

Coca, Bolivia, and the War on Drugs: the tension between
freedom from fear and freedom from want

By

Renée Yap

A Thesis

Submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington in Partial
Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of
International Relations (MIR)

School of History, Philosophy, Political Science and International
Relations

Victoria University of Wellington
2010

ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to demonstrate the tension between human security's core categories of freedom from fear and freedom from want. The two core categories of human security are often held to be complementary to each other. However, by applying a human security analysis to the War on Drugs in Bolivia, particularly with reference to the ideas of freedom from fear and freedom from want, it can be seen that the War on Drugs in Bolivia typifies a freedom from fear approach. This is illustrated through the War on Drugs focus on protecting individuals from physical violence and human rights abuses relating to situations of conflict, as well as its use of coercion strategies, such as sanctions or non-unilateral force; all of these of which are usual to a freedom from fear approach.

An examination of how the War on Drugs has impacted upon the individuals of Bolivia reveals that despite the desired outcome of protecting individual safety and well-being, the War on Drugs has actually compromised the safety and well-being of Bolivians. In addition, in typifying freedom from fear, the War on Drugs in Bolivia has also challenged freedom from want by marginalising or threatening economic, community, food and health security, and thus defying claims that freedom from fear and freedom from want are complementary.

This thesis concludes that by pursuing political and personal security, freedom from fear marginalises and even contests food, health, environmental and most especially economic and community security – the focal points of freedom from want. Security policies adopted to address transnational threats in developing countries must ensure that they not only account for the freedom from fear and freedom from want components of human security, but that they also account for, and manage, the potential for freedom from fear to undermine the wider goals of freedom from want.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks to Dr. Robbie Shilliam for his patience, guidance, and encouragement, but most of all, for helping me to ‘see’ on this journey.

My deepest appreciation goes to Finn, for his never-ending motivation, reassurance, and peer-reviews. Thank you for always being by my side even when I got stressed and grumpy.

Thanks to Lauren, mi querida amiga, for the use of her translation skills, and Cameron for his research advice.

Also, thanks to Pippo, Jo Jo, and Sam for being my team of readers and for providing a quick turn-around even though you had your own busy schedules.

Thanks to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade/NZAID for supporting my studies and to the Victoria University of Wellington Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences for my research grant.

Special thanks to all my family and friends for their endless support despite my limited availability over these past two years – I have missed you.

Most especially, thanks to my Dad, Sidney, for never losing faith in me.

ACRONYMS

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

DEA Drug Enforcement Agency

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FELCN Fuerza Especial de Cucha Contra el Narcotráfico/Special Force for Fighting Drug Trafficking

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GNP Gross National Product

ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

UMOPAR Unidad Móvil de Patrullaje Rural/Mobile Rural Patrol Unit, Bolivia

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNICRI United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute

US United States

USD United States Dollars

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract.....	ii
Chapter 1: Introduction.....	6
Chapter 2: The Human Security Concept.....	10
2.1 From Classical Security to Human Security the UNDP Way.....	11
2.2 The Canadian and Norwegian Approaches to Human Security (Freedom from Fear).....	15
2.3 UNDP's Human Development Paradigm and the Japanese Approach (Freedom from Want).....	18
2.4 Freedom from Fear versus Freedom from Want.....	21
2.5 Freedom from Fear and Freedom from Want in the Context of the War on Drugs in Bolivia.....	26
Chapter 3: The War on Drugs in Bolivia through the Lens of Human Security.....	28
3.1 The War on Drugs: security for whom, and for what values?.....	28
3.2 The War on Drugs: security from what threats?.....	29
3.3 The War on Drugs: security by what means?.....	33
Chapter 4: The War on Drugs in Bolivia and the Tension Between Freedom from Fear and Freedom from Want.....	43
4.1 The Means Used to Fight the War on Drugs in Bolivia Threatens its Own Goals of Personal, Political, and Environmental Security.....	44
4.2 The War on Drugs in Bolivia Marginalises Economic, Community, Food and Health Security.....	57
4.3 How the War on Drugs in Bolivia Impacts Upon Food and Health Security.....	70
Chapter 5: Conclusion.....	72
Bibliography.....	74

LIST OF FIGURES

Table 1: summary of differences between classical security and human security.....	14
Table 2: classification of issues identified by the Canadian & Norwegian approaches to human security.....	17
Table 3: cumulative definition of freedom from want.....	21
Table 4: summary of differences between freedom from fear and freedom from want.....	24

Coca, Bolivia, and the War on Drugs: the tension between freedom from fear and freedom from want

What does a human security framework of analysis of the War on Drugs in Bolivia reveal about the concept of human security, particularly with regard to the conceptual reconciliation of freedom from fear and freedom from want?

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Are freedom from fear and freedom from want complementary to each other, or can they exist to the detriment of the other, or to human security overall? A human security analysis of the War on Drugs in Bolivia demonstrates the tensions between human security's core categories of freedom from fear and freedom from want. The case study in this thesis illustrates that by pursuing political and personal security, freedom from fear marginalises food, health, environmental and most especially economic and community security – the focal points of freedom from want.

Human security has emerged since the early 1990s to provide a framework for understanding and responding to a variety of transnational threats that fall outside the scope of classical security. Since its emergence, human security has become known as encompassing two primary approaches: freedom from fear and freedom from want. Freedom from fear approaches to human security focus on direct threats to individuals and communities, such as physical violence and human rights abuses. In contrast, freedom from want focuses on less direct, often more structural threats, such as economic livelihoods, cultural dignity, environmental threats, food security, and access to health care.

The War on Drugs is a useful case study for examining the tension between freedom from fear and freedom from want because it seeks to address a wide range of security threats using measures derived primarily from a freedom from fear approach. The War on Drugs embodies a supply-side response to the drug problems and security threats created by the transnational illicit drug trade. Under the label of the War on Drugs, the United States (the US) and the United Nations

(the UN) have applied economic, political, legal and military pressure on the drug-producing states of South America, including Bolivia, in an effort to stop the flow of narcotics into the US and around the world. As part of the War on Drugs, the US has sponsored large-scale efforts to reduce coca cultivation in Bolivia, often with the direct assistance of US law enforcement agents, contractors, and even military personnel. The relative success of the War on Drugs has been the topic of extensive debate and is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, this thesis uses the War on Drugs in Bolivia as a case study to better understand human security.

The War on Drugs in Bolivia is a prime candidate for a case study in human security because of its position as a major cultivator of coca. Bolivia also has a large portion of its population involved in some form of the coca or cocaine trade, as well as a long history of indigenous use of coca. Significantly, the use of Bolivia as a case study facilitates this thesis' examination of the tensions within approaches to human security as Bolivia lacks the direct 'classical' security threats, such as armed insurrection or invasion, that plague other coca growing countries. The lack of major classical security threats in Bolivia allows for a clearer examination of human security threats, and the responses that they provoke.

In his article, *A Human Security Approach to US Illegal Drugs Policy*, Simon Wells discusses the War on Drugs through the lens of human security. Wells argues that human security is especially useful as an analytical framework because the War on Drugs raises a number of aspects that human security is concerned with. These are outlined in the following paragraphs.

Human security considers a wide range of interconnected security threats that can exacerbate each other. Wells uses the following example to illustrate how threats related to the War on Drugs aggravate new threats:

the pollution (environmental security) caused by crop spraying leads to respiratory diseases (health security) and also reduces the ability of farmers to produce food from the land (food security). These impacts in turn affect the ability of local people to support themselves financially (economic security) and may force them to abandon their homes (community security).¹

Human security stresses the need for cooperation between states when dealing with transnational issues, which is especially important to a global concern such as the international illicit drug trade. Therefore, a human security framework can offer valuable insight into alternative strategies for the War on Drugs. It is argued that by pursuing state interests, the War on Drugs not only threatens the security of individuals in producer-countries, but it also fails to provide security to those whom it was devised to protect.

This thesis will extend the last point by arguing that a human security analysis of the War on Drugs in Bolivia, with particular reference to the ideas of freedom from fear and freedom from want, reveals that the justifications and strategies for the War on Drugs correspond with freedom from fear. Furthermore, this thesis will argue that the War on Drugs in Bolivia demonstrates the difficulty in reconciling freedom from fear and freedom from want – for one person, coca can mean survival and cultural dignity, whereas for another, coca can mean living in fear of crime or denial of a fair trial. This thesis suggests that by looking at how the strategies adopted to pursue freedom from fear have impacted on the lives of Bolivians, it can be seen that the War on Drugs in Bolivia is at the cost of freedom from want, thereby demonstrating the mutual exclusivity of the two core categories of the human security approach.

¹ Simon Wells, “A Human Security Approach to US Illegal Drugs Policy,” *Revue de Sécurité Humaine / Human Security Journal*, no. 1 (April 2006): 56.

This thesis proceeds by determining the meaning of human security by firstly looking at its emergence from classical security, which is thought of as inadequate, to explain the complex threats of today's interdependent world before turning to the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) concept of human security. After considering UNDP's concept of human security, I will discuss the freedom from fear and freedom from want components that represent alternative (although often thought to be reconcilable) approaches to achieving human security. The third chapter of this thesis will then explore the strategies adopted for the War on Drugs in Bolivia and in doing so will show how the War on Drugs' focus on the protection of individuals from physical violence and human rights abuses, as well as its use of coercion through sanctions and force, typify a freedom from fear approach. Finally, I will explore how the War on Drugs impacts the lives of Bolivians. By doing so, I will show how the War on Drugs in Bolivia (as a freedom from fear approach) is in contention with freedom from want and thereby suggesting that the US' involvement in the War on Drugs is driven by reasons other than the physical safety of Bolivians.

CHAPTER 2: THE HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPT

What is human security? Most impressions of human security link it to UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report, however human security has its ancestry in security debates that predate this report. Most importantly to this thesis are the freedom from fear and freedom from want components of human security, which have their roots in US President Roosevelt's 'Four Freedoms' State of the Union speech on 6 January 1941. As asserted by Kevin Boyle and Sigmund Simonsen, "Roosevelt's vision of 'a world founded upon four essential freedoms' – freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want and freedom from fear – was to become one of the cornerstones of the new United Nations."²

Roosevelt's four freedoms have become enshrined into the UN's perceptions of human security and humanity through the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights³ and the UN Charter.⁴ When UNDP produced its 1994 Human Development Report, the concept of human security that was presented reflected aspects of Roosevelt's 'Four Freedoms' speech, as well as referencing debates around the limitations of classical security models and the rise of globalisation. Human security has also been adopted by countries that have incorporated the concept into their foreign policies in a manner that not only reveals their perceptions of the international community, but that further defines the components of freedom from fear and freedom from want.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I will discuss human security in a general sense by looking at how the concept developed from critiques of classical security to the popularised explanation set out by UNDP. Second, I will define freedom from fear by discussing the Canadian and Norwegian governments' approach to human security. Third, I will define freedom from want by looking at the UNDP

² Kevin Boyle and Sigmund Simonsen, "Human Security, Human Rights and Disarmament," *Disarmament Forum* 3 (2004): 6.

³ United Nations, *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, 1948, preamble, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>.

⁴ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations 1945*, preamble, <http://www.un.org>.

human development paradigm and the Japanese government's approach to human security. Fourth, I will consider the differences between freedom from fear and freedom from want in order to establish the analytical framework for this thesis, which will be used to show that freedom from fear and freedom from want can be at odds with one another.

To understand human security, and to clarify the distinction between it and classical security, as well as the difference between freedom from want and freedom from fear, we need to draw upon four questions that are central to any security debate. Kanti Bajpai in *Human Security: concept and measurement* sets out four questions, which were developed from David A. Baldwin's *The Concept of Security*, to help his readers comprehend the elements of security theory, and these questions are: security for whom, security for what values, security from what threats, and security by what means?⁵ It is through considering these questions that the key debates, critiques and challenges, as well as the analytical framework that are central to this thesis, will develop.

2.1 From Classical Security to Human Security the UNDP Way

There is no doubt that UNDP has championed the popularisation of the human security concept.⁶ UNDP perceives the human security concept as an alternative to classical security,⁷ whose limitations began to be realised after the Cold War. Until then, the realist or 'classical' concept of security dominated security debates and focused them on the integrity of the state and its territory. In terms of Bajpai's four questions, classical security can be characterised as security for the state, to protect values such as state sovereignty and national security, which are

⁵ Kanti Bajpai, "Human Security: Concept and Measurement" (Kroc Institute, August 2000), 9.

⁶ Alexandra Amouyel, "What is Human Security?," *Revue de Sécurité Humaine / Human Security Journal*, no. 1 (April 2006): 10; Gary King and Christopher J. L. Murray, "Rethinking Human Security," *Political Science Quarterly* 116, no. 4 (2002 Winter 2001): 585; Amitav Acharya, "Human Security: East versus West," *International Journal* 56, no. 3 (Summer 2001): 444; Roland Paris, "Human Security: paradigm shift or hot air?," *International Security* 26, no. 2 (Autumn 2001): 89-90; Sabina Alkire, "A Conceptual Framework for Human Security (Working Paper 2)" (Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE, 2003), 13.

⁷ Bajpai, "Human Security: Concept and Measurement," 12-13.

threatened by other states. The means by which the state and its values are protected is through force, and generally of the unilateral kind.

Globalisation presented new challenges for the international community by introducing new threats of a transnational nature. For example, the illicit drug trade, people trafficking, terrorism, disease, environmental degradation, and the decline of state control over their territory. Threats also take the form of state actors, non-state actors and natural catastrophes; all of which are invisible in the classical security model.⁸ As noted by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS):

The traditional, narrow perception of security leaves out the most elementary and legitimate concerns of ordinary people regarding security in their daily lives. It also diverts enormous amounts of national wealth and human resources into armaments and armed forces, while countries fail to protect their citizens from chronic insecurities of hunger, disease, inadequate shelter, crime, unemployment, social conflict and environmental hazard.⁹

Through globalisation, the world has become more interdependent than ever and thereby, the number of indirect threats (and their associated impacts) have not only increased, but are also more real. This is explained by Bajpai as follows, “[our] fates have become intertwined with those people who, in another era, would have remained isolated from us.”¹⁰ As classical security is virtually only concerned with unilateral force, it fails to take into account the interdependent nature of the global community. This narrow focus renders classical security insufficient to describe the multifaceted and interconnected nature of threats such as the illicit drug trade. Such threats have necessitated the development of a wider concept of security, in the form of the human security paradigm, as is demonstrated by the wide spectrum of security responses adopted to fight the War on Drugs.

⁸ Ibid., 3.

⁹ *The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, December 2001, 2.23, <http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp>.

¹⁰ Paul Heinbecker, “Human Security,” *Behind the Headlines* 56, no. 2 (1999): 4.

This is not to say that human security replaces the security of the state, but rather that “the concept of human security should be seen as an extension of this older tradition and in the context of a broader security discourse.”¹¹ State security is still important because it can be a means to individual security, but it is not more important than individual security. This is because there are threats to individual security that go beyond the state’s ability to manage. For example, threats can come from both military and non-military sources,¹² and they sometimes even come from the state itself.

It was in 1994, in the UNDP Human Development Report that human security first gained widespread exposure. On top of seeking to shift the security referent from states to individuals, this report set out seven dimensions or threats to human security: economic security (assured basic income and freedom from poverty); food security (access to food); health security (access to health care and freedom from disease); environmental security (freedom from environmental degradation); personal security (freedom from physical harm); community security (cultural dignity and physical safety of cultural and ethnic groups); and political security (freedom from political oppression).¹³ The wide range of these dimensions reflects the idea that UNDP seeks to re-establish the equal weighting of freedom from fear and freedom from want at a global level.¹⁴

To achieve this, UNDP seeks a change in focus of domestic and international policies so that they incorporate basic needs and human rights, as well as productive and remunerative employment. Therefore, UNDP advocates for the restructuring of the international community through the reform of international institutions and changes to national and international policies.¹⁵ However, any

¹¹ Edward Newman, “Human Security and Constructivism,” *International Studies Perspectives* 2 (2001): 241.

¹² Heinbecker, “Human Security,” 5.

¹³ United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report*, 1994, 25-33.

¹⁴ United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report*, 24; Alkire, “A Conceptual Framework for Human Security (Working Paper 2),” 13.

¹⁵ Bajpai, “Human Security: Concept and Measurement,” 17.

reform and changes need to occur in a manner that takes into account global inequities, the need for sustainability, and participation,¹⁶ as it is only through this restructuring that direct and indirect threats of violence will disappear and hence, there is no room for military force in this approach. UNDP's focus on structural threats and responses is a positive and potentially useful approach to global human security; however it is insufficient as an analytical framework through which to understand the illicit drug trade and the War on Drugs which include aspects outside of UNDP's approach, such as the use of force.

In examining UNDP's approach to human security, I conclude that in terms of Bajpai's four questions, human security seeks security for individuals, but still recognises that state security is important. In terms of values, it is individual safety and well-being that human security is seeking to protect. Further, threats under the human security paradigm consist of transnational challenges that may come from non-state, non-military sources. When it comes to what means should be adopted to achieve this security, the UNDP report recommends restructuring the international community through the reform of international institutions and changes to both national and international policy.¹⁷ The table below summarises the concepts of classical security and human security (as defined by UNDP) and their differences.

Table 1: summary of differences between classical security and human security

	Classical Security	Human Security
Security for whom?	State	Individuals
Security for what values?	State sovereignty and national security	Individual well-being and safety
Security from what threats?	Other states	Transnational threats from both military and non-military sources
Security by what means?	Unilateral force	Cooperation and restructure of international community (non-military)

¹⁶ Ibid., 31.

¹⁷ Ibid., 17.

The UNDP definition of human security has been criticised as being too all-encompassing to be practical, and the means to achieve human security judged too idealistic, or even naïve.¹⁸ The following two sections of this chapter are dedicated to outlining the two different schools of thought that have emerged within the human security paradigm, namely freedom from want and freedom from fear. These two schools of thought can be distinguished by what threats they are protecting individuals from, as well as by what means human security can be achieved. The differences between these two schools of thought will provide the analytical framework for this thesis' examination of the War on Drugs in Bolivia, which will then be used to show that claims that freedom from fear and freedom from want are interdependent are flawed. There can be a tension between the two.

2.2 The Canadian and Norwegian Approaches to Human Security (Freedom from Fear)

[F]reedom from fear - which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor--anywhere in the world.

- U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941¹⁹

In order to ascertain how the War on Drugs in Bolivia corresponds with freedom from fear, we must first understand what freedom from fear entails. “[A]n act of *physical aggression*”²⁰ (emphasis added) is how Roosevelt defined the threat to freedom from fear when he addressed Congress in his 1941 State of the Union speech, but how does this relate to the concept of human security? While still upholding the security of the individual as a referent, Canada and Norway have incorporated a narrower interpretation of human security into their foreign policy frameworks. Both countries are considered by academics to focus on the freedom

¹⁸ Alkire, “A Conceptual Framework for Human Security (Working Paper 2),” 14.

¹⁹ Franklin Delano Roosevelt, “The Four Freedoms Speech,” January 6, 1941.

²⁰ Ibid.

from fear aspect of human security²¹ hence, by examining their approaches we will be able to determine how Roosevelt's initial concept of freedom from fear has grown in light of the advancement of human security.

According to Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, Canada views human security as safety from pervasive threats to people's rights, safety, or lives, as well as the fulfilment of an acceptable standard of living; guarantee of fundamental human rights; rule of law; good governance; social equity; sustainable development (through rules-based trade) and the protection of civilians (especially children) in conflict.²² Threats to these values include such things as intrastate conflict, state failure or decline in state control, fundamental freedoms and international humanitarian and human rights law, transnational crime, antipersonnel landmines, weapons of mass destruction, ethnic conflict, disease, mass atrocities, genocide, terrorism, and of interest to this thesis, the illicit drug trade.²³ The key defining criteria for Canada's version of human security is "vulnerability to physical violence during conflicts."²⁴

The means used to achieve this agenda are not as ambitious as the UNDP approach to human security. Rather than seeking to restructure the international community, Canada's efforts are underpinned by three principles: first, the use of coercion, which may include the adoption of sanctions and force (albeit in limited circumstances, for example when it is in partnership with others – it cannot be unilateral);²⁵ second, the promotion of human security through national security

²¹ Alkire, "A Conceptual Framework for Human Security (Working Paper 2)," 21; King and Murray, "Rethinking Human Security," 590; Bajpai, "Human Security: Concept and Measurement," 18; Paris, "Human Security: paradigm shift or hot air?," 90.

²² Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and Human Security: the need for leadership," *International Journal* LII (1997): 184; Paris, "Human Security: paradigm shift or hot air?," 90-91; Bajpai, "Human Security: Concept and Measurement," 34.

²³ Bajpai, "Human Security: Concept and Measurement," 18; King and Murray, "Rethinking Human Security," 590.

²⁴ Acharya, "Human Security: East versus West," 447.

²⁵ Bajpai, "Human Security: Concept and Measurement," 30.

policies; and third, cooperation between states, international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to institute norms.²⁶

Canada is not alone in its perception of human security, as Norway shares the same approach.²⁷ The two countries are unified in a ‘human security partnership’,²⁸ which brings them together

in concerted efforts to promote human security, leading the way for the global community in specific issues such as the international ban on anti-personnel landmines, prevention of child labor, control of proliferation of small arms, efforts to help war-affected children, the establishment of the International Criminal Court, as well as promoting general respect for human rights and conflict prevention.²⁹

These identified shared issues bring us back to Roosevelt’s definition regarding acts of physical aggression. A review of these identified issues reveals that they can be divided into two categories, namely, physical threats caused by violence and/or conflict, and human rights, with particular regard to women and children’s rights. This classification of issues is shown in the table below:

Table 2: classification of issues identified by the Canadian & Norwegian approaches to human security

Physical Threats	Human Rights Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International ban on anti-personnel landmines • Control of proliferation of small arms • Establishment of the International Criminal Court • Conflict prevention 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevention of child labour • Efforts to help war-affected children • Promoting general respect for human rights

We can see here that freedom from fear is still very much concerned with the physical aggression that Roosevelt mentioned and nearly all of the threats are conflict-related. However instead of a fear of physical aggression against a

²⁶ Ibid., 19-20.

²⁷ Acharya, “Human Security: East versus West,” 445.

²⁸ Acharya, “Human Security: East versus West,” 445-446; Alkire, “A Conceptual Framework for Human Security (Working Paper 2),” 21.

²⁹ *Norway's Official Site in Canada*, http://norwayportal.mfa.no/en/Norway---the-official-site-in-Canada/News_and_events/norwaycanada/history/history/.

neighbouring nation, human security speaks with regard to individuals. In terms of UNDP's seven human security dimensions, it can be seen that Canada and Norway's human security risks are closely related to the UNDP indicators of personal security (freedom from physical harm) and political security (freedom from state oppression); although, they are placed in a context of conflict. Freedom from fear dictates that human security is about the prioritisation of personal and political security in situations of conflict. However, freedom from fear based approaches, such as those set out by Canada and Norway, fail to account for the other five UNDP human security dimensions and do little to explain the relevance of human security to every day life. In the following section I will explore this notion further by examining the concept of freedom from want and determining what it entails.

2.3 UNDP's Human Development Paradigm and the Japanese Approach (freedom from want)

[F]reedom from want - which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants - everywhere in the world.

- U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1941³⁰

Now that we have determined the meaning of freedom from fear, it is essential that we consider freedom from want if we are to understand how freedom from fear relates to freedom from want with regard to the War on Drugs in Bolivia. In his 'Four Freedoms' speech, President Roosevelt defined freedom from want as "economic understandings",³¹ but like his definition of freedom from fear, what does this actually mean in terms of human security? In another speech in 1941 (this time at an International Labour Organisation (ILO) conference) President Roosevelt "speaking of the principle of 'freedom from want', proclaimed *the welfare* of the 'common man' in every country as the objective of the present struggle and stated that, without such a policy, individual freedom cannot

³⁰ Roosevelt, "The Four Freedoms Speech."

³¹ Ibid.

survive”³² (emphasis added). Therefore, from President Roosevelt, we get the idea that freedom from want is about economic understanding and welfare. This is echoed in the UNDP human security dimension of economic security (assured basic income and freedom from poverty). The question is now: is freedom from want just about economic security, or does it encompass more than that?

According to the Canadian interpretation of human security, “human security is freedom from fear, and human development is freedom from want.”³³ The human development paradigm has been institutionalised through UNDP and its human development index, which since 1990 has ranked countries according to the welfare of individuals and not just the macro-economy.³⁴ At its core, human development is about expanding people’s choices³⁵ and hence, takes into account a very broad range of factors that are based on the idea of basic needs, such as, shelter, environmental integrity, health, education, food, sanitation, and human rights.³⁶ Failed or inadequate human development can lead to poverty, hunger, disease or the perpetual existence of disparities between various social groups or regions.³⁷ Based on this, the UNDP human development paradigm adds a lot more to our freedom from want definition. Like Roosevelt’s definition, economic security of the individual is vital, but the human development paradigm also opens up a new social dimension to the agenda. Therefore, in addition to economic security, the human development paradigm encompasses food, health and environmental security, which provides freedom from want with a much wider scope than freedom from fear.

³² Imre Ferenczi, “Freedom from Want and International Relations Policy,” *American Sociological Review* 8, no. 5 (October 1943): 541.

³³ King and Murray, “Rethinking Human Security,” 590.

³⁴ Bajpai, “Human Security: Concept and Measurement,” 8.

³⁵ United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report*, 23.

³⁶ United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report*, 1990, 10-11, http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1990_en_chap1.pdf, accessed 13 February 2010.

³⁷ United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report*, 23.

The clearest example of a freedom from want model of human security can be found in the Japanese approach. In practice, the Japanese approach is the broadest and more inclusive definition of human security: it does not prioritise freedom from fear over freedom from want because it considers both to be equal objectives of human security.³⁸ As a result, Japan's approach to human security covers all threats to human survival, day-to-day life and human dignity.³⁹ For instance, Japan's interpretation of human security is stated in its Diplomatic Blue Book as follows: "[h]uman security comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten human survival, daily life and dignity – for example, environmental degradation, violation of human rights, transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, [the outflow of]⁴⁰ refugees, poverty, anti-personnel landmines and other infectious diseases such as AIDS – and strengthens efforts to confront these threats."⁴¹ Amitav Acharya seeks to explain this occurrence by asserting that Japan's notion of human security has been shaped by "the widespread poverty, unemployment, and social dislocation"⁴² caused by the economic crises of the 1990s and once more emphasises the importance of economic security. However, in terms of UNDP's seven dimensions, this statement draws out concerns for not only economic security, but also environmental, food, health and community⁴³ security (on top of political and personal security), which reinforce the relevance of UNDP's human development paradigm to human security. As I will show in this thesis, the threats addressed by the Japanese approach can occur as a result of security measures driven by a freedom from fear approach to human security.

³⁸ Alkire, "A Conceptual Framework for Human Security (Working Paper 2)," 21.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ As interpreted by Ibid.

⁴¹ "Diplomatic Blue Book 1999, Chapter II, Section 3," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan*, www.mofa.go.jp/POLICY/other/bluebook/1999/II-3-a.html.

⁴² Acharya, "Human Security: East versus West," 450.

⁴³ Community security in the name of cultural dignity and the physical safety of cultural and ethnic groups can be inferred through the reference to 'dignity'. This is consistent to article 22 of the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which determines the protection of economic, social and cultural rights indispensable to the dignity and personality development of an individual.

Table 3: cumulative definition of freedom from want

Source	Definition
Roosevelt – State of the Union speech (1941)	Economic understanding
Roosevelt – ILO speech (1941)	Welfare
UNDP human development paradigm	Shelter/environmental integrity <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Health• Education• Food• Sanitation• Human rights
Japanese approach	Human survival, daily life and dignity through (but not limited to): <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Environmental integrity• Freedom from crime• Human rights• Freedom from poverty• Freedom from physical harm• Freedom from disease

Freedom from want has grown from its early economic focus (as defined by Roosevelt) through the human development paradigm and its implementation in Japanese foreign policy, to reach an approach that is markedly different from the conflict-centric approach that defines its counterpart, freedom from fear. Instead, freedom from want is mainly concerned with the every day needs required to ensure the day-to-day welfare, dignity and general well-being of individuals. The next section will compare these two concepts in more detail.

2.4 Freedom from Fear versus Freedom from Want

The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want.

- US Secretary of State, 1945⁴⁴

The examples discussed in this chapter illustrate the two key schools of thought that have emerged when it comes to implementing human security. They are ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’. Both schools agree that human

⁴⁴ United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report*, 24.

security is about shifting the focus of security beyond the security and integrity of states to encompass the safety and well-being of individuals. They also see threats to security as transnational in nature; leading to both direct and indirect violence. However, freedom from fear and freedom from want noticeably part ways when it comes to what threats to protect individuals from and by what means.

When it comes to threats, freedom from fear is a narrow definition of human security as it limits human security to protecting individuals from physical violence and human rights abuses relating to situations of conflict. As Alexandra Amouyel states, for the freedom from fear definition of human security “the focus is on the individual, but the threats remain of military and physical nature.”⁴⁵ This approach contends that by limiting the focus of human security, the human security agenda is more realistic and manageable. A freedom from fear approach sees the freedom from want approach as not easily transferable to policy, while more direct threats to human security, such as violence and human rights abuses, are. The freedom from fear approach upholds that if these threats can be dealt with, they will create a pathway for the resolution of others. For Canada and Norway, the core value of human security is freedom from threats to people’s rights, safety and lives - in other words - freedom from fear.⁴⁶ In terms of UNDP’s seven dimensions, freedom from fear’s concentration on protection from physical violence and human rights abuses reflects personal and political security.⁴⁷

On the other hand, freedom from want is a broad definition that focuses human security on providing individuals with access to basic economic and social welfare opportunities that enable dignity, and the ability to mitigate the effects of natural disasters.⁴⁸ The rationale for this approach is that hunger, disease and natural disasters “kill far more people than war, genocide and terrorism

⁴⁵ Amouyel, “What is Human Security?,” 13.

⁴⁶ Bajpai, “Human Security: Concept and Measurement,” 18.

⁴⁷ Newman, “Human Security and Constructivism,” 240.

⁴⁸ Alkire, “A Conceptual Framework for Human Security (Working Paper 2),” 13.

combined.”⁴⁹ In terms of UNDP’s seven dimensions, freedom from want’s concentration on providing and protecting social and economic welfare opportunities and dignity reflects economic, environmental, food, health and community security.⁵⁰ Therefore, it can be argued that in comparison to freedom from fear, which is about direct physical violence, freedom from want is about ‘structural violence’.⁵¹

Finally, although both approaches see states, international organisations and NGOs working together to promote norms that reflect notions of human security,⁵² the two differ when discussing the means for achieving human security. Bajpai refers to freedom from fear as “promoting political development” because it views states (through their domestic policies) and international institutions as norms at the forefront of any human security success.⁵³ It also recognises that at times, force or sanctions will need to be relied upon to impose this change in behaviour. Therefore freedom from fear is concerned with changing the way actors act within the international community. Alternatively, Bajpai refers to freedom from want as “promoting human development” because of its advocacy for basic needs, equity and participation at all levels within and across the international community.⁵⁴ It is therefore concerned with changing the structure of the international community (consistent with UNDP’s approach).

⁴⁹ “What is Human Security?,” http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/lie/files/Publications/what_is_HS.pdf.

⁵⁰ Newman, “Human Security and Constructivism,” 240.

⁵¹ Acharya, “Human Security: East versus West,” 447.

⁵² Bajpai, “Human Security: Concept and Measurement,” 31.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

Table 4: summary of differences between freedom from fear and freedom from want

	Freedom from Fear	Freedom from Want
Security for whom?	Individuals	
Security for what values?	Individual safety and well-being	
Security from what threats?	Transnational threats from state and non-state actors	
	Particular focus on threats to physical safety and human rights of individuals, especially in times of conflict	Particular focus on threats to economic and social welfare and dignity of individuals in every day life
	Threats to personal and political security	Threats to economic, environmental, food, health and community security
	Negative freedom	Positive freedom
Security by what means?	Physical violence	Structural violence
	Promoting political development: international norms/institutions and use of sanctions/force (not unilateral)	Promoting human development: basic needs, equity and greater participation

The above table summarises the differences between freedom from fear and freedom from want. From this we can conclude in terms of Bajpai's four questions that with regard to whom security should be for and what values security should be for, freedom from fear and freedom from want are in accord with one another. On the other hand, when it comes to threats, the two focus on different types, whereby freedom from fear concentrates on threats to physical safety and human rights (echoing personal and political security), and freedom from want concentrates on threats to social and economic well-being and dignity (echoing economic, environmental, food, health and community security). Furthermore, freedom from fear and freedom from want differ with regard to what means should be adopted to achieve human security. Here, freedom from fear opts for 'political development', whereas freedom from want takes the option of 'human development'.

In spite of these distinctions, literature on human security states that no matter what perspective is taken on human security, both freedom from want and freedom from fear are hardly irreconcilable because people “fear poverty and destitution” as much as they “want peace and police protection.”⁵⁵ The governments of Japan⁵⁶ and Canada,⁵⁷ as well as organisations such as the UNDP,⁵⁸ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),⁵⁹ and the Human Security Report Project,⁶⁰ and academics such as Newman,⁶¹ Acharya,⁶² Bajpai,⁶³ and Sandro Calvani, Director of United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), consider that despite their differences the two freedoms are complementary to each other, rather than contradictory: “we recognize that the concepts of Freedom from Want and Freedom from Fear are inextricably linked, mutually reinforcing and must go hand in hand.”⁶⁴ Calvani also states that freedom from fear is a determinant of freedom from want, “Freedom from Fear must be taken just as much into consideration, or Wants will never be quelled.”⁶⁵ However, the way the War on Drugs is fought in Bolivia indicates that this may not always be the case.

⁵⁵ Alkire, “A Conceptual Framework for Human Security (Working Paper 2),” 13.

⁵⁶ King and Murray, “Rethinking Human Security,” 590.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Alkire, “A Conceptual Framework for Human Security (Working Paper 2),” 13.

⁵⁹ *Proceedings of the ASEAN-UNESCO Concept Workshop on Human Security in South-East Asia* (Jakarta, Indonesia: UNESCO, October 25, 2006), 13.

⁶⁰ “Human Security Report Project,” *Human Security Report Project*, http://www.humansecurityreport.info/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1.

⁶¹ Newman, “Human Security and Constructivism,” 240.

⁶² Acharya, “Human Security: East versus West,” 460.

⁶³ Bajpai, “Human Security: Concept and Measurement,” 35.

⁶⁴ Sandro Calvani, “Perspectives of Freedom from Want and Freedom from Fear in the African Union” (presented at the international round table “L’Africa in Corsa?” in occasion of the new publication of the Finisterrae magazine, Turin, Italy, February 24, 2009).

⁶⁵ Ibid.

2.5 Freedom from Fear and Freedom from Want in the Context of the War on Drugs in Bolivia

By using the human security paradigm set out in this chapter as a framework for analysis, this thesis will use the War on Drugs in Bolivia to illustrate that the differences between these two ideas can lead them to be in direct conflict with each other; and that the pursuit of freedom from fear can sometimes be at the detriment to freedom from want. Freedom from fear and freedom from want differ from each other in two key ways. First, in terms of the types of threats they seek to protect individuals from. Second, by the means they adopt to counter these threats.

Freedom from fear has a particular focus on threats to the physical safety and human rights of individuals, most especially in times of conflict. These interests most closely correlate with UNDP's dimensions of personal and political security, but can otherwise be determined as a negative freedom in the sense that it strives to achieve an absence of physical or political oppression. A freedom from fear model involves adopting means that promote political development either through the development and promotion of international norms or institutions, the use of sanctions and sometimes the use of non-unilateral force.

Freedom from want, alternatively, concentrates on threats to the social and economic well-being and dignity of individuals on a day-to-day basis. This interest most corresponds to UNDP's dimensions of economic, environmental, food, health and community security. Therefore, freedom from want can be considered as a positive freedom because these dimensions enable individuals to have and create opportunities for themselves. It is also structural in that it relates to the way the current world order harms individuals through inequitable arrangements. A freedom from want model embraces means that promote human development, such as generating initiatives that ensure opportunities to basic needs, creating equity and thus, greater participation in the world system.

The differences between freedom from fear and freedom from want approaches to human security creates a tension that, while not always immediately obvious, can be to the detriment of human security overall. The active pursuit of freedom from fear can inadvertently undermine or damage freedom from want, as will be shown in this thesis' analysis of the War on Drugs in Bolivia. This thesis will use this tension as an analytical framework to examine and analyse the War on Drugs in Bolivia. To provide context for the analysis, the following chapter will examine the War on Drugs in Bolivia through the lens of human security.

CHAPTER 3: THE WAR ON DRUGS IN BOLIVIA THROUGH THE LENS OF HUMAN SECURITY

In order to understand the contention between freedom from fear and freedom from want in the War on Drugs in Bolivia, we need to better understand the War on Drugs. This chapter will provide a background to this war in order to demonstrate that even though the participants do not consider the War on Drugs in light of human security (in that they do not use the terminology), it is nevertheless appropriate, useful and productive to look at the War on Drugs through the heuristic device of human security. To do this, we will refer back to Bajpai's four questions: security for whom, for what values, from what threats, and, by what means? We will explore these questions more in turn below and by doing so, we will be able to see that human security provides a broader perspective to the War on Drugs in Bolivia than a classical security approach can enable. Furthermore, by framing the War on Drugs through these four questions, we will not only see the heuristic value of examining the War on Drugs through a human security framework, but that the War on Drugs exemplifies a freedom from fear approach to security.

3.1 The War on Drugs: security for whom, and for what values?

The War on Drugs is a response to the impact that the illicit drug industry has upon individuals and their communities from both producer- and consumer-countries. As such, the goal of the War on Drugs (to protect individuals and their communities from the impact of the illicit drug industry by eradicating drugs) is compatible with the human security value of protecting the safety and well-being of individuals. For example, Bertram et al. provide that drug abuse poses a threat to Americans as more Americans are now addicted to hard drugs than in the 1970s when Nixon declared a War on Drugs⁶⁶ during a press conference.⁶⁷ Eduardo A. Gamarra adds that the US loses between USD60 to 80 billion a year through

⁶⁶ As per Eva Bertram et al., *Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press), 10., at a press conference on 17 June 1971, Nixon officially declared a war on drugs and labels drug abuse as 'public enemy number one'.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 10.

“through absenteeism, inefficiency, embezzlement, non-productivity and medical expenses” relating to the illicit drug trade.⁶⁸ Meanwhile, in Bolivia the illicit drug trade impacts upon physical safety, well-being and human rights of Bolivians, as well as their environmental integrity and food and health access. This focus on the interests of the individual sees the War on Drugs as analogous to the human security principle of using the individual as the security referent. Furthermore, the goal of the War on Drugs – to eradicate illicit drugs and the illicit drug trade – reflects human security’s value of safeguarding individual safety and well-being.

3.2 The War on Drugs: security from what threats?

Justification for the War on Drugs is grounded outside of ‘classical’ security concepts, in a range of threats to individuals and communities associated with the illicit drug trade, primarily: crime, violence, corruption, threats to health and food access, and environmental degradation. The impact of these threats to people in both producer- and consumer-countries underlie the perception of the illicit drug trade as a human security issue. Furthermore, an examination of the key threats, which the War on Drugs is concerned with, shows that they are comparable to those of freedom from fear. In other words, the War on Drugs can be deemed to be primarily concerned with threats to personal and political security, although it also accounts for threats to environmental, food and health security.

Direct violence and crime are the most visible threats to personal security that emerge from the illicit drug trade as they clearly threaten the physical safety and well-being of individuals.⁶⁹ In order to conduct their business affairs, drug traffickers frequently resort to violence and crime, which has led to the murders of

⁶⁸ Eduardo A. Gamarra, “Fighting Drugs in Bolivia: United States and Bolivian Perceptions at Odds,” in *Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality*, ed. Madeline Barbara Leons and Harry Sanabria (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 245.

⁶⁹ The UNDP, Canadian, Norwegian approaches to human security all state the illicit drug trade as threats to human security. Refer to Chapter 2.

policy makers, judges, soldiers, policemen and innocent bystanders.⁷⁰ Violence and crime associated with the illicit drug trade impacts on both individual and community levels and are disruptive to societies and states.

Another adverse side-effect of the illicit drug trade is an increase in corruption.⁷¹ Daniel Caezas, the Chairman of the Bolivian Senate's Commission on Drug Trafficking said: "There is a serious risk that the armed forces could be corrupted by the cancer of drug trafficking...This is too dangerous for such an important institution as the military, which has the responsibility of protecting us."⁷² Corruption can also destabilise democratic institutions and national security.⁷³ Cornelius Friesendorf argues "traffickers bribe politicians, judges, and the police, and thereby undermine state accountability and legitimacy."⁷⁴ The US administration presents the illicit drug trade as the major threat to democracy in the South America region⁷⁵ and the War on Drugs is justified on the grounds of protecting this democracy.⁷⁶ Corruption, and its impact on democracy, demonstrates another association between the War on Drugs and human security as democracy is an important component to good governance, which enables political security; a key focus of freedom from fear approaches.

The impacts of the illicit drug trade are not always viable, nor immediately clear. The War on Drugs is also justified on issues relating to health and food access as

⁷⁰ Cornelius Friesendorf, *US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Displacing the cocaine and heroin industry*, CSS Studies in Security and International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2007), 1.

⁷¹ Madeline Barbara Leons and Harry Sanabria, "Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality and Policy Illusion," in *Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 127; Kai Ambos, "Attempts at Drug Control in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia," *Crime, Law and Social Change* 26, no. 2 (June 1996): 12.

⁷² Jonathan Marshall, *Drug Wars: Corruption, Counterinsurgency and Covert Operations in the Third World* (Forestville: Cohan and Cohen Publishers, 1991), 12.

⁷³ Ellen C. Leichtman, "Bolivia, Coca, and US Foreign Policy," *Critical Criminology* 9, no. 1-2 (September 2000): 82.

⁷⁴ Friesendorf, *US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Displacing the cocaine and heroin industry*, 7.

⁷⁵ Christina Jacqueline Johns, *Power, Ideology, and the War on Drugs*, Praeger Series in Criminology and Crime Control Policy (New York: Praeger, 1992), 134.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 131.

well as environmental degradation, and the impact that the illicit drug trade has on them. Even though these issues are normally considered to be dimensions of freedom from want, in the case of the War on Drugs, these issues are addressed because of the impact that they have on individuals' physical safety and well-being (a freedom from fear concern). This is as opposed to an approach towards human development or human dignity (a freedom from want concern).

The chemicals used to produce illicit drugs (like cocaine) present yet another example of the destructive impact that the illicit drug trade can have. This example also helps to show the link between the War on Drugs and human security's pursuit for health security as these chemicals can lead to debilitating health implications. For example, *pisadores* or *pisacocas* who are hired to stamp on the coca leaves during the cocaine paste making process can spend around seven hours a day walking on "toxic mulch".⁷⁷ While this task earns them 30 Bolivianos (around USD6), they typically end up "crippled from standing in acid and brain-damaged from the fumes."⁷⁸

Food security is another similarity between the War on Drugs and human security. One of the justifications for the War on Drugs is that the money associated with growing illicit crops simply encourages people to stop growing food crops and as a result, malnutrition is on the rise.⁷⁹ In addition to this, because the land is so poor and infertile in Bolivia, it is difficult to cultivate anything on land that has previously grown crops. In the search for new land to cultivate, deforestation is occurring in the Amazon in order to make room for illicit crops and this also "threatens the food security of the region's inhabitants"⁸⁰ (as well as environmental security, see below).

⁷⁷ Tim Elliot, *The Bolivian Times* (Sydney: Random House Australia, 2001), 165.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Gonzalez D. Posso, "Coca, Deforestation and Food Security in the Colombian Amazon Region" (UN FAO, 2000).

⁸⁰ Ibid.

These threats to food security, loss of nutrients in the soil as well as the clearing of land to plant coca, can also be seen as environmental issues and hence reflect environmental security threats. According to Madeline Barbara Léons and Harry Sanabria, the US Information Agency claims that coca growing exhausts the soil of nutrients, therefore making it unsuitable for any other crops.⁸¹ In addition, deforestation leads to the “loss of plant species, destruction of wildlife habitats, and the burning of trees remove protection for the soil”,⁸² which in turn also leads to a loss of nutrients in the soil.

The chemicals used in the production of drugs such as cocaine have also destroyed sensitive natural habitats.⁸³ According to Hans Salm and Máximo Liberman, the disposal of chemicals used to make cocaine paste and cocaine hydrochloride is one of the main threats the illicit drug trade has to the environment. This is because the left-over chemical products required for producing cocaine pollute the soil and water: “the most serious environmental problem of coca lies not with its cultivation but with environmental contamination that results from the use of chemicals employed in the processing of coca leaves in the elaboration of coca paste.”⁸⁴

From the above, it can be seen that the War on Drugs is not concerned with security in the classical sense because the illicit drug trade goes beyond threats to state territory. The illicit drug trade is linked to organised crime, violence and corruption and thereby jeopardises the physical safety and human rights of individuals (which otherwise, as seen in Chapter 2, can be referred to as personal and political security). On top of personal and political security, there are also wider implications relating to food, health and environmental security. Hence,

⁸¹ Léons and Sanabria, “Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality and Policy Illusion,” 35.

⁸² Hans Salm and Máximo Liberman, “Environmental Problems of Coca Cultivation,” in *Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality*, ed. Madeline Barbara Léons and Harry Sanabria (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 220.

⁸³ Friesendorf, *US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Displacing the cocaine and heroin industry*, 1.

⁸⁴ Salm and Liberman, “Environmental Problems of Coca Cultivation,” 221.

justifications for the War on Drugs identify negative side-effects of the illicit drug industry that are analogous to threats to human security, specifically the personal, political, environmental, food and health dimensions. Also as stated by Kai Ambos, proponents of the War on Drugs state that it “leads to the defense of individual freedom rights.”⁸⁵ Therefore, the security threats that the War on Drugs seeks to counter are those defined by human security, rather than the ‘classical security’ model. Not only this, but in particular, the War on Drugs is justified above all else, on goals that are more akin to personal and political security than the other seven UNDP dimensions, and this is typical of a freedom from fear approach. Additionally, even the label of ‘war’ that the War on Drugs has, denotes freedom from fear tendencies as it may be recalled from Chapter 2 that freedom from fear has a focus on threats to physical safety and human rights, especially in times of conflict.

Now that we understand the War on Drugs in terms of protecting the physical safety and human rights of individuals (and communities) from human security-type threats, we need to understand the War on Drugs in terms of freedom from fear and freedom from want. But, in order to do this, we first need to better understand how the War on Drugs has been waged in Bolivia.

3.3 The War on Drugs: security by what means?

On a global level, there are a number of participants in the War on Drugs, but in Bolivia, the key participants are the UN, the US government and the Bolivian government. Chapter 2 demonstrated that the means adopted for a freedom from fear approach include coercion through the non-unilateral use of sanctions and force. In this section, we will look at each of these methods as they are adopted in the War on Drugs through examples from the UN’s, the US’ and Bolivia’s efforts, and by doing so, we will see how the war is conceived of and implemented as a freedom from fear approach.

⁸⁵ Ambos, “Attempts at Drug Control in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia,” 135.

(a) The Use of Sanctions

Sanctions are a core tool to the freedom from fear approach to human security, and they have been used repeatedly in, and against Bolivia. The illicit drug trade has been an issue on the global agenda since well before the end of World War II, however it was after World War II that the international community (with the US playing a prominent role) began participating on a multilateral level in both the creation and implementation of a number of UN conventions.⁸⁶ Cornelius Friesendorf has shown that:

After World War II, the US lobbied successfully for a prohibition regime in the framework of the UN. The international drug control system is based on three conventions: the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 amendment, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances; and the 1988 Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.⁸⁷

The purpose of the 1961 and 1971 treaties are “to codify internationally applicable control measures to not only ensure that narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances do not get diverted to illicit channels,”⁸⁸ but also to ensure that they are available for medical and scientific purposes. The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs includes the coca leaf (from which cocaine is derived) as one of the substances to be controlled under the treaty.⁸⁹ Specifically, Article 49(1)(c) stipulates that a party to the treaty may reserve the right to temporarily allow coca leaf chewing within its territory, however this is subject to Article 49(2)(e).⁹⁰ Article 49(2)(e) states that coca chewing must be abolished within 25 years of the treaty coming into force.⁹¹ Both the 1961 and 1971 treaties also include general provisions on trafficking and drug abuse.⁹² The 1971 convention was established to deal with psychoactive substances as the 1961 convention is restricted to coca,

⁸⁶ Friesendorf, *US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Displacing the cocaine and heroin industry*, 10.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 9-10.

⁸⁸ “United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime website,” <http://www.unodc.org>.

⁸⁹ United Nations, *Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs as amended by the 1972 protocol*, 1961, Article 2(1) and Schedule 1.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, Article 49(1)(c).

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, Article 49(2)(e).

⁹² “United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime website.”

opium and cannabis related drugs. The 1988 treaty provides additional measures for enforcing the 1961 and 1971 treaties.⁹³ These three conventions are the major international treaties in force to address the global illicit drug issue and together give the first indication of the collective use of sanctions to the War on Drugs. The UN drug treaties approach drugs, including coca, as threats to the physical safety and well being of individuals and communities, thereby conceiving drugs as a threat to freedom from fear, as opposed to freedom from want.

In terms of US anti-drug efforts, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 1986 was one of the first pieces of US legislation to provide rewards of foreign assistance and favourable access to the US market for drug-producing and transit countries that adopt US anti-drug initiatives. Aware that their approach was being undermined by corruption, the US government established the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, under which Congress requires the US president to annually determine whether a country has been appropriately cooperative with America's anti-drugs effort.⁹⁴ If a country is 'certified' then it is rewarded. On the other hand, if the president 'decertifies' a country, or if Congress overturns the president's certification, this could lead to the suspension of US aid (except that relating to counter-narcotics and humanitarian support). Decertification could also mean the prevention of receiving loans from organisations, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank, the end of preferential tariff treatment, restrictions on air traffic between the US and the affected country, increased duties on the country's exports to the US, and it might also mean facing full sanctions.⁹⁵ This is another example of where we can see the collective (or non-unilateral) use of sanctions as certification plays an important economic tool for the fight in the War on Drugs. As Friesendorf says, it has "been a powerful means for influencing the policies

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Marshall, *Drug Wars: Corruption, Counterinsurgency and Covert Operations in the Third World*, 11.

⁹⁵ Friesendorf, *US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Displacing the cocaine and heroin industry*, 11.

and politics of states such as Bolivia, whose economy is highly dependent on US aid.”⁹⁶

The Andean Trade Preference Act is an act that operates in a similar vein to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act. Passed in 1990, under the guidance and support of President George H. W. Bush and his appointed Drug Czar, William Bennett,⁹⁷ the Andean Trade Preference Act 1990 provided a tariff-exemption programme for Andean nations. This piece of legislation gave (and still gives) South America’s cocaine-producing and transit countries⁹⁸ preferential access to the US market. It does this by allowing these countries to export thousands of products to the US free of duty. The intention behind the Andean Trade Preference Act is to give producer-countries an incentive to fight the War on Drugs. However, any benefit under this programme is subject to the countries meeting certain criteria and considerations. These criteria and considerations include whether a country is a communist country, whether it gives preferential treatment to the products of another developed country, as well as whether it meets the narcotics cooperation certification criteria (mentioned above).⁹⁹ Like the certification process, compliance with these criteria is verified on an annual basis and failure to meet these standards leads to a loss of trade-exemption privileges. The US’ array of sanctions are a response to the freedom from fear driven perception of drugs as a threat to the physical safety and well-being of individuals and communities in consumer-countries. Little consideration appears to have been given to the economic impacts of the sanctions thus risking the freedom from want of communities in producer-countries in favour of seeking freedom from fear in consumer-countries.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ This legislation was later renewed and amended by the George W. Bush administration through the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act in 2002. The amendments under the 2002 statute opened up the tariff-exemptions programme to exports that were previously not included in the 1991 Act.

⁹⁸ These countries are: Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and Ecuador.

⁹⁹ Andean Trade Preference Act 1991

In addition to the UN and US' anti-drug efforts (by way of sanctions) it is worth mentioning two examples where Bolivia has adopted sanctions into its domestic law, which are consistent with the UN and US approach. Specifically, according to Robert H. Holden and Eric Zolov, Bolivia has "passed laws, created institutions and adopted antinarcotics strategies shaped by U.S. concerns."¹⁰⁰ Examples of these are the Law of Coca and Controlled Substances (Ley del Régimen de la Coca y Sustancias Controladas, but otherwise known as Ley or Law 1008) and Plan Dignity.

The Bolivian government in July 1988 adopted Law 1008. This piece of legislation is a good example of the non-unilateral use of both sanctions and force, as described by the freedom from fear approach to human security. As provided by Ellen C. Leichtman, the enactment of Law 1008 was not solely due to Bolivia acting alone as "the US played a major role in the passage of [Law] 1008."¹⁰¹ With regard to the use of sanctions, Law 1008 was established to broaden the powers of the Bolivian police force and military in order to assist them to better enforce coca eradication policies. Law 1008 provided for voluntary eradication of crops planted before 1988 and voluntary eradication was complemented by alternative development. This piece of legislation also created a special drug court, special drug prosecutors and an anti-drug police force.¹⁰²

One of the most notable acts of coercion through the threat of sanctions occurred in late 1997. In response to US pressure in the form of threats to cut foreign assistance, the former military dictator and newly constitutionally-elected president, Hugo Suarez Banzer developed and committed himself to Plan Dignity

¹⁰⁰ Robert H. Holden and Eric Zolov, eds., *Latin America and the United States: A Documentary History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 340-341.

¹⁰¹ Leichtman, "Bolivia, Coca, and US Foreign Policy," 82.

¹⁰² Linda Farthing, "Social Impact Associated with Antidrug Law 1008," in *Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality*, ed. Madeline Barbara Leons and Harry Sanabria (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 256.

(Plan Dignidad),¹⁰³ which then became supported by the US through financial, military and intelligence assistance.¹⁰⁴ From 1998, the government implemented this aggressive eradication campaign, which had the aim of eliminating illegal coca cultivation (in other words, coca cultivation areas outside of those classified as Zone One under Law 1008) within five years.¹⁰⁵ Like Law 1008, Plan Dignity is another example of Bolivian legislation that combines the use of sanctions and force. However, the difference between Plan Dignity and Law 1008 is that instead of focusing on individuals, Plan Dignity focused on communities by offering community compensation for voluntary eradication,¹⁰⁶ which after five years would no longer be available.¹⁰⁷ In order to carry out this agenda, Plan Dignity further broadened military power to make forced eradication and interdiction (through the destruction of fábricas) possible.¹⁰⁸

The range of sanctions discussed in this section, both domestic and foreign, are valid to a freedom from fear approach to security. The use of sanctions in the context of the War on Drugs in Bolivia is also relevant to the wider concept of human security because these sanctions are in place for a non-state (that is to say a non-classical security threat) – the illicit drug trade.

(b) The Use of Non-Unilateral Force

The violent consequences of the illicit drug trade necessitate some element of force in order to meet the threats produced by the industry. The use of force as part of the War on Drugs is of relevance to this thesis as it is non-unilateral, and therefore in line with a freedom from fear approach to human security. The use of non-unilateral force became apparent in the War on Drugs in 1986, with the US-

¹⁰³ James Patton, "Counterdevelopment and the Bolivian Coca War," *Praxis: The Fletcher Journal of Development Studies* 17 (2002): 3.

¹⁰⁴ Solimar Santos, "Unintended Consequences of United States' Foreign Drug Policy in Bolivia," *Inter-American Law Review* 33, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 138.

¹⁰⁵ Friesendorf, *US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Displacing the cocaine and heroin industry*, 134.

¹⁰⁶ Santos, "Unintended Consequences of United States' Foreign Drug Policy in Bolivia," 139.

¹⁰⁷ Patton, "Counterdevelopment and the Bolivian Coca War," 4.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

led on-the-ground programmes in Bolivia (and various other parts of the Andes). Examples of these programmes are, Operations Black Furnace and Snow Cap, which were cooperative operations between the US and Bolivia. As stated by Friesendorf:

in July 1986, the administration sent around 160 army personnel, six Black Hawk helicopters, and equipment to Bolivia. In the framework of the four-month Operation Black Furnace, US personnel cooperated with Bolivian security forces in the destruction of cocaine laboratories in the Beni and Santa Cruz regions and in the arrest of traffickers. In spring 1987, the US launched another anti-drug campaign, Operation Snowcap.¹⁰⁹

Both operations, Blast Furnace and Snowcap, were designed to eradicate coca crops from the Bolivian jungles.¹¹⁰ This was in an effort to disrupt the production and trafficking of cocaine. In these operations, the US military and Bolivian security forces destroyed cocaine laboratories (fábricas) and coca crops, arrested drug traffickers and confiscated drugs.¹¹¹

Another example of non-unilateral use of force is the Air Bridge Denial Program, which operated from the late 1980s to 2001, and involved the shooting down of aircraft suspected of trafficking illicit drugs. The thinking behind the Air Bridge Denial Program was based on the premise that (at least until the mid-1990s) a majority of the world's coca was grown in Bolivia and Peru, however most of the cocaine refinement took place in Colombia.¹¹² In order for this to happen, coca leaves were turned into coca paste (or cocaine base) in the originating country before being transported to Colombia for the final stage of the cocaine-making process (which involves turning the coca paste or cocaine base into cocaine hydrochloride). The most common way to transport coca paste from Bolivia (or Peru) was by small aircraft. Eventually drug traffickers established a drug trafficking route, known as an air bridge, which was what the Air Bridge Denial

¹⁰⁹ Friesendorf, *US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Displacing the cocaine and heroin industry*, 81.

¹¹⁰ Johns, *Power, Ideology, and the War on Drugs*, 35.

¹¹¹ Friesendorf, *US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Displacing the cocaine and heroin industry*, 11.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 89.

Program was developed to put an end to.¹¹³ The Air Bridge Denial Program was intended to work in two ways; first of all, by preventing the coca paste from getting to Colombia, the Bolivian, (and Peruvian) coca farmers (known as *cocaleros*) would lose their custom; and secondly, cocaine producers in Colombia would have little material to work with, which would therefore lead to a reduction in cocaine.¹¹⁴ It involved the police, military and intelligence forces from Bolivia, Peru and Colombia, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Coast Guard from the US.¹¹⁵ These forces worked together to: detect airstrips and airplanes; arrest traffickers; and interdict suspicious planes (either by seizure or shoot down).¹¹⁶ The militarised use of non-unilateral force to deny coca farmers of markets was aimed at strengthening the freedom from fear of producer-, as well as consumer-countries, by undermining the organisations responsible for the illicit drug trade. However, this approach to freedom from fear was made without apparent consideration for the livelihoods of coca farmers, thereby endangering their freedom from want.

These examples of non-unilateral uses of force are US-led initiatives, however the Bolivian government has also initiated its own forms of non-unilateral force and thus further illustrating the War on Drugs as characteristic of a freedom from fear approach. For example, Fuerza Especial de Cucha Contra el Narcotráfico – the Special Force for Fighting Drug Trafficking (FELCN) was created as the “national elite drug force”¹¹⁷ to lead Bolivia’s anti-drug effort. According to Madeline Barbara Léons and Harry Sanabria, the FELCN is heavily influenced by the DEA through advice and training (although this may not be the case now) and

¹¹³ As per *ibid.*, 90, the Air Bridge Denial Program’s main goal was to destroy the air bridge, but it was also tasked to stop traffickers from transporting cocaine from Colombia to transit zones near the U.S.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 89.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 90.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 79.

¹¹⁷ Léons and Sanabria, “Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality and Policy Illusion,” 12.

has salaries paid directly through US aid¹¹⁸.¹¹⁹ This unit consists of police officers, as well as officers from the navy and the air force, and it has military training in low-intensity conflict and operates mainly in Beni.¹²⁰

Along with FELCN, Unidad Móvil de Patrullaje Rural – Mobile Rural Patrol Unit, Bolivia (UMOPAR) was established as the uniformed interdiction component of FELCN, with paramilitary functions. It was specifically established to fight the War on Drugs and is based in the Chapare.¹²¹ Tim Elliot noted, “like all of Bolivia’s anti-drug agencies, UMOPAR was trained and directed by the USA.”¹²² UMOPAR officers are supposed to act under the direction and in the presence of the special drug prosecutors, but there are only two in the Chapare region with about 12 to 15 patrols occurring daily.¹²³

Both FELCN and UMOPAR engage in the interdiction, search, patrol, destruction of fábricas, and arrest of suspects. The Bolivian security force’s pursuit of criminal activity has occurred with little regard to the human rights violations created by the drive for higher arrests.

From the examples provided in this section, it can be seen that the War on Drugs is not concerned with security in the classical sense because the illicit drug trade goes beyond the actions of nation states. The illicit drug trade is the transnational threat of non-state actors, whereby responses require the cooperation of states. In this instance, it is the UN, the US and the Bolivian governments working together to combat the coca growers and cocaine traffickers who form an inherent part of the cocaine drug trade. The means that these participants have adopted to fight

¹¹⁸ Although this may no longer be the case since the expulsion of the DEA from Bolivia in November 2008.

¹¹⁹ Leons and Sanabria, “Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality and Policy Illusion,” 12.

¹²⁰ Fernando García Argañaras, “The Drug War at the Supply End: the case of Bolivia,” *Latin American Perspectives* 24, no. 5 (September 1997): 73.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Elliot, *The Bolivian Times*, 164.

¹²³ Farthing, “Social Impact Associated with Antidrug Law 1008,” 264.

the War on Drugs are not the 'hard power' solutions that would otherwise dominate a classical security approach, but instead the use of coercion tactics through the use of non-unilateral sanctions and force. In addition to the threats identified by the War on Drugs, the means adopted to achieve the agenda also demonstrate the War on Drugs as typical of a freedom from fear approach.

This chapter has demonstrated that the War on Drugs in Bolivia is typical of a pursuit for human security as it seeks to free individuals from crime, violence, corruption, environmental degradation, and threats to food and health access, associated with the illicit drug trade. Furthermore, this chapter has shown that it is appropriate and analytically productive to typify the War on Drugs in Bolivia (that involves the use of military force, coercion and sanctions to achieve its agenda) in terms of a policy that accords with the tenets of freedom from fear. Now with this background on the War on Drugs in Bolivia, we can turn to the case study to examine the tensions between freedom from fear and freedom from want as well as how a freedom from fear approach can marginalise and even contest freedom from want.

CHAPTER 4: THE WAR ON DRUGS IN BOLIVIA AND THE TENSION BETWEEN FREEDOM FROM FEAR AND FREEDOM FROM WANT

In the previous chapter we saw that the War on Drugs is justified on the basis of protecting the safety and well-being of individuals, with particular regard to the human security principles of personal and political security (although environmental, health and food security also have their place in the War on Drugs rhetoric). We also saw that the means adopted for achieving this agenda involved coercion through the use of force and sanctions, which is consistent with a freedom from fear approach to human security.

By bearing in mind what we have already uncovered, this chapter will examine how the War on Drugs has impacted upon the individuals of Bolivia. By doing so it will become apparent that despite the desired outcome of protecting individual safety and well-being, the War on Drugs has actually compromised the safety and well-being of Bolivians. In addition, not only has the War on Drugs failed to accomplish what it set out to by failing to achieve personal, political and environmental security, but it has also challenged freedom from want. The War on Drugs in Bolivia compromises freedom from want by marginalising or threatening economic, community, food and health security, and thus it defies claims that freedom from fear and freedom from want are complementary. Friesendorf identified some of the challenges created by the War on Drugs in Bolivia, noting “US coercive drug policies have made matters worse, since the implementation of drug prohibition creates side effects such as human rights abuses, a weaker control of armed forces, violent conflict, environmental destruction, and corruption.”¹²⁴ By using the seven dimensions provided for by the UNDP Human Development Report 1994 to examine the War on Drugs in Bolivia, we can see freedom from fear and freedom from want are at odds with each other. This chapter will focus on personal, political, economic, community, and environmental security, but it will also address health and food security to further demonstrate the tension between these two ideas. It will be set out as

¹²⁴ Friesendorf, *US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Displacing the cocaine and heroin industry*, 2.

follows: first, by the use of coercion through force and sanctions, the War on Drugs in Bolivia threatens political, personal and environmental security; second and third, by typifying freedom from fear, it can be seen that the War on Drugs in Bolivia marginalises economic and community security, and fails to benefit from the holistic approach offered by freedom from want.

4.1 The Means Used to Fight the War on Drugs in Bolivia Threatens its Own Goals of Personal, Political, and Environmental Security

The War on Drugs in Bolivia is justified on the grounds of protecting the personal, political, and environmental security of individuals threatened by the negative side-effects of the illicit drug industry. However, the use of coercion, through force and sanctions, in the War on Drugs in Bolivia has actually compromised these goals.

(a) Personal Security

As already discussed in Chapter 2, personal security is about freedom from crime as well as physical violence from the state, other states, other groups of people, individuals, gangs and threats to the self. This particular dimension has a focus on women and children.¹²⁵

One of the key justifications for the War on Drugs is the need to protect individuals from physical violence as a result of the illicit drug trade. However, even though Bolivia is the third biggest cultivator of coca in the world, Peter Andreas asserts that, “it has so far avoided the kind of organized armed violence that has defined its other drug exporting neighbours.”¹²⁶ On the contrary, the War on Drugs strategy of forced eradication or eradication through coercion has actually resulted in violence and repression, which threatens the personal security of Bolivian peasant farmers. For example, Plan Dignity, which was discussed in Chapter 3, began in 1997 as the brainchild of the former military dictator,

¹²⁵ United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report*, 30.

¹²⁶ Richard Friman and Peter Andreas, eds., *The Illicit Global Economy and State Power* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 650.

President Hugo Banzer. As an aggressive eradication campaign, Plan Dignity was anything but dignified. The aim of Plan Dignity was to abolish all illicit coca cultivation within five years. The plan was heralded as a success, with claims that coca cultivation had been halved and cocaine production possibly reduced by a third,¹²⁷ but this came at the cost of a loss of personal security for some, with numerous deaths and more than 350 farmers injured or detained.¹²⁸

Law 1008, which was enacted in 1988, is another example of how the War on Drugs in Bolivia brings violence (and repression) into the lives of the Bolivian peasant farming family. As stated by Linda Farthing with regard to Law 1008:

“Law 1008 has resulted in a victimization of the poor, just as anti-drug efforts in the U.S. have done. These people, who represent the majority of Bolivia’s population, have been subject to abuse, arbitrary arrest, a lack of due process, and as a result, extended incarceration, frequently for crimes they have not committed.”¹²⁹

Furthermore, by targeting those at the bottom of the socio-economic and cultural structure (for example rural peasant and urban poor)¹³⁰ these anti-coca/anti-drug policies exacerbate the social, cultural and economic divide that exists between Bolivia’s rich and poor and thereby further threatening the personal security of the Bolivian population by creating instability amongst its society.

From these two examples, it can be seen that the coercive and forceful tactics of the War on Drugs (in Bolivia) have in the process of trying to protect individuals from violence actually subjected them to violence, repression, human rights abuses and social, political and economic instability. Additionally in contrast to the War on Drugs’ justification that the coca/cocaine industry creates instability, the War on Drugs has itself, in some cases, increased instability. Andreas goes further to actually say that the coca/cocaine industry helps to bring stability

¹²⁷ European NGO Council on Drugs and Development, *Drugs and Development Newsletter*, No. 27 (Antwerp, 2001), 2.

¹²⁸ Nick Constable, *This is Cocaine* (London: Sanctuary Publishing Ltd, 2002), 164.

¹²⁹ Farthing, “Social Impact Associated with Antidrug Law 1008,” 255-256.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 253.

through the income and employment opportunities it creates: “in some contexts, the revenue and employment generated by the illegal economy can even help to stabilize a volatile situation.”¹³¹

(b) Political Security

Political security was also discussed in Chapter 2, but to recap, political security is about protecting people from human rights violations and state oppression through good governance. UNDP considers this value to be one of the most important aspects of human security.¹³² The 1994 UNDP report states that “one of the most useful indicators of political insecurity in a country is the priority the government accords military strength” and this “shows up in the ratio of military to social spending”.¹³³

(i) Human rights abuses

The War on Drugs has been justified as seeking to uphold principles of good governance and individual freedom from human rights abuses and state oppression in Bolivia by fighting corruption, which has destabilised Bolivia’s democratic institutions. Conversely however, the War on Drugs has resulted in a number of human rights abuses on the part of executive (including military) and judicial officials responsible for enforcing the War on Drugs-influenced law. Human rights abuses have included, but are not limited to: incarceration without trial, denial of bail, questionable fair trials, repressive or coercive acts, direct violence itself, and sometimes death. These examples of human rights abuses are discussed in more detail below.

Anyone who is accused of a crime under Law 1008 has to be imprisoned until and during the time of his/her trial.¹³⁴ But, Law 1008 requires a three-step judicial process, and this process can take between two to four years before the accused

¹³¹ Friman and Andreas, *The Illicit Global Economy and State Power*, 650.

¹³² United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report*, 32.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Under Article 109 of Law 1008.

can be sentenced or acquitted.¹³⁵ During this time, the accused is denied bail and the whole process has very little respect for individual rights and limited universal or impartial application of the rule of law.¹³⁶ In response to this, Human Rights Watch has determined that “both the denial of pre-trial and post-acquittal release in Law 1008 violates internationally established protections for the right to personal liberty.”¹³⁷ Moreover, when a case does make it to court, there is pressure on judicial officials to produce results through sentencing¹³⁸ because any acquittals are regarded as suspicious.¹³⁹

In addition, the nature of the crimes that people are arrested for are at times dubious. Every day household products, like bleach, can be used to help produce cocaine and under Law 1008, it is possible to arrest people for carrying these products (regardless of the amount). During the crackdowns, officers who were concerned with increasing their arrest numbers¹⁴⁰ targeted those individuals carrying personal amounts of these types of products.¹⁴¹ These actions also demonstrate how Law 1008 indirectly boosts “the powers of police and eradication officials to engage in increasingly violent repression in coca cultivating peasants and others at the lower echelons of the coca economy.”¹⁴²

¹³⁵ Under Article 121 of Law 1008, the three-step judicial process involves first of all having the trial heard in the Special Drug Court. If the accused is acquitted in this court, then the Special Drug Prosecutor must appeal the case to the Superior Court. If the accused is again acquitted, the Supreme Court then automatically appeals the case. It is only at the Supreme Court stage that the accused has any chance of being released. This whole process can take anywhere between two and four years with the accused in prison for the entire period.

¹³⁶ Patton, “Counterdevelopment and the Bolivian Coca War,” 5.

¹³⁷ Farthing, “Social Impact Associated with Antidrug Law 1008,” 258.

¹³⁸ Under Articles 82, 121, 127, 128 and 129, sentences apply to judges, prosecutors and attorneys suspected of favouring drug traffickers.

¹³⁹ Farthing, “Social Impact Associated with Antidrug Law 1008,” 259.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 265.

¹⁴¹ Patton, “Counterdevelopment and the Bolivian Coca War,” 5.

¹⁴² Farthing, “Social Impact Associated with Antidrug Law 1008,” 254.

Those convicted under Law 1008 are not eligible for amnesty, pardon or a commutation of sentence, even though others, who have committed crimes under separate areas of Bolivian law, are.¹⁴³ Law 1008 prisoners often spend more time in prison than their sentences require. This is because of the amount of time it takes to run the judicial process. Even so, no compensation is made to those who are found innocent or who spend longer in prison than is required.¹⁴⁴ As a direct result, during its first years, Law 1008 led to a massive explosion of prison populations. For example, eight men and two women were imprisoned in 1987 for coca/cocaine related offences whereas 175 men and 80 women were imprisoned in 1994. These human rights abuses stem from the freedom from fear approach that is characteristic of the War on Drugs in Bolivia. These examples therefore illustrate that despite the War on Drugs being justified on the grounds of protecting individuals from human rights abuses it is in fact creating them.

Force and repression have had an increasingly prominent role in coca eradication and cocaine interdiction, especially since the establishment of Law 1008. The term ‘voluntary’ eradication is deceptive because it hides the range of repressive acts that compel peasant farmers to ‘voluntarily’ destroy their coca. These acts vary from the “use of violent, arbitrary arrests, verbal threats and other forms of intimidation to more subtle forms of coercion, such as claims by officials of the Coca Eradication Bureau that compensation funds were rapidly depleted and that unless growers quickly ‘volunteered’ to destroy their coca shrubs the officials would do it instead without compensation.”¹⁴⁵

The use of force in the War on Drugs by UMOPAR and the US DEA, Special Forces and other US bodies is another example where political security has been compromised. Civil and human rights abuses have occurred despite force being

¹⁴³ Ibid., 258.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 259.

¹⁴⁵ Paul T. Cohen, “Help as a Threat: alternative development and the ‘War on Drugs’ in Bolivia and Laos,” *Development Bulletin*, no. 69, Illicit Drugs and Development (February 2009): 32.

used in partnership. For example, a study conducted by the Andean Information Network revealed cases against UMOPAR

where victims had been shot, submerged under water, beaten while suspended in the air, burned with cigarettes, forcibly injected with unknown substances, tortured with electric shock, severely beaten and repeatedly threatened with death. Many of these violations have occurred during interrogation, but they have also been committed against people neither accused of any crime nor arrested.¹⁴⁶

The DEA, the US Special Forces and other US-led bodies have also reportedly committed these abuses. What is more, victims of these abuses have no right of redress through the courts as “there are no administrative or judicial mechanisms in place in Bolivia to demand the accountability of the anti-drug forces”¹⁴⁷ and tend to come from the lower socio-economic sector of Bolivian society.¹⁴⁸

This arbitrary, repressive, violent and sometimes fatal treatment towards coca peasants and the failure to respect internationally accepted human rights norms of due process and fair and impartial trials threatens the political security of Bolivians. Not only has the War on Drugs in Bolivia disregarded the notions of human rights and freedom from state oppression that it was established to uphold, but it has also failed to protect the democratic institutions it justifies itself on defending. For instance, the War on Drugs is justified by the rhetoric that US military aid programmes and assistance “help to ensure a monopoly of state control over the national territory and even foster democracy, human rights, and military accountability.”¹⁴⁹ On the contrary, this partnering of force in the War on Drugs indirectly threatens Bolivia’s democratic process. As expressed by Hans Salm and Máximo Liberman, a stronger military merely weakens a democracy because it increases the potential for military rule.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁶ Farthing, “Social Impact Associated with Antidrug Law 1008,” 264.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 266.

¹⁴⁸ Argañaras, “The Drug War at the Supply End: the case of Bolivia,” 73-74.

¹⁴⁹ Friesendorf, *US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Displacing the cocaine and heroin industry*, 16.

¹⁵⁰ Salm and Liberman, “Environmental Problems of Coca Cultivation,” 224.

The use of force as a means to manage the threats created by the illicit drug trade, and indeed the conceptualisation of anti-drug trade security measures (as in the War on Drugs), is based on a perception of the illicit drug trade that portrays a freedom from fear approach. This perception, and its resulting use of force as a security measure reveals a failure to conceive of the illicit drug trade as a security threat that results from want, rather than aggression.

(ii) Threat to Bolivia's democratic institutions

The War on Drugs has led to a widening of the scope of military functions and a blurring between police and defence roles in Bolivia. For example, in March 1990, the Commander-in-Chief of Bolivian armed forces revealed that US military assistance to Bolivia was conditional upon the participation of the Bolivian military in the counter-narcotics effort (as part of Plan Dignity).¹⁵¹ This was the first time the Bolivian military played an active part in the counter-narcotics effort. Traditionally, armed forces are seen as the specialists in defending the nation against any attacks from foreign governments. However, Bolivia was a country that had been democratic for less than 25 years at the time that Plan Dignity came into place and as F. G. Argañaras argued, "employing the Bolivian military as an agent of law enforcement against drugs and producers of coca leaves has brought the military directly into the civil arena in a new but no less worrisome guise."¹⁵² Instead of creating a well-funded role for the Bolivian military, the Bolivian government should have been strengthening its democratic institutions.¹⁵³

The War on Drugs is a major threat to the development of Bolivia's democratic institutions. The training and funding of Bolivia's police and military is essential to the War on Drugs' use of force, however the Bolivian police and military have historically shown quite undemocratic tendencies. As stated by Christina

¹⁵¹ Argañaras, "The Drug War at the Supply End: the case of Bolivia," 64-65.

¹⁵² Ibid., 75.

¹⁵³ Constable, *This is Cocaine*, 164-165.

Jacqueline Johns in *Power, Ideology, and the War on Drugs*, “even though such training may decrease the rampant brutality of some units, US funding generally increases military control of the levers of power. In many cases as well, training and funding merely make the repression more sophisticated.”¹⁵⁴

Bolivia’s democratic institutions have also been undermined by the presence of corruption. As stated in Chapter 3, the abolishment of corruption is one of the main justifications for the War on Drugs in Bolivia. Ironically, however, the more the US trained and equipped Bolivia’s enforcement agencies to fight the War on Drugs, the stronger the incentive became for drug traffickers to bribe them.¹⁵⁵

Johns explains,

the War on Drugs has also had negative effects on police institutions in [Bolivia] by promoting even more questionable police tactics and even more widespread corruption than existed before the U.S.-initiated War on Drugs. DEA agents are reportedly as afraid of the police they work with in [Bolivia] as of the drug traffickers they are supposed to arrest.¹⁵⁶

Alarming, from this it can be seen that the more aggressively the War on Drugs is fought in Bolivia, the more corruption spreads.

Corruption is rife amongst the government, military and police in Bolivia because the meagre salaries of these officers are in no position to compete against the bribes of the traffickers. Friesendorf noted that:

“In Bolivia, during the 1980s, traffickers reportedly offered Unidades Móviles de Patrullaje Rural (UMOPAR) officers and town officials between \$15,000 and \$25,000 for keeping quiet for 72 hours to allow small aircraft to land, pick up drug lords, and take off again. Some officials due to a small salary and a monthly U.S. supplement ranging from \$50 to \$100, found it difficult to turn down such offers.”¹⁵⁷

Another aspect of the War on Drugs that aggravates the corruption problem in Bolivia is Law 1008. It is known that any arrest under Law 1008 leads to a long-term imprisonment (purely because of how long the judicial process takes) and

¹⁵⁴ Johns, *Power, Ideology, and the War on Drugs*, 139-140.

¹⁵⁵ Bertram et al., *Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial*, 17-18.

¹⁵⁶ Johns, *Power, Ideology, and the War on Drugs*, 147.

¹⁵⁷ Friesendorf, *US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Displacing the cocaine and heroin industry*, 109.

this knowledge can therefore be used to the advantage of corrupt officers. For example:

“[Law 1008] has enhanced corruption on the part of the police, large numbers of persons languish in prison awaiting trial, rural (primarily peasant) detainees cannot argue their cases as well as their urban (non-peasant) counterparts, and that virtually all of the detainees under Law 1008 are poor and face serious charges in a judicial structure that is notorious for its inefficiency and corruption.”¹⁵⁸

Therefore, despite political security being a feature in the War on Drugs through the notions of good governance, the use of force has led to the strengthening of Bolivia’s military, as well as increased incentives for corruption. Both of which have led to the weakening of good governance within Bolivia. The focus on strengthening the military and law enforcement aspects of Bolivia’s government, without an equal focus on strengthening democratic institutions and human rights, suggests a failure by the War on Drugs participants to understand the interconnected nature of today’s security threats, such as those of the illicit drug trade.

(iii) Erosion of Bolivia’s sovereignty

Related to the weakening of Bolivia’s good governance is the idea that the use of coercion (through the threat of sanctions) in the War on Drugs has eroded Bolivia’s state sovereignty. The most harmful of the threats to Bolivia’s sovereignty seems to be the ongoing pressure on the judicial and executive branch (including the military) to comply with US directives. This is despite the fact that these directives may directly or indirectly threaten or contradict Bolivia’s constitution, the will of the Bolivian people, and/or international norms of sovereignty (for example, the recognition of non-interference with the internal actions of other sovereign states). As stated by Argañaras, “when neither the congress nor the Supreme Court nor the executive of a small country can operate independently of a superpower and key decisions are taken without consultation,

¹⁵⁸ Farthing, “Social Impact Associated with Antidrug Law 1008,” 253-254.

it follows that some political goods obtained through elections are circulating at less than their full value.”¹⁵⁹

Bolivia’s involvement in the War on Drugs often involves Bolivia being coerced to act in a manner that is inconsistent to its own interest and thereby illustrating its inability to protect its own sovereignty. This vulnerability is due to Bolivia’s dependency on the US as well as America’s willingness to exploit this by threatening to let Bolivia’s participation in the War on Drugs impact US foreign assistance to Bolivia.¹⁶⁰ Bolivia’s position is also weakened by its unfavourable place in the global economy, which makes it more vulnerable to coercion.¹⁶¹ Below are some examples where Bolivia has been compelled to act in contradiction to its own interests.

The Clinton Administration threatened to not only cut aid to Bolivia if it failed to eradicate set quotas of coca, but it also threatened to lobby the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to stop loans. In response to these threats, President Sanchez de Lozada said: “I can claim bitterly...it’s very embarrassing to be the president of the country and have these ultimatums. It really rubs salt into the wounds of your independence. But we’re in a hard position. If we end up losing these funds, we’re dead.”¹⁶²

The use of coercion through the threat of sanctions in the War on Drugs has compromised Bolivia’s sovereignty and thereby impacted upon the political security idea of good governance. This result, from an approach that epitomises freedom from fear, is in contrast with both freedom from want and freedom from fear itself. Additionally, the use of coercion in the War on Drugs illustrates the tension between freedom from want and freedom from fear. For example, the compromising of Bolivia’s sovereignty shows that the use of sanctions and

¹⁵⁹ Argañaras, “The Drug War at the Supply End: the case of Bolivia,” 76.

¹⁶⁰ Gamarra, “Fighting Drugs in Bolivia: United States and Bolivian Perceptions at Odds,” 248.

¹⁶¹ Leons and Sanabria, “Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality and Policy Illusion,” 38.

¹⁶² Elliot, *The Bolivian Times*, 20.

coercion exploit Bolivia's vulnerability as a developing country due to its dependency on foreign assistance. Further, by doing so this means of achieving human security exacerbates the inequities of the international structure, which is in direct confrontation with a freedom from want approach that attempts to restructure the international community in an equitable manner.

In summary, by using coercion through force and sanctions, the War on Drugs threatens political security in terms of abusing human rights and undermining good governance (which includes democracy and sovereignty), which are valued by both freedom from want and freedom from fear. Furthermore, these strategies, which typify a freedom from fear approach, have also conflicted with outcomes pursued by freedom from want.

(c) Environmental Security

Environmental security is about the integrity of land, air and water because this is what makes human habitation possible.¹⁶³ Water scarcity, water pollution, increased pressures on land, deforestation, desertification, air pollution, and natural disasters have all been cited as threats to environmental security.¹⁶⁴

Protection for the environment is another rationale behind the War on Drugs in Bolivia and it is argued as two points. First of all, the slash and burn techniques used to clear land in order to facilitate the planting of coca crops leads to the destruction of important ecosystems and also leads to soil erosion. Secondly, the chemical run-off as the result of cocaine production leads to water and soil pollution. While the second assertion is a real problem with the cocaine industry, this section will assert that the approaches adopted in the War on Drugs in Bolivia to eradicate coca crops are actually just as threatening to environmental security. It has been argued that coca cultivation is not as harmful to the environment as is claimed and that it is actually beneficial for Bolivia's environment.

¹⁶³ United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report*, 28-30.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 29.

To begin with, the first concern that the War on Drugs claims environmental security for is a red herring because the soil is so infertile in Bolivia that any new crops to be planted (coca and other) would involve the clearing of new land. Furthermore, because coca continues to produce for up to thirty years, the requirement to clear land for new crops is far less than that of annual crops.¹⁶⁵ The coca substitution and alternative development programmes, that supplement the War on Drugs, threaten environmental security as no other crop can be planted where coca (or any other crop that has been planted for a substantive period) has been previously because of the poor quality of the soil and nutrient depletion. Therefore, alternative crops need to be planted elsewhere, potentially causing people to move to virgin lands. In a country like Bolivia, this only leaves the Amazon, which will require clearing, the removal of forest cover¹⁶⁶ and therefore soil erosion. In lieu of alternative crops, any forced eradication could also lead to coca cultivation spreading from the Yungas and the Chapare to other parts of Bolivia where coca does not currently exist. This would also threaten other ecological preserves.¹⁶⁷

Furthermore, one of the key approaches to the War on Drugs in Bolivia is the spraying of herbicides over coca fields from low-flying aircrafts. Unfortunately, as Friesendorf points out, not only do defoliants destroy coca plants, but they also harm other plants, as well as animals. What is more, herbicides pollute rivers and soil in sensitive ecosystems.¹⁶⁸ Another way in which the War on Drugs creates a threat to environmental security is through the clearing of land for the logistics of establishing the eradication and interdiction policies. One example of this is the

¹⁶⁵ Leons and Sanabria, "Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality and Policy Illusion," 35.

¹⁶⁶ Salm and Liberman, "Environmental Problems of Coca Cultivation," 224.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Friesendorf, *US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Displacing the cocaine and heroin industry*, 16.

Air Bridge Denial Program, which involved environmental destruction through the process of constructing airbases and radar stations.¹⁶⁹

As mentioned, it has been argued that coca cultivation has multiple benefits including characteristics of sustainable agriculture. As James Patton says: “the truth, however, is that coca is more environmentally sound in numerous ways than many alternative crops.”¹⁷⁰ Firstly, coca plants provide shelter to protect the soil from wind or rain erosion. Moreover, as the coca plant grows, its roots help to keep the soil in place and its leaves help to provide shelter from sun, water and wind erosion. This cover also makes coca ideal for inter-planting. Alternative crops usually leave portions of the plant behind that need to be burnt, and this technique destroys any remaining nutrients in the soil, however, this does not happen with coca (at least not until the plant has stopped producing crop). Coca is also highly resistant to flooding¹⁷¹ as well as high levels of dissolved aluminium, which is present in soils that lack nutrients (such as in Bolivia).¹⁷² Therefore, coca is the ideal crop for both Bolivia’s agricultural and economic climate, thus making it the perfect tool for development.¹⁷³ Secondly, coca does not rely on an annual regrowth cycle, unlike other crops, and this, (contrary to what has been argued by proponents of the War on Drugs), actually reduces the drain on the soil’s nutrients. As stated by Hans Salm and Máximo Liberman, “[t]he depletion of soil nutrients by coca...annually removes five times less nitrogen, seven times less phosphorous, and fifteen times less potassium than maize, an annual crop. This far less degrading use of soil nutrients is what allows the continuous production of coca.”¹⁷⁴ The traditional coca cultivation method of building terraces that is used in the Yungas protects the soil from erosion by preventing rain water and nutrient

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 119.

¹⁷⁰ Patton, “Counterdevelopment and the Bolivian Coca War,” 8.

¹⁷¹ Salm and Liberman, “Environmental Problems of Coca Cultivation,” 221.

¹⁷² Ibid., 219.

¹⁷³ Patton, “Counterdevelopment and the Bolivian Coca War,” 8.

¹⁷⁴ Salm and Liberman, “Environmental Problems of Coca Cultivation,” 218.

run-off. Finally, other export crops (for example, cotton) require large volumes of chemical fertiliser and pesticides, which can also reduce the soil's nutrients.¹⁷⁵

To summarise, environmental security illustrates that the means adopted for fighting the War on Drugs in Bolivia can actually have a devastating impact on the environment. This in turn demonstrates the tension between freedom from fear and freedom from want in that by failing to take an holistic approach to human security, a freedom from fear approach compromises the other dimensions of human security such as, food and health (discussed later in this chapter). Also, by having political and personal security as its key focal points, the strategies adopted to fight the War on Drugs in Bolivia can even negatively impact upon the environmental security it is claiming to protect.

This section has demonstrated that the means adopted to pursue the personal, political and environmental security goals of the War on Drugs in Bolivia have had the unintended consequence of threatening these very goals. This result illustrates a lack of understanding of the context as well as a lack of appreciation of the interdependent nature of the human security dimensions, particularly in light of environmental and political security.

4.2 The War on Drugs in Bolivia Marginalises Economic, Community, Food and Health Security

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, by typifying freedom from fear, the War on Drugs in Bolivia marginalises economic and community security, which are components of freedom from want. This section demonstrates how freedom from fear and freedom from want are at tension with one another by discussing how the marginalisation and neglect of economic and community security leads to the insecurity of these two dimensions.

¹⁷⁵ Patton, "Counterdevelopment and the Bolivian Coca War," 7.

(a) Economic Security

Economic security is not a justification for the War on Drugs in Bolivia, however its absence is pertinent to illustrating the tension between freedom from fear and freedom from want. Economic security is about ensuring that individuals enjoy an assured income either through access to employment/livelihood opportunities or through a social safety net. This can come from anywhere, for example, employment or social welfare,¹⁷⁶ which goes to say that when these sources are limited or absent then there is economic insecurity. Coca cultivation provides necessary livelihoods to impoverished peasants in Bolivia¹⁷⁷ and therefore, the consideration of economic security is important to the success of the War on Drugs, as explained below.

In the early 1980s, Bolivia suffered a major blow to the economy when the price of tin (which the Bolivian economy had depended on for decades) fell dramatically. This has been described by Elena Alvarez as “a decline in per capita GDP, an increase in absolute poverty, sluggish growth in private investment, and...a high external debt burden.”¹⁷⁸ Alvarez continues to state that “official statistics show that unemployment rose progressively, up to 15% of the labor force in 1984, as economic activity declined in the early 1980s” and then after the stabilisation programme came into effect in 1985, “unemployment rose even more, up to 20% in 1986.”¹⁷⁹ This blow to the economy, which led to the closure of many of the government’s mines, was mitigated by the coca and cocaine industry.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁶ United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report*, 25.

¹⁷⁷ Leons and Sanabria, “Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality and Policy Illusion,” 2.

¹⁷⁸ Elena H. Alvarez, “Economic Development, Restructuring and the Illicit Drug Sector in Bolivia and Peru: Current Policies,” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 37, no. 3 (1995): 128.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Patton, “Counterdevelopment and the Bolivian Coca War,” 1.

It is difficult to obtain accurate or reliable data on the significance of coca/cocaine in the Bolivian economy and society, as most of Bolivia's domestic coca/cocaine industry is underground.¹⁸¹ Nonetheless, estimates indicate that the coca/cocaine industry carries huge weight in the Bolivian economy.¹⁸² For example, in February 1990 at the Cartagena drug summit, Bolivia's President Jaime Paz Zamora told President Bush "that more than half of his country's imports were financed by the coca-cocaine traffic and that 70 percent of real gross national product (GNP) was cocaine related."¹⁸³

Coca creates economic security for Bolivians in two ways. Firstly, it creates employment/livelihood opportunities where they are otherwise limited. Secondly, coca is a reliable crop that grows well in Bolivia's harsh conditions where other crops struggle to survive. Furthermore, coca farmers can make premium profits because they are part of a monopoly whereas with other crops, they would struggle to compete with the rest of the global market. Therefore, the War on Drugs leads to economic insecurity simply by virtue of its strategy to eradicate coca in producer-countries, but what is more, the sanctions and coercion adopted to implement cooperation with producer-countries also adds to the threats to economic security. These points are discussed in more detail below.

First of all, as mentioned above, for the Bolivian peasant, coca means employment opportunities, income, and survival. In Bolivia, the coca/cocaine industry has been integral in creating employment¹⁸⁴ and coca cultivation is seen as an alternative to urban unemployment.¹⁸⁵ As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to get exact statistics, but information on Bolivia's coca/cocaine economy indicate

¹⁸¹ Alvarez, "Economic Development, Restructuring and the Illicit Drug Sector in Bolivia and Peru: Current Policies," 126.

¹⁸² Leons and Sanabria, "Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality and Policy Illusion," 16; Ambos, "Attempts at Drug Control in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia," 127.

¹⁸³ Bertram et al., *Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial*, 17.

¹⁸⁴ Alvarez, "Economic Development, Restructuring and the Illicit Drug Sector in Bolivia and Peru: Current Policies," 138.

¹⁸⁵ Argañaras, "The Drug War at the Supply End: the case of Bolivia," 62.

that a significant portion of Bolivians depend on this economy for all, or at least part, of their income. For example, in the 1990s, the drug trade was estimated to form up to 20 percent of Bolivia's gross domestic product (GDP) and about 20 percent of employment.¹⁸⁶ Moreover, a 1992 study by the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation found that the eradication of 52,000 hectares of coca leaves would reduce Bolivia's GDP by USD400 million, thereby leaving 170,000 peasant families without an income.¹⁸⁷ In 1988 in the Chapare region alone, an estimated 42,000 families depended on coca cultivation for their livelihood.¹⁸⁸ Any coca eradication programmes would drive these families toward "economic ruin, hunger and, inevitably, back to coca cultivation."¹⁸⁹

The coca/cocaine economy also plays a big part in Bolivia's economic survival. In the 1980s, the coca/cocaine industry helped to ease Bolivia's economic decline after the global price of tin fell in 1985.¹⁹⁰ The fall in price inevitably led to the closure of the government's tin mines and hence resulting in the unemployment of many. By the 1990s, the coca/cocaine industry was bringing about USD1 billion to the Bolivian economy, which equates to more than all of Bolivia's legal exports combined.¹⁹¹ Even today, the employment and income created by the coca/cocaine industry helps to maintain the Bolivian economy. As estimated by Bertam et al., the industry employs roughly 500,000 people, constituting about 20 percent of the Bolivian workforce.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁶ T.G. Carpenter, *Bad Neighbour Policy: Washington's Futile War on Drugs in Latin America* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 92.

¹⁸⁷ Argañaras, "The Drug War at the Supply End: the case of Bolivia," 68.

¹⁸⁸ Peter Kerr, "Bolivia, With U.S. Aid, Battles Cocaine at the Root," *The New York Times*, April 17, 1988, 14, <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/17/world/bolivia-with-us-aid-battles-cocaine-at-the-root.html?pagewanted=1>.

¹⁸⁹ Patton, "Counterdevelopment and the Bolivian Coca War," 1.

¹⁹⁰ Leons and Sanabria, "Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality and Policy Illusion," 14.

¹⁹¹ Elliot, *The Bolivian Times*, 18.

¹⁹² Bertram et al., *Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial*, 16.

From this it is evident that the coca/cocaine industry provides economic security (which is a key component of freedom from want) to both the Bolivian population and Bolivia itself.¹⁹³ Firstly, coca crops provide work and secondly because employment and revenue from the industry (that is injected back into the economy) allows the government to run the state. Therefore any coca eradication programme threatens to bring about economic insecurity and hence challenges freedom from want.

Another example of a threat to the economic security of Bolivians is the War on Drugs' aim to eradicate coca because coca is in many cases the only reliable crop for Bolivians in terms of cultivation success, reasonable profit margins, and sale ability. Coca suits the tough ecological setting that Bolivia presents. The land in many parts of Bolivia is eroded and lacks in nutrients. Where little thrives in many parts of the country, coca is a reliable crop. Not only can it withstand such harsh conditions, it requires little maintenance, can be harvested one year after planting, and has a high yield of two to three crops a year for up to 30 years.¹⁹⁴ In contrast, alternative crops that have been promoted in Bolivia (for example, citrus fruits, pineapples, avocados and bananas) can only be harvested once a year. Moreover, these crops are vulnerable to pests and disease as well as pigs, birds and other livestock.

Coca can also fetch higher revenues for peasant farmers than alternative crops. Unlike coca, which is light in weight and can be dried for longer-term storage, fresh produce is heavy and rots easily in the heat. By the time Bolivian farmers have paid to transport these goods to market, there is little left for their pockets. For example, Bertram et al. assert that "a coca farmer in the Bolivian Chapare region could net up to [USD]2,600 per hectare (roughly 2.5 acres) annually from coca production in the late 1980s, more than four times what he could from

¹⁹³ Padideh Tosti, "Can IR Address the International Drug Trade," in (presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention 2006, San Diego, 2006), http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/9/7/9/5/p97951_index.html.

¹⁹⁴ Patton, "Counterdevelopment and the Bolivian Coca War," 4.

cultivating oranges or avocados, the two most profitable legal crops traditionally grown in the region.”¹⁹⁵

Furthermore, coca is guaranteed to sell. As mentioned by James Patton, “the only economic certainty that the growers have been offered has come from those who would purchase the coca leaf, for licit or illicit purposes.”¹⁹⁶ Zenon Cruz is a coca farmer who was forced to grow beans and oranges in the Chapare region (instead of coca). His quote in the Guardian highlights that not only would peasant farmers make more profit from selling coca, but also that coca is more likely to sell more easily than any alternative crop:

You can fill a lorry with oranges and not sell any of them at market. But coca always sells like hot bread. I was making 150 bolivianos [about £20/USD29] a week before they cut down the coca. Now we sometimes struggle to make 20 [£3/USD4.50]. How can you feed a family on that?¹⁹⁷

Bolivia is actually one of the best places in the world to grow coca as the high altitude means that the coca plant has a higher alkaloid content. This is one of the reasons why peasants often find it easier to market coca than any other crop – the Bolivian coca farmers have a global niche in that they are growing a high-demand export crop with which they have a competitive advantage.¹⁹⁸ As a land-locked country, it is very hard for Bolivia to compete with the rest of the global market when it comes to any of the alternative crops mentioned earlier. Sancho Tree is quoted in Nick Constable’s *This is Cocaine* as follows:

The United States asks peasant coca farmers to switch to fruit, which they must transport in vehicles they don’t have, down roads that don’t exist to sell in markets with no buyers. Even if there were customers the idea that the campesinos could compete in an international global market is truly farcical.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁵ Bertram et al., *Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial*, 15-16.

¹⁹⁶ Patton, “Counterdevelopment and the Bolivian Coca War,” 4.

¹⁹⁷ Nick Thorpe, “Leaves on the line | World news | The Guardian,” *guardian.co.uk*, August 25, 2000, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/aug/25/bolivia>.

¹⁹⁸ Friman and Andreas, *The Illicit Global Economy and State Power*, 645.

¹⁹⁹ Constable, *This is Cocaine*, 163.

In summary, coca provides economic security for the coca-growing peasants of Bolivia because it provides them with an income. What is more is that this income is more reliable and higher than they would seek through alternative crops. This economic security provides them with livelihoods and opportunities to create their own futures, giving them a degree of freedom from want. Celestino Quispe is a coca farmer who was interviewed by the BBC news in La Paz, June 2000:

I have five children. Coca leaves allow me to pay for their education. My children are able to study, which I was not. I have little choice in what I can do for a living now but I am trying to make sure that they get qualifications. I would like them to be able to choose what they want to do in the future. An education is very important because it will give them choice: they will be able to decide whether they want to grow coca like me or something different, something better.²⁰⁰

Finally, another threat to economic security in Bolivia relates to the annual certification process²⁰¹ provided under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (outlined in Chapter 3). In September 2008, President Evo Morales declared the US Ambassador to La Paz, Philip S. Goldberg, persona non grata based on allegations that he was interfering with domestic politics.²⁰² Furthermore, later that same year, in November, Morales suspended DEA activities in Bolivia on the grounds of national security.²⁰³ In response to this, the US President George W. Bush, decertified Bolivia under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, based on the rationale that Bolivia was no longer effective in the drug war.²⁰⁴ Because eligibility to privileges under the Andean Trade Preference Act is linked to certification under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Bush's decision meant that Bolivia was no longer considered fit to receive trade preference to the US. Further, Bolivia's

²⁰⁰ BBC Mundo, "My story: The coca grower," *BBC News*, June 6, 2000, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/779662.stm>.

²⁰¹ Leons and Sanabria, "Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality and Policy Illusion," 31.

²⁰² Jean Friedman-Rudovsky, "Bolivia to Expel US Ambassador," *Time Online*, September 11, 2008, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1840469,00.html>.

²⁰³ Jean Friedman-Rudovsky, "Why Bolivia Quit the U.S. War on Drugs," *Time Online*, November 4, 2008, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1856153,00.html>.

²⁰⁴ Seattle Times, "DEA leaves Bolivia," *Seattle Times*, January 30, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsourc.com/html/nationworld/2008687815_newsline30.html; Frank Bajak, "US cuts Bolivian tariff exemptions on drug efforts," *guardian.co.uk*, June 30, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8586845>.

‘decertified’ status was maintained by President Barack Obama in July 1 2009 who stated that Bolivia “[remained] in breach of its obligation to cooperate in the War on Drugs.”²⁰⁵ Morales has stated that this act of coercion could cost Bolivia around 20,000 jobs²⁰⁶ and it has been reported that Bolivian exports to the U.S. have fallen approximately 14 percent since Bolivia was decertified.²⁰⁷

The loss of jobs, as a result of the decertification and consequential loss of US trade preferences, highlights an additional threat to Bolivia’s economic security. In this example, we see freedom from fear in contention with freedom from want because the War on Drugs’ attempt at coercion through sanctions (a freedom from fear approach) creates a threat to the livelihoods of Bolivians (which is economic security - an essential component of freedom from want).

Any successful coca eradication policy would be followed by economic insecurity in Bolivia because the economic reliance on coca by Bolivians is so great. In typifying freedom from fear, the War on Drugs illustrates how freedom from fear threatens freedom from want through its neglect of economic security and henceforth creates economic insecurity in two ways. First, the War on Drugs’ coca eradication policy threatens to eradicate the one reliable and viable source of livelihoods (economic security) available to many Bolivian peasants – coca. Second, the use of decertification (as a sanction), or the removal of the right to previously established trade preferences to the US, has potentially led to the economic insecurity of a number of Bolivians through the loss of employment.

²⁰⁵ Latin American Herald Tribune, “Bolivian Blasts U.S. Over Denial of Trade Preferences,” *Latin American Herald Tribune*, July 2, 2009, <http://www.laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=14919&ArticleId=338380>.

²⁰⁶ Bajak, “US cuts Bolivian tariff exemptions on drug efforts.”

²⁰⁷ Latin American Herald Tribune, “Bolivian Blasts U.S. Over Denial of Trade Preferences.”

(b) Community Security

Community security is about cultural dignity and inter-community peace by recognising that security can be derived from membership of a group.²⁰⁸ According to Bajpai, threats to community security are “breakdown of the family, collapse of traditional languages and cultures, ethnic discrimination and strife, genocide and ethnic cleansing”.²⁰⁹

Like economic security, community security is not a justification of the War on Drugs in Bolivia. In spite of this, the War on Drugs has had a significant impact on the community security of Bolivians, particularly with regard to cultural dignity, but to a certain extent it has also affected inter-community peace. Similarly to economic security, the absence of community security demonstrates the tension between freedom from fear and freedom from want.

The Bolivian population is composed of the following ethnic groups: 15 percent European, 30 percent mestizo and 55 percent indigenous.²¹⁰ Indigenous Bolivians (in other words, a majority of Bolivians) have been using coca for a thousand years in religious and social ceremonies²¹¹ and for a variety of other purposes ranging from the medicinal to appetite and thirst suppressants to shampoos and soaps.²¹² According to Madeline Barbara Léons and Harry Sanabria, the traditional role of coca in Bolivian culture is not to be taken for granted because it still plays an integral part in the lives of the Aymara and Quechua-speaking peasants who make up the majority of the rural population living in Bolivia.²¹³ In

²⁰⁸ UNDP, “New Dimensions of Human Security”, Human Development Report 1994, p31.

²⁰⁹ Bajpai, “Human Security: Concept and Measurement,” 16.

²¹⁰ “U.S. Department of State website,” <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35751.htm>.

²¹¹ Elliot, *The Bolivian Times*, 19.

²¹² Friesendorf, *US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Displacing the cocaine and heroin industry*, 18.

²¹³ Leons and Sanabria, “Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality and Policy Illusion,” 3-4.

a letter to the UN Secretary General, President Evo Morales stated:

The custom of chewing coca leaves in the Andean region of South America dates back to 3,000 B.C. Historical evidence demonstrates that the coca leaf has been used for thousands of years in Andean culture, both pre-Incan and Incan, and for centuries by the Amazonian and Guaraní peoples.

The chewing or “acullico” of the coca leaf is part of the socio-cultural practices and rituals for the Indigenous Andean peoples. It is intimately linked to our history and cultural identity.

It is currently practised by millions of people in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and northern Argentina and Chile. Its use and symbolism has ritualistic, religious, and socio-cultural meaning that extends past the sphere of Indigenous culture to include mestizo sectors.

The chewing of the coca leaf helps mitigate the sensation of hunger, gives energy during long days of labor, and improves metabolism at high altitudes.²¹⁴

The role that *acullico* plays in terms of cultural identity is also acknowledged at a regional level in a joint declaration signed by the Heads of State and Government of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America – Peoples Trade Treaty (the ALBA-TCP).²¹⁵ Article 26 of this declaration states: “The defense of cultural identity and diversity is essential in the fight against neocolonialism. In this sense, it is important to progress in the revalorization and decriminalization of coca leaf chewing, as well as removing the coca leaf from Schedule 1 of the Convention on Narcotics Drugs of 1961.”²¹⁶

The elimination of coca leaf chewing is an objective of the War on Drugs, alongside coca eradication. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the UN Single Convention of Narcotic Drugs states that coca chewing must be abolished within 25 years of the treaty coming into place. As such, this quest is directly at odds with the community security of Bolivians and hence is another illustration of how

²¹⁴ Evo Morales Ayma, “Letter from President Evo Morales to U.N. Secretary General,” March 12, 2009.

²¹⁵ Member countries of the ALBA-TCP are Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, Cuba and Honduras.

²¹⁶ Issued by the Heads of State and Government of the ALBA-TCP member countries and Translated by the Permanent Mission of Bolivia to the U.N., “Official Declaration: VII Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America-Peoples' Trade Treaty (ALBA-TCP),” October 19, 2009.

the War on Drugs, typified as freedom from fear, is at tension with freedom from want.

Further, it is not just coca leaf chewing that is characteristic of what it means to be Bolivian because the cultivation of coca is too. Evo Morales and cocaleros (most of whom are Aymara Indians)²¹⁷ believe that the right to grow coca comes as part of being Aymara.²¹⁸ The coca leaf (whether it be chewing or cultivating) is argued to be inherently part of what it means to be Bolivian and this is recognised in Bolivia's Constitution. Article 384 of the Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia states: "The State protects the originary and ancestral coca as cultural patrimony, as a renewable natural resource of the biodiversity of Bolivia, and as a factor of social unity."²¹⁹ Even so, the War on Drugs, through Law 1008, fails to recognise the right to grow coca regardless of where in Bolivia a peasant farmer may live.

In more detail, Title I of Law 1008 commits Bolivia to eradicating coca across the country. Title I categorises Bolivia's coca cultivation areas into three types of zones:

- (1) Zone One, known as the legal cultivation zone, allowed for 12,000 hectares of coca to be grown legally. Areas that fall into this zone are acknowledged as areas in which "historical, social and agroecologically coca has been grown" and therefore, the coca from this zone meets the demand of traditional consumption (for example, the North and South Yungas, Murillo, Dolls, Franz Tamayo and Inquisivi provinces of the Department of La Paz);²²⁰

²¹⁷ The Aymara nation is an ethnic group of about 2.5 million people who live in Bolivia and some southern parts of Peru.

²¹⁸ Tosti, "Can IR Address the International Drug Trade."

²¹⁹ *Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia*, 2009, Article 384.

²²⁰ *Ley del Régimen de la Coca y Sustancias Controladas / System Law of Coca and Controlled Substances*, 1988, Article 9. (translated by google)

- (2) Zone Two was known as the transitional zone, and this zone represents those parts of Bolivia where coca cultivation had expanded to under the demand of illicit use. Therefore, the coca from this area is mainly used for illicit consumption and includes the Saavedra, Larecaja and Loayza provinces in the La Paz Department as well as the Chapare, Carrasco, Tiraque and Arani in the Cochabamba Department. As coca in these areas is considered as ‘excess’, Law 1008 subjects the areas to annual eradication plans that started with a yearly eradication target of 5,000 hectares, which was to be built up to 8,000 hectares per year. The statute also notes that alternative development plays an important role in achieving this goal;²²¹ and finally,
- (3) Zone Three was known as the illicit or illegal zone. This zone refers to areas where land is used for illegal production and actually refers to anywhere in Bolivia that does not fall into the other two zones. For example, the new colonisation area of Yapacaní in Santa Cruz. Here, Law 1008 states that any coca growing in this zone is to be destroyed without compensation.²²²

Law 1008 designates only coca cultivation areas classified as Zone One may legally cultivate coca. Consequently, this piece of legislation denies those cocaleros who live outside of the designated legal cultivation zone of a fundamental cultural right and threatens their and other indigenous Bolivians’ community security.

Another aspect of community security is the idea of inter-community peace. The War on Drugs in Bolivia also threatens this aspect of community security, as noted by James Patton, “the most significant impact of widespread arrests and human rights abuses has been the production of a deep insecurity in the

²²¹ Ibid., Article 10.

²²² Ibid., Article 11.

community and disruption of the family.”²²³ Rural life cannot survive without community and family, as it depends on these structures for economic survival. When the man of the house is arrested, the woman and children follow him to prison, and this then places a greater burden on the under-resourced prisons; a burden that is even further increased due to the high levels of prisoners imprisoned without trial.

To summarise, by considering the War on Drugs in Bolivia from the perspective of community security, the tension between freedom from fear and freedom from want can be seen in two ways. First of all, because the War on Drugs only takes into account a limited number of human security concerns (mainly personal and political security), it has a certain preoccupation with the violent, criminal and corrupt side of the coca industry. In doing so, it fails to consider the significant role that coca plays in Bolivian culture and therefore shows that the freedom from fear framework, which the War on Drugs in Bolivia typifies, conflicts with freedom from want as it undermines the cultural dignity of Bolivians and has significant deleterious effects on incomes. Secondly, by considering cultural security, it becomes clear that the use of force and sanctions, adopted by the War on Drugs, impacts not just the political security of individuals, but also their cultural security as their sense of inter-community peace is disrupted.

An economic and community security perspective of the War on Drugs in Bolivia has revealed that freedom from fear and freedom from want are not complementary to each other, and that the pursuit of freedom from fear can lead to the detriment of freedom from want. By focusing on providing personal, political, environmental, food and health security, the War on Drugs in Bolivia through its fight to eradicate coca and coca chewing, marginalises and neglects coca’s role in providing opportunities for livelihoods and cultural dignity to Bolivians. This in turn leads to economic and community insecurity.

²²³ Patton, “Counterdevelopment and the Bolivian Coca War,” 5.

4.3 How the War on Drugs in Bolivia Impacts Upon Food and Health Security

Food security means physical and economic access to food at all times.²²⁴ Accordingly, a lack of food entitlements threatens food security. Health security is freedom from disease or debilitating illness and access to health care. It is linked with poor nutrition and unsafe environments, thereby recognising that threats to health security are primarily greater for the poor, those in rural areas, and women and children.²²⁵

The War on Drugs in Bolivia can be seen as justifying itself on the grounds of food and health security in the sense that food crops are being cleared to make way for coca crops (due to the temptation of money associated with coca) and as a result, malnutrition is on the rise. However, in this instance both food and health security are closely linked to environmental security, which means that any impact on the environment also impacts upon the food and health dimensions. For example, aerobiology (the spraying of pesticides/herbicides from low-flying aircrafts) is one of the forms of eradication adopted in the War on Drugs in Bolivia and was discussed in the environmental security section of this chapter. Not only does aerobiology upset ecosystems, but it also destroys legal crops (including sustainable food crops) and can cause birth defects and other health problems.²²⁶ As stated by Christina Jacqueline Johns in *Power, Ideology, and the War on Drugs: nothing succeeds like failure*: “eradication programs have created health problems by destroying not only coca crops, and by their use of toxic chemicals.”²²⁷ Additionally, this method for fighting the War on Drugs leads to food contamination and poisoning, which in developing country like Bolivia, is exacerbated by a “lack of adequate medical care, chronic malnutrition, and other health problems.”²²⁸

²²⁴ United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report*, 27.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 27-28.

²²⁶ Johns, *Power, Ideology, and the War on Drugs*, 52.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 53.

²²⁸ Rosa Del Olmo, “Aerobiology and the War on Drugs: A Transnational Crime,” *Crime and Social Justice*, no. 30: 28-41.

Again, the tension between freedom from fear and freedom from want is apparent. By typifying freedom from fear, the War on Drugs in Bolivia misses the holistic approach offered by freedom from want. Despite considering environmental security (as well as personal and political security), the War on Drugs in Bolivia, fails to recognise the interdependent nature of the dimensions and that the pursuit of security in one dimension without taking others into account can threaten human security overall.

In this chapter it has been demonstrated that the War on Drugs in Bolivia has compromised the human security of Bolivians. The War on Drugs in Bolivia has failed to protect individuals from physical violence, human rights abuses, environmental degradation and threats to food and health security. Further and most central to this thesis, the War on Drugs in Bolivia has shown the tension that exists between freedom from fear and freedom from want because as a typical freedom from fear approach, the War on Drugs in Bolivia marginalises and threatens economic and community security, which are key concepts to freedom from want.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

A human security analysis of the War on Drugs in Bolivia, illustrates that it can be typified as a freedom from fear approach. By accepting the War on Drugs in Bolivia as characteristic of a freedom from fear approach it can be seen that it marginalises freedom from want, but in particular the dimensions of economic and community security. By marginalising aspects of freedom from want, the War on Drugs in Bolivia is to the detriment of freedom from want, and simultaneously threatens the goal of human security itself. This analysis of the War on Drugs therefore leaves hollow the suggestion that the War on Drugs is conducted for the security of the Bolivian people. This conclusion suggests an alternative motivation for the War on Drugs as a possible means to extend the US' influence in South America.

Additionally, this thesis has demonstrated that in order for an anti-drug strategy to be successful in Bolivia, it is necessary to move beyond the classical security and freedom from fear paradigm. By typifying the War on Drugs in Bolivia as freedom from fear, it can be seen that it misses out on the holistic approach offered by freedom from want. The resulting effect is that actions made in the pursuit of one dimension (or several specific dimensions) can have negative impacts on others. For example, even though personal, political, environmental, food and health security are justifications for the War on Drugs in Bolivia, the goal and means adopted to fight the War on Drugs in Bolivia have had a negative impact on economic, community, as well as personal, political, environmental, food and health security. Therefore, this case study suggests that the assumption that freedom from fear and freedom from want are complementary in the human security approach must be seriously questioned.

Furthermore, a human security analysis of the War on Drugs in Bolivia has inferred that whether freedom from fear or freedom from want is adopted can have an impact on how the problem itself is framed. For the War on Drugs in Bolivia, the tension between freedom from fear and freedom from want

highlighted the distinction between coca and cocaine - where one is a threat to human security while the other is not. In fact, framing coca as a threat to human security, which a freedom from fear approach inevitably does, has actually led to human insecurity for Bolivians.

This thesis has revealed the need for any strategy seeking to address human security threats, which result from the illicit drug trade in Bolivia, to be based around the holistic approach of freedom from want. The need for a freedom from want approach, over a freedom from fear approach, is clearly applicable and necessary within the developing country context of Bolivia, but the extent to which a freedom from want approach would be necessary in dealing with threats within developed countries merits further research. Additional research into how differing socio-economic situations demand greater or lesser emphasis on a freedom from want approach alongside freedom from fear approaches, would assist in the understanding of transnational threats to human security, and in the formulating of strategies and approaches to counter them.

By showing that, in Bolivia, the pursuit of freedom from fear has come to the detriment of freedom from want, we can see that our understanding of human security falls short with regard to how human security should be approached in developing countries. As suggested in the case study of this thesis, the pursuit of freedom from fear comes at a loss of the freedom from want of people in developing countries. Security policies adopted to address transnational threats in such contexts must not only ensure that they account for the freedom from fear and freedom from want components of human security, but they must also account for, and manage, the potential for freedom from fear to undermine the wider goals of freedom from want.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Acharya, Amitav. "Human Security: East versus West." *International Journal* 56, no. 3 (Summer 2001): 442-460.
- Aljazeera. "Summit criticises US-Colombia deal." *Aljazeera*, August 29, 2009.
<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2009/08/200982904428579318.html>.
- Alkire, Sabina. "A Conceptual Framework for Human Security (Working Paper 2)." Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE, 2003.
- Alvarez, Elena H. "Economic Development, Restructuring and the Illicit Drug Sector in Bolivia and Peru: Current Policies." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 37, no. 3 (1995): 125-149.
- Ambos, Kai. "Attempts at Drug Control in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia." *Crime, Law and Social Change* 26, no. 2 (June 1996): 125-160.
- Amouyel, Alexandra. "What is Human Security?" *Revue de Sécurité Humaine / Human Security Journal*, no. 1 (April 2006): 10-23.
- Argañaras, Fernando Garcia. "The Drug War at the Supply End: the case of Bolivia." *Latin American Perspectives* 24, no. 5 (September 1997): 59-80.
- Axworthy, Lloyd. "Canada and Human Security: the need for leadership." *International Journal* LII (1997): 183-196.
- Bajak, Frank. "UN: Colombia Coca Crop Down; Peru and Bolivia Up." ABC News, June 19, 2009. <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=7880731>.
- . "US cuts Bolivian tariff exemptions on drug efforts." *guardian.co.uk*, June 30, 2009. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8586845>.
- Bajpai, Kanti. "Human Security: Concept and Measurement." Kroc Institute, August 2000.
- Baldwin, David A. "The Concept of Security." *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 1 (January 1997): 5-26.
- BBC Mundo. "My story: The coca grower." *BBC News*, June 6, 2000.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/779662.stm>.
- BBC news. "US poised to join Mexico drug war." *BBC News*, March 18, 2009.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7949665.stm>.
- Berestein, Leslie. "Can Mexico learn from Colombia's drug war?." *Sign on San Diego*, February 16, 2009.
<http://www3.signonsandiego.com/stories/2009/feb/16/1n16colombia00218-colombia-drug-war-continues-desp/>.
- Bertram, Eva, Morris Blachman, Kenneth Sharpe, and Peter Andreas. *Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Blair, Jon. "Inside the terror of Rio's drugs war." *The Independent*, October 21, 2009.
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/inside-the-terror-of-rios-drugs-war-1806292.html>.

- Bodenheimer, Thomas, and Robert Gould. *Rollback! Right-Wing Power in US Foreign Policy*. Boston: South End Press.
- Boyle, Kevin, and Sigmund Simonsen. "Human Security, Human Rights and Disarmament." *Disarmament Forum* 3 (2004): 5-14.
- Buenos Aires Herald. "Urbe backs Washington military agreement, Chavez says US preparing for war." *Buenos Aires Herald*, August 31, 2009.
<http://www.buenosairesherald.com/BreakingNews/View/10357>.
- Calvani, Sandro. "Global Trends and Key Issues on Illicit Drugs: Drug Reduction Policies and Alternative Development." *Development Bulletin*, no. 69. Illicit Drugs and Development (February 2009): 10-13.
- "Perspectives of Freedom from Want and Freedom from Fear in the African Union" presented at the international round table "L'Africa in Corsa?" in occasion of the new publication of the Finisterrae magazine, Turin, Italy, February 24, 2009.
- Carpenter, T.G. *Bad Neighbour Policy: Washington's Futile War on Drugs in Latin America*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Carroll, Rory. "Cocaine production surge unleashes wave of violence in Latin America." *Guardian.co.uk*, March 9, 2009.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/09/cocaine-production-united-nations-summit>.
- "The fine line between coca and cocaine - Guardian Weekly." *The Guardian Weekly*, November 25, 2009.
<http://www.guardianweekly.co.uk/?page=editorial&id=1358&catID=17>.
- Carroll, Rory, and Andres Schipani. "Bolivia calls time on bizarre world of prison frequented by tourists." *Guardian.co.uk*, July 8, 2009.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/08/bolivia-bans-tourists-entering-jail>.
- Chavez, Franz, and Diana Cariboni. "Drugs-Bolivia: The Friendly Fight." *Inter Press Service*, January 5, 2007. <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=36076>.
- Chomsky, Noam. "Militarizing Latin America." *In These Times*, September 8, 2009.
http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/4864/militarizing_latin_america/.
- Cohen, Paul T. "Help as a Threat: alternative development and the 'War on Drugs' in Bolivia and Laos." *Development Bulletin*, no. 69. Illicit Drugs and Development (February 2009): 31-35.
- Colitt, Raymond. "Lula to push Obama on Latin America policy." *Reuters*, December 3, 2009. <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE52B5WD20090312>.
- Collins, Dan. "Peru coca farmers warn government." *BBC News*, April 19, 2007.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6570513.stm>.
- Constable, Nick. *This is Cocaine*. London: Sanctuary Publishing Ltd, 2002.
- Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia*, 2009.

- Daily Maverick. "Bolivian indigenes' movement continues its rise as Evo Morales claims re-election as president." News. *The Daily Maverick*, December 14, 2009.
<http://www.thedailymaverick.co.za/article/2009-12-07-Bolivian-indigenes-movement-continues-its-rise-as-Evo-Morales-claims-re-election-as-president->
- Del Olmo, Rosa. "Aerobiology and the War on Drugs: A Transnational Crime." *Crime and Social Justice*, no. 30: 28-44.
- "Diplomatic Blue Book 1999, Chapter II, Section 3." *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan*.
www.mofa.go.jp/POLICY/other/bluebook/1999/II-3-a.html.
- Elliot, Tim. *The Bolivian Times*. Sydney: Random House Australia, 2001.
- European NGO Council on Drugs and Development. *Drugs and Development Newsletter*, No. 27. Antwerp, 2001.
- Farthing, Linda. "Social Impact Associated with Antidrug Law 1008." In *Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality*, edited by Madeline Barbara Leons and Harry Sanabria, 253-269. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997.
- Farthing, Linda, and Kathryn Ledebur. "The Beat Goes On: the U.S. War on Coca." *NACLA Report on the Americas*, December 2004.
- Ferenczi, Imre. "Freedom from Want and International Relations Policy." *American Sociological Review* 8, no. 5 (October 1943): 537-542.
- Friedman-Rudovsky, Jean. "Bolivia to Expel US Ambassador." *Time Online*, September 11, 2008. <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1840469,00.html>.
- . "Bolivia's Revolutionary New Charter." *Time Online*, January 27, 2009.
<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1874157,00.html>.
- . "Why Bolivia Quit the U.S. War on Drugs." *Time Online*, November 4, 2008.
<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1856153,00.html>.
- Friesendorf, Cornelius. *US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Displacing the cocaine and heroin industry*. CSS Studies in Security and International Relations. New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Friman, Richard, and Peter Andreas, eds. *The Illicit Global Economy and State Power*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999.
- Gamarra, Eduardo A. "Fighting Drugs in Bolivia: United States and Bolivian Perceptions at Odds." In *Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality*, edited by Madeline Barbara Leons and Harry Sanabria, 243-252. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997.
- Gluesing, Jens. "A Political Drug War in Bolivia: Is Coca the New Hemp?" *Spiegel Online*, March 28, 2006.
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,408364,00.html>.
- Goldacre, Ben. "Bad science: cocaine study that got up the nose of the US." [guardian.co.uk](http://www.guardian.co.uk), June 13, 2009.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/13/bad-science-cocaine-study>.

- Goodenough, Patrick. "Latin American Leaders Prepare to Squeeze Colombia Over Military Base Deal With U.S." *CNS News*, August 25, 2009. <http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/52998>.
- Goranov, Alexi. "Capitalism and Functioning Democracy Are at Odds." *The Tech*, November 20, 2009. <http://tech.mit.edu/V129/N55/goranov.html>.
- Heinbecker, Paul. "Human Security." *Behind the Headlines* 56, no. 2 (1999): 4-9.
- Holden, Robert H., and Eric Zolov, eds. *Latin America and the United States: A Documentary History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Human Security Centre. *Human Security Brief 2005*. Liu Insitute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, 2005. <http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/main.jsp?page=165>.
- "Human Security Report Project." *Human Security Report Project*. http://www.humansecurityreport.info/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1.
- Hylton, Forrest, and Thomas Sinclair. *Revolutionary Horizons: Past and Present in Bolivian Politics*. London and New York: Verso.
- International Crisis Group. "ICG Report: Venezuela: Accelerating the Bolivarian Revolution." *International Crisis Group*, November 5, 2009. http://www.newssafety.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=16362:icg-report-venezuela-accelerating-the-bolivarian-revolution&catid=66:venezuela-security&Itemid=100310.
- Irish Times. "Drug use of innocent coca leaf creates rift with US." *Irish Times*, March 16, 2009. <http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2009/0316/1224242906528.html>.
- Issued by the Heads of State and Government of the ALBA-TCP member countries, and Translated by the Permanent Mission of Bolivia to the U.N. "Official Declaration: VII Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America-Peoples' Trade Treaty (ALBA-TCP)," October 19, 2009.
- Jelsma, M. *Vicious Circle: The Chemical and Biological 'War on Drugs'*. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute.
- Johns, Christina Jacqueline. *Power, Ideology, and the War on Drugs*. Praeger Series in Criminology and Crime Control Policy. New York: Praeger, 1992.
- Kerr, Peter. "Bolivia, With U.S. Aid, Battles Cocaine at the Root." *The New York Times*, April 17, 1988. <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/17/world/bolivia-with-us-aid-battles-cocaine-at-the-root.html?pagewanted=1>.
- King, Gary, and Christopher J. L. Murray. "Rethinking Human Security." *Political Science Quarterly* 116, no. 4 (2002 Winter 2001): 585-610.
- Kobo, Kinsley. "Obama hails Nigeria's anti-drug war." *Africa News*, October 12, 2009. http://www.africanews.com/site/Obama_hails_Nigerias_antidrug_war/list_messages/27384.

- Kraul, Chris, and Paul Richter. "U.S., Venezuela to restore full diplomatic ties." *Los Angeles times*, June 26, 2009. <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/26/world/fg-us-venezuela26>.
- Laflash, Karen A. "Plan Colombia: Is US Foreign Policy Increasing Human Rights Violations in Colombia?." Chicago: University of Denver, 2004. http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/6/1/1/7/p61172_index.html.
- Latin American Herald Tribune. "Bolivia, U.S. Look to Mend Frayed Ties." *Latin American Herald Tribune*, June 24, 2009. <http://www.laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=14919&ArticleId=335489>.
- "Bolivian Blasts U.S. Over Denial of Trade Preferences." *Latin American Herald Tribune*, July 2, 2009. <http://www.laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=14919&ArticleId=338380>.
- "Bolivian, Russian Leaders Meet in Moscow." *Latin American Herald Tribune*, February 17, 2009. <http://www.laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=14919&ArticleId=327772>.
- "Latin America on Its Way to Legalizing Drugs, Experts Say." *Latin American Herald Tribune*, August 9, 2009. <http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=341018&CategoryId=12394>.
- "Morales: U.S. Has No Right to Judge Bolivia's Anti-Drug Fight." *Latin American Herald Tribune*, September 21, 2009. <http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=343867&CategoryId=14919>.
- "Police Dismantle 2 Coke Labs, Arrest 8 in Bolivia." *Latin American Herald Tribune*, June 9, 2009. <http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=336783&CategoryId=14919>.
- "Police Dismantle Huge Cocaine Lab in Eastern Bolivia." *Latin American Herald Tribune*, May 9, 2009. <http://laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=14919&ArticleId=334132>.
- Leichtman, Ellen C. "Bolivia, Coca, and US Foreign Policy." *Critical Criminology* 9, no. 1-2 (September 2000): 63-84.
- Leons, Madeline Barbara, and Harry Sanabria. "Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality and Policy Illusion." In *Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997.
- Ley del Régimen de la Coca y Sustancias Controladas / System Law of Coca and Controlled Substances*, 1988 (translated by google).
- Livingstone, Grace. "Colombia's desert war." *guardian.co.uk*, March 12, 2009. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/mar/12/colombia-drug-war>.
- Marshall, Jonathan. *Drug Wars: Corruption, Counterinsurgency and Covert Operations in the Third World*. Forestville: Cohan and Cohen Publishers, 1991.

- Morales Ayma, Evo. "If We Don't Defend Mother Earth's Rights, There's No Use in Defending Human Rights," 64th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 23, 2009.
- . "Let Me Chew My Coca Leaves." *New York Times*, March 14, 2009. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/14/opinion/14morales.html>.
- . Letter. "Letter from President Evo Morales to U.N. Secretary General," March 12, 2009.
- Newman, Edward. "Human Security and Constructivism." *International Studies Perspectives* 2 (2001): 239-251.
- "Norway's Official Site in Canada." http://norwayportal.mfa.no/en/Norway---the-official-site-in-Canada/News_and_events/norwaycanada/history/history/.
- Obama, Barack. Letter. "Determinations and Report of the President Concerning the Review of Ecuador and Bolivia Under the Andean Trade Preference Act, As Amended," June 30, 2009.
- Omoniyi, Tosin. "Obama Impressed with Nigeria's Anti-Drug War," November 4, 2009. http://www.newswatchngr.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1474&Itemid=1.
- Palmer, Doug. "Lawmakers mull short-term trade benefit renewal | Reuters." *Reuters*, December 8, 2009. <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5B74P520091208>.
- Paris, Roland. "Human Security: paradigm shift or hot air?." *International Security* 26, no. 2 (Autumn 2001): 87-102.
- Patton, James. "Counterdevelopment and the Bolivian Coca War." *Praxis: The Fletcher Journal of Development Studies* 17 (2002).
- Pilger, John. "War is peace, ignorance is strength." *The New Statesman*, October 15, 2009. <http://www.newstatesman.com/international-politics/2009/10/obama-pilger-war-peace>.
- Posso, Gonzalez D. "Coca, Deforestation and Food Security in the Colombian Amazon Region." UN FAO, 2000.
- Proceedings of the ASEAN-UNESCO Concept Workshop on Human Security in South-East Asia*. Jakarta, Indonesia: UNESCO, October 25, 2006.
- Rocha, Raul. "The Political Economy of Counterdrug Policy: the case of Bolivia, 1997-2006." Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2007.
- Roosevelt, Franklin Delano. "The Four Freedoms Speech" presented at the State of the Union, January 6, 1941.
- Salm, Hans, and Maximo Liberman. "Environmental Problems of Coca Cultivation." In *Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian Reality*, edited by Madeline Barbara Leons and Harry Sanabria, 211-227. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997.
- Santos, Solimar. "Unintended Consequences of United States' Foreign Drug Policy in Bolivia." *Inter-American Law Review* 33, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 127-151.

- Schipani, Andres. "Coca casts shadow on Bolivian election." *BBC News*, November 12, 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/americas/8364909.stm>.
- Sciolino, Elaine. "Drug Production Rising Worldwide, State Dept. Says." *New York Times*, March 2, 1989, sec. A.
- Seattle Times. "DEA leaves Bolivia." *Seattle Times*, January 30, 2009. http://seattletimes.nwsourc.com/html/nationworld/2008687815_newsline30.html.
- Solon (Bolivia UN Representative), Pablo. Radio, March 1, 2009.
- Sullum, Jacob. "The war on poppies flops." *Washington Times*, July 11, 2009. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jul/11/the-war-on-poppies-flops/>.
- The Democracy Center. "Cocalero Expansions Draw Conflict." *Blog from Bolivia*, September 28, 2009. <http://www.democracycr.org/blog/2009/09/cocalero-expansions-draw-conflict.html>.
- The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, December 2001. <http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp>.
- Thomas, Pamela. "Illicit Drugs and Development Critical Issues for Asia and the Pacific." *Development Bulletin*, no. 69. Illicit Drugs and Development (February 2009): 10-13.
- Thorpe, Nick. "Leaves on the line | World news | The Guardian." *guardian.co.uk*, August 25, 2000. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/aug/25/bolivia>.
- Thoumi, F.E. *El Imperio de la Droga: Narcotrafico, Economia y Sociedad en Los Andes*. Bogota: Planeta.
- Tokatlian, J.G. *Drogas, Dilemmas y Dogmas: Estados Unidos y el Narcocriminalidad Organizada En Colombia*. Bogota: Tercer Mundo Editores.
- Tosti, Padideh. "Can IR Address the International Drug Trade." San Diego, 2006. http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/9/7/9/5/p97951_index.html.
- "U.S. Department of State website." <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35751.htm>.
- "UN SC presidential statement calls for stronger international cooperation with global, regional bodies against drug trafficking." *Relief Web*. <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MYAI-7YK3UC?OpenDocument>.
- United Nations. *Charter of the United Nations 1945*. <http://www.un.org>.
- *Convention on Psychotropic Substances*, 1971.
- *Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs as amended by the 1972 protocol*, 1961.
- *United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances*, 1988.
- *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, 1948. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>.

- United Nations Development Program (UNDP). *Human Development Report*, 1990.
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1990_en_chap1.pdf, accessed 13 February 2010.
- *Human Development Report*, 1994.
- “Redefining Security: The Human Dimension.” *Current History* 94 (May 1995): 229-236.
- “United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime website.” <http://www.unodc.org>.
- Wade, Terry, and Marco Aquino. “Peru's Indian groups gain strength, push for change.” *Reuters*, June 19, 2009. <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN19447160>.
- Wade, Terry, and Claudia Parsons. “Chavez now smells hope at U.N. after Bush sulphur.” *Reuters*, September 24, 2009.
<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58N69C20090924>.
- Wallace-Wells, Ben. “How America Lost the War on Drugs.” *Rolling Stone*, December 13, 2007.
http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/17438347/how_america_lost_the_war_on_drugs.
- Weisbrot, Mark. “Latin America's economic rebels.” *guardian.co.uk*, October 28, 2009.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/oct/27/bolivia-ecuador-economy>.
- Wells, Simon. “A Human Security Approach to US Illegal Drugs Policy.” *Revue de Sécurité Humaine / Human Security Journal*, no. 1 (April 2006): 51-64.
- “What is Human Security?”
http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/lie/files/Publications/what_is_HS.pdf.
- Zirnite, P. “The Militarization of the Drug War in Latin America.” *Current History* 97, no. 618: 166-173.