structure of its military forces in order for the country to make an effective contribution to the PfP.<sup>357</sup> This is only achievable through the development of robust capacity to organize, train and deploy troops, thereby enhancing stability.

### ***Disunity in the Larger Bosnia Society***

Undoubtedly, the Bosnian society looks up to the military for the provision of a sense of security and unity. But this has not been cultivated given the hard-line stance taken by the Bosnian entity forces on matters concerning security. Any form of disunity in the Bosnian society invites the possibility of regressing into violence. It also negatively impinges on the other sectors of the Bosnian life such as the economy. With the reformation of the of security sector gaining currency across the globe Chalmer identifies some negative effects of the unreformed security sector, which translates into the disruption of economic growth.<sup>358</sup> In essence, the implicit assumption of the development paradigm is that cultivation of social and economic growth automatically translates to peace and stability.

In the same vein, it is revealed that the three entity armies in the Bosnian national military by no means reflect the access to wealth and education; they

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<sup>357</sup> Ibid, p.206.

<sup>358</sup> Chalmers, M., "Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries: An EU Perspective," Saferworld Conflict Prevention Research Report, (January 2000).

are rather a representation of the differences in the political persuasions in Bosnia.<sup>359</sup> Unlike the multi-ethnic ARBiH and HVO who once stood for an ideal Bosnia-Herzegovina the current national defence force does not. Arguably, the departure of the Bosniak military officers from ARBiH and HVO resulted in a downward spiral in term of identity. This strained relationship between the entity forces has thus incited the general public to adhere to their ethnic prejudices and grievances becoming an obstruction towards Bosnia's peace and stability aspirations.

### ***Diminishing International Standing***

The multiplicity of negative developments within the Bosnian defence force had not only denied it a chance to partner with international organisations but has also reduced the credibility of the forces internationally. The disorganised defence force has created loopholes that make allowances for security threats. One such incident is the Orazo saga. The saga revealed the darker side of the security sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>360</sup> In September 2002 the intelligence agencies of the United States discovered that the Army of the Republika Srpska was trading in military equipment and services with Iraq. At the time this discovery the Bush administration was well into the preparations for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Iraq was also under a UN embargo at the time. The Serb political leaders denied the allegations.

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359 Ibid, p.105.

360 Ibid, The Elephant in the Room: Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina.p. 235 – 242.



The Orazo scandal brought about a serious reassessment of the status of the defence reforms in Bosnia by the international community.<sup>361</sup> This came seven years after the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace and Bosnia still had two entity armies (the Army of the Federation and the Army of the RS ), each of them operating under two disparate chains of command.

The Orazo saga changed the entire political landscape for the reformation of the defence organization in Bosnia.<sup>362</sup> At that time the international community was contemplating an exit strategy from Bosnia but the Orazo saga impelled them to intervene. With the turn of events there could be no serious discussion about the exit strategy for SFOR and the Office of the High Representative as long as the two entity armies continued to exist and operate independently of each other and independently of the state. Therefore, the Orazo saga gave the international community the motivation and the political leverage to confront the legal, political and military arguments that had been used since 1995 to obstruct progress towards any meaningful reform.

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361 Ibid, *The Elephant in the Room: Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina*.p. 235 – 242.

362 Ibid, *The Elephant in the Room: Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina*.p. 235 – 242.

## ***High Cost of Military Operations***

The structure of the Bosnian defence force makes it difficult to account for its budgetary spending. A country cannot adequately budget for its security personnel, equipment and policies if it cannot even account for the numbers of its military personnel. This is one of the challenges that confront the leaders of Bosnia's defence force, mainly due to the ethnic divisions that persist. The high cost of operations in the defence sector can also be attributed to what Hynes calls the inability of the Bosnian state to establish a comprehensive defense budget.<sup>363</sup>

Bosnia and Herzegovina is presently committed to streamlining its defence forces in such a manner that it will only cater for the operations and upkeep of the forces that are necessary for its legitimate defence needs, a concept that demands fiscal responsibility.<sup>364</sup> This means that state authorities, parliament and entity authorities now have responsibility to ensure the effectiveness of the armed forces, within affordable resource limits.

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<sup>363</sup> Ibid, *The Elephant in the Room: Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, p. 235 – 242.

<sup>364</sup> Ibid, p. 207.

Defence spending by Bosnia and Herzegovina is substantially greater than that of European countries of similar size.<sup>365</sup> This is not sustainable for Bosnia and Herzegovina given its limited economy and pressing domestic needs. Therefore, reducing the size of the armed forces and resolving the outstanding personnel issues are critical for defence reforms. The current under-funding in the defence budgets has routinely resulted in problems with the execution of the budget. Without significant defence reform, Bosnia will remain incapable of developing reliable and transparent estimates of defence expenditure, as required by OSCE and NATO.

Undeniably the current defence arrangements, army structure and size have brought about many shortfalls in the Bosnian security sector.<sup>366</sup> Some of them are the lack of adequate command and control at the state level and the ambiguity and inconsistency in law that concern the competency of the state and entities for defence matters. The others are insufficient oversight capabilities, which include democratic parliamentary control of armed forces and the lack of transparency in defence matters at all levels.

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<sup>365</sup> Ibid, p. 207.

<sup>366</sup> Ibid, p. 208.

## ***Lack of Transparency within the Defence Forces***

Tagarev defines the concept of transparency in the security sector as the state of affairs where the general public, including institutions such as the media and the parliament, hold information needed to maintain the legitimacy of the players in the security sector.<sup>367</sup> Transparency is of utmost importance to the civilian elite who possess the right to control the agents of the security sector, whether or not they have at their disposal the necessary information to make sound security policy decisions. Transparency is a key feature in a sound democracy and it is one of the most important factors that ensure success in the reforms of the security sector. Colston adds that “for countries in transition, as in the case of Bosnia, there is a further reason for defence reform; the need to adapt the defence sector to the requirements of a democratic state. Defence forces need to be organized and controlled by the democratically elected authorities of the state, taking account of the role of both government and parliament. Defence issues must be openly debated, not only within the military itself but also by the various political parties, NGOs and the media. The defence sector must be open, transparent, and fully accountable.”<sup>368</sup>

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<sup>367</sup> Tagarev, T., “Elaborating Policy for Transparency of Defense Procurement,” in *Transparency in Defense Policy, Military Budgeting and Procurement*, ed. Todor Tagarev, (Sofia: G.C. Marshall Association-Bulgaria, 2002), 85-86.

<sup>368</sup> *Ibid*, p. 16.

Transparency involves the sharing of information which impacts the ability of the players in the security sector to establish relationships with the various government agencies and departments, the media and the society at large. Therefore, the communication to and with the wider public is central in the effective working culture of the actors in the security sector. It is through transparency that the security sector can procure the decisions reached by the government on issues of national importance.<sup>369</sup>

Among the South-East Europe countries, Bosnia included, the concept of transparency is challenging due to the fact that the societies in these countries are divided and the actors in the security sector not easily held to account. In the security and defence policies of the defence forces in Bosnia for instance, myths and the culture of secrecy prevail. The security and defence policy of a country may be considered transparent only if the elected leaders are cognizant of the goals of the policy, and the means to achieve the goals including the cost of sustaining the means.<sup>370</sup>

In summary, the lack of unity of command within the Bosnian defence forces and the high cost incurred in the country's military operations are all the symptoms of the absence of transparency in the national defence force. The entity forces are subservient to the agendas of their respective territorial sub-government and not

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<sup>369</sup> Ibid, Tagarev, p. 85 – 86.

<sup>370</sup> Ibid, Tagarev, p. 85 – 86.

the national interest at large: due to this they feel that they are not obligated to share intelligence information or to openly cooperate with the other entity forces.

## ***Conclusion***

Chapter Five has discussed how the ethnic division within the Bosnian defence forces impact on the security of the country. The segregation within the defence forces has invariably caused disunity; with each entity army taking the interest of their territory as being above those of the nation. This has entrenched negative ethnicity throughout the entire Bosnian society, as the people look up to the defence forces for protection. The entity defence forces are reluctant to work across the ethnic divide; they are distrustful to one another and only loyal to their territorial leader. This is a real threat to the potential stability of Bosnia.

Secondly, it has been established that due to the segregation of defence forces in Bosnia, there is a lack of unity of command in the national defence forces. The government is unable to create institutions that will oversee defence matters across the board as each entity doesn't support such an initiative. The entity forces regard unity of command in the defence force as giving up their territorial autonomy. This is dangerous to the security of the country as the interests of an entity may as well conflict with those of the nation and cause the parties to slide back into violence. This also means that the defence armies are not at the disposal of the nation state in the event of an act of aggression against Bosnia or if the country is called upon to participate in an international security mission.

Thirdly, it has been established that the segregation has degraded the international standing of Bosnia and Herzegovina defence forces. The governance of the security sector in Bosnia remains weak and is almost entirely reliant on the international community. This is why both the EU and NATO have placed benchmarks for progress through which the Bosnian defence forces must follow in order to receive membership into the organisations. Essentially all the effects of segregation discussed above are somewhat closely related. The lack of unity of command is a result of the lack of transparency; whereas these two in turn contribute to the high cost of operations.

## Chapter Six – CONCLUSION

The defence reform effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been extremely complex and has experienced many more difficulties and challenges than any other state, highlighting the importance of 'Defence' as a state function. The complex nature of the reform efforts can be attributed to the ethnic cleavages in the military, recent memories of a very violent war, an over politicised military structure inherited from the communist regime and the constitutional framework imposed by the international community and the Dayton Peace Accords.

The progress of defence reform in Bosnia is credited to the efforts by the international community. After bringing the conflicting parties in Bosnia to the negotiating table and drawing up the Dayton Peace Accord ratified in December 1995, the international community succeeded in stopping the bloodshed in the country. This would not be the end of involvement by the international community as it became increasingly clear that the attained peace had to be guarded. Thus the ongoing presence of international organisations in the country today. With the continued presence of the international organisations within its borders, Bosnia remains a long way from recovery from its destructive past. The country's constitution has allowed for the international community to play a leading role in nearly all levels of governance and while this is a good check to the ethnic tension that may arise if Bosnians are left to fend for themselves, it hardly bodes well for the country's future. The country must assume responsibility for its own destiny, in all sectors, including defence.



However, despite the efforts of the international community and the progress made in the reform of the armed forces toward entry into the European Union and NATO alliances, a significant obstacle remains. There has been little reconciliation among the ethnic entities and ethnicity remains central in the governance of the defence forces of Bosnia. This is reflected by the social dynamics of the larger Bosnian society where ethnicity plays a leading role in determining governance issues. Confronting the ethnic dilemma in the defence forces is not only crucial to achieving unity within the armed forces but also bringing about a social revolution to the larger Bosnian society. One such ethnic interest, characteristic of each entity army is a reluctance to cooperate with the other. They remain distrustful to one another and loyal only to their territorial leader. This dilemma is not limited to the armed forces; the major political parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina also remain formed along ethnic lines and support policies that only reflect the interest of their ethnic affiliations and not those of the country at large. The threat that this poses to the future stability of Bosnia cannot be overstated. Under these conditions, these political parties have become an obstacle to the achievement of the democracy that is much needed to improve the pace of reforms within the states defence forces. While some integration may appear at the senior levels in the defence ministry, the majority of the armed forces remain in barracks located within their ethnic community. Total integration is required not only to attain full NATO membership but is also the principle preventative for the resumption of hostilities.

The assertion of this thesis is that in ethnically divided countries such as Bosnia, the abolition of ethnically segregated armed forces in favour of one unified force is crucial to state viability and the lack of ethnic integration within the armed forces today contributes to the ongoing instability within Bosnia. The ethnic segregation of Bosnia's defence forces can be attributed to the separation of the entity armed forces that occurred during the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. The Dayton Peace Accords separated the entire population by creating zones of ethnic separation, thereby limiting contact between the warring factions and reducing the opportunity for ethnic violence. This separation has had long-term effects and does little to encourage social integration and reconciliation between the ethnic populace in both the military and government. It has caused even deeper ethnic cleavages and the potential for future ethnic conflict.

Ethnic tension and conflict is often motivated by underlying root causes that actually have little to do with ethnicity. In the case of Bosnia, it was rampant corruption and an outdated, Soviet-style, economic system that had begun to fail. Furthermore, it was also spill-over of nationalism from Serbia and then Croatia, and the fatal decision of others to secede.

When the leadership could no longer take care of the people, it stirred up ethnic fervour to distract from the fact that the state itself failed in its duties as a state. The people themselves lived in Bosnia together for decades without a care for who was Muslim and who was a Christian or an Orthodox. The disintegration of Yugoslavia was a top-down state collapse. It was perpetuated by a political leadership that did not recognise the core vulnerabilities of state institutions and

the rogue elements operating in the security forces, and politicised something that spun out of control very quickly. Bosnia and the Yugoslav model itself was not the cause of the disintegration. Historically, that region of the world with the exception of Kosovo has remained integrated despite racial and ethnic tensions. The version of Muslim radicalism that has gripped many other parts of the world did not affect the Balkans for various reasons. Thus, it was easier to cast differences aside because language and recent history were so similar. It was only the political manipulation of lingering tensions plus factors such as a slowing of economy and rising unemployment that allowed people to really believe that they were "different" from each other.

Bosnia is an interesting case because the formula that Tito used to keep the state integrated was the same formula that Milosevic used to tear it apart. The only difference was that Tito presided over a state that was viable because it was successful, whereas, Milosevic presided over a republic that was failing. Tito knew that the "ethnic card" would see the end of Yugoslavia, so he never played it. Milosevic clearly thought that it would save him from being held accountable for his failure as the country crumbled from within. Essentially, his way of 'spinning' his failure was to blame the minorities.

The tri-Presidency announced in 2001 the wish to join NATO and the European Union. This is a major incentive to increase state viability. Bosnia can enter Europe only as a functioning state. Therefore, before Bosnia can realise its aspirations of becoming part of integrated Europe and Euro-Atlantic institutions, it must work out its internal integration problems. The defence reform process has

had two symbolic meanings. First, providing security to Bosnian citizens is the most important political deliverable to the good of a state; this can be provided through a unified army. Second, NATO leaders are unwilling to speak to three different Ministers of Defence, and to cooperate with three different armies within the same country. With immense international effort, the reform of the military is moving in the right direction and is set to be the first unified state-level institution. Optimistically then, the Defence Reform process testifies to a gradual willingness of Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs alike to make the central state more viable.

The author's experience as a member of the peacekeeping force in both Bosnia and Kosovo reveal that in the memories of the people of Bosnia, war is still something very fresh. Ordinary people do not want it to happen again. On the local level, people want to feel safe and not to be subjects of discrimination. However, because of the grievances created by the war, there is still considerable mistrust between the various ethnic groups and people tend to believe that they will be safe only if they are led and protected by members of their own ethnic group.

The thesis concludes that it is time to advance integration and reconciliation more rapidly, so that Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian divisions are not so firmly entrenched. While Brigade headquarters are ethnically diverse, the subordinate infantry battalions are not. The challenge for Bosnia's strategic military leaders and defence officials therefore is to achieve diversity at all levels. Successful integration within the defence forces would provide a positive effect on the

remainder of Bosnian society. The key for success or failure lies with political and military leadership.

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