

Newcomers as Accessories:  
A Study of Basque and Catalan Autonomy Campaigns  
through Immigrant Integration Strategies

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## Abstract

This thesis examines the political autonomy campaigns of subnational entities. Subnational entities may be defined as political entities located below the state level whose members are connected through historic territories and socio-cultural identities.

Catalonia and the Basque Country are presented as the two case studies of this thesis and are approached with a comparative framework. From the outset, an examination of the Westphalian state structure of the international political system is provided, with particular emphasis on the political position of subnational entities. The thesis then utilises the contemporary phenomenon of international migration and explores the international immigration trends that affect Catalonia and the Basque Country. The potential tension at the intersection of international immigration and subnational autonomy campaigns is analysed, guided by the question of whether Catalonia or the Basque Country approach foreign immigration as a hindrance or a help to their political autonomy campaigns. The integration policies of Catalonia and the Basque Country are then assessed, as well as an analysis of the alternative political relations which Catalonia and the Basque Country have formed based upon the issue of foreign immigrant integration.

This thesis finds that although the sovereign state structure continues to dominate the international political system, Catalonia and the Basque Country demonstrate how subnational autonomy campaigns continue to be pursued. Furthermore, this thesis finds that Catalonia and the Basque Country have recently utilised the issue of foreign immigrant integration as a stratagem for enhancing their informal political competencies.

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The state is commonly conceived of as the primary unit by which the public understands and engages in political order. Those who are citizens of states vote, pay taxes and are bound to abide by civil law. States, in turn, act as their own political entities in the international sphere, engaging in official dialogue, signing treaties and representing the populations for whom they are responsible. Often, the state is regarded as the sole, legitimate authority of political power within a given territory. States have come to inhabit the popular imagination as something unified, something unequivocal. There are others, though, who would vehemently contend that the state is neither unified nor legitimate; those who would proclaim the modern state a hegemonic force which has asserted its dominance over all cultural, economic and political units of a territory. Some would go so far as to pronounce the state an illegitimate foreign invader which has actively sought to purge the population of reculant groups in order to advance the goal of national homogenisation.

While the modern state system continues to dominate the prevailing political understanding, there exist those who critically question the state as the essential sovereign. Such critics may be regarded as national minorities, as they identify with subdominant groups within the national territory. These national minorities are commonly regarded as irrational, acrimonious extremists who live in a bygone political reality. What is significant, however, is that though the formalisation of many Western states occurred over two centuries ago, there remain populations of 'dissidents' who continue to question the rightfulness of the current sovereign state and who still resist the state's intention of national homogenisation.

Throughout history there have been groups who unmistakably belong to political entities which are deemed politically illegitimate within the international political sphere. Some authors label these groups as 'stateless nationalities'<sup>1</sup>, others as 'historic nationalities'<sup>2</sup> and yet others as 'ethnoregionalists'<sup>3</sup>. While each term connotes its own meaning, each term draws attention to historic, ethnic and non-state identities which characterize these groups. In this thesis, the term 'subnationalists'<sup>4</sup> is used to describe

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<sup>1</sup> See Keating (2001).

<sup>2</sup> See Schrijver (2006).

<sup>3</sup> See DeWinter & Cachafeiro (2002).

<sup>4</sup> The author uses the term 'subnational' because, in comparison with the political competencies of the national entity, the competencies of Catalonia and the Basque Country are, essentially, below the state.

those populations who identify with a political entity which, firstly, does not have sovereign state status and, secondly, can be conceptualised as below the territorial and political scope of the sovereign state. Thus, this thesis classifies these political entities with which subnationalists identify as 'subnations', as they are situated beneath the commonly used phrase 'nation-state', in terms of territorial scope, political clout and administrative authority.

For centuries, subnational entities have been a thorn in the side of states because of their demand for extended political autonomy. Moreover, the appeal of and connection to subnational autonomy campaigns<sup>5</sup> have failed to fade away. Questions over the fate of subnational sovereignty and the rights of subnational peoples have been raised periodically over time (Keating, 2001) and though some issues have been addressed, the full extent of the subject has yet to be realised.

This thesis aims to highlight a recent point of contention for subnational autonomy movements: the phenomenon of international immigration. As subnational entities have traditionally invested in the preservation of their distinctive identities and the maintenance of political relationships with their respective states over time, relatively foreseeable political approaches have been developed. However, as the current era of globalisation has increased the international movement of goods, services and technology, so too has it generated an immense rise in the movement of peoples. Caught between sustaining political aspirations of autonomy within the bounds of historical borders and maintaining an effective relationship with the state, subnational entities have become further confronted with the challenge of the arrival of diverse immigrant populations; groups of people whom neither share a common culture with nor a political understanding of newly-settled subnational entities. This thesis, then, explores the phenomena of subnational autonomy campaigns alongside the current trends of foreign immigration<sup>6</sup>.

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Indeed, Colino (2009) states that the “autonomous communities possess a very limited role in the reform of the national federal constitution ...” (p. 263). While Catalonia and the Basque Country have significant autonomy within a range of social and administrative competencies, their formal competencies are, ultimately, of lower status in relation to the state level. Hence the prefix sub-.

<sup>5</sup> Subnational autonomy can be understood as the degree of self-governance allotted by the state to a subnational entity which may include jurisdictional rights of culture, defence, international relations, education, language, tax and policy participation within international the policy institutions such as the EU. See Roller & Sloat (2002).

<sup>6</sup> Foreign immigration can be defined as an incoming population who originate from outside of the

In order to engage more fully in this political intersection, two subnational case studies will be utilised: Catalonia and the Basque Country. These two subnational entities have had long histories of appealing to the state of Spain to work towards furthering their political autonomy aspirations. Chapter 2 of this thesis outlines a concise history of Catalonia and the Basque Country, lending particular attention to Catalan and Basque subnational identities and the formal and informal competencies which they currently operate.

The arrival of foreign immigrants into subnational territories poses both a theoretical and practical challenge to subnational entities. However, immigration is a vast area of research, even when limited to the contexts of Catalonia and the Basque Country. Many authors have studied the trends of immigration within the bounds of these historic territories<sup>7</sup> and have concentrated their research topics on rates of immigration, the contextual background of specific immigration flows and subnational populations' perceptions of foreign immigrant populations. Furthermore, research on Catalan and Basque subnational autonomy efforts have largely disregarded foreign immigration trends as having any relation to subnational autonomy campaigns. For example, many authors who write about European subnationalism popularly engage in topics such as subnational political activity at the supranational level<sup>8</sup>, policy transfer<sup>9</sup>, regionalism<sup>10</sup> and minority rights<sup>11</sup>. Taking into account the shifting demographics within Catalonia and the Basque Country, Chapter 3 examines the immigrant populations of Catalonia and the Basque Country by recounting the historical experience of immigration in these subnational entities and by exploring contemporary immigration rates. Chapter 3 also evaluates how Catalan and Basque subnational identities have been affected in times of high foreign immigration trends.

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receiving state and, for visa purposes, are not nationals originating from European Union (EU) states (Favell, 2009).

<sup>7</sup> Notably, Conversi (1997) and Shafir (1995).

<sup>8</sup> Supranational settings may be the EU or the United Nations (UN), for example. Refer to Downs (2002), Guibernau (2006), Jeffery (2000), Roller (2004) and Squires (1999).

<sup>9</sup> Refer to Davis (2009).

<sup>10</sup> European regionalism may be understood as a process of increased regional interdependence through the creation of institutions made to increase regional cooperation and integration (Downs, 2002).

<sup>11</sup> Refer to Kymlicka (2006) and Sasse (2006).



The arrival of foreign immigrants to subnational entities can be viewed as two separate processes. Firstly, foreign immigration can reveal a lack of territorial control of subnational entities, which allows immigrant movements to enter subnational territories without full limitation. Secondly, foreign immigration can challenge the continuation of subnational autonomy campaigns as subnational entities may become overwhelmed by the sheer scale of foreign immigration trends. There exists the risk, then, that the significant numbers of foreign immigrants could threaten Catalan and Basque autonomy campaigns, as this new demographic lacks the cultural and historical ties to the subnational entities, ties which Catalonia and the Basque Country depend on so deeply for the continuation of their autonomy campaigns.

In examination of how Catalonia and the Basque Country conceptualise foreign immigration trends in relation to their subnational autonomy campaigns, Chapter 4 explores the ways by which foreign immigrants have affected the stratagem of Catalan and Basque subnational autonomy efforts by analysing two sets of primary research sources. The first research source derives from the most recent integration policies of Catalonia and the Basque Country, which are examined using Durkheim's 'national ideal' theory. The second research source comes from a collection of strategic relationships which Catalonia and the Basque Country have recently formed, at both horizontal and vertical levels<sup>12</sup>, under the theme of immigrant integration, which are analysed using Baumgartner and Jones's (1993) 'venue shopping' theory. These strategic relationships will reveal how Catalonia and the Basque Country have used the touchstone issue of immigration as a formal competency by which further subnational autonomy is sought.

This research is important for two main reasons. Firstly, this thesis contributes to a lacuna in the academic literature; the intersection of the globalised phenomenon of migration and the fate of subnational autonomy campaigns. Furthermore, this thesis may serve as a valuable framework by which to research further contemporary issues at the intersection of subnational autonomy campaigns. By utilising contemporary, touchstone issues as a theoretical lens, further interpretations of subnational autonomy

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<sup>12</sup> Horizontal political relationships may be understood as the relations between subnational entities, whereas vertical political relationships may be understood as relations between subnational and national entities or relations between subnational and supranational entities. These terms are discussed in depth in Chapter 4.

campaigns may be examined.

In conclusion, this thesis applies the issue of foreign immigration as a lens through which to assess contemporary political strategies of Catalan and Basque autonomy campaigns. The thesis finds that Catalonia and the Basque Country have used the issue of foreign immigration as a way of strengthening their integration policies and increasing their alternative political relations, with the aim of intensifying their informal political competencies. While formal competencies of immigration policy remain solely under the jurisdiction of the state<sup>13</sup>, Catalonia and the Basque Country have been able to substantially develop their informal political competencies, including increased institutional measures at the subnational level of advanced immigrant integration policies and increased venue shopping practices. Finally, the thesis posits that the expansion of informal political competencies has increased the subnational autonomy of Catalonia and the Basque Country and that by examining these informal competencies, testament is given to the rise and changing tactics of Catalan and Basque subnational autonomy campaigns.

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<sup>13</sup> As per the Spanish Constitution (1978).

## Chapter 2 - Subnationalism

Catalonia and the Basque Country have engaged in their respective subnational autonomy campaigns for many hundreds of years<sup>14</sup>. However, in order to conduct a thorough exploration of Catalan and Basque subnational autonomy campaigns, an understanding of the modern international political structure is necessary. This chapter begins with an examination of the Westphalian state model, offering a basic overview of how subnational entities came to be perceived after the inception of this modern state system. Next, a review of the general aims and strategies which subnational autonomy campaigns employ is presented. An outline of the historical experiences of Catalonia and the Basque Country within the state of Spain is then offered, including a description of the contrasting subnational identities of Catalonia and the Basque Country. Following on, the political structure of the Spanish state is briefly illustrated, lending particular attention to the inherently asymmetrical structure of Spain's autonomous community system. Finally, a summary of the political competencies allotted by the state to Catalonia and the Basque Country is outlined. By venturing from an examination of the organisation of the modern international political structure to the more specific facets of Catalan and Basque subnational identities and political competencies, this chapter presents the groundwork for understanding the historical and political realities of Catalonia and the Basque Country.

### A Westphalian world

The Treaty of Westphalia (1648)<sup>15</sup> is commonly cited as the precedent for the sovereign state system, whereby each political entity, and hence the entire population within each political entity, is ruled by a sovereign. The sovereign, then, may be understood as the centralised source of political power within a sovereign state, and each state's territory must be respected by the other sovereigns within this international political structure. Though the aim of the Treaty of Westphalia was to put

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<sup>14</sup> Catalonia has been cited as having begun its subnational autonomy campaign in 1716, in response to the inception of the *Nueva Planta*, and for the Basque Country in 1876 with the abolition of the *fuero* system (Shafir, 1995).

<sup>15</sup> The Treaty of Westphalia is the popular term for the collection of the two peace treaties of Osnabruck and Munsters (1648), respectively.

an end to the religious wars that raged throughout Europe in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, another, if not more powerful, occurrence resulted in effect of this treaty. The Treaty of Westphalia created the political precedent for an international political system which placed the sovereign state as the sole legitimate actor in the international political system<sup>16</sup>.

While the effect of the Treaty of Westphalia is commonly associated with the modern international political structure, also instrumental has been its influence in the domestic political sphere. As the treaty resulted in establishing the normative political principles in the international sphere, also powerful was the notion of a single political sovereign ruling over a given territory (McGrew, 2006). This treaty, then, created a domestic political norm wherein a sole sovereign would attain political legitimacy at the international level. Political campaigns at the domestic level rapidly unfolded throughout the following centuries, whereby the cultural, economic and political realities of vast territories and populations were targeted by homogenising efforts<sup>17</sup> of the sovereign state (Anderson, 1991). The logic followed that in the aim of creating reputable political order, modern states needed to be established. These modern state-building projects often accompanied the active eradication of subnational entities, often with repressive measures such understood as a necessary to create a modern sovereign state. Accordingly, local identities became differentiated from the state's ideal and became perceived as dissident. Thus, subnational entities, and those who identified with them, became relative enemies of the state, in that they obstructed the state's objective of a homogenous political territory and population.

As the political imagination became informed by the Westphalian, state-centred model, this structure, in effect, reinforced the power of the states with the paradigm of political legitimacy warranted solely to states. Therefore, a cyclical pattern emerged whereby sovereign states became the normative political entities in the international sphere, states then pursued nation-building campaigns in order to achieve sovereign authority over national territories to attain sovereign state status and lower-level political entities (e.g. national entities), which lacked the necessary might in resisting

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<sup>16</sup> Wherein the sovereign state became the recognised actor in the international political sphere, so too was a single sovereign model established in the domestic political spheres.

<sup>17</sup> Homogenising efforts have regularly been employed by states to standardise the cultural, economic and social realities of populations within state territories.

states' homogenising efforts, were suppressed and politically disregarded. Hence, the political power of subnational entities was regarded as illegitimate by the sovereign state and continued to be side-lined, while the populations who identified with these entities continued to feel unrepresented by, if not hostile towards, the sovereign state (Brightly, 1999).

Absent from the conventional understanding of the Westphalian state model is the assortment of entities which had significant political influence in the Treaty of Westphalia's endorsement which offered substantial support to the treaty's passing. Of those who signed the treaty and are described as sovereigns within the treaty are; Ferdinand III of Habsburg<sup>18</sup>, the prince of Suabia<sup>19</sup>, Louis XIV of France, the duke of greater Silesia<sup>20</sup> and the senator of Venice, to name a few. These representatives, who within the Treaty of Westphalia are acknowledged as sovereigns, give testament to the capability of an international political system characterised by diverse political entities, as these sovereign entities were characterized by subnational, national and supranational political realities. However, this very treaty created the political norm whereby only states were held as the legitimate political entities within the modern political system.

The contemporary political imagination, then, has forgotten about the political legitimacy and historical relevance of a system of diverse political entities when the Treaty of Westphalia is reference in defense of the modern sovereign state system. Likewise, the Treaty of Westphalia, by leaving precedence for the modern political norms, works as the normative text to dismiss the political aspirations of diverse political entities, such as the autonomous aspirations of subnational entities. Thus, while those addressed in the Treaty of Westphalia were more often representatives from supranational and subnational entities than national entities, this document has shaped the norm of the international, state-centric political system and has informed the pursuits of countless state-building projects. The diverse political realities of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, then, lie in stark contrast to the contemporary political structure of the

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<sup>18</sup> At the time of the treaty's signing, Ferdinand III of Habsburg was the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire.

<sup>19</sup> A territory which is presently located in Baden-Wurttemberg lander of Germany.

<sup>20</sup> A territory which is presently makes up a region spanning southwestern Poland, eastern Germany and northern Czech Republic.

international system and the principles taken from the Treaty of Westphalia have, and continue to, act as a barrier to the political aspirations of subnational entities.

### **The persistence of subnational entities**

Historically, subnational entities have played a significant role in the configuration of political landscapes. However, with the advent of the sovereign state model, subnational entities have been subjected to domestic forms of colonisation. The most prolific among international colonisers<sup>21</sup> typically carried out internal homogenising activities before engaging in the international colonization campaigns. Thus, while many colonialist states have been popularly imagined as having a unified identity, they in fact were the most ardent of colonisers in their domestic sphere. Yet, although the actions of states to homogenise their domestic political territories and populations were vast in scale, local identities persisted. These local identities, which have often been presented as thorns in the side of nation-state aspirations, have been addressed by authors in diverse reactions. Anderson (1991), for example, cites authors such as Hobsbawm and Weber who defended nation-building projects for the standardization of cultures within a nation-state. Other authors, however, have questioned how after so many centuries of state-directed standardisation policies, subnational identities have been able to persist. Anderson (1991) states that even with all the endeavors of central state governments, including unified language policies and standardised educational systems, diverse subnational identities have continued to exist in nearly every modern state.

Political science authors direct to two theoretical bases for the persistence of subnational identities within modern sovereign states. Some authors draw attention to the legacy of historical injustice<sup>22</sup> directed by sovereign states towards subnational entities. Often, social histories of past injustices are passed down throughout generations within subnationalist discourses. These historic, subnationalist discourses have been identified by several authors who interpret subnationalist discourses and

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<sup>21</sup> For example, France, Spain and the United Kingdom (UK).

<sup>22</sup> Historical injustice may be understood as those acts, perceived by subnational entities, which states have carried out in order to limit a subnation's political autonomy, such as the prohibition of the use of a subnational language or the direct removal of subnational political institutions.

find that each subnation's historic discourse varies on a gradient of how antagonistically<sup>23</sup> the sovereign state is perceived. Other authors, such as Barber, go further and assert that subnationalist identities are archaic forms of culturo-political identities, which Barber deems illegitimate on all accounts and have no basis on platforms of historic injustice.

Conversi (1995) describes an 'antagonistic' identity as an identity which is more often found in subnational populations who lack an obvious cultural distinction from the mainstream state's culture. Those populations with strong 'antagonistic' identities tend to operate in societies characterized by social exclusivity and commonly have hostile sentiments towards outsiders<sup>24</sup>. Following on from subnational identities characterised by social exclusivity, is the high value placed on ethnic purity to which some subnational entities ascribe. Conversi (1997) and Shafir (1995) assert that some subnational entities are particularly lacking in cohesive cultural tools (such as a distinct language) and, thus, place a high value on the ethnic purity of the subnational entity's population. Moreover, Barber (1992) finds these forms of subnational identities as archaic and resistant towards all forms of modernisation.

The academic literature offers a further explanation to the continuation of subnational identities. Many authors point to specific cultural distinctions of some subnational identities as the reason for the persistence of subnational entities. Conversi (1997) judges language as the strongest marker of cultural distinction, which he claims helps to hold the subnational community together. Folch-Serra & Nogue-Font (2004) assert that a culture of civic participation is also a highly valuable subnational marker. In Folch-Serra & Nogue-Font's (2004) argument, the strength of local civic and cultural institutions relates to the engagement of the civil society, which in turn dictates the aptitude of subnational autonomy campaigns. This type of subnational identity is commonly found as being culturally secure enough to operate societies characterised by inclusivity, wherein the subnational entity is secure enough to operate in the modern world while maintaining its unique identity characteristics (Conversi, 1997, Shafir, 1995).

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<sup>23</sup> 'Antagonist' identities may be defined as culturo-political identities which hold a strong point of difference with the sovereign state.

<sup>24</sup> As a result of the legacy of internal colonisation, these groups are prone to antagonism towards most outsiders.

As subnational entities vary in identity, so too do they vary in political ambition. Indeed, McGarry, Keating & Moore (2006) explain that the political aspirations of subnational entities are manifold in nature, ranging from symbolic subnational movements to full-scale subnational succession. While political aspirations may be diverse, one common thread that narrates all subnational political campaigns is the goal of political recognition at the international level. A popular interpretation of this goal is the desire of subnational entities to have equal political standing with nations. Gottlieb (1993) labels this notion the 'nations plus states' model, wherein "... the state keeps the power over its territory but not necessarily over all the people or [sub]nations inhabiting its territory" (in Beylerian, 1995-96, p. 164). This new recognition of political sovereignty would distinguish sovereignty as the political representation of populations from territorial sovereignty. This model would allow the present state system to be extended to include "a system of nations and peoples that are not organised territorially into independent states" (Gottlieb, 1993, p. 36). While the 'nations plus states' supposition has been regularly cited in the academic literature, it is not abstract in nature. Indeed, Giordano & Roller (2002) explain how one of Catalonia's main political parties, the CiU<sup>25</sup>, aims for Catalonia to attain "... political and administrative autonomy *within* the Spanish state" (my emphasis, p. 105).

The main aim of the 'nations plus states' model is for the international political community to pay official recognition to non-state political entities, such as subnational entities, so that these political entities may have political representation in international negotiations and equal participation in transnational organisations (Beylerian, 1995/1996). The importance of international political participation is also in line with Kerremans' (1996) assertion that only by participation in decision-making networks can a political actor participate in and contribute to international political outcomes. Similarly, Nagel (2004) finds that Catalan leaders are, largely, keen to participate in EU policy-making and do not have an independence agenda.

The way in which subnational entities campaign for their political aspirations is subject to their relationship with the central state, the coherence of the subnational

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<sup>25</sup> The CiU is a subnationalist political party in Catalonia, established in 1980 and run, for many years, by Jordi Pujol.



population, as well as various other factors. Necessary in all functional subnational campaigns, though, is a unifying political stance holding subnational projects together and propelling them forward. This united position is often associated with particular subnational identities. Of course, subnational identities may derive from specific local values which give a subnational entity a point of difference from the state and guide it to seek enhanced political autonomy. These subnational identities, whether acting as a point of difference from the state or not, play an instrumental role in the direction of the political autonomy campaigns of each subnation. The next section will explore the historical backgrounds of Catalonia and the Basque Country, illustrating the particular identities which distinguish these subnational entities from the Spanish state. An understanding of these subnational identities will guide the reader in comprehending the history of immigration of Catalonia and the Basque Country and the different ways in which each subnation has intersected with immigrant populations.

### **Catalan and Basque histories and identities within Spain**

For many centuries, the Iberian Peninsula existed as an amalgamation of several coexisting, politically autonomous entities. Classified as a Visigoth territory from the 5<sup>th</sup> to 8<sup>th</sup> centuries and a Moorish territory until the *Reconquista* in 1492, Castilian-controlled Spain did not appear in any real substance until the monarchy of Queen Isabella and King Ferdinand II (Brighty, 1999). From 1492, Spain gained recognition as a modern state and quickly acquired sovereign state characteristics, such as active homogenising efforts in the subnational entities within the Spanish territory. By the early 18<sup>th</sup> century, the Bourbon monarchy advanced a number of proclamations<sup>26</sup> dictating a more unified Spanish state (Conversi, 1997). However, while the state of Spain employed homogenising efforts aimed at constructing a centralised state, subnational entities enacted their own efforts to retain their socio-political identities. This section outlines concise histories of Catalonia and the Basque Country, lending particular attention to each subnational entities' cultural and political identities.

Catalonia has endured a long history of campaigning for subnational autonomy.

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<sup>26</sup> These proclamations are popularly known as the *Nueva Planta*.

Existing as an autonomous political entity in coexistence with numerous Iberian kingdoms for several centuries, Catalonia enjoyed a far-reaching reputation for its advanced mercantile society. Its progressive identity extended broadly and was responsible for influencing the cultural landscapes of the surrounding regions of northeastern Spain, as well as southern France, the Balearic Islands and Sardinia (Conversi, 1997).

Catalan society was characterised by a unique language, customs, laws and wealth in the arts and literature. Furthermore, Catalonia has long been organised by advanced political institutions based on staunch democratic values and administrative systems. A relationship of partnership alongside Castile and other political entities within the Spanish territory (such as the Basque Country and Galicia) existed until 1716, when the *Nueva Planta* was declared (Conversi, 1997). Issued by the first Bourbon monarch, Philip V, the *Nueva Planta* aimed to centralise the administration of the entire Spanish territory. More specifically, this decree aimed at eradicate subnational identities which had not fully conformed to Castilian hegemony. By banning the use of the Catalan language and its autonomous institutions, the *Nueva Planta* aimed at suppressing Catalan political autonomy<sup>27</sup> and cultural identity<sup>28</sup>. For Catalonia, the domineering relationship from Castile onto Catalonia continued, on and off, until the death of Francisco Franco in 1975.

In spite of the efforts to eradicate Catalan autonomy and identity, two main threads of Catalan identity can explain its cultural and political perseverance. The first thread is the strength of Catalonia's economy. Although, starting from the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Madrid took over the administration and taxation of Catalan industrial efforts, Catalonia continued to be the industrial capital of Spain, maintaining a highly efficient and technologically advanced industrialised system (Newhouse, 1997). Not only had Catalonia's advanced economic and industrial base been the envy of central Spain, but a strong connection was created between Catalonia and the more industrially-advanced northern Europe<sup>29</sup> (Conversi, 1997; Giordano & Roller, 2002; Keating,

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<sup>27</sup> For example, the shutting down of Catalan institutions and the overtaking of Catalonia's administrative and tax systems (Conversi, 1997; Laitan, 1997; Shafir, 1995).

<sup>28</sup> For example, a restriction on Catalan language in Catalonia's business and administrative sectors and prohibitions on the use of Catalan in the public sphere.

<sup>29</sup> A connection whereby Catalans more similar to northern European both economically *and* culturally,

2001; Laitan, 1997).

The second thread by which Catalan identity has been able to persevere through the attempted homogenisation efforts of the state of Spain is the continued usage of the Catalan language, through which Catalan cultural characteristics are believed to be transmitted (Eaude, 2007). From book burning to the enforcement of Castilian language in all municipal signs, subnational language eradication had been a common weapon used by the Spanish state against Catalan society (Conversi, 1997). However, Catalan is exceptional in that although it has always been a minority language within the Spanish state, it has maintained a high status in an exceedingly diglossic<sup>30</sup> environment. Thus, Catalan remained the predominant language in Catalonia and has remained that way; evidenced by current Catalan comprehension above 99% (Idescat, 2010)<sup>31</sup>. For Catalonia, then, its language has been, and continues to be, the essential building-block of subnational identity (Conversi, 1995).

Folch-Serra and Nogue-Font (2004) argue that through the entrenched engagement of Catalan civil society, cultural and political identities became important themes around which Catalan people united. Thus, Folch-Serra & Nogue-Font (2004) assert that “Catalan identity has been shaped through time by its civil society institutions” (p. 157). Indeed, for the Catalan case, the subnationalist projects were driven through cultural institutions at the civil society level. The importance of cultural institutions became evident when the Spanish monarchy began abolishing Catalonia's political competencies, beginning in 1716 with the *Nueva Planta*. As Folch-Serra and Nogue-Font (2004) explain, the activities of the cultural *Renaixença*<sup>32</sup> of the 18<sup>th</sup> century helped to promote a re-birth in Catalan culture through local institutions and civil society”. Indeed, Catalan subnational cultural activities were a key thread in keeping Catalan identity in existence throughout so many centuries of cultural and political oppression.

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compared with mainstream Spain.

<sup>30</sup> Diglossia may be understood as the existence of two languages within a society, wherein one of the languages is of higher status (Conversi, 1997).

<sup>31</sup> A 2009 census found that of the Catalan population, 99% understood the language, 95% spoke Catalan, 89% could read in Catalan and 76% could write in Catalan (Idescat, 2010).

<sup>32</sup> The cultural *Renaixença* is a period in Catalan history (ranging from the early 18<sup>th</sup> century to the mid 20<sup>th</sup> century) when Catalan language, arts and history were actively promoted by the intellectual elite and subnationalist leaders of Catalonia (Folch-Serra & Nogue-Font, 2004).

As Catalan civil society continuously engaged in autochthonous cultural activities, these social interactions acted as “... fully fledged bearers of [subnationalist] ideology, later [constituting] the ideological basis for a political movement of self-determination” (Folch-Serra & Nogue-Font, 2004, p. 164). Thus, while cultural, linguistic and political activities in Catalonia were kept, for the most part, underground until the end of the Franco regime in 1975, these continuous autochthonous, underground activities sustained the political values of Catalonia.

The Basque Country is a further subnational entity which has experienced a lengthy political autonomy campaign, although many<sup>33</sup> would argue its journey has been considerably more complex than the Catalan case. The Basque territory is comprised of seven provinces, four of which are located in Spain and are collectively known as the Basque Autonomous Community and Navarre, and three of which are located in France, known collectively as the Northern Basque Country. This thesis explores only the subnational autonomous situation of the Basque Autonomous Community, which will be referred to throughout the thesis as the Basque Country. From the outset, then, the Basque subnation spans two modern states; a territorial situation which has little hope in ever garnering absolute political sovereignty. Furthermore, the Basque identity is of particular distinction, and has been dated back to the 7<sup>th</sup> century (Conversi, 1997). The unique cultural identity of the Basque has been traced by the Basque language, *Euskara*, which bares no linguistic relation to the Indo-European romantic language family of the surrounding areas, but instead belongs to a *pre*-Indo-European language family (Woodworth, 2007). Due to its territorial location and cultural distinction, then, the Basque Country has long been viewed as an obstacle to the state-making processes (Conversi, 1997).

Unlike Catalan political autonomy, which was severely disabled by the *Nueva Planta* in 1716, the Basque Country was largely unaffected by Castilian political hegemony until the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century when, in 1876, the Castilian monarchy abolished the Basque autochthonous administrative and social structures, known as the *fueros*<sup>34</sup>.

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<sup>33</sup> Such as Conversi (1997) and Shafir (1995).

<sup>34</sup> The Basque *fiero* system was an autochthonous administrative structure of local charters dating back to the 7<sup>th</sup> century and which enabled a functional rural noble class, and thus the traditional social

Also during this time, the Basque Country experienced major international investment and industrialisation, permitted by the Bourbon monarchy (Conversi, 1997). Foreign investment and industry ownership flooded the Basque Country, as investors were attracted to the entity's significant supply of natural ore<sup>35</sup>. As new populations and rising industry transformed the Basque Country, most native Basques did not materially benefit, particularly in the rural regions. In fact, much of what resulted from this major shift in the Basque Country was an increase in immigrants<sup>36</sup>, the introduction of an economic system modeled after capitalism and the destruction of the Basque *fuero* structure.

Because external forces did not transform the Basque Country until the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, Basque political autonomy movements began much later than their Catalan counterparts. Beginning in the 1880s, Basque subnational autonomy efforts started in the form of cultural identity establishment<sup>37</sup>. Sabino Arana is the figure who is popularly praised as the sole author and predominant activist of formalised Basque identity and political thought. Arana has been credited for establishing the earliest recorded Basque political ideology, standardising the several dialects of Euskara, establishing the Basque Country's first political party, the PNV, among other subnational characteristics. Indeed, an understanding of Arana's cultural and political ideologies offers significant insight into popular Basque ideology, as Arana's cultural and political contributions to Basque identity continue to influence the culturo-political landscape of the Basque Country.

The history of Basque identity is integral in understanding its exclusive nature. Three main factors contribute to its exclusive disposition. As previously mentioned, Basque livelihood fundamentally changed as a result of external economic interference<sup>38</sup>. External interference from central Spain resulted in a swell in Castilian immigrants.

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structure, of the Basque Country (Conversi, 1997; Shafir, 1995).

<sup>35</sup> Natural iron ore is an essential ingredient in the production of steel. The late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries witnessed a considerable demand of steel for the arms and shipping industries (Conversi, 1997).

<sup>36</sup> At this time in history, 'immigrants' mainly arrived from central (Castilian) Spain.

<sup>37</sup> Historically, Basque autochthonous cultural was very diverse. For example, *Euskara* existed in several divergent spellings (Conversi, 1997).

<sup>38</sup> External economic interference within the Basque Country came, largely, from central Spain. With the establishment of prominent Spanish industrial firms, the autochthonous Basque economic and social framework became fractured.

Furthermore, the Spanish state implemented a deliberate de-institutionalisation programme of the *fueros*. As the late 19<sup>th</sup> century Basque Country witnessed immigrants arriving in droves, mainly to work in proletariat-style mining positions, they brought with them Castilian culture and language. As *Euskara* was so different from the Spanish language, few immigrants took up the autochthonous language. Moreover, a mass exodus to the Basque urban centres took place, which resulted in overcrowded and polluted conditions in several areas throughout the Basque Country. All of these events resulted in the loss of traditional Basque culture, an abolition of the autochthonous institutional structure and a Castilian language assimilation of the Basques. These events were perceived by newly-formed Basque subnationalists as examples of the Spanish state implementing an eradication of Basque identity, and subsequently subnational political autonomy<sup>39</sup>.

One of Arana's significant contributions to Basque subnationalist identity was his classification of the Basque people. In his writings, Arana described the Basque people as ethnically<sup>40</sup> distinct from, and superior to, all other Spaniards, including those from other historical entities<sup>41</sup> (Shafir, 1995). Indeed, Arana believed that for someone to identify as Basque, they must have a minimum amount of direct descendants of Basque ancestry. Arana viewed the rapid industrialisation of the Basque Country, and the subsequent wave of immigration, as the root cause of the loss of traditional Basque identity (Conversi, 1997). Hence, as *Euskara* had proven to be a weak point for Basque subnational identity<sup>42</sup>, Arana used the marker of ethnic purity as "... a defensive barrier to prevent the corruption of Basque values and culture from external encroachment" (Conversi, 1997, p. 61)<sup>43</sup>. Indeed, it is this exclusive style of subnational identity, based upon ethnocentric and anti-modernist values which cause authors such as Barber (1992) to dismiss subnational entities as archaic and

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<sup>39</sup> Indeed, Basque subnationalists perceived the economic, political and social events of the 19<sup>th</sup> century as an occupation of the Basque Country by the state of Spain (Conversi, 1997).

<sup>40</sup> It has been difficult for Basque subnationalists to define the characteristics of an 'ethnic' Basque. In the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, racial-markers were utilised, as was popular at the time of emerging pseudo-science. Basque identity continued to be on a 'racialised' basis until the atrocities of World War II when the use 'race' as separating certain groups of people became politically unacceptable. At this time, the ethics behind 'racial' markers came into question and its popularity fell (Conversi, 1997). More recently Basque ethnicity has been identified along Basque family names.

<sup>41</sup> Such as the Catalans and the Galicians.

<sup>42</sup> Current *Euskara* usage remains at around 30% (Gobierno Vasco, 2010).

<sup>43</sup> Indeed, Arana was fully against the cultural assimilation of immigrants in the Basque Country, as Arana believed a dilution of Basque identity would result.

illiberal.

Historical perceptions and subnationalist identity-creation largely mark the formation of Basque cultural and political identity. Indeed, Arana's pivotal position as the first Basque subnationalist has had a major impact on the Basque people and his particular belief-system created a significantly exclusive subnational identity for the Basque Country. This exclusive identity continued throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, increasing in intensity throughout the dictatorships of General Primo de Rivera and General Franco<sup>44</sup>. As the recent democratisation of Spain has resulted in the most political autonomy the Basque Country has seen for over a century, the exclusive legacy of Basque subnationalist identity continues to have some influence on modern Basque society<sup>45</sup>.

### **An asymmetric state structure**

Following the death of General Franco in 1975, the responsibilities of the state were undertaken by King Juan Carlos and the task of drafting a new constitution was quickly carried out. However, the writing of the Spanish Constitution was by no means a straightforward endeavor as a major concern existed in how to address Spain's subnational autonomy complexities (Brighty, 1999). While many regions throughout Spain were culturally and politically aligned with Madrid, long-standing political sentiments within Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia persisted, and divergent degrees of sovereignty were desired.

As a result of the drafting of the Spanish Constitution, an asymmetric-decentralised political system was proposed, whereby seventeen regions within Spain were deemed 'autonomous communities' (Roller, 2004). Moreover, as a solution to the historico-political issues of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, these autonomous communities were granted 'historic nationality' status which, in effect, allotted these

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<sup>44</sup> General Miguel Primo de Rivera ruled Spain from 1923-1930, General Francisco Franco's dictatorship ruled from 1939-1975.

<sup>45</sup> Particularly, seen by the continued existence of extreme subnationalist political parties, such as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA).

entities increased political autonomy (Brighty, 1999)<sup>46</sup>. Colino (2009) explains that the logic behind Spain's reformed political structure was the creation of subnational autonomy, protected within a constitutional space, so that subnational entities could exist in more stable realities which would, in turn, ensure the central state could better manage subnational. Thus, all seventeen autonomous communities were granted a degree of autonomous political administration, with significant socio-economic and cultural autonomy reserved for the historic communities (Edwards, 1999).

Of considerable importance within the Spanish Constitution is its preliminary declaration:

The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it recognises and guarantees the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all (Spanish Senate, 1978, p. 3).

It is clear from the Constitution's preamble that while the Spanish state cedes significant autonomy to the historic nationalities, all of Spain is to be fully understood as a unified nation. This declaration can be interpreted as a political message to subnationalists: we might recognise your autonomy, but we maintain absolute sovereignty.

An examination of particular policy areas gives great insight for gauging various status levels between the different political levels. For example, under the Spanish Constitution, only the state (the national level) is responsible for the policy areas of "defense, armed forces, international relations, immigration, monetary system and the administration of justice" (Edward, 1999, p. 671). These competencies may be deemed high-status in policy scope, as these policies are aligned with the highest level of political structure; the determinants of state sovereignty. As determinants of state sovereignty include issues of territory, legitimate force and sovereign authority, the competency areas of the state may be reflected in those sovereignty determinants.

There are also competencies shared between the state and the subnational entities, including labour law, social security, culture and education (Edwards, 1999). These

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<sup>46</sup> This pseudo-federal political structure strategy was given the slogan *cafe para todos*, coffee for everyone, wherein each autonomous community was offered varying degrees of political autonomy to keep them satisfied (Brighty, 1999).



policy areas may be considered competencies in which both the national and the subnational levels have an invested interest, but which lack the key determinants of state sovereignty, thus allowing the subnational level to gain a degree of policy self-determination.

Finally, there are policy areas under direct subnational control. These policy areas include cultural heritage, tourism, social services and research (Edwards, 1999). Moreover, the historic communities such as Catalonia and the Basque Country have greater autonomy in these policy areas, compared with the autonomous communities. Policy areas under significant control by the historic communities include areas of civil law and language, for example. Furthermore, the Basque Country is the only subnational entity within Spain to hold substantial fiscal responsibilities, including tax management (Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country, 1979).

The amount of competencies granted to the subnational level, then, is related to the degree of devolution of the state. The Spanish political structure is particular as it aims to satisfy the political autonomy demands of the subnational entities. The formation of this asymmetric political structure was created with the intention of striking a balance between the sovereign responsibilities of the state and the political autonomy demands of the subnational entities. These subnational entities, especially Catalonia and the Basque Country, led the way for such political devolution to be granted. However, the political demands of Catalonia and the Basque Country have matured, largely in response to the evolving phenomena in the international sphere. In the next chapter, the thesis will engage in an area of international significance, by illustrating Catalonia and the Basque Country's experience of foreign immigration and exploring the current political competencies of these subnational entities concerning issues of foreign immigration.

### **Chapter 3 – Foreign Immigrants Meet Subnational Entities**

While there is a plethora of academic literature on international immigration movements and a significant amount of scholarship on subnational identities and political autonomy campaigns, little is written of the intersection of the two topics. This deficiency is curious as international migration trends are certainly entering subnational territories and, thus, affecting subnational socio-political landscapes. This chapter explores the foreign immigration patterns in Catalonia and the Basque Country, noting both historical and current immigration trends. Moreover, the perceptions of foreign immigrants in relation to subnational identity are discussed. This chapter goes on to examine the current subnational political competencies of immigration and explores the issue of why the competency of foreign immigration may be significant to Catalonia and the Basque Country. By analysing the patterns of foreign immigration affecting Catalonia and the Basque Country, an argument will be made that greater subnational political autonomy in the policy area of foreign immigration is necessary for the subnational entities of Catalonia and the Basque Country to maintain their subnational identities.

#### **Immigration background of Catalonia and the Basque Country**

Immigration trends in Catalonia and the Basque Country have occurred in different patterns and integration has, historically, been addressed in divergent approaches. An overview of historical immigration in Catalonia and the Basque Country will help to inform the manner in which immigrants have historically been perceived and the mode by which immigrants have been integrated into the respective subnations. In the following chapter, attention will be placed on current integration policies of Catalonia and the Basque Country and how the subnational identities have informed these integration policies.

Catalonia has experienced immigration trends for many centuries. Due to the strength of Catalonia's agriculture sector and textile manufacturing, the 18<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries witnessed constant growth in the Catalan economy. As the available Catalan

workforce became fully utilised early on and, thus, immigrants were needed to maintain the rising industrial output (Conversi, 1997). Immigrants to Catalonia largely came from Spain's poorer regions, such as Andalusia and Murcia, although immigrant populations also came from southern France (Conversi, 1997). Indeed in the early trends of immigration, Catalonia offered a life of economic prosperity and consisted of a culture which was not too dissimilar from immigrants' native cultures. Conversi (1997) asserts that for immigrants, moving to Catalonia was perceived as a positive experience, as learning Catalan was relatively simple and immigrants were encouraged to engage in the wide variety of Catalan cultural activities<sup>47</sup>. Furthermore, through the expectation of Catalan language acquisition, the social integration of immigrants was able to occur relatively quickly. Although the main source of Catalan subnationalist threat came from the Spanish state and its Castilianisation efforts, immigrants were never a popular target of racism or perceived as a threat to Catalan identity (Conversi, 1997). While most immigrants arrived in Catalonia speaking Spanish, they rapidly assimilated into Catalan life.

Trends in immigration changed significantly by the mid-1970s, turning more international in nature. This shift may be attributed to democratisation of Spain and the international trends affecting Spain. While the background has changed significantly, immigrant integration has remained relatively stable. Indeed, Catalonia remains a region of strong economic activity, with foreign immigrants attracted to Catalonia's tourism, domestic, construction and agricultural sectors (Cornelius, 2004). As of 2009, Catalonia is reported to have a general population 7.5 million. Of the general population, nearly 16% are documented as having been born in a foreign country (Idescat, 2010). The country of origin for the largest group of foreign immigrants is Morocco, with the second largest foreign immigrant group arriving from Romania and the third largest group originating from Ecuador<sup>48</sup> (Idescat, 2010).

Throughout its history, Catalonia has been referred to as the *terra de pas* (the land of

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<sup>47</sup> Catalan cultural activities may include festivals, hiking, choral groups, etc.

<sup>48</sup> Catalonia is reported to have 230,262 legal residents from Morocco, 87,000 legal residents from Romania and 84,170 legal residents from Ecuador, respectively (Idescat, 2010). Moroccans are so prevalent in Spain because of the close proximity of the two countries, Romanians have only recently come into Spain and their high immigrant rates are due to Romania's recent entrance into the EU. Finally, Ecuadorans are prevalent in Spain because of the poor economic situation in Ecuador and the socio-cultural relation of Spanish life.

passage), welcoming immigrants into both its economic and social spheres (Conversi, 1997). The combination of its long migrant-receiving history and its robust subnational identity, prominent Catalan figures<sup>49</sup> have popularly insisted that if one works in Catalonia and speaks Catalan, one is a Catalan (Cardús i Ros, 2005; Conversi, 1997; Kymlicka, 2001; Shafir, 1995). The emphasis on identity in Catalonia, then, has traditionally been placed on language acquisition and civic engagement. Even after centuries of central state efforts to eradicate Catalan identity, with particular efforts leveled at the Catalan language, the Catalan language continued to be used as the primary spoken language throughout Catalonia. This unceasing persistence of the Catalan language has created a new identity for Catalonia; a certain confidence that the autochthonous identity will remain the dominant identity within the Catalan territory, resulting in a lack of threat from the foreign immigrant populations (Conversi, 1997).

Just as the Basque subnational autonomy campaign developed many years after the formation of the Catalan subnational autonomy project, significant immigration to the Basque Country also arrived much later. Immigrants first arrived en masse to the Basque Country in the 1880s, when the region was opened up to large-scale ore mining and steel production (Conversi, 1997). During this period, immigrants (mainly young men in search of full-time employment) came from Castilian-dominated territories within Spain. As *Euskara* was a distinct language to Spanish and because its use amongst Basques was already waning, few immigrants bothered to acquire the language as, unlike in Catalonia, it was an unnecessary factor in gaining employment.

Moreover, as integration within Basque society was popularly formed along 'ethnic' lines, immigrants were not able to access Basque identity, and thus were not able to fully integrate as Basques. Basque identity was heavily guarded, with few, in any, exceptions for a non-Basque person to be considered a Basque or participate in the Basque subnational autonomy efforts. A social tension between native Basques and immigrants then emerged. Barriers to integration, caused by the guarded Basque identity, made it so that immigrants were unable to access Basque identity, such as language and participation in Basque cultural events, leading to a further

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<sup>49</sup> For example, Francisc Candel Tortajada and Jordi Pujol.

Castilianisation of the Basque Country. This cyclical process of a protectionist Basque identity, leading to the alienation of immigrant populations, resulting in the non-integration or uptake of Basque culture by immigrants led to the weakening of a Basque identity. As compared to Catalonia, then, the Basque Country has historically been defensive of its subnational cultural identity in relation to immigrants (Shafir, 1995). This defensive nature of Basque identity, related to the historical experience of Castilian influence and the popular subnational ideology of Sabino Arana, has continued to disadvantage the Basque Country in its foreign immigrant integration efforts (Conversi, 1997).

While internal<sup>50</sup> immigration has been a major phenomenon within the Basque Country, foreign immigration has not been as substantial. As of 2006, the general population of the Basque Country was 2,129,339. Of the general population, approximately 4.5% were foreign-born<sup>51</sup>. Although foreign immigrants do not constitute a major demographic within the Basque Country, general immigration (including internal immigration) has had significant influence on the Basque Country and has been partly attributed to the loss of traditional Basque culture and autonomous institutions (Conversi, 1997).

### **Subnational immigration competencies**

As discussed in Chapter 2, neither the autonomous communities of Spain nor the historic nationalities retain immigration policy competencies. Due, largely, to the Westphalian principle of the sovereign state maintaining national territories, the Spanish state continues to hold sole authority of immigration policy. The reserved right of the state concerning immigration policy can be found in Article 49.2 in the Spanish Constitution which states that areas of citizenship law, immigration and emigration and general foreigner status are invested only at the national level (Davis, 2009; Roller, 2004).

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<sup>50</sup> Internal immigration may be understood as migration deriving from greater Spain. Internal immigrants largely identified with Castilian culture.

<sup>51</sup> Of the 96,000 foreign immigrants in the Basque Country, 23,423 are immigrants from the EU and 72,398 are non-EU immigrants (Gobierno Vasco, 2010).

All people<sup>52</sup>, however, are able to travel freely throughout Spain, moving from one autonomous community to the next. This freedom of movement includes foreign immigrants, moving throughout the entirety of Spain. Given the particularities of formal and informal labour markets, migrants have tended to live and work in specific autonomous communities, with Catalonia attracting the most foreign immigrants<sup>53</sup>. While Catalonia receives the highest level of foreign immigrants in comparison to other Spanish autonomous communities, the Spanish state retains all foreign policy and immigration policy competencies, leaving Catalonia with no authority to create its own foreign policy or immigration policy. Therefore, while Catalonia experiences the largest trends of foreign immigrant populations, it does not enjoy the political authority to create or influence the international trends affecting its territory at a greater degree than the other autonomous communities within Spain. Some authors, such as Guidaeron & Lahav (2000), identify this contradiction as a source of further political autonomy aspiration by subnational entities.

Although the subnational entities of Spain lack the responsibility of immigration competencies, under the Spanish Constitution these entities have the authority to create and fulfill *integration* competencies. Some subnational entities, such as Catalonia and the Basque Country, have taken hold of this competency and have developed robust integration policies. In the next chapter, the thesis argues that Catalonia and the Basque Country have devoted extensive efforts in the creation and promotion of their respective integration policies which the thesis regards as a strategy for these subnational entities to exert some level of sovereignty over a foreign demographic which has the potential to limit subnational identity and political autonomy campaigns. This thesis argues that the significant undertaking of integration policy is not simply used by subnational entities who receive disproportionately high rates of immigrants, but as a tactical strategy whereby the subnations of Catalonia and the Basque Country exert a degree of political autonomy which they use to promote their subnational political campaigns both within their territory and at large<sup>54</sup>.

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<sup>52</sup> Subject to legal immigration status, of course.

<sup>53</sup> Catalonia attracts many foreign immigrants due to its large construction, agriculture and domestic labour markets. Furthermore, these fields of work constitute the bulk of the Catalan informal labour sector.

<sup>54</sup> Catalan and Basque subnational autonomy campaigns may also be found in the wider international context, such as the EU. Chapter 4 will explore this international campaign strategy.

There is a high degree of academic attention paid to the transition of identity from receiving societies to foreign populations within the national context. Indeed, Favell (2009) states that “nearly every European nation-state has formulated in recent years a policy on 'integration' of immigrants that reflects mainly nation-building concerns about imparting national culture and values to newcomers...” (p. 175). This line of logic, then, may be extended to the subnational entities, whereby the dissemination of autochthonous identities is even more crucial, as the cultural cohesion of subnational populations is pivotal in maintaining the existence and advancement of subnational autonomy campaigns (Kymlicka, 2001). The next chapter continues this examination of integration policies and begins by applying Durkheim’s theory of the ‘national ideal’ to the integration policies of Catalonia and the Basque Country. By demonstrating how Catalonia and the Basque Country use integration policies to promote their respective subnational identities, this thesis purports that the promotion of subnational identities assists in the maintenance and advancement of the respective subnational political autonomy campaigns.

## Chapter 4 - Empirical Framework

This chapter is divided into two contemporary theories, Durkheim's 'national ideal' theory and Baumgartner and Jones's 'venue shopping' theory. The aim of using these two theories is to examine the themes of Catalonia and the Basque Country's integration policies and the extent of informal political competency activities in which Catalonia and the Basque Country are involved. Firstly, Durkheim's 'national ideal' theory is discussed and this theory is applied to two sets of integration policy, Catalonia's *Citizenship and Immigration Plan 2005-2008*<sup>55</sup> and the Basque Country's *Immigration Plan 2006-2009*. The second section of this chapter illustrates Baumgartner and Jones's 'venue shopping' theory and applies this theories to examples of informal policy relationships in which Catalonia and the Basque Country are involved. Some of these relationships are deemed horizontal; a term used for relationships at the same political level, namely subnational-subnational. Other relationships are deemed vertical; a term used to classify relationships at different political levels, namely subnational-supranational<sup>56</sup>. These two sections aim, then, to demonstrate how Catalonia and the Basque Country sustain their subnational identities while at the same time, expand their informal competencies in order to advance their subnational political autonomy campaigns.

### Durkheim's 'national ideal' theory

Emile Durkheim's<sup>57</sup> theory of the 'national ideal' is utilised to analyse the integration theories of Catalonia and the Basque Country. Durkheim asserted that for a nation to become its ideal interpretation, a society must actively work to enhance its institutional structure and moral merit (Guibernau, 2006). The concept of a 'national ideal' evolved from Durkheim's notion of the 'human ideal', which purports that an individual strives throughout its life to become the optimum version of herself or

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<sup>55</sup> The term 'citizenship' and/or 'immigration plan' is a rough translation for 'integration plan'. When 'immigration' plans of Catalonia and the Basque Country are referred to, they are to be understood as 'integration' plans.

<sup>56</sup> Of course, subnational-national relations also exist in venue-shopping examples. However, the focus of vertical relations in this thesis will concentrate on subnational-supranational political relations.

<sup>57</sup> Emile Durkheim, French sociologist (1858-1917).



himself, in both abilities and virtues (Guibernau, 2006). Durkheim purported that when individuals were able to realise their ideal incarnation, this phenomenon would be reflected in the society at large, whereby the greater society would, too, become a more capable version of itself. Durkheim suggested that instead of societies basing their prestige on wealth or territorial girth, societies would instead base their eminence on civil liberties, human rights, institutional efficiency and political pluralism (Guibernau, 2006).

Durkheim, then, deduced a reciprocal nature between the 'human' and 'nation' levels. For example, when individuals take up the duty of personal improvement, the respective society will be better off, as it will be populated by individuals actively working to better themselves. Likewise, when a society advances its democratic orientation and practices, such as by improving its policy effectiveness and political institutions, there is likely to be a positive influence on the individuals of that society. Therefore, a cyclical process exists whereby individuals and societies have the ability to influence one another. By understanding this relationship, an active pursuit in the improvement of both individuals and society can be implemented.

Durkheim's 'national ideal' theory will be transmuted into the 'subnational ideal' for the purpose of this thesis, to draw parallel to the subnational cases of Catalonia and the Basque Country. This thesis assesses the aims of Catalonia and the Basque Country by their historic calls for political autonomy, the subnational identities promoted within each subnation's integration policy and the subnational political agendas of Catalonia and the Basque Country apparent at supranational forums. This thesis purports that the aim of subnational entities pursuing political agendas which are embedded with 'subnational ideal' themes is for the supranational level to take notice in the high standard of subnational policy aims. Furthermore, this thesis argues that the aim of the supranational level to recognise the high standard of subnational policy aims is for subnational entities to achieve enhanced political recognition, supported largely by supranational institutions<sup>58</sup>.

Similar to Durkheim's 'national ideal' theory is the literature of Folch-Serra and

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<sup>58</sup> And supranational institutions' subsequent pressure on national entities to more fully recognise and grant political autonomy to subnational entities.

Nogue-Font (2004), who explain that when a state has the ability to influence societal determinants, civil society may transform its respective society to more fully embrace social justice and democratic values. The notion of transforming a society into a superior version of itself relates to many rationales behind subnational political autonomy campaigns. As the legitimate actors in the international political system are states, subnational entities are regarded as inferior political units when compared to states, and therefore are not granted significant political recognition or sovereignty. Therefore, to gain positive attention at the international level, many subnational entities have made use of their less recognized political position by developing or enhancing highly regarded political values in the subnational discourse. For example, Conversi (1997), Giordano & Roller (2002), Keating (2001) and Laitan (1997) have found that Catalonia ascribes to a supposed 'European identity' which, they argue, promotes the implication of highly acclaimed political values such as having advanced democratic institutions, a high level of social inclusion and valuing individual liberties. The logic follows that by creating and promoting a politically and socially sophisticated society, the likelihood of being better recognised in the international political system will be enhanced.

The concept of cosmopolitanism has also been cited as offering an advanced socio-political identity, guided by political altruism, which has been employed by a range of political entities (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009; Guibernau, 2006). By moulding a society to embody the highest level of democratic values, it is surmised that national and supranational political entities will take note of the subnation's advanced socio-political values, disregard the archaic stereotype of subnational entities and reward the subnational entities with increased recognition and participation at the international political level. Guibernau (2006) states that by utilising the 'subnational ideal' as a political strategy, subnational entities, like Catalonia and the Basque Country, will be able to create a more cohesive and compelling subnational political autonomy campaign.

Of course, the 'subnational ideal' as a political strategy may be easier for some subnational entities to engage than others. For example, it could be posited that a society which is already entrenched with democratic values could more readily refine those values than a society which has not been entrenched with democratic values.

McGarry, Keating & Moore (2006) assert that, among other subnational entities, Catalonia and the Basque Country are in a particularly adept position of refining their democratic standards as both subnational entities are deep-rooted in democratic values<sup>59</sup>. Creating advanced socio-political societies, then, may be deemed an achievable task for Catalonia and the Basque Country.

This thesis posits that by utilising the 'subnational ideal' theory, the political function of Catalonia and the Basque Country's integration policies may be more fully realised. In particular, the 'subnational ideal' theory acts as an analytical framework by which to examine the socio-political subtexts guiding Catalonia and the Basque Country's integration policies. While the 'subnational ideal' theory has not been isolated nor affirmed by either Catalonia or the Basque Country, this thesis asserts that the socio-political subtexts of Catalan and Basque integration policies may be embedded in the logic of the 'subnational ideal', which, in turn, aims to promote Catalan and Basque political autonomy campaigns as modern and legitimate in merit.

### **Integration policies of Catalonia and the Basque Country**

In the European context, integration policy creation has been on the rise, particularly since the 1970s, when immigrants were realised by states as permanent in nature. Beginning in the 1980s, many states which were traditionally states of 'emigration' became states of 'immigration'<sup>60</sup>. As immigrants came to be perceived as permanent populations within receiving states, integration policies were conceived to further the social integration of these foreign populations. Integration policies have long been employed as a way of transmitting autochthonous social values to immigrant populations (Favell, 2009). While integration policy construction has been, and remains, popular at the national level, subnational entities have increasingly produced integration policies of their own. Compared to national integration policies, however, subnational integration policies are of particular importance for subnational entities, as subnational entities have limited, if any, authority of immigration policy and,

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<sup>59</sup> Catalonia and the Basque Country's parliaments are reported to be the earliest parliamentary systems established within Europe, making Catalonia and the Basque Country the earliest European societies supported by democratic legislatures (Conversi, 1997; Newhouse, 1997).

<sup>60</sup> For example, Italy and Spain, Cornelius (2004).

hence, largely depend upon the socio-cultural integration of foreign immigrants as a way of maintaining and promoting subnational identity and political understandings.

The reserved right of the Spanish state concerning immigration policy can be found in Article 49.2 in the Spanish Constitution, which proclaims the areas of citizenship law, immigration and emigration and general foreigner status as under the sole responsibility of the state (Davis, 2009). A distinct division, then, is apparent in the policy competencies undertaken by the state and the policy competencies granted to the subnational entities. Although under the Spanish Constitution the autonomous communities do not possess the political sovereignty to engage in foreign policy or immigration policy for example, a generally substantial level of political autonomy is devolved to the subnational level<sup>61</sup>. One such area of political autonomy controlled that by the autonomous communities is *integration* policy. Catalonia and the Basque Country have both produced multiple integration policies, and within them, have tailored unique themes of how integration is best approached in their respective societies.

This thesis asserts that the creation of Catalan and Basque integration policies have been created for two main purposes. Firstly, integration policies represent a method whereby Catalonia and the Basque Country can exert self-determination over the socio-political values which outline how immigrants should integrate into their respective societies. Secondly, integration policies are used as informal competency avenues whereby Catalonia and the Basque Country promote their subnational political autonomy campaigns by utilising socio-political themes within their respective integration policies which are in line with the 'subnational ideal' theory. Therefore, the thesis posits that specific political values are purposely embedded in Catalan and Basque integration policies, with the dual aim of enhancing social cohesion within their societies and gaining supranational recognition for their high quality values embedded in their integration policies.

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<sup>61</sup> Largely as a result of the legacy of the Franco regime, the Spanish state has a notable level of political devolution, with many authors labeling Spain as a quasi-federal state (Roller, 2002). In addition to the level of devolution allotted to the autonomous communities, higher levels of sovereignty have been granted to the historic communities of Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country, which were disproportionately afflicted during Franco's reign.

The following section consists of the first component of the analytical framework of Catalonia and the Basque Country's construction of subnational integration policies as a strategy for gaining increased political autonomy. In this section, discourse analyses of the current Catalan and Basque integration policies are presented. These analyses will be utilised to explore the political themes promoted within these integration policies. The aim of this section, then, is to uncover the political themes of the Catalan and Basque integration policies and connect them with the 'subnational ideal' theory.

### **A comparative analysis of the integration policies of Catalonia and the Basque Country**

While Catalonia and the Basque Country have differing historic-political contexts, 'subnational ideal' discourses can be found in the integration policies of each subnational entity<sup>62</sup>. Throughout Catalonia's *Citizenship and Immigration Plan 2005-2008*, historical references to the legacy of Catalonia's inclusive reception of immigrant populations are noted. For example, the *Generalitat* (2006) states that the integration policy has "an optimistic focus, motivated by a tradition of receiving immigrants, whose perceptions of current immigration is as a new opportunity to unite Catalan society with a view to the future" (p. 158). In this statement, the *Generalitat* makes clear that Catalonia has long been highly competent in the integration of immigrants and this new integration policy aims to maintain that level of competence so as to produce a cohesive Catalan society for the future. Thus, in line with the 'subnational ideal' theory's aim of self-improvement, the Catalan integration policy aims to continue the integration efforts that have so far worked for their society so as to further perpetuate the refinement of Catalan social sphere.

Conversely, the Basque Country's *Immigration Plan 2006-2009* asserts its 'subnational ideal' aim with a complete rejection of its historical legacy of social exclusivity. Indeed, traditional Basque values of ethnic exclusivity and cultural

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<sup>62</sup> This thesis identifies the particular political markers within the Catalan and Basque integration policies. While there are examples of how each subnational entities encourages or enforces their unique political identities within the immigrant population, this thesis merely identifies the political markers unique to the respective integration policies.

nobility are rejected as these values resulted in a negative perception of immigrants which has, thus far, inhibited the integration of foreign immigrants into Basque society (Gobierno Vasco, 2001). Instead, the Basque integration policy aims to declare its new approach with the integration of foreign immigrants and promotes a policy characterised by an inclusive approach to the economic, political and social reception of immigrants (Gobierno Vasco, 2001). Furthermore, the principle of 'reciprocal integration' is promoted, whereby "... both the Basque people and the immigrants participate fully in the economic, political and social Basque life ..." (Gobierno Vasco, 2001, p. 10).

A 'subnational ideal' theme can also be found in both the Catalan and Basque integration policies, which asserts a strong bond with the subnational entities and the EU. In the Catalan integration policy, the *Generalitat* (2006) attributes EU values of democratic political rights and social justice as being the inspiration behind several themes of its policy. Likewise, the *Gobierno Vasco* (2001) attributes its new approach to immigrant integration as akin to the notion of European citizenship, characterised by inclusion and human rights.

The further theme which is apparent in both Catalan and Basque integration policies is the way in which subnational values are extended to foreign immigrant populations. Within the Catalan integration policy, Catalan language acquisition and civic engagement are pronounced as the tools by which foreign immigrants can more fully integrate into Catalan society (*Generalitat de Catalunya*, 2006). For example, the Catalan integration policy states that the likelihood of integration is associated to the acquisition of the Catalan language (*Generalitat de Catalunya*, 2006). Historically, methods of linguistic uptake and civic engagement have been well utilised by immigrants to Catalonia, with the objective of more thoroughly engaging in the economic, political and social spheres of Catalan society and, as a result, more fully integrating into Catalan society. It is not surprising that language acquisition is classified as a method of foreign immigrant integration, as within the Catalan context, linguistic rights and the regular use of Catalan is highly regarded as apart of Catalan culturo-political identity (Conversi, 1997)<sup>63</sup>. Moreover, the Catalan integration policy

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<sup>63</sup> One example of encouraging subnational socio-political identities is the free Catalan language

states that “the residents of Catalonia, whatever their origin, have to be able to communicate among themselves and with the public authorities in Catalan” (*Generalitat de Catalunya*, 2006, p. 160). Furthermore, the Catalan integration policy identifies values such as civic participation as integral to Catalan political identity and explains that by engaging in civil society, foreign immigrants will be better able to partake in Catalan political identity and, thus, fully integrate into Catalan society (*Generalitat de Catalunya*, 2006).

As opposed to Catalan social and political values, the Basque integration policy works to distance itself from the traditional Basque conceptions of identity which have marred the social and political integration of immigrants in the Basque Country. However, one authentically Basque identity value that the Basque integration policy maintains is its understanding the destructive influence which liberal economics can have on traditional cultures. For example, within the Basque integration policy, the *Gobierno Vasco* (2001) states that the unjust underdevelopment of the global South has caused traditional societies to become strained, with huge gaps in prosperity leading some of the desperate to emigrate from their homeland. Indeed, the Basque integration policy attributes a significant factor behind international migration to, largely, uneven patterns of economic capital (*Gobierno Vasco*, 2001). This socio-economic phenomenon is very close to the heart of the Basque experience, as the introduction of the capitalist economic structure in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century resulted in a break-down in traditional Basque institutional structures, mass internal migration to the urban centres and a generalised loss of traditional Basque culture. While the detailing of a global socio-economic reality does not assist in the integration of foreign immigrants in the Basque Country per se, the linking of the two contexts offers an empathetic understanding of the international migration situation.

The final theme which may be analysed in both the Catalan and Basque integration policies is the demand for increased subnational political autonomy. Throughout the Catalan integration policy the *Generalitat de Catalunya* (2006) claims that as Catalonia does not have sovereignty over its borders, it is not able to control the trends of foreign immigration arriving to its territory. This predicament has, as its

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courses offered to immigrants in Catalonia. Castilian courses, on the other hand, are not subsidised by the *Generalitat*.

integration policy states, caused the Catalan government to feel trapped by a globalised situation over which it has little political control. For example, a cynical tone can be interpreted from the *Generalitat de Catalunya's* statement that Catalonia has experienced "... years of foreign communities arriving without the society that was receiving them being able to manage either their arrival or the effect they had" (2006, p. 157). Thus, this statement declares the Catalan government's dissatisfaction with its low level of political autonomy and, in effect, the lack of authority of the management of the highest levels of immigration within Spain. Thus, the contradiction earlier described in this chapter, between the rate of foreign immigration to Catalonia and the lack of authority to manage its foreign immigration flows, is acknowledged in the Catalan integration plan.

Finally, the Basque integration policy places symbolic demands on its political autonomy. While the Basque Country is not a politically sovereign entity, the apparent point of contention within the Basque integration policy lies in the political barrier inhibiting many foreign immigrants to fully integrate within Basque society. The issue is illustrated in the state's sole authority of citizenship competencies. The *Gobierno Vasco* (2001) asserts that de facto residents within the Basque Country should be entitled full political rights and that the conventional pathway of Spanish citizenship is too exclusive and contributes to gaps in the integration of foreign immigrants. Thus, the illegal status of 'irregular immigrants' inhibits foreign immigrants' integration into Basque society. A more inclusive citizenship utilised by the Spanish state would allow for deeper democratic capabilities of foreign immigrants, including increased political and social participation (*Gobierno Vasco*, 2001). Therefore, the Basque integration plan seeks a change to the competencies under the Basque Statute of Autonomy whereby the issuing of citizenship becomes an area of authority for the Basque government. While it is confusing whether the Basque integration policy purports the right to have an autonomous immigration system enabling all illegal immigrants to be granted legal immigration status, or simply the right to enable already legal residents in the Basque Country to attain citizenship, one point is clear; the Basque integration policy promotes the concept that the Basque Country will only be politically autonomous when it is granted the right to regulate who enters the Basque Country's territory.



From the Basque Country's integration policy this thesis gathers that for the Basque, a democratic society is dependent upon the political participation of all people. There is, then, an emphasis on a human rights based approach to citizenship and immigrant engagement. There is also a linkage to Basque citizenship as European citizenship, with the Basque integration plan attempting to distance itself away from its historical, race-based identity and promote a non-essentialist Basque identity. Furthermore, unlike the Catalan case, the Basque integration plan emphasises a human rights-based approach as the basis for integrating foreign immigrants<sup>64</sup>. This is in comparison to the Catalan integration plan, which emphasises Catalan language acquisition and the principle of pluralism. Both policies, however, stress the need for changes to citizenship avenues in order to make the political and social inclusion of foreign immigrants within the respective subnational entities more possible.

While the Catalan integration policy utilises themes of its historic legacy of integrating immigrants with emphasis on language acquisition and civic engagement, the Basque integration plan is found to be a novel conception of immigrant integration for the Basque Country. Thus, the Basque integration policy is found in significant contrast to its former defensive, ethnic-based identity. The purpose behind this shift, I will argue, is the aspiration of the Basque Country's subnational political autonomy campaign to be regarded positively and for its subnationalist campaign to warrant enhanced political opportunities at the international level. While the Catalan and Basque integration plans differ in theme, usage of a 'subnational ideal' theme is apparent in both plans with the aim of enhanced political autonomy.

### **'Venue Shopping' theory**

As subnational entities within Spain have come to realise, formal competency expansion tends to be a very stagnant process. Therefore, alternative political strategies have been employed by subnational entities in order to garner increased levels of political self-determination. The alternative political strategy utilised in this section is Baumgartner and Jones's (1993) 'venue shopping' theory. In this section,

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<sup>64</sup> Examples such as electoral rights, the economic gap between rich and poor and eliminating forms of discrimination are provided throughout the Basque integration plan.

'venue shopping' theory will be described and examples are illustrated to demonstrate how 'venue shopping' practices are utilised by Catalonia and the Basque Country with the aim of developing their informal political competencies. This section purports that the aim of Catalonia and the Basque Country in enhancing informal competencies is to attain increased political autonomy.

Since the ratification of the Spanish Constitution in 1978, Catalonia and the Basque Country have relentlessly demanded increased political autonomy. In governing terms, enhanced political autonomy may be achieved when subnational entities attain increased political competencies (Colino, 2009). However, when the subnational-national relationship becomes strained as a result of the state denying the demanded level of increased authority of the political competencies of the subnational entities, these entities may explore alternative political avenues in order to achieve increased political autonomy. One such alternative political practice comes in the form of 'venue shopping theory'. In this section, the 'venue shopping' practices of Catalonia and the Basque Country are analysed and an evaluation of the alternative political avenues is explored so as to assess whether venue shopping practices have attained increased political competencies, and, in effect, heightened political autonomy for Catalonia and the Basque Country.

Venue shopping is a term coined by Baumgartner and Jones in 1993. This thesis, however, utilises Pralle's (2003) interpretation of venue shopping, as Pralle (2003) applied the concept of venue shopping in his analysis of an independent policy area, similar to what is pursued with integration policy in this thesis. Pralle (2003) states that venue shopping may be understood as an activity which aims at "... finding a decision setting that offers the best prospects for reaching one's policy goals..." (p. 233). The logic follows that if the political outcomes between two groups have become stagnant, the best option for the group that is seeking a change is to 'shop' (i.e. explore, engage in dialogue) around alternative 'venues' (e.g. other state governments, international organisations).

As earlier discussed, Catalonia and the Basque Country are bound by the Spanish Constitution as entities within the state of Spain, whose areas of political authority and participation are restricted. Formal competencies, such as defense, citizenship,

international relations and immigration are controlled at the national level. Informal competencies, such as social services, municipal administration and language have been granted authority at the subnational level, the autonomous communities. Starting in the 1980s, Catalonia and the Basque Country have formally lobbied for greater political autonomy in the form of increased political competencies; however formal competencies have remained solely under the authority of the Spanish state.

Rather than limiting political lobbying to the national level, an alternative method for subnational entities would be to engage with entities other than the state, such as with supranational entities or other subnational entities which have learnt lessons in pursuing increased formal competency authority. Venue shopping is common amongst entities which have previously been stuck in constitutional or organisational arrangements whereby their competency abilities are bound. Such entities have often exhausted their primary policy-relations and are frustrated by the time they embark upon venue shopping (Nagel, 2004; Pralle, 2003). Venue shopping can be rational and planned as well as ad hoc. Pralle (2003) explains the motive behind venue shopping,

“Alternative venues give policymakers and advocacy groups who are on the losing side of policy an opportunity to go over the heads of, or around, a policy elite intent on maintaining the status quo. If successful, the policy conflict moves into a venue where these challengers compete more equally with their opponents, or to an arena where their opponents are not yet mobilised. Policy change often follows if alternative definitions of a policy problem are accepted and promoted in the new venue, policy participation expands as a result of venue shifting, and new rules are articulated and enforced in the policy arena by new institutional actors” (Pralle, 2003, p. 236).

Venue shopping can be used for both short-term and long-term goals. In fact, an entity may engage in venue shopping activities because they understand that “long-term change requires the involvement of a particular institution or level of governance” (Pralle, 2003, p. 243). In the situation where a subnational entity is bound by constitutional law in its political position, and thus restricted in their political scope, this long-term venue shopping strategy may be utilised as a way to influence the respective state, or supranational entity which has the scope of influencing the state,

resulting in an enhanced level of formal competencies or political recognition. For example, Catalonia has established 'cultural embassies' in numerous capital cities throughout the world. While Catalonia, under the Spanish Constitution, is not able to conduct foreign policy on its own behalf, these 'cultural embassies' have provided Catalonia with opportunities of cultural and political dialogue at the international level. Of particular interest is Catalonia's office in Brussels, capital of the EU (Downs, 2003). The presence of Catalan government officials in Brussels is related to the aspiration of the *Generalitat* to have direct participation in EU policy making, and whose ultimate goal is to attain equal political representation as the EU member states (Govan, 2009; Squires, 1999). Thus, by maintaining a constant presence in Brussels, the *Generalitat* aims to supplement Spain's position as the sole representative of the Spanish territory with the addition of Catalan political representation and participation.

Venue shopping strategies are particularly popular within Catalan politics and the Catalan public has begun to take note of the influence which alternative political relationships can make at the subnational level. As one supporter of a Catalan nationalist party (the ERC) states "the [EU] to us represents democracy, human rights and a respect for freedom and we hope one day to be recognised as our own state within it" (Govan, 2009, p. 1). The Catalan subnationalist supporter goes on to state "... the European Union offers protection ... if tomorrow Catalonia voted to break away from Spain, Madrid couldn't send in the army as it has threatened in the past because we are a part of Europe and protected by its laws" (Govan, 2009, p. 1). Alternative political relations, then, are increasingly viewed as having the ability of creating serious political change for subnations.

A major incentive for subnational entities to participate at the EU level may be found in what is termed procedural ability. For decisions to be made, decision-making must first take place. However, one could assert that decision-making is not a fully democratic process, as there are rules as to who can and cannot participate within the decision-making process. Therefore, it is important to note who is allowed, and not allowed, to participate in decision-making, and often this depends on the particular procedures in place at the institutional level. Kerremans (1996) explains that political procedures are a system of power structures, whereby to be apart of policy-making, an

entity must be a recognised member of the political institution. Therefore, in order to influence the decisions of a political institution, the respective political entity must first be recognised in the institution, and second be a valued participant (Kerremans, 1996). This explanation demonstrates the importance of subnational entities' campaigns towards gaining equal political representation as the member states in EU institutions to have any significant influence.

References to the EU as a venue of political opportunity for subnational entities rose in popularity during the 1990s. Downs (2002) attributes this connection to the Maastricht Treaty and its principle of subsidiarity. In the EU context, subsidiarity is the "... notion that the EU should govern as close as possible to the citizen..." (Pollack, 2005, p. 30). Since the enshrinement of the principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty, subnational political leaders have proclaimed the EU's more intimate relationship to the common citizen than the relationship between the member states and their citizens.

While the EU has not, as a result, granted equal political representation to the subnational entities as the member states, the principle of subsidiarity has acted as an allowance for subnational entities to have more presence in Brussels than ever before. The political aspiration of the 'nation plus state' approach is apparent in cases where subnationalist parties, such as the CiU, call for subnational entities to be granted equal status with the member states in the EU Council (Laitin, 2004). The aspiration behind this approach is the creation of an even political playing field whereby subnational and national entities within the EU have equal representation and participation in EU policy-making and agenda-setting. As Catalonia and the Basque Country have yet to attain equal political status with the Spanish state within their own autonomous communities, the opportunity to achieve this level of political representation at the EU level has much allure.

Many subnational leaders have used the principle of subsidiarity to defend their quest of gaining political recognition at the European level. Leaders such as Jordi Pujol<sup>65</sup>, not only profess their respective subnational entity's natural 'Europeanness', they also

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<sup>65</sup> Jordi Pujol (1930 - ) was the *Generalitat's* President for over two decades. He is commonly known as the grandfather of the Catalan subnationalist movement.

use subsidiarity as the principle by which they campaign, asserting themselves as leaders closer to 'the people' than any state leader could ever proclaim (Keating, 2006; Keating, 2001; Newhouse, 1997). Indeed, Downs (2002) explains that this political tactic "...has provided one of the stimuli for [subnationalism] emboldening [subnational] leaders to assert their territorial autonomy, to travel with the attitude and air of a head of state, to open quasi-embassies ('informational offices') in multiple countries, and to sign high-profile agreements with other [subnational entities]<sup>66</sup>" (p. 173).

Vertical relations can be vital assets to the progress and/or outcome of subnational political autonomy campaigns. Edwards (1999) states that "the European context has also provided [Catalonia] with opportunities to promote relations with other regions and to forge cross-border partnerships" (p. 675). While Edwards (1999) acknowledges the limited nature of the political outcomes for Catalonia, he maintains the view that "Europe has provided the Catalans with opportunities to project themselves onto the international stage and to forge another identity..." (p. 675). Newhouse (1997) explains that many regional leaders and officials are self-professed Europeans; promoting the concept of bypassing national levels and engaging directly with Brussels. Again, many subnational leaders have used the principle of subsidiarity to defend their political quest at the European level.

Significant political participation within the EU is particularly important for subnational entities, as the process of 'widening', rather than 'deepening' has become the pattern of the EU's development, leading some subnational entities to demand more political participation in the EU<sup>67</sup>. The process of 'widening' in the EU is also cause of subnational concern and has often fueled discussions concerning the subnational entities in the EU. For example, subnational entities are often overwhelmed when new, comparatively smaller states are admitted as EU member states, while subnational entities such as Catalonia and the Basque Country, which have equal or greater populations than some member states, (e.g. Cyprus, Estonia,

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<sup>66</sup> The phrases 'regionalism', 'regional' and 'regions' were amended to 'subnationalism', 'subnational' and 'subnational entities', respectively, in keeping in line with the thesis's lexicon.

<sup>67</sup> Within the EU context, 'widening' may be understood as the process by which the EU accepts additional member states. 'Deepening' may be understood as the process whereby the EU institutions develop more robust competencies, concentrating on the capability and functioning within the political entities already recognised in the EU (Pollack, 2005).

Latvia, Luxembourg and Malta) continue to be side-lined. While the new member states enjoy significant political relations at the EU-level, subnational entities continue to lack direct representation within the EU (Keating, 2006).

Political parties within subnational entities have taken note of venue-shopping strategies and have responded accordingly. Roller & Sloat (2002) explain that there has been an “...increasing emphasis that [sub]nationalist parties in Catalonia and the Basque Country have placed on 'Europe'... (p. 73). These historical communities in Spain have been the most vocal about their desires for regional representation at the EU level (Roller & Sloat, 2002). Roller & Sloat (2002) state that although subnational entities have largely been successful in publicising contradictions between their lack of formal recognition and their significant economic and socio-political influence across Europe. For example, Catalan subnationalist leaders have publicised that EU member states such as Denmark and Finland, who have fewer language speakers than Catalonia, were allotted official EU language recognition once they became member states. On the other hand, Catalonia, which has a population of seven million, consistently contributes to a quarter of the Spanish economy and has its own language base of over ten million speakers over three states (France, Italy, Spain) does not receive such official recognition simply because it does not have state status (Nagel, 2004; Guibernau, 2006).

For all of its pronouncements of importance, Catalonia has made small steps of progress in EU institutions, including in the area of language recognition. For example, Catalan was the first subnational language to receive official recognition by the EU. Although Catalan is now recognised within the EU as a ‘community’ language, and has yet to be deemed an ‘official language’, it is nonetheless significant that Catalan has garnered such status (Laitin, 2004). This status attainment, however ‘unofficial’, is important as it places some amount of socio-political recognition of a subnational entity at the supranational level. It can be posited that without intense lobbying at the EU, many political feats such as this example would not have been realised.

A final notion that subnational entities have exploited in order to attain greater recognition and participation at the supranational level is the perception of the EU’s

'democratic deficit'<sup>68</sup> (Guibernau, 2006). De Winter & Cachafeiro (2002) explain that subsidiarity and the EU's supposed 'democratic deficit' are related in that as EU integration is a centralised process at the EU level, transfers of competencies from the national to the supranational level result. This process, then, "...constitutes an amplification of the 'democratic deficit' defined in terms of distance between decision-makers and the beneficiaries of public policies" (De Winter & Cachafeiro, 2002, p. 489). As a result of this 'democratic deficit' reputation, the "... European Commission had begun to act in an accessible manner towards sub-national levels of government" (Coates, 1998, p. 267) in an effort to appear more attune with principles of subsidiarity. For example, the Maastricht Treaty has included subnational representatives to be part of decision-making in the EU Council (Coates, 1998).

The next section of this chapter illustrates examples of the venue shopping activities of Catalonia and the Basque Country. In particular, the venue shopping activities which surround the theme of foreign immigrant integration are analysed. Two separate levels of relations by which venue shopping being pursued are explored; horizontal relations and vertical relations. Horizontal relations<sup>69</sup> may be defined as relations formed between two like entities, such as between Catalonia and the Basque Country, Catalonia and Quebec or the Basque Country and Scotland. In each of these pairs, a relation exists between two subnational entities. Examples of horizontal relations may be related to activities of venue shopping and/or policy transfer (Davis, 2009).

The second level of relations, vertical relations, may be defined as relations formed between two different-leveled entities, such as Catalonia or the Basque Country and Spain or Catalonia or Basque Country and the EU. In the case of Catalonia and the Basque Country, these subnational entities have engaged in vertical relations with the Spanish state for centuries. The result of these relations has been met with periods of the Spanish state repressing Basque and Catalan subnational identities and periods when Spain has granted increased political autonomy to these subnational entities. However, because political autonomy campaigns are still prominent in Catalonia and the Basque Country, one could purport that these subnational entities have not

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<sup>68</sup> The EU's 'democratic deficit' may be understood as =

<sup>69</sup> Horizontal relations are often referred to as 'paradiplomacy' in the academic literature (Davis, 2009).



achieved the degree of political autonomy to which they aspire. Particularly since the Spanish Constitution, when competencies at subnational and national levels were outlined in law, subnational relations with the Spanish state have become characterised by only incremental progress. Therefore, alternative vertical relations have been pursued by Catalonia and the Basque Country, such as direct relations with EU institutions.

Catalonia and the Basque Country have engaged in many horizontal and vertical political relations, increasingly possible since the fall of the Franco regime in 1975. In this next section, the thesis argues that horizontal and vertical political relations surrounding immigrant integration policy have been formed by Catalonia and the Basque Country with the aim of pursuing increased opportunities and gaining enhanced political autonomy.

### **The active formation of horizontal and vertical relations**

As the previous section on the Catalan and Basque immigrant integration policies purported, a greater level of political autonomy is desired by these subnational entities. For example, the integration plans of Catalonia and the Basque Country extensively declare their inability to socially include many immigrants because of the inferior political rights of immigrants within Spain. While not the crux of this thesis, it could be further suggested that citizenship law is of interest to the subnational entities. That being said, it appears that the creation of integration policies is only the tip of the iceberg for the interest on immigration competencies for Catalonia and the Basque Country. These subnational entities have created multiple integration policies, which represent a political voice of how these subnational entities conceptualise how foreign immigrants fit into their subnational territories and political autonomy campaigns. However, integration policy is not the only avenue so far utilised by Catalonia and the Basque Country in the pursuit of greater integration policy competencies.

Catalonia and the Basque Country have had long standing relations with the Spanish state. While there have been periods throughout history where Catalonia and the Basque Country have enjoyed significant political autonomy, the majority of modern

Spanish history shows that a balance of power has been struck between the Spanish state and these subnations. Like all relations, though, elements of political power have played a crucial role in the relationship between the central state and the subnational entities. Given its political might, the Spanish state has been able to use its national status to assert power over the subnational entities, choosing whether it will acquire further political power from or grant additional political autonomy to the subnational entities. Presently, Spain's political actions are protected by the international Westphalian political structure. As the Westphalian principle of national sovereignty enables nations to act as sole sovereign within their political territories, remaining solely responsible for their domestic matters, Catalonia and the Basque Country have been forced to enter into tactful relations with Spain in order to further their subnational political autonomy campaigns. While these relationships are often met with trends of give-or-take, they have also been met with great difficulty, and at times outright hostility.

Both Catalonia and the Basque Country have had some success in establishing their political autonomy campaigns within the national territory. For instance, during the process of democratisation after the death of General Franco, Catalonia and the Basque Country were given the opportunity to author their own political statutes and were awarded the label of historic community, which gave them (along with Galicia) more politically autonomous rights than other autonomous communities within Spain. Of course, the Spanish state retained particular rights of their own, rights which are commonly classified as 'high-level' policy and include competencies such as national defense, immigration and citizenship.

While an increase in political autonomy occurred with the democratisation of Spain, Catalonia and the Basque Country have demanded further political autonomy that has yet to be achieved in their relations with the Spanish state. Venue-shopping activities have been actively pursued by Catalonia and the Basque Country with the aim of heightened political recognition. The first example of horizontal relations can be found in 2003, when *Generalitat* ministers, including Artur Mas<sup>70</sup>, met with ministers from the Quebec government in a meeting centered on the issue of new immigration

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<sup>70</sup> Artur Mas was the Prime Minister of Catalonia's *Generalitat* from 2001-2003.

trends in the respective subnational entities (Davis, 2009). The *Generalitat's* meeting with Quebec officials concerning immigration is significant, as the Canadian central government devolved formal immigration competencies to Quebec in 1991<sup>71</sup>. Quebec, then, may be perceived as a figure of inspiration for subnational entities who desire the level of political devolution that Quebec has acquired. This perceived inspiration is evident in the example with the *Generalitat's* meeting with Quebec officials, as any increase in formal competencies, such as immigration policy would equate to a generalised increase in subnational autonomy – a major aim of Catalonia's.

Meetings amongst Catalan and Quebec officials have been common, with the meeting in 2003 only the start of this fruitful horizontal relationship. Indeed, immigration and integration matters are an opportune issue for Catalonia and Quebec to meet, as both subnational entities share very similar immigrant rates (Davis, 2009). A further meeting, in May of 2008, was held in the form of a conference amongst leading immigration experts from the subnational entities of Catalonia, Flanders and Quebec in Barcelona. During this conference, the immigration experts discussed their respective entity's policy on integration, and where possible, immigration, policy (Davis, 2009).

In late 2008, a second meeting between Catalonia's *Generalitat* and Quebec officials took place in Barcelona. This meeting was entitled the *Forum on Management of Immigration and Diversity in Quebec and Canada*. The forum was set up as an informative meeting whereby the Canadian model of decentralised immigration policy was explained, with special attention on how the decentralised model could be translated in the Spanish context with "... emphasis placed on the fact that the Canadian model recognises the powers of different provinces in the area of the selection and integration of immigrants ..." (Barcelona Center for International Studies, 2008, p. 1). Indeed, one key discussion at the forum was the political power Quebec holds in managing their own immigration process and how this greatly assists in the integration of immigrants within Quebec. This forum was funded by the *Generalitat* and displays the *Generalitat's* interest in other subnational entities' political competencies and how the issue of immigration may translate into increased

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<sup>71</sup> As per the Accord Canada-Quebec, 1991 (Davis, 2009).

political competencies, and hence subnational political autonomy. As Spain holds immigration policy and law at the state level, the Quebec immigration case is not a reality for any autonomous community within Spain. The forum's findings suggested that work could be done on “establishing an agreement between the State and the autonomous communities that would increase the latter's powers in the area of immigration” (Barcelona Centre for International Studies, 2008, p. 1). This forum operated as an insight into how Catalonia views Quebec as a subnational example of increased political autonomy, resulting from the management of both integration and immigration competencies.

The thesis now turns to the venue shopping relations at the vertical level. Vertical relations are awkward in reality as supranational entities very often uphold the sovereign rights of the state. Subnational entities' political ambitions, no matter how actively they seek out political relations with supranational entities, are easily halted if they, in any way, threaten state sovereignty. Vertical relations, then, are often used as a way for subnational entities to work alongside states, in a new context, often outside the state territory.

The first vertical relation example may be illustrated in the quasi-political institution, the *Patronat Català Pro Europa*, created by Catalonia's *Generalitat* in 1982, which brings together Catalan government officials and representatives from a wide variety of public sectors (such as universities and business leaders) to operate Catalonia's embassy in Brussels (Roller & Sloat, 2002). Brussels represents an opportune setting for subnational entities to be able to pursue such autonomy as it is the headquarters of EU and provides endless supranational and subnational institutions and interests. *Patronat Català Pro Europa* operates as a vertical relation between Catalonia and the EU, in which it promotes the participation of Catalonia in the institution of the EU (Downs, 2003). This quasi-institution is worth exploring, as it not only represents an example of Catalonia's venue shopping at the EU-level, but also displays innovative ways by which Catalonia is portraying itself to the supranational community. Although Catalonia's embassy in Brussels, and those elsewhere, are not official embassies as such, it does conduct business in matters of tourism, business interests and other quasi-diplomatic activities (Nagel, 2004; Roller & Sloat, 2002). Hence, these ‘embassies’ represent a separate institutional body from that of official Spanish

embassies and gain direct interaction with national and subnational actors which are not fully or directly monitored by the Spanish state. Davis (2009) explains that the concept behind creating these quasi-embassies was put forth by Jordi Pujol with the aim of disseminating information about Catalan language, culture and Catalan industries which had significant position vacancies (Brightly, 1999; Davis, 2009). The rationale for this concept was that Catalonia receives the most foreign immigrants of all the Spanish autonomous communities, better information dissemination and visa coordination<sup>72</sup> were necessary to ensure smoother integration processes for foreign immigrants (Davis, 2009). Although many of these quasi-embassies have ended up closing due to the uncoordinated behaviour between the Catalan and Spanish embassies, this example represents a clear example of a subnational entity taking control of its diplomatic, economic and political interactions in a manner of bypassing the state (Davis, 2009).

A further vertical relation example can be found at the Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona, which in 2009 formed a Master's programme in Immigration Management. Using the EU's European Space of Higher Education (ESHE) as its accreditor, the programme was created by the Centre for International Information and Documentation in Barcelona [CIDOB] and the European Institute of the Mediterranean [IEmed]. The aim of this programme is to “train experts to be able to correctly manage the demands on administrations and organisation created by the arrival of people with different origins and characteristics...” in order for the “*Generalitat* of Catalonia to train immigration technicians to a high professional level...” (Barcelona Centre for International Studies, 2009, p. 1). This Master's programme may be viewed a vertical relation between Catalonia, the ESHE and the IEmed, whereby the ESHE and IEmed are privately engaging with Catalonia under the competency of education. The interesting point here is that the educational programme in which these three entities are engaged centres the issue of immigration, a competency which Catalonia has not been granted from the Spanish state. However, as the implementation of such a programme might benefit Catalan autonomy efforts by having the possibility of increasing its immigration competencies, Catalonia, in this example is purposely using the IEmed and the EU's ESHE to form vertical

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<sup>72</sup> At this time, Catalonia already had authority over certain visa-granting areas.

relationships with supranational organisations, as a strategy of increasing its participation in such a formal political competency.

The next vertical relation example can be found in Govan's (2009) article in which Barcelona is tipped to be the future main base for the EU's *Union for the Mediterranean* project. This project is being constructed in an effort to consolidate with North African states as a means of improving future development. As many North African states constitute the states of origin of some of the largest foreign immigrant groups present in Spain, and in particular Catalonia, Barcelona would be in an exceptionally strategic position to participate in, and thus influence, the Spanish state's immigration strategies with North Africa. The *Union for the Mediterranean*, then, may prove to be a relation which could increase Catalonia's participation in significant international immigration policy.

Finally, the Basque Country has also engaged in vertical relations. Although substantially less literature exists concerning Basque relations with supranational entities in comparison with Catalonia, there are some markers that the Basque Country is actively interacting in vertical relations. For example, the Basque Country also has quasi-embassies within Brussels and other international capitals, which work as "... a network of overseas offices to promote trade and Basque culture" (Brightly, 1999, p. 4). Although foreign immigration has not yet affected the Basque Country as significantly as Catalonia, the Basque Country has started to look abroad to promote its culture, which in fact, could easily inform potential foreign immigrants about Basque culture; about which the Spanish government may not have provided.

There are critics of venue shopping theory who assert that political power remains largely with the states and that alternative political relations will not yield the kind of enhanced political power or self-determination for which subnational entities are seeking (Carter, 2003; Coates, 1998; Guibernau, 2006; Sasse, 2006). For example, Nagel (2004) argues that although subnational entities have been allowed access to the EU's Council of Ministers as part of the Maastricht Treaty, they may only have representative status if their respective member state permits it. Coates (1998) goes on to state that even though the Maastricht Treaty allows the participation of subnational entities in the EU Council, Spain has not once given the opportunity to the Basque

Country. There are also those critics who are skeptical of whether vertical relations should be pursued by subnational entities to further their political ambitions. For example, Guibernau (2006) believes that as far as the EU is concerned, Catalonia's political aspirations are simply a matter between Catalonia and Spain, and purports that Catalonia should remain as a Spanish internal issue, therefore having no relevance to EU involvement. Furthermore, Carter (2003) has stated that it is not that subnational entities can simply subvert the nation and go straight to the supranational level, as subnational entities remain territorially bound within their respective national borders. Carter (2003) believes that the subnational entities must spend as much attention to the subnational-national relationships as on subnational-supranational relationships in order to foster any progress in their political autonomy campaigns. Lastly, there has also been a general disenchantment with the EU as a place for subnational entities to participate equally. For example, Roller & Sloat (2002) explain that Catalonia has not disregarded its relations with the state of Spain and continues to work at the subnational-national level to promote its subnational autonomy campaign.

The aim of introducing venue shopping practices, however, is by no means an abandonment of the subnational entities' relationships with their respective states. Indeed, Catalonia and the Basque Country have maintained positive relations with the state of Spain, while also participating in alternative methods of promoting their political autonomy. While the picture of Catalan and Basque political strategy is neither one thing *nor* the other, it remains clear that these subnational entities "... are becoming more adept at 'playing' the game even if not always 'winning' it" (Roller & Sloat, 2002, p. 82).

## **Conclusion**

Catalonia and the Basque Country have been used as case studies to analyse the political stratagem of contemporary subnational autonomy campaigns. These entities were chosen based upon their unique subnational identities, their long-standing political autonomy campaigns within a centralised state and their experience with contemporary global trends. Firstly, this thesis aimed to demonstrate a comparative analysis of subnational political autonomy campaigns, whereby the subnational level was assessed for its political relationship with the state. As both Catalonia and the Basque Country are within the political and territorial jurisdiction of the Spanish state, a comparative approach was possible.

To understand each subnational entity's contemporary position on the spectrum of political autonomy aspirations, Chapter 2 explored the historical realities of Catalonia and the Basque Country as a background necessary for understanding the specific political realities that are particular to each subnational entity. Although both Catalonia and the Basque Country have the status of 'historic community' within Spain, allowing them enhanced political autonomy in relation to the other autonomous communities of Spain, their pathways of gaining such statuses were shown to be drastically different. Beginning in the early 18<sup>th</sup> century, Catalonia had been a target of cultural and political suppression by central Spain. Indeed, Catalonia was historically a highly self-sustaining political entity, due to its advanced economy and the wide use of Catalan, which promoted Catalonia as a highly capable political entity. However, as Catalonia had long been assumed as within the bounds of the Spanish sovereign territory, the Spanish state found that it could not tolerate significant degrees of political autonomy by Catalonia, and, thus, socio-political suppression came to characterise the relationship between Catalonia and the Spanish state for many centuries.

The Basque Country also had a very unique relationship with the Spanish state. Although assumed as within the bounds of the Spanish territory, the Basque Country



retained a significant degree of political autonomy<sup>73</sup> until the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. With the advent of the capitalist mining industry, the Basque socio-political structure was disestablished due to the abolition of the Basque *fuero* system. This historical background was found to be significant to the contemporary political autonomy aims of the respective subnational entities, as, in general, Catalonia is concerned about its socio-cultural autonomy, whereas the Basque Country is highly invested in the autonomous fiscal management.

Relations between the state and the subnational entities have remained quite stable since Spain's transition to democracy starting in 1975. While political stability throughout Spain would generally be judged as something positive, for subnational entities aiming for enhanced political autonomy, a stable relationship between with the state is not all positive. Thus, Catalonia and the Basque Country have equated the state's lexicon of stability as political stagnation, and have continued to demand greater self-determination.

This thesis used the phenomenon of international immigration as the subject which significantly influences the political tide within Spain. Indeed, the increased movement of people across borders offers a situation in which the socio-political context of Spain is changed by external influences rather than internal ones. This thesis was interested more specifically in the intersection at which foreign immigrants and subnational entities meet. From the outset, one might assume that the arrival of foreign immigrants into subnational entities would solicit automatic conflict. Indeed, it could be possible for tension to exist in a situation whereby a non-dominant political entity is actively attempting to preserve its minority socio-political identity within the greater Spain, while the demographics of its subnation is being altered by an influx of foreign immigrants, most of whom are largely unaware of the socio-political histories of the subnational entity they are entering, and whose immigration status is determined by the Spanish state. Of course this potential conflict has not been absent from reality. Indeed, immigrants were long perceived as contributing to the

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<sup>73</sup> Conversi (1997) attributes the long history of Basque political autonomy to the influence of the Basque coast, used as one of Spain's main naval bases. Thus, as the Spanish state maintained strategic defence locations within the Basque Country, the subnational entity was granted a relationship with significant non-interference in the day-to-day aspects of Basque socio-political life by the Spanish state until the late 19<sup>th</sup> century.

cultural dilution of the Basque Country (Shafir, 1995). While reactions towards foreign immigrants have historically differed between Catalonia and the Basque Country, the contemporary political landscape has witnessed a remarkable new tact.

As immigrants commonly enter subnational entities lacking a substantial understanding of the political relationships between the subnational entities and the central state, one may judge this situation as having the potential to threaten the preservation of traditional, subnational identities and the promotion of subnational political autonomy. However, immigrants also offer a novel opportunity as a political instrument which subnational entities may use to solicit their demands for increased political autonomy. This thesis demonstrated that Catalonia and the Basque Country have taken this contemporary approach to the issue of foreign immigration. Through the development of robust integration policies, Catalonia and the Basque Country have illustrated their respective subnational identities through which immigrants may more fully integrate. This strategy was found within the most recent Catalan and Basque integration policies. Through an analysis of Catalonia and the Basque Country's respective integration policies, Chapter 4 uncovered Catalan appeals for autonomous border control under the pretense of more effective control of the foreign immigration trends in its territory and Basque demands for authority of the administration of citizenship under the pretense of enhancing the political rights and integration of foreign immigrants. Both of these political themes, though under the guise of improving the integration of foreign immigrants, represent significant demands for increased formal competencies from Catalonia and the Basque Country, which, in turn, would result in a greater level of subnational political autonomy for their subnational entities.

The final method in which Catalonia and the Basque Country were evaluated as promoting their subnational autonomy campaigns was through venue shopping tactics, whereby Catalonia and the Basque Country have forged informal political relations with other subnational entities and with supranational institutions. Under the pretence of improving their respective immigrant integration strategies, Catalonia and the Basque Country have formed diplomatic bridges with other subnational entities, such as Quebec, which offer lessons on how heightened formal competencies can be established under immigration policy. Diplomatic relations at the supranational level

were also illustrated and revealed interesting questions regarding the influence of supranational institutions on the national level.

Though the sovereign state system continues to dominate the international political structure, and state-controlled immigration policy continues to affect subnational entities, Catalonia and the Basque Country demonstrate how subnational entities are enhancing their informal political competencies by producing high-quality integration policies promoting a subnational ideal to the international community and engaging in calculated political relationships aimed to further their subnational political autonomy campaigns. Both stratagems represent the multitude of diverse political engagements which subnational entities have constructed with the aim of promoting their political autonomy campaigns.

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