

“NGO Coordination and the Changing Aid Environment in Cambodia: Challenges and Opportunities”

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Abstract

Cambodia is one of the poorest and most aid-dependent countries in Southeast Asia. Historically NGOs have operated in Cambodia since the collapse of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979. Since the Paris Peace Accord Agreement, signed by the Cambodian leaders in 1991, the number of NGOs has grown rapidly and played a pivotal role in delivering public services and advocacy. In an effort to improve efficiencies and effectiveness aid delivery mechanisms have become extraordinarily complex and cumbersome. They require all parties to have strong coordination efforts within their individual groups and amongst broader stakeholders.

This thesis analyses the effectiveness of NGO coordination in Cambodia. It is based on recently completed in-country research involving participant observation and a series of semi-structured interviews. The paper explores NGO coordination and how the NGO community engages in the aid coordination processes led by the Cambodian government.

The findings indicate that the NGO coordination efforts have encountered a series of challenges. These include cultural, political and institutional challenges and poor NGO coordination between the national and provincial levels. They have resulted in a) the absence of a collective voice, b) slow progress on NGO self-regulation, c) the fragmentation and duplication of NGO projects, d) a poor working relationship with the government e) little understanding of aid effectiveness and f) poor engagement in the aid coordination mechanisms. Thus, the NGO coordination efforts are relatively loose although progress has been made since the 1990s. Consequently, Cambodia's NGO sector remains immature and weak. There are, however, some opportunities for improvement through creating an environment that enables policy dialogue with the government.

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List of Abbreviations

AAA	Accra Agenda for Action
ACFID	Australian Council for International Development
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AGSC	The Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness
CCC	Cooperation Committee for Cambodia
CDCF	Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum
CG/RT	Consultative Group Meeting/Round Table
CHRAC	Action Committee for Human Rights
CCIC	The Canadian Council for International Cooperation
CG	Consultative Group
CID	The New Zealand Council for International Development
CIDA	The Canadian International Development Agency
CMDGs	Cambodian Millennium Development Goals
CPP	Cambodian People's Party
CRDB/CDC	Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board/Council for the Development of Cambodia
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DFID	Department for International Development
GDCC	Government Donor Coordination Committee
HLF	High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organisations
JMIs	Joint Monitoring Indicators
LNGOs	Local Non-Governmental Organisations
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MFAIC	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
MOI	Ministry of Interior
MOU	Memorandums of Understanding
NAs	NGO Alliances
NCBs	NGO Coordination Bodies
NEP	NGO Education Partnership
NGOF	NGO Forum on Cambodia
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations

NGO-GPP	NGO Good Practice Project
NSDP	National Strategic Development Plan
NZAID	New Zealand's International Aid and Development Agency
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic and Cooperation Development
PD	The Paris Declaration
PRK	People's Republic of Kampuchea
RGC	Royal Government of Cambodia
TWGs	Technical Working Groups
UN	The United Nations
UNDP	The United Nations Development Programme
UNTAC	The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

Chapter I: Overview

1.1 Introduction

Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) have become popular development agents in the global aid system. Some NGOs provide humanitarian assistance and others provide operational, watch-dog, education, activist and advocacy services to marginalised and poor people who are not able to be reached by markets at local, national, regional and international levels (Edwards and Hulme 1995; Lewis 2006b). As alternative agents for development, they have tried to overcome development issues exacerbated by macro policies such as structural adjustment and neoliberalism in developing countries. Due to increased needs and demands NGOs have continued to rapidly increase in size, resources and scope. They have directly and indirectly influenced individuals, states, multilateral governmental institutions and non-state actors on international issues such as poverty reduction, sustainable development, aid, debt relief, human rights, the arms trade and climate change (Green, 2008). Although there are no official or reliable figures available on the number of active NGOs, estimates suggest NGOs working locally, nationally, regionally and globally lies in the millions (Crewe & Harrison, 1998; Roberts et al., 2005). At least 150 NGO coordination bodies (NCBs) exist in both developed and developing countries (Bennett, 1994).

The new aid architectures, particularly the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD) (2005) and Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) (2008), aim to improve effectiveness of aid and development. However, there is an uneven involvement with the PD and AAA from Northern and Southern NGOs. Northern NGOs have been largely involved with the PD debates because they have technical and financial resources and political space for influencing policy (Burall and Datta, 2008). However, many Southern NGOs have little opportunity to engage in the new process due to a lack of political space from donors and their government, poor coordination, weak capacity to produce research and evidence, language barriers and high transaction costs and scarcity of resources (Menocal and Rogerson, 2006; Pratt and Myhrman, 2009). It is critical to get Southern NGOs actively involved in the processes at global and national levels through balancing the power relationship between Northern and Southern NGOs. There is also pressure from donors and country governments on NGOs to enhance their effectiveness

including accountability, transparency, ownership and outcomes. Therefore, the NGO community might need to develop a 'Paris-like declaration' (Koch, 2008) at both national and global levels. Many NGOs, particularly Northern NGOs have endorsed this initiative. NGOs may decide to apply some component of the PD and/or their own 'NGO codes of conduct' developed by national NCBs in developing countries.

1.2 Context of the Research

The last few decades in Cambodia have witnessed dramatic changes in NGOs working on development, human rights, empowerment, democracy and poverty. Since the first general election was organised by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, the number of NGOs, including local NGOs (LNGOs) and international NGOs (INGOs), has substantially increased to about 1,791 (Informant GOV 02 and 05 and Appendix VI). Until recently, NGOs have played a vital role in providing operational, watchdog, educational, activist and advocacy services to the poor in both urban and rural areas. However, along with the growing number and roles of NGOs, there is concern over their effectiveness and coordination between the national and provincial levels from the Cambodian government and donors.

Cambodia's NGO coordination has been well organised through national and sector NGO coordination bodies (NCBs) established after Cambodian liberalisation. The NGO coordination efforts have become more apparent despite many NGOs in Cambodia being in their infancy. NCBs have made strong progress in attracting NGO members, sharing information and developing a collective voice; however such efforts have encountered significant challenges, particularly their partnership and coordination between the national and provincial levels. They are accused of being donor-driven and sometimes reliant on donors acting as mediators to influence policy changes; it is claimed that their missions are shaped by donors' priorities and funding, more than local needs (World Bank, 2009d). There are many problems that the Cambodian government and civil society need to address. The relationship between the government and NGOs remains weak and unsustainable, leading to consequential misunderstandings and mistrust due to the lack of a legal framework for NGO operations and no genuine dialogue. As a result, coordination issues among NGOs remain very sensitive and if insufficiently addressed could lead to obstacles for development.

On top of their own issues concerning effectiveness, transparency, ownership and accountability, NGOs are facing tough challenges in the new aid mechanisms. This new aid mechanisms allow NGOs to represent their voices (citizens' voices) and hold government and donors accountable at the policy and technical levels. For instance, NGO umbrella bodies have participated in meetings of the Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF¹) and the Government-Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC) and some meetings of the 19 Joint Technical Working Groups (TWGs²) such as education, health, HIV/AIDS, food security and nutrition, and planning and poverty reduction. However there are concerns about their roles and capacity to understand the concepts and engage in aid coordination processes that are extraordinarily complex and cumbersome. NCBs have not yet been scrutinised over their roles, performance and effectiveness.

1.3 Aim and Objective of the Study

The aim of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of NGO coordination on development and poverty reduction in the new aid environment adopted by the Cambodian government and donor community. Therefore, the main objective for this exercise is

- To assess evolving coordination processes among the national and provincial NGOs working on development and poverty reduction in Cambodia's changing aid environment.

To explore this objective I focus on the following sub-questions:

1. What NGO coordination processes currently exist and what challenges do they face?
2. How is NGO coordination being changed and challenged by Cambodia's new aid environment?
3. How can NGO coordination be improved?

¹ High level policy forum where government (ministers), civil society and a head delegation of donor agencies annually discuss and agree on an agenda for development cooperation in Cambodia (CDC/CRDB, 2006c, 2006g, 2006f, 2006i).

² In-country aid effectiveness mechanisms initiated and implemented based on principles of the Paris Declaration articulating ownership, leadership, harmonisation, mutual accountability and managing for results, aimed at strengthening cooperation between the Royal Government of Cambodia and donors. The TWG meetings are held quarterly at TWG secretariat and CDC/CRDB secretariat, respectively (ibid). There are 19 TWGs in respective sectors (ibid).


1.4 Significance of the Study

This study will provide an insight into the effectiveness of NGO coordination in making positive differences to development and poverty reduction in Cambodia. This study also hopes to raise the awareness of NGOs' effectiveness at the national and provincial levels in Cambodian aid coordination mechanisms. The study complements and reinforces an existing Strategic Framework for Development Cooperation Management which argues for an expansion of the technical and political space for NGO representatives to meaningfully engage and participate in the Cambodian aid coordination processes. This can enhance confidence that NGOs can contribute to reducing poverty and to achieving the Cambodian national development objectives.

1.5 Outline of the Study

Figure 1.1 provides an overview of how this thesis is structured. Chapter 2 comprises a literature review covering the basic concepts and roles of NGOs, NGO coordination in both developed and developing countries, and NGO coordination in aid coordination mechanisms. Chapter 3 outlines the predominantly qualitative methods including desk reviews, participant observation and semi-structured interviews, and discusses forms of analysis. Chapter 4 briefly portrays the Cambodian socio-economic, cultural and development contexts. Chapter 5 looks at how NGO coordination in Cambodia has developed and encountered challenges since Cambodian liberalisation. Chapter 6 examines how NGO engagement and participation is conducted within the new aid coordination mechanisms. Chapter 7 concludes with a discussion of the results and with recommendations for future research.

Figure 1.1: Thesis Outline



Chapter II: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

Over the last 30 years Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) have become a key part of the global aid system, providing humanitarian, operational and advocacy services at all levels (Edwards and Hulme 1995; Lewis, 2006b). They have elucidated development issues caused by macro developmental discourses. NGOs have been increasingly scrutinised with a key focus on their important roles in poverty reduction, human rights, trade, politics and other issues in developing countries (Ahmed and Potter, 2006; Anthony et al., 2008). Alongside the benefits that they bring, a number of questions are being asked of NGOs by many actors. However, the coordination work among NGO groups and between other actors such as state and aid agencies and even the private sector has so far received little attention from academics (Bebbington, 2004; Lewis, 2006a). NGO coordination is the key instrument in aiding their effective advocacy work at the national and global levels, especially now they are under the pressure of a New Aid Paradigm (Anthony et al., 2008). This chapter seeks to develop a conceptual framework for NGO coordination based on a limited amount of literature in areas of NGO coordination and management, humanitarian relief efforts and partnership, the nature of development NGO experience and the new trends in aid policy following the Paris Declaration.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first sector looks briefly at the original concept and evolution of NGOs and their roles since the end of the Second World War. The second section discusses the importance of NGO coordination at the national and global levels. The final section provides an overview of NGO coordination bodies and their involvement in new aid architecture including the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action.

2.2 In search of an NGO Definition and Roles

There are many different definitions of NGOs in different countries. Generally an NGO is a non-profit and non-criminal organisation that is free from government control. They influence and/or challenge governments or political parties by primarily focusing on

either delivering socio-economic services or policy advocacy and putting people at the centre of development (Salamon and Anheier, 1997; Desai, 2002). The term NGO or international NGO was first used in the UN Charter in 1946 and the NGOs have become increasingly influential in the last two decades (Boli and Thomas, 1997). In this study, the term NGO is used to explore INGOs and LNGOs according to their specific nature, structure and roles in development and international aid.

Development INGOs are generally based in developed nations, but deliver their services in developing countries. In their home countries, they are limited to fundraising and public awareness of international development and aid. Their offices in the developing countries consist of foreign and local staff. They often assist LNGOs financially and technically. Indeed, they help to build a strong civil society in many countries. According to Boli and Thomas (1997) INGOs have generally been formed under five basic principles including universalism, individualism, rational voluntaristic authority, rationalising progress and world citizenship (See Boli and Thomas, 1997, p.180-182).

LNGOs are indigenously established in developing nations. They are usually small organisations that provide public services to the poor in remote communities and urban areas. Some are also involved in advocacy work. They are often dependent on and accountable to INGO counterparts and donors. They gather information about the real needs of the poor in their daily life and experience in order to form their development projects, goals and strategies (Nyoni, 1987).

2.2.1 Development of NGOs

As alternative agents for development, NGOs have rapidly increased in number and size in both developed and developing worlds. There are estimated to be some 30,000 INGOs in the developed world and millions of LNGOs in the developing world (Crewe & Harrison, 1998, p.6; Roberts et al., 2005, p.1846). They are powerful new suppliers that meet large demands for social and economic services while also undertaking advocacy work in many parts of the developing world (Salamon and Anheier, 1997). They have benefited from the decline of the state under neoliberalism.

Within the growth of the NGO sector, the state has played a key role in managing and regulating NGOs in both developed and developing countries. However, the NGO legal registration varies from one nation to another with some being more restrictive than others. While legal registration allows NGOs to operate, Salamon and Anheier (1997) argue that in some countries the legal framework and legal restrictions have prevented NGO growth even though there are supportive conditions for NGOs. This may arise when the process of registration involves corrupt state institutions regulating NGOs. Despite this the number of NGOs continues to rise across the world. Within this context, NGOs have played a number of roles, both nationally and internationally.

2.2.2 The Roles of NGOs

a) Disaster and Famine Relief

After the Second World War, NGOs have played a key and active role in famine relief, particularly during emergency situations of wartime or destruction caused by natural or human-induced disasters such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2008 Sichuan earthquake and various food crises. Such work gave birth to the first generation of NGOs (Martinussen and Pedersen, 2003). The assistance is done through providing immediate food, medical aid, shelter, or similar basic necessities. Charity and relief aid remain key roles for NGOs today (Ahmed & Potter, 2006); and many OECD countries and agencies such as the European Union and United States Agency for International Development have largely channelled their humanitarian and food aid through such NGOs. In recent years, a specific role for NGOs, particularly INGOs like World Vision International (see Appendix I), has been delivering humanitarian relief and other services in fragile or failed states, in the hope of achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

b) Development Work

The second generation of NGOs, broadly arising since the 1970s, has been more concerned with long-term issues of poverty and economic inequality in developing countries, shifting from giving help to enabling self-help. This approach is to assist people to help themselves: 'teaching a man how to fish' (Martinussen and Pedersen,

2003). They provide technical services and resources both tangibly and intangibly for many purposes. They target the poor both in remote and urban areas such as slums. They are able to target the powerless and vulnerable groups whom the governments' universal services have not reached. These NGOs have become specialised in a number of sectors and sub-sectors. They work closely with and use local knowledge. Therefore, there is a rising governmental interest in such NGOs as they fill the gap where governments cannot provide public goods to their own people.

c) Advocacy Work

Moving to the third generation of NGOs, Korten (1987) states that problems at the ground level demand wider policies of the government. Therefore, advocacy and lobbying has increasingly been seen as a key NGO role on behalf of the poor nationally and internationally since the 1980s. The advocacy NGOs set their goals to contribute to democratisation of the political systems and promote respect for basic human rights and good governance (Hulme and Edward, 1997). Their work aims to change the structure, social, political and economic conditions and policy of the patronage government's institutions toward the marginalised. For example, INGOs serve as lobbyists for LNGOs to influence Southern governments' policies and priorities including increased support of foreign assistance (Nelson, 2004; Teegen et al., 2004).

2.2.3 The Global Roles of NGOs

The third generation of NGOs has built networks across countries to undertake their international advocacy work. According to Keck and Sikkink, the advocacy roles involve four kinds of international politics (cited in Ahmed and Potter, 2006). Firstly, they pursue international information politics through their networks in developing countries (see Appendix I) by finding new issues and setting international agendas such as gender, environment, or debt relief. Secondly, NGOs use symbolic politics to raise global awareness of issues in order to change the discursive positions and procedures of international actors. For example, they highlight failed projects to argue for new policies or structures and frame issues to take advantage of international norms (Nelson, 2004). This is done through cooperating with sympathetic staff and managers and forming alliances with the UN bodies, the World Bank, governments, other

CSOs/NGOs and researchers. Through their public awareness campaigning, NGOs work closely with the media to highlight environmental, humanitarian, human rights and social problems across borders (Anthony et al., 2008). This measure has had positive influences on individuals and the governments in both the developed and developing world. Thirdly, through leverage politics they persuade the states, donors and multinational corporations to act on an issue. For instance, the NGOs have been successful in demonstrating mass support, as in the case of debt relief and trade issues (Nelson, 2004). Finally, Keck and Sikkink identify a fourth NGO advocacy role as the use of accountability politics, persuading the states to live up to accepted international norms through bearing upon the states' behaviour. For example, the Japanese and Indonesian NGOs successfully used lawsuits against the Japanese government and contractors to stop dam construction in Indonesia and influence both governments to compensate the affected residents (Ahmed and Potter, 2006). Thus, NGOs are able to make governments accountable through the international norms.

2.3 Why is NGO Coordination Important?

The terms 'NGO coordination' and/or 'aid coordination' originated within the work among humanitarian relief actors in the 1980s and 1990s in an attempt to make aid more effective. With the end of the Cold War, the number of complex emergencies and emerging failed states increased. During this period a larger scale of external financial resources were directed to a number of war-torn countries and regions (Forman and Patrick, 2000). This funding was aimed at reconstructing and rehabilitating those countries from violence and chronic damage, repairing severely damaged institutional and physical infrastructure³ and alleviating economic and social poverty. The assistance was delivered in the form of complex humanitarian relief by a number of actors, particularly the UN systems and NGOs, mainly INGOs.

The large number of NGOs, both INGOs and LNGOs, rapidly increased. For example, according to Smillie (1997) in Strand (2005, p.88) the estimated number of INGOs

³ The institutional and physical infrastructure devastation include the breakdown of governance systems such financial and procurement systems, legal and judicial systems, government institutions and ministries, the destruction of many kinds of physical infrastructure (roads bridges, railways, airports, hospitals, schools, universities, and other public good entities), the displacement of population, insufficient skill labour and manpower, and massive human suffering (Forman and Partick, 2000, p. 3)

working in the Southern countries was about 4-5,000 in 1997, Hulme and Edwards (1997, p.4) indicate that LNGOs registered with the Nepalese government grew from 220 in 1990 to 1,210 in 1993, and those registered with the Tunisian government from 1,886 in 1988 to 5,186 in 1991. The growing number of NGOs also aimed to absorb the massive increase in resources provided, as Cohen and Deng (1998, p.364) indicate that in 1998 alone US \$8 billion or 10% of total Official Development Assistance (ODA⁴) was channelled from developed to developing worlds through NGOs⁵.

NGOs have become the executive agents or sub-contractors for the UN agencies in humanitarian situations, moving beyond the welfare and safety net services⁶ with skilled professionals⁷ (Duffield, 1997). Moreover, donor countries are also interested in supporting CSOs/NGOs to build democracy and good governance including human rights, rather than supporting governments that are fragile due to corruption and poor governance systems. Donors can closely manage the utilisation of their funds through their selected NGO partners (Strand, 2005).

Additionally, NGOs claim that they are capable of mobilising funds and utilising the resources in a more efficient, less hierarchical and more cost-effective way than the government institutions or UN agencies. As Hulme and Edwards (1997, p.5) conclude “...their supposed cost-effectiveness was in reaching the poorest.” They have become specialised in a number of sectors and cover a broad range of activities. They are crowded mostly in the city or frontline regions, aiming to strengthen their legitimacy, access information, and seek resources.

⁴ Increasing Official Development Assistance (ODA) toward CSOs/NGOs resulted from the change of donor funding policy with the emerging alternative approach as ‘development is for people’ and development policies based on neoliberalism and the market economy introduced in 1980s and 1990s (Pieterse, 2001).

⁵ NGOs, particularly INGOs, mobilise resources from public and private sources. Only a few do not accept public sector funding, while others are funded between 60%-70% of their revenue from their respective donor governments (Natsios, 1995, p. 407). Their private revenues are primarily from public fund-raising events through mass media including television, internet and others (ibid.).

⁶ The welfare and social safety net services include a number of sectors such as agriculture, primary health care, education, water and sanitation, micro-finance and enterprises, reforestation and road construction (Natsios, 1995, p.407).

⁷ The skilled professionals are educators, health care professionals such as nurses and doctors, and those with expertise in aircraft logistics, large-scale commodity handling, engineering repairs, civilian policing, and judicial structures and others (Duffield, 1997, p.538).

Previous experience reveals that there were fragmented and unfocused activities, badly planned and independently implemented relief efforts, and a lack of shared information of the real needs and existing resources among humanitarian actors, especially NGOs (Strand, 2005). This led to under-coverage in some geographic areas and sectors, replication, competition, and ineffectiveness of resources used. Munslow and Brown (1999) note that the emerging coordination efforts were not achieved due to the different and complex organisations and financial sources. Therefore, this distorted the peace building process in failed states (ibid.).

Nevertheless, the concept of coordination has been adopted, albeit differently, within the UN system and amongst NGOs, particularly INGOs. They intend to make use of financial resources more effectively and efficiently. Eventually, the poor will directly gain benefits from it. The next section will elaborate on the meaning and the concept of coordination and NGO coordination.

2.3.1 Definition of Coordination and NGO Coordination

a) Coordination

The definitions of coordination are given in different ways. Coordination is *“the action of coordinating; harmonious combination of agents or functions towards the production of a result”* (Simpson and Weiner, 1989, p.898). Robinson et al. (2000, p.7) define coordination as *“a way to bring together disparate agencies to make their efforts more comparable (in the interests of equity, effectiveness and efficiency) and they caution at the same time that “without coordination, the danger is of lapsing into chaos and inefficiency.”* Moreover, Hvinden (cited in Strand, 2005, p.91) views coordination as *“the process whereby two units are brought to operate together in a (more) harmonious way”*; but he warns that *“this concept is only meaningful when these units are presupposed to act in a coordinated manner”*. The term ‘coordination’ in the current aid context refers to coordination between and within government, NGOs and donors. Coordination is seen as a form of hierarchical and top-down mechanism, reflecting the power relationship in the chain of administrative and institutional management. Robinson et al. (2000) argue that the state legitimately plays a coordinating role over

other actors, particularly NGOs, as the regulator. Thus, coordination is formally formed by one actor in the bureaucratic structure and it always exists at the policy level.

Robinson et al. (2000) maintain that the terms ‘coordination’ and ‘cooperation’, which are often used synonymously, have distinct meanings. ‘Cooperation’ is based on the voluntary principles associated with power generating from knowledge, experience, expertise and contribution, rather than from hierarchical roles and functions. Cooperation is often seen in the spirit of cooperative process in organisations interested in the notions of ‘participation’, ‘process management’, and ‘learning organisations’ (ibid. 2000, p.8). Therefore, cooperation is often used in an informal and voluntary structure with equal partnership between members and positions at the technical level. Therefore, coordination differs from cooperation in this context.

In the context of aid coordination, Disch (1999, p.18) says coordination is associated with policies, principles, priorities, procedures, and implementation or practice. Disch (1999) also notes that coordination involves a different degree of ‘intensity/commitment’ between governments, donors or NGOs/CSOs including ‘consultation’, ‘cooperation’ and ‘collaboration’. The coordination process is a formally complex structure and involves both political and technical levels.

b) NGO Coordination and NGO Coordination Bodies (NCBs)

Historically, NCBs exist at the global, regional, national and/or community level. Within this growing number there are more than 150 field-based NGO coordination bodies (Bennett, 1994). They vary internationally and nationally in both the developed and developing worlds (Stremlau, 1987). They have evolved over time, becoming focal points between the governments, donors and NGOs for exploring national development issues. NCBs in developing countries were created for and have played particular roles in facilitating financial assistance during the humanitarian crises in the 1980s and 1990s. However, they differ with regard to tangible and intangible features such as missions, activities, size, financial and human resources and NGO self-regulation. Bennett (2000) writes “Coordination is also about the power to determine the allocation of resources, to exert influence over warring parties, governments. Most NCBs comprise several dominant agencies that have a vested interest in using the body as a

vehicle for pursuing policies complementary to their own programme”. (Bennett, 2000, p.172). Therefore, NGO coordination is a means to an end, rather than an end in itself.

These kinds of organisations use various terminologies to portray themselves and their different structures. Jon Bennett, an expert on coordination issues, says that NCBs describe themselves variously as consortia, councils, federations, umbrella agencies, networks, unions and coordination bodies (See Box 2.1).

Bennett (2000, p.169) indicates that these organisations require:

- Independence from government, though they may include government participation;
- The setting up of a secretariat, answerable to an elected executive committee, that takes responsibility for administering the day-to-day activities of a membership organisation;
- A national perspective, i.e., they will usually cover more than just one sector and will take on some kind of representational role.

NCBs discussed in this report are the formally-constituted institutions registered with their country’s government ministries. They can be the national NCBs or geographic sector NCBs. The majority of them do not represent all NGOs in their country (Stremlau, 1987; Bennett, 1994), because many NGOs are interested in being independent and autonomous (Roberts et al., 2005). There is often more than one national NCB in one country working and pursuing different objectives and mandates (Strand, 2005). Other NGO networks, particularly provincial or community networks, called NGO networks or alliances in this study, are informal groupings of NGOs working together to achieve common goals and they might not register with their government’s ministries. The organisational structures and roles of NGO coordination bodies will be comprehensively discussed in the following sections.

Box 2.1: The Eight Different Types of NGO Coordination Bodies

1. ***Umbrella organisations of NGOs***: Independent membership umbrella organisations of NGOs active at national and regional level. They usually cover several sectors such as health, education, etc. They may comprise Northern and Southern NGOs together or may be set up exclusively for one or another.
2. ***Umbrella organisations of NGOs for a single sector/issue***: Similar to Group 1 but specifically for one sector. They could also include groups which lobby on one specific issue. Can be either national or regional in scope.
3. ***Groups of grassroots organisations***: Federations, unions or networks of grassroots organisations, they include human rights groups, women's groups, etc. usually national in scope, though sometimes regional.
4. ***Consultative councils***: NGO councils set up by the national government as part of a consultation process between itself and the NGO sector. In some cases a council may be the only permitted coordination structure; in others it may be simply an irregular meeting point for government and NGOs.
5. ***Councils of social welfare or social services***: Mostly affiliated to the International Council on Social Welfare (ICSW). In Africa these are usually pre-independence institutions, mostly in Anglophone countries. Several have now changed their emphasis towards more general development activities, thus joining Group 1. In other cases the Council groups both government services and NGOs and receives a large proportion of its budget from the government.
6. ***International NGO consortia***: Consortia which bring together a number of northern and/or southern NGOs, combining financial and staff resources for a specific programme of activities. Often such consortia exist where it is more difficult for the individual members to operate alone.
7. ***Religious affiliation consortia***: Consortia dealing with relief and development activities within particular religious bodies (usually the Christian church, though there are also several Islamic consortia). Generally, these consortia bring together the development offices of national church/Islamic organisations. In rare cases they represent an ecumenical inter-church alliance.
8. ***Sub-regional networks of NGOs***: These may either be sector-specific or comprise members from other national/regional groupings (Group 1-5).

Source: Bennett (2000, p.170)

2.3.2 Southern NGO Coordination Bodies

NCBs have been set up in war-torn countries under the initiative from donors, particularly UN agencies, governments and INGOs and/or LNGOs (Stremlau, 1987; Bennett, 2000) to enhance the programmatic and managerial capabilities of NGOs and

improve their effectiveness. Bennett (1994) notes some NCBs are established outside international conferences, responding to the common demands and needs of NGOs on the ground. However, Stremlau (1987) argues that in some circumstances NGOs have hesitated to create discernible NCBs due to concern at attracting unwanted government attention. Conversely, outside the scope of humanitarian crises, host communities might directly and indirectly encourage NGOs to establish NCBs in order either to have better working relationships with government or to protect themselves from a dictatorial government.

a) The role of NGO Coordination Bodies (NCBs)

NCBs are created by a number of groups, both LNGOs and INGOs, in respective countries where they meet to agree on common goals, values and activities, and swiftly respond to and coordinate efforts in humanitarian crises or natural disasters and national development issues (Bennett, 1994, 2000). This approach brings not only effectiveness, accountability and cooperation, but also ownership and flexibility to the NGO sector in developing countries. However, Bennett (2000) argues that NCBs are service providers and not regulators as governments are.

According to Bennett (2000) the principles of NCBs are to avoid duplication and wastage through voluntarily sharing information and/or resources and to have an independent forum for collective views of NGOs to be expressed to the government and donors. Bennett also highlights other responsibilities as following: 1) advocacy for, and demonstration of, the comparative advantages of a buoyant NGO sector and guarding

against unwanted influence from either governments or donors; 2) engaging in the wider aid industry structure, acting as educational NGO agencies for NGO advancement through capacity building and information exchange; 3) assisting INGOs, governments, and donors to identify their NGO partners through which to work; and 4) enhancing NGO effectiveness through NGO

<p>Box 2.2: The Roles of NCBs</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Minimising project replication and waste 2. Sharing information and/or providing resources 3. Building a collective voice 4. Influencing government policies and strategies toward affected citizens 5. Participating in international and national aid structures 6. Enhancing NGO professionalism through capacity building and NGO self-regulation 7. Identifying NGO partners for the government, donors and INGOs
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self-regulation for good practice such as operational and ethical guidelines and codes of

conduct (2000, p.174). However, there is no clear blueprint for such formal or informal coordination arrangements that could be easily adapted to different situations. The roles of NCBs (See Box 2.2) need to be prioritised based on unique current political, social, and cultural contexts in individual countries.

There are a number of sector membership organisations playing more pivotal roles in delivering services (Bennett, 2000). However, tensions between national NCBs and sector membership bodies may occur due to different views on their operation and development policies. There are also a number of NGOs that separately run their projects without awareness of the potential for coordination. As Bennett (2000, p.171) states *“everyone is for coordination, but no one wishes to be coordinated, at least not just now”*. Specifically, Bennett does not clarify what mechanisms may be used to avoid duplication and waste. The result is that project and activity replication and wastage remain key issues.

NCBs serve as a forum to link members with different needs and expectations in everyday practices of activities and programmes across a country (Bennett, 2000). Technology transfer might also be included in their services. This would effectively help members to strengthen areas of possible collaboration in future programmes and to avoid duplication and wastage (Stremlau, 1987). Therefore, the NGO sector becomes more effective both individually and as a group. In order to cut costs and to enhance the managerial and programmatic capacities of members, NCBs also provide administrative services; technical assistance, programme strategies and implementation; training programmes in project design, monitoring and evaluation such as logical framework approach; management from accounting to organisational development, and access to funding sources (Stremlau, 1987; Bornstein, 2003; Roberts et al., 2005).

The relationship between membership bodies, donors and INGOs, becomes more important in a funding role. In order to attract funding from donors and INGOs (Bennett, 2000; Bornstein, 2003; Roberts et al., 2005) for their own operations and increasing allocation of funds to members, NCBs disclose information about the capabilities of members and updated local situations and needs (Bennett, 2000). In doing so, they need to have skilled staff, new forms of management and effective

accounting procedures. NCBs in different geographical areas such as Asia, Africa and Latin America have different abilities in allocating grants to members (Stremlau, 1987). Therefore, independent selection committees and membership secretariats must be very effective in their ability to secure grants. Some of them play this role very effectively by gathering members to analyse and document their experiences and share these practices with donors (Stremlau, 1987; Bennett, 2000). The funding role may limit their autonomy due to certain conditions or controls set by donors. Thus, NCBs are not only a means to an end but an end in themselves in this case. However, some members reject any type of funding role to maintain their absolute independence and legitimacy (Bennett, 2000). Another important role for NCBs is to influence and make donors accountable for the quantity and quality of their aid delivery to the country.

As pressure from their own operation and donors, many NCBs have now enforced their own NGO self-regulation to build a better image of NGOs everywhere. However, Pratt and Myhrman (2009, p.6) argue that:

“self-regulation is voluntary and often is not monitored to assess the level of compliance (internally or externally). Some of the initiatives provide code of conduct rules, without specifying very many detail as to what implementation would look like.”

There is little awareness of how initiatives such as operational, ethical and management guidelines and other best practices may be fully adapted and implemented by NGOs, particularly LNGOs, and what progress has been made. This involves staff members' efforts, time and cost for each NGO. LNGOs are even worse than INGOs in that capacity and staff and management understanding of NGO self-regulation and management remains limited.


b) Organisational Structure and Management

NCBs have formal structures, with contracted staff, permanent offices (usually based in the capital city), a clear vision and mission, strategy and annual action plan, membership guidelines, boards of directors and committees (See Figure 2.2). The NCB's organisational management is characterised in horizontal form using the

participation approach (collaboration and cooperation practice) in contrast with vertical and authoritarian approaches (Bennett, 2000). However, Kjellman, et al., (2003, p.856) point out that “*co-ordination bodies have often been unable to reconcile the disparate goals and strategies actors have, and at times have proven rigid, reluctant or simply unable to adapt to the changing needs of dynamic contexts*”.

Bennett (1994, p.16-17) suggests four different types of management structure: General Assembly⁸, Executive Committee⁹, Executive Director¹⁰ and Secretariat¹¹ (See Figure 2.2). Bennett determines their distinctive tasks and responsibilities in order to make the NCBs effective operationally. The capacity, commitment and efforts of NCB staff and the executive director can make a significant difference in coordination work as Bennett (2000, p.18) argues that “*the prestige and image of an NCB is largely a reflection of how good the Secretariat is.*”

Figure 2.2: Typical Structure of Southern NCBs



Sources: Bennett (1994, 2000)

⁸ The General Assembly is given the highest authority of the organisation, responsible for approving the annual programme, annual budget and work plan; providing comments on policy and strategy and major events; and recruiting new officers. The General Assembly is often held annually or more frequently organised based on the decision made by the members of NCBs (Bennett, 1994, 2000).

⁹ The Executive Committee consists of a small number of selected members and/or individuals voted during the General Assembly. The committee actually meets bi-weekly or monthly to work on the organisation's policy, work plan and budget plan before submission to the General Assembly, and appointment of the Executive Director (ibid).

¹⁰ The Executive Director is the key person of NCBs. The trusted, experienced and knowledgeable Executive Director is responsible for NCBs' daily operation, setting policy, debating external issues, developing approaches to particular problems facing the NGO sector and mobilising financial resources (ibid).

¹¹ The Secretariat usually comprises the Executive Director and support staff. They need to have strong backgrounds and experience at the ground level and institutional management in order to provide the daily services to their members. They are paid staff (ibid).

At the management level, their executive directors and staff must be skilled and professional in leadership, development practices and policy analysis at a national level, holding the ability and capacity to manage coordination work between their members, governments, INGOs and donors (Hailey and James, 2004). Additionally, staff need to assess member NGOs in the field, ensuring they are effective (Bennett, 2000), but they are not authorised to manage members' internal operations. Along with paid skilled managers and staff, their organisational structure is seen as being far from local communities. NCBs are not project/programme implementers at the community level. In addition, reporting and daily operational work and the monthly meeting with members should be conducted in the local native language in order to understand the cultural, social and economic contexts.

Furthermore, NCBs might find it difficult to fulfil members' needs, both INGOs and LNGOs, because of their differences in size, structure, mandates, culture of working, nature of the programmes, funding sources and their relationship with the host governments (Stremlau, 1987). INGOs and LNGOs have different expectations on how NCBs should provide services. Basically, LNGOs seem to seek material support (funds) and practical services from NCBs (ibid). LNGOs often have limited knowledge and understanding on NGO self-regulation and other development policy and issues to contribute in the NCB's regular meetings. In contrast, INGOs that are strong institutions aim to share information, coordinate projects/activities and contact LNGOs (ibid). NCBs function effectively and efficiently if their members are active and provide support and comments to achieve common goals and interests.

c) Membership and Fees

Characteristically, membership defines NCBs, their roles and services. NCBs may have a large number of members based on their type of work, mandate and the services they provide. The number of members has a direct impact of the NCBs' performance because the members are the reason for their existence. Stremlau (1987 p.215) observes that *"how to balance the role of the coordinating body and the interests of independent members is one of the most common, and difficult, problems facing these organisations."*

Generally, NGOs are required to meet specific conditions to be a member of NCBs. Those conditions could be a statement of interest, being registered with a government's ministries, providing a NGO description¹², filling the membership application and fee forms. Then, NCBs review and assess the application before their executive committee approves the membership request. In association to this, NGO members will need to pay a regular membership fee, usually an annual fee. The membership fees vary from one NCB to another based on the quality and quantity of the services provided. The fees are calculated in different ways. There may be a fixed annual fee, based on a proportion of the annual budget of NGOs and others.

There might be a number of reasons why NGOs do not want to be the member of an NCB. Roberts et al. (2005) notes that many NGOs are not interested because of the fear of losing their independence and autonomy. Some NGOs do not want to share information and ideas due to the tough funding competition (Strand, 2005). Some might only be interested in parts of an NCB's role but they might feel that they cannot be a full member. Others cannot afford to pay the membership fees or they might not have the budget items to spend on membership fees as their Memorandum of Understanding with their funders might require funds to be strictly used for the specific projects and activities. NCBs are usually situated in the capital city rather in the regions or provinces, and LNGOs might find it difficult to participate on a regular basis in meeting due to the costs of long distance travel and mission expenses. Bennett (2000) says doing coordination work is associated with cost and time. This might prevent NGOs from joining NCBs. Additionally, NGOs might not be well aware of NGO coordination and common benefits that can achieve certain goals.

d) The Working Relationship between NCBs and the Government

Most NCBs improve their relationship with a government by exchanging information, assuming advocacy roles on behalf of NGOs over development issues and government policies, and by significantly contributing to formulating national policies (Stremlau, 1987; Bennett, 2000). However, this role varies from one country to another and is determined by the nature of the respective governments and their relationships.

¹² The description of an NGO includes mission, activities, office, staff, budget, management structure, intended beneficiaries, annual report, reporting and auditing, monitoring and evaluation systems.

Moreover, governments require precise details of NGO activities and funding (Bennett, 2000) and some governments claim that NGOs' complaints are overstated to gain donor aid. NGOs are also subjected to probes and accusations of foreign manipulation (Parks, 2008). The states may not provide any subsidy to them. Like many LNGOs, NCBs heavily rely on donors' and INGOs' funding (Demars, 2005).

Under a new security agenda, some governments strictly regulate, monitor and investigate the NGO sector due to rising political concerns on security and terrorism (Howell et al. 2008). This government control brings confrontational challenges. Also, in some cases, government leaders create government NGO-like bodies to attract funding from donors (Bennett, 2000; Demars, 2005), leading to tension with independent NGOs.

e) NCBs and their Partnership with Donors

International donors have played supporting roles for NCBs and NGOs. Although NCBs raise revenues from membership fees, most rely on external financial resources because they will be unable to generate money from the general public, companies, or the government within a country. Instead NCBs are intermediary agents sharing information with donors about what happens on the ground and they share the information from donors with members. Indeed, position papers prepared annually by NCBs can be used to inform donor policy and practice in the country. This might hold the donors accountable for their country aid practice.

2.3.3 Northern NGO Coordination Bodies

There are a number of NCBs in developed countries such as the US and European countries (See Appendix I). They were established after the Second World War and the Cold War. Many NCBs work to improve the livelihood and human well-being in developing countries, and include such bodies as InterAction, The Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies (VOICE), and The European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development (CONCORD). Some such as EUROPARC and EuroNGOs focus their activities toward their region and country. Their organisational structures are quite different from those in developing countries. They

usually have NGO members but some NCBs might have individual, honorary and constituent¹³ members. The International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease (IUATLD) had 2,727 members in 127 countries creating a strong international network in 2008 (www.theunion.org, retrieved date July 26, 2009). As part of an international network, the constituent members influence health care and public health policies in their own country and abroad.

Since the 1970s many OECD governments have realised the importance of good working relationships and cooperation with NGOs working in their own country and in international development (Rugendyke, 2007). The governments and NGOs have common objectives and interests towards poverty alleviation and sustainable development across the world. They can play complementary roles in the targeted areas and serving the needs of citizens (NZAID, 2008). Significantly, based on this relationship, Northern NCBs are able to have some influence on the aid policies of their governments. For example, the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID) announced its success in influencing Australia's White Paper on the aid programme in 2006 (ACFID, 2006).

Northern NCBs act as the catalyst for communication and negotiation with their governments, particularly in relation to government funding of NGOs and the NGOs' engagement in international aid and development. They aim to coordinate their overseas activities and present a single voice on issues among a growing community of very diverse members. They also aim to enhance NGOs' relationships with the Western governments, multilateral donors such as the UN agencies, the World Bank, IMF, ADB, and others, and strengthen NGO visibility through their representation at international and national events (Rugendyke, 2007). Some provide capacity building and training to members and they also produce a large number of research-based evidence documents available in English, French, Spanish or Portuguese. They enhance the national and international connections organisationally and individually, raise issues with political parties and build the public awareness of international aid and development issues. They promote the use of codes of conduct and ethics among members.

¹³ The constituent members are the members who represent the country to Northern NCBs. There can only be one Constituent Member per country (www.theunion.org, retrieved date July 26, 2009).

Northern NCBs have sustainable financial resources funded by their governments in addition to income generated from membership fees, donations and grants from the public, enterprises and private foundations, and revenue from their own products and services,. For example, the core funding arrangement between New Zealand CID and NZAID has been renewed for the four year term 2008-2012 (CID, 2008). Some NCBs such as the ACFID and CID receive more than half of their total budget income from governments (ACFID, 2008; CID, 2008). VOICE received more than 60% of its income from membership fees in 2008 to ensure its independence (Voice, 2009). Some make revenue from their products (journals, other publications and services) (ACFID, 2008; EUROPARC, 2008); while InterAction and EURONGO raise income from public and private foundations (InterAction, 2009; www.eurongos.org).

According to their programmes and activities, NCBs do not have a long-term strategic framework coordination or alliance to build partnership between Northern and Southern NCBs. There is a gap in a global partnership in the NGO sector that has not been addressed. Fowler (1992, p.28) argues that *“strategic alliance between like minded NGOs with complementary skills both within and between the North and the South are needed in order to rationalise efforts and use of resources...harmonise policy positions on issues affecting NGOs as a whole, nationally and internationally.”* In essence, Southern and Northern NCBs can learn and share information and experience between them. This could improve their effectiveness and help achieve their international goals.

2.4 NGO Coordination Efforts and the Changing Aid Environment

As noted, NGOs and NCBs have influenced governments, donors and others outside the international aid architecture. Since the 1980s they have connected and built a relationship with senior staff members and managers of the international organisations (Ahmed and Portter, 2006; Anthony et al., 2008). However, they have not fully engaged in the policy dialogue and government-donor aid coordination mechanisms that are organised to ensure national institutional participation in structural adjustment and other aid programmes and modalities (Martinussen and Pedersen, 2003). Their roles and responsibilities within the aid architecture have not been clearly identified.

The aid architecture has evolved from project-based to programme-based approaches, reducing the amount of tied aid and conditionality. The donors' aid policies have shifted the focus from macro-economic growth to poverty reduction or MDGs and from structural reforms to state capacity-building reforms (Martinussen and Pedersen, 2003). Donors have also become more harmonised among themselves through changing their practices, procedures and principles (OECD, 2003). While efforts have been made to improve efficiency and effectiveness, aid delivery mechanisms have paradoxically become extraordinarily complex and cumbersome. They require all parties to have strong coordination efforts within their individual groups and among broader stakeholders. These changes have negatively and positively impacted NGOs' operation and advocacy work at the national and global levels, while NGO engagement within the movement of aid mechanisms seems to be doubtful and less apparent.

The issue of NGO coordination has become critical in dealing with the changing aid environment sectorally, nationally and globally. Although Stremlau (1978), Bennett (2000) and Strand (2005) address coordination issues, they seem to mainly concentrate on NGO coordination in periods of wartime, hardship and/or humanitarian relief. This issue has been given little attention in the general context apart from humanitarian relief, particularly in the context of the emergence of the new aid paradigm: the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD). CSO/NGO engagement at international and national aid mechanisms is discussed in the next section.

2.4.1 CSO/NGO/NCB Engagement in Global Aid Mechanisms


The notion of aid effectiveness emerged as a key issue from the Monterrey Consensus¹⁴ (2002) to the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation¹⁵ (2003), and the PD (2005). The PD was signed by OECD governments and recipient governments aiming at increasing recipient government ownership, donor harmonisation and alignment with partner

¹⁴ Monterrey Consensus was conducted in 2002 aimed at (1) Mobilising domestic financial resources for development; (2) Mobilising international resources for development; (3) Recognising international trade as an engine for development; (4) Increasing international financial and technical cooperation for development; (5) Addressing external debt; (6) Addressing systemic issues (De Toma, 2009, p.8).

¹⁵ The Rome Declaration on Harmonisation was held in March 2003 in Italy, with participation by donors and country governments. The declaration is an "international effort to harmonise the operational policies, procedures and practices of our institutions with those of partner country systems to improve the effectiveness of development assistance, and thereby contribute to meeting the MDGs" (OECD, 2003, p.1). However, there was no CSO/NGO/NCB involvement.

systems and priorities and enhancing mutual accountability and managing for results (OECD, 2005). The DP includes 12 indicators and 21 targets with grade scales under five principles (See Figure 2.3). This modality has changed the design and implementation of international development cooperation. It seeks to strengthen recipient governments' capacity, institutions and systems; thereby maximising aid impacts. However, NGO networks and NCBs were not signatories but rather observers and agreed to endorse the declaration albeit with significant concerns (Lavergne and Wood, 2006). Thus, they were not involved in the preparatory processes and had no opportunity to provide comments and recommendation over the PD's implications.

NCBs and CSO/NGO networks argue that the PD has not broken down the vicious cycle of poverty (ROA, 2007) and has excluded a civil society voice (AGCS, 2008). On behalf of the poor, they claim that the PD does not contain democratic ownership and social accountability (Fleming et al., 2007; Schmidjell et al., 2009). Sen (2007) argues that the donor aid disbursement process, including tied aid and aid



conditionality, food aid and financial and technical assistance delivered by the Programme Management and/or Implementation Units (PMUs/PIUs¹⁶), maintains the same degree of exclusive policies toward the poor. The NCBs/NGOs are concerned over the persistence of the blurred indicators of the PD with the limited progress on gender mainstreaming and human rights (Sen, 2007, Fleming et al., 2007). The above arguments were brought to 2008 Accra High Level Forum (HLF) by CSO/NGO representatives through their 18 month efforts, gathering information, consulting, coordinating, with Northern and Southern CSOs/NGOs and producing a CSO/NGO issue paper and concept paper (AGCS, 2007a, 2007b, 2008). There is a positive and negative side to their involvement.

¹⁶ PIUs are a parallel units like the government's department of the ministry or agency, implementing, managing and evaluating stand-alone projects initiated and supported by DPs and/or INGOs.

a) CSO/NGO Engagement Outcomes

The CSO/NGO engagement in Accra HLF was an impressive political success¹⁷ with diverse representation, pursuing strategic roles in enhancing CSO/NGO roles and voice and shaping aid and development effectiveness (Wood and Valot, 2009). The outcomes resulted from solidarity, quality, well-researched analysis and messaging through wide intensive consultations and coordination across Northern and Southern CSOs/NGOs/NCBs (ibid). Some proposals were well accepted, particularly democratic ownership, social accountability, transparency and gender and human rights issues. Specifically, over 700 CSOs/NGOs gathered in the HLF and 80 CSO/NGO delegates participated in its Roundtables and Plenary sessions with over 100 ministers from donor and recipient countries (ibid). Significantly, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) provides potential engagement of CSOs in the aid structure as follows: 1) the important contribution of CSOs in applying the PD within their own boundaries; 2) promotion of CSO development effectiveness through improving CSO coordination efforts with the governments, strengthening CSO accountability for results and enhancing information on CSO activities; 3) provision of an enabling environment that maximises their contribution to development (OECD, 2008b, p.4). The OECD and Accra HLF stakeholders recognise CSO/NGO roles as ‘central players’ and ‘independent development actors in their own right’ (OECD, 2008a, 2008b; Wood and Valot, 2009). This means that donors and recipient governments realise and need to interact with CSOs/NGOs and parliaments.

CSOs/NGOs’ budgets accounted for approximately 10% of the total \$104 billion ODA flow to developing countries in 2006, and these bodies raised approximately \$20-25 billion on their own from the public and foundations in that year (AGCS, 2008, p.9). Thus, they are both aid recipients and donors and have a wide range of roles, including as advocates, watchdogs, service providers, educators and activists. Within the PD and

¹⁷The success reflects the strong commitments and efforts of a CSO International Steering Group that was made up of CSO/NGO networks and Northern and Southern NGOs and AGCS with a highly ambitious agenda and realistic set of proposals. There were over 700 CSO/NGO participants in one week at Accra and 80 CSO/NGO delegates to its Roundtables and Plenary sessions (Wood and Valot, 2009). The AGCS was established and led by CCIC to prepare CSO documents for the Accra HLF 2008. At the Accra HLF, the CSOs/NGOs that gathered to comprehensively discuss the issues and their roles for Accra HLF for 18 months produced their own positions including “Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations” and “Issue Paper and Concept Paper on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness” (AGCS, 2007a, 2007b).

AAA framework the donors, recipient governments and CSOs/NGOs need to work collectively to demonstrate the big picture of how much aid is committed and disbursed to whom, when and with what results.

b) CSO/NGO Engagement Constraints

While their engagement was a political success at HLF it faced some challenges including limited resources, capacity, global representativeness, opportunities and space and CSO/NGO effectiveness. Firstly, CSO engagement processes are an exhausting exercise with a lack of resources (Wood and Valot, 2009, p.28) and their dependency on donors is apparent. Secondly, the impact of the International CSO Steering Groups (ISG) and Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness (AGCS) and awareness of the aid effectiveness agenda have been limited due to poor information dissemination and awareness campaigns and different layers of CSO engagement processes (ibid, p.29). The level of CSO teamwork has not been sufficient and the capacity and knowledge of CSO representatives in effective lobbying is deficient (Wood and Valot, 2009). Some argued that CSOs/NGOs have fewer constructive ideas to put on the table and placed more negative points (ibid). Thirdly, global representativeness and a solid constituency of CSOs/NGOs are very sensitive issues due to the absence of a global civil society representative body (Pratt and Myhrman, 2009). CSOs/NGOs in the global engagement processes are characteristically dominated by the North, rather than the South, particularly the inputs from social movements (Wood and Valot, 2009; Pratt and Myhrman, 2009). This brings in to question their constituency, legitimacy, and process structure. Fourthly, CSOs/NGOs were trapped by the technical and political blockages at the HLF. There were a lot of agendas for discussion in the Accra HLF, CSO/NGO representatives lost opportunities to engage directly with different donors including the World Bank, the USA and many recipient governments (Wood and Valot, 2009). CSOs/NGOs were not able to speak at the table, particularly ministerial meetings where the AAA negotiations were conducted only between donors and recipient governments (ibid).

Finally, many donors and recipient governments are concerned about NGO effectiveness in terms of their use of funds, multiple accountabilities and transparency. Northern CSOs/NGOs have few ideas on how to develop relevant indicators and targets

such as ownership and alignment of their programmes/projects with Southern NGOs. Although Northern CSOs/NGOs have strong types of partnership with Southern NGOs, their programmes and strategies are shaped by their governments' policies and strategies as most secure funding from their governments (Demars, 2005). Northern CSO/NGO strategies and programmes seem to be far from Southern CSOs/NGOs. Many CSOs/NGOs, particularly Southern CSOs/NGOs, have not released their annual budgets and evaluations to the public (Demars, 2005; Aminjanov et al., 2009). Thus, their transparency is also questionable.

There is a turning point where CSOs/NGOs have started the CSO Development Effectiveness Processes and Framework¹⁸, aiming to improve CSO effectiveness and policy engagement based on CSOs' own development approaches, relationships, institutional realities and the impact of their actions (De Toma, 2009, p.14). Many CSOs/NGOs, particularly Northern CSOs/NGOs, have endorsed the initiative. Thus, CSOs/NGOs have rejected the PD applicability due to complex politics of aid reform, the limitations of the PD to CSO and the nature of CSO/NGO roles as donors and aid recipients (ROA, 2008; Wood and Valot, 2009; Pratt and Myhrman, 2009).

2.4.2 Country Aid Architecture and National CSOs/NGOs/NCBs

a) CSO/NGO Engagement Process in Country Aid Architecture

Historically, CSOs/NGOs in developing countries have directly and indirectly influenced governments' policies and strategies at both national, sector and sub-national levels. The heart of aid effectiveness in the aid architecture is better aid coordination. This requires donors, recipient governments and NCBs/NGO representatives, moving together at the same speed from a rhetorical to a practical approach. Aid coordination mechanisms introduced by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

¹⁸ An International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness is under consultation, processes among CSOs/NGOs across the globe that will include a set of principles, indicators, context-specific implementation guidelines, good practices for accountability mechanisms, and minimum standards for external enabling conditions. The expected outcomes include (i) A common understanding, shared by CSOs from around the world, of the challenges to realising CSO development effectiveness; (ii) Increased CSO accountability; (iii) Increased awareness and knowledge of existing tools, mechanisms and initiatives; (iv) Strengthened partnerships to promote development effectiveness and (v) Understanding and support among official donors, governments and possibly other development stakeholders for an enabling environment for CSO actions (De Toma, 2009, p.14-15).

Development/Development Assistant Committee (OECD/DAC¹⁹) with the contribution of DAC member countries have been adopted and implemented by recipient governments to improve the effectiveness of aid. The aid coordination now has been transformed from a donor-led to a government-led process at country level under the PD. Recipient governments have developed their own aid mechanisms to work closely with donors. The mechanisms include Consultative Group (CG²⁰) or Round Table (RT) meetings, semi-annual or quarterly policy meetings²¹, and sector coordination group meetings²² between country governments, donors and CSO/NGO representatives (Disch, 1999) (See Figure 2.5). Disch (1999) mentions that CSO/NGO representatives are invited to participate in forums but fails to identify what roles they should play as there is no blueprint for aid coordination. There is no clear guideline of the selection of CSOs/NGOs to attend in standardised policy processes (Mundy et al., 2008) as governments remain the absolute decision-makers.

In this regard, the aid coordination and management frameworks developed by the country governments and endorsed and supported by donors need to be changed to include the roles and responsibility of CSOs/NCBs. In doing so, a broader dialogue between the country governments, donors and CSOs/NGOs/NCBs should be held to agree on the following issues:

- CSOs/NGOs' positions and roles as 'central players' and 'development actors in their own right' (OECD, 2008b)

¹⁹ The OECD/DAC is first and foremost a secretariat to the donor community. The coordination in OECD/DAC is conducted through DAC high level meetings and the technical committees to persuade and negotiate with the donors to change attitude and actions. As the result of a series of meetings with its members, policy recommendations, guidelines, lessons and best practices and standards have been adopted toward improving the aid modalities and mechanisms for better effectiveness and efficiency. Specifically, OECD/DAC conduct an annual review of donor practice (Disch, 1999, p.20).

²⁰ The CG meeting is an annual high level meeting between donors and the recipient government, chaired by the Minister of Finance or the Minister of Planning, or an appointee from the Central Bank or the government-appointed coordination body. The agenda and structure of such meetings are different from one government to another. The documents, agenda items and other positions papers produced by the government and donors are often shared beforehand. The main objectives of the meetings are to discuss policy issues related to social and economic development, and resource mobilisation (commitment and pledges) as well as to oversee and manage the budget disbursement and program/project implementation. The role of donors has transformed from co-chair to lead donor facilitators (Disch, 1999).

²¹ The quarterly meetings are often organised by the government before and after CG meeting to follow-up the progress and the project/program implementation, provide policy options and resolve problems raised by the sector coordinating working groups (ibid).

²² The sector coordinating working group meetings are at the technical level where the government's line ministries and donors discuss the issues (project design, implementation and evaluation), sector policies and programmes/projects and budget allocation (budget support, sector-wide approaches, program-based approaches, and others) (ibid).

- The degree of participation and engagement in the policy and technical dialogue in CG/TR, sector working group and/or and sub-national working group meetings
- Information sharing and aid disbursement of CSOs/NGOs (IATI, 2009)

This would make NGOs' bargaining powers stronger and hold donors and governments to account for the quality and quantity of their development programmes, transparency and performance. Also, this would turn the backlash against the NGO sector into opportunities for receiving long-term and significant funding and more space for policy influence.


b) CSO/NGO Challenges in Aid Effectiveness Engagement Processes

As mentioned in previous sections, the new aid agenda has provided both great opportunities and significant challenges for CSO/NGO participation and engagement in national and sector policies and strategies. CSOs/NGOs encounter issues including financial scarcity, institutional capacity and legitimacy, and uncertain and unfriendly political environments.

Firstly, CSOs/NGOs claim that the scarcity of financial resources limits their coordination work and capacity to have influential engagement in policy processes at both national and sector levels (Mundy et al., 2008; Bird and Caravani, 2009; Schmidjell et al., 2009; Wood and Valot, 2009). Specifically, shifting single projects to budget support or SWAp in donor giving-aid policies may result in dramatically decreasing funds for the NGO sector (Lister and Nyamugasira, 2003; Howell et al., 2008).

Secondly, the limited capacity of Southern CSOs/NGOs is substantially apparent. An important question here is the ability and capability of Southern NCBs to capture the macro-vision of their global networks/NCBs to enhance their ability to address national and international policy issues (AGCS, 2007a). INGOs have been largely engaged in the PD process, while most of Southern CSO/NGOs have little involvement or even awareness of the PD in their own country (Menocal and Rogerson, 2006).

Figure 2.4: Structure of the Aid Coordination Mechanisms



Sources: (Disch, 1999, IHSD, 2003; CDC/CRDB, 2006c, 2006g, 2006h, 2006j; Mundy et al., 2008; Alemu, 2009; Bird and Caravani, 2009; Mwega, 2009; Schmidjell et al., 2009).

Bird and Caravani (2009) argue that CSOs/NGOs have expertise on the ground by close cooperation with communities but limited understanding of national policy and budgetary processes, leading to weak independent monitoring of government policy objectives and donor programmes. Country aid coordination processes remain highly diplomatic at the policy level; thus, this requires NCB/CSO/NGO representatives to be knowledgeable and have experience in raising issues within that environment.

Finally, an uncertain and unfriendly political environment in developing countries often limits active CSO/NGO engagement in policy processes. For example, in Tanzania well-coordinated CSO/NGO involvement reveals strong evidence-based policy advocacy; but the Tanzanian government has ignored their advice (Mundy et al., 2008). Schmidjell et al. (2009) suggest that governments' political will is vital for expanding CSO/NGO political space.

2.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, NGO coordinating bodies are normative, distributive, obligative and communicative, aiming at strengthening civil society. The NCBs have played a number of pivotal roles in minimising duplication and wastage through sharing information, knowledge and best practices and/or allocating resources to members. They act as focal points for donors, states and the private sector through genuine partnerships. The successes of NCBs in some developing countries have not come without challenges. In fact, NCBs still face constraints such as establishing sole representation and collective voices, limited political space for policy influencing and limited alternative resources with aid dependency on donors.

With their roles evolving over time, they move in the same direction as development assistance, particularly the new aid paradigm. Although they face threats and work in the uncertain context of the changing aid environment, the coordinating bodies may play a more important role in analysing the current status of NGOs and building their capacity to engage, as well as sharing updated knowledge to their members and non-members. Moreover, the increasing interest and awareness of coordination work in the new aid structure, particularly the Paris Declaration, and aid effectiveness among NGOs

to justify their efforts and to maintain their resources and capacities (Handmer and Dovers, 2007), should be addressed.

The PD and AAA have provided opportunities and significant challenges for CSO/NGO participation and engagement in national and sector policies and strategies. CSOs/NGOs claim to enhance democratic ownership, effectiveness, social accountability and transparency. However, the PD and AAA create more complex knowledge, mechanisms and policy processes, limiting the NGO's political space and technical and financial capacity to understand and be effectively involved in the processes. The country governments' coordination body and the donors need to build the capacity of NCBs; while the donors need to continue supporting CSO/NGO coordination at the country and global levels.

Northern and Southern NCBs and CSOs/NGOs view the PD and AAA as not being applicable to CSOs/NGOs due to the complex politics of aid reform, the limitations of the PD to CSO and the nature of CSO/NGO roles as donors and aid recipients. They have started their own CSO Development Framework aiming to improve their effectiveness, accountability, transparency and managing for results and their policy engagement at the national, regional and global levels. However, they need to continually build genuine partnerships with both recipient governments and donors in order to accomplish their goals and development effectiveness.

Chapter III: Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the methods employed to investigate the three research questions mentioned in section 1.3. Primary data on NGO coordination and the aid coordination processes is generated using a case study approach, which employs semi-structured interviews and participant observation. Secondary data, from Cambodian newspaper articles, television reports, documents from the Cambodian government and the NGO community, is used to capture a wider understanding of the local context. A desk review that includes organisational studies on the government ministries/institutions and organisations of NCBs and provincial NGO networks, is also employed. This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section outlines the research techniques. The second section describes the computer-based qualitative analysis and data analysis approach. The third section provides an overview of my adopted position, reflections and (re)presentation of the field research.

3.2 Qualitative Methods

To allow for analysis of specific views on NGO coordination and the changing aid environment, qualitative methods were used in this study. Qualitative methods offer direct and spontaneous sharing of information, local knowledge, expertise and experiences between researchers and participants (Mikkelsen, 2005). This enables researchers to generalise, explain and draw conclusions from the data that varies from issues expected by researchers (Fitzgerald, 2006). Qualitative case studies were also employed as they focus on historical and experimental knowledge and provide accurate information on the influence of social, political and other contexts (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p.444). Furthermore, the methods also involve the ‘boundary systems’ including the particular people, institutions, phenomena, themes, issues, processes, stories and the local contexts (e.g economic, geographical, cultural, political, social, legal and aesthetic) where the research is located (Stake, 2003, p.134-156). This research used multi-case designs, describing, discussing and explaining the case studies at policy and technical levels and by sectors including 19 Technical Working Groups. Government institutions, donors, NGO Coordination Bodies (NCBs) and NGOs alliances in Cambodia were involved. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) note that the use of case studies

allows further investigation on the research questions and allows generalisations to be drawn from specific local contexts. Therefore, the results generated from the case studies are relevant to the contemporary Cambodia aid coordination context.

The data collection techniques used consist of three methods. Firstly, secondary data was collected from the Cambodian Government's institutions, NGO coordination bodies and information from the local newspaper articles such as *The Cambodian Daily News* and *The Phnom Penh Post*. Also, a desk review of a variety of related literature covering the context of NGO coordination, the new aid structure and organisational studies among selected NGOs was carried out. Finally, the primary data was gathered through participant observation and semi-structured interviews with the voluntary informants from the relevant government ministries, donors and NGOs. This research took place in the field in Cambodia over the 11 weeks from 18 March to 7 June, 2009.

3.2.1 Secondary data

Using qualitative methods, secondary data from various sources and organisational analysis (desk review) were employed in this study to bring about a wider understanding of the international and local contexts and comparison.

a) Data Sources

Data was sourced from NGOs and the Cambodian Government to bring about a wider understanding of the local context (Neuman, 2006). The Cambodian Government's data and documents are available at the CDC/CRDB's website (www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh) (See Appendix II) and other related ministries' websites, particularly the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (www.moeys.gov.kh). A number of NGO websites including Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC) (www.ccc-cambodia.org), NGO Forum on Cambodia (NGOF) (www.ngoforum.org.kh), NGO Education Partnership (NEP) (www.nepcambodia.org), Medicam (www.medicam-cambodia.org), Action Committee for Human Rights (CHRAC) (www.chrac.org) and End Child Prostitution, Abuse and Trafficking in Cambodia (ECPAT) (www.ecpatcambodia.org) were also used. Some documents were also gathered from a number of donor websites such as the World Bank (www.worldbank.org), the Asian Development Bank-ADB

(www.adb.org), and the United Nations Development Programme-UNDP (www.undp.org).

In addition, NGO development, NGO coordination efforts and NGO self-regulation were observed through the analysis of reports in the media including local newspaper articles from *The Cambodian Daily News* and *The Phnom Penh Post*, and television news reports. I also read the local news on the internet such as the Radio Free Asia (www.rfa.org/khmer) and the Phnom Penh Post (www.phnompenhpost.com) until I completed my thesis report.

With comparisons between local and global contexts, I reviewed literature available at international and national levels as well as that covering other Cambodian field research. The literature reviewed academic studies on NGO coordination, aid coordination, global and local aid architecture, NGO sector and global aid systems, NGOs' self regulation, aid and donor policies. This draws lessons from best practice in different countries to improve NGO coordination and NGO engagement, contributing to the advancement of aid effectiveness in the local context.

b) Organisational Analysis

Furthermore, in order to gain a deep understanding of NGO coordination in Cambodia, a number of major NCBs and provincial NGO networks and alliances were analysed through organisational studies (See Appendix V and VI). The organisational studies included their planning, strategy and budgeting, organisational and staff management, governance systems and their effectiveness, accountability and transparency. The analysis was done through collection of the existing information and literature from these organisations available on their NGOs' websites, field research interviews and other related material available at the time of the research.

3.2.2 Primary Data

a) Sampling and Snowballing

The total number of voluntary informants participating in this research was 28. Initially a sample of 65 key informants was drawn up covering government officials, donor

management staff, NGOs and research institutions. These were selected from the formal list of Joint Technical Working Groups (TWGs²³) and the Government-Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC²⁴) list prepared by the Council for the Development of Cambodia/Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board (CDC/CRDB) (See Appendix VII), and an Non-Government Organisation (NGO) directory developed by Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC). The 65 were contacted through email while I was still in Wellington, New Zealand, and informed about the objective and process of the study. However, the number of the planned informants dropped to 54 as 11 did not respond. Later, the final interviewed informants were the 28 who agreed to cooperate in the study with the appointments set through email and phone contact. The 28 informants included seven senior government officials, 11 development partners and 10 NGOs. The 10 NGOs included two NCBs, five members of NCBs and three non-members of NCBs (See Table 3.1).

The key informants were selected based on the local context of where these participants are involved in the NGO sector and the new aid modalities in Cambodia. The new aid coordination mechanism introduced in late 2004 by the Cambodian Prime Minister consists of three main forums between the Government, development partners and NGO representatives (CDC/CRDB, 2004e, 2006c). The three key forums are the Consultative Group meeting that later was renamed as the Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF²⁵), the GDCC and the TWGs. The CDCF, GDCC and TWGs are aid coordination structures developed within the Cambodian context. In the three forums, the key stakeholders are the government, donors, and NGO representatives.

²³ TWGs: There are 19 TWGs (See Appendix III). TWGs are chaired by a senior Royal Government official to bring about national ownership on their respective sector and represented by lead donor coordinators or facilitators. Their roles and tasks are to identify, prioritise and sequence their activities through formulating their own action plan to coordinate external support with an agreed set of priorities based on perceived need, available resources and existing capacity (CDC/CRDB, 2006c, 2006f, 2006g).

²⁴ GDCC: is chaired by the Senior Minister of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and the First Vice-Chairman of CDC/CRDB. The membership of GDCC includes ministers and heads of government agencies, ambassadors or heads of diplomatic missions, and country representatives of multilateral institutions. The GDCC meeting is a forum to provide policy guidance, to identify priorities, and to resolve issues raised by the TWGs. The GDCC secretariat is located in CRDB/CDC under the daily management of the Secretary General (CDC/CRDB, 2006c, 2006f, 2006g).

²⁵ Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF) chaired by the Royal Government of Cambodia has been transformed from the Consultative Group (CG) meeting held in 2007. The CDCF is a high level policy forum where government (ministers), civil society (NGOs) and a head delegation of donor agencies annually discuss and agree on agenda for development assistance to Cambodia (CDC/CRDB, 2006c, 2006f, 2006g).

Table 3.1: List of the Interviewed Informants

No.	Code Number	Type of Organisation	Position	Location
1.	GOV 01	Government institution	Deputy Secretary General	Phnom Penh
2.	GOV 02	Government institution	Director	Phnom Penh
3.	GOV 03	Government institution	Deputy Director	Phnom Penh
4.	GOV 04	Government institution	Secretary General	Phnom Penh
5.	GOV 05	Government institution	Deputy Director	Phnom Penh
6.	GOV 06	Government institution	Director	Phnom Penh
7.	GOV 07	Government institution	Director	Phnom Penh
8.	DP 01	Donor/Development Agency	Senior Programme Manager	Phnom Penh
9.	DP 02	Donor/Development Agency	Team Leader Democracy, Good Governance and Human Rights	Phnom Penh
10.	DP 03	Donor/Development Agency	Counsellor for Development Cooperation	Phnom Penh
11.	DP 04	Donor/Development Agency	NGO Desk Coordinator	Phnom Penh
12.	DP 05	Donor/Development Agency	Development Programme Manager	Phnom Penh
13.	DP 06	Donor/Development Agency	First Secretary	Phnom Penh
14.	DP 07	Donor/Development Agency	Senior Democracy and Governance Officer	Phnom Penh
15.	DP 08	Donor/Development Agency	Country manager	Phnom Penh
16.	DP 09	Donor/Development Agency	Coordination Specialist	Phnom Penh
17.	DP 10	Donor/Development Agency	Aid Programme Officer	Phnom Penh
18.	DP 11	Donor/Development Agency	Senior Advisor	Phnom Penh
19.	CSO 01	INGO	Executive Director	Phnom Penh
20.	CSO 02	LNGO	Executive Director	Phnom Penh
21.	CSO 03	LNGO	Executive Director	Phnom Penh
22.	CSO 04	INGO	Regional Administrator	Phnom Penh
23.	CSO 05	INGO	Executive Director	Phnom Penh
24.	CSO 06	INGO	Executive Director	Kandal Province
25.	CSO 07	LNGO	Executive Director	Battambang Province
26.	CSO 08	LNGO	Programme Manager	Ratanakiri Province
27.	CSO 09	LNGO	Executive Director	Kratie Province
28.	CSO 10	LNGO	Executive Director	Siem Reap Province

The informants were also chosen based on their political appointment and formal positions, particularly a number of senior government officials from the Cambodian Government ministries and management staff from donors providing both short-term and long-term financial resources to NGOs in Cambodia. Most participants from the ministries and donors are involved in CDCF and GDCC and are members of TWGs.

There were ten NGO informants including four from INGOs and six from LNGOs. The NGO informants comprised two NCBs, five members of NCBs and three non-members of NCBs. The NGOs were selected based on seven criteria. They are NGOs that:

- (i) are active

- (ii) have boards of directors and/or a proper strategic organisational plan
- (iii) are formally registered with the government institutions
- (iv) work in the priority sectors such as health, education, governance and administration, rural development and land management, human rights, democracy, gender mainstreaming, agriculture, water and sanitation, and environment
- (v) are NCBs, members and non-members of NCBs
- (vi) have operated in Cambodia for more than five years and
- (vii) cooperated for this study.

I directly contacted five that are located in Phnom Penh, the capital city of Cambodia. Another five NGOs are from Battambang, Kandal, Mondulhiri, Ratanakiri Siem Reap and Stung Treng province, where a large number of LINGOs are located (see Table 3.1 and Figure 4.1). One provincial NGO informant was directly contacted. Four NGO informants based in the provinces were chosen through the suggestion of other NGO informants based in Phnom Penh. They are chairmen, former chairmen and members of NGO networks and alliances of their province.

I did not get any response from the formal research institutions and think-tank agencies. As this was different from what I had planned in Wellington, I focused on the three key main stakeholders mentioned above. However, I made sure that that analysis from the wide range of the data and information from different sources would minimise the bias and errors in the study.

As a result, by combining data from a variety of informants such as the Cambodian senior government officials, senior donor management staff and NGOs' leaders I was able to produce a more complete picture of the current NGO coordination and the aid environment in Cambodia.

b) Semi-Structured Interviews

Interviews were conducted through developing semi-structured questions to collect in-depth information (primary data). Key informant interviews are valuable in accessing the knowledge and experience of people involved in a given area and in highlighting

issues related to social reality, cultural meaning, existing and explicit values, and authenticity (Neuman, 2006; Bryman, 2008). This brought more accurate information and data about how NGOs should coordinate their work and operations to proactively and constructively engage in the new aid structure in Cambodia. It also informed what actions the government and donors should undertake towards a new form of NGOs' effective collective action within the current aid coordination mechanism.

The key informants were told about the topic of the interview and the purpose and the process of the research, and related information and documents, both in English and Khmer, were made available. I translated from English into Khmer all documents including information sheets, the consent form, and the interview questions (for donors, government officials and NGOs) (See Appendix IV).

I developed an interview guide outlining the main topics and questions that steered each interview with different institutions, particularly government institutions, donor agencies and the three different types of NGOs. However, interview questions were modified according to the type of organisation or the position of the key informants. Again, the adjusted guide provided scope to redirect the interview as necessary during the period of interviewing in order to get in-depth information based on the knowledge and experience of the informants (Bryman, 2008). The interview guide was eventually modified to reflect emerging themes and categories. The interview questions included introduction questions, follow-up and probing questions, specifying questions, direct and indirect questions, structuring questions, silence, and interpreting questions (Bryman, 2008) (See Appendix IV).

Twenty-seven interviews had an audio recording made of the conversation, and they were transcribed using a pseudonym for the interviewee; one interview with an informant was not recorded due to security reasons. The majority of the interviews were carried out in the office of the informants. I conducted the interviews in English with 11 donor management staff and two English-speaking executive directors of INGOs based in Phnom Penh and Kandal province. Also, I interviewed in the Khmer language seven senior government officials, seven NGOs' executive directors based both in Phnom Penh and different provinces, and one NGO's programme manager based in one province.

The length of the interviews varied. Some interviews were more than one hour and others were less than 30 minutes, with an average of about 45 minutes. This is because the informants have different knowledge, background and experience on the particular issues related to NGOs and the aid coordination process in Cambodia. Some have more knowledge in the NGO sector rather than the aid architecture and vice versa.

During the interviews, the important points were written down in the form of notes. After each interview, I wrote memos of each interview and my reflection and understanding from the conversation. Twenty-seven of the interview recordings were later transcribed, while the one interview without an audio recording was summarised.

c) Participant Observation

In addition to the research techniques mentioned above, participant observation, as a component of the qualitative methods, was employed in the research study. Tedlock (2005, p.474) notes that *“the observation of participation produces a combination of cognitive and emotional information that ethnographers can use to create engaged ethno-dramas and other forms of public ethnography...address important social issues in a humanistic, self-reflective manner, engaging both the hearts and the minds of their audiences.”* Also, it portrays the set of problems and solutions that occur, how the involved and affected people interact and deal with them (Dingwall, 1997). On three occasions in the field research, I undertook a participatory approach. I attended and observed an NGO seminar in one province and two meetings in Phnom Penh.

I had an opportunity to participate in a one day NGO seminar in a province located in North-Western Cambodia. Based on the good relations between myself and an NGO coordinating body based in Phnom Penh, I was invited to participate in the provincial seminar with 65 out of 87 LNGOs in the province. The NGO seminar was organised by one NCB in collaboration with the NGO alliance in the province. The purpose of the seminar was to build awareness of NGO legislative framework and NGO effectiveness and good governance, to share the updated information between NGOs and the Cambodian Government and increase the understanding of the roles of civil society organisations and the aid effectiveness agenda. The seminar discussion provided me with good information about the NGO coordination at the provincial level, the working

relationship between the national and provincial NGOs, the understanding of their own self-regulation and their practical relationship with the Cambodian government. It also gave me a clear picture about the level of provincial NGO understanding of the aid effectiveness agenda set by the government and development partners.

I also attended a meeting of the Government-Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC) and a meeting of the Joint Government-Donor Technical Working Group on the health sector (TWG). The Director of the Bilateral Aid Coordination Department in charge of Asia and the Pacific, agreed to allow me to participate in the GDCC and the meeting of TWG on health at the Ministry of Health. The GDCC meeting on was held by CDC/CRDB at the CDC/CRDB on 28 April, 2009. I participated in the meeting as an observer and a staff member of the CDC/CRDB (currently on study leave). I gathered the relevant documents and observed the NGO representatives, their level of participation and engagement in the two meetings and their interaction with donors and the government officials on the agenda of the meetings. Moreover, I could assess the NGO representatives' current position and their contribution in the two forums.

3.2.3 Limitation of the Study

I am an ordinary government staff member, working for the CDC/CRDB. I also am an international student, studying for a Masters in Development Studies at Victoria University. My views expressed in this report do not reflect or represent any official position by my employer.

There are some limitations of this study. I could not reach and did not interview as many of the initial sample of 65 members of GDCC and TWGs, NGO representatives, NCBs and NGO networks and alliances in all provinces as hoped for. Many did not respond to my request through email and phone contact. Eventually, the information from 28 interviews tells just parts of the story of NGO coordination and aid coordination processes in Cambodia.

Many people working in the same field and processes have different views and interpret the context differently because they have different educational backgrounds and understanding. They also experience and interact with other people and stakeholders

about different thematic issues. Thus, their knowledge in the aid coordination process and the reflection of NGOs' operations is different. The people who are members of GDCC and TWGs are very busy with their daily work. The government institutions and ministries and the donor agencies are very bureaucratic. It is not very easy to get appointments with some of the members. Specifically, I could not travel to interview and seek information from NGO alliances in all provinces and cities in Cambodia due to limitations of time and cost. There is no official record about how many provincial NGO alliances and networks and NGO representatives in each TWGs exist. Therefore, there might be other information that was not captured by the scope of this study. Nevertheless, my questions and approach attempted to gain as broad an understanding as possible within these limitations.

3.2.4 Ethical Issues

This study was reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Human Ethics Committee at Victoria University of Wellington on 14 March, 2009. Fortunately, I was then able to start in the field on the 18 March, 2009 in Cambodia. In the field research, all informants were asked to sign a consent form and 26 informants signed it; two senior government officials did not agree to sign and instead gave me verbal consent. This protected the informants from any expected or unanticipated issues arising after completion of the study. The majority of the interviews were conducted at their offices with audio recording. One informant agreed to be interviewed in a restaurant and another interview was carried out without audio record. Confidentiality was offered to interviewees to avoid any potential harm to their political, social and personal security as well as their positions in the government, donor agencies and NGOs.

At the coding and data analysis stage, the interviews were quoted by using a pseudonym. I used the terms 'GOV' for government official, 'DP' for Development Partners or Donors, 'CSO' for Non-Government Organisations I used coding numbers, for example GOV 01, DP 02, and CSO 03, to identify individuals in order to protect the informants from any potential harm (See above Table 3.1).

After the completion of the thesis report, notes were kept in a safe location. Moreover, upon completion of the project, notes, tapes and informed consent forms will be

submitted to the course supervisor to lock in a filing cabinet in a locked office. In the final report, no individuals were identified by names or position. A summary of research findings will be made available to the interested participants upon request after thesis completion.

3.3 Nvivo 8, Coding and Data Analysis Approach


With reference to Corbin and Strauss (2008) and Bryman (2008), I also used open coding, axial coding and selective coding strategies to classify and categorise the themes and sub-themes of the field interviews. The concepts are grouped and regrouped through classification and categories through axial coding (ibid). The procedure of selective coding is conducted through systematically prioritising and/or integrating the categories to get the key categories for refinement and development (Bryman, 2008). The basic strategy to determine the themes and categories was derived from the broad concepts of NGO coordination and the new aid coordination mechanisms at the international, national and provincial scales and by sectors. When it came to the analysis, I coded the themes in Nvivo 8 through creating tree nodes with hierarchical structures (ibid).

In the interpretation stage, based on the primary data collected from the field with the combination of historical evidence, I re-examined the case studies, while being open about my personal involvement and experience (Neuman, 2006). Accordingly, I imposed particular orders of concepts about the NGO coordination and aid coordination processes on the research study. I regularly checked the field notes and memos over time to assess new and emerging ideas. I determined the key coding themes as followings:

- The challenges of NGO coordination
- The importance of NGO coordination
- The improvement of NGO coordination
- NGO development and changes
- NGOs' understanding and adoption of the aid effectiveness agenda
- The roles of NGO representatives in the aid coordination processes
- The challenges of NGO representatives in the aid coordination processes
- The working relationship between NGOs and the Cambodian Government

Through using Nvivo 8, the themes consist of sub-themes with a hierarchical structure developed after a long series of revision of coding themes (See Figure 3.1). The integration stage is the final and the most difficult part of the qualitative data analysis. It took more time and effort including reworking, rewriting and editing.

Figure 3.1: Sub-theme Analysis of Institutional Challenges to NGO Coordination



I developed the concrete story lines, created diagrams, and concentrated on the relevant topics to analyse the data. The concrete story lines that emerged reflect the particular period of the NGO coordination and the changing aid environment currently experienced in Cambodia. This is part of narrative analysis (Bryan, 2008). This combination was coherently and effectively linked with data collection, the methodology and organisational studies of the key government institutions and key NGOs that were examined.

3.4 Positionality, Reflection and (Re)Presentation of the Field Research

3.4.1 Positionality

I am a government official currently on study leave, and I have worked with CDC/CRDB for more than six years. I was in charge of regional aid programme coordination, basically focused on regional training courses provided by the Japanese Government under the South-South Cooperation Framework. I was involved with regional training programmes and projects for Cambodia, Laos PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam. My involvement included the basic design studies, negotiation, participation in a series of meetings with relevant stakeholders, implementation and monitoring and evaluation. I have known and worked with some of the informants and other members of GDCC and TWGs. I also have a good working relationship with them, particularly the government officials and some senior donor management staff. I worked in partnership with UNDP staff and the advisors based in CDC/CRDB under the Multi-Donor Support Programme for Aid Coordination. I used to work part-time as development consultant for one INGO called Khmer Arts Academy. I have a good understanding of different working environments. I understand the concept of aid effectiveness in the local contexts and aid coordination processes. I not only participated, but also contributed to help organising both CDCF and GDCC and other TWG meetings.

This previous work provided me with some research advantages, including easy access to the wide range of information related to my research, and the ability to get interviews with the most relevant people. Firstly, I was able to quickly access information related to aid coordination mechanisms; specifically government documents. As a native speaker of Khmer, I have been able to converse freely with people from whom I need important information. The most relevant informants in my research were selected from the list of members of the TWGs and GDCC participants, provided by my former colleagues, when I was still in Wellington, New Zealand. Secondly, because I already had a good working relationship with some of my informants in Cambodia, I received positive responses and appointments from them at an early stage. For instance, I interviewed 11 senior donor management staff partly because they knew that I was a staff member of the CDC/CRDB. Moreover, they considered my topic relevant to the

current aid structure in Cambodia. The results of this study might establish substantial information which could improve their operations.

By having the same appearance, speaking the same language, understanding the cultural, political and social contexts, I managed to build a strong partnership with my key interviewees, especially Khmer interviewees. I was comfortable and had good conversations that provided me with information that seemed to come from their heart and soul. I was able to build trust with them. I also developed partnerships with non-Khmer native informants from donor agencies and INGOs. The interviews proved fruitful due to their understanding of the local contexts and their long working experience in Cambodia.

In the field research I considered myself as a researcher from the 'inside'. Before the field research I worked hard to position myself neutrally. I did not align myself with any groups of informants. I discussed with informants the sensitive questions related to political issues between the government and NGOs. However, I could see that the three different types of informants perhaps each saw me differently. The government and donor informants thought I was aligned with the government because they thought I would return to work for the government and because my close working relationship with them would remain steady. However, most of the NGO informants knew only that I used to work for the INGO in Phnom Penh.

3.4.2 Field Research Reflection

To be a good researcher there is a need before the interviews to be well organised in terms of location, time management, dress code, and to have a prepared set of questions. For example, I often went in advance to see the locations where the interviews would take place. Then, I determined how long it would take me to go from my office, my house, or from one ministry or donor office or NGO office to another. It took a lot of time to travel around. I spent time reviewing the questions and sub-questions as well as studying the organisations that I inquired about. Therefore, during the interviews, I could manage to ask the informants the most useful and relevant questions.

Not all key informants have the same level of knowledge or personal experience with NGOs, particularly NGO coordination, or the aid coordination processes in Cambodia. The informants are from different levels of responsibility at work. Some are quite knowledgeable about policy and some only have a working knowledge of the technical aspects of their job. Several informants have both policy and technical knowledge including experience with the aid coordination processes consisting of three main forums and different NGO work. Some can only comment on issues and experiences they have had within their own round of work. Some of the NGO informants understand the complexity of coordination and aid structure; conversely some were not so knowledgeable and not aware of what the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is. A few did not know NGO coordination efforts made by the NGO community or the aid structure developed in the country. It was a challenge in each interview. Therefore, I asked each different informant a set of questions but I made sure that the questions were relevant to my main research and the objective of the research study.

Sometimes, I felt the informants misunderstood difficult questions that are political in nature, particularly the roles of the NGO representatives in the three different kinds of aid coordination forums. For instance, when interviewing five informants about the roles of NGO representatives as one of the key stakeholders in CDCF, GDCC and TWGs I had to ask them in three different ways to get accurate information. Sometimes, they did not understand the concepts or the terminology. Sometimes, I explained the story first to make sure they could understand my ideas and the questions. Even so, I questioned the government officials, donor management staff and NGO's executive directors in a diplomatic and respectful way.

I interviewed seven government officials and eight INGOs' and LNGOs' executive directors in the Khmer language and the rest I conducted in English. After that I transcribed all the interviews. In audio recordings of the interviews in English it is a great challenge to decipher the meaning of words and phrases delivered in different accents. I carefully checked the transcripts with the interview notes to ensure my interpretation was always correct and coherent. The most difficult was translating Khmer into English as I could not find some words that meant exactly the same in English. Some Cambodian informants quoted Khmer proverbs. These were difficult to transcribe and translate.

3.4.3 Field Research (Re)Presentation

Field research reflectivity plays a pivotal role in the writing process. It involves considering the power relationship between researchers and the participants throughout the entire research process (Jasper, 2005). In the (re)presentation and interpretation, Holliday (2007, p.136) stresses that “academic writing is an ‘arena of struggle’ in which students and researchers can find it hard to achieve personal power and voice.” The power inequalities remain a burden for researchers to decide what information to include in their research and also to (re)present what is found in the field. Therefore, speaking on behalf of others that, like me, come from the Third World, it is very important to carry inclusive messages of the marginalised.

Concerning the power relationships in the field, I had no intention to influence my research process; but, as a new researcher from ‘inside’, I characteristically influenced the research process in a number of ways. For instance, I accessed the field research data and documents, and informants’ appointment through my previous network and working relationships with them. I did not rely on anyone to determine the number of informants, or different kinds of informants, to make the appointments and interviews, or to translate and I did not ask for any technical assistance. However, during the interviews, I was largely reliant on the information provided by the informants; thus, I still had limited power when undertaking research. When it came to the writing process, I felt that I was empowered to write and present information on behalf of informants and my self-reflectivity and experience. Thus, it helps me to be aware and accountable for the consequences of my engagement. My analysis is based on the original interviews with informants, with no second interviews. This thesis targets academic audiences.

3.5 Conclusion

To sum up, the entire research process employed qualitative methods, including secondary data, a desk review, participant observation and in-depth semi-structured interviews. These methods are often seen in the development field. This chapter highlighted some of the issues and complexities of this research and potential impacts on the research results. Taking into consideration, positionality, reflectivity and (re)presentation is a significant part of the study.

Although there were some challenges in the field research, I had good interviews with different kinds of informants. The fact that I was a local researcher helped me avoid many problems. However, some challenges remain concerns for both the experienced and new researchers because conducting field research in development studies requires multiple disciplines. The situation in the field varies across regions, sectors, governments, donors, NGOs and individuals. There needs to be flexibility in how one's methodology is designed and adopted as researchers face different socio-economic, political, social and cultural contexts.

I have sufficient information from the field provided by my informants from using the methodologies and research techniques that were suitable for the study. As a local researcher, conducting research on my home country problems, the results are directly enhanced by my background and working experience, my understanding of the cultural and local contexts, positionality and field research experience. This study has benefited from the values and knowledge of the course work that I have obtained from undertaking a Masters in Development Studies at Victoria University of Wellington and the perception and guidance from my supervisor during the analysis and thesis writing process. This enhanced the quality of the data analysis.

Chapter IV: The Cambodian Socio-Economic and Development Contexts

4.1 Introduction

This chapter briefly gives a portrait of the Cambodian social, economic, cultural and development contexts. It is divided into three sections. The first section describes the lessons from the Angkor period through to the peace and reconstruction periods. The second section provides the summary of civil society development from the Angkor period to present. The final section overviews the current political, socio-economic and development context of Cambodia.

4.2 Lessons from Previous Histories

Cambodia is situated in Southeast Asia and shares borders with Thailand to the north and west, Laos PDR to the north, Viet Nam to the east and south and the Gulf of Thailand to the south-west. The current area of the country is smaller (about 181,035 square kilometres) than that of the ancient empire (See Figure 4.1). The total population is now estimated to be more than 14 million (World Bank, 2009a). Khmer remains the dominant ethnic group with Cham or Cambodian Muslim, Vietnamese, Chinese and Laotian minorities (Peou, 2001). The majority of the population is employed in the agricultural sector (World Bank, 2009a). Almost a third of the population lives under the poverty line, earning less than US\$1.25 dollar a day (ibid). Cambodia is one of the poorest and most heavily aid-dependent countries in Southeast Asia (World Bank, 2007b). Tully (2005) notes that Cambodia is still underdeveloped and many people live lives little different from their ancestors. This is the result of a series of internal and external wars, conflicts and power struggles from the collapse of the Angkor Empire to the late 1990s (See Table 4.1).

From the ninth to the 13th centuries, Cambodia's Angkor monarchy ruled much of Southeast Asia from South China to the Andaman Sea and northwards into modern day Laos (Tully, 2005). In that period, Cambodia had a highly developed civilisation with a rich culture and economic and political development. Economic surpluses were used for celebrating rituals and ceremonies and building the great temples, which employed massive numbers of labourers and artisans. This success was the result of the strong

leadership and control exerted by the monarchy (Tully, 2005, p.34), with the healthy and populous civilisation of Angkor driven by an agrarian society that included irrigation systems (barays), bridges, footways, rest houses, hospitals, canals, road networks, reservoirs, embankments and trading routes (Higham, 2001; Tully, 2005). The empire was based on three pillars: Hindu/Sivaism and Mahayana Buddhism, administrative organisation and a highly efficient irrigation system (Esterlines, 1986). However, Cambodia turned from the 'Golden Age' of Angkor into the 'Dark Age' in a series of wars caused by internal and external factors. The collapse of Angkor was caused by 1) loss of the great kings and a weaker state, 2) social and economic problems such as diseases, rebellions, a rapid crime increase and economic crisis, 3) adopting a new religion (Theravada Buddhism), which affected economic and social patterns 4) ecological degradation and 5) the rise of powerful and aggressive neighbours including Siam (modern-day Thailand) and Viet Nam (Esterlines, 1986; Tully, 2005). Since then, Cambodia has been invaded by both countries while Cambodian politics was dominated by Cambodian kings appointed by Siam and/or Viet Nam to rule the country. Khmer kings often sought military support and switched sides between these two powers to ensure Cambodia's sovereignty, stability and survival. Thus, Cambodia became a vassal state of both neighbours until the arrival of the French protectorate in 1863.

The French protectorate shielded Cambodia from her neighbours, particularly Siam, in return for trade concessions and economic development that benefited France (Esterlines, 1986). The French eliminated slavery, strengthened Cambodian armed forces, restructured administrative and legal systems, including the taxation system, and introduced private ownership, especially of land (ibid). However, Cambodia was financially, administratively, judicially and commercially controlled by France (Tully, 2005). Corruption emerged in the ways taxes were collected from the peasants by officials. Public work schemes, education and social welfare systems were not introduced, while the legal system was underdeveloped (ibid).

After World War Two when France's power was weakened, Prince Sihanouk proclaimed Cambodia's independence from France and set up his own government after winning the first national democratic election in 1953 (Esterlines, 1986). His absolute power was derived from the traditional kingship and monarchy as well as his charismatic personality.

Figure 4.1: Map of Cambodia



Source: Maharajh, 2009

Table 4.1: Cambodia Key Historical Dates

Date	Historical Description
8th -14th century	Golden Age of Angkor
16th-18th century	Dark Age-Thai and Viet Nam invasion and the decline of Khmer royal power
1863	Cambodia becomes a French protectorate
1953	Cambodian gains independence from France and becomes a prosperous and fast developing state
1970	Prince Norodom Sihanouk deposed in a coup led by his Defense Minister, General Lon Nol.
1975	The Khmer Rouge takes control of Cambodia and time of the Killing Fields begins.
December, 1978	Viet Nam invades Cambodia and ousts the KR, installing the PRK to administer the socialist nation.
1989	The PRK is renamed as SOC, with the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. Cambodia starts to open its economy on market principles
1991	The Paris Peace Accord is signed by the involved parties, permitting the UNTAC to arrange and facilitate free and fair elections.
1992	UNTAC troops arrive
1993	The UNTAC-organised election is won by FUNCINPEC. SOC is renamed the CPP. The KR rejected the election result. Cambodia had a first Prime Minister (Prince Norodom Ranariddh, son of King Sihanouk) and second (Hun Sen). A new state constitution was approved and Sihanouk is reinstated as King.
1997	Hun Sen stages a coup against Prince Ranariddh. The KR troops are integrated into Cambodian armed forces.
1998	CPP wins second election. The KR ended after Pol Pot's death and the capture of the KR General Ta Mok.
1999	Cambodia joins the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
2003	CPP wins the third election but political deadlock means almost a year passes before a government is formed
2005	Cambodia becomes a member of World Trade Organisation
2007	Khmer Rouge Tribunal starts
2008	CPP wins the majority of the seats in Parliament and forms the government alone.

Sources: (Poeu, 2001; Tully, 2005; Owen, 2005; deGuzman, 2008; Hughes, 2003, 2008, 2009)

From 1953 to 1970, Cambodia was one of the fastest-developing nations in Southeast Asia, exporting primary products²⁶, allocating about 20% of the state budget into the education sector and investing in secondary industries²⁷ (Tully, 2005). However, its political neutrality was undermined by the conflict between the capitalist West and communist East during the Cold War, and particularly the Viet Nam War. The Prince built alliances with Viet Nam and then China rather than the West as a result of a power struggle with other internal communist groups. The regime's political system became a totalitarian democracy as only one party controlled the country and the prince held supreme power and suppressed opponents (ibid). Increased corruption led to inequality

²⁶ The main primary products for export were rice, fish and fish products, livestock, rubber, maize, pepper, cardamom, sugar, soy beans, tobacco, cotton and coffee (Tully, 2005, p.140).

²⁷ The secondary industries included a major cement plant, jute, textile and cotton mills, sawmills and paper and plywood factories and an oil refinery in Sihanoukville (ibid).

and injustice while the regime's economy could not absorb the large numbers of new workers entering from secondary and tertiary education; this caused a political and social backlash in the 1970s (Tully, 2005).

Cambodia's misfortune returned episodically. As Esterlines (1986, p.95) states: "Lon Nol boomed us, Pol Pot killed us and the Vietnamese are starving us". After Prince Sihanouk was deposed in the 1970s, Cambodia was trapped between two larger conflicts, internal political chaos, and then later fell into chronic violence and civil war. The American-backed government lost control after the withdrawal of American troops from Viet Nam; while the Khmer Rouge (KR²⁸) took control the country in April 1975. This extremist regime transformed Cambodia into another greater 'Dark Age' of 'Killing Fields' and 'Prisons without Walls', comprising no state economic, financial, legal or social institutions, no religion, tradition or culture, no currency, no paid work, no trade and industry. The cities and towns and infrastructures were abandoned and demolished. City dwellers were evacuated to live in rural areas and forced to intensively work in agriculture and irrigation and canal systems. Within less than four years it is estimated that about two million men, women and children out of an estimated eight million died from starvation, privation, exhaustion, diseases, massacres and execution (Esterlines, 1986). However, this figure remains controversial as the death toll will never be known.

By December 1978, the Vietnamese-backed People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK²⁹) took control the country and pushed the Khmer Rouge groups to the Thai-Cambodian

²⁸ The Khmer Rouge was officially named Democratic Kampuchea or the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK) and was created by Prince Sihanouk late in 1970. FUNK's senior members included Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary or Penn Nouth, Pol Pot or Salut Sor and Nuon Chea. They removed Prince Sihanouk from the head of the state. At the beginning of their movement, the organisation consisted of 70% Vietnamese troops from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and Vietcong and the rest were Khmer Rouge guerrillas, Sihanouk's personal followers, opportunists, bandits, and peasants (Esterlines, 1986:85-93). The Khmer Rouge militants were trained and equipped by Viet Nam (Owen, 2005). Their political ideology was based within the fundamental Sino-Soviet quarrel which is an extremist political left ideology on human rights and social institutions.

²⁹ People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was renamed from Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation (KNUF). The KNUF was form by by former KR militants-Heng Samrin, Chea Sim and Hun Sen in late 1978 with financial, technical, equipment and military support from the Vietnamese government (Esterlines, 1986; Tully, 2005). Later the PRK that administered the nation from 1980 to 1989 was again replaced by the State of Cambodia (SOC). The regime of SOC was ended by 1991. Both SOC and PRK had a closely cooperative alliance with the Soviet Union and the Vietnamese government between 1980 and 1991 (Gottesman, 2003; Kiernan, 2003).

borders. The PRK was a centralised and socialist government and adopted a centrally planned economy. Large numbers of Vietnamese troops were in the country until 1989 to ensure security against the Thai and Chinese-supported KR guerrillas that often attacked provinces along the Thai-Cambodia borders (Owen, 2005). Cambodia's misfortunes continued due to a series of civil wars at the borders and famine crises. The population returned to their home-lands and others moved to refugee camps at the borders, seeking to emigrate overseas. The PRK had done much to reconstruct the country and economy from scratch with limited human resources and support from external assistance, particularly the Soviet Union. After the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops in 1989 and facing economic stagnation, the government opened up the economy through adopting market liberalisation.

In 1991 the Paris Peace Accord was signed by four parties (the SOC, King Sihanouk, Son San, and the KR) through a series of meetings and conferences from Bangkok, Jakarta, Tokyo, to Paris, initiated by the international community (Kiernan, 2003). According to the Paris Agreement:

“Aid would support three transitions: a shift from war to peace including the cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation of the combatants and the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons; the transformation of a socialist command economy into a free market system; and the movement from an authoritarian regime to a popularity democracy” (Forman and Patrick, 2000, p.16).

Later, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) took over the country's affairs and administration to enable free and fair national elections to be held in 1993. Positively, the large amounts of aid given to Cambodia during the period helped build social and political stability as well as foster the economic growth for development and poverty reduction. However, there were some claims that UNTAC did not successfully achieve the goal to make Cambodia “the land of peace” due to ongoing conflict and a coup in 1997 (Curtis, 1998; Peou, 2000; Kiernan, 2003)

The coup in 1997 was led by the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), which then won non-violent elections in 1998. Following the 2003 and 2008 elections the CPP solely formed the government. Although there are many issues, the current government has

made a lot of progress, promoting political and socio-economic stability, sustainable economic growth and development. The detail is explored further in section 4.4.

4.3 Cultural Beliefs and Religion and Civil Society

4.3.1 Cultural Beliefs and Religion

The Khmer culture is strongly based on devoutly religious beliefs in Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism that took root from before the Angkor period until the 13th Century. Since then, Khmers have practiced Theravada Buddhism, a combination of folk religion, superstition and remnants of Hinduism and Sivaism (Tully, 2005, p.6). For example, Hindu linkages can be seen in the ritual ceremonies and annual national festivals such as the Khmer New Year, Phchum Ben (Buddha's Death Day), and Full Moon and Water Festivals. Inextricably linked with faith, this gentle religion acts as social glue as Theodore De Bary (in Tully, 2005, p.65) claims:

“The [Buddhist] ideal is a society in which each individual respects the other's personality, an intricate network of warm and happy human relationships: mutual respect and affection between parent and child, teacher and student, husband and wife, master and servant, friend and friend, each helping each other upwards in the scale of being.”

Practically, good karma is determined by doing good things. Therefore, the purpose of Khmer life is to achieve a good life, not to accumulate material goods as Khmers believe that they will be reincarnated, depending how they live their lives.

In both social and political contexts, Buddhist temples or 'wat' have played an important role in providing education to Khmers and preserving Khmer language and culture. Chandler (1991, 1995) observes that religious communities are seen as non-state and non-family organisations that fight off bandits and organise ritual ceremonies or national and cultural festivals. Interestingly, after the establishment of the Buddhist Institute by the French in 1930, Buddhist-educated monks created the social movement against the French (Tully, 2005). During Prince Sihanouk's regime, the Royal Monastery, Chhuon Nat, produced the first Khmer dictionary. While cultural beliefs and

religion were banned during the KR regime, they survived and have continued to develop since the regime's collapse.

Under a new Cambodian Constitution approved in 1993, the national motto is "*Nation, Religion and King*". The national flag with a picture of Angkor Wat symbolises the impressive Khmer civilisation whilst the national anthem, featuring the King, the ancient temples and Buddhism, bolsters the state's liberal ideology. Both flag and anthem are part of the "national soul". As Peou (2001, p.53) notes, "*to be Khmer is to be Buddhist*" as the anthem says angels will intervene and maintain the Kingdom's prosperity.

The Ministry of Religions and Cults was established to govern and oversee the activities of religious organisations to ensure the law and rules of conduct of Cambodia and Cambodian religion were followed, and to build Buddhist administrative structures and capacity for monks. The well-known monks that are selected by politicians and/or involved communities to preside in the village 'wat' or Buddhist temple have engaged in politics (Chaupech Ollier and Winter, 2006). Some have close relationships with Prime Minister Hun Sen and other senior government officials. Thus, as Buddhist modernisers, the monks are able to mobilise resources from those officials and communities to build Buddhist temples and Buddha statues, reflecting the great development in the community. At the same time, other religions such as Islam and Christianity (represented in particular by the Catholic Church) have also grown. Traditionally, Cambodian politicians, officials, businessmen, and ordinary people often go to the 'wat' to seek spiritual support for their careers and success. Cambodian politicians have often exploited the Buddhist religion and cultural beliefs to retain their popularity and power (ibid).

4.3.2 Civil Society

In history from the 'Golden Age' to the 'Dark Age', Tully (2005, p.64) asserts that "*Cambodia had no civil society, with no stable groups between the family and the state, which was often remote from the agglomeration of families that made up the village*". The reasons are because the Khmer kings were traditionally treated as gods, legally possessing the land, products and people, regulating by divine law, and protecting

religion and defending the country from external enemies (Easterlines, 1986). Indeed, the population was hugely dependent on state-directed public goods. The society was divided into classes such as royalty, state officials, religious groups, peasants or soldier-farmer-builder groups, and slaves (although slavery was completely eliminated during French colonisation). Tully (2005) argues that Cambodians were more passive than their neighbours, particularly the Vietnamese and Thais, and probably had no formal authority structures at the village scale.

During the protectorate period, the spirit of civil society clearly emerged through a series of skirmishes in the 1890s and peaceful protests in the 1920s and 1940s against French administration, and suppressions across the country (Tully, 2005). *Nagaravatta* or *Angkor Wat* Magazine were printed weekly in the Khmer language in 1936, giving Khmers their first opportunity to read in their own language about national and international politics, particularly the French and Vietnamese communists (Owen, 2005, p.364). The growing social movements paved the road to national independence from the French in 1953.

Under Prince Sihanouk's regime 1953-1970, civil society (mainly Buddhist organisations and student and peasant associations) was weak and fragile as the authoritarian state was little different from previous regimes (Owen, 2005). The political collapse reveals a weak civil society unable to hold the government accountable in terms of pro-poor policy and planning, political maturity, competence and fighting corruption. Civil society gained the momentum after the coup in 1970 with the American-backed government (Meagher, 1998) and INGOs providing humanitarian relief for war victims (Mysliwiec, 2004). But, civil society was virtually destroyed in the period of 1975 to 1980 due to the prolonged period of civil war and the KR regime. Consequently, the regime destroyed the spirit of mutual trust and collective action among Khmers associated with Buddhism and Buddhist organisations. For example, in order to survive, thousands of people were killed because they were named by others, rather than through any wrong doing against the regime's rule (Owen, 2005).

Under the PRK/SOC, civil society remained marginalised and had limited activities due to the government dictatorship. Human rights and freedom of expression deteriorated and this was of concern to the international community (Tully, 2005). Specifically, the

famine crisis emerged in those places where the PRK limited the relief effort provided by UN agencies and INGOs; but the socialist government saw such actions as the ways to feed the KR resistance (Esterlines, 1986). There was no indigenous NGO until 1991. Therefore, the INGOs worked closely at the grassroots level but uncomfortably played their roles under close investigation and management of the socialist government (Mysliwiec, 2004) and they expanded their work to only accessible and safe areas (Walker, 2007). This is because their development approaches were contradictory and confused, leading to mistrust between both sides. However, the government acknowledged the pivotal roles of NGOs in restoration and development, and carrying key messages to the outside world about suffering as Cambodia was isolated from the Western world (Hun Sen, 2009).

The Cambodian Constitution provides citizens with freedom of expression, the press, publication and assembly and Khmer citizens have rights to establish associations and political parties (RGC, 1993). However, there is no law regulating civil society organisations. After the adoption of the Constitution, the formation of a new coalition government and integration of Cambodia into the international community, civil society has re-emerged and developed over time through the increase of INGOs, indigenous NGOs and associations and religious organisations. This is a remarkable achievement in nation-building and democratisation. However, civil society was largely established by external resources under donors' policies and priorities. Unfortunately, because the international community declined to engage and support religious organisations, they failed to build partnerships that might have been the catalyst to accelerating and achieving development effectiveness and democratisation objectives (Mysliwiec, 2004).

Since 1993, civil society has rapidly grown across the country in diverse sectors, identifying values, ideas and norms that often contrast with the state's development discourse. Through applying Gramsci's theoretical framework, "*the civil society is an arena of contestations in Cambodia*" (Landau, 2008, p.249), the arena has become even more confrontational and sometimes violent, with the murders of trade union leaders. While some consider "*the freedom of expression and press law in Cambodia is probably one of the most liberal in the world*" (Sotharith, 2002, p.34), the Press Law 1995 allows the RGC to suspend publication, accuse and arrest publishers and editors if the publication criticises the government and senior officials and/or endangers 'national

security’, ‘political stability’ and now ‘defamation’ (RGC, 1995). The RGC has often used a ‘culture of impunity and defamation’ to restrict and silence critics, limit freedom of expression and a human rights voice. A number of journalists, editors and even members of parliament from opposition parties have increasingly faced law-suits lodged by the RGC (Hughes, 2008; Chak, 2009, LICADHO, 2005, 2009a, 2009b, Phnom Penh Post, 2009a, 2009b); while the judicial and court systems have not been separated from politics. In 2005 the government stopped Global Witness’s operations in Cambodia due to its strong criticism of corruption, human rights and illegal logging in the report of ‘*Taking a Cut*,’ ‘*Cambodia’s Family Trees*’ and ‘*Country for Sale*’ (Global Witness, 2004, 2007, 2009). Thus, the RGC has often suspected and mistrusted the media and advocacy and human rights NGOs that have been seen as anti-government. However, less politically outspoken development NGOs have been welcome to work and build partnerships with the government.

4.4 Current Political, Socio-Economic and Development Contexts

4.4.1 Political System

From the first to the fourth election, the Cambodian political system has become more liberal and pluralistically democratic. A five-year mandate is established after each national election. According to the Constitution, the governance structure places the King as the head of the state, overarching three separate powers including executive, legislative and judiciary (See Figure 4.2). The current King is Samdech Preah Boromneath Norodom Sihanony, appointed in 2004 after the retirement of his father, King Norodom Sihanouk. The King is not involved in politics and has no absolute power but serves as “symbol of unity and eternity of the nation” (Article 8).


The current Prime Minister, Hun Sen, appoints and leads the cabinet of the Council of Ministers (COM) that is the RGC, comprising members such as eight Deputy Prime Ministers, eight Senior Ministers, seventeen Ministers and State Secretaries (CDC/CRDB, 2008i). The Cabinet of COM is a central administration, governing and setting the government’s agenda aimed at attaining policy coordination, reviewing proposed laws and ensuring administrative functions. In the government, there are 24 ministries and a number of state institutions. Each ministry usually has one Minister

leading two to four Secretaries of State, four Under Secretaries of State, and one Secretary General. The administrative structure is divided into 20 provinces and four cities including Phnom Penh, the capital. Each province and municipality consists of districts (*Srok*) and sections (*Khan*), which are subdivided into communes (*Khum*) and quarters (*Sangkat*) and then, villages (*Phum*) and Groups (*Krom*) that are not part of the formal administrative structure. In total there are 183 districts, 1,621 communes and 13,406 villages (Peou, 2001; Hughes, 2008). The RGC has been run solely by CPP's political leaders in the last two mandates. The RGC is highly bureaucratic and politicised, employing a large number of personnel, particularly high ranking officials that have no technocratic credentials and consume a huge government budget and enjoy many benefits. Thus, the RGC has a "big head and thin feet" .

Currently, the RGC has implemented decentralisation and deconcentration policies and has delegated power to provincial and commune authorities to undertake development programmes in order to strengthen the local governments. Commune elections have been held since 2002 that allow the local communities to elect their own leaders to represent their voice and need. However, the provincial and local governments' capacity has remained weak in areas of managing their own projects/programmes, revenues and expenditures and areas of decision-making.

Legislatively, Cambodia has a National Assembly that is based on a proportional representation system and a Senate. CPP won the last election in 2008 and holds 58% of the popular vote and 90 out of 123 parliamentary seats, equivalent to a two-thirds majority (Hughes, 2009, p.206). The parliament represents the sovereign rights of the Cambodian people and is responsible for approving laws and regulations, the national budget, state planning, loans, financial contracts, and the creation, modification and annulment of tax (Article 90). Members of parliament from opposition parties face many challenges defending impunity and defamation charges from the Prime Minister and other top government officials (Chak, 2009, LICADHO, 2009a, Phnom Penh Post, 2009b). The misuse of power and legal abuse is contradictory to the Constitution (Article 80) and erodes the political life and democratisation and public confidence. The Senate was established after the election in 1998 with an amended constitution in 1999.

Figure 4.2: The Political System of the Royal Government of Cambodia



With 61 members, the Senate has to review draft laws approved by the National Assembly as well as having the right to initiate legislation. The Senate also represents the commune/Sangkat councils nationwide through implementation of decentralisation and deconcentration policies.

Practically, the Cambodian state is structured by “*interlocking pyramids of patron-client networks*” (Heder, 1995, p.425) that maintain the ruler’s power and provide rewards and benefits to loyal subordinates. A key characteristic of Cambodian politics might consist of a number of supra-networks formed by sub-networks in which a sub-network has a patron who is the backer or “*Kh nang*”³⁰, of clients (Kheang, 2006). The network is formal and informally built through unequal reciprocity and personal relationships (face-to-face). A heterogeneous network of ministries, councils, agencies, courts, police and provincial and local administration whose members³¹ adhere to the rules of patronage has been consolidated and managed by CPP (Kheang, 2006, p.3). Through this relationship with the patron network and neo-patrimonialism, the power of the three main state bodies has been separated and they have been administered by a single party, CPP. Therefore, their patron networks have been strengthened over time, leading to high corruption³², violation of human rights and social justice, social violence and excessive exploitation of natural resources. Consequently, this erodes the democratisation process.

4.4.2 Socio-Economic and Development Situation

Since the adoption of a liberal market economic policy, the RGC has made impressive progress in accelerating economic gains and social development through a number of state sector and thematic reforms. These reforms lie in the successful implementation of the two phases of the Five Year Rectangular Strategy (See Figure 4.4) and the National

³⁰ Kh nang in Khmer terms means backer or back door.


³¹ The members or clients of the patron networks, particularly officials, judges, prosecutors and others often pay for their post in the government’s ministries, councils, agencies, provincial and local administration, courts and police and others. They need to quickly recoup their investment in a post. In doing so, they need to corrupt and take bribes (Kheang, 2006). The ordinary people and private businesses are forced to pay bribes for public services undertaken with the officials (Kheang, 2006; EIC, 2006)

³² The corruption in Cambodia in all its forms is hierarchically institutionalised in ways that Cambodians characterise as “thum si tam thum; touch si tam touch” (the big eat big and the small eat small) (Kheang, 2006, p.3)

Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) 2006-2010 and the Cambodian Millennium Development Goals (CMDGs).


Cambodia has enjoyed average economic growth of 9.8% over the past decade, and was above 10% from 2004-2007 (World Bank, 2009a, p.5). The drivers of this growth are the rapid expansion of four sectors: garments, tourism, construction and agriculture (See Table 4.2). Figure 4.3 shows that agriculture remains the most important part of Cambodia's economy, feeding the population and employing 59% of the population, although it contributed only 29% to GDP in 2007 (ibid.). The core basic agricultural products for export include crops (mainly rice and rubber), silk, livestock, fish and forest products among others. Absorbing 13% of the labour force, the industrial sector almost doubled, from 17-30% of GDP between 1998 and 2007, the growth mainly generated from textile, construction and mining sub-sectors (ibid). The service sector has remained steady, sharing 41% of GDP and providing 27% of employment in 2007 (ibid) (See Figure 4.3). The engines of service sector growth are tourism, trade, finance, real estate, transport and telecommunications. Besides the state's policies, security and macro-economic and political stability, the Cambodian integration in regional and global forums such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and World Trade Organisation (WTO) has paved the way for strong economic expansion internally and externally. Moreover, Cambodia has used its valuable assets such as forest, fisheries, land, water and heritage to generate growth.

Figure 4.3: Cambodia's Economy: 1993-2007



Sources: World Bank, 2009a, p.5.

Figure 4.4: The Rectangular Strategy of the Royal Government of Cambodia



However, economic growth slowed markedly in 2008 due to the impact of the global financial crisis, creating an uncertain environment for the above mentioned sectors. Externally, there has been less demand and fewer orders of manufactured garments from key trading partners such as the US, EU, and other OECD countries, and increasingly a freezing of the financial flow for construction and real estate activities (World Bank, 2009a). A significant drop of tourist numbers has been caused by trans-national diseases such 'swine flu', political instability in Thailand and the cutting of personal spending in the developed countries (Hughes, 2009). Internally, growth is narrow, with little diversification in export-oriented products and markets, poor domestic savings and investments (World Bank, 2009a) and lack of work to combat corruption in the public and private sector.

The Cambodian high economic growth includes achievements of key national development outcomes in terms of poverty reduction, the improvement of citizens' livelihoods and education and better health. Cambodia more than doubled income per capita from US\$285 to US\$593 in the decade to 2007 (World Bank, 2009a, p.i). The percentage of Cambodians living below the poverty line has dramatically decreased from 40-45 in 1993-1994 to 30.1 in 2007 (ibid, 2009a, p.24). According to current statistics (See Table 4.2), the RGC has substantially allocated more resources to social sectors such as education and rural development, while reducing the government's military expenditure. The government expenditure on agriculture and transport has also risen. Thus, Cambodians are living longer, have better living standards, education and health. Specifically, school enrolments and completion from primary to tertiary education are higher than in the previous decade. The infant and maternal mortality rates have significantly dropped in the same period.

Conversely, there has been a rapid increase in inequality among the urban and rural poor in Cambodia, particularly in the face of difficulties such as accessing land titles, inflation, climate change and external shocks. The distribution of growth has been unequal across the country (World Bank, 2007a, 2007b, 2009a). Many urban and rural poor, particularly indigenous people, have faced evictions and issues of land grabbing by the state and private sector developers (Amnesty International, 2009; World Bank, 2009b). As one victim says "If we lose the land, we have lost everything."

Table 4.2: Cambodian Social and Economic Statistics (1998-2007)

Items	1998	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Population, total	12,263,686	13,489,330	13,720,274	13,955,507	14,196,611	14,446,056
GDP growth (annual %)	5	9	10	13	11	10
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US\$)	251	347	377	419	457	593
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	46	34	31	32	32	29
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	17	26	27	26	28	30
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)	36	40	42	41	41	41
Tax revenue (% of GDP)	..	8	8	8	8	..
Trade (% of GDP)	76	123	135	137	145	138
Gross savings (% of GDP)	6	15	13	13	16	15
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)	-1	10	9	10	13	13
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	15	1	4	6	5	6
Official exchange rate (LCU per US\$, period average)	3744	3973	4016	4092	4103	4056
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)	7	2	2	6	7	10
Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population)	34.8	30
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	58	59	60
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	73	72	70
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000)	95	93	91
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)	67	..	74	76
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group)	31	65	76	85	87	85
School enrollment, primary (% net)	82	90	89
School enrollment, secondary (% net)	17	25	26	24	31	..
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross)	..	3	3	4	5	5
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49)	2	1	1	1	1	1
Gross national expenditure (% of GDP)	113	110	107	109	107	108
Health expenditure, public (% of government expenditure)	..	15	16	12	11	..
Public spending on education, total (% of government expenditure)	10	12
Military expenditure (% of central government expenditure)	..	16	16	15	13	..

Sources: The World Bank, 2009, Retrieval date 30 August, 2009, [http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/helicon.vuw.ac.nz/ext/DDPQQ/ report.do?method=showReport](http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/helicon.vuw.ac.nz/ext/DDPQQ/report.do?method=showReport), the World Bank, 2009a.

(BBC, 2009). Thus, those people have fallen back into chronic poverty and they become vulnerable. Moreover, some are concerned the financial crisis might increasingly pull children back into the workforce as their parents cannot afford the cost of education (Phnom Penh Post, 2009c, 2009d).

Additionally, the strong growth over the last decade has been at the expense of natural resources such as forests, fisheries, land and water and heritage sites. Recently, Cambodia has begun facing the implications of climate change on the economy and social development, particularly in the agricultural sector, which suffered a long drought in 2009 (Phnom Penh Post, 2009e). Therefore, to minimise the impacts of the global financial crisis and to maintain strong growth, the World Bank (2009a, p.i) suggested that “*Cambodia has three important opportunities: harnessing regional integration; managing natural resources in a sustainable way; and investing in its future (through agriculture, infrastructure, education, and higher savings).*” Additionally, Cambodian aid coordination plays a more important role in complementing and reinforcing the Cambodian economic and development policies, aiming to directly reduce poverty and enhance aid and development effectiveness.

4.4.3 Cambodia’s Aid Dependency and Aid Effectiveness

The strong economic growth and improvement of social development is probably associated with aid dependence because aid is a vital source of revenue for Cambodia. Cambodia remains one of the most heavily aid-dependent nations among the developing world (See Table 4.3). ODA to Cambodia accounted for US\$ 672 million in 2007, equivalent to 8.4% of Cambodia’s Gross National Income (GNI) and far exceeding the low income country average of 5.2%. Cambodia’s aid per capita was US\$ 46 in 2007, far above the low income country average of US\$ 31. Cambodia’s ODA accounted for about half of the national budget (OECD, 2008c).

The country aid architecture is historically characterised by high level of fragmentation and deconcentration with highly competitive aid among more than 30 bilateral and multilateral donors (CDC/CRDB, 2007a). For example, development projects are fragmented in health, education and the agriculture and water sectors (ibid). Although Cambodia’s aid predictability now becomes apparent through increased aid

disbursement and donors' commitment on a three year indicative financial framework (See OECD, 2009, p.40), the aid deliveries to most sectors remain rather volatile, reflected in three forms: a larger number of donors, a varied financial size of each donor and the number of donor-funded activities (See Figure 4.5).

Table 4.3: Aid Dependency in Developing Countries


<i>Low Income Countries</i>	<i>Net ODA (US\$ million)</i>		<i>ODA per capita (US\$)</i>		<i>ODA as share of GNI (%)</i>	
	2000	2007	2000	2007	2000	2007
Bangladesh	1,172	1,502	8	9	2.4	2.0
Cambodia	396	672	31	46	10.9	8.4
Ethiopia	686	2,422	10	31	8.5	12.5
Guatemala	263	450	23	34	1.4	1.3
Kenya	510	1,275	16	34	4.1	5.3
Laos PDR	282	396	54	68	16.9	10.0
Madagascar	322	892	20	45	8.4	12.2
Malawi	446	735	38	53	26.1	20.8
Mongolia	217	228	91	87	20.1	5.9
Rwanda	321	713	39	73	18.7	21.5
Tanzania	1,035	2,811	31	70	11.6	17.4
Viet Nam	1,681	2,497	22	29	5.5	3.7
Zambia	795	1,045	76	88	25.8	10.5
Zimbabwe	176	465	14	35	2.5	..
Total Low Income Countries	16,632	40,259	15	31	4.6	5.2

Source: World Bank, 2009c, p.376-378; World Development Indicators 2009.

The aid coordination in Cambodia has become increasingly challenging due to a large number of OECD donors and emerging donors such as China, India and Kuwait. The key five principles of the Paris Declaration are a matter of growing debate. Historically, Cambodia's development cooperation has been donor-driven in all aspects of aid mechanisms. Specifically, during the reconstruction period 1992-1997, Cambodia in effect lost its sovereignty in the modern sense, as the international community dominated the rehabilitation and development processes. Having poor human resources, systems and institutions, the Cambodian government largely failed to direct and manage its process of reconstruction (Curtis, 1998). Aid is seen as both part of the problem and part of the solution to the Cambodia's development. For example, external and technical assistance can impact on good governance, particularly the rule of law and fighting

corruption. Technical cooperation still constitutes a large part of ODA (CDC/CRDB, 2007a, 2008d) and seems to have substituted for rather than built the capacity of local officials (Godfrey et al., 2002). Thus, dependence on aid has a negative impact on development. However, grants and aid scale up the voice of citizens and increase the demand for government accountability (Ear, 2007a, 2007b). The aid effectiveness and country aid coordination processes, particularly related to civil society and NGO engagement will be explicitly discussed in section 6.3.

Figure 4.5: Trends in Development Cooperation in Cambodia



Source: CDC/CRDB, 2008d, p.ii.

4.5 Conclusion

Over the centuries Cambodia has experienced both the highest level of civilisation and the lowest. Internal and external power struggles within the political economy have been the drivers of societal success and failure. This experience provides lessons to Cambodia and Cambodians to ensure that such a painful history will not be repeated. Future development and prosperity must be Cambodia's primary objective. Unfortunately, the Cambodian state has always been centralised as supposed to

participatory where all power has rested in the hands of one powerful leader. It is often the case that civil society has been suppressed by the government and leaders to retain their power.

Nevertheless, since the 1991 Paris Peace Accord, Cambodia has enjoyed high economic growth and an improvement of living standards. However, Cambodia and Cambodians still remain vulnerable to external shocks such as global financial turmoil. Although having made impressive developments over the last decade, much needs to be done socially and economically in a careful strategic and sustainable manner. The Cambodian people also need to be more active and proactive citizens in order to hold their government accountable. For being effective in carrying inclusive messages, Cambodia's NGOs and associations need to cooperate and continually upgrade their capacity to build strong collective action and a voice for influencing better policy.

Chapter V: The Effectiveness of NGO Coordination

5.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses the research questions 1 and 2 (See Section 1.3). The discussion and results in this chapter are based on a desk review analysis covering the evaluation of a number of the NGO Coordination Bodies (NCBs) (See Appendix V and VI). The discussion and results also refer to a critical analysis of the field research information from semi-structured interviews and participant observation. The participants are quoted in the following form: informant GOV 01 for government official; informant DP 02 for donors' representative; and informant CSO 03 for NGO. This chapter portrays the evolution, development and effectiveness of NGO coordination since the fall of the Khmer Rouge. It is divided into three main sections. The first section reports on the evolution of NGO development and assistance in contribution to Cambodian reconstruction and development since the end of the Khmer Rouge regime. The second section outlines the institutional operation of the NCBs and provincial NGO Alliances (NAs). And the final section assesses the internal and external challenges of NGO coordination at both national and provincial levels.

5.2 Evolution of NGO development

5.2.1 The Roles of NGOs in Cambodia's Reconstruction and Development

After the Khmer Rouge regime ended in 1979, INGOs began their activities and operation at the refugee camps along the Cambodian-Thai borders and inside the country with the Vietnamese-backed Government. A group of NGOs, Consortium for Cambodia, successfully ended the political deadlock in 1979 and was allowed access to the country in certain areas by the socialist government (Walker, 2007). With financial mobilisation of more than US\$ 100 million, the consortium helped the starving population through humanitarian activities³³. Walker believes that "NGOs today are, if

³³ The humanitarian activities included an agreed relief program between the NGO consortium and the socialist government, mechanisms and options to deliver aid to Cambodia through Phnom Penh's ports and airport (not cross borders between Thailand), the highest professional standards of codes of conduct, meaningful negotiation with the socialist government, cultural sensitivity, security, visa entry, press passes for journalists, freedom of travel, imported equipment and facilities for daily operation...etc (Walker, 2007, p.136-137).

anything, less likely to be able to respond to new crisis as they did in Cambodia” (in the 1980s) (2007, p.149). Between 1980 and 1991 INGOs worked closely at the grassroots level and had a difficult relationship with the socialist government due to mistrust, close investigation and control and unreceptive behaviour of the SOC (Mysliwiec, 2004). The INGO assistance was relatively small and not able to cope with massive demands and needs across the country including the need for building capacity and institutional building and other development projects (Hun Sen, 2009). The INGOs painted an image of aid politicisation and discrimination and blamed the UN and Western governments through their report *“Punishing the Poor: the International Isolation of Kampuchea”* (Mysliwiec, 1988).

From 1991-2001 INGO involvement remained limited. However by 2000, during the early stage of liberalisation administered by UNTAC, more than 200 INGOs had been founded (ADB, 1999, 2005). INGO growth was driven by the need to rehabilitate Cambodia and grow the spirit of democratisation and good governance at national and community levels. INGOs are donor-driven, their mission, objectives, and activities framed by their funding sources. INGOs have provided basic service delivery on a large scale mainly funded by bilateral and multilateral agencies for reconstruction and infrastructure development. Their assistance is also given through government structures, and building the capacity of government’s institutions at all levels. They have also supported LNGOs and community-based organisations financially and technically through creating community development programmes working at the village level to fight the basic causes of poverty (Mansfield & MacLeod, 2002). Moreover, INGOs have increasingly played roles in research, advocacy and other analytical work including a wide range of development issues³⁴.

The first LNGOs were established in 1991 and the number increased from 100 in 1996 to 400 in 2000 (Downie & Kingsbury, 2001, p.59; Landau, 2008, p.247). The rapid growth of LNGOs was driven by a number of forces including a desire to rehabilitate the country and improve the livelihoods of the poor and to help with employment, the limited capacity of the government to provide universal welfare services, and substantial

³⁴ The development issues are monitoring and evaluation of large-scale development activities, aid effectiveness, and sector and government budget analysis, countering corruption, human right violations, land grabbing, human trafficking and others.

support from Western governments and INGOs, seeking “potential partners” (Downie & Kingsbury, 2001; Mansfield & MacLeod, 2002). However, few LNGOs were probably created by local people’s organisations, as many LNGOs were established by outsiders funded and directed by founders and donors, carrying external philosophies rather than those developed for the realistic demands of local people (Mansfield & MacLeod, 2002). LNGOs have concentrated on promoting social development, democratic principles, respecting human rights, enhancing the rule of law, good governance and fighting corruption through policy, training, public awareness, and other related advocacy work by participating directly in the society at all levels. The roles of building human capacity and institutional development have also been included in their mandates. Indeed, they constantly refer to community relationships and the investment of time in building them as one of the most critical elements of their success.


According to informants GOV 02 and GOV 05, there are 1791 NGOs (450 INGOs and 1341 LNGOs, excluding 989 associations) currently active in Cambodia. These figures reveal the strong demand for social and economic services at the grassroots level and the active role of NGOs in meeting them, both financially and technically. Specifically, since 1991, INGOs and LNGOs have not only contributed financially to rehabilitating and developing Cambodia, but have also substantially built capacity, institutional arrangements and skilled human resources within and outside the government structure, particularly at the provincial, district and community levels (CDC/CRDB, 2004c). Some progressive LNGOs and INGOs have increasingly been involved with advocacy work and have helped and demanded the government change its attitude and policies. Their contribution to Cambodia’s reconstruction and development and their pivotal roles have been widely acknowledged by the government and donors. However, the government values the INGOs and LNGOs serving in economic and social development work more than those that work in human rights and advocacy, seeing them as non-neutral and favouring opposition parties (Clamor, 2001; Kheang, 2006). The human rights and advocacy NGOs are accused of using foreign views and exaggerating the reality for financial gains from donors (Kheang, 2006). Despite progress to improve working relationships between the NGOs and the Cambodian government, many informants claimed that a great distance still exists between the government and advocacy and human rights NGOs.

5.2.2. NGOs' Status and Disbursement by Province and Sector

Most NGOs, particularly INGOs and big LNGOs, are based in Phnom Penh and in some large provinces (See Table 5.1). INGO projects are generally larger than LNGOs. According to the CDC/CRDB database, of 30,000 NGO staff, fewer than 10% are foreign advisors, experts and volunteers; the rest are Cambodians. This not only brings about change and offers social and economic services to reduce poverty and improve democracy and good governance, but it also provides job opportunities for Cambodian people.

Accurate and comprehensive data on the NGO's general status is only available from 1992 to 2007. The data on NGO disbursement from CDC/CRDB shown in Table 5.1, Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1 is limited and represents a sample of about 45% of LNGOs and 90% of INGOs in 2006 and 2007 (CDC/CRDB, 2007a, p.15). Between 1992 and 2007, disbursement of NGO core funds has averaged more than 8% and reached 10% of the total ODA disbursement in 2007 (See Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1).

Figure 5.1: Annual ODA Disbursement: 1992-2007



Sources: CDC/CRDB Database, CDC/CRDB (2000b, 2001b, 2002b, 2004b, 2006a, 2007a, 2008d, p.13 and 39), September 04, 2009.

The NGO share in total provincial disbursements was 18% (CDC/CRDB, 2008d, p.12). Table 5.1 shows that NGOs contributed significant proportions of total ODA

disbursement in some provinces such as 46% in Siem Reap³⁵, 36% in each of Takeo and Koh Kong, 21% in Kompong Chhnang, and 19% in Kampong Cham. NGOs shared about one third of total disbursement in Phnom Penh. Thus, NGO projects have directly and indirectly benefited the poor in both rural and urban areas.

Table 5.1: NGO Disbursements (Core-Fund) by Provinces 2006 - 2007 (USD 000s)

Province	2006			2007		
	ODA	NGO Core Funds	% of NGO share in ODA	ODA	NGO Core Funds	% of NGO share in ODA
Banteay Meanchey	15,203	858	5.60%	16,665	1,730	10.40%
Battambang	21,682	3,408	15.70%	22,235	3,516	15.80%
Kampong Cham	15,978	2,919	18.30%	24,148	4,571	18.90%
Kampong Chhnang	6,198	1,177	19.00%	8,699	1,843	21.20%
Kampong Speu	9,572	1,110	11.60%	10,822	1,652	15.30%
Kampong Thom	17,387	940	5.40%	17,562	1,754	10.00%
Kampot	10,792	789	7.30%	14,001	517	3.70%
Kandal	26,664	1,332	5.00%	53,796	2,666	5.00%
Koh Kong	2,148	956	44.5%	4,403	1,576	35.8%
Kracheh	10,009	373	3.70%	17,987	908	5.00%
Mondul Kiri	5,277	271	5.10%	8,537	433	5.10%
Phnom Penh	68,162	15,163	22.20%	70,690	22,339	31.60%
Preah Vihear	3,928	348	8.80%	5,128	880	17.20%
Prey Veng	9,747	692	7.10%	17,365	1,707	9.80%
Pursat	7,204	518	7.20%	8,021	1,173	14.60%
Ratanak Kiri	2,630	312	11.90%	4,662	404	8.70%
Siem Reap	37,230	14,339	38.50%	44,078	20,187	45.80%
Sihanoukville	27,779	306	1.10%	44,186	2,061	4.70%
Stung Treng	10,831	493	4.60%	7,021	598	8.50%
Svay Rieng	7,361	502	6.80%	8,253	921	11.20%
Takeo	7,640	1,925	25.20%	9,498	3,435	36.20%
Otdar Meanchey	8,519	383	4.50%	11,404	651	5.70%
Krong Kep	892	124	13.90%	1,937	356	18.40%
Krong Pailin	4,021	905	22.50%	2,971	134	4.50%
Nationwide	375,294	22	0.10%	355,532	1,724	0.50%
TOTAL	713,241	50,162	7.00%	790,377	77,736³⁶	9.80%

Sources: CDC/CRDB (2008d, p.38-39) and CDC/CRDB Database, retrieved date September 04, 2009.

³⁵ Siem Reap is known as the biggest tourist site but is one of the poorest provinces (MOP, 2004).

³⁶ From 1997 to 2006 the annual NGO disbursement was about \$US 50 million. However, the amount of NGO disbursement increased to about \$US 77 million in 2007. According to field research informants, some donors have started to breakdown their financial assistance by regions and countries. In many cases, many donors have channelled their funding to NGOs through regional programmes but have not clearly classified the financial aid in detail to different countries or regions. Thus, the number of aid disbursements has increased. Informant GOV 01 argues that “the total financial budget to the NGO sector might be much higher than the current figures.” Many donors have encountered difficulties in sorting their financial aid reports to the government. On the other hand, the CDC/CRDB has had difficulties in managing NGOs because CDC/CRDB does not have any management mechanism toward NGOs. The NGOs register at CDC/CRDB due to the substantial benefit from receiving tax exemptions on their imported materials. Currently, the NGO database at CDC/CRDB is under construction; but there is a need to make it functional and effective. One question is how to attract NGOs to work with the CDC/CRDB and not just to benefit from the tax exemptions from CDC/CRDB.

As shown in Table 5.2, NGO funds significantly increased from \$163.5 million in 2006 to \$183.5 million in 2007. It is apparent that donors channelled funds to NGOs mainly in good governance and democracy, agriculture, rural development and multisectoral³⁷, culture and arts and gender; while NGO (core-fund) did not target these sectors, but concentrated on social sectors such as health, education, community welfare and rural development. This means that external funding for NGO service delivery might have been cut and shifted to policy and advocacy NGOs. The NGOs have not given priority to agriculture through their core-funds as much as donor assistance to this sector in the total share of aid (CDC/CDRB, 2008f). This trend has been seen in many African nations (Lister and Nyamugasira, 2003; Howell et al., 2008). Therefore, NGO efforts may contribute to scale up the poverty reduction in the hope of achieving the CMDGs, particularly universal nine-year basic education, improvements in child mortality and maternal health, and a reduction in HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases.

Table 5.2: NGO Sector Support 2006-2007 (USD million)

Sector	2006 Actual						2007 Provisional					
	NGO Funded by Donors		NGO Core Funds		Total		NGO Funded by Donors		NGO Core Funds		Total	
	USD	%	USD	%	USD	%	USD	%	USD	%	USD	%
Health	14.3	12.6	28.3	56.5	42.6	9.05	9.5	9.0	36.7	47.2	46.2	25.2
Education	3.4	3.0	5.2	10.4	8.5	5.2	4.1	3.9	18.3	23.5	22.4	12.2
Community Welfare	3.0	2.6	7.7	15.3	10.7	6.5	3.6	3.4	10.3	13.3	13.9	7.6
Rural Development	5.8	5.1	6.7	13.4	12.5	7.7	7.9	7.5	8.5	10.9	16.4	8.9
Agriculture	7.4	6.5	1.5	2.9	8.8	5.4	17.9	17.0	2.7	3.5	20.7	11.3
Manufacturing/Trade	1.5	1.4	0.2	0.3	1.7	1.0	6.7	6.3	0.6	0.8	7.3	4.0
Governance	33.0	29.1	0.0	0.0	33.0	20.2	29.8	28.2	0.0	0.0	29.8	16.2
Banking/Business Services	7.9	7.0	0.0	0.0	7.9	4.9	1.9	1.8	0.0	0.0	1.9	1.0
Culture & Arts	1.4	1.2	0.0	0.0	1.4	0.9	1.5	1.4	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.8
Gender Mainstreaming	1.8	1.6	0.0	0.0	1.8	1.1	2.7	2.5	0.0	0.0	2.7	1.5
Multisectoral	29.1	25.7	0.0	0.0	29.1	17.8	10.9	10.3	0.0	0.0	10.9	5.9
Other	4.7	4.2	0.6	1.2	5.3	3.3	9.4	8.9	0.6	0.8	10.0	5.5
TOTAL	113.3	100	50.2	100	163.5	100	105	100	77.7	100	183.5	100

Note: 70% of 337 INGOs originally come from US (97), Japan (43), France (40), UK (22), and Australia (21) (CDC/CRDB, 2007a, p.15).

Source: CDC/CRDB Database, CDC/CRDB (2008d, p.13), September 04, 2009.

³⁷ 'Multisectoral' is a combination of agriculture, rural development and water and sanitation (CDC/CRDB, 2008a).

In summary, many donors³⁸ are now more interested in providing funds through NGOs, reflecting the important roles of NGOs and their effectiveness, transparency and accountability according to field research informants. This contradicts the concerns of NGOs regarding the loss of funding in terms of the Paris Declaration agenda discussed in section 2.4.2. NGOs in Cambodia heavily rely on external aid and they are financed to do particular projects based on the donors' mandates and priorities. There is no government budget available for LINGOs and public donations and charity are very limited.

It is argued that channelling official assistance through NGOs whose projects are small and medium-sized in Cambodia may lead to aid effectiveness challenges in term of alignment and ownership and a higher level of fragmentation (Menocal et al., 2007). Therefore, there have been calls for NGOs to strengthen their coordination and effectiveness (CDC/CRDB, 2000a; Downie & Kingsbury, 2001; Mansfield & MacLeod, 2002; ADB, 2005; Kheang 2007b; World Bank, 2006). The NGO coordination is comprehensively discussed in the section 5.3.

5.3 NGO Coordination in Cambodia

5.3.1 Development of NGO Coordination Bodies (NCBs)

As noticed by Bennett (1994, 2000), the concept of NGO coordination is often applied in the context of fragile states such as Cambodia in the 1980s. A group of INGOs, called Consortium for Cambodia³⁹ successfully delivered relief programmes to deal with the famine crisis after the end of the Khmer Rouge regime. The PRK government realised and accepted that the strength and credibility of NGOs lay in their autonomy and integrity (Walker, 2007, p.147). Thus, a genuine working relationship between the

³⁸ In late 2007, the World Bank Cambodia Office launched a new program to "Enhance Capacity on Social Accountability" over three years due to the realisation of slow progress of the government performance in the governance sector (World Bank, 2008a, 2008b). This project will provide a grant to non-state institutions of \$4.5 million out of \$20 million in three years (ibid). This development program will help build capacity of non-state actors and the Cambodian government to become accountable, transparent, and participatory. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has also funded and worked closely with a number of NGOs in Cambodia (ADB, 2007).

³⁹ The Consortium for Cambodia comprised a core group NGO coalition that had been formed during the mid-1960s with representatives from the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and other major voluntary agencies including Oxfam, Catholic Relief Service and the Lutheran World Federation, which represented the World Council of Churches (Walker, 2007, p.137).

Consortium and the government emerged in the 1980s, allowing the members to deliver humanitarian aid to starving Cambodians.

In 1991, a small number of national NCBs were established by groups of INGOs and LNGOs and associations, intending to coordinate NGO projects, share information and do advocacy work; while the number of INGOs and LNGOs dramatically increased to absorb the financial assistance to Cambodia. This is because the existing transitional government of Cambodia had very limited capacity to handle large amounts of funds due to a lack of human resources, unreliable government financial and administrative systems, and ineffective aid coordination mechanisms.

As noted in 2.3.1 above, NCBs are formal NGO membership organisations. They are formally registered with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MFAIC) and Ministry of Interior (MOI). Their mandates and roles are uniquely distinctive. For example, Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC) takes a more representational and protocol role in regards to common issues, cooperation and NGO best practice concerning the entire civil society. The NGO Forum on Cambodia (NGOF) targets development, economic, environmental, land and livelihood issues. Medicam, NGO Education Partnership (NEP), Action Committee for Human Rights (CHRAC) and End Child Prostitution, Abuse and Trafficking in Cambodia (ECPAT-Cambodia) emphasise health, education, human rights and child rights, respectively. NCBs are basically located in the cities and work in partnership with other powerful and strong INGOs and LNGOs. Most have access to good communication systems such as telephone, fax, email and internet and modern office facilities. The executive directors and staff of these NGOs have more knowledge of development, management, operational and administrative work than LNGOs, with most holding at least bachelor's degrees (See Appendix V).

a) The Roles of NGO Coordination Bodies (NCBs)

The developing roles of NCBs in the Cambodian context have been accompanied by a reborn civil society and an influx of aid into Cambodia. Their advantages are translated into a different view by their members, non members, government and donors. Their

overarching role is to strengthen civil society organisations. Similar to Bennett's observation (2000), NGO coordination in the Cambodian context aims at:

1. Sharing information between national and community levels
2. Building a strong NGO collective voice and representativeness
3. Minimising project replication and waste
4. Enhancing NGO professionalism and institutional effectiveness through NGO self-regulation
5. Influencing policies and strategies of the Cambodian government and donors
6. Participating in country aid coordination process and
7. Identifying NGO partners for the government, donors and INGOs.

In the case of information sharing, it can be done in two forms through their monthly members meeting. NCBs share the updated information about government policies, strategies and other necessary regulations with their members, while receiving information from the NGO community on a diverse range of issues. Both NCBs and members learn from each other and use that information to devise new approaches for helping the poor. Informant DP 05 mentions that:

“What Medicam does in the health sector for example...it probably has the best information from the across the country on how people are spending money on medical treatment, which is very important because that is a huge part of households' budgets in poor households across Cambodia.”

This approach encourages members to strengthen their advocacy of evidence-based policy; thus, members become active and proactive. The more active members are, the stronger capacity NCBs have.

Based on qualitative and quantitative information from the grassroots generated from the monthly member meetings and special events⁴⁰, NCBs produce useful advocacy documents for the Cambodian government and donors in quarterly and annual meetings such as the TWGs, GDCC and CDCF, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

⁴⁰The monthly member meetings and special events are the forums that allow NCBs and members and/or non-members to participate and to discuss the common issues and development issues by sectors, and endorse the common view that is consequently called collective voice.

NCBs can inform the government and donors about the real situation across the country in the hope of achieving inclusive policy and strategy and better outcomes for the poor.

NCBs have continually supported and built the capacity of members and non-members through training courses⁴¹ and evidence-based research articles about different issues. Some courses are freely offered and others charge fees. For example, the Cooperation Committee for Cambodia has developed the NGO Good Practice Project (NGO-GPP) comprising *The Code of Ethical Principles and Minimum Standards for NGO and NGO Voluntary Certificate System*. With support from donors, the CCC has offered training courses⁴² on “*NGO Good Governance, Professionalism and Accountability*” free of charge to members and non-members nationwide. The process of NGO GPP is fairly and acceptably conducted through desk review and field assessment by NGO working groups⁴³, the Code Compliance Committee⁴⁴ and capacity building. All informants of this study acknowledged that the NGO GPP is a good local initiative for Cambodians. This action consequently builds trust and social capital of the entire civil society, particularly among NGOs and NGOs, the Cambodian government and donors.

b) Organisational and Management Structure and Governance Systems

The organisational and management structure of each NCB is slightly different due to their different mandates and organisational history (Bennett, 2000). Most NCBs have a clear and formal organisational structure, permanent staff, clear mission, vision and objectives, five year strategic plan, and/or by-laws (See Appendix V). The

⁴¹ The training courses provided by NCBs: 1) CCC: Training courses on NGO Good Governance, Professionalism and Accountability for senior and management staff of LINGOs/INGOs and to be conducted in different provinces from 2009-2010 within six round (CCC, 2009), basic courses and community level courses (Non-members need to pay training fees); 2). Medicam provides training according to the needs of NGO members such as primary health care, HIV/AIDS counselling, monitoring and evaluation, and more (www.medicam-cambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009) 3). NEP provides education policy training (www.nepcambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009).


⁴² The courses are conducted in six rounds of four days. The courses cover four topics: 1). Organisational Policies and Board Development, 2). Effective Human Resource Management, Sound Financial and Administrative Management, 3). Monitoring and Evaluation, and 4). Organisational Strategic Planning (CCC, 2009:2).

⁴³ The NGO Code Working Group is voluntary to assess the NGOs that apply for the NGO Voluntary Certificate System. There are 12 members of the Working Group (CCC, 2008c).

⁴⁴ The NGO Code Compliance Committee is also voluntary to assess NGOs that apply for the NGO Voluntary Certificate System. There are 8 members of the NGO Code Compliance Committee (CCC, 2008c).

organisational structure consists of organisational members⁴⁵, associate members⁴⁶, a Board of Directors or Management Committee⁴⁷, Secretariat, Executive Director and library (See Figure 5.2). The Secretariat and Executive Director of each NCB play an important role in running the operation and interacting with members and other actors. An Executive Director is elected by members of the Management Committee. A General Assembly is usually conducted annually with all members. Their libraries have a wide range of resources, which are often open to the public, particularly the CCC and Medicam. Staff meetings are also conducted monthly to assess and follow up their activities.

Figure 5.2: Structure of NGO Coordination Bodies (NCBs)



Sources: CCC (2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b), NGOF (2005, 2006, 2007a, 2008a, 2008b), Medicam (www.medicam-cambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009); NEP (2005, 2006, 2008); Chrac (www.chrac.org/eng, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009); ECPAT (2006, 2007, 2008) and information from field research from March-June, 2009.

Generally, their organisational structure is hierarchal although they have decentralised work with NGOs in provinces through their working groups, sub-networking groups, sector working groups or their provincial offices. Their coordination work is often ad-hoc and unsystematic. For example, the well-known NCBs such as the CCC and NGOF do not have provincial offices. The monthly members meetings are usually conducted in

⁴⁵ INGOs and LNGOs and/or associations have a right to vote and elect members of the Management Committee or Board of Directors (See Appendix V).

⁴⁶ Individual members and associate members are just observers and have no rights to vote or elect members of the Management Committee or Board of Directors (See Appendix V).

⁴⁷ The Management Committee or Board of Directors have a membership of around five to seven based on the size of NCBs. The Committee oversees the five year strategic plan, budget, memberships, the executive director's work and others. The members of The Management Committee or Board of Directors meet at least four times a year (See Appendix V).

the capital. As will be discussed, fieldwork observation reveals that their network and coordination work have remained loose.

NCBs have good governance systems such as auditing, financial reporting and annual reports. However, only a few NCBs such as the CCC, NGOF, Medicam and NEP have implemented the NGO GPP. The CCC, NGOF, and Medicam have a high profile at the international and national levels while the rest have well-known brands at the national level. The Medicam and CHRAC the have highest profile at the community level as they have provincial offices. The rest have a lower profile due to poor regular communication and no provincial offices (See Appendix V). Therefore, their capacity varies and is judged by their institutional capacity, staff capacity and skills, funding availability and governance systems (See Appendix V).

c) Members and Membership Fees

There is a membership process initiated by NCBs, particularly the CCC, NGOF, Medicam and NEP. The members are tied by bylaws and have to pay a membership fee to NCBs. They must apply for membership through filling in an application form and submitting this with other required documents⁴⁸ to NCBs, indicating which sub-working group they want to participate in. The process of registration can take at least one to two months before being approved by the NCBs' management committee. Currently, only four NCBs have large members: the CCC, which has 110 members, the NGOF with 83 members, Medicam with 131 members and NEP with 79 members. The CHRAC and EPACT have 21 and 27 respectively, without having a membership agreement. The NCBs' members are required to undertake minimum participation and some mandatory tasks⁴⁹. There is "*free open membership without any tension and*

⁴⁸ The relevant documents include: 1). a request letter to NCBs, 2). legal registration document with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the Ministry of Interior or even the MOU with the sector ministry, 3). Organisational backgrounds, description and programme and project description such as office, beneficiaries, annual budget, governance system, reporting and auditing...etc (CCC 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b; NGOF, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2008a 2008b; Medicam (www.medicam-cambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009); NEP, 2005, 2006, 2008); and information from field research from March-June, 2009).

⁴⁹ Some mandatory tasks are 1) right to vote in every election for positions on committees and on every issue placed before quorum meetings of the members; 2). eligible to stand for election or be appointed to positions on NCB management committees; 3) right to observe at any and all NCB meetings with the exception of Executive Committee meetings 4) right to raise issues, provide comment, and offer

competition” between NCBs as informant CSO 01 and 02 address. For example, 23% and 18% of CCC’s members belong to NGOF and Medicam, respectively (See Appendix VI). The NCBs only represent their members and not the whole NGO community. NCBs generate income (membership fees) from members. They use the membership income and donor funding to cover the cost of administration, staff salaries, and other projects for building the collective voice, conducting studies and research, providing training courses for member capacity building. The membership fee of NCBs varies and is calculated in different ways⁵⁰.

5.3.2 Development of NGO Alliances (NAs)

There are provincial NGO alliances (NAs), formed by a number of INGOs and LNGOs, although the exact number of NAs in Cambodia is not known. There are three different kinds of NAs: formal NA⁵¹, semi-formal NA⁵², and informal NA⁵³. Basically, most of the NAs are semi-formal NGO networks. However, a sub-decree approved by the MOI for legal registration of local NGOs and associations does not cover how an NGO network/alliance should be established and does not require registration with the Ministry (informant CSO 09).

recommendations on all matters relevant to the activities and operation of the NCBs (CCC, 2008b, NGOF, 2007a, NEP, 2005, informant CSO 02).

⁵⁰ The NEP charges each LNGO only US\$30 and each INGO only US\$120 per year without considering their annual budget. The NGOF’s membership charges range from \$10 to \$300 per year based on the member’s overall budget. However, those LNGOs that are committed to be active members may request NGOF’s management committee for a waiver of the membership fee. The CCC calculates membership fees based on 0.00225 multiplied by the member’s annual budget. The CCC’s observers are asked to pay only \$55 a month. Medicam has three ways of charging its members. The members that have an annual budget over \$1,350,000 a year pay a membership fee of \$3,000 per year. The members with annual budgets ranged between \$35,000 and \$1,349,999 are asked to pay the same membership fee calculated like the CCC (0.00225 multiplied by the annual budget) and members that have an annual budget less than \$34,999 are charged only \$55 a year. The observers or individuals pay only \$77 per month. However, the membership fee comprises a small part of the NCBs’ annual budget. For example, the CCC received only about 18% of its annual budget from membership fees; the NGOF got less than 1% of its budget in 2008 (See Appendix VI). Thus, the NCBs are largely reliant on the donors’ funds as informant CSO 01 and 02 mention.

⁵¹ The formal NGO alliance, like NCBs, is a formal organisation registered with the MOI or MFAIC in Cambodia.

⁵² The semi-informal NGO alliance is an informal organisation whose members are formal NGO organisations registered with the MOI or MFAIC but the network does not register with any ministries.

⁵³ The informal NGO alliance is an informal organisation. Neither the network organisation nor its members are formal organisations, nor do they register with any ministries.

a) Organisational and Management Structure

After NAs are established, members join together and appoint a number of NGOs to participate in the NAs' executive committee. In the first meeting, one NGO will be asked to voluntarily chair the NA for a certain period agreed among members. The management style of NAs varies in different provinces based on the working relationship among members. The selection of the NAs' chairman can be conducted in the form of voluntary commitment and rotation among the members. Some NAs consist of sub-groups by sector such as health, education, environment, natural resource management, micro-finance, gender or rural development and human rights.

According to the interviews with provincial LNGO informants there is no formal structure of NAs, including no permanent office, secretariat, support staff, financial support from donors, strategic plan and activities, by-laws, and/or clear vision, mission or objectives. NAs often have poor communication systems such as phone and internet, particularly in the provinces where public and private services are limited and expensive.

NAs play a different role in each province and community based on their capacity, which is basically that of each NAs' chairman. The chairman uses the financial resource and staff of their own NGO to run the NA. The chairman usually does little more than maintain a directory including the addresses, contact numbers, number of NGOs and NGO projects in a province. An NA can only share the up-to-date information they have to each other during monthly meetings. The NAs' effort is prioritised lower than that of the chairman's own NGO's activities. Thus, maintaining an effective provincial NGO alliance is more difficult than operating an NGO (informant CSO 09).

Four provincial NGO informants claimed that there is no financial and technical support to set up an effective NA and secretariat. Donors have little or no interest in financing NAs' projects and activities. However, many donor informants thought that NAs in provinces should be strengthened. Informant DP 08 stresses that *"there is a need to strengthen the NGO coordination at the provincial level because many NGOs at the provincial level are not being involved in the aid coordination process and at the national level."* The LNGO informants also agree that they have limited capacity,

particularly in project design and development and in the use of English (informant CSO 10) to be able to write a good proposal for donor funding.

b) Membership and Fees

Members of NAs are voluntary. Obviously, not all NGOs in the province participate in the network due to “*workloads, a lack of financial resources and staff*” (informant CSO 07). Other reasons might be a lack of interest and/or less awareness of NGO coordination. Thus, there is no membership agreement and fee to support a secretariat, staff and activities. LNGOs are small and their budgets are not sustainable, backed by donor’s funding. They are not able to pay any contribution. Thus there is no membership fee for NAs.

c) Provincial NGO Self-Regulation

The provincial NGOs (particularly NGO staff and executive directors) might have limited knowledge on their NGO operation, NGO self-regulation, management and administration. They have poor governance systems including financial systems, and activities reporting through their annual report. For instance, informant CSO 07 illustrates that:

“Some LNGOs have policies, some have boards of directors and some haven’t...even though our organisation has not had all points following the NGO-GPP. For example, we implement gender projects but we have not finalised the gender policy yet.”

Indeed, the provincial NGOs have limited awareness of NGO minimum operational and ethical codes and the NGO voluntary Certification System developed by the CCC. From observing the seminar, LNGOs have different ideas about how this system should be applied, particularly the difference between large NGOs and small provincial NGOs.

d) Provincial NGO Coordination Efforts

As most of the key informants point out, many provincial NGOs lack an awareness of NGO coordination and the benefit of a solid collective voice for their common challenging issues. It has been very difficult to make a wider constituency on common issues to be expressed to provincial government and authority. Informant CSO 09 emphasises:

“members of the network are busy with their work... the provincial NGOs are small and have a small number and it is difficult to foster the coordination efforts and advocacy on common interests and issues...we are less active than NGOs in Phnom Penh, particularly the CCC and NGO Forum.”

Sometimes members cannot devote time to join NAs' regular meetings. In addition to this, the chairman would rather spend time on his/her own NGO operation than maintain NA's action plans/activities and share useful information to members. For instance, informant CSO 07 stresses that *“I don't have time to follow up these sub-networks in the province.”*

Communication among NA's members and between NAs and NCBs has proven difficult due to limited knowledge and understanding as well as poor access to email and the internet. Sometimes they contact each other in cases where they face problems and they need help. The same mistakes appear on both sides; informant CSO 07 exemplifies that *“LNGOs don't often make the regular working relationship with the NGOs at the national level.”* Another example was revealed during the discussion at the provincial NGO seminar where nine members of the provincial NA that participated in one meeting at the national level did not convey updated information to other provincial NGOs. This indicates poor provincial NGO coordination. NAs have poor advocacy capacity to address common and certain issues to provincial government and authority. They have little or no research ability to build capacity of their members. Their representation might be limited and/or non-existent.

5.4 Cultural and Political Challenges to NGO Coordination

Based on desk review analysis and narrative analysis, the NGO coordination in Cambodia, particularly NCBs, has faced a number of challenges including cultural challenges, an unfriendly political environment and institutional challenges (See Appendix V). These causes have resulted in a) absence of collective voice, b) slow implementation of the NGO-GPP, c) fragmentation and duplication of NGO projects, and d) poor working relationship with the Cambodian government. Consequently, Cambodia's NGO sector and civil society remain immature and weak although it has been improved since the 1990s.

5.4.1 Cultural Challenges

The cultural barriers to coordination and partnership include a lack of trust, hesitation and fear of losing face, high bureaucracy and patron-client relationship and immature and weak NGOs and other institutions. Lack of trust is a big problem in Cambodia. The spirit of unity and collective action was destroyed during the Khmer Rouge period and the long conflicts, leading to mistrust among Cambodian people. Many hesitate to be critical of others or to offer help to others because *“practically there is not a culture to coordinate among them and to work together”* (informant DP 10). Some people are active, free riders and some others do not listen and accept others' ideas for improvement. Moreover, as part of Asian culture and Khmer culture, questioning is uncommon or 'silence is golden.' Questioning can be interpreted as a way of accusing, challenging and looking down on someone (Bradely, 2005, p.36). Therefore, people become passive. In connection with questioning, a concept of 'losing face' is another barrier preventing people from communicating with each other because they do not want to look lost and unaware of any specific issue. Hence, they could agree on something without making a genuine commitment.

As noticed in chapter four, the institutions of the democratic state and the civil society, particularly NGOs are immature with a scarcity of financial and human resources caused by wars and internal conflicts. The culture of patron-client relationship practice has taken root in those institutions (See section 4.4.1). Thus, they are highly

bureaucratic leading to ineffective cooperation, partnership and coordination in their operation.

5.4.2 Political Challenges

The working relationship between NGOs, particularly NCBs/NAs, and the Cambodian government has been very good on the overall scale. This achievement reflects the strong and constructive NGO engagement in the aid coordination processes although their space for policy influencing remains limited. Generally, according to the government reports in 2007 there is more engagement between NGOs and the government, which can be considered a healthy development given the clear roles of NGOs during the NSDP Mid-term Review (CDC/CRDB, 2008d). In this engagement the government places most emphasis on development NGOs; while advocacy and human rights NGOs' engagement seems not to be welcome. For example, the provincial authorities prevent the human rights and advocacy activists of NGOs from doing field investigation and getting information from affected people in areas where there is a dispute and human rights are violated (Informant CSO 08, Phnom Penh Post, 2009f). Sometimes, human right activists face lawsuits for disinformation and incitement on certain issues during their work in provinces (Phnom Penh Post, 2009g). There is mistrust between NGOs and the government: informant CSO 09 mentions that *“we don't have any trust that the government that will have the willingness to approve the new NGO law to protect civil society organisations.”*

Some government, donor and NGO informants agreed that some NGOs are involved with politics. For example, informant GOV 04 also mentions that *“Some NGOs act as the opposition parties against the government and they don't have constructive idea to contribute to the development of Cambodia.”* The government seems to silence critics and challenge freedom of expression, but as informant CSO 09 expresses *“not all issues related to politics...it is about human rights and expression of information and idea to the public.”* Some NGOs, particularly LNGOs, are suspected to have gone off track as agents of development, damaging the NGOs' image. For example, informant GOV 05 indicates that: *“14 LNGOs are operating their activities that are involved with politics and dishonesty to the local people and communities.”*

Some LNGO leaders are very aligned with the political parties, particularly the opposition parties and/or those using foreign ideologies. Some NGOs have no intention to work with the government (informant CSO 07). Informant CSO 05 claims that:

“it was just so negative; it was just criticism and negativity flowing each way. There was no listening to each other, so there is very challenging between the civil society, the government and the private sector.”

Sometimes NGOs can be highlighted as political allies by others for their personal benefits; thus, NGOs need to inform local authority about their activities (informant CSO 07). In some cases, their critics say their inputs are similar to the opposition (informant CSO 02). The challenge and difficulties come from confusion and mistrust of each other and people that are powerful or untouchable (informant CSO 08). It has been argued that NGOs bypass the government systems. Except for strong sector ministries such as the MOH and the MOEYS, other ministries have poor leadership and corruption (Informant CSO 06). This makes it difficult for NGOs/NCBs to collaborate with them.

Although the NGO's engagement in the policy arena has widened, NGOs claim that their inputs have not been integrated into the government's policy documents. So far, no forum and direct dialogue has been organised between NGOs and the Cambodian government. In the case of formulation of the new NGO and Civil Society Organisation law, both government and NGOs failed to reach a consensus. The government complains that civil society, particularly NGOs, could not provide their collective position on the draft of a new law (Informant GOV 04); while NGOs blamed the government that they were not invited as stakeholders in the drafting law process. The mutual accountability between NGOs and the RGC is still missing (Informant DP 06). That is a mistake from both sides.

Practically, LNGOs need to register with the MOI⁵⁴; INGOs must register with the MFAIC, and might require registration and cooperation agreements with particular line

⁵⁴ The Ministry of Interior (MOI) has limited capacity to administer and manage LNGOs across the country. The MOI only records the number of LNGOs and associations but does not know how many LNGOs are active or dead. The MOI is preparing the draft law on NGO and association and set up the committee for discussion. Thus, the process is underway. The MOI has one NGO Department

ministries they work with. The formal registration with the ministries is conducted through signing the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Then, INGOs and LNGOs must provide their annual activities and financial reports to the MFAIC and MOI at the end of every fiscal year. They also need to send their reports to CDC/CRDB (See Appendix VII) that manages the external assistance to Cambodia including NGOs. There is no single government institution that is solely in charge of managing and administering NGOs. Indeed, the MFAIC, MOI and CDC/CRDB all require NGOs to send quarterly and annual reports. The line ministries might impose other regulations and procedures for NGOs to follow in order to get work done smoothly. This leads to conflict and confusion over the roles of government institutions in the registration of LNGOs and INGOs and assessment of their performance reports. Many NGOs might not know which ministries they should approach to start new projects. The local governments and authorities also require LNGOs report to them according to many NGO informants. NGOs have many responsibilities to write different reports and follow different processes and procedures required by the national and local government institutions, and their donors. Obviously, some government and NGO informants think that LNGOs seem not to take their responsibilities seriously to report to the government and provincial authorities. For example, informant GOV 07 claims:

“Only 20% of them have sent the annual report to the ministry because the NGOs and associations are confused about the process of reporting. In the MOU, they need to send the annual report to ministry of interior and make a copy to the provincial government where they are based. Because there is no legal framework and only MOU, the ministry cannot force them to report to us on the regular basis.”

5.5 Institutional Challenges to NGO Coordination

At the heart of NGO coordination issues are the institutional challenges of NCBs and NGOs in Cambodia. The institutional challenges are mainly the limited capacity of the NGO sector, including the coordination bodies. This will be analysed in the form of

overseeing and managing LNGO registration. However, the department has limited human and financial resources to work effectively, particularly to manage and maintain the LNGO database. Thus, with the structure from national, provincial, district to commune levels the ministry has not set restricted standards, particularly reporting (informant GOV 05). The local governments and authorities still do not know how many LNGOs operate in their regions.

limited capacity of NCBs and NGOs and problems of slow mobilisation impacting on the NGO coordination process.

5.5.1 Limited Capacity of NCBs and NGOs

NCBs face five key challenges: institutional management and structure, financial resources, fragmentation, collective voice, and slow implementation of the NGO Good Practice Project (NGO-GPP). Their challenges are also strongly associated with the limited capacity of NGOs as discussed below.

a) Institutional Management and Structure

Few NCBs, except for the CCC, NGOF and Medicam, have clear membership criteria, annual reports, by-laws, or long-term and medium strategic plans. Their organisational structure and management are hierarchical and evaluations are rare.

Most NCBs have limited capacity to work closely with LNGO members and non-members in provinces. They do not have provincial offices; thus, many members are based in Phnom Penh. Although they have decentralised work by sector through their working groups in recent years, particularly 2009, the monthly member and general assembly meetings are usually held in Phnom Penh. They rarely conduct seminars or meetings with members and NGOs in the provinces to directly scale up the capacity of LNGO members and non-members, where it is most needed. Poor communication between NCBs, NAs and LNGOs in provinces is widely accepted by informants. From the supply side, informant CSO 07 argues that: *“the information from national level is limited and is rarely conducted and when the CCC conducts the seminar it was not so clear as well because the CCC just briefly explained and not in details.”* Similarly from the demand side, the NCBs’ capacity *“to coordinate and to absorb the contents at the community level”* remains weak (Informant CSO 01).

Most NCBs are understaffed and have difficulty in attracting and retaining good staff or matching the salaries paid by other institutions. For instance, the CCC and NGOF are recruiting new staff to replace staff lost in 2007 and 2008 (CCC, 2007a, 2008a; NGOF, 2008). In some cases their coordination and advocacy rely greatly on external assistance

such as external advisors and volunteer advisors or internees. They need more qualified staff in information technology, policy analysis, advocacy and aid effectiveness. Indeed, informant CSO 01 gives the example that *“the person who is in charge in the process is only me and Mr. A who works for NGO B and his boss is less aware of aid effectiveness.”*

b) Finances

Few NCBs have fundraising development skills to get more financial resources to implement their projects. Based on the current foreign assistance climate and financial crisis, NCBs and NGOs face shrinking financial resources (the Cambodia Daily, 2009a). Thus, NCBs need to diversify their sources of funds away from donors and membership fees. Also, donors have paid less attention to the coordination work among NGOs but have instead channelled funds to specific sectors mentioned in section 5.2.2. Most of the NCBs' projects/activities are under-resourced, both in budget and labour. For example, the implementation of the NGO GPP has been relatively slow in the last four years because *“it is still limited in resources”* (informant CSO 05).

c) Fragmentation

Generally, one NGO carries out a number of activities in more than one sector. A number of informants from the government, development partners and NGOs realise that most of NGOs have similar or overlapping mandates and competition for donor funding is very intense. In terms of micro vision, informant GOV 01 states that *“it leads to duplication, overlapped activities and wastage of resources on transaction and administrative cost [...] because NGOs compete with each other for funding.”* Replication can be minimised if NGOs build a strong partnership with each other where they are based. As noted, the spirit of coordination and partnership among NGOs is new for Cambodians. Many people remain unaware of the importance of coordination and partnership building among their groups. Thus, the NGOs are *“very immature and often very ineffective”* (Informant CSO 05) in working together.

Fragmentation and duplication among NGOs' projects/activities raise huge concerns for NGOs and other actors. Informant DP 10 said *“their activities are very fragmented”*.

Consequently, the impact of their projects/activities is reduced. Informant CSO 01 accepted the fact that *“we do not have a clear-cut mechanism to avoid duplication projects in the NGO community.”* It is a very difficult job to make sure that the NGOs projects/activities are concentrated, coherent and coordinated. The approach of ‘avoiding project replication’ might exist only in theory rather than in practice due to the current social, political, institutional, and cultural context in the country.

d) Collective Voice

Further, most NCBs face a key challenge in mobilising their constituencies. NCBs have no authority to interfere in the internal work of any members. They must respect different interests, different views of members on specific issues and diversities of membership in the NGO community. In the NCB regular meetings, members might not participate every time (informant CSO 04) or may be passive participants and do not provide any useful and substantial comments. Thus, the objective of the meetings might not be achieved. For instance, informant CSO 03 says *“sometimes they don’t send a key person who is able to make any decision to participate in the meeting.”* The staff have no absolute rights to make any decisions on behalf of their executive directors. They just listen without expressing ideas on common issues because they are not aware of or do not understand information raised at the previous meeting. Moreover, NGO members, particularly LNGOs, are not often keen in searching for and learning about new types of knowledge; informant CSO 05 stresses that *“very seldom Cambodian NGOs are interested in good research-based policy, independent research-based evidence in their policies.”* Indeed, an NGO membership organisation that is strong depends on the active participation of its members. Specifically, informant DP 05 suggests that:

“...any coordinating body like that is as good as its members and the way to get better quality from coordinating bodies is to encourage the active involvement of members they get their strength from...that is a circular thing.”

Clearly collective voice is a key issue for NGO coordination as informant CSO 01 accepts that:

“The difficulty we are facing now is the mobilisation of collective voice because the level of understanding of NGO members and level of their engagement remain limited. Therefore, agreeing on the common issues from all members is a big challenge”

A number of informants strongly stressed that the NGO community, particularly NCBs, have not mobilised a single collective voice on certain issues, particularly a new NGO law. NCBs and NGOs have different ideas on common issues such as a process of drafting a new NGO law by the Cambodian government. Also, the way they work with their relevant stakeholders is different, shaped by their financial sources or sometimes foreign ideologies. Few advocacy NGOs and human rights NGOs are members of the NCBs engaging with the government. Many human rights NGOs are not the members of any NCBs. Their view on human rights issues was observed in the provincial NGO seminar. For example, some NCBs have jointly organised a number of workshops in provinces to gather collective views on the NGO law from LNGOs. Their joint NGO statement on NGO law has not yet been released to the government and the public. However, the human rights networks released to the newspapers and news websites their statements concerning the issues of substance and the process of drafting the new NGO law (the Cambodia Daily, 2009b; CHRAC, 2008). Informant CSO 05 says of NGOs that:

“they have no collective voice and many NGOs do not want a collective voice...they are not interested in coordination and in an effective collective voice.”

Additionally, many non-members of NCBs that are not invited to participate in the NGO coordination processes might have some good ideas and views on some specific issues concerning NGOs’ operations. Their input is not included in the NGO joint statements and other documents integrated and compiled by NCBs. Coordination work and mobilising the collective voice is a very challenging job.

e) Implementation of the NGO Good Practice Project (NGO-GPP)

Given the country’s short-term experience in democracy, the relatively rapid growth of NGOs reveals the infancy and immaturity of NGOs in Cambodia, particularly LNGOs since 1991. Based on the strong concerns over NGO effectiveness, in 2004 the

Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC) initiated the *Code of Ethical Principles and Minimum Standards for NGO and NGO Certificate*⁵⁵, comprising 25 points with indicators of each point (CCC, 2004, 2008c). The NGO Voluntary Certificate System is renewed every three years (ibid). It is very much a locally based initiative. All informants in this study applaud the great initiative that helps to build the effectiveness and governance of the NGO sector. However, NGO-GPP progress is very slow as few NGOs have received NGO certificates. There are a number of reasons including the nature of the growing and immature NGOs, limited financial resources and time, and a lack of awareness.

Firstly, NGOs are often weak institutions led by strong executive directors who were basically educated overseas with strong foreign ideologies. Based on the discussion in the workshop in one province, there is confusion over the implementation of NGO self-regulation and the new NGO law proposed by the government. The NGO community should seriously consider the political and cultural context and the roles of the government and civil society. Despite NGOs being non-governmental, non-political, non religious and not-for-profit entities, the government intends to regulate and coordinate NGOs working in Cambodia. Moreover, NGOs need to have their own self-regulation to become strong institutions.

Secondly, the implementation of the NGO-GPP is always associated with the human and financial resources and time required to upgrade the level of understanding among staff and implement changes. Specifically, the CCC has a limited budget to extend the programme and provide self-regulation training for NGOs, particularly provincial LNGOs. For example, informant CSO 05 stresses that *“it is still limited in resources... the number of NGOs that have reached compliance, and there is not enough awareness of it.”* The adoption of the NGO-GPP consumes time and resources to follow the process through 25 points. For instance, informant CSO 10 argues that *“We are not well prepared to follow all criteria of NGO best practice...I think that is not easy to get an NGO certificate and we need to have some resources and capable staff to do this job.”*

⁵⁵ The purpose of this project is to build effectiveness and governance over the entire NGO community in Cambodia. The project is supported by Australia, Spain, and INGOs such as ActionAid International, and Concern World Wide. The project will also lead to the establishment of a voluntary NGO certification system based on compliance with the Code of Ethical Principles and Minimum Standards for NGOs in Cambodia. Now it is in the second phase. (CCC, 2004, 2008a).

In some cases, NGOs might give up the implementation of the process due to the complications and other issues (informant GOV 02).

Finally, although the NGO-GPP project commenced in 2004, few NGOs have received a certificate, revealing the low awareness and understanding of the NGO-GPP. The CCC currently provides a capacity development programme⁵⁶ to LNGOs to promote awareness and understanding of the NGO-GPP nationwide. Not many LNGOs are interested in joining the training programme and committing themselves to pursue best practice for their own good. They basically concentrate on their own activities and organisation. For example, informant CSO 07 mentions:

“I have tried to convince LNGOs to join the training freely offered by CCC...there are several NGOs interested but many are so busy and not able to join the training and prepare the documents to implement NGO-GPP.”

5.5.2 Slow Mobilisation of NCB Members

In the last decade, the NCBs have made slow progress in expanding their membership and collective voice. They do not have the clear strategic approach of a business marketing strategy to attract either existing or new international and local NGOs. According to the desk review (See Appendix VI), about a quarter of the total NGOs (46% of total INGOs and 16% of total LNGOs) in Cambodia are members of the NCBs at the national level. Hence, most NGOs in Cambodia are not members of an NCB and NCBs are not fully representative. Informant CSO 01 mentions “*we don’t have a collective voice of NGO representatives in Cambodia.*” Thus, the issues are a lack of awareness of NGO coordination, a lack of interest, time constraint and scarcity of financial resources.

⁵⁶ The programme consists of six rounds of training courses in provinces, commencing 25 May, 2009 to 08 April, 2010. The training courses are conducted in four days by CCC staff and are free of charge to LNGOs. The programme’s curriculum includes organisation policies and board development, effective human resource management, sound financial and administrative management, monitoring and evaluation, and organisational strategic planning (CCC, 2009).

a) A lack of Awareness

Most informants from the Cambodian government, donors and NGOs in this study agreed that awareness of NGO coordination, cooperation and partnership is very limited. The concept of coordination, partnership and coalition is very new for Cambodia and Cambodians. Social capital grows very slowly in Cambodia. Although the level of education has increased in the last decade, the number of people that have a higher education is miniscule (World Bank, 2009a). At the provincial NGO seminar, many were passive participants and did not express and share ideas and information or did not trust other participants as they do not know them well enough. It reveals that the capacity of NGO staff in provinces is low; it is difficult to attract skilled staff to work outside the capital due poor rural infrastructure and social interaction.

In terms of external causes, many NGO staff (LNGOs) have not been well trained as development practitioners. They have limited access to information and training in a number of skills, particularly the importance of NGO coordination, partnership and alliance. For example, during the provincial NGO seminar many LNGO participants did not know clearly the roles of NCBs and how they work to improve the effectiveness of the NGO sector and boost the NGO reputation with government and donors. LNGO informants indicate that NCBs rarely conduct workshops and events to build the capacity of LNGOs in provinces. Therefore, the provincial NGOs are weak and their staff have a limited level of understanding of their roles, activities, their operations, and the partnership and coordination required to achieve the NGOs' common goals, values and a collective voice.

Individual benefits win out over the common interest and benefit of the entire NGO sector. Many NGOs, particularly LNGOs, think that they should receive substantial benefits from NCBs when they join. For example, informant CSO 06 points out that *"I don't want to join because I don't know what benefit I have from joining these organisations."* Some LNGOs seek funding from NCBs due to the tough funding competition in Cambodia, yet NCBs are not able to provide funds to their members as they are not funding bodies (Informant CSO 02). In other cases, members might withdraw their membership when they think they do not benefit from NCBs (Informant CSO 02).

b) Lack of Interest

According to many informants, a lack of interest in becoming members of the NCBs is a common issue among Cambodian NGOs. Informant CSO 07, who is very knowledgeable and clearly understood the process of NGO alliances, expresses that “*we are not interested and concerned about this.*” Some of the reasons for the lack of interest include “*competition, territoriality, duplication, confusion, voice, and incredible demand of the Cambodian government and other Cambodian NGOs...because of conflicting interests and different systems and agendas*” (Informant CSO 05). Other members might not express any ideas on the common issues if they think that there might be negative consequences (Informant CSO 04). Many NGOs desire to work independently as they want to maintain their autonomy. Thus, these factors prevent them from being part of NCBs.

c) Time Constraint

As Stremlau (1987) and Bennett (2000) observe, participating in the coordination process consumes the time of members. Members of NCBs are required to participate in the monthly members meeting and to be active and share information to others members. However, NGOs are tied up with their daily operations, upward and downward accountability with their donors and communities and social accountability with the government and local authorities. NGOs are very concerned about their funding sources and survival. Accountably and transparently, they spend more time in writing proposals and different reports with different fiscal years to donors and INGOs (according to most informants). Also, they allocate time with communities they serve and collect information from them. Therefore, they do not have much time to learn about and search out new approaches and to think about common issues. In some cases, they feel that they might not be active members and could not contribute to the NCBs’ meetings as much as they would like. For example, LNGOs that have limited knowledge of advocacy work and are situated in remote provinces cannot afford to spend time travelling to the city to participate in the NCBs’ meeting due poor infrastructure and transport. For example, informant CSO 08 mentions that “*we are based in this province and very far away from Phnom Penh city.*” Thus, they would

rather concentrate on work to accomplish their organisation's goals, and search for future funding.

d) Scarcity of Financial Resources

Coordination work also consumes financial resources as Streamlau (1978) and Bennett (2000) argue. NGO members need to pay membership fees to NCBs. However, NGOs, particularly LNGOs, might only have the budget to implement their projects and activities, and not money for membership fees. The key informants of this study agreed that there is increasing competition among NGOs in Cambodia. NGOs, especially LNGOs, receive small and insufficient budgets from their donors with many conditions and requirements. Specifically, informant CSO 09 argues that

“Sometimes we think that it is almost unacceptable and we don't have choice...annually we compete strongly with each other for funding...that is a great challenge.”

Many NGOs, particularly LNGOs, have no expense items besides the items agreed under the MOU signed with their donors for specific activities. They cannot afford to pay for annual membership fees. For example, informant CSO 02 indicates that

“NGOs face difficulty in joining NGO umbrellas...due to lack of closer relationships, shortage of financial resources... Some NGOs still cannot afford to pay the membership fee.”

Existing members of NCBs, mostly INGOs accounting for 45% of total INGOs, have sufficient funds to pay membership fees. Some have joined more than one NCB as they target different sectors. However, only 16% of all LNGOs join NCBs and the rest might not have the resources to be members (See Appendix VI). Thus, membership fees might limit NGOs, particularly LNGOs in joining NCBs.

Long distances and poor communication make it difficult for LNGOs based in remote provinces to establish working relationships. Although they may understand and they are aware of the NGO coordination, they cannot be active members. They are not often able to actively participate because executive directors or assigned staff cannot afford

travelling costs⁵⁷ to participate in the NCBs' meetings. Therefore, they are likely to cut costs on other activities such as cooperation and put more resources into core plan/activities.

Cambodia's physical infrastructure is slowly developing after two decades of war and internal conflicts. Except for mobile phones, communication facilities like landline telephones and internet access in the provinces are unreliable, poor quality and expensive for LNGOs to invest in. This makes it difficult for them to access updated information about coordination efforts, partnership and development.

5.6 A Weak Systematic NGO Coordination Processes

Respondents indicate that there is a weak systematic NGO coordination process in place in Cambodia. This is the result of the limited capacity of NCBs, NAs and their members and poor partnership between them. It is a common issue caused by limited resources. Moreover, NCBs and NGOs are heavily dependent on external assistance due to a lack of alternative income such as strong membership fees. The current NGO coordination process is often done only at the national level through forming specific meetings with powerful INGO and LNGO members of NCBs. The process is also done on an ad hoc basis between the national and the provincial levels. The coordination work often takes a long time to achieve a goal with a series of meetings. For example, the process of formulation of a joint NGO statement on certain issues is firstly developed at the national level. The joint NGO statement is signed by participating NGOs in Phnom Penh and then NGOs in provinces are later asked to look at a joint NGO statement for endorsement. This is '*a top down approach*' that is well structured and organised. However this approach does not empower LNGO participants to express their views on certain issues. It can lead to ineffectiveness. For instance, during a provincial seminar, some LNGOs expressed the concerns on wording and some meanings of the statement and they wanted to revise parts of it. There was a lot of confusion in the meeting and many LNGOs were hesitant to sign the agreement and some of them felt that they had no absolute right to make the decision. Moreover, this approach is contradictory to what NGOs including executive directors and staff are familiar with: the '*bottom-up*

⁵⁷ Travelling costs might include transport costs, accommodation and per-diem expenses.

approach'. LNGOs use this approach to carry out their activities and gather factual information for advocacy work from the local community because they empower people to speak and express their concerns. LNGOs are the real implementers and they have more accurate local, factual information than NCBs and NGOs at the national level.

Furthermore, NGO members, particularly LNGOs, are not enthusiastic about building the connection and partnership between the national and local levels. For instance, informant CSO 07 strongly stresses that

"we always complain about the government but we have not done very well in terms of NGO coordination among ourselves...NGOs in provinces try to survive by themselves and LNGOs don't often make the regular working relationship with the NGOs at the national level. They have all made the same mistake in this case."

5.7 Conclusion

NGOs have been the key actors in rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of Cambodia since the fall of the Khmer Rouge. Specifically, NGO coordination roles have been successfully pursued by NGOs, particularly NCBs. Due to the rapid growth of INGOs and LNGOs in the country, there is a rising concern over their effectiveness and NGO coordination efforts between the national and provincial levels. Their challenges are weak institutions, slow mobilisation of NGO members, and a weak systematic NGO coordination, resulting in no collective voice, slow implementation of NGO GPP, fragmentation and replication of NGO projects/activities and poor working relationships with the Cambodian government. NCBs need to play stronger roles in building the image of the NGO community and promoting NGO professionalism; if they did this, NGOs would find it easier to attract more funds from donors and gain more political space from the government for advocacy and policy influencing. NCBs need to build the capacity of their own organisations as well as members, and in particular strengthen provincial NGO coordination. At the same time, donors need to provide support to keep this concept alive while the government and authorities can enable a friendly environment for NCBs and particularly NAs to grow.

Chapter VI: NGO Coordination Efforts and the Changing Aid Environment

6.1 Introduction

This chapter further explores research questions 1 and 3 (See Section 1.3), describing how NGOs/NGO representatives played their roles and engaged in the aid structures in Cambodia before and after the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness as well as the Accra Agenda for Action. There are two main sections in this chapter. The first section portrays international aid jointly financed by the donors and INGOs and their roles and involvement in unstructured aid coordination between 1991 and 2004. The second section discusses the positions, roles and responsibility of the NGO representatives in the current aid coordination mechanisms developed after 2004.

6.2 The NGO Coordination Efforts and the Aid Architecture: 1991-2004

NGOs played a critical role after the Paris Peace Accord in 1991 and the arrival of UNTAC in 1992. Donors channelled funds through NGOs, particularly INGOs to provide basic service deliveries to the poor. In 1992, the Ministerial Conference for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia (MCRRC⁵⁸) was held in Japan to discuss how to aid Cambodia, and it established the International Committee for Rehabilitation of Cambodia (ICORC) based on the Tokyo Declaration on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia (Peou and Yamada, 2000). The ICORC was a consultative body for donors to provide Cambodia with financial and technical resources for social and economic recovery and to respect Cambodia's sovereignty, priorities and institutional and absorptive capacity (ibid). The ICORC and the Declaration formed an aid framework for Cambodian reconstruction and placed emphasis on reconstruction issues⁵⁹ (Tith, 1998). Due to the lack of a government aid

⁵⁸ The MCRRC was hosted by the Government of Japan on June 21-22, 1992 and co-chaired by Japan and UNDP. The conference comprised bilateral and multilateral donors, the Cambodian government (note that the SOC was not legitimate before the first national election held in 1993), and the NGO representatives including the Cambodian Development Research Institute, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and International Organisation for Immigration (IOM) (Peou and Yamada, 2000; Peou, 2000; CDC/CRDB, 2006j, CCC, 2007a).

⁵⁹ The development of reconstruction issues were the provision of basic needs: security, health care, housing, education and training, and transportation as well as the restoration of Cambodia's existing infrastructure and public utilities (Tith, 1998).

coordination body, the ICORC⁶⁰ served as a body for coordinating the medium and long-term official assistance to Cambodia (Peou and Yamada, 2000). The roles of NGO representatives and NCBs were apparent in sharing information (on humanitarian needs and reconstruction) with the government. The ICORC meetings were held from 1993 to 1995 switching locations between Japan and Paris (See Figure 6.1). Reliable national statistics⁶¹ were not available for donors to build need-oriented aid projects and policies (Peou and Yamada, 2000). Many INGOs were acting as both donors and implementer, having as much influence as donors when they financially and technically supported aid reconstruction and coordination, particularly in health and education. The Cambodian government was marginalised in its own national development.

The development aid to Cambodia was relatively small between 1991 and 1994 as it was delayed by several factors (Forman and Patrick, 2000). Those factors were a lack of understanding of socio-economic and cultural contexts and political conditions, uncertainty of the transitional situation, donors' ownership of projects, a lack of donor harmonisation and country aid coordination mechanism, insufficient local human resources and weak government structures and systems (ibid). Indeed, most donors' and INGO's staff were dominated by foreigners who could not understand the language and the Cambodian socio-economic and cultural contexts (Mysliwiec, 2004). Specifically, there was less consultation on projects (including project design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation) among NGOs, the Cambodian government, donors and communities (ibid). This was because NGOs lacked expertise and institutional capacity to handle aid deliveries and sometimes clashed with donors' development philosophies (Peou and Yamada, 2000). NGOs were also part of the problem in hindering aid disbursement as NGOs' budgets were underspent (Peou and Yamada, 2000). There was no or very little mutual accountability between donors and the Cambodian government and between donors and NGOs. Many donors and INGOs implemented their projects

⁶⁰The ICORC was expected to provide the forum for all stakeholders to coordinate and share all information among themselves and with the Cambodian government and authorities. The ICORC was also expected to encourage an enabling environment for the Government of Cambodia to develop and facilitate its planning and aid requirement and priorities, to be financed by donors and NGOs. The donors and NGOs consulted and advised the Cambodian counterparts on development priorities and requirements for setting their committed aid levels and priorities for Cambodia. The ICORC was to provide the Cambodian government with an opportunity to develop an institutional economic and social planning and aid management capacity necessary for the successful implementation of the reconstruction programmes (Peou and Yamada, 2000, p.71).

⁶¹ The national statistics include the national account, human development index, consumer price index, budgetary and employment statistics and others (ibid).

largely bypassing government structures (CDC/CRDB, 2000a; Mysliwiec, 2004). This impeded the harmonisation efforts between donors and INGOs. Therefore, within the context of fragmented and duplicated aid efforts, aid competition with high related impacts on some sectors (the sectors reflected the donor's identity, profile and territoriality), the weak capacity of NCBs and their duplication roles, NGO coordination efforts were weak. This consequently contributed to weakness of the NGO sector, including a decline in reaching the poor, donor-driven, incoherent projects, a lack of local participation in the process of decision making, absence of legal framework and professional deficit (ADB, 1999).

There were no national plans to guide development assistance until 1994, when the new Cambodian government, with co-prime ministers from the first national election, announced the National Programmes for Reconstruction and Development of Cambodia, and the plan was approved by the National Assembly. The Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) established the Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board at the Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC/CRDB⁶²) in 1994 as the national aid coordinator acting as focal point between donors, line ministries and NGOs (CDC/CRDB, 2006c) (See Appendix VIII). With support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) through the Aid Coordination and Management Programme⁶³, the CDC/CRDB was able to gradually fulfil its mandates and functions, to initiate an aid management framework with the consensus of line ministries, to allocate external assistance to priority sectors through policy dialogue with donors and to initially build government-donor partnerships (ibid). The aid management

⁶² This new government institution lacked competent and skilled staff and institutional knowledge to effectively perform its roles and functions. The staff were seconded from other line ministries and their professional backgrounds varied. At an early stage, the staff lacked English language skills and special skills in managing and administering projects and programmes. The aid coordination work was very reliant on long-term external advisors based at CDC/CRDB.

⁶³ The Aid Coordination and Management Programme consists of three phases. The first two phases 1995-2000 and 2001-2005 were solely supported by UNDP. The third phase of the programme namely the Multi- Support Programme for Aid Coordination and Management 2005-2010, was financed by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and UNDP. The programme has provided a quality and quantity of (long-term and short-term) aid advisory services, technical manpower, logistical support and other services to strengthen the institutional capacity of CDC/CRDB to perform and operate its mandates and functions (CDC/CRDB, 2005a, 2007d). The programme also aims at helping the CDC/CRDB in establishing an aid management framework through enhancing partnerships and coordination with key relevant line ministries, improving external assistance mobilisation, and programming, monitoring and evaluating development cooperation (ibid). Moreover, it has assisted the CDC/CRDB to effectively locate aid resources for prioritised sectors through policy debate with DPs and to develop government-donor partnerships (ibid).

framework or Operational Framework for Development Cooperation Partnerships mainly emphasised the trust and partnership⁶⁴ building and joint development responsibilities between the RGC and donors (CDC/CRDB, 2000a, 2001a).

Between 1996 and 2001, the ICORC was replaced by Consultative Group (CG) meetings that were convened in Paris and Tokyo and were co-chaired by the host donors and the World Bank (See Figure 6.1). During this period the country aid mechanisms and structures were moving away from ‘donor-ship’ to ‘government ownership’ (CDC/CRDB, 2001a). These efforts occurred in a transitional period enabling the CRDB to take some ownership and leadership in aid coordination to strengthen its performance and mandates. However, the mechanisms were weak and remained driven by donors (CDC/CRDB, 2004c). The government’s policies and strategies⁶⁵ were often written by foreign advisors through donors’ technical assistance⁶⁶ (Peou and Yamada, 2000; CDC/CRDB, 2001b; Godfrey et al. 2002; Mysliwicz, 2004). NGO representatives participated in the CG meeting and circulated documents and contributed to providing inputs to national and sector policies and NGO disbursement (See Table 6.1). They maintained their roles and positions in the CG meetings such as the ICORC, acting as donors and aid recipients and having equal influence on the side of donors.

⁶⁴ Achievements of Operational Framework for Development Cooperation Partnerships have included (i) establishing a partnership focal point within Government; (ii) securing broad-based Government acceptance and establishment of procedures/guidelines for national-level partnerships; (iii) securing broad-based donor acceptance and establishment of procedures/guidelines for government-donor partnerships; (iv) arriving at a general agreement on the operational framework; and (v) starting pilot implementation programmes (CDC/CRDB, 2001a, 2002a, 2004e).

⁶⁵ The key government documents during that period were the first Socio-Economic Development Plan, 1996-2000 (SEDP-I). That was followed by a 2nd Socio-Economic Development Plan, 2001-2005 (SEDP-II) and a Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), Operational Framework for Development Cooperation Partnerships, A New Development Cooperation Partnership Paradigm for Cambodia, the CG position papers, and Development Cooperation Reports (CDC/CRDB, 2000a, 2001a, and 2001b).

⁶⁶ Technical assistance (TA) has formed a large part of total ODA to Cambodia. The TA has both positive and negative impact on development and aid practice. Positively, the TA builds the capacity of the Cambodian government officials and NGO staff through overseas/in country training, studies and workshops. The TA can be replaced by the developed strong capacity of local staff in one place (Godfrey et al., 2002; Mysliwicz, 2004). However, there are problems where the TA takes place and it is translated into a different practice by team leaders, local staff and senior management. For example, a team leader often considers their role as manager rather than facilitator and trainer. Senior government officials prefer the TA experts or advisors to do tasks such as writing official letters, speeches, reports, laws, and advising the ministers, rather than developing capacity locally to do the job (Godfrey et al., 2002). The senior government officials prefer the TA as a means to have a better working environment such as the provision of materials and equipment (CDC/CRDB, 2004c). Government officials seek opportunities to work in TA projects, getting benefits including salary supplements (CDC/CRDB, 2004c), gaining more knowledge for their future career, training overseas by obtaining per-diem and travelling costs (my observation from working in CDC/CRDB). This practice undermines good aid practice and the capacity building of the government in the long-term.

Figure 6.1: Transformative Processes of Aid Coordination



Note: * the 1st ICORC meeting was chaired by France and Facilitated by UNDP

** the 1st CG meeting was co-chaired by Japan and the World Bank

NGO representatives attended some of the Government-Donor-NGO sector working group meetings, particularly in the health and education sectors where NGO representatives/NCBs are active and many LNGOs and INGOs have worked. Specifically, the NGO Education Partnership (NEP) was created with strong support from the RGC and donors, and was the outcome of Education Sector Working Group meetings to coordinate NGO activities⁶⁷ (CDC/CRDB, 2001a). The NEP was invited to regularly attend the Working Group, and jointly and independently appraise and review the education documents⁶⁸ (ibid).

The government urged donors and NGOs to build their systematic capacity to accelerate the process. The government also complained that donor and NGOs continued to carry out their projects using their parallel systems and avoiding the government systems ((CDC/CRDB, 2000a, 2001a, Godfrey et al. 2002). This leads to high transaction costs and low accountability. For example, NGOs consumed more than 50% of the total technical assistance provided by donors (CDC/CRDB, 2004a, 2004c, 2004d).

⁶⁷ During that period, the perceived missions, mandates and priorities of education sector NGOs were fragmented and diverse, and achieving a shared and common view of the role of NGO partners was still embryonic (CDC/CRDB, 2001, p.9).

⁶⁸ The documents that resulted from key milestones in the partnership development process were 1) the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (MOEYS)/Donor/NGO Statement of Intent; 2) the formulation of an initial policy, strategy and financing paper: Equity, Quality and Efficiency in Education Financing; 3) the Education Strategic Analysis; 4) the Education Strategic Plan 2001-2005; 5) New Principles for Education Partnership; 6) agreed joint MOEYS/donor/NGO guidelines for review and appraisal of the ESP and the Education Sector Support Programme (ESSP) 2001–2005 (CDC/CRDB, 2001a, p.7).

Table 6.1: Summary of NGO Engagement (Position, Inputs and Issues) Analysis in Aid Coordination Mechanisms

Aid Coordination Forums	NGO Representatives' Position	NGO Inputs	
		National/Policy Level (Joint NGO Statement)	Sector/Technical level
Ministerial Conference for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia (MCRRC)-1992	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acting as donors and aid recipients (implementers/executive agencies) Equal influence as donors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Financial and technical support on aid reconstruction and coordination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Financial and technical support on aid reconstruction and coordination, particularly in health and education sectors
1 st -3 rd International Committee for Rehabilitation of Cambodia (ICORC) Meeting: 1993-1995	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acting as donors and aid recipients (implementers/executive agencies) Equal influence as donors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Financial and technical support on aid reconstruction and coordination and development NGO Pledging statement (13 sector group papers) Absorptive capacity Rural Poverty Alleviation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Financial and technical support in social development sectors, particularly health sector Improving the level of understanding of the people about democratisation and human rights, particularly in rural areas
1 st -5 th Consultative Group Meeting (CG): 1996-2001	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acting as donors and aid recipients (implementers/executive agencies) Equal influence as donors Representing civil society in CG, semi-annual policy dialogue and Government-Donor sector working group meetings, particularly in health and education, gender, mine action (Medicam and Educam) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Spreading joint NGO statement on 'Towards Genuine Partnership' NGO Strategies for development in Cambodia 1996-2000 (11 sector group papers) in CG meeting and other focus such as rural political stability, human resource development, human rights, rule of law and good governance Producing two case studies on aid coordination conducted by Medicam and Educam) Many NGOs based in Phnom Penh and some provinces have provided their operational and budget records to CDC/CRDB for NGO Disbursement. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Aid Coordination (two case studies conducted by Medicam and Educam) Contributing to conduct two case studies for improvement of good practice in aid coordination and development cooperation Constructing policy in implementing sector reforms such as health, education, gender, mine actions (Medicam, Educam and other NGOs)
6 th -8 th Consultative Group Meeting (CG):2002-2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acting more as aid recipients (implementers/executive agencies) and advocates and watchdogs Less influence and not an equal partner at the table Representing civil society in the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Circulating joint NGO statement on good governance, rule of law, rural livelihoods, agriculture and natural resource management in CG meetings Providing inputs for national policy formation such as National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS), National Strategic Development Plan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Contributing to policy formulation for implementing sector reforms such as health, education, gender, mine actions, decentralisation and deconcentration, agriculture, forestry and environment and others Overseeing and evaluating the implementation

Aid Coordination Forums	NGO Representatives' Position	NGO Inputs	
		National/Policy Level (Joint NGO Statement)	Sector/Technical level
	CG, GDCC and some of 18 TWGs meetings <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Controversial roles (stakeholders, partners, observers and/or resources) 	(NSDP) and Cambodian Millennium Development Goals (CMDGs) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Many NGOs based in Phnom Penh and some provinces have provided their operational and budget records to CDC/CRDB for NGO Disbursement. 	of sector reforms such as human rights and gender, legal and judicial reform, anti-corruption, land encroachment
1 st -2 nd Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF): 2007-2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acting more as aid recipients (implementers/executive agencies) and advocates and watchdogs Representing civil society in the CDCF, GDCC and 15 out of 19 TWGs meetings Proposing five roles as government partners and stakeholders but having little influence and power at the table 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Releasing joint NGO statement focusing on natural and human resource management, monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of NSDP, good governance, enhancement of agriculture sector and private sector development, environment for the Implementation of the Rectangular Strategy Continually providing NGO disbursement data and information for NGO database to CDC/CRDB 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitoring and evaluating the implementation of aid effectiveness agenda such as action plan H-A-R and JMIs and NSDP. Overseeing the national budget monitoring and public revenue carried out by NGOF Monitoring public expenditures by sector, particularly health and education by Medicam and NEP Providing public oversight including commune monitoring committees, citizen rating report and parliamentary monitoring and corruption studies by NGOs

Sources: Peou and Yamada, 2000; Peou, 2000; Nagasu, 2004; CDC/CRDB, 2000a, 2001a, 2002a, 2002c, 2004a, 2004c, 2004e, 2006b, 2006c, 2006f, 2006g, 2006h, 2006i, 2007a, 2008d, 2008f, 2009b; MOP, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005; CCC, 2007a; Hun, 2009; World Bank, 2009d.

These claims were clearly addressed in two studies commissioned by the government, namely (i) Capacity Building Practices of Cambodia's Development Partners⁶⁹ and (ii) Practices and Lessons Learned in the Management of Development Cooperation⁷⁰. NGOs and NCBs contributed to the first study through gathering and analysing data from 77 participating NGOs. This reveals that NGOs and NCBs tended to improve aid coordination in Cambodia.

From 2002 to 2004 the aid coordination processes were more driven by the government as the CG meetings were held in Phnom Penh and co-chaired by the World Bank and the government. This progress was the outcome of the partnership building⁷¹ among the government, donors and NGOs. The aid coordination processes were restructured by the government through Prime Minister Hun Sen giving permission and direction in September 2004. The restructured processes comprise three key forums: the Consultative Group meeting that later was renamed the Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF⁷²), the Government-Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC⁷³), and the Joint Government-Donor Technical Working Group (TWGs⁷⁴). This

⁶⁹ Capacity building practices of Cambodia's development partners including NGOs provides factual and detailed analytical information on expenditures on five capacity building activities, including the number and costs of deploying national and international advisor/consultants to support the implementation of the programme and/or to fill capacity gaps in Cambodia (CRDB/CDC, 2004b). Based on this study, the action plan resulting from the discussions between Council for Administration of Cambodia with development partners has been implemented (CRDB, 2007a, 2007b).

⁷⁰ The Practices and Lessons Learned in the Management of Development Cooperation paper documents lessons from experiences in jointly formulating, reviewing and implementing sector and cross-sector programmes/projects and programme-based approaches (PBA)/Sector Wide Approaches (SWAs) in the Education, Health, Local Governance, and Public Finance Sector (CRDB/CDC, 2004a).

⁷¹ The partnership building was strengthened through implementation of A New Development Cooperation Partnership Paradigm for Cambodia, covering five principles and seven strategic implementation considerations. The five principles are a) a common vision and shared objectives; b) agreed governance and accountability structures; c) harmonised strategic management and operational capacities; d) learning and adaptation capacities; and e) building and maintaining trust (CDC/CRDB, 2004a, 2004e). The seven strategic implementation considerations are a) ownership, commitment and shared resources; b) flexible partnership modalities; c) starting gradually, getting priorities right and using pilots; d) identifying and differentiating partner roles; e) developing national (in-country) coordination capacities; f) strengthening external donor capacities for aid management and coordination; and g) implications for good governance and administrative reform (CDC/CRDB, 2004c, p.3-4). It also provided structure for conceptual understanding and implementation options for building partnership with development partners to achieve the Cambodian development goals (CMDGs).

⁷² Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF) chaired by the Royal Government of Cambodia has been transformed from the Consultative Group (CG) meeting held in 2007. The CDCF is a high level policy forum where government (ministers), civil society organisations (NGOs) and head delegations of donor agencies annually discuss and agree an agenda for development assistance and cooperation to Cambodia (CDC/CRDB, 2006c, 2006f, 2006g).

⁷³ The Government-Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC) is chaired by the Senior Minister of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and the First Vice-Chairman of CDC with co-facilitators from the World Bank and UNDP. The membership of GDCC includes ministers and heads of

aims at building partnership enhancement among the government, donors and NGOs in carrying out and evaluating the government's sector reforms. The NGO representatives' participation in the CG meetings continued and extended in the GDCC meeting to include members of some of 18 TWGs including health, education, gender issues and decentralisation and deconcentration (CDC/CDRB, 2004a). However, the involvement of NGO representatives in other TWGs was invisible as it was just the early stage of development of the new aid coordination mechanisms. Indeed, their involvement seemed unclear as NGO representatives can be invited to be part of the TWGs when necessary (ibid). Although NGO representatives were placed on the side of donors, their roles and position were more aid recipients with less influence, and they were unequal partners in the forums. However, they played more active roles as advocates and watchdogs through releasing the Joint NGO Statement and provided inputs for policy formulation and oversight of the implementation of sector reforms (see Table 6.1).

6.3 The Roles of NGO Representatives in the Current Cambodia Aid Coordination Mechanisms 2005-2009

6.3.1 NGOs and Aid Effectiveness Agenda

a) The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness

As mentioned, the development of the Cambodian aid coordination mechanisms follows the standards and best practice guided by the OECD's guidelines and procedures. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness that was signed by development partners (DPs) and country governments was put into force in 2005. The declaration principles are a means to improve aid coordination and management. After restructuring the in-country aid coordination mechanism, the RGC localised the declaration into 'the Declaration by

government agencies, ambassadors or heads of diplomatic missions, and country representatives of multilateral institutions. The GDCC meeting is a quarterly forum to provide policy guidance, to identify priorities, and to resolve issues raised by the TWGs. The GDCC secretariat is located in CRDB/CDC under the daily management of the Secretary General (ibid).

⁷⁴ The joint government-donor technical working groups (TWGs): There were 18 TWGs in 2005; one more TWG was additionally established, the total reaching 19 TWGs (See Appendix IV). The quarterly TWG meetings are chaired by a senior Royal Government official to bring about national ownership on their respective sector and represented by lead donor coordinators or facilitators. One or two donors are chosen to be facilitator or co-facilitators in the TWG. Their roles and tasks are to identify, prioritise and sequence their activities through formulating their own action plan to coordinate external support with an agreed set of priorities based on perceived need, available resources and existing capacity (ibid).

the Royal Government of Cambodia and Development Partners on Enhancing Aid Effectiveness' in late 2006, supported by 14 donors⁷⁵ (CDC/CRDB, 2006h). The outcome of the Cambodian declaration was RGC's Action Plan on Harmonisation, Alignment and Results: 2006-2010 (Action Plan H-A-R), covering 12 indicators and a number of activities with milestones and baselines (See CDC/CRDB, 2007b).

The RGC has continually developed and updated the Action Plan that is jointly reviewed and assessed by stakeholders annually. The RGC's Strategic Framework for Development Cooperation Management⁷⁶, the National Operational Guidelines for grant assistance⁷⁷ and the Standard Operating Procedures for loan assistance⁷⁸ were approved and implemented by the RGC and DPs. Cambodia has been chosen for OECD's Aid Effectiveness Survey⁷⁹ based on the rapid development of the government's ownership and leadership in coordinating and managing development cooperation in 2006 and 2008 (action plans, working groups and review processes) to guide implementation and evaluation of aid. The Cambodian aid effectiveness plans have brought about substantial positive changes with growing government ownership and leadership.

Conversely, as discussed in section 2.4, the NGO engagement in the PD was not apparent because NGO representatives were not signatories of the Cambodia declaration

⁷⁵ 14 donors are ADB, Australia, Canada, Denmark, the European Union, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, the UNDP, the UK, the US and the World Bank (CDC/CRDB, 2006h).

⁷⁶ RGC's Strategic Framework for Development Cooperation Management aims to improve aid effectiveness to maximise its benefits for the people of Cambodia through strengthened national systems and procedures, and aid coordination and resource mobilisation mechanisms that are based on principles of Cambodian leadership, ownership, and mutual accountability to achieve RGC's Rectangular Strategy's goals, and the priorities of the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) to reduce poverty and to achieve CMDGs (CRDB/CDC, 2006c, p.7)

⁷⁷ National Operational Guidelines for Development Cooperation: Grant Assistance is developed to set out policies and operational procedures for planning and management of the implementation of development cooperation activities. It is based on concepts embodied in the OECD/DAC Good Practices Papers and best over the last decade (CRDB/CDC, 2006j).

⁷⁸ Standard Operating Procedures for loan assistance (SOP) were approved by the RGC and supported by donors, particularly the World Bank and the ADB, aiming to effectively and efficiently manage and administer loan projects and clarify the government institutional roles, responsibilities, accountability and procedures between the relevant government institutions and staff. The other objectives of the SOP are to maximise the social and economic outcomes and minimise negative impacts of external loan projects/programmes for the benefits of the Cambodian people in the framework of the country ownership (MEF, 2005).

⁷⁹ The OECD's Aid Effectiveness Survey was conducted and managed by the OECD/ Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and it was co-chaired by Viet Nam and the UK with support from Austria, Cambodia, Canada, European Commission, France, Germany, Ghana, Mali, Nicaragua, Norway, Senegal, South Africa, UNDP, United States and World Bank. There were also 23 partner countries and 23 bilateral donors and several multilateral institutions participating in the progress report for the Accra High Level Forum in 2008 (CDC/CRDB, 2006b).

nor even observers and not involved with the Action Plan H-A-R (NGOF, 2008b). Indeed, NGO representatives' roles have not been clarified at policy or technical levels.

b) Accra Agenda for Action


As noted in section 2.4, the AAA provides the global framework to extend the participation and engagement of NGO representatives in inclusive policy dialogue on development and aid effectiveness at the global and country levels. The AAA seeks an improvement of NGO coordination efforts with government programmes, enhancement of NGO accountability and outcomes and acceleration of NGO information sharing with the government. Thus, the role of NGO representatives must be as 'central players' and 'development actors in their own right' under the AAA (OECD, 2008b). However, the commitments and promises, particularly at paragraph 20 in the AAA, have not been transformed into action at the country level and it is too early to judge interaction among the government and donors toward NGO representatives' roles and political space.

The NGO representatives' roles at both political and technical levels have remained under-discussed due to the absence of a genuine dialogue between the Cambodian government and NGO representatives. Their roles and political space are not sufficiently clear. These issues will be discussed in the following sections.

6.3.2 NGO Coordination Processes and Engagement at National Level

NGO coordination in the aid processes has been conducted since 1992 and it has evolved over time. Most field research informants in this study believe that the presence of NGO representatives in the aid coordination process is very important and necessary. Yet only three NGO representatives attended the last Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF) (out of 239 participants 137 were from government and 98 from donors) (CDC/CRDB, 2008i).

Figure 6.2: Structure of the Cambodian Aid Coordination Mechanisms



Sources: (CDC/CRDB, 2006c, 2006g, 2006h, 2006j)

And seven NGO representatives (out of 147 participants: 71 from government and 69 from donors) participated in the last Government-Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC) (CDC/CRDB, 2009b) while a number of NGO representatives participated in 15 TWGs (See Box 6.1 and Appendix III).

The Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC), NGO Forum (NGOF) and Medicam are the three key NGO representatives at the CDCF and GDCC meetings. Annually, CCC, NGO Forum and Medicam select capable and competent members to participate in the meetings to be representatives for civil society. NGO representatives/NGOs have their own process to gather and coordinate information from all parts of Cambodia to produce the NGO Position Paper and Joint NGO statements. NGO reports on the thematic issues and sectors are also widely distributed to different stakeholders before and during the meetings of the CDCF and GDCC. They have made impressive progress in recent years, particularly at the last CDCF meeting.

NGO representatives use their own 34 working groups across the sectors and thematic issues (Informant CSO 01). The CCC, NGOF, Medicam and NEP organise workshops separately to gather information and build a collective voice from members and non-NGOs. They call for NGO alliances by sectors and provinces to collect information on certain thematic issues and send it to the national level. Then they compile the information into one paper. The executive summary of the NGO paper reflects the key issues related to the CDCF's and GDCC's agenda. The final draft of the executive summary is shared back to NGOs for feedback before publication and circulation. NGOs work collectively among their groups and they work separately from the government and donors.

The roles of NGOs have changed slightly due to the direction and movement of the global aid system, particularly donors' policies and priorities in giving aid to developing countries such as Cambodia. Since the adoption of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, the donors' systems and structures have also developed. The donors aim to strengthen public services and governance systems of the recipient governments. The change in role of civil society as service providers is apparent when its funding shrinks due to the global financial crisis and a change in donors' priorities, and improvement in public services (See section 5.2). Their role is just temporary where the government

public services and systems are weak and unreliable and the public services do not reach the poor and vulnerable groups.

However, their roles as watchdogs and advocates are more important now. Many donors have set their own policy toward improving good governance, democratisation and human rights (See section 5.2). Therefore, the available funds for these sectors becomes wider and donors mostly channel the resources to NGOs to do the job. Within the new aid structure, NGO representatives carry out the watchdog and scrutinising functions for enhancing democratic ownership and social accountability as Fleming et al, (2007), Schmidjell et al (2009) and Wood and Valot, (2009) claim. Interestingly, during the second CDCF meeting the NGO representatives proposed five key roles for the NGOs/CSOs to both donors and the government (Sin, 2008). The roles are:

- a) Meaningfully engaging in formulating national plans, strategies and policies responsive to the need and voice of Cambodians
- b) Contributing to monitoring implementation of the plans and policies
- c) Acting as complementary service providers in areas where the public systems can not reach the poor and vulnerable
- d) Essentially building and strengthening evidence-based policy influencing and
- e) Helping and encouraging Cambodians to actively participate in enhancing transparency, accountability and good governance and in implementing the country aid effectiveness agenda (ibid).

Reflecting on this proposal, there are some good signs of NGO engagement in the preparation and formulation of the second National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) (CDC/CRDB, 2009b). It is believed that the NGO inputs will lead to an inclusive NSDP II. Many informants applaud the constructive preparation work and contribution of NGO representatives in the CDCF, acknowledging that they have produced good research and evidence-based documents.

The participation of NGOs in the aid coordination processes benefits the NGO community and the poor in a number of ways. Firstly, the NGO representatives/NGOs can inform policymakers on development impacts and progress, experienced by the poor and vulnerable communities and observed by the numerous and diverse NGOs working with them. As noted, the NGO representatives have collected accurate and up-

to-date information at the community level from all parts of Cambodia and integrated the information into a single document. The government and donors were impressed by the quality of the work that NGOs have put into the second CDCF. As mentioned in section 5.3.1, the availability of qualitative and quantitative information and technical expertise from the NGO community is able to shape the policy decisions and make development efforts more responsive to the need of the poor and vulnerable groups. With regards to the aid disbursement, the annual disbursement provided by NGOs to the CDC/CRDB has placed their assistance to Cambodia on both national and international maps. Informant DP 10 mentions that *“the NGO disbursement helps to better understand what NGOs are doing and to what sector they contribute.”* This reflects the historical record of their performance, effectiveness and transparency as the International Aid Transparency Initiative proposes.

6.3.3 NGO Coordination Processes and Engagement at Sector Level

NGO representatives request and/or are invited to participate in the 15 TWGs where NGOs are active and provide assistance/services and/or contribute to the work of the TWGs (CDC/CRDB, 2006c, 2006f, 2006g). However, the number of NGO representatives in TWGs varies across the TWGs. Participation might be decided by the chairmen of the TWGs and facilitators and/or proposed NGO representatives. For example, Medicam and CCC are the only NGOs to have representatives participating in the TWGs on health and partnership and harmonisation. The NGOF has representation in the TWGs on public financial management, forestry and environment, land, and planning and poverty reduction. However, there are five NGO representatives appointed by the NEP in the TWG on education and two NGO representatives⁸⁰ in the TWG on planning and poverty reduction.

The request of NGO representatives to become members of the TWG on legal and judicial reform was rejected by the council of legal and judicial reform and the council of ministers. There is no NGO representative in other three TWGs such as Infrastructure and Regional Integration, Public Administration Reform and Private Sector Development. For example informant CSO 02 argues that:

⁸⁰ The two NGO representatives are the NGOF and Cambodian Development Research Institute.

“some exclusions come from NGOs themselves and some come from the government. Sometimes, there is no NGO working in the sector. Therefore, the NGO representatives’ ability and capability to participate in the forums remain limited. Moreover, the capacity of NGO representatives is still low and they have limited experience in the process and staff capacity; so it is difficult to participate....and some NGOs have no experience at all in the aid coordination process with the government and donors.”

NGO representatives/NGOs share a wide range of information among the stakeholders about the status of the government reforms by sector, donors’ support of the reforms, progress reports and evaluation. For example, Medicam and NEP issue monthly newsletters reporting on the progress of the government and NGO activities in both health and education sectors. This directs and helps the independent operation of NGOs.

Box 6.1: NGO Representatives in 15 Out of 19 TWGs

1. Agriculture and Water	11. Partnership & Harmonisation
2. Education	12. Planning & Poverty Reduction
3. Fisheries	13. Public Financial Management
4. Forestry and Environment	14. Rural Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene
5. Food Security and Nutrition	15. Decentralization & De-concentration
6. Gender	16. Legal and Judicial Reform
7. Health	17. Infrastructure and Regional Integration
8. Mine Action	18. Private Sector Development
9. HIV/AIDS	19. Public Administration Reform
10. Land	

Conversely, making the 19 TWGs function effectively and efficiently is a challenge because government officials, particularly CRDB staff, have limited capacity, skills, knowledge and experience to support the processes. Indeed, the sector ministries’ staff are not aware of the clear objectives of TWGs and need support and guidance from the CDC/CRDB. According to Cox (2006) and some informants, a third of the 19 TWGs have functioned well, another third have started making progress, but the rest have gone off track and not been able to develop their respective TWG action plans or activities.

According to informants’ responses, NGO representatives tend to have a strong engagement and make a constructive contribution to TWGs such as health, education, HIV/AIDS, fisheries, gender, decentralisation and deconcentration, rural water supply, sanitation and hygiene and mine action. Some NGO representatives discuss among their groups in the sector what they can contribute and provide comments before attending the TWG meetings. For example, informant DP 10 states that:

“there is an NGO representative participating in the TWG on mine action, and before the TWG meeting the NGOs meet together to discuss and see what they can contribute. There is a good level of preparation from the NGO side.”

The strong engagement of the NGO representatives is apparent where the TWGs function well. However, problems for NGO representatives in other TWGs that have limited capacity will be discussed in the next section. Compared with the policy level, the NGO voice generally tends to be apparent at the sector level. For example the AE report reveals that:

“A number of TWGs acknowledge the positive role of civil society, especially when related to socio-economic issues (rural water, HIV/AIDS). Many other TWGs, and most development partners, see a more high-profile role for civil society, primarily in its capacity as sector experts and as representatives of wider interests (CDC/CRDB, 2008d, p.22).”

In summary, the combination of NGO involvement at both the policy and sector levels marks a healthy attitude and paves a constructive path towards development and aid effectiveness with the Cambodian government.

6.3.4 The NGO Coordination Challenges in the Aid Mechanisms

NGO representatives in the aid coordination processes have also encountered a number of challenges in the three main forums. These challenges are the unclear position of the NGO representatives, limited space for policy dialogue, limited engagement capacity of the NGO representatives and insufficient motivation and support from the RGC and DPs.

a) Position of NGO Representatives

There is controversy over the roles of NGO representatives in the CDCF and GDCC. Some informants said NGO representatives are not equal partners and just observers at both CDCF and GDCC meetings because there is no single collective voice from the NGO community. On the other hand, the government is not interested in making more space for them to have dialogue while the CDCF and GDCC's agenda items are very

formal and political, well organised and restricted as Bird and Caravani (2009) stress. The government controls the processes as a means to gain full ownership and leadership. For example, informant DP 11 stressed that *“The government does not like being told what to do and being criticised and it makes the meeting really awful. This is the approach that donors take.”* Some informants see the roles of NGO representatives as on the side of the donors. However, a number of government officials in this study see their roles as stakeholders because they contribute by presenting joint NGO statements in the CDCF and circulating joint NGO Position Papers at both the CDCF and GDCC meetings.

At the TWG level, the roles of NGO representatives vary based on the status and functional efficiency of the TWGs. Again, their roles remain uncertain and blurred among NGO representatives and the sector ministries and lead donor facilitators in each TWG. Their roles as stakeholders become clear when they actively engage, substantially contribute and build strong partnerships with the sector ministries. For example, informant DP 08 claims that *“there seems to be more progress where NGOs can contribute with DANIDA⁸¹ to pool funds into the common basket.”* However, they are less active or even inactive in some TWGs and their working relationships with the sector ministries are often poor and/or confrontational. Informant DP 11 argues that:

“They need to find carefully what their role is when they have the opportunity. There is an important role for the TWG on Public Financial Reform, Public Administration Reform, and Legal and Judicial Reform. And I don’t think they play their roles more effectively in the TWGs. I also think maybe there is the opportunity to engage with civil society later.”

NGO representatives need to be clear themselves whether they are observers and/or stakeholders in the aid coordination processes (informant GOV 02). Informant CSO 01 mentions that *“we are just the observers and we are not the equal partners...in the CG processes we were equal partners.”* Other NGO informants have the same views because they think they have an opportunity to take part in the processes but the environment does not allow them to speak out, particularly in the GDCC and some TWG meetings. Conversely, informant CSO 05 suggests that *“good NGOs should be*

⁸¹DANIDA is Danish International Development Agency.

resources; they should be able to effectively communicate the views and needs of the disadvantaged in communities.”

In summary, the core problems are caused by the lack of clarity of NGO roles and responsibilities in the aid management framework and the absence of real and genuine dialogue among NGOs, the government and donors on the roles and positions of NGO representatives in the three main forums. This conflicts with the AAA approach that clearly identifies CSOs/NGOs as central players and development actors. Thus, reinforcing the aid management framework and conducting genuine Government-NGO dialogue is necessary. NGO representatives have not widely discussed with their groups their roles in those processes and they do not have a clear coordination goal or systems in different TWGs as the government and donors have (this is discussed in the next section).

b) Limited Space for Policy Dialogue

▪ *Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF)*

The NGO space for policy dialogue remains limited according to the common views of donor and NGO informants in this study. This situation is similar to other countries in Asia and Africa claimed by Mundy et al. (2008), Alemu (2009), Bird and Caravani (2009) and Mwega (2009). There are a number of reasons. The CDCF process that is at the highest level of policy dialogue is well structured and organised by the government, emphasising the dialogue and affairs between the government and donors but not NGOs. The dialogue covers reviewing development progress made during the year including Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMIs) and the NSDP and CMDGs implementation; prioritising and endorsing new priorities and the Action Plan H-A-R and the multi-year indicative financial framework (aid pledge) (CDC/CRDB, 2006f). Another reason for limited NGO involvement is that NGO representatives were not signatories of the Cambodian Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. They have not been involved in the Action Plan H-A-R. Moreover, in the CDCF meeting NGOs cannot provide the multi-year indicative financial framework in three year terms as donors do. Characteristically, they often seek annual funding from donors and there are no sustainable basket funds for them, leading to tough funding competition in the entire NGO sector. Both the

government and donors actually behave in a very diplomatic way. Everyone tries to make the situation more relaxing and comfortable (informant DP 05). The CDCF is political and might be associated with international relations, not only aid. Indeed, the government wants to look good for donors and donors express positive views on the development and progress. However, the NGO inputs stated in the NGO joint statement and position paper have never been discussed.. Sometimes NGO representatives see their views and inputs as accepted at the meeting but rarely integrated in the national policy documents (Informant CSO 02). There is no feedback from the government. The NGO representatives only have a very limited time to speak within the two day meeting as the agenda items are full of discussion issues raised by the RGC and DPs.

▪ ***Government-Donor Coordination Committee Meeting (GDCC)***

The GDCC is currently held twice a year, aiming to discuss development issues and priorities including the NSDP and CMDGs, and follow up JMIs and promote the implementation of the Paris Declaration. The NGO space and participation are characteristically shortened although the joint NGO statement and position paper are circulated. The issues result from the nature and characteristics of the process, NGO representatives, the government and donors. The GDCC has been seen as ‘a hostile forum’ with the donors ‘ganging up’ against the government (Informant DP 11). The seating allocated to NGOs has limited their actual participation at the GDCC (Informant DP 10) and the GDCC format primarily focuses on the affairs between donors and the government. NGO representatives have not had space to discuss issues that are more relevant to them. They become lost or confused. Therefore, they could not determine what action should be undertaken for constructive contribution.

A number of NGO informants accept that their capacity to have strong advocacy among the NGO community is still weak and NCBs need to have strong inputs from their members. For example, *“the aid effectiveness agenda is too complicated and too isolated from NGO sector”* (informant CSO 01). Furthermore, informant DP 11 claims that *“I would describe the initial contribution of NGOs in the GDCC to be very limited... I would say they make no progress.”* On the other hand, informant GOV 01 argues that *“NGOs don’t need to argue with the government. The government often pays attention to the NGO’s statement. Indeed, the NGO’s recommendations are quite*

common and similar to the government commitments.” Nevertheless, based on my observation in the GDCC meeting in April, 2009, NGO representatives have almost no space to express their concerns on the agenda and issues raised by the government and donors. Thus, NGO representatives have not spoken up (Field research observation and Informant DP 03).

▪ ***Joint Government-Donor Technical Working Group Meeting (TWG)***

The NGO engagement in the TWGs varies due to the varying capacities of some sector ministries, a lack of donor support and limited capacity of the NGO representatives in some TWGs such as land, partnership and harmonisation, food security and nutrition, agriculture and water, decentralisation and deconcentration and forestry and environment.

The GDCC and TWG guidelines set by the government did not provide precise details about the roles and responsibilities of NGO representatives in the TWGs. The leadership of some TWGs has been relatively weak, making TWGs weak and/or dysfunctional. Sometimes the government limits their space and they can only act as observers (informant DP 01). In another case, the government has no willingness to listen to what NGO representatives say (Informant DP 06). Similarly, informant CSO 05 claims that:

“we would like to make a strong contribution on the substance on the finding around planning for the poverty reduction and planning and the discussion between the donors and the government in the TWG [...] So our participation has been very limited because they are not interested in the process. We think it should be a good process. What we used to do is to feed our valuable policy research findings into the discussion of poverty reduction strategy and planning and it is very limited and I am so frustrated about it.”

In the TWG framework, the communication and information sharing differ based on the leadership of the sector ministries. As mentioned above, some TWGs are better functioning than others. Some donors and NGO informants claim that information sharing in the TWGs is a key problem. Informant CSO 05 stresses that *“often the quality of documents is poor and they are received very late, so it’s hard to consult with*

our constituencies, with each other and/or with others in the TWG. I think there should be information disclosure beforehand.” This issue creates an unfriendly environment for NGO representatives to make significant contributions due to lack of timely information.

A number of NGO representatives in some TWGs have not understood their responsibilities at the technical level because the TWGs are the forums for designing, planning, formulating sector strategies and policies, budgeting, implementing and evaluating the development projects/programmes by sector. Sometimes, *“doing advocacy work is a challenge and difficult with the government and if NGO representatives are very aggressive with the government it becomes confrontational”* (informant CSO 02). In terms of the limited space for policy dialogue, the controversial issue that has been often raised by the donors, government and NGOs is using donors as mediators for policy change influenced by NGOs. Some donor and NGO informants agree with this concept and channel, as informant CSO 07 argues that *“it is a peaceful advocacy.”* Some others view it as a bad and ineffective approach. Nevertheless, using donors as ‘puppets’ for policy influencing creates ‘a bad relationship’ between NGOs and the government (informant DP 11).

c) Limited Capacity of NGO Representatives

Many informants agree and share the same view as AGCS (2007a), Mundy et al (2008) and Bird and Caravani (2009), that most NGO representatives/NGOs have limited capacity to participate in the aid processes particularly the TWGs. Specifically, NGO representatives in some TWGs have not substantially contributed to the dialogue and meetings (Informant DP 01). In some cases, NGO representatives hesitate to speak up due to being afraid of difficulties, sensitivity, danger and destruction in the working relationship with the government (informant DP 03).

Most informants also argue that many NGOs, particularly LNGOs, are unaware of Cambodian aid effectiveness and the Paris Declaration. Clearly, NGO representatives have not had capable staff who are knowledgeable in aid effectiveness and processes as noted in section 5.4.2. For example, informant DP 11 argues that *“some NGOs send someone very junior who has low capacity to participate...because we see some young*

NGO officers come in...and they have nothing to say...it is very serious and not good for the future when they represent poorly and the government thinks it is pathetic.” Many of them do not have a macro approach at the sector level (informant DP 01). Some informants are also concerned about the low level of understanding of NGO representatives in the way the government works. Thus, NGOs/NGO representatives are not diplomatic enough to build trust and work with the government in a better way (informant DP 10). Another example is given by informant GOV 04: *“if NGOs want to add something in the policy documents then they need to make communication with or contact with the sector ministries or institutions they work with.”* Some NGO informants do not know even the process whereby NCBs and NGO alliances work together to represent the NGO community in the new aid coordination mechanisms. This is a weakness of NCBs, that they do not inform the NGO community about their work.

According to provincial NGO seminar observation and informants, many LNGOs in provinces have not been involved with the aid coordination processes and they have no knowledge about the aid effectiveness agenda. Specifically, in the provincial NGO seminar the NCB staff only presented the original concept of the Paris Declaration but not the Cambodian Declaration. Their explanation was very brief and unclear and the LNGO participants were not familiar with the concept. The opportunity for the provincial NGOs/NGO alliances to participate might be not available although there is a sub-TWG structure in some sectors at provincial level. The provincial sector departments might not clearly know the role of NGO alliances. Everything is very new and complicated for everyone to handle. However, everyone still has the opportunity to explore and share views and information for fruitful development.

There is an absence of a strong systematic NGO coordination process within the aid coordination mechanisms as the government (the CDC/CRDB) and donors have (the World Bank Cambodia Office). NGO representatives have not had a proper secretariat set up to coordinate all information from NGO representatives participating in different TWGs. Currently, the information and coordination work among NGO representatives at the national level is loose. For example, informant CSO 02 mentions that *“I am not sure whether NGO representatives share the information with others...for NEP...it is only necessary that we disclose the information to our members and we post it on the*

website.” Due to the weak systematic NGO coordination processes, the dialogue among the NGOs and NCBs and provincial NAs has not been constantly conducted as mentioned in section 5.6. They have worked on the ad-hoc approach one and three months before the CDCF and GDCC, respectively, when they need to make a case and participate in the CDCF and GDCC meetings.

d) Insufficient Motivation and Support from the Government and Donors

Some informants agree that the government, particularly the CDC/CRDB, and donors have failed to take seriously enough the aid coordination processes to build the capacity of civil society organisations/ NGOs. The government and donors have not made any progress to educate CSOs/NGOs about Cambodian aid effectiveness and the Paris Declaration. It is also the government’s job to expand the NGO space in the aid processes. For example, clarifying roles and responsibilities of the NGO representatives in the three key forums is vital. This includes sharing information, engaging with dialogue and building trust between the government and NGOs. For example, informant GOV 02 mentions that *“at the national level the CDC/CRDB has not distributed the Cambodian Declaration on Aid Effectiveness signed by 14 donors and the government to NGO community.”* The government aid coordination and the capacity of the CDC/CRDB and sector ministries remains limited and fragile and staff’s capacity in those institutions is limited; particularly the CDC/CRDB, which is understaffed (CDC/CRDB, 2007d, 2008f).

As Mundy et al. (2008), Wood and Valot (2009), Bird and Caravani (2009), and Schmidjell et al. (2009) claim, many informants agreed that the development partners have not done very well in financing NGO representatives to enhance coordination work, particularly the provincial NGO alliances. But they have rather funded NGOs to do a particular job as mentioned in section 5.2.2. Characteristically, the NGO representatives’ roles are not to implement PBAs or SWAs as they are small institutions with limited staff and resources (informant DP 01).

6.4 Conclusion

Generally, NGOs played significant roles as donors in reconstruction and rehabilitation of Cambodia in the early 1990s due to poor government aid coordination mechanisms. NGO representatives were invited to participate in a range of meetings from ICORC to CG and other sector working groups on the side of donors because NGOs were seen as donors. Their roles were as open and equal as donors'. Since then aid coordination structures have been strengthened under government leadership, moving closer to global concepts such as the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action. Many informants report that some INGOs and big LNGOs have a few components of the Paris Declaration such as alignment, harmonisation, mutual accountability and managing for results in their agendas and strategies.

NGO representatives proposed five key roles in the last CDCF meeting. Indeed, many informants applaud the convincing and constructive preparation and contribution of NGO representatives in the GDCC and CDCF; they have produced well researched and evidence-based documents. However, NGO representatives in the aid coordination processes have also encountered a number of challenges in the three main forums. These challenges are the unclear position of NGO representatives, limited space for policy dialogue, limited capacity of NGO representatives and insufficient motivation and support from the government and donors. The NGO roles and space for policy dialogue have become narrowed although a number of NGO representatives have participated in the CDCF, GDCC and 15 TWGs. However, the NGO voice tends to be more apparent at the sector than policy level. NGO representatives and NGOs are not well educated and/or aware of the Cambodian aid effectiveness agenda and mechanisms. The core problems are caused by unclear stated roles and responsibilities of NGO representatives in the aid management framework and a lack of real or genuine dialogue among NGOs, the government and donors on the roles and positions of NGO representatives in the three main forums. Also, NGO representatives have not widely discussed with their groups their roles in those processes and they do not have a clear coordination in the different TWGs as the government and donors have.

Chapter VII: Conclusions and Recommendations

7.1 Introduction

This thesis has examined how NGO coordination among national and provincial NGOs is contributing to development, poverty reduction and aid effectiveness in Cambodia. This chapter provides summary points about how NGO coordination efforts have developed and the strengths and weaknesses of current approaches. It also highlights how NGOs/NGO representatives participate in aid architectures such as the CDCF, GDCC and TWGs. It concludes with recommendations for policymakers to improve the country's aid effectiveness.

7.2 NGO Coordination Processes: Outcomes and Challenges

7.2.1 Internal NGO Coordination Outcomes

As mentioned in the previous chapters, NGOs are one of the key development agents, contributing to rehabilitating and building the nation and society with the Cambodian government and helping the poor since the collapse of the Khmer Rouge. Early on NGOs, particularly the Consortium for Cambodia, ended the political deadlock with the socialist government and provided humanitarian relief to the starving population in certain accessible areas. In the early 1990s Cambodia was liberalised and administered by UNTAC to build peace, security and social, economic and political stability through formalisation of the first free and fair national election. Since then, NGOs have dramatically increased in number to financially and technically reconstruct the fragile Cambodian state and spread ideas of democratisation, human rights and good governance nationwide. NGOs have operated in diverse sectors in two cities and 22 provinces to pursue the CMDGs and inclusive development. Specifically, NGOs have increased their disbursement in recent years, magnifying their strong contribution to Cambodian development and the aid system. One of key findings is that many donors have continually financed NGOs, reflecting their important roles in providing large public services and advocacy and building strong civil society and democratisation. This is contradictory to what NGOs' fear about losing their funds in terms of the Paris Declaration agenda (Lister and Nyamugasira, 2003; Howell et al., 2008). Instead NGOs

in Cambodia are heavily donor-driven as government budget is unavailable and public donations and charities are very limited. However it is argued that channelling official assistance through NGOs whose projects are small and medium-sized in Cambodia may lead to aid effectiveness challenges in term of alignment, ownership, accountability and a higher level of duplication and fragmentation, particularly in the health and education sectors. Thus, there have been calls from government, donors, NGOs and academics for NGOs to strengthen their coordination and effectiveness.

NGO coordination efforts have become qualitatively and quantitatively apparent despite many NGOs in Cambodia being in their infancy. NGO coordination has been organised through national NGO coordination bodies (NCBs) like the CCC and NGOF and sector NCBs such as Medicam, NEP, CHRAC and others. The NCBs seem to follow the standards suggested by Bennett (1994, 2000) although they have distinctive roles and mandates accompanied by a reborn civil society and the influx of aid into Cambodia. Field research informants claim that NGO coordination in the Cambodian context aims to 1) share information between national and community levels; 2) build a strong NGO collective voice and representation; 3) minimise project replication and waste; 4) strengthen NGO professionalism and institutional effectiveness through NGO self-regulation and capacity building; 5) influence government and donor strategies and policies; 6) participate in country aid coordination processes and 7) identify NGO partners for the government, donors and INGOs. Thus, their overarching role is to continually enhance and improve civil society organisations through meetings and information sharing.

The NCBs are situated in Phnom Penh and work in partnership with the government, donors and other powerful INGOs and LNGOs. They are formal organisations, registered at the MOI and/or MFAIC and other sector ministries. They have formal organisational structure, secretariat, permanent staff, clear mission, vision and objectives, five year strategic plan and/or by-laws, good governance systems, large members, membership fees and strong fund-raising capacity. Most NCBs have access to good communication systems and modern office facilities. The executive directors and staff of the NCBs have more knowledge on development, management, operational and administrative work than the provincial NGO alliances (NAs), with most holding bachelor's degrees. Thus, national NGO coordination is apparent. Conversely, the NAs

that are informal organisations without legal registration have no possibilities to set up as effective NAs with secretariats. They have limited staff with varying levels of competence, no membership fees and insufficient or no financial and technical support from donors. The provincial NGOs have limited awareness of NGO coordination and poor operational and management knowledge, leading to poor provincial NGO coordination.

7.2.2 NGO Coordination Constraints

Based on a desk review, narrative analysis and discussion in the previous chapters, it can be concluded that the internal NGO coordination efforts have sought positive change. The NCBs have achieved some degree of information sharing, collective action on some certain issues for influencing government policies and strategies at the national and sector levels, continual capacity building of NGO members, and implementation of NGO self-regulation and the increasing participation in the country's aid coordination mechanisms. NGO coordination is fairly well understood by NGOs based in the city, by donors and the Cambodian government. However, the NCBs have not made strong progress in some issues such as developing a collective voice, NGO self-regulation and effectiveness and coordination of NGO projects. This lack of progress is caused by (i) cultural and political challenges (ii) institutional challenges to NGO coordination and (iii) poor NGO coordination between national and provincial levels.

A. Cultural and Political Challenges

Culture has had a strong impact on the evolution of NGO coordination in Cambodia. The cultural roadblocks to coordination efforts include a lack of trust, hesitation and fear of losing face, high bureaucracy with patron-client relationships and immature and weak NGOs and other institutions. For example, mistrust is a big problem in Cambodia due to the destruction of social unity and collective action during the time of the Khmer Rouge. This important cultural linkage has not been noted by Fowler (1992), Streamlau (1978), Bennett (1994, 2000), Robinson et al. (2000), Roberts et al. (2005) and Demars (2005).

The results of this study also found that an unfriendly political environment directly or indirectly distorts the NGO coordination efforts. The working relationship with the government and the NGOs has been considered to be steady in overall terms. However, the government seems to value development NGOs rather than advocacy and human rights NGOs. The lower level of freedom of expression, high corruption, weak legal and judicial systems, and poor capacity of some government ministries and institutions, limits the diverse advocacy efforts of NGOs aiming to bring about social justice, social accountability and to allow the voice of vulnerable and affected citizens to be heard. Some informants claim that both the government and NGOs, particularly advocacy and human rights NGOs, behave destructively. This leads to mistrust and a huge mutual accountability gap as there is no genuine dialogue regularly conducted between them.

B. Institutional Challenges

At the heart of NGO coordination issues are institutional challenges, mainly the limited capacity of the NGO sector, including the coordination bodies. The institutional challenges were analysed in the forms of the limited capacity of NCBs and NGOs and slow mobilisation problems. Thus, the NGO coordination efforts and NGO sector are relatively loose and weak although progress has been made since the 1990s.

▪ *Limited Capacity of NCBs and NGOs*

The limited capacity of NCBs includes weak institutional management and structure, limited financial resources, fragmentation, a weak collective voice, and slow implementation of the NGO Good Practice Project (NGO-GPP). Their challenges reflect the associated limited capacity of NGOs.

Firstly, the NCB organisational structure and management are hierarchical and evaluations are rare. Most NCBs have limited capacity to work closely with and build capacity among LINGO members and non-members in provinces due to limited resources and a lack of provincial offices. Thus, NGO professionalism is deficient, particularly in provinces. The NCBs seem to be understaffed and have difficulty in attracting and retaining competent staff. In some cases their coordination and advocacy rely greatly on outside technical assistance such as external and volunteer advisors or

internees. Secondly, most of the NCBs' projects/activities are under-resourced, in both budget and skilled staff. Informants realise that many NGOs have similar or overlapping mandates and that competition for donor funding is very intense. Thirdly, the existing NGO coordination system cannot minimise project replications and fragmentation in the NGO sector; thus, their activities remain very fragmented, particularly in the health and education sectors. Consequently the impact of their projects/activities is reduced. Therefore, the approach of 'avoiding replication' might exist only in theory rather than in practice due to the current local context.

Fourthly, an NGO membership body that is strong depends on the active participation of members. However, some members of the NCBs are active and some are passive due to a limited capacity of good research-based policy officers. The NCBs have no authority to interfere in the internal work of any members. The NCBs should respect different interests and views of members on specific issues and recognise the diversity of members. There are different views between the development NGOs and human rights NGOs on the NGO law that is currently being discussed by the government. Thus, doing coordination work and mobilising the collective voice is a very challenging job. Finally, the progress of the NGO-GPP implemented by the CCC is very slow due to the nature of growing but immature NGOs, limited financial and human resources for implementation and a lack of awareness and understanding. Indeed, LNGOs have poor administrative and management knowledge which is a key requirement for improving coordination efforts.

▪ *Slow Expansion of NCBs' Members*

In the last decade, the NCBs have slowly made progress in expanding their membership and their members' collective voice. This clearly reflects what Bennett (2000, p.171) claims: "*everyone is for coordination, but no-one wishes to be coordinated, at least not just now;*" but the precise details of the problems are not explicitly discussed. In the Cambodian context, about a quarter of the total NGOs (46% of total INGOs and 16% of total LNGOs) are members of NCBs at the national level. Hence, many NGOs in Cambodia are not members of an NCB and NCBs are not fully representative.

The shortage of membership is the result of a lack of awareness of NGO coordination, a lack of interest, time constraints and a scarcity of financial resources. Firstly, most government, donor and NGO informants in this study agreed that the awareness of NGO coordination is very limited; yet this awareness is something Robinson et al., (2000) suggest is vital. The awareness issue is caused by untrained NGO staff as development practitioners, different expectations of NGOs in becoming NCBs' members and seeking funding sources, and NGO concentration on self-interest rather than common interests. Secondly, a lack of interest to become members of NCBs is common issue among Cambodian NGOs. The key factors of the issue are competition, territoriality, duplications, confusion, voice, conflicting interests, concerns about autonomy and negative consequences, and the incredible demand of the Cambodian government and other Cambodian NGOs. Finally, as Stremlau (1987) and Bennett (2000) observe, doing and participating in coordination processes are resource- and time-consuming. The members need to pay annual membership fees and actively participate in the NCBs' monthly meeting. Only big and powerful INGOs and LNGOs are able to pay the membership fees, the rest struggle to compete for funding which comes with conditions and requirements attached, and they do not have budget for the fees. Specifically, LNGOs based in provinces cannot afford travelling costs to participate in the NCBs' meetings. Even if they can afford the cost, they might not be active members and devote their time for the meetings as they are tied up with accountabilities with donors, government and local authorities and communities.

C. Poor Coordination between National and Provincial Levels

A third significant constraint is the weakness of systematic NGO coordination processes between national and provincial levels. Stremlau (1978) suggests building a strong connection between different types of NCBs and other networks but does not clearly specify what measures should be taken. It is a common issue caused by limited resources for both the NCBs and NAs. Specifically, donors in Cambodia are not interested in providing funds for NGO coordination, particularly at the provincial level. The current partnership and coordination of the NCBs and NAs are weak and ineffective. Current NGO coordination process is often done only at the national level through forming specific meetings with powerful INGO and LNGO members of the NCBs. The process is characteristically more top down rather than participatory, and

also done on an ad-hoc approach between the national and provincial levels. LNGOs are not enthusiastic about building the coordination and partnership between national and community levels. This leads to ineffectiveness.

7.3 NGO Coordination in the Aid Coordination Mechanisms

Considering the objective of this study, NGO roles have evolved over the last two decades. Early on, NGOs (particularly INGOs) and NGO representatives acted as both executive agencies and donors, contributing to Cambodian reconstruction and development. Between 1991 and 2004, their space for political intervention was similar to that of donors. In the early 1990s NGOs (especially INGOs) were part of the problem in terms of late aid disbursement, poor harmonisation and little accountability among the Cambodian government, donors and INGOs. Since then, their strong progress has included increasing annual NGO aid disbursement to about \$US 50 million and actively participating in the CG meetings and other sector/thematic working groups such as health and education. After restructuring the aid coordination mechanisms in late 2004, the country aid processes have been strengthened with the adoption within Cambodia of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD).

However, NGO representatives are not signatories nor even observers of the Cambodian Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Also, NGO representatives have had no involvement in the Action Plan H-A-R, covering 12 indicators and a number of activities with milestones and baselines. This seems to isolate NGO representatives. The Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) seeks an improvement of NGO coordination efforts within the government programmes, enhancement of NGO accountability and outcomes and acceleration of NGO information sharing with the government (OECD, 2008b). However, the AAA has not provided any specific aid engagement framework globally or nationally that would allow NGOs to fully participate in the processes. According to the aid effectiveness report (CDC/CRDB, 2008d), the implementation of the Action Plan H-A-R during the last three years has made little progress, endangering the aid processes and commitments made. The PD and AAA seem to have become highly ambitious with many desired actions but limited timeframes and resources against the actual plan. The aid processes are associated with mixed issues including politics of aid,

diplomatic procedures and trade-off relationships between individual donors and Cambodia.

The Cambodian aid coordination mechanisms comprise the annual Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF), the semi-annual Government-Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC), and the 19 quarterly Joint Technical Working Groups (TWGs). The processes have paradoxically become complex and cumbersome with new approaches and a high demand of knowledge and flexibility. According to the discussion and narrative analysis, NGO representatives have fairly engaged in the processes such as CDCF, GDCC and 15 out of 19 TWGs. Many informants report that some INGOs and big LNGOs have a few components of the Cambodia declaration such as alignment, harmonisation, mutual accountability and managing for results in their agendas and strategies. NGO representatives made strong commitments and engagements in the forums through claiming five key roles in the processes in the last CDCF meeting in 2008. The key roles are (i) meaningful engagement in inclusive national plan, strategy and policy formulation; (ii) monitoring of national plan, strategy and policy implementation; (iii) continual provision of complementary social services to the poor; (iv) essential invention and enhancement of evidence-based policy influencing and (v) participation and implementation of the country aid effectiveness agenda. Indeed, many informants applaud the convincing and constructive preparation and contribution of NGO representatives in the CDCF and GDCC, acknowledging that they have produced well researched and evidence-based documents. The NGO voice generally tends to be more apparent at the sector level than policy level. NGO involvement both at the policy and sector levels marks healthy attitudes and paves constructive paths towards development and aid effectiveness with the Cambodian government.

Alongside their apparent successes, NGO representatives have also encountered a number of challenges in the three main forums. These challenges are the unclear position of NGO representatives, limited space for policy dialogue, limited capacity of NGO representatives and insufficient motivation and support from the RGC and DPs. Firstly, the NGO representatives' positions are controversial. Some informants believe sometimes they should be stakeholders, sometimes observers and others as resources. The core problems are caused by unclear roles and responsibilities of NGO

representatives in the aid management framework and a lack of real or genuine dialogue among NGOs, the government and donors on the roles and positions of NGO representatives in the three forums. NGO representatives have not widely discussed with their groups their roles in those processes and they do not have clear coordination in the different TWGs as the government and donors have.

Secondly, the NGO roles and space for policy dialogue have become narrowed although a number of NGO representatives have participated in the CDCF, GDCC and TWGs. This situation is similar to other countries in Asia and Africa claimed by Mundy et al. (2008), Alemu (2009), Bird and Caravani (2009) and Mwega (2009). In the CDCF and GDCC, their inputs have never been discussed on the table. In the CDCF, they have limited time to speak as the agenda items are full of discussion issues raised by the government and donors while in the GDCC there is no space for them to raise issues.

Thirdly, many informants agree and share the same view as AGCS (2007a), Mundy et al (2008) and Bird and Caravani (2009), that most NGO representatives/NGOs have limited capacity to participate in the aid processes particularly the TWGs. Sometimes, they have not understood the political arts and ways governments work and neither have the government officials. The awareness of the Cambodian aid effectiveness agenda and mechanisms is very low among NGOs, and the government and donors have failed to spread out the country aid effectiveness and processes to the NGO community. Finally, the development partners have not done very well in financing NGO representatives to enhance the coordination work, particularly the provincial NGO alliances.

The common issues in the new aid structures are more about processes than seeking constructive outcomes. There are so many mechanisms and working groups, meetings, and demands on the government officials, donors and NGOs. Every one ends up being very superficial and makes little progress. The government, donors and some powerful NGOs often spend money on very expensive international consultants for the detailed work (informant CSO 05). Thus, NGO representatives often struggle to keep up or make a high quality contribution.

It is too early to conclude that the NGO coordination in aid coordination processes has made a significant contribution to improving the country aid effectiveness as the

CDC/CRDB's report (2008d, p.22) reveals that *"The sustained effort at establishing policy frameworks and creating an aid architecture comprising TWGs, the GDCC and the CDCF has not yet produced the anticipated results in terms of effective aid delivery and improved development impact."* This analysis shows that the development partners have failed to recognise the importance of NGO coordination or to support and build the capacity of NCBs and NAs, particularly in the aid effectiveness agenda. The commitments in both the Paris and Accra documents must be translated into action and implemented within the local context of aid mechanisms with sufficient resources and time to allow the achievement of a high aid impact on development.

7.4 The Opportunity for NGO Coordination Improvement

There are many challenges to NGO coordination. However, these obstacles can be partly overcome through the following recommendations:

- 1. Strengthen systematic NGO coordination processes between national and provincial levels.** A regular participatory NGO meeting at both the national and provincial levels should be conducted at least twice a year. Some NCBs such as the CCC, NGOF and NEP should mobilise resources and/or establish branch offices in key provinces that have large number of NGOs to support the activities. The success of a Tanzanian NCB reveals strong national and local NGO coordination through its decentralised offices (Mundy et al., 2008). Thus, the awareness of NGO coordination can be spread out across provinces and cities and the membership mobilisation can increase. Moreover, the implementation of NGO-GPP can also be accelerated. Therefore, the qualitative and quantitative information exchange and experience can be regularly conducted and the capacity building of LNGOs can be gradually upgraded. Thereby, a strong NGO collective voice can be achieved. The systematic NGO coordination processes can also be used as a tool to conduct monitoring and evaluation of NGO impacts on society to enhance their service deliveries and policy advocacy at all levels.
- 2. Establish systematic coordination among NGO representatives in the CDCF, GDCC and 15 TWGs.** NGO representatives, particularly in 15 TWGs, need to set up one secretariat to network among themselves to share information and

experiences of the way they work with the sector ministries and donors. Thus, NGO representatives can understand their respective roles to increase political space in the different forums through participatory discussion. Also, they can understand the arts of political and diplomatic affairs between the government ministries and donors; thereby, they can enhance their constructive and meaningful engagement in the aid coordination processes.

3. **Continually build the capacity of NCBs, NAs and NGOs.** NCBs need to play more important roles in continually upgrading their own organisations, NAs and LNGOs, because capacity building is a long process and it needs to be done over time, particularly that related to NGO self-regulation, development and aid effectiveness through the enhancing NGO coordination processes. Diversifying the NCBs' incomes is necessary to support these activities. Approaching different donors about the importance of NGO coordination is essential. Consequently, NGO professionalism can be gradually developed to bolster NGO image at local, national and international levels. Thereby, the impacts of NGO projects/activities can be maximised.
4. **Seek a regular genuine dialogue between government and NGOs.** The NGO community, particularly the NCBs, should seek the opportunity and approach the government to have a regular genuine dialogue on certain issues such as NGO law, freedom of expression and their roles and political space in the three key forums. This will pave the way for constructive development and partnership for Cambodia. Specifically, NGO representatives need to distinguish and clearly understand that they could provide comments and recommendations at both policy and technical levels. Some informants suggest that the dialogue might find or change the format of the meetings and aid coordination framework where NGOs can participate and make the process more effective. The framework should contain the specific roles and responsibilities of NGO representatives at the CDCF, GDCC and TWGs, based on decisions made by the government and NGOs in the dialogue.
5. **Gain government's political will and financial and technical support from donors.** The government's aid coordination mechanisms are required to be

strengthened in relation to NGO coordination processes. The government and line ministries, particularly the CDC/CRDB, should open more space for NGOs/NGO representatives to engage in the forums. Furthermore, the government and donors need to build the NGOs' capacity about the aid coordination mechanisms and country aid effectiveness. It is vital that donors focus their attention and priority to technically and financially improve the NGO coordination in Cambodia.

7.4 Future Research

As noted, NGO research is largely conducted by case studies (Bebbington, 2004). Research has only been conducted in the field of NGO coordination during the humanitarian emergencies and/or aftermaths of wars such as in Cambodia, Ethiopia and Afghanistan and natural disasters such as in Aceh caused by the tsunami in December 2004. However, NGO coordination in the normal non-war context and inter-agency coordination, particularly the aid coordination processes at the global, country and sector levels have so far received little attention from academics (Bebbington, 2004; Lewis, 2006a). NGO coordination is the key instrument in aiding effective advocacy work at the global, regional, country and sector levels, especially in the new aid structures such as the Paris Declaration on AE and AAA. The lessons learnt about NGO coordination and NGO involvements at policy and technical levels in aid architectures in different countries are necessary to improve international development cooperation. Thus, the NGO coordination and inter-agency coordination at the country and sector levels should be further scrutinised by academics, bearing in mind NGOs' increasing roles, importance and tensions in the new aid structures.

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Appendix I: The International NGOs Coordination Bodies (NCBs) and INGOs Networks

1. The US-based Interaction or InterAction: The US-based Interaction or InterAction, founded in 1984, is the largest coalition of U.S.-based international nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) focused on the world's poor and most vulnerable people. InterAction's 175 members work in every developing country. Members meet people halfway in expanding opportunities and supporting gender equality in education, health care, agriculture, small business, and other areas. The U.S. public shows its support for this work through contributions to InterAction members totalling around \$6 billion annually (<http://www.interaction.org>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).
2. The Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies (VOICE), established in 2001, is a network representing 85 European non governmental organisations (NGOs) active in humanitarian aid worldwide. Unlike its members, VOICE is not operational. It is seeking to involve its members in information, training, advocacy and lobbying. VOICE is the main NGO interlocutor with the European Union on emergency aid, relief, rehabilitation and disaster preparedness. 91% of VOICE members have a framework partnership agreement with EC DG Humanitarian Aid (ECHO). (<http://www.ngovoice.org>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).
3. The European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development (CONCORD), founded in 2003, is the European confederation representing, through its 40 members, over 1800 European NGOs for relief and international development. The main objective of the Confederation is to enhance the impact of European development NGOs vis-à-vis the European Institutions by combining expertise and accountability. (<http://www.concordeurope.org>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).
4. The New Zealand Council for International Development (CID), founded in 1985, works to achieve effective high quality international development programmes which focus on the alleviation and eradication of poverty. It works to enhance the capacity and participation of member agencies, the NZ Government and other sectors of the NZ community. The CID has 90 members that include most of New Zealand's major non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that work in aid and development (www.cid.org.nz, retrieved date 28 July, 2009).
5. The Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), was formed in 1965 to 'create a vehicle to enable government to relate to the NGO community more easily'. ACFID is an independent national association of Australian NGOs working in the field of international aid and development. Their NGO members are more than 70 in 2008 (<http://www.acfid.asn.au>, retrieved date 28 July, 2009).
6. The Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC) established in 1968, seeks to end global poverty, and to promote social justice and human dignity for all. It comprises about 100 Canadian voluntary sector organisations

working to end global poverty. (<http://www.ccic.ca/e/home/index.shtml>, retrieved date 28 July, 2009).

7. BOND (British Overseas NGOs for Development), founded in 1993, is the UK membership body for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in international development. Established in 1993, BOND now has over 340 member organisations, from large organisations with a worldwide presence to smaller, more specialist organisations working in specific regions or with specific groups of people. (<http://www.bond.org.uk/index.php>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).
8. EUROPARC, founded in 1973, is now recognised around the world as a professional organisation for European protected areas. EUROPARC has 500 member organisations in 39 European countries. Together they are responsible for the management of more than 400 protected areas across the continent. EUROPARC provides them with a forum to share professional experience, collaborate on technical projects and progress common aims (<http://www.europarc.org>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).
9. EURONGOs, founded in 1996, is a European network of non-governmental organisations that cooperate in the field of sexual and reproductive health and rights, population and development. EURONGOs currently has 31 full members in 19 EU member states and seven associated members from Canada, Australia and New Zealand (<http://www.eurongos.org>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).
10. AIDS Action Europe (AAE), created in 2004, is a partnership of more than 230 AIDS-related non-governmental organisations from 44 European and Central Asian countries. Its mission is to unite civil society to work towards a more effective response to the HIV epidemic in Europe. AAE strives for better protection of human rights and universal access to prevention, treatment, care and support. AAE works towards a reduction of health inequalities in Europe focusing on key vulnerable populations in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. (<http://www.aidsactioneurope.org>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).
11. CCFD is an association comprising 28 movements and services of the Catholic Church. It has a permanent staff of 170 based in Paris and in various regions of France who work to fulfill CCFD objectives. CCFD was founded in 1961 by movements and services of the Church in order to mobilise Christians in the fight against hunger. CCFD also boasts a network of 15,000 volunteers spread across 99 diocesan committees and 1500 local teams. (http://www.ccfid.asso.fr/ewb_pages/, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).
12. EURODAD (European Network on Debt and Development), founded in 1990, is a network of 59 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from 18 European countries working on issues related to debt, development finance and poverty reduction. The Eurodad network offers a platform for exploring issues, collecting intelligence and ideas, and undertaking collective advocacy. (<http://www.eurodad.org/aboutus/>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).

13. IUCN, the International Union for Conservation of Nature, helps find pragmatic solutions to pressing environment and development challenges. It supports scientific research, manages field projects all over the world and brings governments, non-government organisations, United Nations agencies, companies and local communities together to develop and implement policy, laws and best practice. IUCN is the world's oldest and largest global environmental network - a democratic membership union with more than 1,000 government and NGO member organisations, and almost 11,000 volunteer scientists in more than 160 countries. IUCN's work is supported by over 1,000 professional staff in 60 offices and hundreds of partners in public, NGO and private sectors around the world. (<http://www.iucn.org/about/>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).
14. The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), founded in 1962, is a global network that brings together humanitarian and human rights NGOs as an advocacy alliance for humanitarian action. Focusing on humanitarian and refugee policy issues, ICVA draws upon the work of its members at the field level and brings their experiences to international decision-making forums. ICVA has over 75 member agencies around the world working in the fields of humanitarian relief, human rights, and development. (www.icva.ch, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).
15. The Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), created in 1972, is an alliance for voluntary action of currently nine major international humanitarian organisations and networks including Care International, Caritas International, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, International Save the Children Alliance, Lutheran World Federation, Oxfam, World Council of Churches/ACT and World Vision International. (<http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/IASC/pageloader.aspx?page=content-about-schr>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).
16. The International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease (IUATLD), created in 1920, is a membership organisation that brings innovation, expertise, solutions and support to address health challenges in low- and middle-income populations. The Union has its headquarters in Paris and regional and country offices serving the Africa, Asia Pacific, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, North America and South-East Asia regions (www.theunion.org, retrieved date 26 July, 2009)..
17. The World Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (WANGO) is an international organisation uniting NGOs worldwide in the cause of advancing peace and global wellbeing. WANGO helps to provide the mechanism and support needed for NGOs to connect, partner, share, inspire, and multiply their contributions. Initiated in 2000 by a handful of international NGOs, WANGO is committed to the ideals of universal peace, justice, and wellbeing in over 140 countries (<http://www.wango.org>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).
18. The Conference of NGOs in Consultative Relationship with the United Nations (CONGO), founded in 1948, is an independent, international, non-profit

membership association of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with more than 500 members worldwide. Its role in conceiving forms of NGO participation in UN world conferences and its advocacy on behalf of NGOs at UN Headquarters highlight CONGO's chief objectives: to ensure that NGOs be present when governments discuss issues of global concern at the United Nations and to facilitate NGO discussions on such issues. (<http://www.ngocongo.org>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).

19. The Child Rights Information Networks (CRIN), established in 1995, is a global network coordinating information and promoting action on child rights. More than 2,000 member organisations in 150 countries and tens of thousands more activists from across the world rely on CRIN for research and information (www.crin.org, retrieved date 27 July, 2009)
20. CIVICUS, founded in 1991, is the World Alliance for Citizen Participation. CIVICUS is an international alliance of members and partners which constitute an influential network of organisations at the local, national, regional and international levels, and span the spectrum of civil society including: civil society networks and organisations; trade unions; faith-based networks; professional associations; NGO capacity-development organisations; philanthropic foundations and other funding bodies; businesses; and social responsibility programmes. CIVICUS is an international alliance dedicated to strengthening citizen action and civil society throughout the world. CIVICUS currently has more than 450 members in 110 countries (<http://www.civicus.org>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).
21. The Network of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), founded in 1990, is a dynamic civil society, influencing policies and actions at all levels to safeguard the global environment and promote sustainable development. GEF has 650 members across the world (<http://www.gefngo.org>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).
22. The Coalition for International Criminal Court (CICC), founded in 1995, works in partnership to strengthen international cooperation with the ICC; ensure that the Court is fair, effective and independent; make justice both visible and universal; and advance stronger national laws that deliver justice to victims of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. CICC has 2,500 organisations around the world (<http://www.iccnw.org>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).
23. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), founded in 1919, is the world's largest humanitarian network. The Movement is neutral and impartial, and provides protection and assistance to people affected by disasters and conflicts. The Movement is made up of almost 97 million volunteers, supporters, and staff in 186 countries (www.ifrc.org, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).
24. The Reality of Aid project is the only major North/South international non-governmental initiative focusing exclusively on analysis and lobbying for poverty eradication policies and practices in the international aid regime. It

brings together more than 40 civil society networks working in the field of international cooperation in the 22 donor countries, in Asia, the Americas and Africa. The project builds independent assessment of aid policies and practices, accompanied by constructive dialogue with policy makers at national and international levels. The Reality of Aid project aims to contribute to more effective international aid and development cooperation strategies to eliminate poverty, based on principles of North/South solidarity and equity. (<http://www.realityofaid.org/index.php>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).

25. The Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC) is a non-profit, non-partisan networking NGO founded in 1987 by a group of NGO leaders who saw the need to better coordinate activities in Japanese society and facilitate communication with overseas groups. At present, JANIC has 84 NGO members and is governed by a Board of Trustees, with a secretary general and a pool of 14 staff. (www.janic.org/en, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).
26. Africa Humanitarian Action (AHA) is a pan-African non-governmental organisation (NGO) providing effective humanitarian assistance to alleviate human suffering, building on the strength of African people to solve African problems. Founded in 1994 in response to the Rwandan genocide, it has supported more than 10 million people in 16 African countries to regain their health, dignity and wellbeing. (www.africahumanitarianaction.org, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).
27. Tanzania Social and Economic Trust-TASOET was established by the representatives from several individual NGOs and CBOs 1998, and officially registered in October, 2000 under the TrusteesTM Incorporation Ordinance CAP.375 of the United Republic of Tanzania Law. (<http://www.angonet-tz.org>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).
28. Environment and Development Action in the Third World (ENDA-TM) is an international non-profit organisation based in Dakar, Senegal. Founded in 1972, ENDA is an association of autonomous entities co-ordinated by an Executive Secretariat. ENDA has worldwide representation. (<http://www.enda.sn/english/org.htm>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).
29. The Asia Pacific Research Network (APRN) was established in 1998 as a result of networking including a number of conferences in 1997, where the objective to channel and focus the efforts of NGO research towards supporting the need for information, education and advocacy of grassroots organisations was recognised by a number of key Asian research organisations or non-government organisations with established research departments. With the goal to develop at least one NGO in each target Asian country that can become a research-information provider by introducing data banking and research as a general service, the APRN was formally established in a conference. The APRN also set as one of its objectives the identification of common strategies in research-information work and the development of a common research agenda in support of the members' respective social movements. Since 1999, the APRN has grown to 37 research organisations in 17 countries in Asia and the Pacific. (www.aprnet.org, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).

30. The All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) is a fellowship of Christian churches in Africa that accounts for over 120 million Christians across the continent. AACC is the largest association of Protestant, Anglican, Orthodox and Indigenous churches in Africa and is a member of the worldwide ecumenical network. AACC has 173 members in 40 African countries. (www.aacc-ceta.org/en, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).

31. Care International

- Global size: approximately \$550 million in 2000; 12 member agencies plus CARE International (London); 14,500 staff, of which 90 percent are locally hired (2009). The United States government provides about half the global budget; much of the rest comes from other government and multilateral agencies.
- Founded: 1945 as a US organisation: Cooperative Agency for Relief Everywhere, initially providing relief to refugees and others after WWII; later broadened to relief/welfare in the South, then to development. It executes many projects for government and donor agencies. Members (and percent contribution to total income): the United States (79%), Canada (15%), Australia, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, and Norway.
- International structure: CARE works as a single organisation; each programme in the South is managed by one of the ten CAREs as lead agency.
- Working with 55 million disadvantaged people each year in almost 70 poor countries (2008). (<http://www.care.org>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).

32. World Vision International

- Global size: \$2.2 billion; works with more than 100 million people in 98 countries (2007).
- Founded: 1950 in the US by an evangelist.
- Members (and percent contribution to total income): the US (68%), Canada (12%), the UK (6%), others (14%).
- International structure: Since the late 1980s the programme officers have sat on the WVI council, which meets every three years. The board (which meets regularly and is more powerful) has some Southern representation. WVI maintains strong control over all partners. (<http://www.worldvision.org>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).

33. Save the Children International

- Global size: \$361 million (2007); 26 members; reaching 66 million children in 50 countries including the US; 6,000 staff.
- Founded: 1919 in the UK in response to WWI.
- Members: the US and the UK are largest (both had incomes of approximately \$140 million in 2000). Save the Children-US is over 50 percent US-government funded, Save the Children-UK is about 60 percent privately funded.
- International Structure: it is both the largest and most informal INGO network. The International Save the Children Alliance (ISCA) was established in 1988 and until recently served mostly information and coordination roles; in the mid-

1990s a secretariat was established in London. (<http://www.savethechildren.org>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).

34. Oxfam International

- Global size: \$504 million (1999); 13 members; works with 3,000 local partner organisations in 170 countries (2007).
- Founded: 1942 in the UK (as Oxford Committee for Famine Relief) to bring relief to Greek citizens suffering as a result of the Allies' war effort. It started to establish Oxfams in other countries in the 1970s but soon decided that these should be independent.
- Members: the UK, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Quebec, the US, Hong Kong, and Germany.
- International structure: Until the early 1990s, Oxfam International was a very loose network, though Oxfam UK coordinated relief programmes for all Oxfams. In 1992 the agencies decided to strengthen Oxfam International for advocacy and to explore programme harmonisation. A secretariat with CEO was established in Oxford with sub-offices for advocacy in Washington, Geneva, and Brussels. (<http://www.oxfam.org>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).

35. Plan International

- Global size: \$595 million (2007); 15 member, 80 percent of income from child sponsorship; serving more than 1.5 million children and 9 million people in 49 countries
- Founded: 1937 as Foster Parent Plan to help children victims of the Spanish civil war. Plan works in 42 programme countries.
- Member (and percent contribution to total income): Netherlands (25%), Germany (11%), the US (14%), Japan (9%), the UK (11%), Canada (10%), Norway (7%), Belgium, Australia, and six others.
- International structure: A corporate HQ, initially in the United States, now in the UK, is responsible for all programme work. All national Plans are fund-raisers.
- Total staff is 5,859 (5,358 in programme countries, 422 in national organisations and 79 at HQ). (www.plan-international.org, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).

36. Medecins Sans Frontieres or Doctors without Borders International

- Global size: 569 million EURO (2006); six full members; 19 support members (and Medecins Sans Frontieres International based in Brussels).
- Founded: in France during Biafran war (in response to the Red Cross not being allowed to provide relief without government approval). Medecins Sans Frontieres maintains distance from all governments and emphasises its "witness" role. It has 2,500 volunteer doctors and nurses in 60-70 countries at any given time; 25,000 staff.
- International structure: Full sections were set up from 1981 to 1985 in Belgium, Switzerland, Netherlands, Spain and Luxembourg. Then only support offices formed (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the US, and the UK). Full members share the same charter, act independently, but are loosely coordinated by Medecins Sans Frontieres International. (<http://www.msf.org>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).

37. WWF International

- Global size: \$663 million (2006-2007); five million members; 3,300 staff.
- International structure: Network of largely independent national conservation organisations, mostly Northern based (though there are WWF in some larger Southern countries); serviced by a large Swiss secretariat (WWF-I). To diversify and expand the Southern voice, for the last five years WWF has included programme offices in the deliberating processes, though these have less weight. The largest offices (WWF-US, WWF-NL, and WWF-I) dominate decision making. (<http://www.wwf.org>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).

38. Association of Protestant Development Agencies in Europe (APRODEV) International

- Global size: 720 million EURO (2007); about 40 percent private, and the rest from the European Union and other official sources.
- Members: 18 Protestant church-based NGOs; having 342 groups of churches in 100 countries world wide.
- International structure: Very loose association with a small secretariat in Brussels, largely for making joint statements on policy issues and liaison with World Council of Churches. (<http://www.eed.de/en.home/en.2002.eed>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009).

39. International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity (CIDSE) International

- Global size: \$905 million (2000) for 7,781 projects (32 percent Africa).
- Member: 16 Catholic church-based NGOs in Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the UK) and one in Quebec.
- International structure: Very loose network. (<http://www.cidse.org>, retrieved date 27 July, 2009)

Appendix II:

List of Policy Documents produced by the Royal Government of Cambodia

No.	Title	Ministries/Agencies	Year
1.	A New Development Cooperation Partnership Paradigm for Cambodia	CDC/CRDB	2000
2.	Development Cooperation Report	CDC/CRDB	2000
3.	Advances in Implementing a New Partnership Paradigm in Cambodia	CDC/CRDB	2001
4.	Development Cooperation Report	CDC/CRDB	2001
5.	Building Partnership for Development An Update	CDC/CRDB	2002
6.	Development Cooperation Report	CDC/CRDB	2002
7.	Socio-Economic Development Priorities and the Official Development Assistance Needs (position paper)	CDC/CRDB	2002
8.	Building Partnership for Development An Update	CDC/CRDB	2004
9.	Development Cooperation Report	CDC/CRDB	2004
10.	Practices and Lessons Learned in the Management of Development Cooperation: Case Studies in Cambodia	CDC/CRDB	2004
11.	Capacity Building Practices of Cambodia's Development Partners: Results of a Survey	CDC/CRDB	2004
12.	Implementing the Rectangular Strategy and Development Assistance Needs (position paper)	CDC/CRDB	2004
13.	Cambodia's Report on Progress Toward Enhanced Aid Effectiveness	CDC/CRDB	2005
14.	Development Cooperation Report	CDC/CRDB	2006
15.	Enhancing Development Cooperation Effectiveness to Implement the National Strategic Development Plan (position paper)	CDC/CRDB	2006
16.	Strategic Framework for Development Cooperation Management	CDC/CRDB	2006
17.	Mutual Accountability: An Imperative for Capacity Development?	CDC/CRDB	2006
18.	What structures and processes are emerging at country level to support a more effective and accountable development partnership?: Cambodia Case Study	CDC/CRDB	2006
19.	Cambodia chapter of the OECD/DAC 2006 Paris Declaration monitoring survey	CDC/CRDB	2006
20.	Guideline on the Role and Functioning of the TWGs	CDC/CRDB	2006
21.	The Government-Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC) and Technical Working Groups (TWGs) in Cambodia: A Review	CDC/CRDB	2006
22.	Declaration by the Royal Government of Cambodia and Development Partners on Enhancing Aid Effectiveness	CDC/CRDB	2006
23.	The Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum: Objectives and Procedures	CDC/CRDB	2006
24.	Aid Effectiveness Report 2007 (position paper)	CDC/CRDB	2007
25.	RGC's Action Plan on Harmonisation, Alignment, and Results: 2006-2010	CDC/CRDB	2007
26.	Joint Monitoring Indicators for 1st CDCF Meeting (19-20 June, 2007)	CDC/CRDB	2007
27.	A Capacity Development Strategy for the Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board/Council for the Development of Cambodia, Evaluation of Aid Effectiveness in Cambodia	CDC/CRDB	2007
28.	The Cambodia ODA Database User Manual	CDC/CRDB	2007

29.	Policy Performance of the Royal Government of Cambodia: Report on Progress towards Targets of 2006Joint Monitoring Indicators	CDC/CRDB	2007
30.	Technical Cooperation for Capacity Development in Cambodia: Making the system work better	CDC/CRDB	2008
31.	Developing Health Sector Capacity in Cambodia: The Contribution of Technical Cooperation Patterns, Challenges and Lessons	CDC/CRDB	2008
32.	Paris Declaration Country Chapter Draft Final, August 2008	CDC/CRDB	2008
33.	The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2008	CDC/CRDB	2008
34.	Synthesis Analysis of Self-Assessment Surveys Evaluation of Aid Effectiveness in Cambodia	CDC/CRDB	2008
35.	Independent Review Team-Final Report 2008	CDC/CRDB	2008

Sources: The Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board of the Council for the Development of Cambodia (Retrieved date, 18 June, 2009, www.cdc_crdb.gov.kh and www.mop.gov.kh).

Appendix III: 19 Joint Technical Working Groups (TWGs)

No.	TWG	Government (Chair/Co-Chair)	Lead Donor Facilitators	NGO Representatives
1.	Agriculture and Water	The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery The Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology	France Australia	The Resource Development International Cambodia
2.	Decentralisation and Deconcentration	The Ministry of Interior	The United Kingdom	One NGO Representative- No information available.
3.	Education	The Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports	UNESCO	The NGO Education Partnership (NEP) with its five selective members
4.	Fisheries	The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery	The United Kingdom	The World Fish Centre, Greater Mekong Regional Office
5.	Food Security and Nutrition	The Council for Agriculture and Rural Development The Ministry of Planning	World Food Programme FAO	The NGO Forum on Cambodia (NGOF) and Cambodia and Cambodian Development Research Institute (CDRI) and Oxfam Great Britain ⁸²
6.	Forestry and Environment	The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery	Denmark	The NGO Forum on Cambodia (NGOF)
7.	Gender	The Ministry of Women's Affairs	UNDP Japan	One NGO Representative- No information available.
8.	Health	The Ministry of Health	WHO	Medicam
9.	HIV/AIDS	The National Aids Authority	UNICEF	The Khmer HIV/AIDS NGO Alliance (KHANA)
10.	Land	The Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction	Germany	The NGO Forum on Cambodia (NGOF)
11.	Mine Action	The Council of Ministers	UNDP	The Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC)
12.	Partnership and Harmonisation	The CRDB/CDC	UN Systems	The Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC)
13.	Planning and Poverty Reduction	The Ministry of Planning	UN Systems World Bank	The NGO Forum on Cambodia (NGOF) and Cambodian Development Research Institute (CDRI)
14.	Public Financial Management	The Ministry of Economy and Finance	World Bank	The NGO Forum on Cambodia (NGOF)

⁸² The three NGO Representatives: NGOF, CDRI and Oxfam GB participate. Sources: Food Security and Nutrition, 2009a, Minutes of TWG on Food Security and Nutrition Meeting, Retrieved date November 05, 2009, http://www.foodsecurity.gov.kh/docs/docsMeetings/Draft_Minutes_TWGF-SN%20Meeting_10Feb09.pdf; Food Security and Nutrition, 2009b, TOR of Interim Working Group on Social Safety Net, Retrieved date November 05, 2009, http://www.foodsecurity.gov.kh/docs/docsMeetings/TOR_Sub-group%20on%20SSN_10Feb09.pdf.

15.	Rural Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene ⁸³	The Ministry of Rural Development	ADB	International NGOs from the Water and Sanitation (WATSAN) Group ⁸⁴
16.	Infrastructure and Regional Integration	The Ministry of Public Works and Transportation	Japan ADB	No NGO Representative
17.	Legal and Judicial Reform	The Council of Jurists	UNDP France	No NGO Representative
18.	Public Administration Reform	The Council for Administrative Reform	Australia World Bank	No NGO Representative
19.	Private Sector Development	The Ministry of Economy and Finance The Ministry of Commerce The Ministry of Mine, Industry and Energy	World Bank	No NGO Representative

Sources: CDC/CRDB, 2006c, 2007a, 2008d

⁸³ TWG on Rural Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene was established in November 2007: MORD, 2007, TOR of TWG on Rural Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene, Unpublished document, Phnom Penh, Cambodia).

⁸⁴ The TOR of TWG on Rural Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene. (Source: MORD, 2007, TOR of TWG on Rural Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene, Unpublished document, Phnom Penh, Cambodia).

Appendix IV: Field Research Process and Methodology

The Field Research Process and Methodology included information sheets, the consent form, and the interview questions (for donors, government officials and NGOs).



Information Sheet for Key Participants

First of all, thank you very much for volunteering and taking part in this research.

Research Title: “NGO Coordination and the Changing Aid Environment: Challenges and Opportunities-A Cambodian Case Study”

Researcher: Samnang Chum: School of Geography, Environment and Earth Science, Victoria University of Wellington

Purpose of the Research:

The aim of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of NGO coordination on development and poverty reduction in the new aid environment adopted by the Cambodian government and donor community. Therefore, the main objective for this exercise is

- To assess evolving coordination processes among the national and provincial NGOs working on development and poverty reduction in Cambodia’s changing aid environment

I am conducting this research through semi-structured interviews by interviewing a number of possible key informants from the Cambodian government ministries and institutions, donor agencies, NGOs and educational and research institutions.

Your identity will be kept confidential as nothing you say will be traced back to your position or the organization that you work for. Indeed, the researcher will only use the terms such as “government 1”, “donors 2”, “NGOs 3” and “research institutions or think tanks 4” to identify statements. Only the researcher and the researcher’s supervisor (Dr. Andrew McGregor) will be able to access the data collected.

The interviews can be conducted in your office or anywhere you prefer and will take around 45-60 minutes. If you would like I can email you the interview questions before we meet. You will be asked to sign the consent form for this study; if you do not wish to do so, you can provide verbal consent. Also, you will be asked to agree to an audio recording of the conversation, and thus your interview will be quoted by using a pseudonym (false name). Moreover, you can choose whether to have English or Khmer conversation. All interviews will later be transcribed. The important points will be written down in the forms of notes immediately after the conversation. Notes will be kept in a safe location at all times.

Furthermore, upon completion of the project, notes will be disposed of (shredded), tapes will be wiped, and informed consent forms will be submitted to the course supervisor who will keep them locked in a filing cabinet in a locked office. In the final report, no individuals will be identified by names or position in the research. A summary of research findings will be made available to the interested participants upon the request by email after thesis completion. The thesis will be submitted to the School of Geography, Environment and Earth Science and deposited in the University Library. It is intended that one or two articles will be submitted for publication in scholarly journals.

This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Human Ethics Committee at the Victoria University of Wellington.

If you have any questions or would like to receive further information about the project, please contact me or my supervisor through the address below.

Mr. Samnang Chum,
Postgraduate student of Masters in
Development Studies,
Department of Development Studies,
Victoria University of Wellington,
Phone: +64-21-178-1271
Email: cs.samnang@gmail.com

Dr. Andrew McGregor,
Senior Lecturer in Development Studies
Department of Development Studies
Victoria University of Wellington,
Wellington, New Zealand
Phone: +64-463-8110
Email: andrew.mcgregor@vuw.ac.nz.

Samnang Chum

Signed:

Consent To Participation In Research

**Title of Project: “NGO Coordination and the Changing Aid Environment:
Challenges and Opportunities-A Cambodia Case Study”**

I have been given and have understood an explanation of this research project. I have had an opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I may withdraw myself (or any information I have provided) from this project (before data collection and analysis is complete) without having to give reasons or without penalty of any sort.

- ☐ I consent to information or opinions which I have not given being attributed to me in any reports on this research.
- ☐ I would like to tape recordings of my interview returned to me at the conclusion of the project.
- ☐ I understand that I will have an opportunity to check the transcripts of the interview before publication.
- ☐ (Only where appropriate) I understand that the University retains insurance cover against claims relating to harm, loss or damage suffered by participants in research projects as a result of any negligent act, error or omission by or on behalf of the University.
- ☐ I understand that the data I provide will not be used for any other purpose or released to others without my written consent.
- ☐ I would like to receive a summary of the results of this research when it is completed.
- ☐ I agree to take part in this research
[Or I agree that _____, who is under my guardianship, may take part in this research].

Signed:

Name of participant

(Please print clearly)

Date :



**List of Interview Questions for Informants such as government officials, donors,
NCBs, NGO members and non-members***

1. Could you tell me a little bit your roles in your organisation?
2. How have your agency's operations changed since the new aid structure was adopted in 2004?
3. What do you know of the NGO coordination existing in Cambodia? How do you think NGO coordinating bodies benefit the NGO sector and Cambodian society?
4. How do you think the NGO coordinating bodies could be improved in order to represent the Cambodian society for poverty reduction, justice and equality after the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness?
 - What measure or options can be adopted to improve and enhance NGO coordination?
 - How well do you think the NGO community is aware of the NGO coordination in Cambodia?
 - In your perspective, what do think about the operational and ethical principles and guidelines and other codes initiated by the CCC to improve effectiveness of the NGO sector?
 - Should an NGO concentrate its activities just on one or few sectors? What are the reasons for and the implications of the diverse activities implemented by NGOs?
5. How do you define the roles of NGO representatives/NGO coordinating bodies as one of the key stakeholders in CDCF, GDCC and TWGs? How do NGO representatives engage in the aid coordination process?
 - Should NGO representatives present their roles in all 19 TWGs?
 - There has been a clear communication between donors and the Cambodian government, how does the communication between NGOs, donors and the Cambodian government flow in the aid coordination process?
6. How do you think that the new aid mechanism affects NGO umbrellas/NGO sector/NGO representatives and what response have they made in the aid coordination process?
 - Should NGOs adopt an approach similar to the "Paris Declaration?

- How do you think donors will continue to support the third sector or should donor communities create a special basket fund for the NGO sector in Cambodia? Or is there an alternative option to support them? If so, should common standard reporting and other common arrangements be developed to reduce the time consumption which NGOs are now facing?
7. How do you think the relationship between NGO Coordinating Bodies/NGOs and the Royal Government of Cambodia has changed after the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness?
- Currently, there is no NGO law in Cambodia. How does a lack of a legal framework for the NGO sector affect NGOs' activities?
 - Should the Cambodian government regulate NGOs operating in Cambodia? If so, what would a new NGO law look like? And which government institution should be mandated to manage the NGO sector?
8. Based on your experience and observation, what is the relationship between NGOs and donors before and after the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness?
- In your experience and observation, do donors consult with NGOs when their projects/programme and/or country assistance strategy for Cambodia are developed? What benefit do donors have in collaboratively working with NGO sector?
 - How do you think some donors have helped NGOs to influence the Cambodian government for policy changes? How effective is this way?
9. Is there anything else you would like to say?

*Note: The questions were revised in each interview, with government, donors, NGO coordination bodies, NGO members and non-members in the period of interview.

Appendix V:

Analysis of NGO Coordination Bodies (NCBs) and Provincial NGO Alliances (NAs)

1). Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC)

Establishment Date: In 1991 by 24 INGOs as INGO. CCC had its first Cambodian executive director in 2007

Vision: A strong and capable civil society, cooperating and responsive to Cambodia's development challenges.

Mission: As a professional association of non-government organisations in Cambodia, the Cooperation Committee of Cambodia provides high quality services to civil society and influences Cambodia's development partners with a collective voice.

Objective: To achieve its mission, CCC has adopted four strategic goals. Each goal relates to a sub-clause of its mission.

- Strengthen the collective voice of civil society
- Enhance effective cooperation across civil society
- Influence the thinking and practice of Cambodia's development partners
- Deliver high quality services appropriately responding to the true needs of non-government organisations

Programme/Project: Analysing Development Issues (ADI) Project and CCC NGO Good Practice Project (NGO GPP)

Members: 110 (78 International and 27 Local NGOs, as well as 5 Associate members), a number of sub-working groups and monthly members meeting

Staff: 18 Cambodian staff, four foreign advisors and four vacant positions

Budget: \$466,032 (\$86,059 from membership fees, \$58,087 office space rent fees, \$22,788 from publication fees and the rest from donors such as Ausaid, AAI, BD, CCO-CIDA, CWS, Danida, EED, ESP, FSIF, Oxfam Aus, Oxfam GB, UNDP-CDC in 2008 (Annual Report 2008)

Governance system: Formal Structure, seven executive management committee members, annual management meeting and monthly member meeting, reporting and auditing system, five year strategic plan and by-laws and information system

Working relationship with other actors: Has a good relationship with government institutions such as CDC/CRDB, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the Ministry of Interiors and others and the

donors such as Ausaid, UNDP, European Union, Denmark, Canada and others

National Coordination Activities: Organising and preparing NGO position papers for CDCF, GDCC and TWG on Partnership and Harmonisation

International Coordination Activities: Participating in regional and global conferences such as the Regional Conference on Aid Effectiveness in Hanoi and the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra.

Website: www.ccc-cambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009

2). NGO Forum on Cambodia (NGOF) as LNGO

Establishment Date: began in 1980s as an INGOs and became a LNGO in 1993 with a Khmer executive director

Vision: Cambodia will have a well-informed and empowered population participating in a strong and vibrant civil society, to the benefit of poor and vulnerable people in Cambodia.

Mission: The NGO Forum is made up of local and international non-governmental organisations grounded in their experience of humanitarian and development assistance to Cambodia. The NGO Forum exists for information-sharing, debate and advocacy on priority issues affecting Cambodia's development. The NGO Forum has an important role to highlight the impact of development processes and economic, social and political changes on Cambodians.

Objective: The rights of poor and vulnerable groups in Cambodia are recognised and supported by the policies and practices of Cambodia's government and donors, and by the wider community.

Programme/Project: Three programmes: Development Issues Programme (development issue, economic development policy, national budget and aid effectiveness), Environment Programme (environmental awareness and protection, pesticides reduction and sustainable agriculture, and hydropower and community rights), and Land and livelihood Programme (land titling and land grabbing, indigenous minority land rights, resettlement and housing rights, and forest livelihoods and plantations and land information centre)

Members: 83 members (33 INGOs, 48 LNGOs and 2 Association members), Ten sub-working groups

Staff: 29 Cambodian staff and three foreign advisors, six vacant positions

Budget: \$999,779 in 2008 (\$8,500 from membership fees, \$43,026 from other receipts, and the rest from donors such as AAI Cambodia, Broederlijk Delen, Catholic Fund for Overseas Development, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Christian Aid, DanChurchAid, Development and Peace (Caritas Canada), Diakonia, European Union, Interchurch Organisation for Development, Co-operation (ICCO), Misereor, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), Oxfam America, Oxfam Australia, Oxfam Great Britain, Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund (SCIAF), Trocaire, USAID through East West Management, Institute (EWMI), World Vision International - Cambodia

Governance system: Formal structure, seven executive management committee members, annual management meeting and monthly member meeting, reporting and auditing system, five year strategic plan and by-laws and information system

Working relationship with other actors: Having a good relationship with government institutions such as CDC/CRDB, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the Ministry of Interiors and others and the donors such as Ausaid, UNDP, European Union, Usaid, Norway and others

National Coordination Activities: Organising and preparing NGO position papers for CDCF, GDCC and a number of TWGs on Planning and Poverty Reduction, Gender, Land, Food Security.

International Coordination Activities: Participating in regional and global conferences such as the Regional Conference on Aid Effectiveness in Hanoi and the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra.

Website: www.ngoforum.org.kh, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009

3). Medicam as LNGO

Establishment Date: in 1989 and run by a Khmer executive director

Vision: Improved health status in Cambodia by building bridges between the health sector's NGO community and the Royal Government of Cambodia.

Mission: Medicam is the primary networking agency for the country's health-related NGOs. It seeks to link all health sector stakeholders by representing the voice of its NGO members, facilitating policy, advocacy, building capacity of Medicam's members and health partners, and sharing relevant quality information.

Activities: In addition to its representation and advocacy role, information exchange, and capacity building, Medicam also provides the following services:

- A large e-mail network for the fast dissemination of Cambodia's health-related information. This network facilitates faster and easier transmission and reception by the membership of essential information from the field. Direct e-mail contact with high officials in the Ministry of Health also greatly enhances communication. To date, the network comprises over 900 very targeted health professional correspondents, with some acting themselves as a relay to other networks, expanding readership even further
- The holding of a health related library/documentation centre (containing nearly 4,000 documents and books) with an average of 30 new documents added each month. These include publications, reports, study findings, evaluations, etc.
- The creation and maintenance of several Cambodian health-related databases: NGO health projects in Cambodia, countrywide health experts directory, etc.
- A monthly health-related conference with information exchange, a health lecture/debate, and an essential tea break for informal networking!
- A monthly newsletter, summarising the main news items in the health sector and broadcasting announcements from Medicam members.
- Organisation and facilitation of working groups addressing specific health issues: health financing, cost-recovery/user's fee schemes, community participation, prison health, reproductive health working group, etc.
- Special health-related events (conferences, workshop, courses).
- Support to Cambodian health NGOs by having all activities bilingual (English/Khmer), organising courses and workshops, monthly meeting of Cambodian NGOs, organisational support to regional NGO networks, facilitating overseas scholarship, etc.
- Orient and advise numerous visitors such as consultants, researchers, officials, new comers in Cambodia, new NGO/UN/IO staff, etc.
- A website representing the Medicam Community
- Compile in-country job vacancies in the health sector, as well as maintain a folder of qualified health professionals (both Cambodian and expatriate) available for missions.

Projects: Information Exchange, Representing the Voice of NGOs & Facilitating Advocacy, Provincial Networking and Capacity Building Project (PNCB), Building Management Capacity for Cambodian NGOs (BMCC) and Engaging Communities.

Members: 131 members (55 INGOs, 61 LNGOs, 13 associate members and two individuals), and 13 sub-sector working groups

Staff: N/A (No Annual Report Available)

Budget: N/A (No Annual Report Available)

Governance system: Formal structure, seven executive management committee members, annual management meeting and monthly member meeting, reporting and auditing system, five year strategic plan and by-laws and information system (by-laws, strategic plan and annual reports is not available)

Working relationship with other actors: Has a good relationship with government institutions such as CDC/CRDB, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the Ministry of Interiors and particularly the Ministry of Health, and the donors such as Ausaid, UNDP, European Union, Usaid, Norway and others

National Coordination Activities: Organising and preparing NGO position papers for CDCF, GDCC and TWG on health.

Website: www.medicam-cambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009

4). NGO Education Partnership (NEP) as LNGO

Establishment Date: in 2001 and became an LNGO with a Khmer executive director

Mission: NGO Education Partnership is a membership organisation that coordinates dialogue and cooperation among key stakeholders to improve the quality and accessibility of education in Cambodia.

Programme/Project: NEP is committed to developing dialogue between government and civil society on education issues, undertaking and disseminating research on key issues, and helping education NGOs increase their effectiveness.

In the past year, NEP has:

- Supported the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MoEYS) during the Education Strategic/Education Sector Support Plan Mid-term Review process
- Participated in education policy reform discussions on behalf of the education NGO sector
- Completed a National Education NGO Inventory, with 78 education NGOs reporting on their activities, challenges, achievements and financial commitments
- Produced a 2008 Position Paper on Education for the Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF)
- Released a research report on pre-school education and its impact on primary school enrolment
- Produced and released a research report on teacher motivation and related issues
- Produced and released an annual Education NGO report on education sector activities and challenges
- Continued to monitor the practice of informal school fees
- Facilitated two enrolment campaigns supporting increased primary level enrolment
- Played a lead role in planning and implementing Cambodia's Global Action Week as part of the Global Campaign for Education
- Organised bi-monthly information sharing meetings and offered training workshop for its members

NEP will continue to facilitate discussions and act on opportunities for collaboration, collective learning and action for higher quality and accessible education.

Members: 79 members (33 INGOs and 46 LNGOs)

Staff: Six Cambodian staff and one foreign staff member (Understaffed)

Budget: Limited financial resources (Donors are UNICEF, VSO, MISEREOR, ASPBAE) (Annual report is not available)

Governance system: Has a structure and a five year strategic plan

Working relationship with other actors: Has a good relationship with government institutions such as CDC/CRDB, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the Ministry of Interiors and particularly the Ministry of Education, and the donors such as European Union, UN agencies-UNICEF and others

National Coordination Activities: Organising and preparing NGO position papers for CDCF, GDCC and TWG on education.

Website: www.nepcambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009

5). Action Committee for Human Rights (CHRAC) as LNGO

Establishment Date: in 1994 by a group of LNGOs

Vision: Cambodia as a peaceful and liberal democracy where development takes place in an environment where human rights are respected and protected.

Mission: To reduce the number of serious violations of human rights in Cambodia

Activities: human rights advocacy, management and investigation of human rights and land rights, encouragement of formulation of laws to help reduce practices of human rights violations in Cambodia with the National Assembly and Senate, and engagement and monitoring of Khmer Rouge Tribunal (KRT).

Members: 21 members of LNGOs and associations

Staff: Ten secretariat staff

Budget: N/A, donors such as National Endowment for Democracy (NED), German Development Services (DED), East West Management Institute (EWMI) and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

Governance system: Five steering committee members, three sub-committees: investigation (seven members), legislation (10 members) and KRT

(eight members), 18 provincial action committees. No long-term strategic plan, by-laws.

Working relationship with other actors: Might have a good relationship with government institutions but no specific information, and with donors such as Germany, Norway and USAid.

National Coordination Activities: Contributing to NGO position papers for KRT and other papers for CDCF.

Website: <http://www.chrac.org/eng>, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009

6). End Child Prostitution, Abuse and Trafficking in Cambodia (ECPAT-Cambodia) as LNGO

Establishment Date: in 1995

Vision: ECPAT-Cambodia's vision is the realisation of the rights of all children to live free of child prostitution, abuse, child pornography and child trafficking for sexual purposes.

Mission: ECPAT-Cambodia works to eliminate the commercial sexual exploitation of children through awareness-raising, advocacy, monitoring and the coordination of actions and sharing information among relevant stakeholders.

Objective: The objectives of ECPAT Cambodia are:

- To create a strong and effective network to fight against the sexual exploitation of children by strengthening the internal management affairs of ECPAT and the capacity building of members.
- To strengthen collaboration among members and stakeholders against child sex tourism, child trafficking, sexual abuse and exploitation, and child pornography.
- To monitor the implementation of the National Plan against Trafficking in Persons and Sexual Exploitation (TIPSE)
- To promote and uphold the rights of children and youth to participate in planning, implementing and assessing actions against sexual exploitation.
- To influence the government, international government organisations and the private sector to become more accountable for protecting children against sexual exploitation

Programme/Project: Commercial sexual exploitation is the sexual abuse of a child by an adult paid for either by cash or in kind (through meals, clothes, payment of rent etc). The four elements are: child prostitution, child pornography, child sex tourism and trafficking of children for sexual purposes.

Members: 27 Members (8 INGOs and 19 LNGOs and Associations)

Staff: More than four staff (There are four management staff)

Budget: \$ USD 393,694 in 2008 (\$1,275 from membership fees and \$890 from private contributions, \$40,000 from volunteer advisor and the rest from donors such as ANESVAD and INTERVIDA)

Governance system: Five members of board of directors, five year strategic plan and annual report, no by-laws, reporting, financial and auditing systems.

Working relationship with other actors: Might have a good relationship with government institutions but no specific information, and the donors such as Usaid, the Asia Foundation and others.

National Coordination Activities: Contributing to NGO position papers for KRT and other papers for CDCF.

Website: www.ecpatcambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009

Desk Review Analysis of NGO Coordination Bodies (NCBs) and Provincial NGO Alliances (NAs)

Items	CCC	NGOF	Medicam	NEP	CHRA	ECPAT	Other NCBs	NAs
Roles	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪Agency: Strong advocacy at the national level ▪Poor Capacity and limited connection at provincial and community levels ▪Support: Capacity building, research capacity and facilitating, coordinating and representing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪Agency: Strong advocacy at the national level ▪Average Capacity and connection at provincial and community levels ▪Support: Capacity building, research capacity and facilitating, coordinating and representing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪Agency: Strong advocacy at the national level ▪Good Capacity and connection at provincial and community levels ▪Support: Capacity building, research capacity and facilitating, coordinating and representing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪Agency: Strong advocacy at the national level ▪Poor Capacity and limited connection at provincial and community levels ▪Support: Capacity building, research capacity and facilitating, coordinating and representing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪Agency: Strong advocacy at the national level ▪Strong Capacity and connection at provincial and community levels ▪Support: Capacity building, research capacity and facilitating, coordinating and representing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪Agency: Strong advocacy at the national level ▪Poor Capacity and limited connection at provincial and community levels ▪Support: Capacity building and funding for projects, and facilitating but not representing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪Agency: Weak advocacy at the national level ▪Poor Capacity and limited connection at provincial and community levels ▪Support: Poor capacity building and funding for projects, not facilitating and representing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪Agency: Limited advocacy at the national level ▪Poor Capacity at the provincial level ▪Support: No capacity building and research capacity, not facilitating and representing
Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪Strong governance system as implementing NGO GPP and NGO Voluntary Certification System ▪Good financial reporting and strategic plan ▪High profile 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪Strong governance system as implementing NGO GPP and NGO Voluntary Certification System ▪Good financial reporting and strategic plan ▪High profile 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪Strong governance system as implementing NGO GPP and NGO Voluntary Certification System ▪Good financial reporting and strategic plan ▪High profile 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪Good governance system implementing NGO GPP and NGO Voluntary Certification System ▪Good financial reporting and strategic plan ▪Well known 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪Good governance system ▪Good financial reporting and strategic plan ▪Well known brand at national level ▪Clear objective and strategy ▪Having a number of sub- 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪Average governance system ▪Good financial reporting and strategic plan ▪Well known brand at international and national levels ▪Clear objective and strategy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪Weak governance system ▪Average financial reporting and strategic plan ▪average brand at national level ▪Unclear objective and strategy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪Formal Institutional development does not exist, but informal gathering when it is necessary with weak governance system ▪Not well known at national level or even their

Items	CCC	NGOF	Medicam	NEP	CHRAC	ECPAT	Other NCBs	NAs
	brand at international and national levels ▪Average profile brand at community level ▪Clear objective and strategy ▪Having a number of sector and networking groups with monthly members meeting ▪Participation agreement ▪No external institutional evaluation report	brand at international and national levels ▪Average profile brand at community level ▪Clear objective and strategy ▪Having 10 working groups with monthly members meeting ▪Participation agreement ▪No external institutional evaluation report	brand at international and national levels ▪Average profile brand at community level ▪Clear objective and strategy ▪Having a number of sub sector working groups with monthly members meeting ▪Participation agreement ▪No external institutional evaluation report	brand at national level ▪Poor profile brand at community level ▪Clear objective and strategy ▪Having a number of sub-sector working groups with monthly members meeting ▪Participation agreement ▪No external institutional evaluation report	sector and networking groups with monthly members meeting ▪Participation agreement ▪No external institutional evaluation report	▪monthly members meeting ▪Participation agreement ▪No external institutional evaluation report	▪monthly members meeting ▪Participation agreement No external institutional evaluation report	community
Localisation and Scope	▪Headquarter in Phnom Penh ▪Many members are based in the capital ▪Having decentralised work in 2008 in mobilising collective voice on NGO law	▪Headquarter in Phnom Penh ▪Many members are based in the capital ▪Having decentralised work by sector ▪Monthly members meeting mostly	▪Headquarter in Phnom Penh ▪More members are based in provinces ▪Decentralised work via two provincial offices ▪All stages of policy process	▪Headquarter in Phnom Penh ▪More members are based in provinces ▪Less decentralised work ▪All stages of policy process but mostly	▪Headquarter in Phnom Penh ▪Decentralised via 18 provincial sub committees ▪All stages of policy process but mostly policy formulation	▪Headquarter in Phnom Penh ▪Less decentralised work ▪All stages of policy process and advocacy ▪Not just government but donors	▪Headquarter in Phnom Penh ▪Less decentralised work ▪All stages of policy process and advocacy	▪Office is rotating by NGO member who takes a lead in the province ▪More decentralised work ▪All stages of policy process and advocacy

Items	CCC	NGOF	Medicam	NEP	CHRAc	ECPAT	Other NCBs	NAs
	and NGO GPP through workshop and training in the provinces. ▪Monthly members meeting mostly conducted in the capital ▪All stages of policy process and advocacy on common issues ▪Not just government but donors	conducted in the capital ▪All stages of policy process and advocacy by sector ▪Not just government but donors	but mostly policy formulation and implementation in health ▪Not just government but donors	policy formulation and implementation in education ▪Not just government but donors	and implementation in human rights ▪Not just government but donors			for the provincial government and local authority
Capacity and Skill	▪Not enough staff (18 Cambodian staff, four advisors and four vacant positions) ▪Need more skilled and qualified Khmer staff (IT, policy analysis, and aid effectiveness) ▪Limited fundraising strategic	▪Not enough staff (29 Cambodian staff, three advisors and six vacant positions) ▪Need more skilled and qualified Khmer staff (IT, policy analysis, and aid effectiveness) ▪Good fundraising strategic	▪Strong capacity of secretariat ▪Khmer staff ▪Research networking, database communication s, management and fundraising skill are good ▪Capacity for evidence based policymaking influence ▪Good fundraising strategic development	▪Not enough staff (5 Cambodian staff, one volunteer advisor and one vacant position) ▪Need more skilled and qualified Khmer staff (IT, policy analysis) ▪Limited fundraising strategic development	▪Strong capacity of secretariat ▪Khmer staff ▪Need more skilled and qualified Khmer staff (IT, policy analysis) ▪Limited fundraising strategic development skills	▪Strong capacity of secretariat ▪Khmer staff ▪Need more skilled and qualified Khmer staff (IT, policy analysis) ▪Limited fundraising strategic development skills	▪Not enough staff ▪Need more skilled and qualified Khmer staff (IT, policy analysis) ▪Limited fundraising strategic development skills	▪No support and skilled staff ▪Poor fundraising strategic development skills ▪Poor communication and IT

Items	CCC	NGOF	Medicam	NEP	CHRAAC	ECPAT	Other NCBs	NAs
	development skills ▪Building staff's capacity (Some staff have been trained overseas and at university in Phnom Penh) ▪Having a few advocacy experts but need more advocacy staff	development skills ▪Having a few advocacy experts but need more advocacy staff ▪Capacity for evidence based policymaking influence	skills	skills				
Resources	▪Low funding support for the entire programme and external activities with the government such as aid effectiveness ▪Human resources are limited as some staff departed in 2008 ▪Good ICT and database	▪Good funding support for the entire programme and external activities with the government such as aid effectiveness ▪Human resources are limited as some staff departed in 2008 ▪Good ICT and database	▪Good funding support for the entire programme and external activities with the government ▪Good human resources ▪Good ICT and database	▪Low funding support for the entire programme and external activities with the government ▪Human resources are limited ▪Average ICT and database	▪Low funding support for the entire programme and external activities with the government ▪Human resources are limited ▪Good ICT and database	▪Low funding support for the entire programme and external activities with the government ▪Human resources are limited ▪Good ICT and database	▪Poor funding support for the entire programme and external activities with the government ▪Human resources are very limited ▪Good ICT and database	▪No funding support for the entire programme and external activities with the government ▪Human resources are very limited ▪No ICT and database
Membership	▪Three levels of membership-clear criteria for each ▪Fee is different	▪Three levels of membership-clear criteria for each ▪Fee is different	▪Three levels of membership-clear criteria for each ▪Fee is different	▪One standard of membership ▪ Fee is fixed for INGOs and LNGOs	▪Unclear membership criteria ▪Fee is fixed ▪A minimum	▪Unclear membership criteria ▪Fee is fixed ▪A minimum	▪Unclear membership criteria ▪Fee is fixed ▪A minimum	▪No membership criteria and fee ▪Participation is voluntary

Items	CCC	NGOF	Medicam	NEP	CHRAc	ECPAT	Other NCBs	NAs
	for each level ■A minimum amount of participation is required from members and some tasks are mandatory ■Membership agreement ■More heterogeneous membership ■Member replication with other NCBs but free open membership ■Representing only members ■Members (LNGOs) lack advocacy expertise	for each level ■A minimum amount of participation is required from members and some tasks are mandatory ■Membership agreement ■More heterogeneous membership ■Member replication with other NCBs but free open membership ■Representing only members ■Members (LNGOs) lack advocacy expertise	for each level ■A minimum amount of participation is required from members and some tasks are mandatory ■Membership agreement ■More heterogeneous membership ■Member replication with other NCBs but free open membership ■Representing only members ■Members (LNGOs) lack advocacy expertise	■A minimum amount of participation is required from members and some tasks are mandatory ■Membership agreement ■More heterogeneous membership ■Member replication with other NCBs but free open membership ■Representing only members ■Members (LNGOs) lack advocacy expertise	amount of participation is required from members ■No Membership agreement ■Member replication with other NCBs but free open membership	amount of participation is required from members ■No Membership agreement ■Member replication with other NCBs but free open membership	amount of participation is required from members ■No Membership agreement ■Member replication with other NCBs but free open membership	
Organisation structure	■Clear organisational structure with members (INGOs, LNGOs, associate members), executive	■Clear organisational structure with members (INGOs, LNGOs, associate members), executive	■Clear organisational structure with members (INGOs, LNGOs, associate members), executive	■Clear organisational structure with members (INGOs, LNGOs, associate members), executive	■Clear organisational structure with members (INGOs, LNGOs, associate members), executive	■Unclear organisational structure with members (INGOs, LNGOs, associate members), executive	■Unclear organisational structure with members (INGOs, LNGOs, associate members), executive	■No organisational structure

Items	CCC	NGOF	Medicam	NEP	CHRAc	ECPAT	Other NCBs	NAs
	management committee and its seven members ▪Has five year strategic plan and by-laws ▪High hierarchal structure and coordination work	management committee and its seven members ▪Has five year strategic plan and by-law ▪High hierarchal structure and coordination work	management committee and its seven members ▪Decentralised structure and coordination work	management committee and its five members ▪Has five year strategic plan but no by-laws ▪Hierarchal structure and coordination work	management committee and its five members ▪No five year strategic plan and by-laws ▪Decentralised structure and coordination work from national to provincial levels	management committee and its five members ▪Has five year strategic plan but no by-laws ▪Hierarchal structure and coordination work	management committee and its five members ▪No five year strategic plan but no by-laws ▪Hierarchal structure and coordination work	
Communication	▪Strategy, staff, funding and ICT	▪Strategy, staff, funding and ICT	▪Strategy, staff, funding and ICT	▪Strategy, staff, funding and ICT	▪Strategy, staff, funding and ICT	▪Strategy, staff, funding and ICT	▪Strategy, staff, funding and ICT	▪No strategy, staff, funding and ICT
External Environment	Cultural Challenge ▪Lack of trust ▪Weak institutions ▪Hesitation to ask for and offer help ▪Fear of losing face ▪Highly hierarchical (Patron-Client Relationships) ▪Reluctance to be critical of others			Challenges in the NGO climate ▪Culture of participation-per-diem and free lunch and drink ▪Highly centralised aid industry ▪Bureaucratic institutions and process ▪Lack of capacity of staff and executive director, institution ▪Low NGO professionalism ▪Proliferation of NGO seeking funding			Challenges in the political arena ▪Relatively low freedom of speech and real democratisation ▪Strong executive and weak legislative ▪High corruption ▪Weak judicial system ▪Lack of transparency and accountability ▪Juxtaposing of programmes and responsibilities	
Strategic adaptive capacity	▪Can deal with internal and external change ▪Flexible ▪Can deal with reform process	▪Can deal with internal and external change ▪Flexible ▪Can deal with reform process	▪Can deal with internal and external change ▪Flexible ▪Can deal with reform process	▪Limited capacity to deal with internal and external change	▪Limited capacity to deal with internal and external change ▪Low degree of	▪Limited capacity to deal with internal and external change ▪Low degree of	Limited capacity to deal with internal and external change ▪Low degree of	▪No capacity to deal with internal and external change ▪No mobilisation of members

Items	CCC	NGOF	Medicam	NEP	CHRAAC	ECPAT	Other NCBs	NAs
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪Is upgrading outputs and strategies ▪Partly dependent on steady funding from external sources (donors and INGOs) but could be sustainable (based on membership, office space and publication fees) in the future ▪Slow mobilisation of members ▪No collective voice on the common issues ▪Slowly building the awareness of NGO coordination and NGO GPP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪Is upgrading outputs and strategies ▪Largely dependent on steady funding from external sources (donors and INGOs) ▪Slow mobilisation of members ▪Limited collective voice on some issues ▪Slowly building the awareness of NGO coordination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪Is upgrading outputs and strategies ▪Partly dependent on steady funding from external sources (donors and INGOs) but could be sustainable (based on membership and publication fees) in the future ▪Slow mobilisation of members ▪Having appropriate collective voice on health issues ▪Slowly building the awareness of NGO coordination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪Low degree of flexibility ▪Limited capacity to deal with reform process ▪Is upgrading outputs and strategies ▪Largely dependent on steady funding from external sources (donors and INGOs) ▪Slow mobilisation of members ▪Having appropriate collective voice on education issues ▪Slowly building the awareness of NGO coordination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> flexibility ▪Limited capacity to deal with reform process ▪Is upgrading outputs and strategies ▪Largely dependent on steady funding from external sources (donors and INGOs) ▪Slow mobilisation of members ▪Having appropriate collective voice on human rights issues ▪Slowly building the awareness of NGO coordination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> flexibility ▪Limited capacity to deal with reform process ▪Is upgrading outputs and strategies ▪Largely dependent on steady funding from external sources (donors and INGOs) ▪Slow mobilisation of members ▪Having appropriate collective voice on child exploitation, trafficking and labour issues ▪Slowly building the awareness of NGO coordination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> flexibility ▪Limited capacity to deal with reform process ▪Largely dependent on steady funding from external sources (donors and INGOs) ▪Slow mobilisation of members ▪Limited collective voice on some issues ▪Slowly building the awareness of NGO coordination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪No collective voice on issues ▪No or very limited awareness of NGO coordination

Sources: CCC (2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2009), NGOF (2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b), Medicam (www.medicam-cambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009); NEP (2005, 2006, 2008); Chrac (www.chrac.org/eng, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009); ECPAT (2006, 2007, 2008) and information from field research from March-June, 2009.

Appendix VI:**List of Members of the NCBs and Analysis****1). Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC): 110 (78 International and 27 Local NGOs, as well as 5 Associate members)**

No.	Name	Acronym
INGOs		
1.	Action Aid International Cambodia	AAI
2.	Action on Disability and Development	ADD
3.	Adventist Development and Relief Agency	ADRA
4.	Australian Business Volunteers- (Formerly AESOP)	ABV
5.	Aide et Action - Asie du Sud-Est	AeA-ASE
6.	American Friends Service Committee	AFSC
7.	Asian Outreach Cambodia	AOC
8.	Association Angkor Belgique	AA-B
9.	Association of Medical Doctors of Asia	AMDA
10.	Austcare Cambodia	Austcare
11.	Australian Catholic Relief/Caritas Australia	Caritas Australia
12.	Australian People for Health, Education & Development Abroad	APHEDA
13.	Cambodian Acid Survivors Charity	CASC
14.	Cambodian Center for Independent Media	VOD
15.	Cambodia Trust	CT
16.	Cambodian Health Committee	CHC
17.	Cambodian HIV/AIDS Education and Care	CHEC
18.	CARE International in Cambodia	CARE
19.	Caritas Cambodia	CARITAS
20.	Catholic Relief Services	CRS
21.	Centre for Advance Study	CAS
22.	Christian Care For Cambodia	CCFC
23.	Child Fund Cambodia	CFC
24.	Christian Reformed World Relief Committee-Southeast Asia	CRWRC
25.	Church World Services	CWS
26.	Cooperazione e Sviluppo	CESVI
27.	Concern Worldwide	CONCERN
28.	Dan Church Aid	DCA
29.	Digital Divide Data	DDD
30.	Enfants & Développement	E&D
31.	Enfants d'Angkor	EDA
32.	EveryChild	EveryChild
33.	Food for the Hungry International - Cambodia	FHI/C
34.	Forum Syd	Forum Syd
35.	Foundation for International Development/Relief	FIDR
36.	Friends-International	Friends
37.	Gender and Development for Cambodia	GAD/C
38.	German Agro Action/Deutsche Welt Hunger Hilfe	GAA/DWHH
39.	Hagar	Hagar
40.	Handicap International Belgium	HI.B
41.	Handicap International France	HI.F
42.	HelpAge International	HAI
43.	Health Unlimited	HU
44.	International Cooperation Cambodia	ICC
45.	International Development Enterprises	IDE
46.	International Volunteers of Yamagata	IVY
47.	Japan International Volunteer Center	JVC
48.	Jesuit Service Cambodia	JS/JRS

No.	Name	Acronym
49.	Legal Aid of Cambodia	LAC
50.	Lutheran World Federation/Department for World Service	LWF
51.	MARYKNOLL - Cambodia	MARYKNOLL
52.	Medecins du Monde	MDM
53.	Medical Teams International - Cambodia	MTI
54.	Mennonite Central Committee	MCC
55.	New Humanity	NH
56.	Norwegian People's Aid	NPA
57.	Ockenden International-Cambodia	OIC
58.	Open Forum of Cambodia	OFC
59.	Oxfam America-East Asia Regional Office	Oxfam America
60.	Oxfam Australia (OAus)- Formerly	Oxfam CAA
61.	Oxfam Great Britain	Oxfam GB
62.	Oxfam Québec	Oxfam Québec
63.	Pact Cambodia	PACT
64.	PLAN International Cambodia	PLAN
65.	Save the Children Australia	SCA
66.	Save the Children Norway, Cambodia Office	SCN-CO
67.	Services for the Health in Asian & African Regions	
68.	Shanti Volunteer Association	SVA
69.	Soutien a l'Initiative Privée pour l'Aide a la Reconstruction	SIPAR
70.	The Asia Foundation	TAF
71.	Veterans International/Cambodia	VI/C
72.	Voluntary Service Overseas	VSO
73.	Volunteer Service Abroad	VSA
74.	World Education - Cambodia	WE/C
75.	World Relief Cambodia	WR-C
76.	World Vision Cambodia	WVC
77.	Youth With A Mission	YWAM
78.	ZOA Refugee Care Netherlands	ZOA
LNGOs		
79.	Banteay Srei	BS
80.	Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association	ADHOC
81.	Cambodian Researchers for Development	CRD
82.	Cambodian Rural Economic Development Organisation	CREDO
83.	Caring for Young Khmer	CYK
84.	Development and Partnership in Action	DPA
85.	House of Family	HoF
86.	KHEMARA	KHEMARA
87.	Krousar Yoeung	KrY
88.	Meatho Phum Komah/Home Land	MPK
89.	NGO Education Partnership	NEP
90.	NYEMO Cambodia	NYEMO
91.	Partnership for Development in Kampuchea	PADEK
92.	Ponleur Kumar	PK
93.	Ponleu Ney Kdey Sangkum	PNKS
94.	Pteah Teuk Dong	PTD
95.	Rain Water Cambodia	RWC
96.	Rural Animal Health Development Organisation	RAHDO
97.	SABORAS	SABORAS
98.	Save the Earth Cambodia	STEC
99.	Shalom Life Careserve Center	SLCC
100.	SILAKA	SILAKA
101.	Sovann Phum	Sovann Phum
102.	Trotrung ning Akphiwat Sokapeap neak Krekror	TASK
103.	Vicheasthan Bandosbondal Neakropkrong Kangea Aphivath	VBNK
104.	Wathnakpheap	Wathnakpheap

No.	Name	Acronym
105.	Wholistic Development Organization	WDO
Associate Members		
106.	Australian Agency for International Development	AusAID
107.	Australian Volunteers-International	AVI
108.	Canadian Cooperation Office	CCO-CIDA
109.	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	SIDA
110.	United States Agency For International Development	USAID

Source: www.ccc-cambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009

Having member replication: 26 NGO with NGOF or 23% (19 INGOs and 7 LNGOs);
20 NGOs with Medicam or 18% (17 INGOs and 3 LNGOs)

2). NGO Forum on Cambodia (NGOF): 83 members (33 INGOs, 48 LNGOs and 2 Association members)

No.	Name	Acronym
INGOs		
1.	ActionAid International Cambodia	ActionAid
2.	Action on Disability and Development	ADD
3.	American Friends Service Committee	AFSC
4.	Australian Catholic Relief	ACR/CA
5.	Care International	CARE International
6.	Catholic Relief Services	CRS
7.	CORD	CORD
8.	Christian Reformed World Relief Committee	CRWRC
9.	Church World Service	CWS
10.	Community Forestry International	CFI
11.	Concern Worldwide	Concern Worldwide
12.	Deutsche Welt Hunger Hilfe - German Agro Action	DWHH/GAA
13.	Enfants et Développement	E&D
14.	Forum Syd	FORUM SYD
15.	Groupe de Recherche et d'Echanges Technologiques	GRET
16.	Health Unlimited	HU
17.	HelpAge International	HAI
18.	Japan International Volunteer Centre	JVC
19.	Jesuit Service Cambodia	JS/JRS
20.	Lutheran World Federation	LWF
21.	MARYKNOLL-Cambodia	MaryKnoll
22.	Mennonite Central Committee	MCC
23.	Norwegian People's Aid	NPA
24.	Oxfam Community Aid Abroad	OCAA
25.	Oxfam Great Britian	Oxfam GB
26.	Oxfam Hong Kong - Women's Agenda for Change Project	WAC
27.	PACT Cambodia	PACT
28.	Plan International Cambodia	PLAN Cambodia
29.	Save the Children - Norway	SCN
30.	Swiss Interchurch Aid	HEKS
31.	World Vision International - Cambodia	WVI-C
32.	World Wildlife Fund for Nature	WWF
33.	Youth Council of Cambodia	YCC
LNGOs		
34.	Association of Protection Development for Cambodia Environment	APDCE
35.	Banteay Srei	Banteay Srei
36.	Buddhism for a Progressive Society	BPS
37.	Cambodia Women Culture Development	CWCD

No.	Name	Acronym
38.	Cambodian Farmer Economic Development	CFED
39.	Cambodian HIV/AIDS Education and Care	CHEC
40.	Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association	ADHOC
41.	Cambodian Labour Organisation	CLO
42.	Cambodian League for the Promotion & Defence of Human Rights	LICADHO
43.	Cambodian Rural Economic Development Organisation	CREDO
44.	Cambodian Sanitation and Recycling Organisation	CSARO
45.	Cambodian Women's Development Association	CWDA
46.	Cambodian Youth Development	CYD
47.	Centre d'Etude et de Developpement Agricole Cambodgien	CEDAC
48.	Christ for Development Kampuchea	CDK
49.	Community Legal Education Center	CLEC
50.	Cooperation for Development of Cambodia	Co-DeC
51.	Culture and Environment Preservation Association	CEPA
52.	Development and Partnership in Action	DPA
53.	Farmer Livelihood Development Organisation	FLD
54.	Fisheries Action Coalition Team	FACT
55.	Gender and Development for Cambodia	GAD/C
56.	Healthcare Centre for Children	HCC
57.	Human Rights Vigilance of Cambodia	Vigilance
58.	Human Resource and Rural Economic Development Organisation	Hurredo
59.	Indra Devi Association	IDA
60.	Khemara	Khemara
61.	Khmer Community for Agricultural Development	KCAD
62.	Khmer Farmers Association	KFA
63.	Khmer Women's Voice Centre	KWVC
64.	Legal Aid of Cambodia	LAC
65.	Meada Khmer Development Organisation	MKD
66.	Mlup Baitong	Mlup Baitong
67.	National Prosperity Association	NAPA
68.	Organisation for Assistance of Children and Rural Women	CWARO
69.	Partnership for Development in Kampuchea	PADEK
70.	Project Against Domestic Violence	PADV
71.	Prom Vihear Thor Organisation	PVT
72.	Socio-Economic Development Organisation of Cambodia	SEDOC
73.	Sor Sor Troung	SST
74.	Strey Santepeap Deiombeiy Parethan	SSP
75.	Urban Poor Women Development	UPWD
76.	Urban Sector Group	USG
77.	Vicheasthan Bandosbondal Neakropkrong Kangea Aphivath	VBNK
78.	Violence Against Women and Children of Cambodia	VAWCC
79.	Indigenous Community Support Organisation	ICSO
80.	Cambodian Disabled People's Organisation	CDPO
81.	Intervida Cambodia	Intervida
Associate Members		
82.	DanChurchAid	DCA
83.	Oxfam America	Oxfam America

Source: www.ngoforum.org.kh, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009

Having member replication: 26 NGO with CCC or 31% (19 INGOs and 7 LNGOs) and 12 NGOs with Medicam or 14% (10 INGOs and 2 LNGOs).

3). Medicam as LNGO: 131 members (55 INGOs, 61 LNGOs, 13 associate members and two individuals)

No.	Name	Acronym
INGOs		
1.	Adventist Development and Relief Agency	ADRA
2.	American Red Cross	AMCROSS
3.	Asian Outreach Cambodia	AOC
4.	Aide Odontologique Internationale	AOI
5.	CAMA Service Inc	CAMA
6.	CARE International in Cambodia	CARE
7.	Caritas Cambodia	CARITAS
8.	Christian Care For Cambodia	CCFC
9.	Canada Center for Int'l Study and Cooperation	CECI
10.	Cooperazione E Sviluppo	CESVI
11.	Center for International Health, University of Toronto	CIH
12.	Churches of Christ Overseas Aid	COCOA
13.	Catholic Relief Services	CRS
14.	Church World Service	CWS
15.	Enfant Et Developement	ED
16.	Family Health International/Impact	FHI/IMPACT
17.	Foundation for International Development/Relief	FIDR
18.	Friends Without A Border- CBHEP	FWAB-CBHEP
19.	General Board of Global Ministries	GBGM-CCMA
20.	Groupe de Recherche et d'Echanges Technologiques	GRET
21.	HelpAge International	HAI
22.	Handicap International Belgium	HI-B
23.	Handicap International France	HI-F
24.	Helen Keller International	HKI
25.	Health Net International	HNI
26.	Health Unlimited	HU
27.	International Cooperation for Cambodia	ICC
28.	INTERNEWS	INTERNEWS
29.	International Resources for the Improvement of Sight	IRIS
30.	Japan Overseas Christian Medical Cooperative Service Cambodia	JOCS
31.	Louvain Développement	LD
32.	Lutheran World Federation	LWF
33.	Mennonite Central Committee	MCC
34.	Mekong Eye Doctor	MED
35.	Malteser Germany	MHD
36.	Maryknoll	MKL
37.	Médecins Sans Frontières - Belgium	MSF-B
38.	NOMAD Recherche Soutien International	NOMAD RSI
39.	Programme For Appropriate Technology in Health	PATH
40.	Partners for Development	PFD
41.	Project Hope Japan	PHJ
42.	Plan International	PLAN
43.	Pharmaciens Sans Frontières	PSF
44.	Population Services International	PSI
45.	Save The Children Australia	SCA
46.	Services for the Health in Asia & African Regions	SHARE
47.	Sihanouk Hospital Center of Hope	SHCH
48.	Sok Sabay	Sok Sabay
49.	TASK-SERVANTS	TASK
50.	University Research Co.	URC
51.	VOR-ORT	VOR-ORT

No.	Name	Acronym
52.	Voluntary Service Overseas(UK)	VSO
53.	Flemish Office for Development Cooperation and Technical Assistance	VVOB
54.	World Relief Cambodia	WR-C
55.	World Vision Cambodia	WVC
LNGOs		
56.	Association For Care of Children and Youth	ACCY
57.	Agriculture Development Foundation	ADF
58.	Association for Development and Over Villager's Right	ADOVIR
59.	Buddhism for Health	BFH
60.	Bandos Komar	BK
61.	Buddhist Study Association	BSA
62.	Cambodian Organisation for Assistance to Families and Widows	CAAFW
63.	Cambodian Association for Development of Farmer and the Poor	CADFP
64.	Cambodia Anti- Tuberculosis Association	CATA
65.	Community of Cambodian Women for Development	CCWD
66.	Cambodian Development and Relief Center for the Poor	CDRCP
67.	Community Economic Development	CED
68.	Cambodian Family Economic Development Association	CFEDA
69.	Cambodia Global Action	CGA
70.	Cambodian Health Committee	CHC
71.	Cambodian HIV/AIDS Education and Care	CHEC
72.	Chet Thor	CHETTHOR
73.	Cambodia Health and Human Rights Alliance	CHHRA
74.	Children and Love Association	CLA
75.	Cambodian Medical Services Support Organisation	CMSO
76.	Cambodian Save Children Network	CSCN
77.	Cooperation for a Sustainable Cambodian Society	CSCS
78.	Community Support Improve Development	CSID
79.	Cambodian World Family	CWF
80.	Development and Partnership in Action	DPA
81.	Mith Samlanh	Friends
82.	Hope Association for Development	HAD
83.	Islamic Local Development Organisation	ILDO
84.	Khmer Farmer Association	KFA
85.	Khmer Traditional Medecine Health Association	KHA
86.	Khmer HIV/AIDS NGO Alliance	KHANA
87.	Kienkes Health Education Network	KHEN
88.	Kunathor	KNT
89.	Kum Nit Thmey Organisation	KNTO
90.	Khmer Rural Development Association	KRDA
91.	Khmer Women's Cooperation for Development	KWCD
92.	Leucaena/CCN	LEJ/CCN
93.	Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights	LICADHO
94.	MARIE STOPS Cambodia	MSC
95.	New Life Foundation	NLF
96.	NYEMO Cambodia NGO	NYEMO
97.	Operation Enfant du Cambodge	OEC
98.	Partners in Compassion	PC
99.	Partner For Health And Development	PFHAD
100.	Ponleu Ney Kdey Sangkhem	PNKS
101.	Ponleu Sokhaphheap	PSP
102.	PROMVIHEAR THOR	PVT
103.	Reproductive and Child Health Alliance	RACHA

No.	Name	Acronym
104.	RACHANA	RACHANA
105.	Rural Community and Environment Development Organisation	RCEDO
106.	Rural Development Association	RDA
107.	Reproductive Health Association of Cambodia	RHAC
108.	Social Environment Agricultural Development	SEADO
109.	Society for Malaria Control in Cambodia	SMCC
110.	Transcultural Psychosocial Organisation	TPO
111.	Vocational Training for Alleviation of Poverty and Social Development	VAPSD
112.	Vulnerable People Support	VPS
113.	Vulnerable Teenager for Help	VTH
114.	Woman Development Association	WDA
115.	Woman Organisation for Modern Economy and Nursing	WOMEN
116.	Women and Youth Action	WYA
Individual members		
117.	Robyn Devenish	
118.	David Wilkinson	
Associate members		
119.	GTZ-Support to the Health Project Sector Reform Programme	GTZ-SHSRP
120.	Support to the Health Sector Reform	SHSR
121.	United States Agency for International Development	USAID
122.	St.Elisabeth Sick Shelter-CATHOLIC CHURCH	SESSC
123.	Asian Health Institute	AHI
124.	Department for International Development	DFID
125.	Intervida World Alliance	INWA
126.	The World Bank	WB
127.	United Nations Population Fund	UNFPA
128.	United Nations Children's Fund	UNICEF
129.	World Food Programme	WFP
130.	World Health Organisation	WHO
131.	Belgian Technical Cooperation	BTC

Source: www.medicam-cambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009

Having member replication: 20 NGOs with CCC or 15% (17 INGOs and 3 LNGOs) and 12 NGOs with NGOF or 9% (10 INGOs and 2 LNGOs).

4). NGO Education Partnership (NEP) as LNGO: 79 members (33 INGOs and 46 LNGOs)

No.	Name	Acronym
INGOs		
1.	Aide et Action	AeA
2.	Assemblies of God	AOG
3.	Cambodian Children's Advocacy Foundation	CCAF
4.	CARE	CARE
5.	Caring for Young Khmer	CYK
6.	CCS ITALY Centro Cooperazione Sviluppo/ Center of Cooperation and Development	CCS Italy Cambodia
7.	Centro Italiano Aiuti all Inanzia	CIAI
8.	CORD South and East Asia	CORD
9.	Don Bosco	DBFC
10.	Family Health Promotion	FHP
11.	Federation for the Development of Book Sector in Cambodia	FDBC
12.	Hagar	Hagar
13.	Handicap International France	HIF

No.	Name	Acronym
14.	Health Education and Development Organisation	HEADO
15.	InnerChange	InCh
16.	International Cooperation - Cambodia	ICC
17.	Intervida Cambodia	INWA
18.	Jesuit Service Cambodia	JRS
19.	Maryknoll-Cambodia	Maryknoll
20.	New Humanity	NH
21.	New Life Foundation	NFL
22.	Operations Enfants du Cambodge	OEC
23.	Plan International	Plan
24.	Protect the Earth Protect Yourself	PEPY
25.	Pour un Sourire d'Enfant	PSE
26.	Room to Read -Cambodia	RtR
27.	Save the Children Norway	SCN-CO
28.	Schools for Children of Cambodia	SCC
29.	Shanti Volunteer Association	SVA
30.	Soutien a L'Initiative Privee pour L'Aide a la Reconstruction	SIPAR
31.	Voluntary Service Overseas	VSO
32.	World Education	WE
33.	World Vision	WV
LNGOs		
34.	AFESIP Cambodia	AFESIP
35.	BANDOS KOMAR	BK
36.	Cambodia Support Group	CSG
37.	Cambodian Border Community Development Organisation	CBCDO
38.	Camodian Disabled People's Organisation	CDPO
39.	CGF Cambodia'Building the future generations of Cambodia	CGF-Cambodia
40.	Cooperation for a Sustainable Cambodian Society	CSCS
41.	Cooperation for Prosperity	CFP
42.	Damnok Toek /Goutte d' Eau Cambodia, Neakloeung	DTC
43.	DAMNOK TOEK POIPET	DTP
44.	Development Association of Cambodia	DAC
45.	Disability Action Council	DAC
46.	Disabled Youth Children Foundation for Education and Vocation	DYCFE
47.	Homeland (Meahto Phum Ko'mah)	MPK
48.	Human Rights and Development Organisation	HRDO
49.	Kampuchean Action for Primary Education	KAPE
50.	Khmer Angkor Development Organisation	KADO
51.	Khmer Chit Vit Thmey	KCTO
52.	Khmer Cultural Development Institute	KCDI
53.	Khmer Development of Freedom Organisation	KDFO
54.	Khmer Development Organisation	KDO
55.	Khmer Serving the Poor Children Organisation	KSPC
56.	Khmer Student Representative Association	SKAR
57.	Khmer Youth Camp for Culture	KYCC
58.	KNK network Cambodia	KnK
59.	Komar Pikar Foundation	KPF
60.	Komasantipheap 2/ Peaceful Children Home 2	Ksp II/ PCH II
61.	Krousar Yoeung	KrY
62.	Kumar Ney Kdey Sangkheum	KNKS
63.	Leadership Character Development Institute	LCDI
64.	Mith Samlanh	Friends
65.	Mlup Baitong	MB
66.	Ong Cambodia Institute Foundation	OCIF
67.	Open Institute	NI
68.	People Improvement Organisation	PIO

No.	Name	Acronym
69.	Professors' Alliance for Development	PAD
70.	Promviheathor	PVT
71.	Puthi Komar Organisation	PKO
72.	Rural Development Association	RDA
73.	Save Cambodia's Wildlife	SCW
74.	Sovann Phoum	SP
75.	Street Children Assistance and Development Project	SCADP
76.	Urban Poor Women Development	UPWD
77.	Wathnakpheap	WP
78.	Women Development Association	WDA
79.	Youth Resource Development Programme	YRDP

Source: www.nepcambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009

Having member replication: 15 NGOs with CCC or 19% (14 INGOs and 1 LNGO) and 11 NGOs with NGOF or 14% (8 INGOs and 3 LNGOs)

5). Action Committee for Human Rights (CHRAC) as LNGO: 21 LNGOs

No.	Name	Acronym
LNGOs And Associations		
1.	The Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association	ADHOC
2.	The Cambodian Defenders Project	CDP
3.	The Centre for Social Development	CSD
4.	The Cambodian Women in Crisis Centre	CWCC
5.	The Khmer Institute for Democracy	KID
6.	The Cambodian Centre for Protection of Children's Rights	CCPCR
7.	The Coordination of Action Research on AIDS and Mobility	CARAM-Cambodia
8.	The Cambodian Health and Human Rights Alliance	CHHRA
9.	Cham Khmer Islam Minority Human Rights and Development Association	CKIMHRDA
10.	Mission of Generous Cambodian Alliance	GENEROUS
11.	Human Rights Organisation for Transparency and Peace	HROTP
12.	Indradevi Association	IA
13.	Khmer Institute for National Development	KIND
14.	Khmer Kampuchea Krom Human Rights Organisation	KKKHRO
15.	Khmer Kamuchea Krom for Human Rights and Development Association	KKKHRDA
16.	Khmer Student Association	KSA
17.	Khmer Youth Association	KYA
18.	Legal Aid of Cambodia	LAC
19.	People Centre for Development and Peace	PDP
20.	Protection of Juvenile Justice	PJJ
21.	Human Rights Vigilance of Cambodia	VIGILANCE

Source: <http://www.chrac.org/eng>, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009

6). End Child Prostitution, Abuse and Trafficking in Cambodia (ECPAT-Cambodia) as LNGO: 27 Members (8 INGOs and 19 LNGOs and Associations)

No.	Name	Acronym
INGOs		
1.	AIDe Tous Cambodia	AIDeTous
2.	International Center for Family and Children in Cambodia	CIFA
3.	Friends International	FI
4.	Hagar	Hagar
5.	Save the Children Australia	SCA

No.	Name	Acronym
6.	Save the Children Norway	SCN
7.	South East Asia Investigations into Social and Humanitarian Activities	SISHA
8.	World Vision Cambodia	WVC
LNGOs		
9.	Agir pour les Femmes en Situation Precaire	AFESIP
10.	The Cambodian Centre for Protection of Children's Rights	CCPCR
11.	Child Assistance for Mobilisation and Participation	CAMP
12.	Children and Love Association	CLA
13.	Child Rights Foundation	CRF
14.	Cambodia Women Development Agency	CWDA
15.	Mith Samlanh	Friends
16.	HealthCare Centre for Children	HCC
17.	Khmer Development Freedom Organisation	KDFO
18.	Khemara	Khemara
19.	Khmer Youth Camp for Culture	KYCC
20.	Legal Aid of Cambodia	LAC
21.	Protection of Juneville Justice	PJJ
22.	Pteas Teuk Dong	PTD
23.	Promvihear Thor	PVT
24.	Rural Aid Organisation	RAO
25.	Save Incapacity Teenagers	SIT
26.	Vulnerable Children Assistance Organisation	VCAO
27.	Watanak Pheap	WP

Source: www.ecpatcambodia.org, Retrieved date 08 September, 2009

Having member replication: 7 NGO with NEP or 26% (3 INGOs and 4 LNGOs)

Analysis of the NCBs' Members

Type of NCBs	Members of NCBs						Total NGOs in Cambodia		
	INGOs	% of Total INGOs	LNGOs	% of Total LNGOs	Total	%	INGOs	LNGO	Total
CCC	78	17.30%	27	2.00%	110	6.10%	450	1,341	1,791
NGOF	33	7.30%	48	3.60%	83	4.60%			
Medicam	55	12.20%	61	4.50%	131	7.30%			
NEP	33	7.30%	46	3.40%	79	4.4%			
CHRAAC	0	0.00%	21	1.60%	21	1.10%			
ECPAT	8	1.70%	19	1.40%	27	1.50%			
Total	207	46%	222	16.60%	451	25.20%			

Appendix VII:

ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CDC/CRDB

EXTRACTS

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KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA

NATION RELIGION KING

Royal Government of Cambodia
No. 147 ANK BK

SUB DECREE

ON THE

**ORGANISATION AND FUNCTIONING OF THE COUNCIL FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CAMBODIA**

The Royal Government of Cambodia

- Having seen the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia;
- Having seen the Royal Decree N° NS/RKT/0704/124 dated 15 July 2004 on the formation of the Royal Government of Cambodia;
- Having seen the Royal Kram N° 02/ NS/ 94 dated 20 July 1994 on the Organisation and Functioning of the Council of Ministers;
- Having seen the Royal Kram N° 03/NS/94 dated 5 August 1994 on the Promulgation of the Law on Investment of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Royal Kram N° NS/RKM/0303/009 dated 24 March 2003 on the Promulgation of the Amendment to the Law on Investment of the Kingdom of Cambodia; and
- Pursuant to the needs of the Council for the Development of Cambodia.

It Is Hereby Decided:

I

**ORGANISATION OF THE COUNCIL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CAMBODIA**

Article 1: The composition of the Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC) is as follows:

1. Samdech Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Cambodia as Co Chairman
2. Samdech Krom Preah Norodom Ranaridh, Special Adviser to the Royal Government of Cambodia as Co Chairman
3. H.E. Mr. Keat Chhon, Senior Minister, Minister of Economy and Finance as First Vice Chairman
4. H.E. Mr. Cham Prasidh, Senior Minister, Minister of Commerce as Vice Chairman
5. H.E. Mr. Kong Vibol, First Secretary of State, Ministry of Economy and Finance as Vice Chairman

6. Minister in Charge of the Council of Ministers or Representative as Member
7. Minister in Charge of the Royal Palace or Representative as Member
8. Co Ministers of Interior or Representative as Member
9. Co Ministers of National Defense or Representative as Member
10. Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation as Member
11. Minister of Education, Youth and Sports as Member
12. Minister of Information as Member
13. Minister of Rural Development as Member
14. Minister of Health as Member
15. Minister of Culture and Fine Arts as Member
16. Minister of Justice as Member
17. Minister of Water Resources and Meteorology as Member
18. Minister of Post and Telecommunication as Member
19. Minister of Labor and Vocational Training as Member
20. Minister of Women's Affairs as Member
21. Minister of Social Affairs, Veteran and Youth Rehabilitation as Member
22. Minister of Planning as Member
23. Minister of Industry, Mines and Energy as Member
24. Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries as Member
25. Minister of Environment as Member
26. Minister of Public Works and Transport as Member
27. Minister of Tourism as Member
28. Minister of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction as Member
29. Minister of National Assembly Senate Relations and Inspection as Member
30. Minister of Cult and Religious Affairs as Member
31. Governor of the National Bank of Cambodia or Representative as Member
32. Secretary of State of the Secretariat of Public Function or Representative as Member
33. Secretary of State of the Secretariat of Civil Aviation or Representative as Member
34. Commander in Chief of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces or Representative as Member
35. National Police Commissioner or Representative as Member
36. Commander in Chief of the Royal Para Military or Representative as Member
37. Secretary General of the CDC as Member
38. Secretary General of the Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board as Member
39. Secretary General of the Cambodian Investment Board as Member
40. Secretary General of the Cambodian Special Economic Zone as Member
41. Director General of the Cambodian Petroleum Authority as Member
42. Municipal and Provincial Governors or Representative as Member
43. President of the Phnom Penh Chamber of Commerce or Representative as Member

Article 2: The organisational structure of the CDC is as follows:

1. The Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board (CRDB) under the direct supervision of a Secretary General.

2. The Cambodian Investment Board (CIB) under the direct supervision of a Secretary General.
3. The Cambodian Special Economic Zone Board (CSEZB) under the direct supervision of a Secretary General.
4. The General Secretariat under the direct supervision of the Secretary General of CDC

Article 3: The Secretary General of CDC, the Secretary General of CRDB, the Secretary General of CIB, and the Secretary General of CSEZB shall be respectively assisted by a Deputy Secretary General. The Deputy Secretaries General shall perform their duties as assigned by the Secretaries General with approval of the executive committee of CDC. The Secretaries General, in performing their duties, shall consult their Deputy Secretaries on a regular basis.

Article 4: The organizational structure of CRDB is composed of the following units:

1. Public Relations and Aid Mobilisation and Coordination
2. Documentation and Information Management
3. Bilateral Aid Coordination with Asia Pacific and Oceania countries
4. Bilateral Aid Coordination with European Union and countries in Europe and the Americas
5. Aid Coordination with Multilateral Institutions (such as ADB, WB and IMF)
6. Aid Coordination with UNDP and other UN Agencies
7. NGO Coordination
8. Programme/Project Analysis
9. Administration

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Article 8: Each unit has the rank of a department and under the supervision of a Director assisted by a number of Deputy Directors.

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II ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CDC

Article 10: CDC is an executive agency of the Royal Government of Cambodia and shall have the following roles and responsibilities:

1. Act as the "Etat Major" and "One Stop Service" of the Royal Government of Cambodia in the areas of Rehabilitation and Development and Public Investment, Private Investment, and the establishment and management of Special Economic Zones.
2. Lead in the formulation of development visions and strategies for Cambodia by collaborating with concerned institutions.
3. Liaise with foreign countries, bilateral and multilateral partners and NGOs to get them informed of national economic development visions and strategies and priorities in national rehabilitation and development

plans with the aim of making external aid coordination and utilisation effective and aligned with national development needs and priorities.

4. Coordinate the work of the Ministries that are working with donor countries and institutions and investors.
5. Provide directions in the allocation and utilisation of public and private resources for national development.
6. Facilitate and streamline administrative procedures for donor countries and agencies and investors.
7. Review and make decision on work pertaining to rehabilitation and development and public investment, private investment and the establishment and management of Special Economic Zones.

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Article 13: In Rehabilitation and Development, the roles and responsibilities of CDC are as follows:

1. Act as the "Focal Point" and "One Stop Service" of the Royal Government of Cambodia in its relations with donor countries, agencies and NGOs; and as the "Focal Point" and "One Stop Service" for Government ministries and agencies in aid coordination and allocation/utilisation.
2. Formulate and implement the Strategic Framework on Development Cooperation Management to strengthen Government ownership and leadership in development process and to strengthen partnership between Royal Government of Cambodia and the donor community.
3. Mobilise and allocate external assistance to implement the priorities set out in the National Strategic Development Plan and other sectoral development plans.
4. Directly lead the harmonisation of development partners' practices and procedures to enhance aid effectiveness.
5. Provide technical support to the Government Donor Coordination Committee that is the mechanism for policy dialogue and provide support to strengthen the Technical Working Groups mechanism.
6. Cooperate with ministries and agencies in formulating national rehabilitation and development strategies, and setting immediate, medium and long term national development priorities for the preparation of annual plans of action. These plans of action must be coherent, systematic and inter-related.
7. Participate in the preparation of national socio economic development plans and sectoral development plans.
8. Manage public investments by closely cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies. This is mainly related to coordinating and guiding the allocation and utilisation of national and external resources for the rehabilitation and development of Cambodia.
9. Pursuant to the delegation of power from the Prime Minister, sign on behalf of the Royal Government of Cambodia the acceptance and/or allocation of external assistance with bilateral and multilateral donors and international organisations.
10. Lead the preparation of government policy papers to be submitted to conferences for the rehabilitation of Cambodia such as the Consultative

Group Meeting of Cambodia with cooperation from relevant ministries and agencies.

11. Prepare six-month and annual report and submit to the Royal Government of Cambodia for review and guidance to further improve rehabilitation and development.

Article 14: In the management of public investments, working relationships between CDC and ministries and agencies are as follows:

1. CDC shall coordinate the formulation of visions and strategies for public investments and shall coordinate the ordering of priorities for public investment for medium term and one year.
2. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation shall be the diplomatic window.
3. The Ministry of Planning, by cooperating with other ministries and agencies, shall prepare the 5 year public investment plan.
4. The Ministry of Economy And Finance shall prepare the macroeconomic framework for the medium term, shall prepare national budget for the implementation of the annual public investment plan, and shall monitor the implementation of financing.
5. Line ministries shall prepare sectoral public investment plans by closely cooperating with the Ministry of Planning and CDC and shall implement those sectoral public investment plans.

Article 15: All ministries and agencies shall perform their duty related to public investment in a coordinated manner through the "One Stop Service" mechanism.

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III THE FUNCTIONING OF CDC

Article 25: The Vice Chairmen of CDC shall have the following responsibilities:

A. H.E. Mr. Keat Chhon, First Vice Chairman:

- i. Oversee the overall functioning of CDC in the absence of the Co Chairmen of CDC.
- ii. Propose national development strategy.
- iii. Supervise the functioning of CRDB with focus on coordinating public investment and mobilising and coordinating external assistance.
- iv. Manage and supervise the daily operations of CDC.
- v. Chair the executive meeting of CDC and the plenary meeting of CDC and sign the minutes in the absence of the Co Chairmen of CDC.
- vi. Coordinate between CDC and ministries and agencies.
- vii. Liaise with donor countries and agencies.
- viii. Chair the "One Stop Service" meetings organised by CDC on matters pertaining to rehabilitation and development and investments prior to submission for approval from CDC Executive Committee.
- ix. Perform tasks as delegated by Co Chairmen of CDC.

Article 26: The roles and responsibilities of the Secretary General of CDC are as follows:

- i. Responsible for the coordination and monitoring of the performance of CRDB, CIB and CSEZB as well as for the management of the Secretariat of CDC.
- ii. Act as technical "Etat Major" for CDC in the implementation and monitoring of policies and strategies on trade, industry, private investment and special economic zones.
- iii. Prepare CDC's work plan, agenda and other relevant documents for CDC Executive Committee and Plenary meetings.
- iv. Prepare the minutes of CDC Executive Committee and Plenary meetings for signature of the meeting Chairman.
- v. Prepare press release for CDC.
- vi. Coordinate the preparation of annual and six month progress reports on matters pertaining to rehabilitation and development, private investment and the special economic zones for review and approval by CDC prior to submission to the Royal Government.
- vii. Participate in the "One Stop Service" meeting for review and approval of work pertaining to rehabilitation and development, private investment and special economic zones.
- viii. Perform tasks as delegated by Co Chairmen of CDC or Vice Chairmen of CDC.
- ix. Act as the Secretary General of the Government Private Sector.

Article 27: The roles and responsibilities of the Secretary General of CRDB are as follows:

- i. Supervise the functioning of CRDB.
- ii. Prepare agenda and relevant documents for the "One Stop Service" meetings on matters pertaining to rehabilitation and development.
- iii. Assist the Secretary General of CDC in preparing necessary documents related to rehabilitation and development for submission to CDC Executive Committee and Plenary meetings.
- iv. Monitor the implementation of public investment programmes by cooperating with concerned Government ministries and agencies, and prepare progress report and recommendations for review and corrective actions by CDC Executive Committee.
- v. Assist the Secretary General of CDC in preparing annual and six month progress on work pertaining to rehabilitation and development for review and approval by CDC prior to submission to the Royal Government.
- vi. Participate in the "One Stop Service" meeting on matters pertaining to rehabilitation and development.
- vii. Perform tasks related to rehabilitation and development as delegated by Chairman of CDC or Vice Chairmen of CDC.

Article 35: The implementation of the "One Stop Service" mechanism of CDC on matters pertaining

- i. to rehabilitation and development, investment and the special economic zones shall be based on the following principles:

A. For CRDB:

- i. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Planning shall respectively designate an official of the rank of director of department to work with CRDB. The official must:
 - Be competent in his/her field of specialty.
 - Have the delegation of authority from the head of his/her institution and must liaise closely with the latter and in particular must prepare reports and seek recommendations from the head of his/her institution.
 - Be proactive with the work of CRDB.
 - Have good command of one or two foreign languages especially English.
- ii. Other Government ministries and agencies shall also appoint a representative to participate in the "One Stop Service" mechanism, but this is done on an ad hoc basis and upon the request of the Secretary General of CRDB on matters pertaining to public investment which involves the concerned ministries and agencies.
- iii. The Secretary General of CRDB shall provide all the documents necessary for the "One Stop Service" meeting to all representatives of relevant ministries and agencies one week before the meeting date so that the head of the relevant institutions shall be able to review and make recommendations.
- iv. After preparing all the necessary documentation, the Secretary General of CRDB shall submit the documents for review and approval of the "One Stop Service" meeting.
- v. The Secretary General of CRDB shall prepare the necessary documents and relevant information which are the outcome of the "One Stop Service" meeting and forward them to the Secretary General of CDC for submission for review and approval by CDC Executive Committee.

Article 37: The Council for the Development of Cambodia shall have its own staff and budget. The management of the revenues and expenditures of CDC shall be governed by the Law on Finance.

Article 38: The Sub Decree N° 70 ANK/BK dated 27 July 2001, Sub Decree N° 112 ANK/BK dated 12 November 2002, and Sub Decree N° 35 ANK/BK dated 4 August 2004 shall be rendered null and void.

Phnom Penh, 29 December 2005
Prime Minister
Hun Sen