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THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION:

A Study of Attitudes Pressures and Relations in the New Zealand Education System.

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"He that goeth about to persuade a multitude that they are not so well governed as they ought to be, shall never want attentive and favourable hearers; because they know the manifold defects whereunto every regiment is subject, but the secret lets and difficulties, which in public proceedings are innumerable and inevitable, they have not ordinarily the judgment to consider."

(Richard Hooker, The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity).

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S.J.I.

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CONTENTS

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FOREWORD

Political science is a discipline which purports to study power as a process, a distinct but inseparable part of the social process. It is the general aim of this study to shed light on the inner workings and operating norms of a democratic system. More specifically, the study hopes to offer an empirical examination of the pressures, attitudes, and relationships which constitute one sector of democratic government in New Zealand, the administration of public education.

The philosophic starting point for the study is in part pluralistic, in that education 'politics' is seen to be a 'system' of components which can be described and examined and which is itself a component of a more embracing 'system' called New Zealand politics.[1] Briefly stated, it is believed that by studying one sector of governmental activity - that is, one 'system' - in some detail, one may arrive at conclusions which could be applied to wider settings. An alternative method of approach would have been to look at a particular facet of the governmental process - pressure group activity for example - over a wider area. Both methods have drawbacks, but for a complete picture to emerge eventually, both types of study will be needed.

Although it would be possible to gain valuable insight into the general political process - the shaping, distribution and exercise of power - from any field of government activity, the education system offers particularly good prospects for four chief reasons.

First, teaching has been described as the most 'socialised' of all the professions, and the opportunities for outsiders to have some say at least in educational matters are considerable. The formal structure of administrative and professional decision-making tends to maximize the opportunities for the expression of non-governmental opinion within the system.

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1. By system is meant a definable area of governmental and administrative activity which is comparatively self-contained.

Second, the whole nation, at some stage, has been directly bound up within the system and is therefore certain to have at least a subjective view on what is good and what is bad about the schools. This level of opinion and information is substantially augmented for those citizens who as parents, have children in state schools. Therefore if non-government opinion can be said to exist as a force in decision-making in New Zealand, it would certainly evidence itself in the education system.

Third, the student of New Zealand education is fortunate in that recent years have seen the setting up of a Commission on Education with wide terms of reference. The subsequent report naturally dealt with most of the issues which divide educationalists, with the very stuff of education politics in other words. Further, copies of the 400 written submissions to the Commission were available for the writer to study. Together with a record of some of the oral submissions, these formed an invaluable encyclopaedia of the pressures and attitudes within the system and the problems that have to be faced. In sum, the education system offers very considerable facilities for the study of what has been called "the complex infrastructure of the democratic polity". [2]

Fourth, education is becoming increasingly important, both in terms of input (government expenditure) and output (as a general socialising agency). Education is seen to be one of the principal tools by which man can create an acceptable future for himself.

Thus the way the community administers its education system is important both in its own right and as a guide to understanding democracy in action in New Zealand. This is the central theme of the present study.

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2. G.A. Aldmond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963.

SECTION ONE

An Approach to the Study of the Education System

Section One is introductory in nature. It seeks simply to establish a framework for this study. It comprises two chapters. The first is chiefly theoretical. It establishes a conceptual basis for the study. The second provides a more empirical basis. It offers some thoughts on the New Zealand social and political culture and finally goes on to introduce the reader briefly to the education system.

Chapter One

DELINEATION OF APPROACH

It is proposed to establish in Chapter One a method of approach. The sub-sections of the chapter will deal first with the philosophy of the writer's approach to his discipline and subject-matter, second with the adaptation of this approach to the subject in the form of a conceptual framework and third with the method of analysis to be used.

I

Schattschneider claimed: "Political research is never better than the theory of politics on which it is based." [1] Such assertions are common, and can be seen as indications of the increasing stress being placed by political scientists upon theoretical elegance, a development which has resulted largely from the impact of sociological and quantitative methodology. Unlike sociology however, political studies were by no means new. Traditional, more subjective and consequently less scientific methods were firmly rooted. The impact of the new approach thus tended to have a polarising effect among students of politics, producing at the one extreme a sociologically oriented school concerned with the verification of scientifically determined hypotheses, and at the other a school of historically-oriented writers more concerned with the accurate description of political phenomena.

The bone of contention lies in the very nature of their discipline: is political science in fact a science (in the sense of a body of laws which enable measurable predictions to be made)? In his inaugural lecture as Professor of Political Science at Cambridge, Ernest Barker felt that the term science, if applied to political studies, might convey suggestions and excite anticipations that could not be justified. He went

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1 E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960, p. 123.

on to say that he wished his own studies to be regarded as simply a 'speculation' about a group of facts in the field of social conduct - a speculation intended to result in a general scheme which would connect the facts systematically with one another and thus give an explanation of their significance. In contrast to this, science, according to Aldous Huxley, seeks to explain the "endlessly diverse phenomena of nature by ignoring the uniqueness of particular events, concentrating on what they have in common and finally abstracting some kind of law in terms of which they make sense and can effectively be dealt with". [2] Thus Barker is 'speculating' in search of a general scheme, and Huxley is reducing phenomena to some common denominator in order to provide a law. The scientists feel they must ignore the 'uniqueness of particular events' and the humanists (if thus we may call the traditionalists, institutionalists and political historians) feel that they cannot ignore them.

Faith in the application of 'science' to political problems is not a product of the twentieth century. Aristotle and Plato, within the limits of their knowledge, offered a similar approach; so did a great number of theorists from the Renaissance onwards, as is testified by the works of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Bentham, St Simon and Marx. That political science has not been able to match the progress of the natural sciences is not through want of ambition. In 1821 for example, St Simon claimed: "In the new political order....decisions must be the result of scientific demonstrations totally independent of human will." [3]

Although ambition outran performance among those who sought to create a 'Science' of political behaviour,[4] this is not to

2. Quoted in Lindsay Rogers, "Notes on a Political Science", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXXIX, No. 2, June 1964, pp. 209-33.

3. See Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics, Penguin, 1964, p. 96.

4. Some writers have attributed the comparative lack of progress of political science (and the 'science' of public administration) to the failure to hypothesize an acceptable basic unit of analysis. David Easton, for example, feels: "One of the major stumbling blocks...has been...the great difficulty in discovering units of analysis that have the degree of stability and definiteness and lack of ambiguity in their boundaries necessary for the kind of propositions expected of an exact science." (David Easton, Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York, John Wilie & Sons, 1965, p.11). Physics, in contrast, established a basic unit of analysis when Democritus, as a result of empirical observation, logical reasoning and intuitive thinking, hypothesised that all matter was composed of single, indivisible atoms, which are indestructible and qualitatively alike. Thus as Nicolaidis points out, physics had acquired an adequate foundation by about 400 BC. (N.G. Nicolaidis, Policy, Decision and Organisation Theory, Los Angeles, University of Southern California, 1960, p.241).

suggest that their aspirations went completely without reward. They failed in the attempt to discover a body of laws governing political behaviour. But the word 'science' implies more than an objective; it connotes a means or method.

As a method to be pursued in the discovery of knowledge, science would seem to offer two types of approach, quantitative and non-quantitative. The quantitative approach has made considerable advances, especially since the advent of the computer. Generally speaking, the quantitative approach presupposes a two-stage development: First, only verifiable data, which can be subjected to measurement, are observed. Second, qualitative statements must be converted into quantitative ones. The obvious drawback to science as a logic of verification in political studies resides in the probability that at stage one, relevant experience and information will be omitted because it is not capable of 'quantifiable verification', and that at stage two, there can be no certainty that the attempt to attain a "comprehensive conversion of empirical qualitative observation into quantitative statements",[5] has been entirely successful. However, these problems do not appear to be insoluble and much can be anticipated of science in political studies as a logic of verification (and thus, with specific limitations, of prediction).

Science as a non-quantitative method is virtually synonymous with the traditional empirical approach. It envisages a detailed marshalling of observable fact. Traditionally, non-quantitative methods have been the only practical ones and the tendency towards a less empirical basis for study has thus been a constant threat. By the middle of the twentieth century, Alfred Cobban could speak of political studies as having become purely academic, with their own esoteric jargon, and as "having entered the realm of scholarship....some modern forms of which....reproduce the limitations which dominated thought in the Hellenistic epoch".[6] Professor Whitehead had earlier made the same point. He claimed that political studies tended to "canalize thought and observation within predetermined limits, based upon inadequate metaphysical assumptions dogmatically assumed".[7] Behaviourism was at least in part a reaction against this general lethargy; a complete faith in empirical research and observation was its main weapon. What the

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5 Nicolaidis, op cit. p.224.

6 A. Cobban, "Decline of Political Theory", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXVIII, No. 3, September 1953, pp. 321-376.

7 Ibid

behaviourists opposed bitterly was that "....analysis of the moral rather than the strictly empirical world has stood at the peak of theory's hierarchy of priorities".[8] In place of this the behaviourists sought a "point of view which aims at stating all the phenomena of government in terms of the observed and observable behaviour of men".[9] The ultimate goal of such observation was seen to be "the development of a science of the political process".[10] One of the most beneficial effects of the behaviourist movement was simply to stress the basic importance of an empirical foundation to all political studies.

It would appear that science has much to offer as a method if not an objective. Must the students of politics, then, face up to a fundamental choice as to whether or not he is a scientist? In fact, it is not necessary to pose this question. Eclecticism is endemic to political research. There is no reason why a student of politics who repudiates the idea that "the ultimate goal of a student of political behaviour is the development of a science of the political process"[11] should not avail himself fully of scientific and quantitative method. It is undeniably true that political research has not been able to claim the exactness of control in experiment, nor the predictive certainty of the natural sciences. It is also true that the postulating of rigorous 'laws' pertaining to political behaviour having the same authority as laws in natural science is unlikely at least in the foreseeable future. Yet scientific method with its emphasis on empiricism and the strict marshalling and ordering of fact, has a great deal to offer the student of political behaviour. He can make extensive use of scientific method without being bound by purely scientific goals. In short, he can - indeed he should - have the best of both worlds. As Bernard Crick says: "The debate among academic students of politics about whether or not their study can be made a science is notoriously sterile. The choice is one that need never be made".[12]

The factors which weigh in the choice of approach for a student of politics are practical as well as theoretical. If in the construction of a conceptual framework, a certain orientation becomes manifest, it will be due at least partly

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8. David Easton, op. cit., p.5.

9. R.A. Dahl, "The Behavioural Approach to Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest," American Political Science Review, Vol 55, 1961, pp 763-72.

10. Ibid.

11. Social Science Research Council, Items, December, 1961, pp 37 - 39.

12. Bernard Crick, op. cit., p.101.

to practical matters. Many behaviourist writers have stressed that a methodological approach is essential to political research, but such a view if strenuously held, leads to a totally unwarranted underestimation of the value of factual - or descriptive - research; research, that is to say, which provides "the clarification of complex empirical relationships to which a priori concepts and ideas are often extraneous". [13] Leiserson claims that a great deal can be gained by essentially descriptive studies of what he calls "the institution in action". But again, there is no essential dichotomy between theoretic works and works of a descriptive nature. It is the content of the theory and the importance which is attached to it that differentiates basically 'descriptive' and basically 'theoretical' works. [14]

The nature of theory is a conceptual scheme or system which purports to explain, or assist in the explanation of, a group of phenomena. In the original Greek, the word 'theory' encased two separate but inter-dependent ideas; a looking at and a speculating upon. Theory is thus strongly linked with observation, and hence description. Consequently in areas of political science where the ground is not well known, there is a strong case for studies which are largely descriptive. The present study falls within such a category:

> "There is a place in the study of education administration for deliberate observation of the process without any, or at least a minimum of a priori hypotheses....As a matter of fact, the study of education administration exclusively through the testing of hypotheses, however minor, may be premature at this stage of development." [15]

Drawing in the threads of argument, the case is put forward for a chiefly descriptive study which is behaviourist in that it is concerned more with political behaviour than with political institutions <u>per se</u>, and which is based upon an objective ordering of evidence. However, the writer does not accept the complete behaviourist credo, that all political studies should aim at the development of a science of the political process. As Santayana has pointed out, there are two basic ways of understanding the world, one being scientific and explanatory and the other sound wit, which estimates humanly the value of science and of everything else. [16]

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13 A. Leiserson, "Problems of Methodology in Political Research" <u>Political Science Quarterly</u>, Vol.LXVIII,1953, p. 158

14 David Easton, op. cit., p.4.

15 J. Walton, <u>Administration and Policy-Making in Education</u>, Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1959, p.7.

16 Quoted in Avery Leiserson, op. cit.

II.

The bulk of modern political theory has been written by Americans and about America. One might well question its relevance to non-American situations. In fact, weighed down as the theorists sometimes are by problems of the internal validity of methods of analysis, one could occasionally question its relevance to American situations. Oliver Garceau's criticism of group theory which is valid in a far wider context, indicates the nature of the possible failure: "The search for a complete theory of the group basis of politics may be stretching too far to theoretical elegance at the sacrifice of immediate convenience as an analytical tool". [17] It is true of most of the ' specialists' - writers who are oriented to a particular theoretical standpoint - in political theory that they too often attempt to account for the total dynamics of political behaviour in terms of their particular field of study. Like some modern Procrustes they seem determined to cudgel and batter their subject matter until it fits into a theory which they are publicly espousing.

Perhaps because they were the first of the 'specialists' in the field, the group theorists have received most criticism in this regard. In his study of French pressure groups, Jean Meynaud concludes: "Si importante soit l'étude des groupes de pression pour la compréhension des phénonemès, elle ne constitue qu'une partie de la tâche à remplir pour une analyse complête et équilibrée du système politique". [18] This point is emphasized by Macridis:

> "Researchers who start with a group orientation finish by admitting the inadequacy of their approach; they tell us that in order to understand how groups behave and how they interact, we must study the political system, the overall behaviour patterns, the values and beliefs held by the actors, the formal organization of authority, the degree of legitimacy etc. etc. Without realising it they reverse their theoretical position. They start with the groups only to admit the primacy of political phenomena and suggest that in order to explain group behaviour we must start with what group behaviour purported to explain - the political system". 19

Gabriel Almond attempts to refute this argument when he points out that: "The growing concern among scholars with interest groups and public opinion is the consequence of a search for a more complete and systematic conception of the political

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17. Quoted in R.C. Macridis, "Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis", Journal of Politics, Vol. 23, February 1961, pp.25-45.

18 Jean Meynaud, Les Groupes de Pression en France, Paris, Cahiers de la Fondation nationale des Sciences Politiques, Librairie Armand Colin, 1958, p.36.

19 Macridis, op. cit.

process as a whole, rather than a search for an approach which is an alternative to the present emphasis on formal governmental institutions".[20] It is nevertheless true that many 'specialists' have attempted to account for the dynamics of political behaviour simply in terms of their own theory. Bentley, Truman, Wright Mills and Floyd Hunter offer immediate examples. Because this can be regarded as an 'occupational hazard' for the specialist, this study has sought a more general conceptual basis.

There are practical reasons which reinforce this decision. As stated at the outset, the relevance of largely American theory to non-American situations is questionable. "In our discipline", said Meynaud, "analytical and, more logically, explicate schemes must be strictly studied. Once this effort has been made in each country, then we will be able to conduct real and exact comparative studies".[21] In other words we must build up a solid store of knowledge of political behaviour in New Zealand before we can hope to assess the relevance of American conceptual apparatuses. Beer[22] made this point in 1956 when he wrote that the exclusive use of group theory would constitute an unsatisfactory conceptual framework for his analysis of British politics.

The rejection of a specific orientation for this study is not an act of despair but of choice, for there is a growing body of political study centred around what is termed 'systems analysis'. Basing their theories upon the earlier work of Talcott Parsons and others, writers such as David Easton and Gabriel Almond have focused attention on the concept of systems analysis, the scope of which is so vast that it cannot be thought of as an orientation in the way that elitist theory, for example, can be. Systems analysis, at best, is a synthesis. In "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," Easton[23] makes this point when he says: "The study of politics is concerned with understanding how authoritative decisions are made and executed for a society. We can try to understand political life by viewing each of its aspects piecemeal. We can examine the operations of such institutions as political parties, interest groups, government

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20. G.A. Almond, "A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process", Social Science Research Council, New York, April 1957, p.5.

21 Quoted in J. La Palombara, "Utility and Limitation of Interest Group Theory in Non-American Field Situations", Journal of Politics, Vol. 22, 1960, pp. 29-49.

22 S. Beer, "Pressure Groups and Parties in Britain", American Political Science Review, Vol. 50 No. 1, March, 1956, pp. 1 - 24.

23 David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems", World Politics, Vol. 9, 1956-7, pp. 383 - 400.

and voting". But to obtain a rough picture of the whole, he goes on, it is necessary to combine the results.

> "In combining these results, however, there is already implicit the notion that each part of the larger political canvas does not stand alone but is related to each other part: or, to put it positively, that the operation of no one part can be fully understood without a reference to the way in which the whole itself operates.... it is valuable to adopt this implicit assumption as an articulate premise for research and to view political life as a system of interrelated activities". 24

Those who have written on systems analysis have followed Parsons in using action as a frame of reference. That is to say:

> "The student of political systems is concerned with empirically observable behaviour. Emphasizing 'action' merely means that the description of a political system can never be satisfied by a simple description of its legal or ethical norms. In other words political institutions or persons performing political roles are viewed in terms of what it is they do. The term system satisfies the need for an inclusive concept which covers all the patterned actions relevant to the making of political decisions....the concept of system implies a totality of relevant units, and a certain stability in the interaction of these units". 25

Again, following from Parsons, students of systems analysis have taken as their unit the role, which is defined as: "That organized sector of an actor's orientation which constitutes and defines his participation in an interactive process". 26 Thus a system is envisaged as a structured interaction of roles. But there is no need to insist upon a unit at all - the idea of a unit tacitly acknowledges that all action can be broken down to that unit and accounted for in its terms. It seems presumptuous to suggest that all the forces operating within a system can be reduced to the same basic element. Further, it is not particularly helpful to accurate analysis. It would be more valid and, judging from the rationale of systems analysis, more logical, to try to reduce the subject matter to relationships, or situations, and not to units. This is not to deny that role is a key concept in systems analysis, but to maintain that it is not the only concept of importance.

The overwhelming difficulty of describing a complete (in the sense of national) political system is mitigated in the United States and some Western European countries, by the extent and depth of political research, so that the process is one of collation and selection. In the majority of countries,

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24 Ibid. The stress is the present writer's.

25 G. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems", Journal of Politics, Vol.13, 1956, pp. 391 - 409.

26 See Parsons and Schils, Towards a General Theory of Action, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1951, quoted ibid.

including New Zealand, this is not so. Political research in these countries has not yet developed to the extent that any analysis of national politics as a system would be fruitful. But this does not rule out the plausibility of systems analysis on a smaller scale. There remains the possibility that the method is equally applicable to systems other than national systems; in other words to particular sectors of a national system - what Easton might describe as sub-systems. For example, if one were to select an area of government which was reasonably self-contained and submit it to close analysis, the results would offer a most useful guide to understanding the workings of the national system. By no means could it offer a complete guide. By no means could we consider it simply as the national system writ small. In a country like New Zealand, it would be possible to arrive at an accurate analysis of the total system only after a number of such studies had been conducted and coordinated with specialist studies with such orientation as group and elitist theory, mass communications and public opinion theory.

This study then, proposes to take that sector of government activity known as education administration, in the widest sense of the term; to call it for the sake of simplicity a system, rather than a sub-system; and to submit it to close, functional analysis. The practical justification for such a step has been outlined above, the theoretical justification is obvious. From the structure of the human personality to the structure of the universe we are faced with a succession of systems, each closely related to those immediately above and below it, each by its own method of operation telling us much of the workings of the next. That the systems analysts such as Almond and Easton chose to speak of national politics as a system does not alter the fact that the family is just as much a system and just as much open to some form of systems analysis, albeit less sophisticated. Thus the education system is worth studying both in its own right and as an important step towards an understanding of New Zealand politics generally.

III

It now remains to borrow or, if necessary, to evolve some tool of analysis which is going to provide as complete an understanding as possible of the workings of the education system.

As has been implied earlier, the writer is drawn towards the concept of role, though seriously doubting its viability as a basic unit. In recent years however, several writers have sought to make use of what virtually amounts to a role concept within a wider system of analysis known as 'games theory'.

A considerable body of psychological research deals with the transfer of patterns of social behaviour into the play activity of children and back from the play of children into social life. It seems probable that adults also may tend to find those types of games more interesting which permit them to adopt patterns of behaviour they can also apply to some social situation, or which:

> "permit them to act out, as games, those patterns of behaviour initiated in some experience of social life but which only in the innocuous form of games can be carried to completion. Though we cannot wage private war and kill our opponent, we can play chess and checkmate the opponent's king; and the art of deceiving others profitably is more safely practised first in the game of poker than in politics or economic life". [27]

The analogy between certain social situations and game situations is thus not difficult to establish. Norton Long takes the analogy further when he states that these social games "provide the players with a set of goals that give them a sense of success or failure. They provide them determinate roles and calculable strategies and tactics. In addition, they provide the players with an elite and a general public that is in varying degrees able to tell the score". [28] Long feels that there is much evidence to suggest that many participants in group structures regard their occupations as at least analogous to some game; this does not imply that they take life lightly, for the game is seen as providing a satisfactory sense of significance and a meaningful role.

In pure form, games theory is static. It does not allow for changes in the performance characteristics of particular elements, nor does it ordinarily permit change in the rules.

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27. K.W. Deutsch, "Game Theory and Politics: Some Problems of Application", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. 20, February 1954, pp. 76 - 83.

28 N.E. Long, "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games", American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 64, November 1958, pp. 251 - 261.

The first proponents of the concept, Von Neumann and Morgenstern specified this fact clearly: "We repeat most emphatically that our theory is thoroughly static....A static theory deals with equilibria. The essential characteristic of an equilibrium is that it has no tendency to change." [29] In such situations it would be possible to formulate "mathematically complete principles that will specify what is rational behaviour in certain kinds of social situations and, on the basis of such principles to isolate the general characteristics of such behaviour." [30] However, it is hard to believe that such a concept could be of assistance in analysing a political system, for the nearest approach to an analogy of the political game is the croquet game in Alice in Wonderland where the balls were live hedgehogs, the hoops were soldiers doubled up and the mallets were live flamingoes. As Deutsch reminds us: "The hedgehogs would crawl, the soldiers would stretch and the flamingoes would squirm at every stage of the game." [31]

Yet one does not have to be bound by the limitations of the theory, for it can be used - indeed in this study it will be used - simply as an analytic device for describing behaviour, the properties of which are specified to some degree by the situation. As Snyder points out: "Games theory is in essence a simplifying analytic scheme that enables us to concentrate on crucial aspects of conflict situations." [32] The usefulness of the games concept in analysing and explaining social situations is a fact recognised not only by sociologists and political scientists. Novelists have often made use of the device, though not always consciously. A convenient example is George Orwell's short story The Shooting of an Elephant. Here a conscious attempt is made to account for an official's action by a form of games-analogy. The story is both perceptive and vivid. [33]

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29. Quoted Deutsch, op cit.

30. R.C. Snyder, "Games Theory and the Anaysis of Political Behaviour", Research Frontiers in Politics and Government Brooking Lectures, 1955, (pub. Brooking Institute, 1955).

31 Deutsch, op cit.

32. Snyder, op cit.

33 D.H. Lawrence, in his lengthy novel, Women in Love, often uses the device though less forcefully: "Alexander, the up-to-date host, so bloodlessly free and easy, Fraulein so prettily chiming in just as she would, the little Italian countess taking notice of everybody, only playing her little game, objective and cold, like a weasel watching everything and extracting her own amusement never giving herself in the slightest; then Miss Bradley, heavy and subservient treated with cool, almost amused contempt by Hermione, and therefore slighted by everybody - how known it all was, like a game with the figures set out, the same figures, the Queen of Chess, the knights, the pawns, the same figures moving around in one of the innumerable permutations that make up the game."

Games analogy has also withstood the test of more acute analysis. The philosopher Wittgenstein based his analysis of language upon a 'games theory'.[34] For example:

> "Doesn't the analogy between language and games throw light here?
> [i.e. in linguistic misunderstanding] We can easily imagine people amusing themselves in a field by playing with a ball so as to start various existing games, but playing many without finishing them and in between throwing the ball aimlessly into the air, chasing one another with the ball and bombarding one another for a joke and so on."[35]

Historians, especially military and political historians, have also used simplified games analogy to good effect, as Moorhead's account of the Gallipoli campaign illustrates. There are good reasons then for believing that 'games theory' is an effective analytic device in both social and theoretical situations.

As has been stated, it is consistent both with the conceptual approach of this study and with the inherent limitation of games theory in pure form, that the theory be adapted to fit the needs of this analysis. Wittgenstein admitted that his 'games' concept was a concept 'with blurred edges'. Now Fregge compared a concept to an area, and for him an area with a vague boundary is not an area at all. Thus a concept with blurred edges is not a concept. But this position seems to assume a clarity and precision in definition which does not exist outside the laboratory. The real problem is to avoid emptiness in our assertions, and this can most easily be done by stressing the empirical nature of our observation and by rigorously marshalling our evidence.

Within the games theory as set out by Snyder there are five major concepts, each relatively simple to state. They are: rules, pay-off, strategy, information and coalition. We shall consider them in turn:

1. Rules. These are the limiting conditions under which the game is played. Especially important to the concept of rules - and often overlooked - are the cultural norms, operating in the society in general. What Walter Lippmann described as 'the public philosophy' however, provides no sure and adequate basis for an understanding of the rules of the particular game that is being played in any specific situation.

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34. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford, Blackwell, 1963, passim.

35 Ibid, p. 34.

Nevertheless it does constitute an important "hazard to be calculated" by the players.[36] Perhaps the most important facet of the concept of rules is the institutional structure in which the 'games' take place.

2. Pay-Off. This is what the game is all about. It is the measurement of success in terms of progress to avowed goals. The precision of this concept is somewhat impaired by the acknowledged fact that for many, satisfaction is sought not chiefly from the end product, but from the nature of the process.

3. Strategy. Strategy is concerned with logical action according to a pattern of probabilities. In other words, the players, with the background of accumulated 'game' experience, are sure to have acquired certain specific tactics for set situations within the game and general approaches towards the game.

4. Information. It should be remembered that the 'structure' of information at various levels is likely to have a considerable effect upon the game. As Deutsch points out: "Most of the decisions in games...must be made under conditions of incomplete information".[37]

5. Coalition. There is often a community of interest between two sections, and thus coalitions are formed. Often they are formidable, but nevertheless transitory. The price of violating a coalition will depend upon the sanctions available.

These then are the principal terms in which we shall analyse the education system in New Zealand. It is essential that they bend themselves to a working analysis of a working situation - of a 'system in action'. Therefore they are simple. Administering education is very often a down-to-earth process, our theoretical framework must be geared to this fact.

Conclusion. Chapter One has dealt with the initial problems facing this study. The theoretical basis will be supplemented in Chapter Two by a discussion in more practical terms of New Zealand socio-political culture and of recent educational developments in New Zealand.

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36 Long, op. cit.

37 Deutsch, op. cit.

Chapter Two

NEW ZEALAND AND THE EDUCATION SYSTEM

It is proposed in Chapter Two to supplement the theoretical discussion of Chapter One with a more factual account of the New Zealand setting. It is intended to deal first with the use of the term 'democracy' and its applicability to the setting. We shall then pass on to discuss New Zealand social culture, political culture and finally education in New Zealand.

I

The term 'democracy' has never been adequately defined, indeed is probably incapable of being defined with accuracy. Practical, working definitions tend to be either tautologous or simply value judgements, and theoretical definitions have as much relevance for actual methods of government as pure logic has for human conversation. [1] Abraham Lincoln will be remembered among many other things for his working definition of democracy given in the Gettysburg address. Yet within his short span of power Lincoln often completely reversed cabinet decisions - apparently without a qualm - and was also prepared to coerce a very substantial minority of his fellow countrymen into accepting his reading of the constitution. Whatever his motives, Lincoln did not operate within his own definition of democracy. By no means does it follow, however, that because it cannot be accurately defined, democracy has no meaning. The philosopher Wittgenstein points out: "We sometimes demand definitions not for the sake of their content but of their form. Our requirement is an architectural one; the definition is a kind of ornamental coping that supports nothing." [2] Walter Lippman declares that the acceptance of 'great ideas' (such as freedom and democracy) is an act of faith and goes on: "But in the great ideas there is some kind of central validity around which disagreements and a variety of meanings continue to evolve. Every one of the great ideas is confusing, because it is too full of meaning to be defined simply. But if it were empty of meaning, it would have disappeared into the void." [3]

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1 For a discussion on this and similar points see T.D. Weldon, The Vocabulary of Politics, Penguin, 1953.

2 Wittgenstein op. cit., p. 85.

3 Walter Lippmann, The Public Philosophy, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1955, p. 140.

That we should claim to be saying something meaningful when we say that, with the USA, and the other older Commonwealth countries, the New Zealand system is democratic, can be tested simply. According to Dahl [4] there are two major distinctive features of a democratic system: first, an underlying consensus on policy among the predominant portion of the politically active members and second the characteristic of greatly extending the numbers, size and diversity of minorities whose preferences will influence the outcome of governmental decisions. By these characteristics, Dahl feels that the continuous political competition between individuals, parties or both makes for the responsiveness of government leaders to non-government opinion in such a way that the distinction between democracy and dictatorship will make sense. Since it is generally accepted that groups (or at least those which are prepared to operate within the rules of the system) can make themselves heard effectively at some stage in the making of a decision, and since an underlying consensus on policy indisputably exists, Dahl's 'operational norms' of the democratic system are both meaningful and applicable to New Zealand.

The cynic will still argue that these democratic concepts are illusory; indeed many of them may well be. Yet this does not detract from the fact that they are illusions which are built into the system and therefore must be taken into account. George Orwell wrote forcefully on this subject:

> "An illusion can become a half truth, a mask can alter the expression of a face. The familiar argument to the effect that democracy is 'just the same as' or 'just as bad as' totalitarianism never takes this into account. All such arguments boil down to saying that half a loaf is the same as no bread. In England [and, one may add, in New Zealand] such concepts as justice, liberty and objective truth are still believed in. They may be illusions, but they are very powerful illusions. <u>The belief in them influences conduct, national life is different because of them.</u>" [5]

Orwell concludes that democracy is less of a fraud than it sometimes appears.

Thus although it is not a totally known factor (since it cannot be accurately defined) and although there may be room

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4 R.A. Dahl, <u>A Preface to Democratic Theory</u>, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956, p. 63.

5 George Orwell, "England Your England", <u>Inside the Whale and other Essays</u>, Penguin, 1962, p. 71.

for doubt as to whether its tenets represent actual fact or simply illusion, New Zealand democracy is something we must take for granted in this study, indeed it presents an obvious starting point. From here, one must set out to acquire a more precise knowledge of the cultural and historical factors which have characterised the New Zealand deomcratic system. For the sake of convenience the analysis will be sub-divided into two broad categories, namely social and political culture. It should be noted at the outset that there is no serious attempt at comparison with other democracies. No doubt many, if not all, the characteristics we shall note are to be found in somewhat similar ratios in other systems. But this is not the point: what is important, is that we understand the cultural, social and political forces operating upon democracy in New Zealand.

II

Equality. Baldly stated, the history of New Zealand tells of the development of markedly homogeneous people with markedly egalitarian social and political values. Social equality is the characteristic of New Zealand which most strikes the European visitor, and is the most decisive factor in any study of New Zealand political and social life. As Milne has noted:

> "There is widespread agreement that an outstanding feature of New Zealand life is its tendency towards equality - indeed Leslie Lipson chose for the title of his book, The Politics of Equality. This is not to say that class distinctions are completely absent in New Zealand. But it seems evident that, although they exist, they are not nearly so rigidly defined as they are in Britain. Extremes of wealth are less than in Britain, and there are smaller differentials between the wages of the skilled and the unskilled. There is certainly resentment against inherited status, privileges or wealth." 6

Donald Horne has said of Australia that the 'ordinary people' have won a profound and satisfying ideological victory: much the same could be said of New Zealand. Horne continues:

> "Taxi drivers prefer their passengers to sit with them in the front seats and sometimes tip them the small change. A person who doesn't like ordinary people to think they are as good as he is, or to enjoy some of the things he enjoys himself, will not like Australia. The spirit of fraternalism permeates the nation." 7.

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6 R.S. Milne, Political Parties in New Zealand, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966, pp. 6 - 7.

7 Donald Horne, The Lucky Country, Penguin 1964, pp. 11 - 12.

Visitors from the 'old world' who have attempted, in their first few days in New Zealand, to tip a porter, waiter or taxi driver, would testify to the fact that what Horne has to say is equally applicable to the New Zealand scene.

It could be further said of New Zealand that there is no great prestige in wealth, nor prerogative of leadership. Without doubt, there exists in every town a small clique which regards itself as 'society', but Sinclair finds in such groups nothing but "an anaemic relic of English gentility and an outlet for harmless snobbery".[8] "Not only are very rich or very poor people rare; the average income is not just a simple average, it is also close to the typical income".[9] Again, Donald Horne's comment on Australia could equally well be applied to New Zealand. Condliffe's studies reinforce this claim: "Real wage-rates, the consumption of food, low rates of infant mortality and the obvious vigour of the population, attested by low disease and death rates, indicate that the living level is unusually high".[10] Basing his comments on what Siegfried had said over half a century ago, Airey claimed: "There is no socialism, class tension is slight and capitalism is not seriously challenged. The standard of living is high by comparison with most countries and the egalitarian spirit leads to comment on New Zealand as the land of the comfortable mediocrity; democracy is the term that still springs to mind as the best description of this doctrineless society".[11]

Yet egalitarianism depends upon the minimisation of sectional conflict (in the social rather than geographical sense). Conrad Blythe[12] argues that in New Zealand the virtual lack of sectional conflict depends to a large extent upon a situation in which the number of positions available exceeds the number seeking employment. But full and over-full employment depend upon the steady flow of export earnings. These, in turn, depend in considerable degree upon a relatively small range of agricultural exports - butter, meat and wool. Fluctuations in market prices for these products have political repercussions, such as import and exchange controls

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8. Keith Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, Penguin, 1959, p. 276.
9. Horne, op. cit., p. 13.
10. J.B. Condliffe, The Welfare State in New Zealand, London, Allen and Unwin, 1959, p. 315.
11. W. Airey, "Andre Siegfried's 'Democracy in New Zealand': Fifty Years After", Political Science, Vol 6 No 2, September 1954, p. 43
12. Conrad Blythe, "The Special Case : The Political Economy of New Zealand", Political Science, Vol 18 No 1, March 1966, pp. 38 - 52.

and higher taxation to cut internal demand.[13] Severe market fluctuations might have a considerable effect upon the social structure, perhaps producing social conflict and thereby seriously threatening New Zealand egalitarianism.

In matters of national security just as much as in economic and social stability, New Zealand is dependent upon overseas countries, notably the United States and the United Kingdom. Such dependence is a difficult pill to swallow: "That our nationalism depends on what Bradford is willing to pay for a fleece, on what size of butter quota Britain grants us, on whether the US will alow us to send her any beef: this is the rub."[14]

Two defence mechanisms, which tend to make the position more palatable, are common. The first is denial. Many New Zealanders, especially those with an agricultural background, would claim that their country is isolated from the outside world and therefore safe from danger. In 1964 an Auckland team won the national debating trophy in proposing the motion: "That this house believes New Zealand's isolation to be an asset." The amount spent by New Zealand on its own armed forces shows there is little national appreciation of the notion that any future major war is likely to be fought in South East Asia, and that in reality, New Zealand is far from isolated in the military sense. There exists nevertheless an important school of thought which believes New Zealand's 'isolation' to be its most important asset and which bases its attitude to foreign policy on this belief.[15] The second defence mechanism is identification. Although an increasing number of New Zealanders are following Australia's lead and tending to identify with the United States, the majority continue to identify with the United Kingdom. Approximately one New Zealander in every six is in fact British by birth (that is, born in the United Kingdom) and the attitude of many others can be summed up in the phrase: 'we are more British than the British'. In a sense this goes beyond simple identification, in that although British standards and values are used, to an extent it is New Zealand superiority that is being measured.[16] Basically, however, a share in

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13 See R.S. Milne, op. cit., p.5.
14 Blythe, op. cit., p. 51.
15 For example, Keith Sinclair "New Zealand's Future Foreign Policy", Political Science, Vol. 18 No. 2, September 1966, pp. 68 - 77.
16 Keith Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, pp. 297 - 298.

the so-called British virtues (such as sportsmanship, courage and modesty) is implied. Indeed, it should be pointed out that New Zealanders have every right to identify with British achievement, since on a number of occasions they have played a palpable part in that achievement. An example of New Zealand's identification with the United Kingdom was offered by the Minister of Education at the time of the Suez crisis, the Hon R.M. Algie. At the opening ceremony of the Rangitoto College he said that he did not know that he could quite justify British action morally. "But if England feels she needs a few friends, I would be proud to say that I am one of them, and I believe all of you would." The large gathering of parents is reported to have applauded the Minister's statement.[17] This "inordinate rage and irrational fervour that grips New Zealanders when Britain's security and honour are affected"[18] is attributed by some to the fact that, though abounding in geography, New Zealand is sadly lacking in history. "We have nothing of our own, therefore we give a fanatical devotion to the far-off Motherland."[19]

Conformity. Some years ago, an American journalist caused a stir by writing that New Zealanders 'all looked alike'. Sinclair, a New Zealander himself, seems to be in basic sympathy with this statement:

> "Men and women generally wear clothes conspicuous only for their dowdiness. They mostly speak alike. If we ignore the Maoris, customs differ little from one locality to another. This homogeneity is due partly to the predominantly British origins of New Zealanders, partly due to rapid developments in communications in the past century, partly to the state education of the vast majority of the population. No significant number of children apart from Catholics go to private schools. There are no private universities. Education has, for many years, been free, secular and compulsory up to the age of 15....The proportion of the population receiving a university education is one of the highest in the world. Consequently there is an almost complete equality of opportunity to enter the professions and a high degree of social mobility. No particular prestige adheres to rising in society from poverty to power, affluence or eminence. Nor does any great stigma attach to changing from white collar to overalls. It is also true that education is geared to the task of attempting to produce a high average, even at the expense of the exceptional." 20

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17 New Zealand Herald, November 5th 1956.

18 M. Dalziel, "Disaster in the Primary Schools", Landfall, Vol. 16, No. 1, March 1962.

19 Ibid.

20 Sinclair, op. cit., p. 277.

De Tocqueville would have imagined that in such a society a certain basic intolerance of diversity would have manifested itself, under the 'intellectual dominion of the greatest number'.[21] Wakefield's failure to mould New Zealand into a stratified society along European lines signified also the eschewing of what Gladstone described as the Englishman's 'love of inequality'. The value-system which developed consequently attached much importance to conformity. Paradoxically the strength of the Nonconformist churches has tended to reinforce this attitude, bringing dislike of diversity which could only survive in an homogeneous and socially isolated community.

"The most influential religious tradition in shaping early New Zealand", it has been stated, "was the puritan one. It consciously appealed to the individual to manifest the fruits of salvation in his personal moral life. It was predominantly a personal religion, and its influence on the national life, though a profound one, was indirect".[22] However, during the twentieth century, puritanism became a direct socio-political force as result of two national movements. First was the NZ Alliance for the Suppression and Prohibition of the Liquor Trade, which was founded in 1886. "The prohibition campaign channelled much of the moral energy of the puritan into a responsibility, albeit a crude one, for national as opposed to individual salvation."[23] Second was the Bible in Schools League, formed in 1912, with the backing of all the Protestant Churches, "to campaign for a system whereby the Bible was read in schools without any comment or additional teaching."[24] These movements, cutting across political allegiance, were products of a social culture which was manifestly prepared to use the state in pursuance of its own social objectives. Vestiges of the influence of such movements are to be found in New Zealand's rigid liquor laws.

Other examples of an intolerant attitude include: (i) the treatment of conscientious objectors, harsher than that of the United Kingdom during (and after) each of the world wars.

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21 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1948, Vol. 2, p. 11.

22 A.J.S. Reid, Church and State in New Zealand, Unpublished MA thesis, VUW, 1962, p.1.

23 Ibid, p.2.

24 Ibid, p.3.

(ii) The position of groups which 'do not conform' vis-a-vis the community - students, for example. British students occupy something of a privileged position in the community, whereas their New Zealand counterparts are despised as a 'group apart' - the breed of 'beardies and weirdies'. (iii) The illiberal system of state aid to private schools in New Zealand, which compares unfavourably with that of most other Protestant countries. The community appears to be offended that any sector should not be content with the state education.

The Paternal State. Lilburne saw men as 'equal and alike in power, dignity, authority and majesty'. Yet it is palpably clear that where equality exists it is not natural but has been fostered by conditions which have been created to that end. This presupposes a strong central government. Thus the more nearly a society approximates to egalitarian principles, the greater becomes the power wielded at the centre. As Lamartine pointed out in the economic sector, if society were to insist upon equal rewards and equal industry, the central authority would need to be an omnipresent and omniscient judge.[25]

Consequently, unlike Tom Paine, New Zealanders have not looked upon government as being 'like dress, a badge of lost innocence', rather they have welcomed it as a tool for creating an egalitarian society.[26] Thus although one individual is equal to any other, none is equal to the source of authority. This point can be exemplified by reference to an educational matter. New Zealand primary teachers enjoy complete equality when applying for a post. The post must (except under very unusual circumstances) go to the highest graded applicant. Yet the whole grading system is based on assessment by an inspector, himself an ex-teacher, who represents central authority. Thus the equality between the teachers is a result of central authority. New Zealand seems to have accepted intervention by the state more willingly than most nations. There is a danger, however, in over-dependence upon the state. De Tocqueville felt such a system of government would debilitate the human spirit. Indeed, one is drawn to the comparison between Sinclair's comment on New Zealand's homogeneity (supra) and de Tocqueville's statement that in an egalitarian society,

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25 Alphonse Lamartine, "Vindication", Dissertations, 11, pp. 395-397.

26 See Blythe, op cit., p. 42.

democratic government:

> "....provides for their [the people's] security, foresees and supplies their necessities, facilitates their pleasures, manages their principal concerns, directs their industry, regulates the descent of property, and subdivides their inheritances: what remains but to spare them all the care of thinking and all the trouble of living?" [27]

Such a power, de Tocqueville felt, does not tyrannise, rather it "...compresses, enervates, extinguishes and stupifies a people, till each nation is reduced to nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd". [28] Nietsche, who condemned egalitarianism as the bearer of mediocrity, put the point even more strongly, when he referred to equality as "...this brutalising of man into a pygmy with equal rights and claims". [29]

That New Zealand has escaped the full impact of such tendencies would be generally accepted. But they are present in New Zealand society and are not completely without effect: "For a nation with so instinctive a distrust of militarism, we show a strong partiality for marching in step." [30] Implicit in the dogma that no person should be 'better' than his fellow is the assumption that no man should be different from his fellow.

What preserves New Zealand from sinking into a condition of authoritarianism, [31] is that the New Zealand social and geographical environment demand of the citizen a rugged individuality and self-reliance. However dependent the New Zealander may be upon his central government, however much the egalitarianism he cherishes depends upon strong central control, he is not in the least deferential towards the government. It is there, he knows, to serve his purposes, and if government should not fully comprehend these purposes, he is at pains to enumerate them to any Cabinet Minister or senior public servant.

Particularism. A lack of deference on the part of the citizen to central government is reinforced by his sense of loyalty to his own town or district. For a small country New Zealand

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27 De Tocqueville, op cit., p. 318.

28 Ibid, p. 319.

29. Friedrich Nietsche, "Beyond Good and Evil" (1886), translated H. Zimmern, in The Philosophy of Nietsche, New York, 1927, p. 497.

30 PPTA Journal, Vol. X No. 10, November 1963.

31 Some foreign observers, notably David Ausubel, would say that New Zealand has, in fact, sunk into authoritarianism. See his The Fern and the Tiki, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1960.

delights in a considerable number of sectional antagonisms - 'local and regional jealousies' - as Peter Campbell termed them.[32] The two main rivalries noted by Campbell are between the North and South Islands and between Wellington and Auckland. But it would be true to say that antagonisms exist between many cities and regions comparable in size. The report of the Commissioner on Education District Boundaries[33] offers much documentary evidence in support of the above statement. It was suggested, for example, that the whole of the Marlborough area should be administered by the Nelson Education Board rather than by Wellington. This recommendation was vociferously opposed by local school committee members on the grounds that 'Nelson people' would dominate them. (See Chapter Seven). This is but one example in many. An example from a different field is the protracted struggle conducted between Napier and Hastings as to which is the chief centre for Hawke's Bay.[34] One of the many facets of the dispute concerns which of the towns should be the home of the Hawke's Bay Rugby Football Union yet the towns are only 18 miles apart. Perhaps the strongest evidence of particularism in New Zealand however, is to be found in the sphere of local government amalgamation where practically every suggestion is defeated because the smaller partner in the proposed amalgamation is afraid of domination.

Pragmatism. The last facet of New Zealand social culture which should be mentioned is the most difficult to come to grips with. Perhaps it can best be described as 'pragmatism'.[35] According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, pragmatism is defined as a "matter-of-fact treatment of things" and as a "doctrine that estimates any assertion solely by its practical bearing upon human interests." In both senses of the word, New Zealanders are an eminently pragmatic people for several reasons. First, the small population usually makes it possible to ensure the individual of a hearing in the case of mistreatment by a public authority. Thus the individual

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32 Peter Campbell, "Politicians Public Servants and the People in New Zealand", (No. 1), Political Studies, Vol. 111 No. 3, October 1955, pp 193-210.

33 Report of the Commissioner on Education District Boundaries, Wellington, Government Printer, 1964.

34 P.S. Werry, "Hawke's Bay: The Rival Cities", Comment, Vol. 3 No. 4, July 1962.

35 This chapter was originally prepared in February 1966. It is interesting to note that R.S. Milne, in his subsequently published Political Parties in New Zealand has chosen the same word to describe much the same phenomena.

can often be placed above a 'rule' in the sense that the authority can frequently afford to make exceptions. (In fact, such is the importance of pressure in New Zealand national and local politics, that sometimes the authority cannot afford not to make exceptions!) Second, as a society, New Zealand is not doctrinaire, thus allowing for an 'estimation' of matters 'solely by their practical bearing upon human interests'. Third, there is, in a state with slender resources, an inherent difficulty in making firm rules. An example from the field of education will perhaps put the point more clearly. In most countries a teacher with qualifications in physics can count on the fact that, if he applies for a physics post at a given school and is accepted, then he will be teaching that subject in the next school year. In New Zealand this is often not the case, because understaffing at the last moment may well mean that the new physics teacher will be taking predominantly, say, mathematics. Thus the rule (in this case that a specialist teacher should be taking his own special subject) has broken down, but the system does not break down because the master who draws up the timetable can be depended upon to be reasonable. When the opportunity arises, the new master's timetable will be readjusted. The acceptance of this probability by the new master is itself an act of pragmatic reasonableness. The whole sphere of national life is pervaded by this air of pragmatism. But however pleasant an atmosphere it creates, it tends to preclude high standards.

It is perhaps unfortunate that New Zealanders tend to make a fetish out of their 'matter-of fact treatment of things'. An acceptance of poor quality and poor service has grown out of the need to 'make do'. But theirs is an essentially easy-going society in which any person, whatever his social origins, can live comfortably. It should not be forgotten that although New Zealand suffers from some of the cramping effects of egalitarianism, it also enjoys the blessings - as do egalitarianism's critics. Perhaps the words of such a critic offer an appropriate conclusion to what has, of necessity, been a brief summary:[36]

> "That we may never lack two Sundays in a week
> One to rest and one to play
> That we may worship in the liturgical drone
> Of the race-commentator and the radio raconteur
> That we may avoid distinction and exception
> Worship the mean, cultivate the mediocre
> Live in state houses, raise forcibly-educated children

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36. M.K. Joseph, "Secular Liturgy", quoted Sinclair, op cit., p. 274.

Receive family benefits, and standard wages and a pension
And rest in peace in our state crematorium
Saint Allblack
Saint Monday Raceday
Saint Stabilisation

Pray for us".

III

Equality. New Zealand social and political cultures are unquestionably congruent, political and social action being bound within much the same framework. Egalitarianism is the dominant theme in political thought, offering both the basic premise for much social legislation and the phraseology for political dialogue. Although 'class' is important in terms of political alignment in New Zealand, the concept hardly carries the emotional undertones that it does in the United Kingdom. Parties have a 'class' image it is true, but there is no ' class war', rather what Siegfried described as a 'judicious grouping of interests' [37] General elections tend to evoke atavistic slogans, such as 'socialism' versus 'free enterprise' but these do not engender the bitterness that has been traditional in the United Kingdom. When the leader of the Social Credit Political League points out - as he continually did in the 1966 general election campaign - that there is no difference between the two major parties, many heads nod in agreement. Whatever Mr. Grimond, the Liberal leader in the United Kingdom, may have said in the general election campaigns fought by his party, he did not suggest that there were no differences between his opponents. In fact, it is interesting to note that the British Liberals sought to establish themselves in a central position, between the major parties. The New Zealand 'third party', however, inevitably occupied a position to the right of the major parties - the country already possessed two middle-of-the-road parties, one of which accommodated the bulk of the country's leftists. More will be said of the political parties in a later chapter, but it is sufficient to point out here that the party programmes have been shaped to the aspirations of a generally egalitarian society more than to any exclusive section of that society.

Egalitarianism has also strongly affected the relationship between government and the citizen. Peter Campbell commented:

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37. A. Siegfried, Democracy in New Zealand, London, Bell, 1914, p. 78.

"The distinctive feature of the process of government and politics in New Zealand is its intimacy". [38] He was of course referring to the very strong links between people, representatives and administrators, which can be seen simply as institutionalised egalitarianism. This theme will be expanded in a later chapter, but for the present it should be noted that nothing distinguishes New Zealand political culture from the British more than its 'open door' policy - be it a facade or genuine - whereby any constituent can have almost constant access to his MP, and any person with a complaint can take his case to the relevant Minister and receive what amounts to individual treatment. It is this 'localisation' of political issues which lends to debates in the House of Representatives an "air of familiarity and what Lord Bryce has called 'a certain lack of elevation'." [39]

Conformity. Conformism in political terms has tended to detract from the prestige of party politics. Even in the overtly 'political' years of the depression and the rise of the Labour Party, many voices were heard against the party system. In the 1928 election for example, the Methodist Times was moved to comment - rather hopefully - that: "The day for party politics is drawing to a close and the present system of party government has outlived its day of usefulness." [40] Prior to the next election, the Presbyterian Outlook stressed that the party system kept moral men out of politics and suggested that the churches should organize to "put all the good people on one side of the fence, and all the bad people on the other side." [41]

In the post-war years the parties appear to have reacted to this attitude. Professor Wood speaks of parties "getting on with an attitude rather than a policy" [42] and others have stated that "...there is no longer any conception of a social ideal, no longer any party policy other than a random set of vote-catching promises. [43]

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38 Peter Campbell, op cit., p. 193.

39 Leicester Webb, "Politics and Administration", in H. Belshaw (Ed.) New Zealand (UN Series), Berkeley University of California Press, 1947, pp. 263-291.

40 Methodist Times, November 3rd 1928, quoted Reid op cit., p. 9.

41 Outlook, April 30th 1931, quoted Reid op cit., p.9.

42. Wood, op cit., p. 95.

43 J.L. Roberts and R.H. Brookes, "The Reluctant Elite", Comment, Vol. 12, No. 5, Spring 1960.

The Messianic drive which characterised the Liberal and Labour parties in former years is no longer in evidence. It is no longer possible for a political leader to say, as Harry Holland did in 1919, that: "The struggle in which we are engaged is not a struggle between individuals for the possession of the Treasury Benches....It is a struggle between capitalism and socialism.. The Labour Party comes pledged to secure every immediate improvement that is within the bounds of possibility."[44] Thus it is often difficult when reading through reports of parliamentary debates to identify the party affiliations of speakers; the sides may change but debates remain the same. The standard topics for debate in education, for example, have been the allocation of funds for education, the status, training and remuneration of teachers, and the provision for school building and maintenance. Tactics have differed little over the years, and are divisible into 'Opposition' and 'Government' tactics, not 'Labour' and 'National' tactics.

Two other factors contribute to the pressure on New Zealand politicians to conform, the first being party discipline. Peter Campbell claims that the New Zealand system "produces parties as disciplined as they are in Britain".[45] But in fact a more detailed analysis would show that if anything party discipline in New Zealand is stronger,[46] resulting from the comparative smallness in numbers of the New Zealand parliament. The second is the pervasiveness of national culture-goals. For a party or even an ambitious politician to attack openly the welfare state, the principle of secularism, the Commonwealth connection or the Western alliance would be unthinkable.[47] The amount of common ground between the parties is surprising; the areas in which radical disagreement is possible between successful politicians comparatively small. The choice of the voter is therefore restricted: "However widely the politicians and their supporters may differ in their view of life, the need to conform to the well-established opinions of the common man

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44 Maoriland Worker, December 10th 1919, quoted B. Brown, The Rise of New Zealand Labour, Wellington, Price Milburn, 1962.

45 Campbell, op. cit.

46 Therese May, "Parliamentary Discipline in New Zealand since 1954", Political Science, Vol. 17, No. 1, March 1965, pp.37-55.

47 See Condliffe, op. cit., esp. Chapter VIII; see also Wood, op. cit., esp. Chapter XII.

reduces them to a single unanimity on immediate aims."[48] The nature of political dialogue in New Zealand can be summed up in the words of a leading official of the opposition Labour Party: "All we can do is wait for them [the Government] to make a mistake, and the longer they stay in, the fewer they make." Talcott Parsons developed a useful model of a two-party system,[49] in which the parties form strata of a hierarchy of value-based institutions, graded according to goal-specificity. In the New Zealand political system, one would need to compare quite specific goals and values before one perceived a vital contrast. Thus party politics in New Zealand, in response to a number of pressures not the least of which is the need to conform, have become less partisan. This is hardly surprising since politics reflect the social situation and, as Aristotle pointed out: "The diner - and not the cook - will be the best judge of the feast."[50]

Examples of specific legislation of a conformist and intolerant nature are offered by Sinclair, namely Prime Minister Fraser's referendum on compulsory military training in 1949 and the Police Offences Act of 1951. Of the former he concludes: "The whole business smelt strongly of the plebiscites of dictators, but few people seemed to have sensitive noses." Of the latter he comments: "The law has not been used to curtail civil liberties, but it is there, waiting its dictator."[51] The Narcotics Act of 1965 is of much the same ilk. R.S. Milne offers further examples, and concludes that successive Governments have exhibited "...a certain unscrupulousness...and a tendency to slight the rights of minorities."[52]

Particularism. Since the New Zealand MP is much more a representative of his constituency and spokesman for his constituents' needs than his British counterpart, particularism tends to be very much a part of national politics, and Webb

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48 Wood, op. cit., p. 96.

49 T. Parsons, "Voting and the Equilibrium of the American Political System", in American Voting Behaviour, Burdick and Brodbeck (eds.), Glencoe, Free Press, 1959.

50 The Politics of Aristotle, translated E. Barker, Oxford, 1950, p.147.

51 Sinclair, op. cit., p. 284.

52 Milne, op. cit. p.18.

points out that this tendency has been accentuated by the absence of real national issues.[53] Elections are fought to some extent over the amenities which the incumbent has procured - or failed to procure - for the constituency. This of course means that Cabinet (itself chosen, to some extent, with geographical considerations in mind) must balance as carefully as possible such new works and buildings as are to be undertaken. This is not to say that Cabinet is above what might judiciously be called 'timing' its programme, or release of its intended programme. Thus it was that Labour announced its intention to build a university in the Waikato just before an important by-election at Hamilton, at the very time when a committee was sitting on university expansion and allied topics. But particularism is just one pressure among many, and as is shown in the dispute concerning the division of the Auckland Education District (as was) to permit the formation of the new South Auckland District, it is not of the first importance. In opposition, an Auckland member, R.M. Algie, attacked the proposed division. "The stripping of the fair city of Auckland", Mr Algie told the House in 1948, "has gone too far...It is time that Aucklanders took a firm stand and told Southerners that if they want to enjoy the things that Auckland has, they should live in Auckland."[54] As Minister, the Hon R.M. Algie told the Education Boards conference in 1951 that some Boards were too big. He was not thinking of any particular Board, nor did he consider taking any action until asked to do so by the Boards. The following year the Auckland Education District was divided.[55] Thus it would seem that the necessities of sound administration can outweigh particularist considerations.

Pragmatism. Pragmatism in political culture can perhaps best be seen as an attitude of mind which accepts - perhaps too stoically - the failings of the system and which sets out, with complete faith, to make the system work. Once again one may

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53 Leicester Webb, op. cit.

54 NZPD, July 27th 1948.

55 Ian Cumming, Glorious Enterprise - The History of the Auckland Education Board (1857-1957), Christchurch, Whitcombe & Tombs, 1959, p. 664.

draw a parallel with the Australian position: "Procedural patterns and conceptualisation are so ramshackle that some parts of the country's institutional structure seem to be held together with safety pins and bits of string." [56]

If New Zealand government is reasonably efficient, it owes its efficiency primarily to the professionalism of its top public servants, and top politicians, the spirit of the remainder of its politicians and the sense of pragmatic reasonableness of its people. As Professor Wood points out:

> "New Zealand's machine of government is not only reasonably efficient; it is essentially democratic in the sense of being sensitively in tune with the life of the community as a whole. This result is achieved by devices drawn from British experience but radically changed from the original models. The people's will is revealed not only through the ballot box but through countless private organizations. Parliament is not so much the supreme organ of government as a channel for the expression of opinion; according to the original meaning of the term, it is a place where men speak their mind, and perhaps speak it all the more freely because they know that nothing they are likely to say will have the smallest difference on the immediate decision. Members of parliament, deprived of their one-time functions of legislation and government, are channels through which individual electors can make contact with Authority and get the impression - not always illusory - that they can have their views and requests favourably considered." [57]

Thus we have traced, in social and political terms, some of the bases of New Zealand culture. There has been no attempt to offer a complete picture, but rather to show some of the major facets which, though by no means unique to New Zealand, tend to characterise much of its social and political culture. Although some have seen this system as being depicted by the "physical deficiencies, the ad hoc decisions and the last minute staving-off of disaster...a lack of prescience by authority, a peculiar centralisation which plays off one centre against another, and above all, the absence of an informed public opinion", [58] a more comparative analysis would tend to stress the essentially democratic nature of New Zealand political and social culture. Manifestly, the ordinary citizen in New Zealand is given a 'fair go' this is the first and most lasting impression which New Zealand creates on the student of politics.

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56 Horne, op. cit., p. 39.

57 Wood, op. cit., p. 103.

58 T.E. Carter, "Report of the Universities", Landfall, Vol. 14 No. 1, March 1960.

IV

To complete this introductory section, it is intended to pass on to a brief analysis of recent trends in the New Zealand education system. It is a feature common to many Western countries that "an attentive public keeps a continuing watch over policy towards education: teachers' associations and PTAs are the most important spokesmen for this public, but many (sometimes, one suspects, too many) people consider themselves to be experts on education and do not hesitate to give confident vent to their assured views".[59] It is not difficult to appreciate two chief reasons why so many should be interested in education: "Each of us has been on the receiving end of the school system and now we see what it is doing, or failing to do, for our children".[60]

The administrative structure of this system so closely watched over is set out below. It forms much of the basis of discussion in the main body of the work and an understanding of it is therefore essential.

1.1 Education Administration for State Primary and Post-Primary Schools.



59. V.O. Key Jnr., Public Opinion and American Democracy, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1961, p. 545.

60. W.J. Ford, "The Currie Report", Comment, No. 13, October 1962.

The first point to be noted is that this study is concerned exclusively with the state schools system at primary and secondary (or post-primary) levels. The reason for this limitation is simply one of expediency, that is to say the necessity of using an area which was small enough to be manageable yet sufficiently broad to enable conclusions to emerge from the study, and which was, at the same time, architecturally sound. Even within this restricted area, it will be necessary to concentrate only on the more important aspects.[61]

Modern developments in New Zealand education, according to the Department of Education,[62] can be summarised under four headings:

(i) An effort to provide equality of educational opportunity in the fullest sense of the term;

(ii) An effort to provide a richer and better-balanced education at all levels than has been available in the past;

(iii) An effort to improve personal relationships within the class-room and keep them more in step with modern psychological thought on the nature and needs of the adolescent and pre-adolescent;

(iv) An effort to keep abreast of the (chiefly technical) demands of a rapidly changing world.

These trends can be traced back to a common point of reference, though not, perhaps to a common source. They were first accepted as more or less explicit government policy by the Labour Government which came into office in 1935 and were given recognition in the annual report of the Minister of Education to Parliament in 1939. The key phrase of this report read: "Every person, whatever his level of academic ability, whether he be rich or poor, whether he live in town or country, has a right as a citizen to a free education of the kind for which he is best fitted and to the fullest extent of his powers." A casual glance through the educational journals of the 1930s would be enough to show that the Minister, the Hon Peter Fraser, was using ideas that had long been current among educationalists in New Zealand and elsewhere, but which had not been put into practice because of the depression. The report of 1939 was not so much the source as the formal recognition of the trends set out above. But more, the Government was promising to put these ideas into action.

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61. Maori education, for example, has been almost completely ignored. It is administered separately by the Education Department. Further, it presents unique problems with which this writer was not competent to deal.

62. Submission of the Department of Education to the Commission on Education, 1962.

The Government was aiming at nothing less than the complete reorientation of the education system from selection to equality; the implied goal of Labour's policy was an education more congruent with New Zealand's social values. Under the old system, inherited principally from Victorian England, an elementary education based almost exclusively on the Three R's was given to all, but post-primary education was something separate and had to be bought by the better-off or won by the very able. Although time had eroded much of the rigour of selective education, it had by no means disappeared, and two sections of the community - the less well-off and the rural population in general - suffered. It was indeed the inevitable outcome of a system of education consisting of "mass instruction chiefly designed to produce an orderly, literate and productive working population"[63] that no education beyond the elementary stage was deemed necessary for them.

Perhaps the best single example of the reorientation was the abolition in 1936 of the Proficiency Examination, thus opening the post-primary schools to all who wished to enter them. This legislation brought about a problem, in that post-primary education was dominated by the university entrance examinations in which after 1936 the large majority of post-primary pupils were not interested. This majority was substantially increased when the compulsory leaving age was raised to 15 years in 1944, but by this time steps were being taken to remedy the situation. In 1942 new conditions for University Entrance were created and thus the way was open for the creation of a new school-leaving certificate which, it was hoped, would reflect the interests of the majority, and for the remodelling of the school curriculum in a corresponding manner. The desire for educational equality was thus an important stimulus to the attempt to create a better-balanced and fuller education.

A consultative committee (the Thomas Committee) was set up to consider the post-primary curriculum and it presented its report in 1945. The committee had sought to "aim firstly at the full development of the adolescent as a person; and secondly at preparing him for an active place in our New Zealand society as a worker, neighbour, home-maker and citizen".[64]

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63. Compulsory Education in New Zealand (UNESCO), 3rd printing 1960, p.31.

64. Report of the Consultative Committee on the Post-Primary Curriculum, Wellington, Government Printer, 1945.

Its recommendations - which can be seen as following implicitly the concept of 'democratic equality of educational opportunity' - form the basis of the curricula in state post-primary schools today. Although the stress in those years was on post-primary education,modernisation of the primary syllabus along similar lines had also been initiated in 1942.

A development more in the public eye has been the strong reaction in some circles against 'repressive' discipline. Corporal punishment and its accompanying fear have been the traditional foundations of school discipline. However, with the recent expansion, inside and outside the school system, of psychological theory, these traditions have been increasingly questioned. The Minister of Education in his annual report to parliament in 1957 was moved to state that there was less corporal punishment in the schools and that behaviour in the classroom was improving. The difficulties of measuring such trends are obvious. The statement may be an indication of the attitude of departmental officials rather than of the realities of the situation. Nonetheless it is probable that, owing to the new emphasis in training, attitudes to punishment among teachers have changed. Bitter feelings have been aroused on this subject; it cuts into the nation's social culture exposing an egalitarianism which wishes to accept the pupil as a fellow and an intolerance which recognises strong discipline as a necessary part in the pupil's training.

The fourth trend of modern development in New Zealand education has been the attempt to keep abreast of the implications of technological developments in the changing world. The growth of technical education dates back to the introduction in 1948 of day-release classes in technical schools and the establishment in the next year of the New Zealand Trades Certifications Board, with its own system of examinations. To make the advance more widespread, a Technical Correspondence School was also set up. In 1958 a Technical Certification Act provided for the development of courses and examinations for technicians in all branches of industry. In addition, two senior technical institutions, the Seddon Memorial Technical College in Auckland and the Central Technical College in the Hutt Valley were provided, and in 1958 a national conference organized by the Department of Education resulted in the setting up of an advisory body, the New Zealand Council for Technical Education, which was to foster close relations between technical education and industry. This movement took technical education out of the hands of secondary institutions, and therefore beyond the scope of this study.

The technical colleges which had provided secondary education with a technical slant for the less academically able child were called upon to reorientate their syllabuses in order to become multilateral secondary schools, and technical instruction became the responsibility of tertiary institutions.

CONCLUSION. This section has sought to establish the framework for the main body of the study. Much has, of necessity, been omitted in so brief a survey, but it is hoped that a base has been created from which to expand in the course of the study. As far as the concepts of games analysis are concerned, the sub-sections on social and political culture have established the framework of the 'rules of the games'. Also, the features which have been noted in Chapter Two (based mainly on a review of the available literature), should be observable in the education system. It should be possible then, to expand on them later.

The diagram below sets out the state school system. With diagram 1.1, it offers a point of reference for much of the ensuing discussion.

1.2 New Zealand State School System [65]



NOTES

Compulsory age of enrolment: 7 years
Usual " " " : 5 years
School leaving age: 15 years

NB: A number of students spend two years in Form VI.

NB: Often pupils in District High Schools will transfer to larger urban schools at VIth Form level. Bursaries are provided for this purpose.

NB: Many technical schools have been converted into normal secondary schools within recent years.

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65. Adapted from Compulsory Education in New Zealand, p.36.

SECTION TWO

The Primary Sub-System

For the sake of convenience, the education system has been divided into three areas. The first two are concerned with primary and secondary (or post-primary) education. They could each, according to our theory, be justifiably labelled 'systems', but for the sake of clarity, they will be called 'sub-systems'. The third area is concerned with the intersecting of the educational and the political systems.

Section Two deals with the primary sub-system. It comprises five chapters. Chapters Three and Four deal with the statutory bodies in the local administration of education, the school committees and the district Education Boards. The areas within which they may make decisions are strictly limited and controlled by statute. Occasional jealousy between the two tends to reinforce the legal position. Thus the areas of functional decision-making correspond to the formal administrative structure to a considerable degree, and if one is to understand how the Boards and committees take their decisions, it is important to grasp the scope within which they can operate.

Boards and committees, then, are responsible for the business administration, the supply of services, building equipment and other goods necessary to enable the teachers to teach. But education administration has another distinct side. Chapters Five and Six deal with the development and promulgation of education policies in matters relating to curricula, teaching methods and the internal organisation of schools. The Department of Education, under the Minister, has the direct responsibility for these policies, but naturally the teachers' body, the NZ Educational Institute (NZEI), has a significant part to play in their formulation.

Chapter Seven offers some case studies (or 'game situations' to use games theory terminology) to complete the picture of primary education by showing the sub-system in action.

Chapter Three

THE SCHOOL COMMITTEE

"School committees are the tap roots of our education system", we are told authoritatively. "Farmers, housewives, tradesmen, shopkeepers, clerks, pensioners and professional men all play their part and give their time to promoting the welfare of their own local schools, without the hope or expectation of monetary reward".[1] It is proposed in this chapter to deal with the following aspects of committee work and membership: a brief historical introduction; committee structure and functions; relations with other bodies; elections; membership; and finally the spokesman of school committees on national policy, the NZ School Committees' Federation (NZSCF).

I

Prior to 1914 the school committees occupied a position of great importance within the system. The Act of 1877 had envisaged that: "The school committee....should be the major check on the power of the Boards."[2] The Boards consisted of the elected representatives of the committees which were themselves elected on a household franchise. This relationship was intended to give the committees ultimate control. They had likewise considerable though indeterminate powers relating to the appointment of teachers. As it turned out, the school committees proved "quite unable to counterbalance the power of the Boards. Their jurisdiction was confined to a single school: they had little opportunity to act in common or develop ties and associations with each other. Consequently their position declined steadily till it became merely that of guardians of the... local school".[3] This development was inevitable.[4] Yet, particularly after the introduction of the subsidy system of local contributions, the committees continued to perform an extremely useful and necessary function.

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1. R.M. Algie in Handbook for School Committees, Wellington, Department of Education, 1957.

2. Report of the Commission on Education in New Zealand, Wellington, Government Printer, 1962, p. 73.

3. Ibid.

4. See Leicester Webb, Control of Education in New Zealand, Wellington, NZCER, 1937, p. 129.

Today the position of the school committee is not in question: the Handbook makes the point that, "the school committees are a cornerstone of this enterprise [education administration] and their active and informed participation is essential if progress is to be maintained." [5]

New Zealand is divided into ten educational Districts, each controlled by an Education Board. Each Education District is, in turn, sub-divided into a number of school districts, and in all but a very few cases there is one school to each district. The Boards form, divide or alter school districts. In order to prevent overcrowding they are empowered to limit attendance at a particular school. When a new school is opened and a new school district formed the Board can compel parents to transfer their children to the new school or continue to send them to the old one.

Every school district must have a committee, which must consist of not less than 5 members and not more than nine, size being governed by the school roll thus:

up to 100	-	5 members
up to 200	-	7 members
over 200	-	9 members.

All householders in a school district are eligible for election to the committee. They need not be parents, or if they are parents, their children need not be attending the local school - or any school at all. Committee members whose period of office has expired are permitted to seek re-election, provided they are still duly qualified. Those ineligible are undischarged bankrupts, lunatics and certain convicted criminals. Until 1948, school teachers and paid servants of the Department, Boards and committees were ineligible but amending legislation removed this bar.

Meetings of householders to elect the school committees are held every second year. The date of the meeting is fixed by the Board and at least three weeks beforehand public notice must be given. At this meeting a chairman for the evening - usually the chairman of the previous committee - is elected. The retiring committee must give a full account of its proceedings during its term of office and then the new committee is elected. As will be shown later, it often happens that there are not enough, or only enough, candidates for the vacant positions. But should a ballot be required, all householders

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5 Handbook for School Committees

present may vote by secret ballot. Disputes over elections are submitted to the Board which will decide whether another election is to be held. The duly elected committee then proceeds to elect a chairman. A secretary and treasurer or secretary-treasurer must then be appointed, either from within or from outside the committee. Most Boards stipulate that teachers from the school may not hold this post. If a committee fails to meet for three months it ceases to exist.

II

The formal functions of school committees are concerned with general management. They must keep the school in good order, provide cleaning and heating, sanitation and care of the grounds, fences and gates. They have other functions stemming from this role of general management. These may be set out under the following headings.

Expenditure: Money received by school committees comes from different sources and is allocated for a variety of purposes. They are:

(i) Incidentals expenses account. These funds are paid by the Board to the individual committees. 6

(ii) Moneys received from the Board by way of subsidy on locally raised funds. 7

(iii) Money raised locally and not eligible for subsidy.

(iv) Money paid to the committees by the Board for explicit purposes, e.g. wages of caretakers and cleaners. 8

All money received must go into the school fund, and two accounts, a general account and a special account must be kept.

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6 An annual grant is paid by the Board to meet 'normal' and 'reasonable' expenses as set out in the regulations. It is the job of the Boards to secure a reasonable distribution to the committee in each district. The ways in which the money is to be spent are laid out in School Committees' Handbook in great detail (pp22-26). If anything remains, the committee is entitled to spend it on equipment for the school. It should be noted that any urgent repairs must have Board approval before being undertaken.

7 A £1 for £1 subsidy is payable on sums raised locally of not less than £5, if it is spent on 'approved items', of which a comprehensive list has been compiled. On funds raised locally by voluntary effort for the construction of an assembly hall, a subsidy of £2 for £1 is payable.

8. It should be noted that the source of all money not raised locally is the Department, which draws it out of the Consolidated Fund. (See Appendix 'D')

In the former records are kept of all receipts from the Board, all payments made from this account, and all money received as a result of letting school property. In the special account a record is kept of all money raised locally by voluntary effort. The committee accounts are regularly audited by the Board finance branch.

Religious Instruction: Buildings may be used for other than school purposes, and this is mostly at the discretion of the local school committee. For example, the committee may allow the use of the school premises for the teaching of religious instruction under the conditions laid out by the Education Act of 1964. [9]

Appointment of teachers: This is nowadays done for primary teachers by a district Appointments Committee which consists of a representative of the Board, the Department and the primary teachers' body, the New Zealand Educational Institute (NZEI). School committees have the right only to comment on appointments, and to recommend to the Board the suspension, dismissal or transfer of a teacher. Also the Board must 'consult' the committee before the suspension or dismissal of any teacher.

Complaints against teachers: Protecting teachers against vague complaints is an important function of the school committee. In the case of an official complaint the by-laws of the Board lay down the proper procedure it must be specific, must be made in writing and must be made to the chairman of the committee, who must forward a copy to the teacher concerned, and a statement is made in reply. If the committee thinks the case serious, it passes it on to the Board.

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9 If the school committee, "after consultation with the headteacher, so determines, any class or classes at the school, or the school as a whole, may be closed at any time or times of the school day for a period of not exceeding 30 minutes for any class in any week for the purpose of religious instruction given by voluntary instructors approved by the school committee and of religious observances conducted in a manner approved by the school committee or for either of these purposes; and the school buildings may be used for these purposes or for either of them." Attendance at such instruction is not compulsory. If a teacher wishes, he may be allowed to take part in religious instruction in his own school. But "no person shall directly or indirectly bring any pressure to bear on a teacher to take any such part, and the position of any teacher and his opportunities for appointments and promotion shall not be adversely affected because he does not take part in religious instruction and religious observances or either." (Clauses 78,80). This form of Religious Instruction is known as the Nelson System. For an account of its development see the Report of Commission on Education, 1962 , pp 675 - 677.

A study was undertaken of school committees in the Auckland district in the early 1950's which analysed the problems of committee work.[10] One of the main themes of the study was to highlight the inadequacy of the incidentals grant. One committee member interviewed likened the position to "trying to fill a gallon jar from a pint bottle". About this time, the Auckland Education Board commissioned an independent investigation into school committees' finances, the findings of which were incorporated into a report presented to the Board in September 1953. It listed three types of committee:

(i) The committees which are satisfied to expend on only the barest essentials; such committees manage to 'live' within their incidentals grant.

(ii) The committees which have due regard to their income and, though desiring to expend more on services, materials and equipment for their schools, keep within - or almost within - the limits set by available finance.

(iii) The committees which expend on what they consider necessarily or highly desirable, irrespective of available finance, and in doing so exceed their income.

Figures generally showed that Auckland committees had an average deficit of 32% of their income. It would be accurate to say that this picture is true not only of Auckland committees and not only of the early 1950's. In 1965 it was reported of Otago schools that: "Of the 165 schools to be audited, the audit has been completed in 154, and this shows that 110 schools are in debt in general accounts to a total of £7,172. 3. 5".[11] The secretary manager of the Otago Education Board made the point that: "To keep the schools provided with essential equipment and keep them heated, the Board has had to guarantee overdrafts on trading banks. This is an illegal procedure."[12] From time to time an addition is made to the school committees' incidental expenses grants, but the process is as drawn out as possible and when an increase is made it comes like a deus ex machina to save a deteriorating situation from complete disintegration.

The onus of providing the school with sufficient finance to keep it up to standard, let alone creating additional facilities,[13]

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10 H.G. Dickinson, The Development and Functions of School Committees in the Auckland District, unpublished M.A. thesis, AUC, 1957.

11 Otago Daily Times, August 19, 1965.

12 Ibid

13 One NZSCF leader in Auckland quoted to the writer a survey undertaken in schools within the Auckland district which suggested that around 20 per cent of incidentals expenses had to be met from funds raised voluntarily in the majority of cases.

thus falls squarely on the shoulders of the local people; the school committees and the local Parent Teacher or Home and School group (referred to hereafter as PTA's). Dickinson notes two principal methods of fund-raising;

(i) The traditional method, namely the holding of money-making functions such as galas, fairs, 'bring-and-buys', bottle-drives, concerts, fancy dress balls, card evenings, flower shows, newspaper and clothes drives and the like.

(ii) The more modern approach, which is simply to impose a direct levy on parents for a small amount each year or each term.

The benefits of the first method are fairly obvious they tend to make the school into a community centre, and this can be of great social importance, especially in a country centre. A sense of purpose gives unity and pride in achievement. Its drawbacks are equally obvious, namely that such work tends to devolve upon a handful of hardy regulars and its success depends not only upon their efforts but upon the weather and the lack of a rival social attraction. The second method facilitates budgeting and tends to spread the burden more evenly; it is probably more effective as a fund-raising technique. Its disadvantage is that it does nothing to enhance a community spirit directly. Indirectly, however, it may educate parents as to the needs of the school and encourage a more positive attitude, since it is <u>their</u> money which is being spent. A more serious drawback to the direct levy is that it has no legal standing whatever, which means that no parent can be forced to pay. There was a case in the Hawke's Bay district [14] in which parents who had not paid the levy to the school committee complained to the Education Board that their children were being 'victimised', by having their names read out in front of the class and so on. One feels that if a school committee were to present the case to parents effectively, then difficulties of the above nature would be minimised. But the levy system, though less uncommon today than it was ten or even five years ago, is still comparatively rare, being confined to the better-off, chiefly suburban areas. Further, although funds raised by levy may cover routine outgoings, specific fund-raising activities would still be needed for major projects, such as an assembly hall.

Whatever the fund-raising system, it remains an important task for the school committee to encourage parent activity on behalf of the school. There is always much to be done:

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14 <u>Dominion</u>, June 29 1962.

trimming hedges, topdressing the playing field, assisting with minor works which the caretaker is unable to handle on his own, and so on. The motto of school committees might well be paraphrased from J.S. Mill: give a parent nothing to do for his school and he will not care for it.

III

Relations with the Boards: Although disputes can - and quite frequently do - arise between a committee and its Board, it should be appreciated that the day-to-day workings of Board and committee are concerned with administrative detail, the precise nature of which is governed by regulations. There are areas in which one school may contend that its own particular circumstances demand more finance than other schools are receiving; an example is that of an old school which is fully exposed to the elements asking for more finance for heating. It is possible that by having the right contacts at Board level, one school in such a position could get a more favourable hearing than another, but this appears to be becoming less and less the case. As will be shown, efficient administration and budgeting of their funds by Boards has almost eliminated such pressure. Thus, it is basically true that Board-committee relations are amicable.[15] There is not sufficient money, but what is available is distributed according to a reasonably objective set of priorities. The routine nature of the usual Board-committee relationship is best illustrated by example.

In the Board building branch, requests are frequently received for information on the construction of swimming pools. For such a project the Department of Education is prepared to make a subsidy, through the Board, of £1 for every £1, provided that the Board is satisfied with the plans proposed by the committee. In this regard there are two courses open to the committee - it can either choose a plan prepared by the Board or submit its own plans for Board approval. Thus the movement must begin with the committee or with the local PTA acting through the committee. They must raise half the cost of the pool, which would amount usually to some £650, the pool costing around £1,300. When they have reached or are reasonably

15 In a questionnaire sent to Education Board members, 95% of respondents agreed with the statement : 'Cooperation between Education Boards and school committees is better now than it has been for a long time'. (See Appendix 'B')

near their target they submit their plans and specifications to the Board's chief architect for approval. Before the subsidy is made, the committee must have its share of the total to hand. The Department will then automatically pay the subsidy to the Board, which will lodge an account in the name of the committee concerned in a local bank. Progress payments are then made from time to time to the committee, on a certificate issued by the building supervisor or equivalent administrative officer for the area.[16]

A larger matter altogether, but operating under the same principles, is the erection of an assembly hall.[17] One case in 1962, offers a typical example of negotiations. A dispute arose, after departmental authority to undertake the work had been given, as to where the hall was to be sited. The school's Assembly Hall Sub-committee (comprising the whole school committee plus representatives of the PTA) eventually accepted the view expressed by the Board officer, but the headteacher opposed the suggested siting. The decision, however, was the committee's, and by a vote of 11 to 2, it was decided to accept the Board officer's recommendation. In April 1963, the committee passed the resolution forwarding £3,200 to the Board for the establishment of a joint account.[18] In July tenders were called for in the local papers. It was not until the end of November that all the tenders were in and assessed. The cheapest was not chosen, but a local contractor, whose tender had been second cheapest was given the contract.

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16 Even in such purely administrative matters, however, problems can arise. In constructing one pool, for example, there was a problem of drainage. Owners of the adjacent section to some newly-built baths complained that water was being drained over their land. Local feelings became heated, but the Board intervened and, as usual, a compromise was achieved.

17 In respect of an assembly hall the maximum subsidy is two-thirds and this arrangement also applies to the architect's fees. It is the Board's duty to assess both the cost of the scheme and the architect's fees in order to report to the Department and obtain the subsidy.

18 The amount of money which some local schools raise is considerable. The school in question reported to the Board on one occasion: "It is pleasing to be able to inform you that the net proceeds of our recent annual fair just exceeded £1,000." As is pointed out from time to time however, the subsidy system has its drawbacks, chief among which is that it promotes local fund-raising in what are in effect well-to-do areas. By subsidising local funds, the Department is in reality giving to those whose need is least. Conversely, those schools which stand in most need of improvement have the greatest amount of difficulty in raising funds locally.

He had apparently undertaken a number of minor works for the school free of charge, and the Board's architect strongly approved of the step. This information was forwarded to the Department and the subsidy was paid. The [illegible]

"The erection of the school at Laingholm arose partly out of a combination of transport and accommodation difficulties in the Titirangi area; moreover, the Titirangi parents were not so convinced of the pedagogical advantages that were claimed for intermediate schooling that they wished to continue sending their children in overcrowded buses to the Avondale Intermediate School. The Titirangi Committee, with a thoroughness of organization seldom, if ever, equalled by a School Committee, conducted an investigation and presented its case to a large and enthusiastic meeting of householders on 19th May, 1948; facts and figures, lantern slides and resistless eloquence..... persuaded the [Board members] who attended the meeting that the people who chose to live in that hilly area.....had genuine reasons for dissatisfaction. The outcome was the establishment of a school at Laingholm, the enlargement of the Titirangi school and the return of Standards V and VI." 19

Relations with the parents: Ideally, the PTA should be a coordinative force, bringing together the parents, their representatives - the school committee - and the teachers. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. There are certain areas, finance being the most important, in which disputes sometimes occur. It is often the PTA which raises money for the school, but only the school committee can claim the subsidy. More than once the case has arisen of a PTA which, having raised money, simply refused to pass it on to the committee and thus gain the benefit of a subsidy. One can imagine that, having raised money, the PTA feels that it has some rights in deciding how the money should be spent. One can also imagine the position of a school committee which jealously guards its functions in the face of what it regards as 'poaching'. Happily in the normal situation - especially where there is a degree of overlapping membership - relations are good and enterprises are undertaken after joint consultation. Nevertheless, disputes do occur, and the following example will perhaps shed light on the nature of these disagreements.

Apparently a traffic hazard existed near the school in question. The local headteacher had spoken to the school traffic officer of the Transport Department but no action had been forthcoming. Some time later a member of the managing committee of the school PTA had prepared a report on the matter, and had spoken to the traffic officer himself. Statements which the headmaster of the school had alleged this officer to have made were not, so it was claimed, borne out by this officer himself. The PTA managing committee member felt some clarification by the headmaster was essential. The headmaster took exception to this report - although he did not deny its factual statements - and reported the incident to the school committee. Accordingly 5 members of the school committee

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19 Ian Cumming, Glorious Enterprise, Christchurch, Whitcombe & Tombs, 1959, p.659 .

attended the next meeting of the PTA managing committee without notice and demanded the right to address the meeting. The school committee members claimed:

(i) The PTA should be purely a social body, with no right to discuss matters other than social and fund-raising.

(ii) That the managing committee existed purely at the pleasure of the headmaster. It had no right to use school premises.

(iii) Matters such as the above should be left in the hands of the school committee.

Thus it would appear then that the following problems presented themselves:

(i) Was the PTA taking more upon itself than it ought?
(ii) Could it reasonably expect the headmaster to give a report to them on what was purely an administrative matter?
(iii) In such a position, what powers are possessed by the headmaster, or the committee to restrict or even eliminate a PTA?

Legally, neither the headteacher nor the school committee can disband a PTA, but they can refuse to grant it recognition. The school committee in fact can legally prevent the PTA from using the school premises for any of its meetings or functions.

The other questions can only be answered in general terms. A local PTA can of course put its views on any matters concerning the general management of the school to the headteacher or the school committee. But the headteacher alone is concerned with the internal running and organization of the school. Accordingly, a PTA committee of management could reasonably ask for a report from either headteacher or school committee on the point in question, but neither is obliged to reply. This means in essence that tact should be used, that good personal relationships should prevail. Then a committee of management could reasonably submit recommendations with factual evidence, but not in such a way as to embarrass either headteacher or school committee - especially both. There is no limit to what a PTA can take upon itself within the area specified, provided it has the goodwill and cooperation of its partners. Good fences, it should be remembered, make good neighbours.

As part of this study a questionnaire was sent out to a number of school committees.[20] Respondents were asked to comment upon the statement: 'School committees have little idea of what the ordinary parent thinks about their school.' The answers were as follows:

Response	Percentage of Total
Strongly agree	3
Agree	19
No opinion	4
Disagree	54
Strongly disagree	20

Where a school committee is active, or where a PTA exists to provide effective liaison it is probably true that school committees are reasonably representative of parental opinion. But this does not alter the fact that school committees can get very much out of touch. The following example is offered. In 1960 the school committee at Kamo decided by a majority to discontinue religious instruction at the local school[21] which they were able to do by not allowing the school premises to be used for such purposes. A thirteen-point statement was issued to parents explaining the committee's decision, but the minority on the committee forced a local referendum on the matter. The whole issue received wide publicity and called into question the legal position of religious instruction in state schools under the Nelson system. The result of the referendum caused the committee to rescind its decision. It was:

	Percentages of Total
In favour of religious instruction:	52.74
Opposed to religious instruction:	22.15
Indifferent to the issue	24.89

A body which does not have to face its electorate in between two-year terms and which is usually elected by a very small number in the first instance faces a problem in maintaining its 'representativeness'. It is probably fortunate that much of what committees have to deal with is administrative and basically non-contentious.

Relations with the headteacher: Relations between school committees and headteachers are almost totally dependent upon personalities. A personable headteacher can get a great deal

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20 See Appendix 'A'

21. W.P.B. Gamlen, "The Kamo Dispute", Comment, Vol. 1, No. 4, Winter 1960.

of assistance from an active committee; their mutual dependence offers a very good reason for sound cooperation between them. It is not usually difficult for a headteacher to establish leadership in the local situation. There is not the same degree of continuity among school committees that there is in secondary school boards. Further, there is a much clearer definition of powers in the primary sub-system. The school committee has no authority whatever in professional matters.[22] However, disputes do arise. Local parental opinion becomes hostile occasionally to a particular headteacher, usually because they feel he is not doing his job properly. Such situations are not uncommon. Responses to two statements in the questionnaire show that almost one committee member in two would like more influence in the matter of appointments. The results were as follows:

Statement:	School committees should play a larger part in the appointment of headteachers	School committees should play a larger part in the appointment of teaching staff
	Percentage of Total	Percentage of Total
Response:		
Strongly agree	12	5
Agree	31	30
No opinion	7	5
Disagree	37	46
Strongly disagree	13	14

Strained relations between headteachers and school committees, therefore, are probably not as uncommon as one would like to believe.

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22 The School Committee Handbook states that: "None of the managerial powers of the school committee must be allowed to conflict with the legitimate powers of the headteacher or the teachers; in fact the efficient running of the school depends upon a high degree of cooperation between them". Until recently head teachers had no legal right to attend committees, but it was always recommended that they be made welcome in the interest of a united effort - in an advisory capacity. Since 1965, they attend as of right. Also, there appears to be no general desire among committee members to exert influence in professional matters. In response to the statement: 'School committees should be given more opportunity to influence what is taught in the classroom', only 18% expressed agreement.

IV

If one is to gauge the extent of local interest in school committee work by the numbers of parents and householders presenting themselves at the biennial meeting at which committees are elected and by the number of candidates standing, one is forced to conclude that it is not strong.[23] An NZEI recess committee on local Rating for Schools in 1924 spoke of the "deplorable lack of local interest in schools".[24] In his history of the Auckland Education Board Ian Cumming noted a similar lack of interest. In 1944, he tells us, no biennial meetings were held at three committees in one area because of bad weather; at a fourth a local wedding had been responsible for no one attending the householders' meeting; of the three individuals who had attended at a further school only one had been willing to go on a committee. In another area, the inhabitants "had absented themselves for fear of being persuaded on to the committee."[25] In all these cases the Board was forced to appoint commissioners to do the work. Cumming goes on to point out that even where elections were held, they did not meet with everybody's satisfaction: "In 1948 a Silverdale resident who, with commendable modesty, used the nom de plume 'Seeking Knoledge' (sic) informed the Board: "The headmaster of Silverdale School took an active part in the election of a new committee in as much as he actded (sic) as secretary for the meeting....". Another correspondent from Ngaroma summed up the outcome of many election meetings: "As a householder....I call for another meeting as the meeting was rong from the start. Ones that got on the committee don't want to be on, and ones that was left out want to be on." (sic)[26]

The point has often been made that parent interest ends when a school is efficiently run, that high parent participation is synonymous with maladministration. This view is not completely supported by facts. One school committee, for example, which had stood firm against the Board's desire to supply prefabricated classrooms, had thus secured three new permanent classrooms for the school, and had generally run affairs smoothly and efficiently. It was rewarded with a meeting of 81 parents and householders, with 21 aspirants for the 9 committee places.

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23. This has not always been the case. Interest was high in the early years of the century. On one occasion the Social Democratic Party presented a 'ticket' for some Wellington school committee elections. One of the 7 successful candidates was Peter Fraser. (R.W. Heath, Labour Politics and Education in New Zealand 1904-35, unpublished M.A. thesis, VUW,1965, p.25.)

24 National Education, Vol. VI, No. 59, June 2nd 1924.

25 Cumming op cit., p. 644

26 Ibid, p.645.

It is sometimes true that a dispute at the local school stimulates interest at the biennial elections. Such disputes can take several forms but will usually concern the sitting committee and the Education Board, the headteacher or the local PTA. In Christchurch for example, a resolution was passed at one meeting as follows: "We the residents.... protest at the tactless way in which the Canterbury Education Board handled the transfer of the headteacher and refuse to form a school committee."[27] There was an example at a Wellington school of the PTA putting forward a complete ticket for committee at one election. Each PTA candidate was elected. Two years later however, at a well attended meeting, the original committee was reinstated. An example of a prolonged dispute between a school committee and the headteacher which created considerable local concern is offered by a Southland school: "No committee was formed and nothing was proposed to overcome the deadlock which exists between the headmaster and the old committee which resigned last August in protest against some of the headmaster's rulings."[28] Board officers and the local Member of Parliament were present at this meeting in an abortive attempt to end the deadlock.

If one is to search for generalisations concerning participation, the nearest to the truth is probably the comment by one newspaper that interest is highest at the newer schools but dissatisfaction is usually most acute at the older schools.[29]

Many newspaper reports imply that elections are becoming increasingly poorly attended over the years. But since the war at least - indeed, one suspects, since soon after the committees lost the bulk of their power in 1914 - the biennial meetings of house-holders have presented a tale of continued poor attendance in most districts, with a considerable number of schools failing to find the required number of candidates. Although some schools manage to hold extremely well-attended meetings - one school in Auckland had an attendance of 125 in 1955 - the general reaction to elections is caught by the headline over the results in the Christchurch Press in 1965: "Deadliest Ever" and the general effect has been that:

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27 The Press, April 29th 1965.

28 Southland Times, April 19th 1955

29 Waikato Times, April 11th 1957.

"The biennial elections of school committees have brought forward the usual brigade of volunteers prepared to give their time and ability in the course of helping teaching administration to ensure the best possible start in life for the nation's children." [30]

Complete figures for committee elections do not exist. However, a number of newspapers carry some illuminating details concerning several facets of elections. Some report the numbers of committees where elections were held, some reports show the number of committee members who have been newly elected, and still others give details of numbers attending meetings. Although no high degree of accuracy was possible in assessing these factors, from such figures as were available in the press it seems safe to make the following conclusions:

(i) No election was necessary in between a third and a half the number of committees studied over ten years.

(ii) During the same period between 30 and 40% of biennial meetings studied recorded attendances of 15 or less.

(iii) The percentage of new members elected to school committees in any one year over the same period was between 55 and 65%.

(iv) No downward trend in participation was apparent.

Thus it would appear although the system may be no nearer collapse through lack of participation than it was 10 years ago, there can be no doubt that it functions on the efforts of a relatively small number of stalwarts, as is amply supported by findings from our questionnaire.

V

Membership of school committees is the perogative of no social group. The results of the questionnaire show from what sections of the population school committee members are recruited.

The first point to note is that most - 87% of the sample - have children at the school. 89% of the remainder had children at the school when they first joined the committee. Being parents they naturally tended to fall into the 'younger middle aged' categories:

Age	Percentage of Total
20 - 29	2
30 - 39	40
40 - 49	46
50 - 59	11
60 and over	1

30 Evening Star, Dunedin, April 16th 1957.

The occupational composition of committees differs from district to district according to the type of environment of the school. But the national figures break down as follows:

Occupational Status	Percentage of Total
Professional	9
Minor business	18
Clerical	20
Farming	40
Skilled	5
Unskilled	6
Domestic	2
Housewife[31]	11
Retired	-

There is thus the expected bias in favour of the more well-to-do. This is explained largely by the fact that committee work as such would not appeal to manual workers. It has been noted elsewhere [32] that the working class is, by and large, not as interested in the education of its children. Overall, the position of the agricultural interest is - again as we might have expected - dominating.

Another factor of interest is that committee work is chiefly the prerogative of men - 89% of our sample were male. Several women on school committees have mentioned that they felt their presence unwelcome when they first joined. One remembered that after she had only served for three months, her chairman offered to nominate her for a Board by- election. Her pleasure was somewhat dimmed when she discovered later that if successful, she would be expected to resign her committee position ! The small number of women serving on school committees is surely a sign that New Zealand is still largely a male-dominated society. [33]

Most people, it seems, joined school committees because they were asked to. Of our sample, 66% were approached by others and asked to stand: a further 10% were co-opted. Of those persuaded to stand, 80% were persuaded by an 'acquaintance but not a close friend' and 3% by 'somebody not previously known.' The remaining 17% were persuaded by a 'close friend or relation'. Judging from interviews with committee members,

31 Housewives were classified according to former occupation.

32 D. Marsden and B. Jackson, Education and the Working Class, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962.

33 The position of women has never been secure in school committee work. In 1905, two women were elected to one committee with seven men; the gentlemen however refused to sit with the ladies, and no meeting could be held nor officers be elected. (New Zealand Journal of Education, July 1905, p.104, quoted in E.J. Simmonds, The NZEI and Educational Reform, 1899 to 1914, unpublished M.A. thesis, VUW, 1966).

it would probably be safe to state that the great majority are persuaded to stand by people already connected with committee work. At all events, some form of 'social selection' by interested parties would appear to be the norm. It is doubtful if any social prestige adheres to committee membership. Only 13% of the questionnaire sample agreed with the statement: 'Too many people join school committees because it improves their standing in the neighbourhood'.

Prior membership of the PTA is by no means an essential qualification - indeed PTAs do not exist in many areas. In our sample only 30% had been active PTA members. But 64% of committee members did claim to be active on other committees (that is, of clubs, societies, associations, and so on) and 11% held some public elective office (that is, on Power Boards, River Boards, County Councils and the like). It would thus appear that those prepared to take on school committee work were socially active parents - the type who in other contexts might be called 'opinion leaders'.

Educationally school committee membership exhibits an admirable cross section. The figures break down as follows:

Education Level	Percentage of Total
Completed primary school	16
1 year secondary school	10
2 years secondary school	23
3 years secondary school	22
4 years secondary school	14
5 years secondary school	8
Training college (full time)	2
University (full time)	5

In addition 40% of the sample had undertaken some form of professional or trade training or further education not specified above.

It should be noted that half the sample enjoyed three years secondary education or more. When it is remembered that 40% of the sample were farmers, a group which tends to leave school early, it becomes clear that committees are well served by people who have themselves benefited from the education system. However, it should be pointed out that sometimes the most active in the cause of education are those who have benefited least themselves.

Once on a committee, the majority of members would probably tend to serve whilst their child - or children - continued at the school. The following table, showing length of committee service, reinforces this proposition. If a child spent 8 years at school, it would probably not be until

he had been there for at least several years that a parent would be sufficiently interested to accept nomination, or put himself forward for election. If such an hypothesis is true, then it is likely that most parents would serve only one term - or two, if they had more than one child at the school:

Length of Service	Percentage of Total
Less than 4 years	50
4 - 7 years	31
8 - 11 years	14
More than 12 years	5

A small proportion of members become involved in committee work, accept a post on the committee and continue after their children have moved on. This is a mixed blessing, for they tend to become out of touch with parental views. They also tend to take most of the committee work upon their own shoulders and when they eventually leave, the committee they have served may find considerable difficulty in maintaining efficiency, especially in secretarial and accounts work.

Leadership: [34] In the sample, separate categories were maintained for post holders, to enable significant differences between them and the ordinary members to be observed. There were two categories of post holder, one for chairmen and one for secretaries, treasurers and secretary-treasurers (called hereafter simply 'secretaries'). Chairmen formed 18% of the total sample and secretaries 27%.

The chairmen showed themselves to be generally older, as is seen below (in each case the first set of figures (A) represents the chairmen, the second (B) the secretaries and the third (C) the total sample):

Age Group	A:percent	B:percent	C:percent
20 - 29	0	4	2
30 - 39	33	39	40
40 - 49	42	49	46
50 - 59	20	8	11
60 and over	5	0	1

34 It is interesting to note that in the school committee world 'leadership' does not necessarily equate with activity. In our questionnaire, 47% of the total sample agreed with the statement: 'The bulk of school committee work is undertaken by one or two members'. 46% of all chairmen agreed as did 58% of all secretaries, treasurers and secretary-treasurers. Bearing in mind that the last group would have, of necessity, a considerable amount of written work, it would seem that the workload is usually widely spread and is by no means the prerogative of leadership.

Not surprisingly, since they tend to be older, chairmen generally serve for longer periods on committees, as the following table shows:

Length of Service	A: per cent	B: per cent	C: per cent
Under 4 years	18	49	50
4 - 7 years	35	35	31
8 - 11 years	30	11	14
More than 12 years	17	5	5

Thus almost half the number of chairmen in the sample had served for 8 years or more. It is for such as these that school committee work becomes a vocation. This is the group most likely to supply members for Education Boards and leaders for the national and regional associations of school committees. Paradoxically then, by the time they have assumed leadership, the leading spokesmen for parents are least likely to have children at the primary school themselves.

It is interesting to note that there is no significant difference between the occupational status of the groups, as is shown below: [35]

Occupational Status	A: per cent	B: per cent	C: per cent
Professional	8	11	9
Minor business	9	18	18
Clerical	9	29	20
Farming	63	31	40
Skilled	8	3	5
Unskilled	-	7	6
Domestic	3	1	2

The dominant position of the farming community in school committees is reflected also in Education Boards, as will later be shown. It is an interesting facet of the sub-system.

Women, it would seem, have a natural aptitude for secretarial tasks. Of all women in the sample, nearly 1 in 2 (41%) held a post as secretary, treasurer or secretary-treasurer. Chairmanship, on the other hand, is a male prerogative:

Sex	A: per cent	B: per cent	C: per cent
Male	97	83	89
Female	3	17	11

Chairmen showed themselves somewhat more active than secretaries and the general sample, as is shown by the fact that 23% of chairmen held some public elective office as

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35 The apparently significant 29% of secretaries in the clerical status group is chiefly accounted for by the fact that of female secretaries, 88% were placed in this group. This would also account for their suitability for the post of secretary.

compared with 6% of secretaries [36] and 11% of the total sample. In addition some 73% of the chairmen were active on other committees compared with 59% of secretaries [37] and 64% of the total sample. This is much as one would expect. Leadership tends to gravitate to the more socially active.

With regard to education, the overall patterns were similar. 18% of chairmen had completed primary school only, but this was to be expected with such a high proportion of farmers. On the other hand, 10% had a full time university education. 57% of secretaries had 2 or 3 years secondary schooling. Thus the average education for this group is also the typical education of the whole sample.

Thus school committee members are much as we should expect. They are drawn from among the more active parents. And the more active parents, more often than not, are the better-off parents. The likelihood of this being the natural state of affairs is considerable. But given the weakness of participation at the biennial elections and the general lack of interest, the above seems the only possible outcome. If a committee is seeking to make up its numbers, or if certain dissatisfied parents are seeking a representative, it is to the better-off and the more socially active men of the community that they will turn. It is interesting to note that one of the principal qualities needed for leadership in the school committee world is staying power. No doubt it is pleasant to find that one has become indispensable in the local situation. But in some ways it is not advantageous for parents whose children have long since departed to retain their committee positions. One Education Board member has said: "When I hear about someone having been on for twenty years or more, I always say it's time to give him his gold watch and get rid of him."

VI

As far as relations with the Department and Government are concerned, school committees are organized into a Federation at national level and an association at district level. The Dominion Federation of School Committee

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36 Sex again appears to be an important factor here. None of the female secretaries held any public elective office.

37 Again, the sex factor is of significance. Whereas 65% of male secretaries were active on other committees, only 31% of female secretaries were.

Associations [38] is not part of the official administrative structure - it is a voluntary body. Membership of the district organisation is purely optional, but a committee which joins such an association must pay an annual subscription, and regular meetings are held to discuss common problems. The national body is simply a federation of the district associations meeting annually with a nation-wide coverage. The annual conference enables the representatives of the district associations to pool information and discuss common problems. More than 30 associations, representing 1,200 school committees, belong to the NZSCF.

Although a national federation existed prior to 1924, in that year it was decided to form two separate federations, for the North and South Islands, in order to reduce expenses. In 1931 however, meetings were held in Wellington in a fruitless effort to amalgamate the two federations. More meetings followed in subsequent years and a constitution of the proposed Dominion Federation was drawn up; in 1934 the first annual meeting was held in Timaru. During the war years, the Wellington Association Executive carried on the business of the Federation, without holding any annual conferences. But in 1944, the annual conference reappeared, the first being held in Wellington. The Dominion Federation owed much to the work of the Wellington Association during these years. The organization ran smoothly after the war period, but it suffered something of a setback when, in February 1964, the secretary had the misfortune to lose her home by fire, and with it many of the Federation's records.

The annual conference of association representatives (numbering slightly over 60) has as its chief objective the discussion of association remits. If passed, these are later pursued with the Department by means of a committee known as the parliamentary committee, which organises deputations and the like. A good indication, perhaps, of the NZSCF's position vis-à-vis the Department is that there is no NZSCF representative on the Standing Committee for administration (primary) [39] At a meeting with the Director in March 1957 the President of the Federation pointed out that at a national level, school committees had a different

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38 In 1964 the name was changed to NZ School Committees' Federation.

39 The Standing Committee on administration is representative of the Department and the Education Boards. Its objective is better administrative coordination. Prima facie, there was a case for Federation representation. For a fuller discussion of the Standing Committee, see Chapters 4 and 6.

view-point from the Education Boards - in fact the Federation maintained no relations whatever with the New Zealand Education Boards Association (NZEBA) at this time. However, neither the Department nor the NZEBA was prepared to countenance Federation representation.

In general, remits passed at the annual conference are sent to the Minister - and hence to the Department - for comment.[40] The Minister will discuss them with members of the Federation's parliamentary committee whose job it is to pursue the remits. Written replies to each remit are then made and duplicated in time for the next annual conference. As stated, however, the Department does not regard the NZSCF as one of the more dynamic organs of the system and remits sent in March are often not replied to for many months. The position of remits was discussed in a Federation newsletter in the following terms:

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40 A good indication of Federation policy can be obtained by looking at the most recent remits to be forwarded to the Department. In 1965 the Minister received the following remits:

1. That the Federation oppose any move made to alter the present system of electing Board members, in the strongest possible manner.

2. That the Federation press for the early release of the report by government committees set up in 1962 on ancillary services and the early implementation of its decisions.

3. That the Department press for a considerable increase within the education vote for the primary service.

4. That the Minister of Education be requested to permit forms 1 and 2 of district high schools to be attached to secondary departments where the parents desire it.

5. That further pressure be brought to bear on the Department to provide more suitable covering on the floors of infant departments of older schools at no cost to school committees.

6. That the Federation draws the attention of the Minister to the many inequalities and anomalies in the operation of the basic equipment scheme. It urges that an immediate review be undertaken in order that:

   a) These anomalies and inequalities may be corrected

   b) The finances necessary to bring existing schools up to code be increased to enable Boards to provide for eliminating deficiencies within the period of six years as promised by the then Minister of Education, the Hon. B. Tennent.

   c) That existing schools be entitled to one free issue of equipment as provided by the code at the point where such items previously provided under subsidy become due for replacement.

7. That the Minister of Education be asked to state what positive action has been taken towards better teacher training and smaller classes as stated in his press release of July 2 1963.

8. That the government be advised that it is the Federation's opinion that New Zealand's state education will be harmed by any further financial aid to private schools, and that the incoming Executive....make direct representations on this matter.

"A careful survey of the remits, Minister's replies and parliamentary committee's comments leads inevitably to the realisation that most are declined by the Minister (and that is as far as they have got), many ask for what is already departmental policy, and a considerable number would better have been referred to the Departments of Health, Transport, the NZEBA, NZEI etc. The conclusion cannot be avoided that far from aiding Federation policy, the sheer number has led to less consideration." 41

The realisation of the position led inevitably to a stricter supervision by the Executive of remits. As a result, the following year, 15 remits, typed into booklet form, and presented to the Minister personally, with a detailed 'justification' for each remit, took the place of the usual 50 - 75 remits hastily put together. Copies of three of the remits were sent to Treasury. But even so, the secretary had to write to the Minister in January of the following year - over seven months after the remits had been presented - to secure the written replies for the conference that March ! Yet it is true that the Minister appreciates the importance of good relations with the NZSCF. He will, for example, write to each newly elected president emphasising that his door is 'always open 'to representation from the organization.

The Federation does not have the strength of organisation necessary to reinforce its point of view: there is a degree of autonomy in the local associations and without a (semi-permanent at least) national executive and a full-time secretary, it is not likely to attain a position of real strength at a national level. At the regional level, some Associations are most effective, combining well with Education Boards and being drawn into their confidence. Others - probably the majority - are not well organized and comparatively inactive. 42.

CONCLUSIONS. The 'Committee Game'. Each of the chapters concerned with one of the bodies in the system will have a conclusion in the form of an analysis of that body's part in and attitude to the education game in which it is involved. In discussing the committee game we shall use the concepts set out in Chapter One.

Rules of the Game. The committee game involves committees and Education Boards. The basis of the rules of the committee game, as in fact of all the education games, is to be found in

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41 Dominion Federation Newsletter, May 29th 1961.

42 See, for example, "New Life Wanted in Parents' Group", Evening Post, Tuesday November 15th 1966.

the social and political culture of the country as a whole. This has been discussed in Chapter Two. In this and following chapters we shall deal simply with such facets of the institutional framework as bear on the concept of rules. In the committee game the most important rule of an institutional character is that committees should be controlled by Boards. In other words, in any dispute between the two, the Boards make the final decisions. In fact, school committees will often break this rule and attempt to bring political pressure to bear, through the local MP, who can raise the matter in the House or privately with the Minister. This is a dangerous course of action because the Boards still implement any decision, even when that decision is 'forced' upon them from above. Imagine a situation where a school committee demands a certain improvement which the Board refuses to undertake. The committee brings pressure to bear through the political process and the Board is finally obliged to promise action. But the Board is master of its own budgeting. It can simply put the work at the bottom of its maintenance priority list. Any amount of pressure <u>within</u> the Board framework is permissible. But if the committee wishes to make the issue political - and therefore, by definition, public - it should first seek the collusion of fellow committees. Since there is an element of competition among committees in some Education Districts, this can be difficult, unless the complaint is general and can be supported by the district School Committees' Association. In such circumstances the game is really played against the Government.

The rules of the game vary somewhat depending upon the relationship between Boards and committees. In some Education Districts, these are extremely close. The Board practises the fullest discussion with the Executive of the local School Committee Association. In such circumstances, full confidence in one's partner is the basic rule of the game.

<u>Pay-Off</u>. Pay-off for school committees is best understood in terms of the motivation of committee members. As was shown by the questionnaire, the great majority of school committee members are simply parents who wish to improve the standard of schooling that their children receive. Consequently, pay-off is basically measurable by the committees' ability to improve the appearance and amenities of their school. But our results seemed to indicate that committee leaders tended to serve for many years. Pay-off for them would be measurable, to some extent, in terms of the processes involved.

Negotiations with Government offer an obvious example. Ordinary parents can get an opportunity to speak to Government leaders and unquestionably some take great pleasure from this.

However reluctantly a person joined a school committee, it is true that realisation of the inadequacies of the incidentals grant and a general sense of frustration that 'not enough is being done' soon take hold. The majority of school committees have a deep feeling for their schools.

Strategy. If the school committee wishes to improve the appearance and amenities of its school it must fight a battle on two fronts. On the local front, it must galvanise parental effort. In rural communities, especially where the school is small, this is not too difficult a task. But in urban areas the task of achieving a sense of local feeling is difficult without the help of an active PTA. A number of committees have long since given up the struggle.

On the second front, the school committees must keep up continual pressure on the Government to increase the amount of money spent on schools. They must also secure the most efficient spending of such money as is available. To this end, committees should form strong local associations. School committees if unorganized can often be jealous of each other. But united, they can meet the Education Board and present a common point of view. The following gives an example of the success a strong local association can have. The majority of committees have difficulty balancing their accounts. In the survey, several members pointed out that one of the chief reasons for a lack of volunteers for committee places was that the post of treasurer or secretary-treasurer was so onerous. The Auckland Board discussed the matter with the Executive of the local School Committees' Association. Soon after elections, Board officers gave a talk, illustrated by coloured slides and so on, on how accounts should be kept. Over 200 treasurers, secretaries and secretary-treasurers attended and a considerable improvement manifested itself.

A strong School Committees' Association is also in a position to help out a school with particularly severe problems. They can pool their resources. In some Education Districts this is done with considerable success.

At the national level, the NZSCF try to apply continuous pressure to the Government. Its leaders must endure equally continuous frustration. They are playing in a game in which

delaying tactics are the norm. Even when they have achieved a victory - such as an increase in the incidentals grant - the Government, concerned primarily with economic rather than educational considerations - will delay actually granting the increase for as long as possible. It is for this reason that the same remits come up for discussion at annual conferences of the NZSCF year after year. In fact the successful application of pressure often appears to result from a break-down in communications between the leadership and the rank-and-file. The former, more likely than not, will be well aware of the economic difficulties facing the Government and will put forward their demands with restraint. The latter, more concerned with the difficulties at the local school, press their case with militancy. If they did not, such gains as are made would be smaller and slower in coming.

Information. The information which local committeemen have is based primarily upon the local situation. Where the local Association is strong, however, this information can be placed in some sort of perspective. It makes a great difference to a committee clamouring for additional toilets, for example, to discover that a school ten miles away has even fewer toilets. Sound relations depend upon a sharing of information, but it is quite impossible for an Education Board to share information with 200 or more schools. Yet it can do so with an Executive committee representative of those schools. At the national level, leaders of the school committee movement are not taken into the Department's confidence in the way that Board or NZEI leaders are, though it is not too difficult for them to come to grips with the basic patterns of activity at this level. But generally speaking the structure of information in the committee game follows the classical dichotomy of 'front line' and 'headquarters' information; it relates to two basically different situations.

Coalition. In its submission to the Commission on Education, the NZSCF (or DFSCA as it then was) claimed that no form of administration other than the present could achieve "such close cooperation between the wide electorate of parents and householders who elect the school committees, and the Education Boards, whom the committees themselves elect. There is overwhelming evidence that this close relationship fosters a wide interest in education and ministers to a sense of responsibility which permeates Boards and committees." The submission went on: "As a general rule, excellent relationships exist between committees and Boards and their devotion to a common cause is a fairly effective surety of this."

Coalition is thus seen to be a vital concept in all aspects of the committee game. At the local level, if a committee of a large urban or suburban school is successfully to galvanise local activity it must work in close harmony with the local PTA. At regional level committees must work in harmony with each other and with the Boards - indeed the two ideas seem interdependent.[43] At the national level, the NZSCF, if it is to be successful, must cooperate fully with the NZEBA and, where possible, the NZEI. It was not until 1958 that the NZSCF announced its intention to establish and maintain the closest working relationship with the NZEBA, and even at the present time, it does not regard its interests and those of the NZEBA as identical. Yet in recent years there has been a recognition of mutual usefulness. As L.J. McCarthy pointed out to the annual conference of the NZEBA in 1963, more effective liaison with local associations and the National Federation would substantially improve the bargaining position of both committee and Boards. He felt that, to this end, Boards should be 'more forthcoming with information' and 'more sympathetic in their general attitude'.

Yet some Boards have shown a reluctance to recognise Associations and have treated the Federation with some disdain. The attitude of the NZEBA to school committee representation on the Standing Committee was one of complete opposition. Recognition of Associations of school committees implies a lessening of Board autonomy - of sharing such powers as Boards have, individually and collectively. It was decided that although the NZSCF was not to be represented on the Standing Committee, when that body was discussing topics of immediate concern to school committees, a Federation representative would be co-opted. Yet when the Standing Committee was discussing the school committees' incidentals grant no NZSCF representative was co-opted. Rather the opinions were sought of a number of individual committees. Thus coalition, though its benefits are considerable, is not so easy to obtain at the national level.

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43 In the questionnaire, support for the Education Board position was expressed by committee members, 80% of whom felt that Boards were an essential safeguard against central bureaucracy. In addition 76% expressed the wish to see Boards given greater freedom in the designing, building and furnishing of schools. It is interesting to note that support for the Boards is most certain among chairmen. In response to the statement: 'Education Board officers should be public servants responsible to the Minister of Education', 60% of the chairmen disagreed, compared with 47% of the total sample and 46% of the 'secretaries'. In each case there was a relatively high proportion of 'no opinions - 18% of chairmen, 23% of the total sample and 25% of secretaries.

L.J. McCarthy, himself a far-sighted Education Board administrator, paid a tribute to school committees which offers a fitting conclusion to this Chapter:

> "Through the years the committee has become the ally and support of the teacher and safeguards him from irresponsible criticism and complaint by members of the community. The teacher looks to the committee for protection and assistance in his work in the classroom and for active interest in the material requirements of the school. Furthermore, the committee acts as a spur to the members and officers of an Education Board and constantly reminds them of the school needs in the district. School committees in general have no inhibitions, and they are quick to point out deficiencies in administration and delays in meeting their requests. They avail themselves readily of their constitutional rights to make their needs and complaints known to their local member of Parliament or to the Minister of Education and even to the Prime Minister. There is perhaps no more salutary check to complacency and to bureaucratic tendencies than the watchful and dedicated activities of the energetic school committee." 44

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44 L.J. McCarthy, "Decentralisation in Education" in Decentralisation in New Zealand Government Administration, (NZIPA), London, Oxford University Press, 1961, pp 60 - 61.

Chapter Four

THE EDUCATION BOARDS

The second tier in the administrative structure of the primary sub-system is the Education Board. At the present time there are 10 such Boards.[1] These are:

The Auckland Board, centre Auckland city.
The South Auckland Board, centre Hamilton.
The Hawkes Bay Board, centre Napier.
The Taranaki Board, centre New Plymouth.
The Wanganui Board, centre Wanganui.
The Wellington Board, centre Wellington city.
The Nelson Board, centre Nelson.
The Canterbury Board, centre Christchurch.
The Otago Board, centre Dunedin.
The Southland Board, centre Invercargill.

In discussing the Boards, this chapter will follow a similar pattern to Chapter Three. It will contain sub-sections on the following: an historical survey; structure and relations with other bodies; elections; membership; and finally the national spokesman for Boards, the NZEBA.

I

No institution has been the centre of more debate in the field of education administration than the Education Board. By some it has been seen as an important instrument of local control, and by others as an anachronism. Whichever point of view one takes however, it is generally accepted that the trend during this century has been to increase centralisation, a trend which has considerably weakened the Education Boards.

The drift away from local control. As we saw in Chapter Three, prior to the Education Act of 1914, education had been administered regionally for the main part, and although teachers and educationalists felt that the disparities and inequalities which resulted were of a sufficient dimension to warrant a move to centralisation and standardisation, there can be no doubt

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1. It has been suggested that new Boards be set up to serve Northland and the Bay of Plenty. For a full discussion on the problems involved in such a move see Chapter Seven.

that the Boards were the key administrative units of the day. In the terms of that Act, however, it was stipulated that the inspectorate was henceforward to be controlled not by the local Boards but by the central Education Department. The power of the Boards began seriously to decline, for they had come to depend for their efficient working upon the knowledge and competence of their inspectors. Centralisation of the inspectorate led to the establishment of a national grading system for teachers and a further loss of Board power. Dispute continued over the Boards' financial administration, and this dispute tended to be focused upon the Boards' administration of their building fund. The Department took two measures to minimise Board inefficiencies: in 1917 the Statute Law Amendment Act required Boards to keep separate Maintenance and Building accounts and in 1920 the Department appointed an architect whose function it was to report on Boards' building proposals. These steps were brought to their natural conclusion in 1922 when the Education Amendment Act of that year required all works financed out of a Board's Building Fund to be approved by the Minister. Thus within a decade of the passing of the 1914 Act, the Boards had lost most of their ability to influence education policy. They had lost control of the inspectorate, had lost their discretion in the appointment of teachers, and were able to determine the use of their funds only within well-defined limits. Whether this legislation was piecemeal or whether it was part of a plan formulated previously is a matter for conjecture. Certainly the NZEI, whose influence on departmental policy had been considerable over preceding years, favoured the abolition of Education Boards. It is also known that the Department presented detailed plans for the total abolition of Education Boards to the National Efficiency Commission in 1921.[2] If abolition had been a long-term departmental policy since before 1914, it was doomed to frustration for the Government of the day rejected the proposals, despite the fact that they had been endorsed by the Commission.

At this juncture a new Minister of Education (the Hon R.A. Wright) came into office with a 'mandate' to economise. Public feeling was not behind the Boards at this time - as it was to be later - owing to some unfavourable publicity following an investigation into the affairs of the Wellington Board.

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2. Three years earlier, too, the Minister of Education had complained: "The whole process [of administration] is most tedious and defective." (A to J 1918, E-1, pp. 13-15).

The time being ripe, the Department used every opportunity during the next five years to advance its case for abolition. Under this continuous threat the Boards united for self-defence. Although there appeared to be good grounds for abolition - if sound and economic administration was to be the chief criterion - the Boards were slowly able to win support in the press, in parliament and among the electorate for the retention of some element of 'local control' in education as a safeguard against 'bureaucracy'. The position continued to be uncertain however.

Economy and Administration. In 1927, the Department attempted to wrest control of the teacher training colleges from the Boards, and the Boards' response was not so much concerned with the merits of central or local control of training colleges, but simply with the more general question of preserving such powers as they still possessed. One Board chairman put the Boards' attitude succinctly: "They are asking us to commit suicide." [3] The question had arisen as follows. In August of 1927 the principalship of the Wellington training college had fallen vacant. The Wellington Education Board thereupon nominated the vice principal, but the Department withheld its consent. A deadlock ensued, because the Department did not have the power to nominate its own candidate. On June 7th 1928, the Department drafted a memorandum to the Boards, proposing new regulations which would have enabled it to make an appointment to the vacant principalship; it was requested that this memorandum be treated as confidential. But the Wellington Board rebelled against this method which it described as 'un-British', and sought successfully to gain the support of its sister Boards in the struggle, and in the resultant clamour the new draft regulations were dropped, the Department accepting the nomination of the Wellington Board. Leicester Webb concluded his account of the dispute: "It is not profitable or relevant to discuss the original subject matter of this dispute, for its main importance is as an illustration of the extent to which antagonism between the Boards and the Department was damaging the true interests of education." [4]

Meanwhile a more general dispute had also broken the surface in 1927, when the then Director of Education, T.B. Strong, presented a case for the abolition of the Boards to a government

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3. N.Z. Herald, October 6th, 1927.

4. L. Webb, Control of Education in New Zealand, p.112.

committee set up to discover ways of reducing the cost of education. He also advocated the abolition of secondary and technical school authorities, though not of school committees. However there was a leakage from the committee and soon the general public was aware of its intentions. The long campaign conducted by Education Boards to recruit public support began to produce results, for resolutions and letters of protest began to pour into parliament. A reply to the Department's proposal was prepared by a committee of Board secretaries and submitted to the Minister of Education and the parliamentary committee, but such was the outcry from the press, post-primary school authorities and school committees that it was obvious that no consensus existed for the implementation of the Boards' recommendations either. Stalemate followed and Board-Department relations continued to be very strained. Functional co-ordination became extremely difficult, and the atmosphere for any advance towards a rational re-organisation of administrative machinery had been ruined.

In 1929, a change in Government brought upon the scene a new Minister of Education (the Hon Harry Atmore). He quickly sought to restore confidence to all concerned with the administration of education. Speaking to a conference of Education Boards in 1929 he referred to the Boards as "essential and important members of a great co-operative undertaking." [5] However, if he was prepared to make do with the structure of administration, he was not satisfied with its performance and he empowered a parliamentary committee to sit during recess and report on "all matters relating to education and public instruction generally." The report of this committee declared against the Department's proposals to abolish the Boards. "The public of New Zealand would rather bear the burden of the extra cost of the present system than change it for one of bureaucratic control, however. much cheaper the latter may be". [6] What recommendations the committee did make, such as a unified system of control, were not implemented owing to a sudden change in the political atmosphere: New Zealand began to feel the impact of the Great Depression and in 1931 a coalition Government was formed whose chief concern in the field of education was economy.

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5. Minutes of NZEBA conference, Wellington, 1929, quoted in L. Webb, op. cit., p. 113.

6. Education Committee (Parliamentary Recess), Report on Educational Reorganisation, (A to J. I - 8A 1930) - the 'Atmore report'.

Under the Directorships of N.T. Lambourne and C.E. Beeby relations between the Department and the Boards improved, despite a Bill brought down in 1938 by the then Minister of Education (the Hon Peter Fraser), which endorsed to some extent the recommendations of the 1930 recess committee. However, owing to the exigencies of the war effort, the Bill did not become law. This inconclusive battle was to be the last in the long struggle between the Boards and the Department until 1962, when the report of the Commission on Education opened the whole issue once more. But as a general conclusion to the pre-war disputes, we cannot do better than borrow from Webb who said: "The history of the period between 1927 and... [1937] shows clearly enough that a majority of the people of New Zealand believe that local control in education is desirable...the success of the Boards in their fight for existence cannot be explained on any other hypothesis." [7]

In the years immediately following the war, the need to supply teachers for the tremendous increase in the school population took precedence over all else in determining education policy. By this time the Department showed itself willing to work for efficiency <u>within</u> the structure, rather than by changing the structure drastically. Regional Offices of the Department have been set up, thus modifying the move to complete centralisation. Following a visit by three departmental officers to England in 1954, a new building scheme for primary schools was introduced which halted to some extent the process of taking power away from the Boards. Under this "White Lines" scheme, which will be discussed more fully later, Education Boards were given a greater amount of freedom with regard to school building. The position of the Education Board was further strengthened in 1957 when the Standing Committee on administration was established, on which the Boards were represented. This advisory body has the task of reviewing all aspects of policy related to the administration of the primary sub-system.

Both the "White Lines" scheme and the Standing Committee on administration were the fruits of a joint committee established in 1955 by the Minister of Education (the Hon R.M. Algie), to: "Explore the desirability of making changes in the division of functions and powers between the various organs of the primary school system, to examine the conditions under which changes could profitably be made, and to make recommendations on any

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7. Webb, op. cit., p.116.

changes that seem to be desirable."[8] This committee provided the first opportunity since 1929 for a comprehensive review of the powers of the Boards. The Standing Committee on administration was certainly the most significant result of the Joint Committee, for it has provided a permanent working committee to reconcile the interests of Boards and Department. Current Board-Department relations will be dealt with at greater depth in a later chapter; at this point it is sufficient to say that following the report of the Education Commission in 1962, the future of the Boards is once again in doubt.

Power moves to the Board officers. An important development, often overlooked, which followed the Department's assault on Board autonomy, was a shift of power within the Boards themselves. It became apparent that if the Boards were to retain their place within the system, they would have to become more efficient. After all, the assault had been made on grounds of economy and efficiency. It is inherent within the Board structure that greater efficiency could only come by strengthening the hand of the Board officers. These latter, with the statutory right to be present at all Board meetings and at the meetings of the various committees of the Board, are in a position to offer advice which the Board members find difficult to reject. They are the professionals; it is they who have the information, the grasp of administrative detail and the essential knowledge of how to get things done. In relation to their officers, the Board members have lost influence. Some of them have become what in other areas might be described as 'me-tooists'. Having said that, it must be added that final power still rests with the Board. It can reject any piece of advice given by one of its officers; it can even dismiss any of its officers. But in reality, the power of the Education Board member is a checking power; a power to be used thoughtfully and only when the occasion demands. Since 1924, it is the Board officer rather than the departmental officer who has taken power from the Board member. Perhaps an example will illustrate the point more clearly. The following case concerns the introduction of an annual budgeting scheme by one Board.

Prior to the inception of the budgeting scheme, the system had been that a school committee which needed building

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8. Report of the Joint Committee of the Administration of the Primary School System, July 1955 - August 1956.

improvements would write to the Board works committee. No comparative test as to the merits of each request existed, and therefore pressure played the key part in deciding which schools were to receive funds. Under such a system, power lay with the Board member who was a gifted speaker to get more for the schools in his ward than other schools were receiving. As a consequence, discrepancies occurred over the years to which individual committees were not blind, even though their ability to protest may have been restricted by the relative ineffectiveness of their ward representative. Being unable to act through the Board directly, those committees whose complaints had been piling up on the secretary's table decided upon joint action. They pointed out that this 'bush-fire' system, as they termed it, was unfair, and their regional association passed a vote of no confidence in the Board. The Board's reaction could scarcely have been one of surprise; the situation had been long deteriorating. The first move on the part of a secretary who was an elderly man not renowned for his innovative spirit, was simply to inform the Department of the chaos and ask for financial assistance. Not surprisingly the Department refused to help in any way until the Board introduced a budgeting scheme which would distribute funds equitably to the schools. Similar schemes were operated by other Boards. Some, for example, budgeted major maintenance items and others would deal with schools in a certain order (the dangers of the latter system are apparent, but at least it <u>is</u> a system).

Thus there was no alternative for the Board but to produce a budgeting scheme which would, by definition, drastically reduce, if not eclipse, the role of pressure and the power of the individual ward representative. Since the Board's own administrators had the task of preparing the new scheme, little doubt existed as to who would benefit in the redistribution of power.

The administrators met informally and decided that the new scheme, whatever its final shape, could not be operated without additions to the existing machinery. The reason for this was that, given the existing structure, any new scheme would necessarily be administered by the Board architect, who had as two of his functions the planning of new schools (in the sense of evaluating the need for them and locating them) and maintenance of existing schools. It was apparent that neither of these fitted well into an architect's scope; they were more of an administrative nature. In addition, the architect simply did not have sufficient staff. As a consequence, the

administrators recommended that the Board should create a new position, a buildings executive officer, to administer the new scheme. However, the architect was by no means content with the prospect of losing these functions and he lobbied several Board members. As a result, when the buildings executive officer's post was advertised, the Board deferred appointment. Only after nine months of intensive counter-lobbying was the appointment made, whereupon the architect resigned.

Meanwhile some budgeting scheme had to be operated and basic disagreements arose as to its nature. The scheme eventually brought in was, as might be apparent from the situation, hurriedly conceived. It proposed that a reserve fund be created for large, high-priority works, and that what was left should be parcelled out to the schools on a simple pro rata basis, just as the Board received it from the Department. The major failing of the scheme, however, was that it took no account of the age of schools nor of the special conditions pertaining in certain cases. As a result, new schools continued to improve and old schools became more decrepit. It became evident that money would have to be taken back from the newer schools and re-allocated. Within a year the system had fallen down and a buildings executive officer had been appointed. He was thus in a position to introduce his own scheme, which was based on the schemes being operated by other Boards.

The new scheme, totally different in conception from the old, had to be presented to the Board as an 'adjustment', but it soon became apparent to Board members that they would in fact lose much of their former power to the new buildings executive officer and his three maintenance officers.[9] The Board, despite the exigencies of the situation, were not at all happy with the new scheme. They set up an investigating committee, which interviewed the buildings executive officer. In its report to the Board, however, it accepted what amounted to a fait accompli. The difficulty of providing an acceptable alternative must have weighed heavily with the investigating committee. However, to make the system more acceptable to itself, the Board specified that members should be given a list of all the work which the school committees had asked for, with

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9. The district was divided into three, each with a maintenance officer, whose job it was to check the need for the works requested by the school committees. Each had a third of the total funds available to account for, but he was accountable not so much to the Board as to the buildings executive officer.

the idea that they could collectively decide that a particular item should be allowed to stand, when the Board officers had decided to remove it from the list of priorities. Nevertheless, lack of finance left the trump card with the administrators, for if something new were included in the list, then an equivalent item of recommended expenditure would have to be deleted. Thus the role of pressure was severely restricted.

It is in this manner that the power of the individual Board member has been restricted, though not completely eclipsed. Areas still exist in which a Board member can exert pressure on behalf of a particular school, such as in the disposal of monies set aside for emergencies and for 'unforeseen works'. But generally speaking, the Board member has accepted that it is only by cooperating with fellow members and with Board officers that the efficiency of the Board can be maintained. Unquestionably that Board functions more efficiently which enjoys the fullest cooperation between members and officers.

II

Boards are elected every second (i.e. even) year - one half at a time - by the school committees of the education district. Each education district is divided into wards, each of which elects one member. Wards represent a roughly equal number of state primary, intermediate and district high schools. Members of the school committees within each ward elect their respective members. Any resident over the age of 21, so long as he is or she is not legally disqualified from standing for election to a school committee, may stand for the Board, and retiring members may stand for re-election.

The by-laws of each Board lay down in detail the procedure to be adopted at meetings, which take place monthly. The monthly meeting however, is chiefly coordinative; most of the business is conducted through a number of standing committees. Chief among these is the Executive, which is the only committee with the power to make decisions; the others can only recommend action. Meeting fairly frequently, the Executive has the main function of dealing with matters of urgency which occur between Board meetings. In general, the duties of the Executive are:

"(a) To consider and report to the Board on such matters as may from time to time be referred to it.

(b) To make such recommendations to the Board as it considers will promote efficiency.

(c) To deal with questions of urgency and other matters arising between meetings of the Board, which matters shall be reported for confirmation at the following meeting of the Board." 10

Other Board committees will usually include a finance committee, a Works Committee and an education committee. The number of committees varies from Board to Board, but it is true to say the committees are constructed to keep a watch over the work of the Board's officers. The Canterbury Board for example, operates eight standing committees: on agriculture, professional matters, buildings, finance, manual and technical work, staffing, teachers' college administration and transport.

Basically the Boards are responsible for establishing, maintaining and controlling the schools in their districts. They erect and maintain school buildings, appoint school teachers, arrange school transport, fix school hours and holidays, administer the funds granted by the Government and appoint their own administrative staff. Funds are granted by the Government for the following purposes: Teachers' salaries, school transport costs, incidentals grant, maintenance grant, new buildings grant, general administration grant, manual training grant, subsidies on voluntary contributions and wages for caretakers and cleaners. Some grants, it can be seen, are intended to cover actual costs, teachers' salaries and subsidies for example, but others are made on a simple pro-rata basis and the Board must 'live' within the limits of the money made available.

Administrative machinery. The typical Education Board would be structured along the following lines. In charge of the day-to-day running of the Board's affairs would be a secretary or general manager and his assistant. They would preside over some nine or so branches of administration, covering the following areas: accounts, buildings, architectural, staff and salaries, transport, supplies, teachers college, records and general matters. Some of the larger Boards, Auckland for example, [11] employ a full-time planning and research officer who has the responsibility of examining and predicting enrolment trends. The census figures form a basis for such studies. Working from these, it is possible to make calculated adjustments for demographic trends and forecast total enrolment and therefore additional requirements

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10. By-laws of the Education Board of the District of Wellington, printed by Stone, Son and Company as amended August 1963.

11. L.J. McCarthy, Planning at the Local Level: A New Zealand Example, (a paper presented at a meeting of the International Conference for the Advancement of Education Research.)

of accommodation. Other allowances that have to be made include immigration, internal migration and industrial development. But for the local translation of these figures, local knowledge is required - of schools, classroom figures, teacher availability and so on. Close contact must be maintained with the Government and other agencies concerned with land and housing development. The local council, for example, would have proposals for land sub-division and building development which could be made available to the Board. Depending upon the socio-economic level of the parents, children of primary school age vary from about 0.6 to 1.4 per house, thus with a knowledge of general socio-economic levels, the Education Board can identify likely pressure points and make planning allowances. Such a knowledge of likely developments is sound economics and good planning in rapidly expanding urban areas. Foresight may reduce costs as well as minimising disruptions.

But in the last resort, forward planning of this nature must be integrated with estimates of cost of the development of land which it is proposed to acquire. Specialists in land purchase from the Ministry of Works undertake the legal and financial aspects of this work and as stated, a code defines the optimum size of all aspects of the proposed school and its various facilities. Coordination is essential, for if there is a time-lag in site purchase, then the whole buildings programme could fall behind target dates and all the careful forward planning come to nought.

Structure of administration. The main branches of Board administration appear to fall into three groups, internal, external and teachers' college. The last is entirely separate as far as Board administration is concerned, and college administration involves specific problems which are not within the purview of this study.[12] The branches that deal with the internal administration of the Boards are also of little concern to us; they are the records branch and the 'general' branch, the latter being not so much a branch as a collection of sub-branches.

Of the branches which are concerned with external administration, the supplies branch fulfills a purely distributive function.

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12. It has been suggested that Education Boards relinquish their control of teachers'colleges. Some have acceded - South Auckland for example - and independent councils have been established.

Its methods of operation offer a good example of the routine nature of much of Board work, and show to how great an extent the work of Education Boards is predetermined by departmental control and regulations. The individual Boards are each rated by the Department according to their needs in, for example, the field of art and craft supplies. This rating is based on a system whereby points are allotted according to the size of the roll, the overall score being supplemented in certain special cases; classes of backward children and intermediate schools, for example, will be awarded supplementary points because it is considered that they will have greater need of art and craft materials. The Board then supplies the headteacher with a list of items and their relative scores; he is also informed what rating his school has. He will then be able to order as he wishes to make up the school's total, with a proviso that, to prevent a run on certain specified items such as scissors, the school will only be allowed a certain number as a maximum. Within the specifications of such a system, there can be little room for contention. The bulk of education administration is of a similar pattern.

The transport branch concerns itself with devising and operating routes which will get the maximum number of eligible children to school with the minimum inconvenience. The general public is inclined to complain more about school transport than practically any other aspect of the system. The channels through which the parents can complain are various. They can put the matter to the local committee, which will get in touch with the Board. They can see the headteacher and he will contact the Board. They can contact the Board directly or they can write to their local M P or to the Minister himself. A large number adopt the last course. If proof were sought of the strength of New Zealand's egalitarian democracy, one need look no further. From the Minister, the chain of communications operates down through the Regional Office of the Department back to the transport officer of the Education Board, who will be asked to comment on the particular complaint. Obviously a parent contacting the Minister either directly or through his or her local M P would make out the strongest possible case, but an investigation is always held in which the Board transport officer can comment fully on the complaint and supply a full factual analysis. The regulations which cover school transport are, to say the least, confusing, (see Chapter Ten) but to those who claim to understand them fully, they are precise. It is therefore possible to give an answer which is accurate, if not

charitable. But that answer more often than not is determined at Board level, because the decision of an experienced Board transport officer is usually accepted by departmental officers. Results show that the quickest way to obtain an answer to one's complaint is to write to the Minister, but it is not a great deal quicker and the process takes several months whichever method of complaint is chosen. School transport then, is the most contentious area in education, judging by the number of complaints and requests for 'information'. Yet as far as the transport branch of the Education Board is concerned, it is simply a matter of applying a confusing set of regulations to an equally confusing situation. Transport officers, it has been said, are made and not born; the process takes many years.

The staffing branch is chiefly concerned with personnel work among teachers and public relations. Appointments are of course largely automatic, being decided by the Appointments Committee, representing the Board, the NZEI and the Department. Any appointment will, apart from very extenuating circumstances, go to the highest-graded applicant, and although the 'comments' of the school committee concerned are 'invited', there is no likelihood of such comments influencing an appointment, except where the committee is in possession of certain facts concerning the applicant's moral unsuitability for the post. Consequently the staffing branch concerns itself with helping to solve the personal problems of its teachers. A staffing officer of one Board has said: "I always make sure to have a spare handkerchief ready when a teacher is coming in to see me, and it is often needed." Good relations with the local Committee of Branches of the NZEI are invaluable, and it will be found that most staffing officers are on first-name terms with leading NZEI officials in the region. The setting up of the Appointments Committee in 1948 on which, as has been stated, the Institute is represented, removed the chief area of contention. Relations between the Board and the Committee of Branches are on the whole good, bearing in mind that one is the employer and the other the employee. Following a remit at its annual meeting in 1960, the NZEI Executive sent a questionnaire to members in order to discover how the Appointments Committees were functioning. Executive claimed: "Institute members have invariably stated that the Appointments Committees work harmoniously, with all members endeavouring to reach agreement on points of difference.

NZEI members also report that their opinions are well received and given full consideration." [13]

One staffing officer spoke of the importance of 'playing the game', as he called it: "If you are fair in your dealings with the teachers at this level, then there is not likely to be any trouble." He stressed the importance of the fact that, since the regulations were so explicit, there were not a great number of opportunities for unfairness anyway. Situations do occur, the officer continued, where an Education Board would like to use its influence in appointments; a typical situation would be where two apply for a headteacher's job with equal qualifications and similar reports. One of the applicants however, is from a local school and the Board is very much behind him, looking upon him as 'one of our teachers'. But such is the position that Board members can do little but 'keep their fingers crossed'.

Some staffing branches have expanded in recent years to enable them to play their 'public relations' function more skilfully. If a teacher is thinking of resigning, for example, an officer is ready to make a hurried trip out to his school to try to talk him into staying in his position - an operation which requires a great deal of tact. Another function which requires consummate skill is the disposal of relieving teachers. Since many of these are not in the first rank of teaching ability they have to be adroitly placed and moved around often so that no one school has a particular relieving teacher for too long.

Contact with the local community and the school committees is largely to be found in the area of appointment of teachers. Here, as has been pointed out, the power of the school committees is negligible. Seldom does a committee attempt to influence the process. There are, in the files of each Board, examples of school committees which have commented adversely on a particular appointment. One such case, the appointment of a teacher to a one-teacher school in 1965, has an interesting background. The post was advertised as having with it an old house - which in fact had originally been the school building. On seeing the advertisement, the relieving teacher who was

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13. National Education, Vol. XLIII, No. 466, June 1st 1961.

occupying the post - and the house - at the time, telephoned the Board in a state of considerable surprise. He claimed to be living in a new, spaciously designed house. It transpired that the buildings branch had replaced the old school house two years earlier, without informing the staffing branch, and that the previous full-time teacher has been charged a rent of only £15 per annum, as for the former old residence. Consequently the post was readvertised, but this time an error by the Board's printer led to its being advertised in the wrong grading. Meanwhile the months slipped by. When at last an appointment seemed imminent, the Board received a telegram from the committee of the school concerned: 'Please defer appointment teacher 'X' school until receipt of letter.' After so many delays however, the Board Executive decided on the same day that the appointment should be proceeded with. When the letter arrived it stated that the committee felt that it would be unwise to appoint a single man, because he would not take an interest in the house and the surrounds. "Should he be contemplating marriage in the near future then the committee would withdraw its objections." The Board wrote back that the fact that he was single was "not sufficient grounds to upset an appointment." The appointment was made.

A more common reason for a school committee to object to an appointment is the applicant's sex. That is to say, if a school has a reputation for being 'tough', the committee will sometimes object to the headship going to a woman. In fact, some Education Boards are in sympathy with this feeling and advertise for a headmaster to fill such posts, but such action is generally frowned upon as being contrary to the spirit of 'equal opportunity'. Opinions can become heated on this issue as is shown by a case in 1960 when a school committee wrote to the Education Board that it was unanimously of the opinion that the appointment of a woman to the post of headteacher could not be in the best interests of the school. The school had been in the charge of a headmistress some time previously and discipline and behaviour had deteriorated seriously. The position had been aggravated, the committee felt, by there being a large number of Maori boys who were 'big for their age' and older than their classmates. "All parents consulted are in full support of the committee's views on this matter." The Education Board Executive overruled the committee's criticisms, pointing out that the applicant's sex had been taken into

account when the appointment was made. No doubt there are occasions when such tasks are better left to men, but the risks of invoking criticism from the NZEI are more serious for an Education Board than those presented by one or two discontented committees.

The finance branch is, of course, basically concerned with the application of the Government's financial regulations governing school committees.[14] One of the most important functions of the branch is to supply the commissioners with all the financial information they are likely to need when a new school is set up. It is explained at what rate incidental expenses will be paid, that is, a specified sum depending upon a school's grade plus a per capita grant of 3/1d. The Board will forward this grant to the commissioners (as it does to all school committees) at regular intervals - two-monthly in most cases. School cleaning costs are assessed according to regulations,[15] payment, of course, being according to a set schedule. An establishment grant for new Grade IV schools of £50 is made, for the purchasing of specified items. One cannot overstress the control exercised by the Board - and indirectly, the Department - in the setting up of a new school, and in its financial administration thereafter. Commissioners are even advised at which bank they should open the school's account. Books, circulars and pamphlets on the question of subsidies on voluntary contributions are sent out, and any information the commissioners may require is provided.

The regulations which govern school financial administration are complex; so complex in fact that where communications between Board and committee are not very good, it appears normal for the committee to try for what it can get! It becomes difficult for the Board to assess priority cases adequately. When he was Minister of Education, the Hon B. Tennent further complicated the issue by announcing that all schools built after a certain date would be eligible for certain free equipment; it is not unusual for committees to want the best, and thus the finance officers had the difficult task of checking the requests that came in.[16]

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14. See Appendix D.

15. A four-roomed school for example, is calculated to need twenty hours per week.

16. The secretary of one school committee for example, wrote to the Board that he wanted to buy a sewing machine at £36.5.0, until it was pointed out to him that sewing machines for schools usually cost £31.5.0. These are the checks which Board officers must apply.

Two areas in which disputes frequently occur between Boards and committees are cleaning and grass cutting. The set payment for grass-cutting is £6 per acre, and this takes no account of the obvious disparities in actual cost brought about by the nature of the terrain. This is overcome in most cases by having the grass cut 'voluntarily' by a committee member or an acquaintance. In this respect a country school will have obvious advantages, since a number of committee members are certain to be farmers. However, some suburban and small-town schools, where the terrain is difficult, have to meet the extra expense from the committee's locally raised funds. Many committees experience great difficulty in finding a good cleaner, especially on the rates of pay provided. It is a generally acknowledged fact that cleaners are often paid more than the regulation wage because they have come to some 'arrangement' with the local school committee. An example of this situation is offered by a new school whose committee wrote to the finance officer of the Education Board and explained that their cleaner was a pensioner working part-time. In winter, it was necessary for him to make two trips from his home each day, one of them in the morning to light the boiler. The committee wished to know if any means existed by which he could be paid what was in effect a split-time allowance as a travelling expense. The Board was not at all helpful in its reply. An established school, it must be added, would never have approached the Board but would have come to a satisfactory 'arrangement' itself. Although it is well-known that such arrangements exist, and although it is also known that they do not always follow the letter of the law, they nevertheless provide schools with cleaners at a cheap rate and thus, it is probably assumed, fall within the spirit of the law.

Buildings branch and the architects' branch are so closely connected that they are best studied together; together they form what is probably the most important sector of Board administration and certainly the area of greatest conflict with both school committees and the Education Department. As stated the governing procedure for the design and construction of school buildings is known as the "White Lines" scheme. Prior to its inception, the Boards would make plans for their own schools which were dealt with individually by the Department. Dealing with different Boards, different conditions and a range of building and transportation costs, the Department found that a considerable variety of standards was emerging.

By the early 1950s it became apparent that steps had to be taken to apply a common standard and consequently a conference of Education Board administrators was held, and Board architects were asked to draw up plans for a national standard design. It should be noted that this was an admirably democratic method of tackling the problem. From among plans proposed by the Boards, the best was selected by Department officers. But so strong were the complaints of other Boards that features of their designs had to be incorporated. When the hybrid was eventually put to the test of tender, it proved too expensive, and thus certain 'extras' were abandoned, such as teaching bays and covered pathways. But the variation in building costs was still a problem.

In 1954 a group of experts from the Department paid a visit to the United Kingdom to see how the problem was being dealt with in that country. They brought back with them the "White Lines" scheme, which to some extent mated flexibility with economy. This scheme envisaged a cheap standard design which was capable of modification to local conditions; it envisaged cost limits according to local building costs. Thus the Boards could build their own variation of the standard design, the chief feature of which was an absence of corridors, within certain limits. These limits were formed by a minimum building code on the one hand and the cost-price figure on the other. The cost-price figure was arrived at by simply multiplying cost-place (the amount needed in that locality to provide a place for one child) by the estimated roll. The palliative, as far as the Boards were concerned, to the necessity of operating a standard plan divorced of non-essentials, was that any saving which the Board could make by the ingenuity of its modifications could be spent on additions of 'educational value' to that particular school. In the early years of operation, for example, a number of schools were provided with libraries in this manner. What could be classified as being of 'educational value' was ascertained by a committee comprising the district senior inspector, the Board architect and the secretary of the Board.

The significant difference between the scheme as operated in the United Kingdom and in New Zealand is that there was provision for a regular review of the cost-place in the former. In New Zealand this was not the case, and the consequence has been that the savings have become significantly smaller and thus the White Lines have merged. Boards have had to strive

to their utmost to build within the cost-price limit, leave alone make any saving. Thus the stringency of financial control prevented the free operating of the scheme.[17] Even if it were freely operating however, the scheme has a significant disadvantage in that the quality of the schools is too largely dependent upon the fluctuations of the tender market. Thus a school which, because of a shortage of work generally, was built at a time of competition among builders, will be better equipped than a neighbouring school which was built during an abundance of work when builders were not so concerned at undercutting competitors.

It is interesting to note that the "White Lines" scheme, which answered a pressing problem, was not the result of democratic participation. The Boards were not sufficiently organised to come together and promote their own joint design; such was the jealousy between them that they were unable to accept the scheme of a fellow Board in the first instance.

The day-to-day problems of the buildings branch concern the maintenance of schools in such a way as to spend the Board's annual grant equitably and keep individual school committees reasonably content. Disputes occur, naturally, from time to time, of differing degrees of severity (see Chapter Seven), but generally speaking, relations are cordial, as we saw in Chapter Three.

III

In fighting for their autonomy, Boards presented their case as being just one more battle in the struggle against 'bureaucracy', as being one more bastion of local control coming under heavy attack. Certainly Boards are a bastion, but scarcely of local control! Boards are elected by school committee members. School committees, to all intents and purposes, are elected by the public. Thus a theoretical pattern of responsibility and authority exists. But as we saw in Chapter Three, local participation at the biennial committee elections is, generally speaking, slight. Schools are lucky if 1 parent in 20 attends the election meeting. Figures for Education Board elections show an almost equally poor rate of participation. As the diagrams below illustrate, the proportion of uncontested seats is high.

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17. In 1966 the Public Expenditure Committee recommended triennial review of the cost-place figure. (Report of the Public Expenditure Committee, Wellington, Government Printer, 1966, p. 27).

In almost every post-war election, the majority of seats were uncontested. More significant perhaps, there appears to be a downward trend in participation. The second diagram shows that the number of candidates offering themselves for elections is diminishing. One might conclude that Education Boards have no more than a random chance of representing local opinion.

This lack of representativeness is surely one reason why Boards have not been delegated more authority. They are spending public money but are in no way responsible to the public. Yet Boards have strenuously opposed efforts in the past to have themselves elected on a direct public franchise. In a questionnaire to Board members of similar design to that used in Chapter Three, (see Appendix 'B'), members were asked to register their reaction to the statement: 'Education Boards should be elected by the general public'. The results were as follows:

Response	Percentage of Total
Strongly agree	2
Agree	3
No opinion	-
Disagree	48
Strongly disagree	47

In fact, the present position, as long as Boards can continue to fill their vacancies, has merit, for those who take positions on Education Boards almost invariably have some educational background. They are sufficiently 'of the public' to be able to bring pressure to bear upon the Government, yet sufficiently 'of the system' to work effectively with the Department in administration.

2.1. Education Board Elections

Number and proportion of seats contested in Education Board elections in the post-war period. *

Line A = Seats vacant
Line B = Seats actually contested
Shaded area shows proportion of uncontested seats.



* For the figures for individual Boards see Appendix C.

2.2 Education Board Elections

Number of candidates who have contested Board elections in the post-war period.

No. of candidates

Line A = Number of candidates needed to fill vacant seats

Line B = Number of candidates standing

Shaded area shows surplus number of candidates



IV

To the great majority of Board members, the basic motivation for seeking election is a desire to serve and to be concerned with issues which could be considered vital. For the most part education offers the most obvious expression of this desire, because Board members usually have a school committee or teaching background.

"Why? I suppose I'm what you might call a compulsive volunteer," replied one Board member when questioned about his motives for joining an Education Board. One other Board member, in the questionnaire, set out some 23 committees to which he belonged. Other members showed themselves to be extremely active, far more so than school committeemen. For many, Education Board work was one outlet among several.

Yet another group was quite inactive generally. Many farmers and ex-school teachers fall into this category. One ex-teacher said: "Well, education has been my life after all. And I felt that I had valuable experience of the problems that the schools face. So I could still be of some use to education." For farmers, school committee and Education Board work is a form of indulgence. Since they do not work set hours, farmers can make the time to work on education matters.

Whatever their motives, Board members as a group have given a very great deal to education. The following shows the length of time spent on school committees by Board members.

Length of Committee Service	Percentage of Total
Less than 4 years	5
4 - 7 years	22
8 - 11 years	19
More than 12 years	54

The same picture emerges from a table showing the length of time spent on Boards themselves.

Length of Board Service	Percentage of Total
Less than 4 years	24
4 - 7 years	25
8 - 11 years	20
More than 12 years	31 [18]

18. It should be added that a number of Board members had served for over 20 years.

As one would expect from the length of service of many members, as a group Board members are mostly elderly. 21% of the respondents were retired. It is the retired person, in fact, who can devote most time to Board work and is probably least likely to be depressed by the continual frustrations which seem endemic to the system.

Age	Percentage of Total
20 - 29	-
30 - 39	5
40 - 49	15
50 - 59	29
60 and over	51

Occupationally, Education Boards appear to be very much dominated by the farming group, as is shown by the table below.

Occupational Status	Percentage of Total
Professional	28
Minor business	16
Clerical	4
Farming	52
Skilled	-
Unskilled	-
Domestic	-
Housewife	6
Retired	21

Generally speaking, the Board members seem to occupy a somewhat higher status than committee members. This should offer no surprise. It is generally true that representatives occupy a status higher than those they represent. Nevertheless, the hold that the agricultural sector has on the education system is something to be noticed. More will be said of this in a later chapter.

As in school committee work, the dominance of the male is unchallenged: 93% of the respondents were men. Since there are so few women on school committees, and since even fewer of them attain the position of chairman, this is not surprising. Yet housewives, especially after they have raised a family, tend to be socially and politically active in overseas countries. Board and committee work would offer a natural outlet to such women - and the sub-system would benefit from their participation.

With regard to Board elections, we noted a lack of participation through the years. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that 84% of the sample felt that standing for election to a Board had not been their idea originally. They had been persuaded to stand, and 87% of these had been persuaded by an 'acquaintance but not a close friend'. There is a fairly extensive 'grape vine' in all Education Districts and it soon becomes known in most committees concerned when the ward representative is going to retire. In these cases the same sort of social selection goes on as was observed in the hunt to fill school committees. Again, when dissatisfaction is felt with one Board member, a group of committeemen may nominate a champion. It seldom happens that Board members themselves canvass to fill vacancies, but officers will sometimes encourage some committeemen.

As a group, Board members spent a longer time in formal education than did committee members, though like the latter, the sample exhibits a cross section.

Education level	Percentage of Total
Completed primary school	15
1 year secondary school	6
2 years secondary school	16
3 years secondary school	17
4 years secondary school	9
5 years secondary school	11
Training college (full time)	11
University (full time)	15

In addition 35% of the sample had undertaken some form of professional or trade training, or further education, not specified above.

As has been stated already, Board members are more active as a group than committee members. 72% served on other committees (excluding secondary school boards on which 76% sat),[19] a number sitting on many committees. Further, 33% of the sample held some public elective office, including one mayor.

Thus Board members are people with a desire to serve and often a flair for elective positions. They are not motivated, as

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19. Education Board members may sit on secondary school boards ex officio (see Chapter Eight).

the majority of committeemen are, by the desire to improve the quality of their children's education, for only 20% of the sample had children at a school under the Board's control.[20]

The Education Board is many things to many of its members. To those who seek the eye of the public it offers considerable opportunities especially to those not interested in party politics or not sufficiently talented politically to make a name for themselves in that field. But certainly the 'political animal' is to be found on the Education Board and some members thrive on the cut-and-thrust of debate. One member admitted that he would often suggest a particular step of which he did not himself approve simply to "put the cat among the pigeons". There is even scope within the Board system for political 'engineering'. For example, one influential Board member made good strategic use of the fact that Boards do not publish details of election nominations. He would assemble a list of as many committee members as the votes he might require and would then visit each privately and ask them to propose him for re-election. None of them was aware that he was part of a 'mass-proposal' scheme and was probably somewhat flattered to have been asked to nominate a prominent Board member for re-election. Having nominated the member, the committee man would naturally feel obliged to vote for him. Consequently the Board member was able to estimate with a considerable degree of accuracy the number of votes he would receive.

There are members who obtain a Board position, one imagines, simply for the status. It is difficult to discover any other hypothesis which accounts for the person who habitually slept through Board meetings and committee meetings of the Board. Such is the atmosphere of Board meetings that it became the practice with his colleagues to record his name as having proposed certain motions not specifically proposed by another member. Over the years this member's name appeared in the minutes as often as the most active. The need for attention is a stimulant to some. One may cite the example of one particularly able and active member who found himself placed at the end of a row at one prize distribution. He immediately put in a request that, since he was in danger of falling off

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20. It is interesting to note in this context that 29% of the sample had no children at the local school when they first joined a school committee. This is considerably higher than that for school committees (only 1.4%) and leads one to conclude that if a person without children can be persuaded to join a school committee, he will often find his way to the Board and serve for a number of years.

the stage, could he not be placed in the centre somewhere - perhaps next to the chairman.

Thus Education Boards provide an outlet for a considerable variety of personalities, and Board work satisfaction for a variety of psychical needs. That a characteristic of a number of members is outspokenness is all to the advantage of education. It provides the primary sub-system with an organisational base for the criticism of Government policies and for the expression of a (usually uncoordinated) non-government point of view.

V

The national spokesman for Education Boards, the NZEBA, was formed specifically for these purposes:

(i) "consultation by Education Boards on questions of general interest to themselves and the discussion of matters relating to Education Board activities.

(ii) To watch over and protect the interests, rights and privileges of Education Boards.

(iii) To promote the efficient carrying out of educational administration throughout the Dominion.

(iv) To do all such lawful things as may appear necessary to the carrying out of the foregoing objects." 21

The NZEBA has enjoyed a somewhat chequered existence. It was not until the report of the Joint Committee in 1956 recommended that the NZEBA be recognised as the official spokesman for all Boards that the Association became in any way powerful. Even so, it took several years of the Standing Committee's operating to convince the average Board member of the usefulness of a national negotiating body. The Boards are not yet prepared to take all their issues with the Department through the NZEBA and the Standing Committee. Matters which are 'purely domestic' are considered to be the business of the Board concerned. In reality, the belief is still quite widely held that a Board will obtain more by direct representation to the Department. Acting on its own, a Board might still steal a march over other Boards.

Paradoxically, the NZEBA has suffered over the years from a plethora of purely domestic requests made at annual conferences which in no way touched upon general policy. The very fact

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21. NZEBA Executive memorandum, June 1st 1962.

that the individual Boards forwarded them to the conference probably signified that they had already been turned down by the Department. In 1962 for example, 42 out of 44 remits to conference were of a specialised, local nature. Few decisions taken at these conferences over the years were truly realistic, since sponsors of remits took little trouble to explore the costs involved in their recommendations and decisions were taken on small votes. In fact, Boards freely admitted difficulty in 'thinking up' remits and agendas were continually being 'padded'.

Yet during recent years (since a committee on conference procedure was appointed in 1962) remits have been discussed according to a priority system and debate has been tightened generally. Three groups are set up at the beginning of each conference to discuss sets of remits, reclassify them and report back to conference. There has been a serious effort, in short, to make of conference what the Boards felt it should be: "the top level yearly educational meeting in New Zealand".[22]

If in fact debate at conference is elevated, the hand of the NZEBA would be strengthened and it could truly become the spokesman for Education Boards. But a lifetime of defending their autonomy against the centralising tendencies of government has not left Boards willing to lose autonomy to their own national body. Even when the suggestion is simply that all Board senior officers should be called either general managers or secretary managers, agreement between individual Boards is difficult. There still exists an amount of jealousy between Boards which is closely related to the particularist tendencies noted in Chapter Two and progress towards a central body able to make the widest variety of decisions on behalf of all Boards will necessarily be slow.[23]

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22. NZEBA Executive memorandum, June 1962.

23. An example of NZEBA weakness was quoted in the House of Representatives by Mr Rae. Apparently there had been a joint agreement between Minister and NZEBA leaders that where a building was structurally sound, it should not be replaced. However, when the chairmen returned to their individual Boards, local pressure made more than one absolve himself from the agreement and thus the general agreement was worthless. (NZPD, Vol. 311, p. 266, June 25th 1957.)

CONCLUSIONS: The Board Game.

Rules of the Game. The Board game concerns primarily the Education Boards and the Department of Education. It has to do with the efficiency of administration and the preservation of what is called 'local control' as exercised by the Boards. The basic rules of the game not covered in Chapter Two concern these two central themes. That is to say, each move which the Department makes in the game must be expressed in terms of improving the administration of the schools and thus saving the taxpayers' money. Any moves which the Boards make (usually defensive) must be expressed either in similar terms or in terms of preserving local control. Yet these rules are not as limiting as might be thought.

Pay-Off. Preservation of autonomy and - if possible - its extension is the goal of Board strategy.[24] Yet in some ways the Board position is a difficult one to defend. As has been pointed out, if elections are anything to go by - and surely they are - Boards are not representative of local opinion. Yet even the term 'local' is a complete misnomer. As one Board member pointed out in his individual submission to the Commission on Education: "There is little justification for the use of terms such as 'local control of education' when, in fact, what we have is 'local' control of school housekeeping at the primary level and local participation in school administration at the post-primary level." How could one consider Education Boards 'local' when some of them cover 10,000 square miles, the submission continued?

Pay-off in reality has little to do with abstract principles such as these. It has a great deal to do with the checks and limits within which a Board has to run its affairs. For example, although the position has recently improved, for many years the building of a teacher's house was authorised in the following manner:

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24. In the questionnaire, Board members were asked to express their views on the following statements: (i) 'Education Boards should be given greater freedom in school buildings'; (ii) 'Education Boards should be given greater freedom in the running of school transport'. 80% agreed with statement (i) and 85% with statement (ii). But there are limits to the extension of Board autonomy. The above results show that Board members would like to strengthen their hand in some administrative areas, but not many wish to extend Board influence into professional matters. In replying to the statement: 'Education Boards should be given more opportunity to influence what is taught in the classrooms', only 24% expressed agreement.

(i) Education Boards could only build teachers' houses within a well-defined policy, laid down by the Department.

(ii) Such a house must first be included in the annual building programme of the Board and approved.

(iii) Using the standard plan, the Board can then call tenders.

(iv) The Board recommends the lowest tender to the Regional Office of the Department.

(v) The latter transmits the recommendation to the Head Office.

(vi) The recommendation is sent to the Minister for approval.

(vii) The latter returns his approval to the Head Office.

(viii) Head Office relays the approval to the Regional Office.

(iX) The Board is finally authorised to accept the tender it has recommended.

At this point work could begin. Thus pay-off for the Education Boards is concerned with ensuring that this irksome pattern of checks becomes no more irksome and perhaps a little less so.

Strategy. Board strategy must accommodate two very different situations, which we shall call 'open' and 'defensive'. The open situation envisages the free-running of Board-Department relations. The defensive situation envisages a governmental threat to the position of Education Boards. Not surprisingly, Board strategy differs in each.

(i) Open strategy. In the open situation, Boards feel free to express basic dissatisfaction with the system. It causes delay and duplication, the argument goes. The only acceptable solution is that strong local bodies be fashioned. The Commission on Education presented the Boards with an opportunity to deck their open strategy in full array. Several submissions were made on behalf of Boards, one of the best thought-out being from the general manager of the Auckland Board. The open strategy, judging by these submissions, is a campaign for a locally oriented scheme of control in which augmented Boards would play the key role. The structure of such a scheme as seen by Boards is set out below.

The Central Department would:

(i) Take responsibility for national curriculum and standards, examinations and distribution of funds to local authorities (on the basis of annual budgets and programmes of works);

(ii) Carry out essential but minimal audit and supervision of the activities of the regional education authorities;

(iii) Conduct research and act as a clearing house for new developments and experiments in education:

(iv) Be controlled by a Commission consisting of a Director and three Assistants, administrative, professional and local-administrative.

The Regional Authorities (that is, augmented Education Boards) would:

(i) Be elected by school committees and post-primary boards, with representatives from kindergartens, universities

(ii) Defensive Strategy. As we have seen in the earlier part of this chapter, the existence of Boards has been in doubt on several occasions. In such circumstances, Board strategy accomplishes no mean tour de force. It switches over to full support for the existing system. This is best illustrated by Board reaction to the Report of the Commission on Education, which was not impressed by the Boards' open strategy. Its own recommendations were an attempt to reconcile two virtually irreconciliable positions by enlarging Education Boards (to the extent that they lost their former identity) and staffing the hybrid body with public servants responsible to the Minister of Education. Thus the Boards had come under a very real threat.[28] Under the threat Boards very quickly became appreciative of the 'efficient and friendly' ties between themselves and the Department. "In my opinion", wrote the Auckland general manager, "we can quite confidently predict that the existing administrative system will function in future at a high level of efficiency and with a new harmony in all its parts".[29] Though it may be sound open strategy to point out the deficiencies of the system, defensive strategy attempts no such thing. Rather it feigns surprise that anybody should wish to alter a system which is working so well. How could the Commission recommend such sweeping structural changes, it was asked, "after acknowledging the marked improvement in the functioning of our system under the Department and the Boards, and after finding no serious breakdown or faults in the primary field?"[30]

These, then, are the chief Board strategies.

Information. The flow of information from the Department of Education has become increasingly efficient since the inception of the Standing Committee on administration. Board leaders are now far more aware of the difficulties facing the system. Though they cannot disseminate such information among members, they can influence stands taken on particular issues. There is indeed a far more general appreciation of the problems with which the Department has to deal than existed in the past.

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28. The Commission did not feel this to be so, but one is forced to agree with the statement of the general manager of the Auckland Board that "the place and influence of the elected Boards in our local system of administration would be seriously and detrimentally affected if they were to lose the authority to appoint and control their own officers." (See L.J. McCarthy, The Present State of Administration in the Field of Primary Education, a monograph prepared for the NZEBA, 1963).

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

The sharing of information by Department officers has resulted in substantial support for their position. In the questionnaire, members were asked to comment on the statement: 'Cooperation between Education Boards and officers of the Department of Education is better today than it has been for a long time'. The response was as follows:

Response	Percentage of Total
Strongly agree	36
Agree	54
No opinion	10
Disagree	-
Strongly disagree	-

Thus the emphasis on pooling of information has had a marked effect on Board opinion. Yet the NZEBA is not sufficiently informed of the activities of all its member Boards. As stated, there are deeply rooted reasons for this, but nonetheless the NZEBA seldom acts from complete information.

The pooling of information implies a two-way process. It is obviously true that the Department has become more aware of the thinking of the Boards through the discussions of the Standing Committee. Thus no move made by Government need be entirely misinformed, as some have been in the past. Complete information is impossible to obtain, and probably it would offer no panacea if it were. But the quality of decisions should improve in some sort of proportion to the mutual availability of information.

Coalition. In general, Boards can count upon the support of their committees whenever their position is called into question. This is shown by the submission of the NZSCF to the Commission on Education, the general theme of which was a desire for "more Board and less Department" in the administrative set-up. Further, a committee set up by the NZSCF following the Commission's report came out strongly against the latter's recommendations on reorganisation. Board members were asked in the questionnaire to comment on the statement: 'Cooperation between Education Boards and school committees is better now than it has been for a long time'. The response was as follows:

Response	Percentage of Total
Strongly agree	41
Agree	54
No opinion	5
Disagree	-
Strongly disagree	-

Apart from this coalition with the school committees, Boards can usually count on support from outside the system, as they have shown on more than one occasion. Their appeal to sentiment, on the grounds that they are an instrument of local control, has been more effective than the economic arguments of their opponents. Despite the ambivalent position of the NZEI leadership, Boards have the general support of teachers and also of the New Zealand Secondary School Boards' Association (SSBA). They have support in depth when under threat, but in the 'open' situation, this coalition is non-existent. Thus Boards will be able to muster support in depth for the defence of their position in the foreseeable future at least. But there is no general support for an increase in Board powers.

Having discussed the administrative agents in the primary sub-system, it is now proposed to look at the main teachers' organisation, the NZEI.

Chapter Five

THE NEW ZEALAND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTE

Few who are knowledgeable about the 'politics' of education in New Zealand would disagree that the primary teachers' body, the NZEI, is the best organised and probably most successful pressure group in the system. There are several reasons for this and it is hoped to isolate them during the course of this chapter. It is natural that the two chief teacher organisations should be better organised than other education groups; they are affected most directly, they have the mass membership and the finance. The NZEI has the further advantage that it has been a coordinated negotiating body (in the sense that decisions made by the leadership are binding upon the membership) for over 70 years.

One of the chief concerns of this study is to show the relationships that exist between the various organs in the system. In the majority of cases this has entailed the discussion of recent - or even present-day - developments. In the case of the NZEI however, the position is somewhat different. The ties which exist between it and the Department were built up over the last decade of the 19th century and the first decade of the 20th. It would be incorrect to say that nothing significant has happened since, yet it is probably true that any developments have been evolutionary.

In terms of the present study, this means that the chapter dealing with the NZEI must be largely historical. Thus the four sub-sections will deal with the setting up of the NZEI; policy and relationships with other bodies during the early years (up to 1914); policy and relationships during the later years (from 1918 to the present) and finally the structure of the Institute.

I

The first conference of the NZEI was held at Christchurch on January 2nd 1883, with delegates from most parts of New Zealand.[1] In all, 18 delegates were present. The moving

1. Lyttelton Times, January 4th, 5th, 1883.

force behind the conference was the Otago Institute of Teachers, certainly the best organised and most active of the regional Institutes which existed in many parts prior to this date. An Education Institute had been formed in Otago as early as 1865, but the organisation had collapsed within one year. There followed the formation of the Otago Schoolmasters' Association, composed largely of Dunedin teachers, but its efforts to expand met with little success. In 1878 however, the Otago Institute of Education was formed "on such a basis as to include all educational interests". [2] The paid-up membership of the Institute was just short of 200. The success of its branches, it was soon discovered, "depended chiefly upon the secretaries and treasurers chosen". [3] This was a lesson which the Otago Institute took to heart, and one which was passed on to the national Institute in later years. Moreover, the spokesman for Otago teachers declared to the conference his belief that the Otago Institute had been able to influence the legislators in 1877. "Unceasing watchfulness in observing any changes in the Education Act", he went on, "is a matter of vital importance. This can best be secured by Federation". [4]

Though the Otago Instiute, with support from South Canterbury, was in a position to lead the conference's thinking, it should not be imagined that teacher bodies did not exist in other regions prior to 1883. Auckland, for example, had had a Teachers' Institute since 1875, though in truth this had been an ineffective body. However, it was gaining strength, and Auckland representatives expressed a keen desire to see the various district Institutes federated. The Wellington Teachers' Institute had been founded in 1871; by 1883 it had a membership of 45, drawn almost exclusively from the city and the suburbs. In Southland 25 teachers belonged to the Otago Institute. South Canterbury had a membership of 30, and North Canterbury had 62. Though no teachers' body existed in Hawkes Bay, the senior inspector had persuaded a teacher to attend the conference. His statement concerning Hawkes Bay teachers probably reflects the general attitude: they were "keenly alive to the advantages of union in education matters." [5]

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2. The Report of the Formation of the NZEI, printed in Auckland, 1883.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

The conference was a considerable success, due largely to the direction given by the Otago Institute, and to the advice offered by the Education Institute of Scotland, which had forwarded to the secretary of the Otago Institute a copy of its charters, rules and regulations. Teachers at this time had very real grievances, and previous attempts at redress had shown the futility of purely local organisation. An organising committee of one member for each district thus came into being and in the following year the first official meeting of the Council of the NZEI took place at Wellington. The words of the meeting's chairman in 1884 were indicative of a spirit which has characterised the Institute in its dealings with Governments since that date: "It cannot be spread about too widely that the NZEI has nothing of an aggressive character in its objects. It will not hunt for grievances in order to redress them".[6] He went on to speak of a bond of union having arisen among the teachers which was gaining the 'sympathy of a large portion of the thinking public'.

A factor which no doubt assisted in both developments was the setting up of two journals, the Schoolmaster and the Education Monthly Journal, though neither of these was directly controlled by the NZEI.

II

By 1885 a permanent organisation had been set up, the district institutes being run by committees of management which had to give notice of any business that they intended to raise at the Council to the central committee two months before the Council meeting. Thus a remit system of sorts was instigated. A system of annual-meeting sub-committees was set up soon after, to discuss remits sent in and report back to the main body of Council. Within the constitution from the earliest days, provision was made for a strong central committee of 'officers of the Council' with power to act for the Council during recess.

Relations with other bodies. A factor of the greatest significance became apparent from the nature of the earliest Council remits: what the membership desired, the goals that it was aiming for, could only be achieved under a strong central Department. Unlike the Post Primary Teachers' Association in later years, the NZEI had no dispute with the central administration (which in these years could hardly be said to exist) but with the Education Boards and the school

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6. Report of the Meeting of the Council of the NZEI, printed in Auckland 1884.

committees. Thus it was supported by those in the Government who felt that progress in education could only be achieved through centralisation. Let us be quite clear: the NZEI was not basically concerned with the principles of central or local control per se. It simply knew that teachers suffered through local control more than they would under a standardised national system.

The goals of the central committee of the NZEI overlapped those of the Inspector General and his staff to a considerable degree, as is shown, for example, by the attitude of both to the centralisation of the inspectorate. To the Institute, a centralised inspectorate was essential if standardised schemes of grading and promotion were to operate; it was impossible to establish a general process of promotion when school committees were in charge of appointment and dismissal. Inspector-General Habens was equally anxious to centralise the inspectorate, as a direct financial saving to the Government. Also, as he pointed out to the annual meeting in 1898: "It would be wise for the State to take the inspectors into its own service, and employ them as agents to assist the teachers in understanding the actual requirements of the syllabus." [7] Conversely it can be seen then that a nationally organised body of teachers was much in the interests of the central Department; without teacher opinion organised on a national scale it would have been very difficult to challenge the autonomy of the Boards. The Department was therefore anxious to establish an entente with the NZEI. The president of the Institute made this point when he addressed the annual meeting in 1886 at Dunedin. "As district institutes we had comparatively little influence on national administration but as soon as we had completed our organisation our position was fully recognised, and our proposals were received with all the respect and consideration we could desire." [8] The proposals from the previous conference had been submitted to the Minister of Education, and passed out to inspectors and district inspectors for consideration. The resulting papers had been printed and presented to both Houses of Parliament.

Having mentioned the importance of Education Boards and school committees with regard to Institute policy in the early years, it would be as well at this stage to have a closer look

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7. Report of the annual meeting of NZEI, Dunedin 1898.
8. Report of the annual meeting of NZEI, Dunedin 1886.

at the position. It will be remembered that when the Education Act was passed in 1877, the provincial councils had not long been abolished; inter-provincial rivalry was still high and the Act was much of a compromise, the Education Boards being sops to the provinces. The local school committees, as we have seen, were also far more powerful than is the case at present. It was with these bodies that the school teachers, individually and regionally, had to bargain. In general terms, the Institute recognised the importance of local participation in the control of education (though it should be borne in mind that as a principle this was not in question at this time), but nevertheless felt that Boards and committees were too powerful and dubiously constituted. The methods of election to both were strongly criticised as being inefficient and as producing bodies which were unrepresentative. In 1889 an Institute deputation visited the Minister to discuss administrative questions. It wished to enlarge school districts and so secure more competent committees. "Many of the men elected do not understand education", it was stated, "and are not in sympathy with the teachers....a great deal of pressure is frequently brought to bear on teachers".[9] Examples were given to the Minister of school committees keeping back teachers' cheques and of teachers being caused 'a great deal of annoyance' because they had found it necessary to punish a committee member's child. At the annual meeting two years later the president stated: "Sometimes on our committees are to be found men whose major object in seeking election seems to have been to annoy some other member of committees, or to induce the teacher to migrate".[10]

The deputation on school districts in 1889 had been told by the Minister, (the Hon Mr. Fisher), that school districts could be enlarged when the Boards 'became no longer necessary'. It was, of course, the Education Boards which controlled teaching conditions most fully, and it was against these bodies that the Institute brought its full weight to bear. The basis of Board autonomy came under attack often. "It seems to me an anomaly", said one president, "and one at variance with the principles of taxation, that the Board of Education should have the control and expenditure...of the colony's money and not be responsible... to Parliament, or directly to the people".[11] Consequently much discussion centred around the need to strengthen the

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9. Report of the annual meeting, Dunedin 1890.

10. Report of the annual meeting, Christchurch 1892.

11. Report of the annual meeting, Aucklabd 1897.

central Department at the expense of the Boards during these years. (In fact a Bill appeared before the House in 1900 seeking the total abolition of Education Boards, but it was easily defeated.) For the teaching profession of course, the question of control was acutely significant. Boards at this time had the power to appoint an uncertificated teacher when a certificated one was available, and standards of salary differed greatly. "In one education district a teacher may receive 20% more than he would in the next".[12] In fact, the so-called colonial system was colonial only in the sense that the whole colony provided the finance. Naturally it was felt that the Institute was "only discharging its duty when it expresses an opinion not only on the constitution of these bodies, but on any action that these bodies may be pleased to take".[13]

Institute Policy. From the earliest days policy was substantially in the hands of the Executive, whose report was masked in the annual presidential address. The annual meeting has never had the power which, for example, the conference of the PTA possesses (see Chapter Nine), and this has traditionally given the Executive a better bargaining position and has enabled a spirit of 'give and take' to emerge between departmental officers and the Executive. Meetings with the Minister also became more frequent with the passage of time, and when the Executive had failed to achieve its objectives, as often was the case, it would simply report back to the annual meeting that "many of our demands were beyond the scope of the Minister", but that "we were, as usual, received with great courtesy and sympathy".[14] This, it appears, was usually sufficient to placate most members.

But not all NZEI policy was unsuccessful by any means. In 1888 for example, a Court of Appeal against non-appointment was set up, which was to become the focal point for a number of disputes with Education Boards. This was a major step along the road to standardisation. It also provided a means whereby the NZEI could strengthen its own organisation, presenting as it did the opportunity for the Institute to champion the cause of some of its members who had fallen foul of some regional malpractice.

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12. Ibid.

13. Report of the annual meeting, Dunedin 1890.

14. Report of the annual meeting, Christchurch 1899.

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The years 1899 to 1914 were of great importance for the New Zealand educational system and for the NZEI. In a sense this was largely because the interests of the Institute coincided with those of Inspector-General Hogben. In his informative thesis which covers this period, the present secretary of the Institute, E.J. Simmonds,[15] selects a number of issues which the Institute considered of importance, and shows how, by securing legislation, the NZEI strengthened both its own hand and the hand of the central Department. Freedom for the head teacher to classify pupils is one of the issues which Simmonds discusses. It had been part of NZEI policy from its earliest days, and the Institute had brought much informal pressure to bear on inspectors to give up their function of recording individual examinations externally. At an inspectors' conference in 1894 internal examinations replaced inspectoral assessment for Standards 1 and 2. When Hogben became Inspector-General he was strongly in favour of extending upward the system of internal examinations. At an inspectors' conference held in Wellington in 1901, it was resolved: "That in the opinion of members of the conference it is desirable that individually recorded passes in Standards 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 be abolished".[16] The external examination for Standard 6 - the Proficiency Examination - remained until 1936.

A colonial salary scale had been 'the burning question' at meetings of the NZEI Council: "Time after time...the subject has been thoroughly threshed out...and always with the same result, that the principle has been affirmed by a large majority".[17] Again it was to the central Department that the Institute turned. Salaries varied from Board to Board, and generally speaking the smaller Boards were unable to pay competitive salaries: at a Taranaki school of average attendance 48 to 51 the teacher would receive £127. 5s. 0d., whereas in Wellington he would receive £215; at a South Canterbury school of average attendance 100 to 200 the teacher would receive £175, whereas in Wellington he would receive £290. When the Minister (the Hon W.C. Walker), spoke to the Council of the Institute in 1900, he expressed sympathy for a colonial salary scale but stressed the opposition of the larger Education Boards. Following a Royal Commission on teachers' salaries in 1901, an Act was passed which went

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15. E.J. Simmonds, op. cit.

16. Ibid, p. 58.

17. New Zealand Journal of Education, May 1899, p.50, quoted Simmonds, p. 62.

part of the way to satisfy the Institute, but unfortunately Education Boards were no longer in a position to keep on teachers if a school roll fell temporarily; thus a local epidemic could mean dismissal. The Education Amendment Act 1908, however, reduced considerably the number of school grades, consequently salary reductions due to loss in attendance were less likely and less severe.

The Institute showed considerable interest in curriculum development from its earliest days, but more especially after Hogben's revision of the syllabus in 1904. In 1910 a syllabus conference was held in Wellington representing the teachers, the University and the Department. Two years later a Royal Commission on education sought to revise the syllabus, but the Institute was not at all happy with the manner in which it was consulted. The draft was prepared in the Department and circulated to the branches: however there was no consultation at drafting stage and no open discussion on the part of the branches was allowed, a difficult operation in any case since each district Institute received only one or two copies which it was asked to return within a short space of time. Such was the outcry that greeted the new syllabus that Simmonds feels it had an important effect in demonstrating to the Department the need for fuller consultation. "The foundations of this cooperation [i.e. in syllabus construction] were laid in the years 1899-1914 when the Institute forcefully reiterated the principle that those who worked with the children in the schools were the ones who could contribute most to revision work and that they had a professional right to consultation at each stage in the revision programme".[18]

During these years the beginnings of a national scale for classification, appointment, and promotion was introduced, again prompted by the Institute and again the channel of pressure chosen was the central Department. But in addition, methods of indirect pressure were used. There was a publicity campaign; support was sought from the major newspapers; biennial meetings of householders were asked to raise their voices in support of the teachers - though few of them did - and an official circular was sent to M Ps. But it was not until the inspectorate was centralised in 1914 that appointment and promotion schemes worked with any real success.

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18. Simmonds, op. cit., p. 189.

The centralisation of the inspectorate was important not only in facilitating the first national grading list (supra), and weakening the Education Boards, but also in providing the Education Department with a "corps d'élite from the ranks of which, during the next twenty years, almost all the higher officials were chosen." [19]

Simmonds concludes that: "By 1914 [education in New Zealand] was a national system in fact with uniform scales of staffing and salary, national grading, appointment and transfer procedures, a superannuation scheme and a national system of teacher training. The profession had taken a firm stand on its right to consultation on curriculum revision, and was beginning to formulate views of its own about teaching methods and the educational aims of schools." [20] Equally important for the future of the Institute was that during this period control of policy had shifted from the Boards to the Department, especially after the centralisation of the inspectorate. Thus the Institute could concentrate its negotiating powers in the face of the waning influence of the District Institutes. Within a few years the NZEI had appointed its first full-time secretary.

III

Following the natural lull in educational activity during the war years, the Institute ran a campaign of National Interest in Education, in which a great deal of publicity sought to focus the attention of the public upon education. In 1919 a new journal appeared to replace the old NZ Journal of Education, [21] which had been printed in Dunedin as from March 1st 1899. The latter had never gained theauthority nor the wide circulation that had been hoped for it. The new journal, based in Wellington, was to be far more successful. Further, unlike its predecessors, the new journal was directly under the control of the Executive. In the early 1920s, a further step towards uniformity was taken when a national recruitment scheme was adopted. The Executive claimed: "The whole Dominion will soon be open to all teachers as a field of service, and the whole teaching service will be available to each board as a field of recruitment". [22]

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19. L. Webb, op. cit., p. 97.

20. Simmonds, op. cit., pp. 378,9.

21. National Education, Vol. 1, No. 1, February 15th 1919.

22. Executive Report, 38th annual meeting, Wellington 1921, National Education, Vol. 111, No. 22, February 1 1921.

The inter-war period witnessed an important shift of emphasis from disputes with the Education Boards to disputes with the Department. This was a result of two processes, the first being the decline in power of the Boards and the consequential rise in power of the central Department, and the second was the effect of the depression and the drive for economy. When the Minister addressed the annual meeting of the Institute in 1922 for example, his statement that the days of classes of 80 and 90 pupils had passed was met with cries of "No! No!"

"At all events", replied the Minister, "there are not many".

(Voice) "If there are a few, there are too many!" [23]

It is to be noted that during these years, the stress in the Minister's speech to the annual meeting fell to an increasing extent upon the bread-and-butter aspects of economy. In 1927, for example, the Minister's speech was described as a 'dissertation on economy'. [24]

As it grew more serious the depression caused a lengthening shadow to fall over the education system. In 1931 the Prime Minister claimed that the country could not afford to spend £4 millions on education; in his schooldays it had cost a quarter of that, and had been perfectly adequate. [25] Education suffered in a direct way: in 1931 the 'remote allowance' for country teachers was removed and in 1932 - with all government employees - teachers' salaries were cut. Unemployment faced the profession and the Institute was forced to negotiate a 'work-sharing' programme. In 1933 some 1456 teachers had no permanent employment. [26] Executive was faced with insuperable problems in trying to safeguard the rights of members in such circumstances. It made the attempt however and in 1931 organised a petition to parliament. But the Government saw economy as an absolute necessity and would not budge.

As has been stated, the effect of the depression was to create a common feeling between the NZEI and the Education Boards; both fought the Government's economies wherever possible. Yet the Institute strongly supported the recommendations of the Atmore report and in fact produced its own plan for

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23. National Education, Vol. IV No. 37, June 1st 1922.

24. National Education, Vol. IX No. 92, June 1st 1927.

25. Christchurch Times, November 11th 1931, quoted W.C. Kane, The NZEI and Government Policy in Education during the Depression Years, unpublished M A thesis, VUC, 1956, p. 55.

26. Ibid, p. 113.

administrative reform, which was very similar, in 1934.[27] The Atmore report, it was felt, "embodied nearly all the chief points advocated by the Institute for years past".[28] Thus the better understanding between the Institute and the Boards did not develop into a lasting coalition. Traditionally the Institute seems to have found the Department easier to deal with. Certainly despite the exigencies of the depression, both were prepared to continue to cooperate. After 1924, for example, the Department decided to submit all proposed new regulations to the Institute for comment, thus hoping to create a "sound working basis for amicable relations in the future".[29] This 'sound working basis' managed to withstand the depression, though not without a little creaking.

Unquestionably good relations were enhanced by an Executive attitude which showed a readiness to compromise and which did not espouse policies entirely concerned with improving the status of teachers. In fact, if anything, the opposite was the case: "It was the custom", one president tells us, "to plead for a higher social standing for teachers. With that plea I have nothing but impatience. The right social standing is only to be gained by recognition of work skilfully planned and conscientiously performed. Nothing else matters".[30] Under the Ministership of the Hon Peter Fraser, the mutual spirit of good will was strengthened considerably, and the new salary scales which were introduced in 1938 were the results of amicable negotiation.[31]

These were exciting years in the development of education, and much of the progress achieved by the Labour Government in these years (abolition of the Proficiency Test for example) was based upon the sound relationship which existed between the Department and the Institute. Disputes were few and where they did occur one has the feeling that they tended on the whole to strengthen rather than weaken the partnership. In 1941 for example, biennial grading was introduced very much against the wishes of the Institute. The decision was not preceded by negotiation; in fact although inspectors in the field passed the information on to NZEI branches, the Executive was quite unaware that the policy was being implemented.

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27. "Order out of Chaos", NZEI Executive, see Kane, op. cit. pp. 93-104.

28. National Education, Vol. XIII No. 136, June 1st 1931.

29. National Education, Vol. VI No. 59, June 2nd 1924.

30. President's address, National Education, Vol. XV No. 158, June 1st 1933.

31. National Education, Vol. XXI No. 224, June 1st 1939.

Executive complained to the Director in the tones of a betrayed lover, yet eventually accepted the position in a commonsense way: "It seems that biennial grading is to be introduced. That being so, we are concerned as an institute representing those most directly affected as to the methods of its introduction."[32] As for the Department, it realised that if its good relations with the Institute Executive were to continue, then the position of the Executive vis-à-vis the Institute membership would have to be preserved by consultation at an early stage.

During the war years the Institute was unable to meet annually and, naturally enough, no great advances were made during this period. However, the end of the war saw the Institute "stronger in resources and organisation than ever it was. It is not over-praising it to call it a competent machine and one that is well run-in."[33]

Amalagamation. A problem to which the NZEI turned its attention after the war was amalgamation. Unquestionably the Government of the day supported the idea of one unified teaching body, and Prime Minister Fraser took pains to let the fact be known. At the annual meeting in 1946, the president stated: "I consider, too, that a factor militating against real educational progress is the division of our system into primary and secondary". This division, it was claimed, was "an anachronism due to a lingering and obsolete tradition".[34] Inter-body meetings began in December 1946. Detailed plans of amalgamation were drawn up by the NZEI, and sent to the Executives of the other teacher bodies. A joint committee was set up in 1948, and in 1950 the annual meeting declared unanimously in favour of amalgamation. Representatives of the Secondary Schools' Association (SSA) appeared equally anxious for amalgamation initially but they did not have the support of their own full Executive. By October of 1948, the SSA Executive intimated that no amalgamation with the NZEI was possible until post-primary amalgamation had been achieved. The Technical School Teachers' Association (TSTA) travelled far along the road to amalgamation, even to the point of sending out a draft constitution to its branches. Yet at the same time a second TSTA committee was negotiating along similar lines with the SSA.

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32. National Education. Vol. XXIII No. 246, June 3rd 1941.
33. National Education, Vol. XXVI No. 283, October 2nd 1944.
34. National Education, Vol. XXVIII No. 301, June 4th 1946.

It was generally acknowledged that even if the TSTA Executive decided to join with the NZEI, only a small proportion of its membership would do so. Amalgamation as an issue passed into the background after 1952, when the SSA and TSTA amalgamated to form the PPTA.

Salaries and Grading. The chief problems with which the Institute had to deal in the 1950s were grading and salaries. At the annual meeting of 1951 it was made plain that members felt the system had become unacceptable. In conjunction with the Department, a consultative committee comprising 9 members was set up. The chair was taken by a professor of education; the Department was represented by the Director and two other senior officers; the NZEI had three representatives and two Board secretaries reprsented the NZEBA. The committee reported in 1952, and although the Executive was prepared to accept its recommendation the membership was not. At the next annual meeting, Executive, sensing that approval for the committee's recommendations would not be forthcoming, called for a referendum of members. A move within the annual meeting to give that body the power to make a decision was defeated.[35] Owing to the activity of several branches opposed to the new grading scheme, the referendum showed the majority to be opposed to the committee's recommendations. Negotiations with the Department broke down, since the NZEI had no official policy. Prior to the annual meeting in 1954 however, the Executive planned its ground meticulously. Having asked branches to produce their own grading schemes for discussion, the Executive had selected the three which were obviously best and explored their possibilities fully.[36] Thus at the annual meeting, Executive was able to lead delegates step by step,with reasoned arguments, to the adoption of the best scheme. Upon its adoption by annual meeting with a 2 to 1 majority, the scheme was officially sponsored without delay and immediately became policy. In such areas as grading, the chief concern of the Department is that an acceptable procedure be found which is administratively feasible; it was therefore pleased that a basis now existed for negotiation.

On the subject of salaries however, the views of the NZEI and of the Department (that is, in its capacity as an official agent of government) are often diametrically opposed. In 1955 for example the Institute claimed that additions granted to public servants should also be given to teachers; the Minister

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35. National Education, Vol. XXXIV No. 368, July 1st 1952.

36. 16 schemes were forwarded.

rejected the claim. The Executive statement to members, entitled "Partnership Imperilled", pointed out that the nature of the partnership between the NZEI and Government was one-sided, that when the Government needed the cooperation of teachers it was quite willing to negotiate fully, but when it was the teachers who made a request, the partnership ceased to function: "This ill-balanced partnership threatens the traditional practice of cooperation".[37] Membership feeling during the early months of 1955 solidified and the Executive was forced to take a strong course. In April the Prime Minister received a deputation. "Only in exceptional circumstances would the Executive go over the head of the Minister of Education," said the secretary. "In any normal negotiation on behalf of teachers we would treat the Minister's decision as final, as there would have been discussion between the parties. In this instance however, there has been such an absence of reason in the replies we have received we must seek your intervention".[38] By June of 1955 a compromise had been reached and the Institute journal could comment that teachers owed a debt of gratitude to the Dominion Executive for the firm stand it had taken.

A better example of a salary dispute's not fitting within the general pattern of friendly negotiations occurred in 1959. In June a complacent National Education commented:

> "The readiness of those in charge of educational administration to consult and act in cooperation with teachers in introducing educational changes is indicative of the influence of our own teacher organisation and the professional influence and activities of an organisation are measures of its status".[39]

Yet the following month a salary dispute occurred, and National Education referred to Cabinet's "disparaging decision down-grading headmasters of grade 7 schools which could well strain or even destroy the good relations [which] have existed over so many years". It appears that within the framework of joint negotiations between the Minister, the NZEI and the PPTA, the Minister had made a private agreement with the latter; and had "Balkanised the teaching service".[40] In this matter, as in others where the NZEI considers it has been unfairly treated, the secretary contacted the Prime Minister; a new salary scale which was produced in October of that year settled the matter amicably.

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37. National Education. Vol. XXXVII No. 396, February 1955
38. Ibid.
39. National Education, Vol. XLII No. 455, June 1960.
40. National Education, Vol. XLII No. 456, July 1st 1960.

There can be little doubt that among those of the public who think about educational matters objectively, the image of the NZEI is brighter than that of the PPTA. One could account for this by such reasons as its firm leadership, its greater cohesion, its statesmanship and its readiness to compromise. All these, no doubt, would contribute. But a fact of overriding importance which is almost invariably overlooked is that the growth-area of the education system is secondary education, and it is, of course, in the growth-areas that one expects the tensions. This is not to deny the strength and ability of the Institute's leadership. There can be no better illustration of this ability than the debate over Form 1-6 high schools. The membership of the Institute has traditionally been opposed to this recent development, but through its contacts with senior officers of the Department, the leadership has been made well aware that Form 1-6 high schools are government policy for country areas. The leadership has thus been trying to coax the membership into taking what is in fact a very bitter pill. Though the pill has not yet been swallowed, the patient has by no means thrown it away. If the NZEI membership does come to accept the Form 1-6 high school, this would be a significant success for the principle of Department-Institute cooperation.

It was in the period 1899-1914 that primary education took on the basis of its present form; in that period, primary education was the growth-area of the system. By 1914 a pattern of cooperation with the Department had grown up which has persisted. It is fair to say that for many years past, the most knowledgeable individuals in the primary system have worked together for the good of the whole, and together they have achieved a great deal for primary education.

IV

The importance of the structure of an organisation as a function of its ability to achieve goals can be overstated. For a professional pressure group however, the ability of the leadership to negotiate for its membership in the fullest sense of the word is crucial. In this regard, the NZEI possesses a structure that is much to be envied. The formal structure of the Institute is as follows.

Annual Meeting. Present at the annual meeting are members of the Executive and representatives of the branches (one representative for each 75 members, with the proviso that each branch be represented). All remits to be considered take the

form of a resolution accompanied by a "summary of arguments in support of the resolution" [41] and are published in the journal National Education two months before the annual meeting. Further, each remit must have substantial support before it can get on to the order paper, as the constitution points out that "all remits for discussion by the Annual Meeting must have the sanction of the Dominion Executive or of a general meeting of a branch". Further, no motion or amendment can be discussed at the annual meeting which, in the Executive's opinion, could have been embodied in a remit. No member can speak twice to a question, though the mover of a substantive motion has the right of reply (not the mover of an amendment, however). Meeting once a year this body exerts only an indirect control over the Executive. F.L. Combs pointed out that representatives were 'to a considerable extent' senior teachers. "Young representatives with enterprising views" he continued, "are perhaps up against an unduly conservative weight of opinion".[42]

Branches. It is at the grass roots level that the NZEI has an organisational advantage over the PPTA, for branch organisation in the latter is based upon a school. Branch meetings therefore closely resemble staff meetings, and it is not a difficult matter for the principal to secure as dominating a position in the former as he can in the latter. As a consequence, it is often the case that the secondary teacher's attempt to better his condition can be baulked at a low level. The branch organisation of the NZEI is based more upon numbers than upon schools. Thus a branch could consist of teachers from a handful of schools, and the headteacher would no longer hold the commanding position. Generally speaking, this leads to a more happy and more effective local organisation than is the case in the secondary sub-system. An NZEI branch then, will consist of at least 25 members from within a certain defined area. It is interesting to note that associations of secondary school teachers and teachers in Maori schools may be admitted as branches. The branches are governed by a constitution which states that the branch must elect a president, and two vice presidents (one of whom should be the retiring president), a secretary and a treasurer, together with "such other members as may be deemed desirable"; together these officers form a

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41. All quotations in the following pages, unless otherwise stated, are taken from the Constitution of the NZEI.

42. F.L. Combs, "The New Zealand Educational Institute", NZ Journal of Public Administration, September, 1943.

managing committee. Where sub-branches (of not less than 10 members) exist, provision has to be made by mutual agreement for their representation upon the managing committee. The managing committee, which calls an annual meeting to give its report to branch members and to hold elections for the following year, has little effective restriction upon its power at this level. With regard to representation at the annual meeting, the quota of representatives are elected at branch level under the auspices of the managing committee.

Committee of Branches. An important link in the organisational chain of the Institute is formed by the committees of branches. These committees coordinate the activities of the branches at the Education District level. The committee of branches is elected by the branches within its district. It then proceeds to elect its own officers, consisting of chairman, vice chairman, secretary and treasurer. The committee itself decided upon the frequency and actual timing of its meetings. It considers business brought forward by constituent branches affecting teachers within the district and makes representations on their behalf to the Education Board. At the national level, it considers and reports on matters sent down to it from the Executive. It is an important fact that regional organisation within the NZEI corresponds exactly with Education Districts. This enables each committee of branches to get first-hand knowledge of regional administration, and to cooperate with the Education Boards in the setting up of regional committees to look at regional problems. As far as the internal organisation of the NZEI is concerned, it is of course important for the free flow of information that some regional body exist between the national Executive and the local branch; the committees of branches are in an ideal situation to "originate discussions and stimulate interest in all matters affecting teachers".

Dominion Executive. The position of the Executive vis-a-vis the membership is perhaps the most significant facet of any organisation. That is to say, if we know the kind of relationship that exists between Executive and membership, we can predict the strength, bargaining power and authority of the organisation concerned. Nowhere is this better exemplified than in the comparison between the NZEI and the PPTA. As will later be shown, although the position within the PPTA has changed considerably of late, a comparison taken over the past twenty years shows an acute disparity between the relative strength of the Executives concerned.

The control exercised by the membership (as represented at the annual meeting) is perhaps not as effective in the Institute as it is in the PPTA. One can contrast the effectiveness of a remit passed at the annual conference of the PPTA [43] with the following, which illustrates the situation in the NZEI.

"Remits must be considered as expressions of opinion only, unless they change basic principles. In the final stages of negotiation, the executive reposes full confidence in the negotiators and, if time is the essence of contract, they have full authority to accept, compromise or reject any offer made by Government". [44] The 'negotiators' in such cases consist of the president, the two vice presidents and the secretary.

The Executive of the NZEI acts on behalf of the Institute when it is not in session; that is to say, for 51 weeks in the year. Now although Executive is empowered to conduct a referendum of members on any important policy change according to the constitution, in reality its power is virtually unchecked. Executive has a history of successful negotiations with the Department behind it, as we have seen. It has secured as much for the teacher by its methods of consultation, and 'give-and-take' diplomacy as could have been secured by more flamboyant methods; [45] why then should the membership complain at its lack of power? In fact, it is clear that if the membership became totally dissatisfied with Executive, then the latter would be destroyed. As Combs put it: "The Executive, though its influence at times exceeds what it is democratically entitled to, can by no means count on having things all its own way". [46]

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43. For example, the 1961 remit on school certificate marking. See Chapter Eleven.

44. National Education, Vol. XLIII No. 466, June 1st 1961.

45. When the House of Representatives select committee on education was hearing evidence on the 'disciplinary clauses' of the Education Bill (see Chapter Thirteen), it was claimed that of 20 organisations giving evidence, the NZEI was the only one to support the clauses, which later stood part of the Act (NZPD, Vol. 341, December 1st 1964, p. 3986). Furthermore, Opposition MPs, several of whom boasted past membership of NZEI, claimed that evidence submitted by the Executive did not reflect the views of members (ibid, p. 3985).

46. F.L. Combs, op. cit.

2.3. NZEI Executive Turnover

Area beneath line A: Executive members in 1956
Area immediately beneath line B: Members first elected in 1957
Area immediately beneath line C: Members first elected in 1958
Area immediately beneath line D: Members first elected in 1959
Area immediately beneath line E: Members first elected in 1960



The diagram shows a fairly even turnover. In any given year there will be a good proportion of experienced members. There is no marked tendency for members to 'hang on'. If a member progresses up to the presidency, his name ceases to appear when he has relinquished the post of senior vice president.

Executive is headed by a president, with a senior vice president, who is the retiring president, and a junior vice president, a treasurer, a 'non-official' member and eleven other members. Following the elections each year, the president makes a tour of all branches, in the company of the secretary. This is a most useful means of coordination. Executive is elected at the annual meeting, retiring members being eligible for re-election. There exists within the Executive structure an inner sanctum known as the Standing Committee which is composed of the president, vice presidents, treasurer and 'non-official member' (who must come from the Wellington area) - with a quorum of three. Since the Executive meets only three times per year - in May, August and January - the real power is held by the Standing Committee. As will be shown in a later chapter, the PPTA experienced a considerable amount of difficulty concerning the post of permanent secretary; this is a problem which has never troubled the Institute. The secretary is appointed by the Executive and is responsible to it and not to the Institute. He exercises a considerable amount of influence and his relations with the president and other senior officers must be first class if he is to continue to hold his influence. The last secretary held office for over 30 years and wielded great influence.

Structural Reform. There have been surprisingly few major alterations to the structure over the years. In 1919 the Institute set up a permanent office in Wellington with a permanent secretary. The smooth running of the Institute was impaired only by its continued growth. In 1934, the Auckland branch prepared a report which criticised among other things: representation at the annual meeting and the conduct of the meeting; the structure of the Dominion Executive; relations to the Institute of sectional bodies. However, the report was held not to be representative of the general opinion, its findings were inconclusive, and no action followed. In 1955 a remit was passed at the annual meeting calling for reform of Executive. It suggested that:

"A committee consisting of the secretary and three past Dominion executive presidents to examine and report at the 1956 annual meeting on

(a) composition of Dominion executive
(b) methods of electing Dominion executive
(c) functiins of branches and sub-branches
(d) functions of committee of branches
(e) size of annual meeting
(f) any other relevant matter pertaining to the well-being of the Institute". 47

47. Remit 3, 1955.

The committee was duly established and set about its task by asking branches for their suggestions on reorganisation. Only 33 out of 70 had any advice at all to offer. To say the least there was no general desire for drastic change and certainly no consensus as to the direction any change should take. Thus the committee had only the framework of its own experience and preferences in which to operate. However, it was quite clear that the key issue was the composition of Executive. Up to this time, day-to-day business and emergency matters had been dealt with by what is known as 'local Executive' (that is, Wellington members of Executive - of whom there was a statutory minimum - and senior officers). This system had obvious advantages but the growth of a competent permanent staff, the creating of a full-time position for the president, and the facilities of air travel had somewhat allayed the difficulties of providing a decision-making core which was fully representative. Yet it had to be remembered that much of what local executive did was time consuming; its members represented the NZEI on such bodies as the UN Association, the Road Safety Council, the Refresher Course committee, the Combined Services Organisation, various committees originating with the Department of Education, the School Broadcasting Advisory Committee and so on. Thus the bringing together of the full Executive more frequently would not solve the problems which were concerned not merely with policy-making but chiefly with policy-implementation.

Following the report of the reorganisation committee the local Executive was abolished, its place being taken by a small standing committee of senior officers plus one non-official member to be elected in a branch situated in or near Wellington.[48] The committee was to meet at least every three weeks. The other recommendation of importance was that a permanent office of the Institute be established in Auckland. The committee made the point that branches did not want their local committee of branches to develop to a position of great influence. "Too many branches regard their committee of branches as an unnecessary expense, a body to be called together as seldom as possible and given a minimum of business to deal with."[49] The committee also felt that:

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48. National Education, Vol. XXXIX No. 442, June 3rd, 1957.

49. Interim report of committee on reorganisation 1956, National Education, Vol. XXXVIII No. 411, June 1st, 1956.

"In pursuit of its objectives the Institute has a splendid history of achievement, the more impressive because in all its negotiations with Government and the education department its representatives have been, and are, in the position of amateurs doing battle with professionals. Admittedly they have the services of a professional coach who takes a prominent part in play, but essentially they are spare-time negotiators". 50

The position of annual-meeting remits had been cause for concern over the years. They had previously been dealt with by committees reporting back to the meeting; it had later been recommended that only a small number - say 8 - be discussed. In 1962 however, the Institute followed the NUT practice of pre-selecting a certain number of key issues for debate at annual meeting. This has not prevented the discussion of a plethora of remits at conferences since that date however and annual meeting debate generally has been unsatisfactory. At the 1964 annual meeting for example, discussion was "strangled by a tangle of amendments". 51

Thus it can be seen that sections of the membership are unhappy about the composition of Executive and about the part played by annual meetings. The discussion of reform of Executive has centred around the geography of its composition - some would like to see it elected on a regional basis - but the leadership sees real difficulties in making that body answerable to the regions. Others have thought the problems soluble by means of improved communications. Following a fact-finding trip to Australia in 1964 two Executive officers produced a report which suggested that an area organiser be appointed - to become in effect a liaison officer. Executive has itself espoused the idea and it is probable that such an appointment will be made. It would seem that active sections of the membership will continue to oppose the present structure, in which power is effectively centralised and regional activity is virtually confined to relations with the Education Boards, but so long as the Institute leadership can look after the interests of the majority of its members effectively, there is not likely to be widespread opposition.

There can be little doubt that mass membership has freed the leadership of sectional interest, and that a long history of good and trusting relationship with the Department has given the leadership great status. In its own fairly specialised field,

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50. Ibid.

51. National Education, Vol. 46 No. 499, June 1st, 1964.

the NZEI is surely one of the best examples of a successful multi-purpose pressure group. Its ability not only to influence Departmental thinking but actually to staff the Department with its own members - ex-Executive members among them - is a remarkable feature of the system. This is by no means a new state of affairs; Hogben, the departmental head responsible for the success of so many of the reforms in that important period of 1889-1914 had been president of the Institute in 1886-7. (Indeed at the conference over which he presided at Christchurch in 1887, a motion was passed calling for centralisation of the inspectorate, a measure which Hogben later helped to implement!) No wonder then, that NZEI-Department relations are so cordial.

CONCLUSIONS. The Institute Game.

Rules of the Game. Virtually from its inception the NZEI has been quite clear in its approach to the game. "It cannot be spread about too widely", one president declared, "that the NZEI has nothing of an agressive character in its objects. It will not hunt for grievances in order to redress them".[52] Probably because it has had so much in common with those in the Department with whom it has to deal, the NZEI Executive has traditionally acted with restraint and understanding. The rules of the Executive game[53] are thus mutual trust and cooperation, based on as full a sharing of information as is possible. Perhaps this is best illustrated by the following NZEI statement:

> "The NZEI yields place to none in its willingness to cooperate with the Government in all endeavours to deal with the many problems concerned with education. It is prepared to appreciate the difficulties imposed by unfavourable economic circumstances. It will exercise patience with, and understanding of, the slow progress achieved in the face of political and administrative considerations". 54.

Pay-Off. As will be shown in Chapter Seven, there is no essential clash between the interests of the Institute and those of Government, though conflicts arise on matters of salary and conditions. On these issues the Government - and therefore the Department - is primarily concerned with saving money.

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52. Report of the first meeting of the Council of the NZEI, printed in Auckland 1884.

53. In Chapter Seven we will attempt to distinguish between the 'Executive game' and the 'membership game', but for the present it is sufficient to note that most game situations which occur in this area involve the Executive rather than the membership.

54. An Executive resolution, National Education, Vol. 44 No.477, June 1st 1962.

Where the Government has come under criticism from the general public for a stand it has taken jointly with the NZEI, the latter is prepared to support it if possible. The best example of this is probably offered by the attacks on 'play-way' or 'Beebyism', to which the Institute retorted:

> "Lest it be thought that modern educational methods have been foisted on us by a group of misguided theorists and bureaucrats we wish to state unequivocally our belief that most of the changes that have been made have broadened the education that children are receiving without sacrificing its quality. As a profession we have taken a responsible part in trying out new techniques, in revising the curriculum, and even in helping to plan the buildings and equipment that we use". 55

Pay-off for the NZEI is expressed in terms of a continuance and, if possible, improvement of the close working relations with the Department of Education. Yet at the same time the Institute must respect the aspirations of its membership with regard to improved conditions and remuneration.

Strategy. The most commonly adopted strategy in the Institute game is what has been described as the 'cards-on-the-table' strategy. Primary teacher leaders have stressed that the attitude of reasonableness and cooperation which they would like to pursue is:

> "impossible to maintain in the rank and file of the NZEI membership unless there is complete frankness in our dealings with the Government and a sense of complete confidence and understanding on both sides. These essentials are being eroded by the failure to take teachers into its confidence as partners, and by an unreasonable reticence regarding Government's plans, intentions and decisions.
>
> The Minister could have full support from the teachers, but this is not likely to be encouraged when there is lack of full liaison, and instead a feeling of being "put off". Teachers are not merely seeking advantage for themselves; they are seeking ways and means of improving our schools and providing better educations for our children. A "cards-on-the-table" policy by the Government will link teachers and Government to attain these ends". 56

Such a strategy can only be effective when there is an overlap of pay-off for those involved in the game. To some extent this has always been the case as far as the Institute and the Department of Education are concerned. It would have been totally impractical strategy to adopt earlier in the century when the Institute game was played against the Education Boards rather than the Department.

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55. NZEI submission to the Commission on Education, 1962.

56. Executive resolution, June 1962. The subjects in dispute were both recommendations of the interim report of the Commission on Education, brought down at the Government's urgent request in July 1960, namely a higher starting salary and a qualifications allowance.

Information. As has been pointed out, the type of game played by the Institute can only succeed with a fairly complete structure of information. To a considerable degree the Department has been prepared to make its information available to leaders of the NZEI and vice versa. The legal guide which officers in the Department use in primary administration was written by the then secretary of the NZEI. In fact, one employee of the Department of Education claimed that it was not until leaving the Department's employ that he realised that this Institute leader was not a Department officer, so often did he visit the Department.

It has been said that in the welfare state, pressure groups tend to become almost part of the governmental hierarchy.[57] Of no group could this be more true than the NZEI. But as will be noted in detail in Chapter Seven, this information is available only to the leadership.

Coalition. The NZEI is the most powerful non-government group in the education system below university level. It has enjoyed good relations with successive Governments. Its need of coalition is therefore slight. It cooperates with Education Boards chiefly to its own advantage, in areas such as threats to teachers. It cooperates with school committees and PTAs to bring joint pressure to bear on the Government (See Chapter Seven). It also forms a coalition with the PPTA on such joint salary disputes as occur. But often such coalitions involve some sacrifices on both parts about which neither is happy. The NZEI, as an illustration, prefaced their salary claims to the Commission on Education with the following: "As the PPTA are now submitting that a wider differential between primary and post-primary salaries would help their recruitment we now feel free to advance our own claims and to disregard some of the concessions we have made in the past for the sake of unanimity".[58]

In conclusion, the Institute game is a difficult one to play and demands a great deal of skill. Yet the players have much in their favour, as will be seen in Chapter Seven. The game is also the oldest of the education games and has a history of achievement.

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57. Professor Webb, "Round Table Discussions", in Interest Groups on Four Continents, H.W. Ehrmann (ed.), University of Pittsburgh Press, Second Printing 1960, p. 247.

58. The stress is the present writer's.

Chapter Six

THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION: A PRIMARY VIEW

One of the major problems concerning the layout of this study was how to describe structurally the Department of Education. It seemed that if one were to divide the study into sections dealing with primary education, secondary education, and the more overtly political side of educational administration, then aspects of the work of the Education Department would have to be mentioned in each section. The Department, however, as will be shown, is not divided strictly into primary and secondary sections, but rather into professional and administrative sections. The division which has been adopted here is nevertheless neither artificial nor arbitrary. Education in New Zealand is very definitely divided into primary and secondary sectors, and the Department, in its functional and in part in its structural organisation, must take account of this fact. If neither artificial nor arbitrary, the division is none the less an awkward one, for most of the divisions of the Department deal with both primary and secondary aspects of their particular area. Nevertheless we must strive to introduce all the 'players' concerned before we discuss the 'game'. Second, we must ensure that the overall representation of the Department, as it pertains to this study, is complete. It is proposed, therefore, to deal with the Department of Education in three chapters. The first two chapters will be devoted to discussing the Department's primary and secondary organisation, as controlling and coordinating mechanisms in the day-to-day running of their respective sub-systems; the third chapter will be partly concerned with the Department as one aspect of the process of government, as a very important force in the formulation and implementation of national education policies. In the present chapter it is proposed to discuss the departmental machinery for coordination and control in the primary sub-system. The chapter comprises three sub-sections, dealing with the inspectorate, curriculum development (ie the chief instruments of professional control) and administrative controls.

I

The most obvious starting point for any discussion of the 'primary work' of the Education Department is the inspectorate. The inspector is an officer of the Department drawn from the teaching service. He is appointed to an Education District,[1] and is placed under the immediate direction of a district senior inspector who is in turn responsible to the Director of Primary Education at Head Office. The headquarters of the district inspectorate will usually be the offices of the district Education Board.

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1. Appointments are made by the Public Service Commission on the recommendation of the Department of Education.

Functions. The functions of the primary inspectorate have undergone a considerable change since its establishment. In earlier days, the inspector's was a task of strict supervision concerned with the maintenance of adequate standards by pupils and compliance with existing regulations by the schools. Thus the position was comparable to that of the English school inspector (HMI) of the time. Each year he was to examine all children and decide which were to be promoted. Thus he could be viewed as an enforcement officer and "however much he might have been disposed towards more liberal practices, there was little else that he could do when classes were so large".[2] But as conditions and the standard of instruction slowly improved, syllabuses became more flexible and a greater responsibility for the maintenance of standards devolved on the teachers themselves. These changes made possible an increasing stress upon consultation and advice by the inspectorate. Thus its role increasingly became one of professional leadership, to which it aspires today. Such a role demands an ability to work with and through the headteacher in an effort to encourage the 'professional growth' of each staff member, including the headteacher himself. In itself this task presents great problems in that a man who has spent many years in the teaching profession, often with fixed ideas of what should be taught and how it should be taught, has to keep himself informed of all modern educational developments and encourage others, often with equally fixed ideas, to take advantage of them.

The inspector's chances of success depend to a large extent upon his ability to become accepted as an ally by those with whom he comes into contact: "He must contrive to be drawn into the school's broad planning, and be welcomed as a sharer in its hopes, its endeavours and its achievements. To win acceptance he must be able to bring to the schools a wide fund of experience, skill and wisdom. He must be capable of giving real help in the identification and solution of problems both in the classroom and over the school as a whole."[3] Thus to be successful he must be well aware of the human and material resources and how to maximize them. In the words of Robert Burns, he must:

> "Not only hear them, but patronise them, befriend them,
> and where ye justly can commend, commend them,
> And aiblin where they winna stand the test
> Wink hard, and say the foukes has done their best."[4]

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2. Submission of the Department of Education to the Commission on Education, 1962.

3. Ibid.

4. Quoted by John Leese, Personalities and Power in English Education London, E.J.Arnold, 1950, p.53.

He has, it should be said, recourse to a number of sources of assistance - the officers of the Department, and specialist instructors of the Education Boards and the Department. Also he has the great advantage of in-service teacher training, and regular meetings of teachers within particular areas at his disposal in the attempt to offer professional leadership. In most districts, study groups which meet regularly have been established; the universities and training colleges offer facilities for similar types of meeting in the larger centres. Thus the inspector has the weight of authority, the assistance of experts, and regular meetings and discussions with teachers as his chief weapons.

Assessment and Inspection. Militating against such advantages, however, is the cramping effect of assessment; the inspector is required to assess individual teachers for purposes of appointment and promotion. "The dual role of education leader and assessor is an extremely difficult one."[5] This comment on the situation by the Department of Education does not exaggerate the difficulties involved. The inspector is called upon to write comprehensive notes and a personal report within the structure of an informal, friendly visit. He is asked to offer an objective assessment of another teacher's abilities and methods after a lifetime - or half a lifetime - of teaching with his own methods; methods which, if he was conscientious, he must have considered to be the best. Although the sheer quantity of assessment is not now as great as it was, it is still by any standards considerable. Until 1942 teachers were assessed every year; from then until 1955 assessment took place every second year, and since 1955 it has become a three-yearly process. The work load of assessment is still considerable, but it is the actual dual nature of the role which makes it so imperfect. It is claimed to 'work out reasonably satisfactorily', but this is the system at its best; if what the Department has called a 'constructive professional relationship' is the primary aim of the inspectorate, then it often fails. The situation brings to mind the tale of Huckleberry Finn, who, on asking the way to a certain place was informed that it was five miles on; after walking a considerable time, he asked again, only to be told again that the place was five miles further on. When this happened for the third time, Finn remarked that he might not be getting any closer, but that at least he was 'holding his own'. The pressures are such that the Department of Education is only able to 'hold its own', and although this implies a certain amount of progress if only to keep pace with the growing complexity of problems, it is very difficult to provide a really progressive professional leadership through inspection.

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5. Submission of the Department of Education to the Commission on Education, 1962.

The difficulties of even enumerating the significant factors involved in arriving at an overall index of teaching effectiveness are immense.[6] Further, the difficulty of assisting teachers with various behavioural characteristics has also been freely acknowledged[7]. Thus any 'technology of teaching method' is in its infancy.[8] Yet the New Zealand inspector is expected to make a reliable and impartial judgement within a complex framework of pertinent criteria. Below, under broad headings, are some of the variables included in the evaluation process for a Specialist Teacher's Personal Report:

i) Personal professional qualities
ii) Relationships with children
iii) Planning, preparation, records and organisation of work
iv) Quality of performance in specialist field
v) Relationship with teachers, specialist colleagues and parents
vi) Leadership in specialist field.

Let us select the first broad heading to see exactly what an assessment of personal professional qualities entails:

a) Effort to give the best possible service to children
b) Understanding of the purposes of the school
c) Effort to keep up-to-date professionally and to use new knowledge
d) Vitality, initiative and organising ability
e) Capability to carry responsibility
f) Qualities of particular relevance in the specialist field (e.g. aesthetic sensitivity for art and crafts).

Apart from the basic difficulties involved in mere assessment of such qualities, it is plain that many of the criteria have emotional overtones. For these reasons a 'halo effect' in assessment is likely. Some investigations have been conducted in the area of reliability of assessment, but they have been on too small a scale for valid conclusions to be drawn from them. However,

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6. See Handbook of Research on Teaching. N.L.Gage (Ed.),Chicago, Rand McNally & Co., 1963, pp.1122-1126.

7. See J.W.Getzels and P.W.Jackson, "The Teacher's Personality and Characteristics" in Gage, op.cit.

8. See N.E.Wallen and R.M.W. Travers, "Analysis and Investigation of Teaching Methods", Gage, op.cit.

it is probably safe to say that it is unlikely that two inspectors would completely agree in assessing a teacher's performance.

Another facet of the general work of inspection is concerned with the school as a whole. The inspector has to prepare a report comprising three sections for the relevant Education Board. The first section is concerned with staffing, rolls, classification and organisation; the second section forms a general report on the operational efficiency of the school; the final section, confidential to the Education Board, contains detailed notes on the school's efficiency together with general and specific recommendations. The school committee receives a copy of the first two sections, and the headteacher receives a copy of sections one and two plus that part of the third section which deals with professional matters. It is difficult to assess the value of the school inspection because so much will depend upon the tact and ability of the inspectors involved. To suggest, as the Department's submission to the Education Commission does, that "the inspection of a school, when properly carried out, should be a positive educational experience for all concerned" is to express a hope which is not always justified by the facts.[9]

Co ordination through the Inspectorate. No set of people at any level within the education system has as great a power to influence as does the inspectorate, in its coordinative capacity: "A good inspectorate is an essential personal link between a distant Department and the people involved in its (the Department's) administration, and is thus, wisely conducted, a strong safeguard against government without initiative."[10] In the school system, the inspector forms a link between intermediate and contributing schools,[11] and through his professional contacts, between intermediate and secondary schools. Liaison at both levels is often achieved by committees comprising key staff members from both types of school under the chairmanship of the inspector. Within the primary service, standing committees under the chairmanship of the district senior inspector or his deputy, known as child care committees or coordinating committees, sit in the major centres. Such committees comprise representatives of the Department, Education Board, Child Welfare Department, visiting teachers, Psychological Service, Health Department, Housing Division of the City Council, Society for the Welfare of Women and Children, and other voluntary welfare organisations. The task of these committees is to coordinate local effort on behalf of those with 'special' needs, such as physically handicapped children. Thus the inspector plays an important part in coordinating, or helping to coordinate, the various organs within the system.

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9. Department's submission to the Commission on Education, 1962.

10. John Leese, op.cit, p.5

11. Contributing schools: those primary schools which feed into an intermediate school at Form I. (See diagram 1.2)

The inspector's liaison work is no less important as far as the general public is concerned, especially at times of 'educational change'. A school which does not take the trouble to keep its parents, who naturally tend to form a conservative influence, fully informed of current practices and objectives, can find itself a target for local hostility. As a representative of the Department, the inspector can step in at public meetings to bolster up the position of the headteacher. His ability to influence local opinion is enhanced by the fact that he is often in the position to speak to Rotary groups, religious groups, women's organisations and other interested groups.

The inspector is also a key link in the chain of communication between the schools and the Department; in fact he is the only continuously active link. Through the district senior inspector, who presents an annual report on the subject, he is able to keep the centre informed of the needs of the district. General departmental policy thinking, in fact, depends to a large extent upon the district senior inspectors, who meet regularly under the chairmanship of the Director of Primary Education. These meetings are of great importance in the formation of general policy. Through the district senior inspector, the inspector is strategically well placed to anticipate the effects of policy changes when they are made. He is in a position to evaluate the changes and in the first instance to interpret syllabus changes to the teacher.

Finally, the inspector - more especially the district senior inspector - is an important link in the day-to-day relationships between Board and Department. His comment and advice is always available to the Board because, as stated, the inspectors in any district are headquartered at the Education Board premises. Thus he really has the function of being professional adviser to the Boards, and it should be noted that since Boards are chiefly administrative bodies, the advice of a professional is most important. He sits by statute on the appointments and building committees of the Board, but in practice, will sit by invitation on many others, such is the value of his advice. Perhaps even more important in the actual running of affairs, is the informal contact which the district senior inspector and his fellow inspectors have with the Board officers. It is in this sphere that personal relations take on a great importance. In such matters as relieving appointments, provision of special equipment, and release of teachers for special purposes, harmony is important and any personal rancour is liable to lead to some maladministration. Some district senior inspectors begin to associate themselves with their Board and its views; others feel more attached to Department policy. For these, a phlegmatic temperament is important. One district senior inspector said that he often had to sit through a 'tirade' against the Department. "And I just have to sit there while they're having

a go at my Department and there's nothing I can do." It is not often that Department and Board policy clash to the extent that the district senior inspector would feel in an uncomfortable position, though this has not always been the case. The district senior inspector has a certain influence among Board members. On one occasion, for example, one district senior inspector and a Board member were going to address a PTA on the advantages of intermediate education. The Board member was known to be strongly against intermediate schools and the district senior inspector felt it was his duty to take the member to one side before the meeting began and point out that the member could not speak against what was established Board and Departmental policy. This situation exemplifies the tact that the district senior inspector is called upon to use in the effort to fulfil his duty and at the same time preserve good relations.

Inspectors are drawn chiefly from the primary service, though some are from the staffs of the teachers colleges. They are at least in mid-career when they become inspectors and many have several years of headship behind them. There are very few women indeed in the inspectorate; at the time that the Commission on Education was sitting there was, in fact, only one. The recruitment problems which have been evident in the secondary branch for a number of years have, over recent years, caused some concern in the primary inspectorate. These problems resulted from the fact that the salary scale was slipping behind that of the headships in the larger intermediate and primary schools.

In its submission to the Commission on Education, the Department stressed that it would like to see the inspectorate slough its duties of assessment, and to see the inspector grow into an 'education officer'. But any such development is dependent upon a change in policy on the part of the teaching profession. Unquestionably the main force behind the retention of assessment is supplied by the teachers themselves: whatever they may think individually, collectively they would oppose its termination unless an obviously suitable alternative had been found. If such an alternative exists, then it is surely the responsibility of the NZEI to discover and promote it.

II

The Curriculum Development Unit. is a further example of a controlling and coordinating unit in the professional sector. The activity of the Unit spans both the primary and secondary sub-systems, but since its approach in both fields is similar, it will be dealt with here. Before the Unit was instituted, curriculum development was in the hands of the Chief Inspectors. From time to time, the system was added to. Supervisors, superintendents and national advisors, each with his own advisory staff took their place. A chain of information has always existed from the classroom teacher to the Directors of Primary and Secondary Education, for the inspector in the field

in the secondary system at least, and to an increasing extent in the primary system, is a subject specialist. Thus the inspector was in a position both to advise his superiors as to the need for curriculum changes, and also to assist in their implementation. For a period of ten years prior to the report of the Commission on Education, there had existed a (primary) curriculum officer, whose method of keeping the primary curriculum up to date was largely ad hoc. No set procedure existed, and he accomplished his task by means of a number of committees, representative of the NZEI and the Department. On the secondary side, one of the Head Office inspectors was given authority in curriculum matters, though since 1958 special officers for school mathematics and science have been brought into the structure. All were working in relative isolation.

When the Unit came into existence it was designed to supplement, to fit into, the existing organisational structure, and not to replace it. Thus the Unit's function has been strictly to establish liaison within the Department between those agencies affecting curriculum development. The Unit provides, then, a coordinative team interested in the whole curriculum.

Curriculum review in any particular subject is initiated in a variety of ways, principal among which would be: an officer at Head Office who had been particularly interested in the topic as a teacher or inspector; an inspector in the field with a specialised knowledge of, and interest in, a given topic; an individual teacher, acting through his own body[12] or through the inspectorate. Wherever the new suggestion originates, it will pass through the same mechanical process before it becomes policy. That process, in a word, is 'consultation'. Unquestionably the views of the Directors of Primary and Secondary Education and those immediately beneath them are crucial, for these are the people who - in the last analysis - will be responsible for obtaining government approval. (Since any development in the curriculum is going to necessitate additional finance, government approval is vital.)

We can take an example from the case that arose in the mid-1950s, when the 'Janet and John' series of infant readers was due to be reprinted. There had been much criticism of the books, chiefly on account of their stilted style and dated vocabulary. An advisory committee of experts was set up by Department, and this in turn set up a number of sub-committees whose job it was to prepare reports on the type of vocabulary being used by children, the constructions that were in common use, and so on. When these sub-committees reported, the mother committee passed on a synopsis of the sub-committees' thinking to the senior professional officers in the Department.

The next stage was for a booklet to be prepared which incorporated these more modern speech habits in a series of short stories. The booklet was cyclostyled and ten schools in each district were selected as pilot schools, and issued with the booklet as a reader. In preparation for this move, of

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12. The NZEI has recently appointed its own curriculum officer to keep the membership fully informed of the Unit's activities. The Post Primary Teachers' Association, as we shall see, has its own curriculum groups.

course, the senior inspectors and inspectors within the districts, if they were not already on one of the sub-committees, were fully informed of developments. The scheme operated in the schools for one year, at the end of which results were collated and the parent committee at this point made its specific recommendation.[13] Having thus tested the new ideas adequately, and having gained the acceptance of the Director-General, who would make such a decision in conjunction with senior professional officers, the booklet was passed over to School Publications, in order that a book could be prepared along similar lines. Meanwhile a handbook was prepared for the teachers who were going to have to put the new approach into operation. Thus it would appear that the process, though lengthy, is a reasonably efficient one.

When the Commission recommended the establishment of a Curriculum Development Unit it was primarily concerned with the coordinating of syllabuses so that secondary education could truly be said to begin at Form I. Priority was given to coordinating the general science, mathematics and foreign languages curricula - and the pattern of development followed closely the traditional method as illustrated by the 'Janet and John' revision. When finally put up for Cabinet approval, the new general science syllabus (preparations for which had begun some three years prior to the Commission's report) was estimated to cost £250,000. Thus efforts at modernising the curriculum have to be well spaced if Treasury support is to be secured.[14] Though not all new changes would be as expensive as those involving apparatus, new text books are a costly factor in any scheme.

The key to the successful modernisation of the curriculum is, of course, teacher training. Yet to incorporate new ideas into initial teacher training is not easy. The span of time between the acceptance of a new scheme or approach by educationists and its eventual incorporation into the curriculum is something between six and ten years. By the time it has found its way into training college courses it is probably out of date. This problem can be eased if not solved by securing teachers college staff representation on the curriculum committees, a policy which the Department has been following to an increasing extent. In-service training of course affects the teacher more immediately, but it is more difficult to control. Those who attend - though the numbers are growing - represent the more enlightened elements anyway, and it is not necessarily these teachers who would benefit most from the courses.

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13. However, if such a scheme is taken to the 'experimental stage', it has an extremely good chance of being accepted by departmental officers, as was the case in this instance.

14. Individual teachers complain nonetheless about the number and rapidity of changes in syllabus and approach.

However, the scheme which operates in some of the states of the USA, where promotion cannot be gained until a certain number of courses have been attended, appears to be gaining adherents in the Department and in the teaching bodies.

The Curriculum Development Officer and his unit play a key role in the developing system, forming:

i) A bridge between primary and secondary education.

ii) A key area of growth.

iii) An area of great importance in the developing 'technological' society.

Their task is seen as being the establishment of consensus. One officer commented: "Sometimes it seems we have to consult, consult and consult". But it is recognised that consensus is the only basis on which such changes can be undertaken. The secretary of the NZEI has written:

> "Today, syllabus revision is a continuing process, with very full consultation with teachers at every point. Revision committees in each subject include practising teachers who are experts in the field; trials of the proposed new procedures take place in selected schools; drafts are widely circulated for discussion before a new syllabus is adopted. Generally only one subject revision is officially adopted at a time."[15]

To conclude, the chief means of professional coordination and control operated by the Department are as follows:

i) The work of the inspectorate, especially in its capacity of professional leadership.

ii) The Curriculum Development Unit.

iii) The work of specialists. Working as a team, specialists are usually housed with the inspectorate. They provide a considerable body of experience over a fairly wide range of topics for teachers in the area.

iv) The special appointment of suitable officers to provide courses and information in the fields of science, mathematics and reading. These officers act individually and their advice is of a more specific nature. Together with the specialists of category (iii) they provide an important source of coordination and of advice to teachers.

There exist other coordinative agencies within both primary and secondary sub-systems, among which are:

i) The training colleges, which run short in-service courses for groups of teachers.

ii) The National Refresher Course Committee. Financed by government funds, this body plans and runs numerous vacation courses.

iii) University Departments of Education. These occasionally provide courses for teachers.

iv) The liaison committee. This committee, representing the NZEI and the PPTA, seeks to provide in-service training and to discuss common training problems.

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15. E.J.Simmonds, op.cit., pp. 188,9.

v) Organising teachers, These assist coordination in country areas.

vi) Teaching bodies. Through their branches and regional meetings the NZEI and the PPTA provide considerable opportunities for discussion. Some branches have set up in-service committees (for example, the Hutt Valley branch of the NZEI).

vii) Ad hoc committees. A number have been set up in the main centres by educationalists with a mutual interest in particular areas.

viii) Staff meetings. These provide the opportunity for teachers to talk over common problems at low level, and if properly used and controlled, can be most effective.

ix) Journals. Such journals as the NZEI's National Education, the PPTA's Journal and the Department's publications, especially Education, are important coordinative devices.

The NZEI has commented upon this seemingly all-embracing array that: "The list looks imposing, yet many teachers get little more than the occasional contact with an inspector or colleague or the all too brief stimulation provided by a convention in a country district."[16] To be successful, coordination must be continuous and far-reaching; it must cater not only for the element which takes the trouble to become well-informed upon recent developments, but those who are difficult to contact. In-service training is obviously of crucial importance in an age of rapid developments in methods and, perhaps, in aims. Many within the education system, including inspectors, have complained that not enough provision is made for efficient in-service training. It may well be that nothing short of compulsory in-service training and the provision of all the additional facilities this would involve will solve the problem. Certainly, departmental officers have been giving much thought to the issues involved in all aspects of training of late.

III

The pyramid of day-to-day administration of the primary system reaches its apex in the administration and buildings sectors of the Department's non-professional structure.[17] To deal with the workings of a government department is obviously a major undertaking in its own right; it is not proposed in this study to give more than an outline, filling in only areas of direct relevance.

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16. Submission of the NZEI to the Commission on Education, 1962.

17. There is some confusion caused by the double use of the word "administration". It refers to the whole non-professional side of the Department organisation and also to a branch or sector within the non-professional side. But the context will clarify the meaning.

As will later be shown, the administrative side of the Department has acquired the important position it now holds only comparatively recently and it should be made perfectly clear at the outset that the functions and the influence that have accrued to the administrative side are proportionate to the loss of independence on the part of the primary and secondary boards. By controlling school building and school finance the administrative officers assert an almost inflexible authority over the whole administrative system. Many Education Board officers have spoken in favour of extending Board power in these purely administrative fields. But power in a static situation is finite. It is measureable. If the Boards gain power in any sector of activity, then the administrative officers of the Department lose it. In a situation of growth, power tends inevitably to accrue to the central Department. Some 'Board men' would have us believe that the officers of the Department are intent upon the destruction of Education Boards; this appears to be far from the case. But it is certainly true that most administrative officers would not willingly see any substantial movement of power away from the centre under the present system.

It is now proposed to discuss in more detail the nature of central control as exercised in the key divisions of buildings and administration.

The Buildings Division. The structure of control is so detailed as to rob both primary and secondary boards of initiative. We have discussed the White Lines system - a system designed to allow some local initiative and discretion - but have noted that, without an annual (or at least regular) cost-place review, the system becomes quite ineffective.[18] No other schemes of a similar nature exist for retaining initiative at the local level. The work of the buildings division in the Regional and Head Offices is intimately bound up with the annual building programme, which must be clearly set out before any understanding of the division can be gained.

The school building programme is built up in two sections. Schedule A is concerned with works which have already been started and it estimates how much is likely to be spent on them during the next five years (with a complete annual breakdown).[19] Schedule B is concerned with new works to be undertaken in the next financial year, and is compiled on a priority system, following the basic pattern of: new schools, additions, replacements, minor works. On new schools, the Department has a demographic checking device in the regional investigating officer. He will check against the Board's justification and report to the assistant executive officer buildings. As for replacements, one Department officer pointed out: "It would take an earthquake or an

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18. The Public Expenditure Committee, in its 1966 report, recommended a triennial review of the cost-place figure, as was pointed out in Chapter Four. Such a step would substantially improve the workings of the scheme.

19. The whole school building programme has been put recently on to a (five-year) rolling programme, with an annual review.

outbreak of bubonic plague for those to appear high in the priorities". The total cost, again with an annual breakdown, is indicated for each work. The process of drawing up the complete programme is initiated by the Boards, who operate on the recommendations of school committees and Board officers. Beside each item it is necessary to submit a justification. This is prepared by the Boards during October and November. Towards the end of November the draft programme comes before the buildings officers of the Regional Office, who check the justification with their own information. There are often differences over siting and over the moving of classrooms, but it is usually not difficult to reach agreement. Certain low-priority items have to be taken off the programme at this stage because the Regional Office will have an intimation of how much the Government will allow to be spent. By Christmas or thereabouts the programme will be passed on to the Head Office. The buildings division at Head Office will set each regional programme into the national context. Information is fed to Head Office throughout the year and thus divisional officers have a reasonably sound basis for comparison. They are in a position to decide exactly how much of each programme is to be 'cut back', and, although approximately two-thirds of the programme will be unaffected at this stage, further 'cutting back' often occurs later in the year, and one officer described the decisions made at that time as "pretty unpalatable".

About a month later the programme goes on to Treasury which has to make a report to the Minister of Finance. Then, with the report from Treasury and the programme, the Cabinet has to decide in time for the new financial year as to the actual allocation to regions. In these allocations schedule A is naturally given priority. The Boards are then advised of their allocation and have to bring their programmes into line. There is always an awkward discrepancy between the school and financial year, but there is an arrangement which permits the Department to go ahead with major works during the 'interregnum'.

As far as primary schools are concerned, as has been mentioned in Chapter Four, the Education Boards are responsible for forward planning in their own districts. Each Board has several basic designs approved by the Department which it will use for schools of different sizes. As we have seen, due to the exigencies of the upper limit of the White Lines scheme, there is little variation in design as between the Boards other than that caused by terrain. Architectual ingenuity concerns itself with cheapness and flexibility rather than with style or line. One of the major break-throughs in recent years is seen by the buildings division to be a permanent (in other words, not obviously temporary as most 'prefabs' are) but movable classroom, known as the PMC.

The buildings divisions at the Regional and Head Offices are subject to the controls of Treasury and the Ministry of Works. No animosity appears to be felt towards the Ministry of Works at the lower level. It acts as

'purchasing agent' for the Regional Office and undertakes the construction itself wherever possible. The feeling towards Treasury is simply that the latter will prevent any work from going ahead if it can. Treasury does not frequently sent an investigating team down to a site, but when it does, its criterion of judgement appears simply to be: is this work absolutely essential at the present time? A member of the buildings division of one Regional Office pointed out that even where Cabinet policy was concerned, the check still operated, as was the case with a particular secondary school hostel. As from 1962, it was Cabinet policy to build not more that five such hostels in a five-year period, provided the schools fulfilled certain conditions as to size. Two had been built in two years; a third was deferred for one year on a Treasury recommendation because it could not be classified as being in the 'essential' category - the proposal, it was recommended, could 'at least' be deferred.

It should be reiterated that each separate work, though it has been approved in the programme, must be justified once again when the Education Board or Regional Office is ready to go ahead with it. There are well authenicated stories, which it would obviously be impossible to substantiate with recorded evidence, of cases where the Regional Office has undertaken a building work whilst its justification was waiting to go before the Cabinet Works Committee, which in fact decided against beginning the project at that time. It says much for the 'flexibility' of the system that it manages to overcome such occurrences without any major upheavals.

The discretionary powers permitted by regulation in building are as follows:

Programmed Works: Minister of Education - £75,000 Director General of Education - £10,000; Chief Accountant and Assistant Regional Executive Officer - £2,000; District Officers - £1,000; Assistant District Officer - £500. It will be noticed that a considerable gap exists between the Director General and the next category. This is because in Departmental practice, the Assistant Director (Administration), the Chief and Senior Executive Officers and the Regional Executive Officer exercise discretion up to £10,000 in the name of the Director General.

Unprogrammed Works. Minister of Education - £10,000; Director General of Education - £2,000; Executive Officer, Assistant Regional Executive Officer - £550; Assistant District Officer - £500; Property Supervisor - £150 (he is concerned with post-primary schools only). Fresh approval has also to be sought for programmed works which exceed the estimate by more than 10 per cent.

The Ministry of Works is responsible for maintenance works. Close contact is kept with a pool of private tradesmen who will undertake specific jobs which, for some reason, the Ministry is unable to undertake itself.

As site agent, the Ministry of Works will supply a detailed 'cost of development' plan. When the Regional Office is forced to buy a piece of land which is going to cost a great deal to develop, care is taken to make little of the cost of development until the purchase has actually been completed in case of an adverse Treasury report. Mention has been made of the construction of post-primary hostels; these are looked upon by the Regional Office as being a business venture for the board concerned; when they are completed, they are handed over to the controlling board, whose job it will be to keep the hostels in a good state of repair.

This completes the discussion of the structure of buildings control and the mechanisms of control exercised by the buildings branch.

Administration Division. The chief means of formal control exercised by the administration division is financial. In Appendix 'D' is set out in detail the precise nature of primary and secondary financial delegation. At this stage, it is only necessary to point out that so precise is the nature of delegation to Education Boards that the only major choice left open to them is whether to be efficient or inefficient administrators.

Another area of control not as important as the ones mentioned but equally irksome to some Education Boards is that of school transport. School transport offers a further bulk of detailed regulations which are drawn up by the Department and operated by the Boards. The chief controlling agency is the transport division of the Regional Offices, most of it being undertaken by the Wellington Regional Office. (See Chapter Eleven) Mention has already been made of the way in which the Boards undertake their transport work: in his submission to the Commission on Education, the general manager of the Auckland Education Board pointed out that although his Board was entrusted with over £250,000 each year, it could not authorise the expenditure of even £1 on transport without Departmental approval. It is something of a blessing that, since transport is dealt with largely at the regional level, the delay is not very great. It is none the less frustrating.

Administrative Coordination. There are a number of formal links in the administrative set up. The chief of these, on which Boards and Department are represented, are as follows:

Statutory Bodies.

Central Advisory Committee on Appointments and Promotion of Teachers.

Review Committee, which provides teachers with the right to a review of the grading they have been given.

Electoral College of the New Zealand Council for Educational Research (NZCER)

New Zealand Road Safety Council

Outside Committees and Bodies

Standing Committee on Administration.

Committee on Maori Education.

Departmental Committees and Sub-Committees.

Teachers salaries (departmental committee on).

School buildings sub-committee.

Teacher recruitment (departmental committee on).

Consolidation of the Education Act Sub-committee.

Of these the most important is the Standing Committee on Administration. Constituted in 1957 the Committee offered the first permanent link between Board and Departmental administrators. It operates as a "permanent working committee concerned to reconcile the interests of the Boards and the Department in the field of primary administration and has become the instrument through which the Boards and the Department can reach agreement on particular administrative issues."[20] However imaginative an innovation the Committee has been, it does not make the Department of Education less subservient to the financial controls of Government. Thus the "potentialities of conflict still remain".[21] Nevertheless the Standing Committee offers some real hope of an end to the conflicts which are generally acknowledged to have "absorbed far too much time and energy of administrators in the past".[22]

Informal links are of supreme importance in New Zealand where such a store is set by egalitarianism and the 'open door' policy of the government. This is a mixed blessing for the Boards, since a common policy among Boards is much more difficult to achieve as a result. When one Board knows that by paying a visit to a particular officer or by telephoning it might obtain a better deal for itself, it is tempted to do so. There are obvious advantages to be gained from such semi-secret discussions and these must be weighed against the advantages offered by publicising disputes. It is usually true that, provided a Board can present a good case to the Department in a restrained fashion, it will get a sympathetic consideration, if nothing more. One senior officer spoke of a request received from one Board (not, it should be noted, through the channels of the NZEBA) for finance to provide libraries in twelve of its schools. One of the members of the Board, keenly interested in libraries, had been instrumental in passing a resolution at a Board meeting asking the District Senior Inspector to list the twelve schools which would most benefit from a library. Armed with this list, the Board had requested additional finance. The senior officer in question paid a visit to the schools and was ready to talk the matter over with Board members and officers, but the press had been called in with "pads ready and pencils sharpened." Nothing resulted on that occasion. If they are to succeed, such links must be completely informal.

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20. Submission of Department of Education to the Commission on Education, 1962.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

CONCLUSIONS. The Department Game.

Rules of the game. The Department of Education has a dual role in the game. It is staffed in part by ex-teachers with a great feeling for education. It is, as it were, the apex of the education system. Yet it is also a Government Department and as such must not only support Government or Treasury policy, but must be seen to support this policy. In deciding what recommendations it will make to the Minister and to Cabinet, the Department will have in mind two types of virtually incompatible considerations. The one will be emotive: to do what should be done for the schools. The other will be economic: to do only that which is essential and that which is cheapest. The rules of the Department game are thus concerned with establishing patterns of action which reconcile these somewhat divergent ends.

Pay-off. The Department is anxious to achieve a stable, economic, and educationally sound system. In terms of administration, the emphasis in the past appears to have been on economy. On a number of occasions, as we have seen, moves have originated in the Department to abolish or fundamentally alter Education Boards. A number of senior departmental officers in the past have found it difficult to endure the obstinacy of some Boards. They have found the job of continuous persuasion and cooperation somewhat arduous after being used simply to issuing instructions to public servant subordinates. Thus pay-off in the administrative sphere has chiefly been measured in terms of making the system more economic and efficient.

On the professional side, pay-off is measured in terms of smooth running and steady pedagogic advance. Naturally, economic considerations play a considerable part. We have observed that any such advances have to be 'spaced' if Cabinet approval is to be gained, but the sum of gains is not fixed. That is to say, with adequate consultation, educational progress can be relatively free of serious conflict. This is not necessarily the case in salary decisions; here economic considerations are uppermost in the Department's mind.

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Strategy. The Department's strate

Thus any new professional move which the Department initiates is likely to receive a sympathetic hearing from the NZEI so long as the position of its members is not threatened. But any new administrative move initiated by the Department is almost certain to be evaluated by the Boards in terms of its overall effect upon their position.[24]

In New Zealand there is a general ill-will towards 'bureacrats'. The Department is therefore often on the defensive. In addition, any criticism of a Government department reflects discredit upon the Minister concerned. It is the policy, generally speaking, to reply to any publicly-made criticism through the means of Ministerial statements to the press. Yet strategy in these situations usually demands a conciliatory tone, as was exemplified in the case of the 'Green Report'. This was a report on primary administration undertaken in the mid 1950s by a member of the Auckland Education Board. The Director of Education described the document as being 'really offensive in tone' and as offering a 'serious indictment' of the Department and its officers. Nevertheless, the report was adopted unanimously by the Auckland Education Board and received wide publicity. The NZEBA followed up the attack by claiming that a prima facie case existed for a thorough investigation into the administrative structure. As a result, the Joint Committee on Administration was set up, and valuable work was done to improve the mechanics of consultation and negotiation. The Director insisted that the Joint Committee condemn the Green Report, which it did, though in a half-hearted manner. Thus, because Department strategy under threat is basically defensive and conciliatory, tactics such as those employed by the Auckland Board in this instance are sometimes successful. The Green Report may have been offensive and inaccurate but it resulted in the establishment of the Standing Committee on Administration, which the Commission on Education called an 'imaginative conception'.[25]

The Department, in recent years, has placed much stress on a strategy of 'involvement', in which outside groups are increasingly consulted before policies are formulated. More will be said about the effects of the policy in Chapter Fifteen, but it is sufficient to point out here that examples of this strategy are to be found in curriculum consultation (professional) and the Standing Committee (administrative). It is a strategy of limited application in the administrative sphere but, as we have seen, has been used widely in relations with the NZEI.

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24. A good example of this is offered in the field of teacher training. As was pointed out in Chapter Four, the Department has sought to take control of training colleges. Although training college administration has never been popular with most Boards, some have put up considerable resistance to the move on the grounds simply that they are losing power. Others, as was pointed out, have been more open-minded.

25. Report of the Commission on Education, 1962. p. 95.

Information. In most cases officers of the Department can act from reasonably complete information. Head Office has the Regional Offices at its disposal and the inspectorate housed with the various Education Boards. But these sources of information are not always used, as will be seen in Chapter Seven. Information of a political nature, however, is not always available to the Department. The majority of decisions taken by the Cabinet are based on the advice of departmental officers, but on occasions political considerations will cause Cabinet to take a different line. Its reasons for doing so will not be disclosed, and departmental officers will have only as little information as the general public.

In addition, the Department does not possess detailed knowledge of the financial situation. Though they could not show it, departmental officers might have been as dismayed as NZEI leaders when the introduction of three-year teacher training was postponed by Cabinet for six months.

A further category of information not readily available to the Department is that concerned with the day-to-day problems of individual primary schools and local situations. Only by close liaison with the Boards - who in turn must be in liaison with their committees - would this information be available.

Coalition. In negotiating with the various bodies within the primary subsystem, the Department is usually faced with alternative decisions, each of which will offend one party. It must therefore create some basic pattern of coalition - a guide of whom to support at the expense of whom and under what circumstances. Evidence of such a pattern exists. The Department refused to give an annual grant of £100 requested by the New Zealand Council of Home and School and Parent Teacher Associations (CHSPTA) though it has traditionally given one to the NZSCF. The Department knew that by acceding to this request it would injure relations with the NZSCF. On the other hand, it refused to grant NZSCF representation on the Standing Committee because it realised that by doing so it would injure relations with the NZEBA. As we have seen, the Department has historically supported the NZEI against both committees and Boards. Yet the latter was moved, on one occasion, to claim that the Department was prepared to 'Balkanise' the teaching profession in order to achieve its own objectives (see Chapter Five). Thus there is a pattern of coalition available for certain set game situations.

This completes discussion of the primary aspects of the Department of Education. The concluding chapter of this section aims to place the subjects of this and preceding chapters into perspective.

Chapter Seven

THE PRIMARY GAMES

So far in this section we have discussed the main 'players' in the primary 'games' in some detail. Attention has been paid to relations between the players and also to the players' attitudes to the game in which they are involved. The basic concern, however, was to treat each in isolation. This was essential for two reasons: first, to achieve the aim of presenting an overall picture of the education system in its own right; second, to provide a complete structural and institutional background for an analysis of the system in depth which, it is hoped, will shed further light on the workings of democratic government in New Zealand. It is as if we had taken the main players off the field of play to discover how each one fulfilled his functions. Having put the players back into position it is now necessary to make the signal to see the whole game in action.

It is quite impossible to envisage any theoretical construct - including games theory - which would account for all the pressures, relationships, patterns of communication and so on that pertain to the primary sub-system. (It takes years of an experienced administrator's life to recognise them all fully.) It is equally impossible to present any event or manageable sequence of events -or 'game situation' in games terminology- which would illustrate all the pressures involved in play or which would show more than a limited range of the strategies adopted in different plays. However, provided we select an important game situation in each of the main areas and analyse it carefully, we can gain a considerably amount of knowledge of basic strategy. There are three main types of game at the primary level; we shall call them the Board game, the Institute game and the Committee game. It is proposed to deal first with the Board game.

It is necessary at the outset to make the point that in selecting 'game situations' one is not seeking to typify the game in question. The game situations selected in the present chapter and Chapter Eleven are not offered as being typical examples of the way their respective games are played: the mere fact of chosing an 'important' game situation limits the possibility of its being representative in that sense. Rather it has been sought to illustrate the typical relationships and pressures behind the play: it is not so much the general pattern of relationships that one is trying to represent - this will have emerged from preceding chapters - but the underlying forces which the general pattern must take into account.

I

The Board Game - a "fixed-sum" game. The limitations of games theory (in its pure form) for political analysis, were pointed out in Chapter One.

Deutsch notes that where it has been usefully applied the theory has not rendered theoretical assistance "in the technical sense . . . but a source of ideas and suggestions".[1] Deutsch argues the case for adapting the theory for analysing particular situations, as did T.C.Schelling in his study of international politics, The Strategy of Conflict.[2]

Earlier games theorists such as Von Neumann and Morgenstern[3] had used two categories of games: 'zero-sum' and 'non zero-sum' games. The former represented situations of pure conflict and the latter pure cooperation. Schelling felt that a two-fold division "lacked symmetry" and was insufficiently definitive. He suggested a reclassification: the 'pure' games he labelled 'fixed-sum' and 'variable-sum' games, but he also introduced a third category of games where conflict and cooperation were mixed to varying proportions; these he labelled 'mixed-motive' games.

Schelling's method of making the theory more flexible is an interesting one. Yet, as it stands, it does not seem to be any more helpful to the present study than the original classifications, for each of the education games is mixed-motive. None is concerned with pure conflict or pure cooperation. For the purposes of this study, therefore, it is suggested that 'fixed-sum' and 'variable-sum' games be taken as the two ends of a continuum and 'mixed-motive' games be taken only as the midpoint. It will thus be possible to classify games according to the situation to which they tend to correspond, according, that is, to their particular ratio of cooperation and conflict.

The Board game is about the administration of the primary sub-system and concerns the division of functions among the players, who are the Boards themselves, the school committees and the Department of Education. It would be fair to say that the Board game is characterised by a continual jostling for a better position by the players; each is trying to add to his role in order either to make the system more efficient or to strengthen local control. Now power (defined simply as the ability to influence decisions) in this situation is governed by a fixed ratio. That is to say, one player's ability to influence play can only be strengthened at the expense of another player's, a point which is well borne out by the history of the Board game (see Chapter Four). Thus the Board game tends to be fixed-sum.

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1. K.W.Deutsch, "The Theory of Games", Chapter Four, The Nerves of Government, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1963. p.67.

2. T.C.Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, New York, Oxford University Press, 1963.

3. J.Von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2nd. Ed., 1947.

BACKGROUND. The problems of the administrative structure were put in sharp relief by the report of the Commission on Education in 1962, which suggested the setting up of District Councils of Education, representative of all the branches of education within the district, which would be staffed by public servants.[4] This meant, it was plain, the end of the Education Boards. Now the Commission had received submissions from both the Department and the NZEBA on the subject of administrative reform and its own recommendations were in the nature of a compromise. It was a compromise which suited none of those affected by it, and it seems to have been abandoned. The geography of administration also needed improvement. Following a recommendation of the Commission on Education, a Boundaries Commission was established in 1962 to look at the existing boundaries of Education Districts.[5]

Yet the Boundaries Commission was not a bold response to a new situation: rather it represented a last resort in an effort to solve an old problem by compromise. It had long been appreciated that modifications to the existing Education Districts were inevitable. In the discussions concerning the division of the old Auckland Board (that is, into the separate Boards of Auckland and South Auckland), the Department recognised that eventually a separate Board for the Bay of Plenty would be necessary.[6] There was also discussion at the time about a division of the Canterbury Education Board, but Department officers were not favourable to such a scheme.[7] Not long after, the possibilities of creating a new Board in Northland were fully considered by the Department[8] and the following year the press was discussing the Bay of Plenty Board again.[9] Thus the advantages and drawbacks to the above schemes

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4. Report of the Commission on Education, 1962. pp. 99-109.

5. The terms of reference for the Boundaries Commission, contained in subsection 4 of Clause 13D of the Education Amendment Act 1962, read as follows:

> "(a) To investigate the various factors that make for education districts of desirable size and, in the light of such criteria as he may establish, to recommend to the Minister such alterations of boundaries of education districts and such new education districts as he considers necessary:
>
> (b) To investigate, report, and make recommendations, as the Minister may from time to time require, on any proposal for the alteration of the boundaries of education districts or for the constitution of a new education district or on any matter relevant thereto:

Provided that the Commissioner shall, before making any recommendation to the Minister for the alteration of the boundaries of an education district or for the constitution of a new district, consult with the Education Board for every district whose boundaries will be affected."

6. Departmental files, August 21st,1952.

7. Star-Sun, June 19th,1953.

8. Departmental files, May,June,July,August,September,1955.

9. N.Z.Herald, October 17th,1956 and the Rotorua Post, October 17th,1956.

were fully mulled over by the mid 1950s.

Yet discussion continued. The question of geographical reorganisation was handed over to the Standing Committee on Administration at its inception, and the optimum size for Education Districts was on its agenda almost continuously thereafter. In 1958, at the request of the NZEBA, all Boards discussed the topic and their individual views were made known to the Standing Committee and to the Department. In May of 1959, the Standing Committee made a report which set out the arguments but made no solid recommendations simply because it represented all the affected Boards. It did, however, recommend that an independent commission or tribunal be set up on the general subject of Education District boundaries.[10] There remained one hope for a simple compromise solution - that the Commission on Education would make some firm recommendations. Though it expressed dissatisfaction with the existing set-up, the Commission made no firm recommendations itself. Rather it , also, suggested that a Boundaries Commission be set up.[11]

It further suggested that to facilitate any changes the Boundaries Commission might suggest, the manner of effecting such changes should be made more efficient. Under the system which existed at the time, the Governor General could alter the boundary between two contiguous Districts by Order in Council; new Boards could be created by the Minister only at the request of every Board whose boundaries would be affected.

In response to the Commission's recommendations, the 1964 Education Act set out a new procedure for the creation of new districts and alteration of boundaries of existing Districts as follows:

> "The Minister may, after consideration of the recommendations (if any) of the Education Districts Boundaries Commissioner, by notice published in the Gazette, constitute part of the district or districts of one or more Education Boards as a new Education District."
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> "The Governor-General, on the recommendation of the Minister given after consideration of the recommendations (if any) of the Education Districts Boundaries Commissioner and after the Minister has consulted with the Boards concerned, may by Order in Council alter the boundaries of any two contiguous Education Districts by the exclusion of any defined area from one such District and its inclusion in the other District."

Following the Commission's recommendations, a Boundaries Commissioner acceptable to the Boards, being an ex-secretary of the NZEBA, was appointed. The Commissioner asked for written submissions, and later, oral evidence, from all interested. The largest written submission came from the Department of Education. Its recommendations were quite clear and precise and

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10. Departmental files, September 1960.

11. Report of the Commission on Education, 1962, pp. 110-2.

reiterated all the points previously made by the Department in its dealings over the preceding decade with individual Boards and the NZEBA. In short, the Department recommended that new Education Districts be established for Northland (centred at Whangarei), for Bay of Plenty (centred at Rotorua), and that no new Education District be established in South Canterbury; that Marlborough be taken out of the Wellington Education District and placed under the Nelson Board. No firm recommendations were made by the Department concerning the minor adjustments which were under discussion among the Boards - namely in the Taranaki, South Auckland and Wanganui boundaries and the Canterbury, Otago and Southland boundaries -though its preference for a general rationalisation of the system was well known.

Two years later the Commissioner made his report.[12] By the time his investigations were completed he complained of being 'a very tired and rather disillusioned man'. It is apparent that nobody had appreciated the sheer size of the problem, nor the animosities that would be laid bare. It is equally clear that the Department was not altogether happy with the findings. Although he followed the departmental line with regard to the establishment of new Education Districts in Northland and Bay of Plenty, the transfer of Marlborough from Wellington to Nelson and other minor rationalisations, he also recommended the creation of a new Education District at Timaru. The Director found the recommendations an 'interesting mixture of the expected and the unexpected'. The recommendation concerning the Southern Central Education District[13] was, in truth, more than a little embarrassing. If the Department had any illusions as to the reception the report would receive generally, they were soon to be dispelled. Within a very short time after the publication of the report, the Department was inundated with telegrams and letters of protest, couched in such terms as 'strongly object', 'completely unacceptable', and the like. The Commissioner himself was praised by those to whose case he subscribed as an 'expert administrator'; others, who stood to suffer as a result of his recommendations, referred to him as a 'one-man band'.

Of the areas likely to become new Education Districts, the one which campaigned most vigorously for a Board was in fact the Timaru area. A number of local bodies became concerned, seeing the issue as a matter of local status. When the Minister of Education was in Timaru, the Mayor raised the topic of a Southern Central Education District and the Minister let it be known that he was prepared to see a deputation on the matter. The Mayor released this

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12. Report of the Commissioner on Education District Boundaries, Wellington, Government Printer, 1964.

13. The Southern Central Education District, to be centred at Timaru, was to include parts of the existing Canterbury and Otago Districts.

statement to the press, a tactic often used to put promises on record.[14] For the sake of etiquette the Minister saw the Canterbury and Otago Boards beforehand, since any new District would naturally be created from their existing Districts. He was told that both were opposed to the setting up of a new district, a piece of news which was given a great deal of prominence in the Timaru press. Far more important was the fact that the Department had been opposed to setting up a new Education District centred upon Timaru for over a decade. In any case the matter became forgotten in the wider issue of structural reorganisation which came to the fore some months later. In disgust at the proceedings, the Timaru Herald pointed out that the Minister was interested in setting up new Districts "only within the framework of a new national system of education that has not yet been formulated."[15]

With regard to the transferring of groups of schools from one Board to another, the Commissioner disturbed a veritable hornet's nest. Geographic rationalisation had long been departmental policy, but as one Board officer pointed out, it was a strategy motivated by the 'public service outlook', which did not take into account the expectations of the people and communities involved.[16] School committees, except those likely to form the nucleus of a new District, nearly all favoured the status quo. Committees at Taumarunui, for example, were not at all anxious to be transferred from the South Auckland Board unless the transfer be to a Board established in their own area. They had in mind a Central Districts Board, centred upon Taupo or Taumarunui.[17]

The Department was somewhat embarrassed by the reception accorded to the Commissioner's report. Its first reaction had been to support most of the recommendations, which is not surprising, since they had been Departmental policy for something like fifteen years. The Director sent a copy of the report to the Minister with departmental comments appended, with the intention of preparing a Cabinet paper seeking approval for the setting up of the new Districts. The Department's advice to the Minister was perfectly clear and unequivocal. The suggestions equated precisely with the Department's original submission to the Commissioner. But when the wave of public criticism lashed both Department and Commissioner, it became apparent that to move against such a current would not be politically expedient, to say the least. A Director's meeting (see Chapter Fourteen), called to review the situation, decided that

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14. Timaru Herald, November 2nd 1964
15. Timaru Herald, May 15th 1965
16. Marlborough Express, August 19th 1965
17. Letter to the South Auckland Education Board, March 11th 1965.

only 'minor tidying up' should be recommended and that the contentious issues should be shelved. The non-contentious issues were taken a stage further when the Minister contacted the local Members concerned asking for their assistance in 'facilitating of amicable local agreement'.

There was fairly general - if in some cases half-hearted - agreement concerning the creation of new Districts in Northland and Bay of Plenty, yet these recommendations were also shelved, for at this stage the atmosphere of play was changed by the raising of an issue which had been in the background. The Minister declared to the Mayor of Timaru that he was not interested in creating new Boards but wished to experiment with regional structure, creating District Councils after the pattern of the Department's submission to the Commission on Education. This manoeuvre put a new complexion on to the situation; there were no minor adjustments at stake now, rather the whole Board system was being called into question.[18] The situation became deadlocked, for the National Party was by no means as confident as was its Minister of Education of the benefits of a District Council system, for each Member knew the importance to his own vote of local school committees and PTAs, which were generally opposed to the scheme. The Minister, however, made it perfectly plain that he had no intention of creating new Education Boards; he wanted to make savings on educational administration. The Public Expenditure Committee offered an obvious solution. If it were to study educational administration, it could make recommendations on the District Councils scheme. These recommendations could either be used to support the Minister's case or permit him to withdraw from his extreme position, depending upon their nature. In fact the Public Expenditure Committee undertook such an investigation. Its recommendations were firmly against the Council scheme - a fact which probably tells something of the feeling among National party backbenchers.

Thus no action has resulted from any of the main recommendations of the Boundaries Commission to date. No solution has yet been found to problems that have been present, if not pressing, for well over a decade.

GAMES ANALYSIS

Rules of the Game. The first two sub-sections of Chapter Two dealt in some detail with the social and political culture of New Zealand, thus forming a basis for the 'rules of the game' concept. The basis was later built up in each of the preceding chapters of this section. The rules do not alter much from game

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18. It would be entirely wrong to say that the subject of new forms of administration was not raised before the Boundaries Commissioner's report, for opposition to creation of a Council instead of a Board at Whangarei had been registered in 1963, by the Northland Association of School Committees for example, but there can be no question that it was not a major issue whilst the Commissioner was at work.

situation to game situation, therefore there is no need to add to what has already been said. In the present chapter and in Chapter Eleven, we will pass on to discuss the concept of pay-off.

Pay-off. It is clear that the concept of pay-off in the Board game is not seriously impaired by players seeking satisfaction from the game itself rather than the result of the game. Although it is true that certain animosities have existed between some Board officers and members on the one hand, and some departmental officers on the other, it would not do to overstress this aspect. This animosity does not create a game situation, but merely forms part of it. What counts in the Board game is the result. In this particular game situation, it was quite impossible for the Boards to come together as a team for reasons which have been fully dealt with. Thus the set play broke down into a number of secondary plays. The game was still keenly contested, however slender the pay-off, and this is an important concept. When one considers the repercussions which followed the suggestion to transfer seven schools from one Board to another, one is amazed first by the parochialism and second by the strength of New Zealand democracy, since these school successfully opposed a Commissioner's report and the wishes of a Government Department. Perhaps the concepts of Board and Department pay-off as outlined earlier in this section are brought into fullest relief by the re-introduction of the question of control of the administrative system. Almost immediately the Boards closed ranks. Although room for compromise exists on minor questions, no direct challenge to Board administrative autonomy can be countenanced. It was thus a fundamental issue which the Minister touched upon when he spoke of District Councils for the new Education Districts.

Pay-off for the Department of Education seems to follow the pattern described in Chapter Six. Certainly, from the beginning the Department was motivated by a desire to make the system more efficient, but it must be added that a certain dynamism was given to the Department's strategy by some officers who were anxious to see the power of Boards weakened, particularly the power of the Wellington Board. Pay-off for them would be measured in terms of their success in this objective. However, the move to make geographic reorganisation dependent upon the acceptance of the proposed Education Council structure does not appear to have originated within the Department but with the Minister. Although it is true that the Department had submitted to the Commission on Education a plan very similar to the one proposed by the Minister, there is no evidence of continued pressure by the Department to secure the adoption of the scheme. By this time the officer chiefly responsible for the scheme had moved from the Department. Yet although the move probably originated with the Minister, it nevertheless falls into the pay-off syndrome of efficiency and economy which we have associated with the Department.

Pay-off for the school committees has been dealt with in passing. The committee role in the Board game is chiefly subsidiary. In this instance

pay-off seems to equate generally with preservation of the status quo, except in the case of committees or committee associations which were likely to form the nucleus of a new Board. As has been stated, such committees were generally in favour of creating new Boards.

Strategy. Board strategy in this particular game situation is most revealing. There was no positive common policy adopted by the NZEBA, rather that body withdrew as far as possible from the game. This was largely due to lack of cohesion among the Boards and a certain amount of jealousy. Thus the Association was unable to solve the problem of boundary adjustment, unable to create a policy which member Boards might follow. With regard to the creation of new Education Districts, the Association was, generally speaking, in favour of the moves suggested by the Department, but again it was felt that the Boards concerned should make their own arrangements. It was for this reason that the Standing Committee on Administration was unable to agree to any firm recommendations, though it discussed the matter over a number of years. Individual Boards viewed the two distinct issues at stake differently. First, let us deal with the creation of new Districts. The strategy differed somewhat between the Boards. Auckland, for example, was a large enough administrative unit to part with Northland without any significant loss of status; over the years it had become conditioned to accept the likelihood of a division. South Auckland showed more reluctance; communications between the Rotorua and Districts School Committees Association[19] and the South Auckland Board show that the latter had specified that it would not consider agreeing to the setting up of the new District until the area concerned had achieved a population of 25,000. In addition, since there was no evidence of dissatisfaction with the Board's management, the move to create a new District would have to come from the Government. Otago and Canterbury were flatly opposed to the creation of a Southern Central District.

Second, Board strategy with regard to the minor adjustments suggested was, as has been stated, governed chiefly by whether or not they gained or lost a few schools. One Board, for example, had agreed to the transfer of certain of its schools, acknowledging that a neighbouring Board was in a better position to service them. But in reality it had agreed only because it was being recompensed by gaining schools in another area. When it became clear that it would not get the schools after all, the Board declared its unwillingness to lose any of its schools. Any adjustments, it stated, would have to be renegotiated within a completely new framework. Other Boards operated a defensive strategy completely reversing usual Board strategy. Boards likely to lose some of their schools in adjustments pointed out that any

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19. These were the committees which would form the nucleus of a new District for the Bay of Plenty.

diminution of their powers would result in inefficiency and additional expense.[20] This strategy was reinforced by reference to local school committees: "Without any spirit of complacency . . . this Board has reason to believe that in the main there is no measure of complaint from the teachers or school committees in the Board's district."[21]

It is interesting to note, in conclusion, that one Board, which had been concerned in the boundaries struggle, wrote to the Department some time later asking for information: "Unfortunately, the Board's records of school districts are very limited and I should be pleased if you would advise me if you have any knowledge of where my Board could apply to for a copy of school committee boundaries as defined for this Board." It is probably fair to conclude that Boards' strategy was based more on the symbolic than the actual importance of the few schools involved in transfers.

Department strategy, on the other hand, followed its usual pattern. It was concerned with securing changes which it considered desirable on grounds of efficiency. It should be noted that from the outset the Department tried to secure these changes by asking the interested parties, the Education Boards, to reach agreement among themselves as to the adjustments needed. Apart from the obvious benefits of such a course, it will be remembered that until 1964 there were legal difficulties in attempting to enforce a solution from above. There is the further point, however, that if the Department were to accede to the wishes of local school committees and create new Boards in the Bay of Plenty and Northland, it would find it very difficult to ignore the pressure from local people in and around Timaru to create a Southern Central Education District - and this, the Department felt, was not at all in the interests of efficient administration.

The setting up of a Commission to look at Education District boundaries can be viewed from two positions. Some would feel that it was welcomed by influential departmental officers as providing an opportunity to press their schemes for complete restructuring of the system. Others would point out that the idea of a Commission was reluctantly accepted by the Department as a last resort in the attempt to solve the problem at hand, namely how to make the present system run more efficiently. The second position is the more likely for two reasons. First, the Department's submission to the Commissioner was detailed and where it made a recommendation, it did so strongly. But it made no reference to forms of administration at all. Second, to suggest that the whole problem of regional adjustments was used simply as a vehicle to attack Board autonomy is to credit departmental officers with a malevolence which is quite unwarranted. The setting up of a Boundaries Commission, then, was probably viewed as a last resort in the

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20. Letter from the South Auckland Education Board to the Commissioner on Education District Boundaries, July 29th 1963.

21. Ibid.

in the solution of the problem at hand.[22]

It is strange to note that the Department's submission was based entirely upon thinking at the Head Office; the Regional Offices knew nothing of the nature of the submission nor indeed of the activities of the Commissioner whilst he was at work. Again, there are certain inconsistencies in departmental strategy which need explaining. For example, feelings expressed within the Head Office were strongly in favour of taking Marlborough out of the Wellington Education District and joining it to the Nelson District. On the surface this would seem a reasonable move in keeping with departmental strategy: it no doubt appeared strange that the Wellington District should straddle the Cook Strait, and Nelson, in addition, was one of the smallest Districts. Yet the Department should have known the strength of the anti-Nelson feeling in Marlborough. It should have realised that this antipathy was sufficiently strong to throw the gravest doubts upon the advisability of the suggested scheme.

If departmental strategy in the case of Marlborough was based on incomplete information, then its reaction to the pressure brought to bear by those in the Timaru area campaigning for a Southern Central Education Board is contradictory. When the Minister passed on to his Department a paper received from Timaru local bodies in support of such a new District, the Department stated that the onus was on those who wanted change to show in detail how the present system was failing to work adequately. It is difficult to believe that the Department could have produced a detailed case to show how Marlborough was being administered less effectively than the rest of the Wellington district.

School committee strategy with regard to the setting up of new Boards can be accounted for in terms of pay-off. That is to say, the majority of committees in the areas likely to be constituted as new Education Boards were usually in favour of the creation of such Boards, and campaigned actively for their cause. The South Canterbury School Committees Association, for example, employed a well-planned strategy of local involvement to achieve its ends. A Committee for a Southern Central Education District was formed, which became a very active pressure group, including in its list of correspondents the Minister, the Christchurch Regional Superintendent, the Canterbury and Otago Education Boards, three local MPs, local school committies, local bodies and newspapers. As has been shown, local bodies generally

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22. This view is supported by the fact that the Department brought in an officer from a Regional Office whose task was, in effect, to check on the work of the Commissioner - that is, the validity of his proposals - and who briefed senior officers. (One senior officer in fact submitted a few recommendations himself, which he felt were not covered in the Boundaries Commissioner's report.) This regional officer in no way concerned himself with structural reorganisation.

supported the school committees in their objectives. With regard to the adjustments, it is probably fair to say that in general committees concerned were in favour of the status quo. This was particularly the case where jealousy existed between contiguous areas. Particularism played an extremely large part in committee strategy; one Marlborough committee opposed amalgamation with Nelson on the grounds of "a psychological feeling of domination more than anything else - the psychological fear of control of any sort coming from over the hill".[23]

Marlborough schools, in fact, formed by far the largest body of schools to be transferred. Criticism of the recommendation was deep and sustained. The biennial meeting of householders at Blenheim passed a motion on April 28th 1965 expressing the desire to stay with Wellington. The Marlborough school committee members contacted their MP, who wrote to the Minister pointing out that the recommendation was violently resented throughout Marlborough. A headline in the local press captured the spirit of the movement: "Marlborough Schools or Nelson Control".[24] Local bodies were contacted and these also made known their disapproval. The local Chamber of Commerce and the local branch of the Federated Farmers added their voices to the clamour. The Minister replied to the Member, pointing out that he was aware of the opposition to the proposal and concluding that no definite steps would be taken without the fullest discussion at the political level.

Similar pressure came from schools in the Pio-Pio area, where several local schools strongly opposed the recommendation that they be transferred from the South Auckland Board to the Taranaki Board. A petition was raised against the transfer, the results of which showed that 90 per cent of the parents of the seven schools concerned were against the transfer.[25] Pressure built up during the following months on a pattern similar to that shown at Marlborough. The nine schools involved were prepared to 'fight to the last man' to preserve their connections with Hamilton.[26] The South Auckland Board gave full support to the committees concerned, writing to the Minister: "Perhaps the most striking effect of reading the recommendations of the Commissioner, especially on how they affect our schools in the southwest, is that they are absolutely opposed to the wishes of the people he interviewed."[27]

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23. Report of the Commissioner on Education District Boundaries 1964, p.59.

24. Marlborough Express, July 23rd 1965.

25. King Country Chronicle, June 1964 passim.

26. King Country Chronicle, February 26th 1965.

27. Letter from the Chairman of the South Auckland Education Board, April 20th 1965.

In most cases, in fact, school committees' attitudes were reflections of local attitudes. The desire of Pio-Pio schools to remain in the South Auckland Board was probably more an indication of the local commercial and agricultural connections with Hamilton than of the efficiency of the South Auckland Board. To an even greater extent, the stand taken by Marlborough school committees is reflective of attitudes that have nothing to do with educational administration. One school committee in the province of Taranaki but in the Education District of Wanganui complained bitterly that during the Governor General's visit to Taranaki, he had visited all the major towns except theirs which was the third largest. They felt that they would be treated with the same disdain by the Taranaki Education Board and thus opposed transfer.

Perhaps the best single example of particularism is offered by one MP whose constituency would have been affected by the transfer of certain of its schools. Although the schools might be nearer their proposed new Board, he said, the people were as far away in sentiment from the people of that area 'as Cypriot Greeks from Turks'. He strongly recommended that the Minister take no action, particularly since a man from his district had been Chairman of the Education Board to which they already belonged!

Information. The structure of information in a system which depends for its success upon consultation is necessarily complex. This is certainly the case in educational decision-making. There are two facets of interest in this particular game situation. First, with regard to departmental strategy, it will be noticed that the basis of this strategy was not complete knowledge of the game situation. Further, the Department did not take all the steps open to it to become fully informed. It did not discuss the various issues with its Regional Offices for example. Certainly the issues were clear enough in everybody's mind; no doubts existed as to the goals of the various players at the onset of this phase of play. But the Department, acting on a lack of information on the human elements involved, erroneously equated 'efficiency on paper' with efficiency in the actual situation. This is a basic failing with central planning and the 'bureaucratic' mind. Concerned with the situation in their own areas, both Boards and committees could be said to have been more fully informed. The Commissioner himself must have been affected by the myth of 'efficiency on paper', for to some extent this was the goal of his own strategy. As one member of the Marlborough School Committees Association remarked: "We had the impression that the Commissioner already had his mind made up when he came here."[28]

The second facet of interest with regard to information in the game situation is that nobody in the primary sub-system could know how closely structural reorganisation was allied in the Minister's mind to geographical reorganisation. That is to say, although people engaged in play knew that 'something was in the wind', there could have been no certainty during the

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28. Marlborough Express. August 19th 1965.

earlier phase of play. When the Minister stated that the creation of new Education Boards could not be considered, he put the matter beyond doubt. Yet the situation prior to his statement illustrates well that in some ways the whole sub-system operates on incomplete information in the sense that none of the players can be quite sure what the Government is planning, what demands political or financial considerations will make upon the sub-system.

Coalition. In this game situation, coalition falls into the general pattern of relationships in the field of primary administration. That is to say, the Boards were supported by their committees because a community of interests was seen to exist. In the case of the transfer of Marlborough schools from Wellington to Nelson for example, the desire of the Wellington Board to preserve its authority was in happy alliance with the desire of Marlborough people not to 'submit' to 'domination' from Nelson. Several Board officers were agreeably surprised by the support they received from school committees in danger of being transferred. Under normal circumstances Boards receive little in the way of praise from their committees. The only way in which the Department could have secured a coalition with school committees or with regional Associations would have been to offer such groups the prospect of an Education Board in their own locality, thus bringing into conflict pay-off for the local committees and the local Board. But such a move would hardly be acceptable to departmental strategists.

Other groups within the primary system did not formally ally themselves to either side. Committees of Branches of the NZEI, where they submitted pertinent evidence, (i.e. in Auckland and South Auckland, but not in Canterbury/Otago, nor Wellington/Nelson) submitted in favour of the creation of new Education Boards, but they expressed no hostility to Education Councils. PTAs, on the other hand, were useful local allies for the school committees, although the CHSPTA made a submission only with regard to the division of South Auckland and of Auckland, in which they favoured 'decentralisation', and thus were neutral in the question of structural reform. Both groups were only peripherally concerned.

This brings to a conclusion discussion on the game situation concerning regional reorganisation and with it this first part of the chapter which has dealt with the Board game.

II

The Institute Game - a "variable-sum" game. As was pointed out in Chapter Six, there are two distinct types of situation in the Institute game. In the great majority of game situations, the Institute is represented by its Executive. But on occasions, the NZEI membership feels that Executive is not pursuing Institute goals with sufficient energy, and it plays a more prominent part in the game. In either case, a characteristic of the Institute game is that it is basically a game of cooperation. When the Executive is involved, the game tends to be variable-sum, which is to say

that the sum of gains is not fixed, and the gain of one player is not synonymous with the loss of the other. Thus there is a substantial common interest in mutually advantageous outcomes. Added to this is the fact that players on both sides have much the same background. One of the questions which T.C. Schelling asks is whether a successful outcome to any game situation is more likely between players of similar temperaments and backgrounds. Judging by the Executive game, it would seem that similarity of background is important in the variable-sum situation. Many in the Department have been teachers and thus, as has been stated, the mechanics of negotiations, both formal and informal, run very smoothly in this game.

When the membership becomes involved, the game tends to be more a mixed-motive one, in that the membership is naturally a little more concerned with the securing of specific objectives and a little less concerned with the preservation of close cooperation with the Department than is the Executive. The latter has developed a multiplicity of pay-offs, one of which is the preservation of the closest possible relations with departmental officers. It is therefore important to distinguish carefully the roles of Executive and membership in the game. Two game situations are presented for discussion here, one (A) illustrating the role of the Institute Executive and the other (B) the membership.

BACKGROUND. At the end of 1964 the first bonded students in the primary service were due to have completed training. Officers of the Department had envisaged that a number of the bonded students, wishing to teach in urban areas, would not be able to find jobs; they would apply for several posts and not be accepted. The question was: could the bond be legally enforced upon a person who had honestly sought a teaching post and failed to obtain one? The Department decided to discuss the matter with both the NZEI and the Education Boards before the problem actually arose. Talks soon took place at a high level between the Department and the Institute.

It was suggested to the NZEI that the whole position of the bonded student would be undermined if those who were unable to find a place in the area of their choice were de facto released from their bond. In reply, the Executive negotiators pointed out that a 'sharp reaction' had been received from members in response to the Department's suggestion that teachers should be 'placed' for a year if they failed to find a post themselves. However, on the understanding that the position would be reviewed by the Director of Primary Education in the following year, the Institute 'would not press the matter'. The Boards for their part had a number of vacancies, and although placing bonded teachers for a year offered no permanent solution, it was a step in the right direction. Consequently, a Department circular, dated January 28th 1965, claimed that agreement had been reached: newly certificated teachers who could not obtain a post were to be 'placed' for one year. If the vacancy which they were sent to fill became filled through advertisement, then they should, if possible, be allowed to stay, to ease staffing situations;

if there were a serious shortage elsewhere, then they were to be moved, but no student could be moved more than once.

The new arrangements have given greater stability to staffing and at the same time have enabled the great majority of young teachers to teach the same group of children throughout their first year of teaching instead of changing from school to school on short-term relieving positions as happened so often in the past. Generally speaking, the scheme has proved successful, providing newly-trained teachers with suitable employment and resulting in a reduction in the size of many classes.

GAMES ANALYSIS.

Pay-Off. Pay-off for the Department, for the Boards and for the Institute can be measured in terms of meeting the situation successfully. In such matters the Board and Department interest is almost synonymous; not wholly so because, being in continuous contact with the Institute, the Department is something of a moderating force on the employers (i.e. the Boards). For example, the position of teachers who had completed a third year in some specialist subject, such as speech therapy, was raised by one Board. Could not such teachers be bonded to teach in that subject? The position was, that they would accept any teaching post in the main centres, whether or not it gave them the opportunity to practise their specialised skill, rather than go into country areas to teach in speech clinics. Subject bonding, apparently, was a possibility which the Department had not considered and some time elapsed before a reply was given. During that time there can be little doubt that the departmental officers had talked the matter over with the Institute leadership and concluded that this was too extreme a position to adopt, and that to bring in regulations as suggested when there were more specialists than positions available would be a retrograde step. Existing procedure, if properly applied, offered a solution; the district senior inspector could, when he examined a specialist in a general position, issue only a provisional assessment, thus placing the recipient at a disadvantage. This moderating influence of the Department, arising from and reinforcing the sense of confidence between its officers and the Institute Executive, is part of the pay-off of the latter. It shares also in the pay-off of providing sufficient teachers to meet the needs of the schools. Additional teachers would tend to improve conditions for the teacher in the school concerned, and thus would be an important pay-off for the membership. However, the membership accepts bonding itself only as an emergency measure. The 'placing' of bonded teachers unable to find employment was accepted even more reluctantly. Executive pay-off was therefore also concerned with presenting the case for 'placing' in the best possible light to its Institute members.

Strategy. The most interesting fact about Department strategy is that the suggestion which its officers made, namely of 'placing' bonded students unable to find a post, was not legal. It was not authorised by any regulations when it was first suggested, nor when it was finally agreed to by the Institute Executive, nor indeed when it was finally put into operation. In other words, the Department was wittingly acting outside the letter of the law because it had been presented with a problem with which the law was at the time unable to deal. It was not until covering regulations were issued in 1965 that the Department had the legal authority to do what it had done earlier. It should be made clear that in taking this action, the officers of the Department were acting in the best interests of the education system, if one accepts bonding as a fact. It is none the less true that, as was pointed out in Chapter Two, the system functions because those involved are prepared to bend the rules.

It says much for the close relations between them that the Department was prepared to face the Institute Executive on such a matter, when both sides knew that there were no covering regulations. The Executive was in a position to 'expose' this apparent malpractice and make political capital in so doing. But such strategy is not within the rules of this variable-sum game. In such a situation, as Schelling has pointed out: "each player's best choice of action depends on the action he expects others to take, which he knows depends in turn, on the other's expectation of his own".[29] Now coordination is the central concept in a variable-sum game and it can only be built upon mutual dependability, and therefore both the Executive of the Institute and the Department have developed very considerable mutual trust, dependability and understanding in which both players can be sure of a consistent line of action by the other. Thus there was no danger in the step taken by the Department.

The position adopted by the Executive vis-a-vis the membership is equally interesting. In securing a promise that the Director of Primary Education would review the position after one year, the Executive felt it could satisfy the anxieties of members. When it was later under pressure from members, the Executive proposed to the Department that bonded student teachers who had been 'placed' should be moved only at the end of a term, and treated as relieving teachers with regard to travelling expenses. Both of these propositions were turned down by the Department. This placed a strain on the Executive position, but a strain it was able to bear.

The strategy of the Education Boards is not difficult to analyse: they were in favour of any reasonable scheme which would provide more teachers for their schools.

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29. T.C.Schelling op.cit., p.86.

Information. In this set-play the Department was acting from complete information. It is to be noted that Department officers shared this complete information with the Executive's negotiators, though of course it was not made available to the NZEI membership. Certainly the membership did not have anything like complete information, but this must be an habitual occurrence where a body places complete trust in its negotiators.

Coalition. In many variable-sum games coalition would appear to lose some of its force as a concept, though this is not always the case. In this game situation for example, the coalition between the Institute Executive and the Department is stronger than that between the Executive and the Institute membership, and of more value in solving the problem at hand. It is apparent that if government administrators are to take non-government leadership fully into their confidence, they substantially alter the relationship of that leadership to its members. Most supporters of democratic government are in favour of as much non-government participation in administrative decisions as possible; they must, however, take into account the consequences of such participation for the structure of leadership in the non-government body concerned. It must become more autocratic (in structure, it should be noted, not in spirit).

The main body of dissent in this game situation was the New Zealand University Students Association (NZUSA), whose opposition to all forms of bonding was well known. Their opposition, however, while of a general nature, was more directed at post-primary bonding and was of little importance in this particular play.

This completes discussion on the Executive game. The second game situation is more concerned with the membership of the NZEI.

(B) BACKGROUND. The second game situation concerns the NZEI's 'Revaluation Campaign'. The campaign originated in a remit to the annual meeting in 1961, which was later referred to the Executive for consideration. It was in six parts and called for an additional year's training, an entrance qualification of University Entrance and a professional qualification at Bachelor level. It also called upon members to make every effort to assist the Executive in cooperative planning to overcome the initial problems.

The rationale behind the campaign which the sponsors of the remit, the Wellington Branch, initiated was as follows: "Government alone can implement reform but reform can only come when it is politically expedient. Teachers must so present the issues and prepare public approval that Government is enabled to act."[30] Total revaluation meant simply that education should come to occupy not only a major part in the Government's economic planning but also in the thinking of the people.

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30. Memorandum to Executive from the Wellington Branch, August 1961.

"Total revaluation" the memorandum went on, "has as its particular objective the placing of the teaching profession in a position where it can negotiate with the Department and with Government a signed agreement for the lengthening by one year of the initial training course."[31] It was stressed strongly that the Institute should show its willingness to help overcome the initial teacher shortage caused by the scheme. The Wellington Branch called upon the National Executive and all other branches to take up the campaign and make a united effort.

At the August meeting of Executive two members of the Wellington Branch explained in detail the nature ofthe campaign they wished to promote. At the same time the Branch formally applied to have the remit discussed in detail at the next annual meeting. Had it desired, the NZEI leadership could have made it very difficult for the remit to gain priority, for an NUT technique had recently been adopted whereby branches selected fifteen priority remits only for discussion. But in making this fact known to the Wellington Branch, the Secretary advised them to make other branches fully aware of the nature of the remit so as to ensure its full support and discussion.

As a consequence the branch published a pamphlet entitled : Total Revaluation of the Teaching Service - From Crisis to Campaign.[32] A campaign was envisaged with the following four stages: internal planning and organisation; winning public support; negotiations with the Government and, finally, a concerted effort to overcome the problems caused by the initial teacher shortage. "We must create a climate of opinion favourable to the teaching profession . . . either we gain effective publicity for our campaign or we must put up with frustration until other forces create a general opinion that is in line with ours." The pamphlet concluded with the call: "See your branch actively supports this vitally important remit."[33]

A revaluation committee was set up and an ex-journalist schoolteacher was seconded from the teaching service following the 1962 annual meeting. By July of 1962 the revaluation committee had undertaken the following: an explanatory pamphlet had been sent to individual members; presidential statements and press statements had been prepared; discussions had been started with representatives of the PTA and NZSCF; a survey of teacher opinion had been undertaken (through the pages of National Education); speakers' notes had been prepared; representatives of Lions Clubs had been approached and articles had been prepared for publication based upon the

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31. Ibid.

32. Printed by Wright and Carman, Wellington, 1962.

33. Ibid.

report of the Monetary and Economics Council which stressed the importance of education to industrial expansion.

Newspapers were approached and assistance was immediately forthcoming from the New Zealand Herald and the Nelson Evening Mail. Training College students were also addressed, in an effort to gain the fullest support.

Towards the end of the year the NZEI sought assistance from some of the major national groups, the first being the National Council of Women and the NZ Retailers Federation. Eventually the Associated Chambers of Commerce, the Federated Farmers, the NZ Manufacturers Federation, and the League of Mothers were contacted. To each, the NZEI stressed the implications of revaluation which were of particular interest to each group: the Institute stressed to the Federated Farmers, for example, the "need for quality teachers if the shortage in country districts is ever to be overcome",[34] and to the Manufacturers' Federation the Institute stressed the connection between increasing productivity and a fully educated people.

At the local level an all-out effort to make wide contact with school committees, PTAs and other community groups was made; each was supplied with copies of September's National Education which carried a supplement on revaluation. By late 1962 the specific objectives of revaluation were being stressed. In a letter sent to the secretaries of school committees and PTAs, emphasis was placed on: higher entrance qualifications; an extra year of training; smaller classes and a greater allocation of the national income to education. By November a revaluation levy had been made (which could not legally be made compulsory) and a monthly newsletter, the Revaluation Campaign News, was being sent to members. In these newsletters much importance was placed on local efforts, and the praises of Stakhanovite branches were sung. Some had established contact with local newspapers and brought into being a weekly education column; others had built up panels of speakers for community meetings. The general campaign was assisted by a CHSPTA publication entitled Education; our Right and our Responsibility.

The Institute president gave an eleven minute talk on the national station and local radio stations were also used. Although it had initially been intended to supply each political party with a set of questions to be answered well prior to the general election, the idea was abandoned, and the only help from the political side was the MP's traditional complaint about conditions in his own area.

At the next annual meeting, the Wellington branch spoke out strongly against Executive leadership, claiming that the campaign had lost momentum and was becoming lost in the established pattern of routine. Other

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34. Revaluation committee Minutes, September 18th 1962.

branches were not content with the standard of literature used in the campaign; one branch wrote to the Executive that whilst agreeing in principle to financing the campaign, they did not approve of the money being spent on "the sort of rubbish received lately". Executive leadership was asserted, however, and 1963 presented opportunities for the intensifying of the campaign, particularly favourable times being: the opening of the school year in February, the annual meetings of the PTAs in March, the biennial householders meetings in April, the annual meeting of the Institute in May and the general election campaign from September to November.

Prior to the election campaign a series of pamphlets was prepared to improve the running of the revaluation campaign at the local level.[35] Election meetings were organised in some areas, usually sponsored by school committees and PTAs, to which parliamentary candidates were invited along with NZEI spokesmen. Such a policy of 'confrontation' was only practicable in the larger centres; in the country areas it would not have been wise for the teachers to become associated with political debates. Country branches, however, arranged for their speakers to visit Rotary, Lions and Jaycee meetings. Working committees for the election were set up in some areas comprising NZEI, school committee and PTA representatives, and a leaflet was sent to every NZEI member advising him to contact his local MP.

Although in many ways successful, the campaign continued to provoke serious criticism from the initiating branch of Wellington. The branch went so far as to circularise to other branches a written criticism of Executive leadership entitled: "A Crisis in the Campaign". Nevertheless before the 1963 election the Government made known its approval in principle of the introduction of the three-year training course and the reduction in size of primary school classes. Following a meeting with a deputation representing the NZSCF, the NZEI and the NZEBA in February 1964, the Minister announced a list of Government priorities: longer training, improved entrance qualifications, smaller classes, ancillary staffing, the provision of adequate equipment and the expediting of the school building programme in older schools. The immediate gains of the campaign were the raising of the entrance qualification in 1964 to Endorsed School Certificate, and the provision of three-year training in 1965.[36]

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35. These were: How to win friends for education and influence people; Telling the people who matter about quality education; How to hold a radio audience; Facts and information for public meetings and How to get best results from a campaign meeting.

36. Government deferred the introduction of 3-year training in 1965 for a period of six months, claiming the delay to be an administrative necessity. The general feeling among educationalists, however, was that the decision was taken for financial reasons.

GAMES ANALYSIS.

It will be interesting to have a closer look at this apparently successful campaign, and to assess more carefully the roles of the membership and the Executive.

Pay-off. It is important to note that from the beginning the campaign was not directed against anybody. This was in effect a realisation that no essential conflict existed between the goals of the various players. Pay-off for each was measured in terms of improving the primary sub-system and dispute was confined to timing and to the order of priorities. There is reason to believe that the membership was initially more concerned with securing smaller classes than with three-year training, for the size of classes affected them more immediately. The officers of the Department on the other hand were anxious to raise teaching standards at the earliest possible moment, and discussion had gone on with Institute negotiators on these topics. In consequence the Executive too became convinced that an extra year's training was more important as a first step than securing smaller classes. Thus when the Minister was able to offer the Institute leadership an option of priorities after the elections in 1963, the latter opted for longer training as a first priority. Pay-off for the membership in the revaluation campaign was simply to create a political atmosphere in which education would secure a greater share of national expenditure and teachers a corresponding rise in status. All players in the game situation were much in agreement with these goals. In addition, there is reasonably strong evidence that the campaign was an expression of 'no confidence' in the Executive's handling of the issues involved. Pay-off for the membership was therefore also concerned with making Executive more responsive to members' aspirations.

Strategy. The questions which one really wants to answer in respect to the strategy of the players are: in terms of its operational goals, to what extent was the campaign successful? Second, to what extent was the campaign responsible for raising the entrance qualification to Endorsed School Certificate and the provision of three-year training? Third, what part did the Executive play in the campaign? Last, what was the departmental strategy?

To begin, the strategy of the membership as set out in the Wellington branch's memorandum to the Executive was realistic. It stated that "reform can only come when it is politically expedient", but a more important consideration in this game situation was practicability. As stated, there was already general agreement among the main players concerning the desirability of the reforms sought, but it was thought to be essential that the country achieve a certain ratio of teachers to pupils before either three-year training or smaller classes were feasible. Further, in From Crisis to Campaign[37] the Wellington branch states: "We must create a climate of opinion

37. See pp. 163,4.

favourable to the teaching profession . . . or put up with frustration until forces create a general policy that is in line with ours." As was shown by the report of the Commission on Education, there already existed a climate of opinion among educationalists favourable to the teachers' demands. The aim of the campaign, then, was to add a sense of urgency by means of agitation on the part of the general public so that decisions agreed to in principle might be acted upon. As a campaign it was as widely effective as any staged by a non-government group since the Education Boards' struggle for survival in 1927-29. The importance attached to gaining the active support of all members, the techniques of cooperation, the astute use of local and national community groups (especially school committees and PTAs) stamped the campaign with a degree of political competence. Yet the campaign does not appear to have produced a tide of public opinion in favour of any specific reforms, largely because revaluation as presented to the public was not a specific concept. If, for example, the campaign leaders had stated: 'We want an extra year's training now and we want smaller classes within five years,'[38] the general public would have known precisely what it was being called upon to support. The information officer employed for the campaign described revaluation as a nebulous term and went on: "There is, unfortunately, some evidence that while we attempt to move forward on a broad front we lose ground on more specific matters."[39] But if the campaign failed to create a strong body of opinion in favour of specific recommendations among the general public, it galvanised those within the public already interested in education and created a rather general feeling of anxiety among others.

The second question - to what extent was the campaign responsible for the raising of the Entrance Qualification and three-year training - the answer must be: it was responsible for action on the part of the Government which was more prompt than might otherwise have been the case. But it should not be imagined that the campaign had any significant effect on the form that action took. The aim of 'revaluation' was by no means original.

Third, what strategy did the Executive adopt? The role of the Executive was important in both controlling the campaign and negotiating the actual conditions of the decision. It was in the Executive's interest that the camapign be moderate and not get out of hand. It would have been easy for a dramatic press statement to have come out of the campaign, and as Schelling points out: "Statements calculated to arouse a public opinion . . . permit no concessions to be made. If a binding public opinion can be cultivated

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38. One is concerned here only with offering an example of a specific goal, or set of goals, for the campaign, and not with the feasibility or desirability of the example given.

39. NZEI 'Revaluation' File, 1963.

and made evident to the other side, the initial position can thereby be made final."[40] In other words, public statements run the risk of establishing an immovable position and thus provoke a likelihood of stalemate; and general campaigns such as the revaluation campaign run the risk of producing such statements.

If, on the other hand, the Executive was restraining the membership (and judging from the criticism of the Wellington Branch it is hard to imagine otherwise), it was bargaining with the Department on the other. There were those on the Executive who set more store on their bargaining position with the Department than on attempts to influence the Government by an appeal to the public. This tended to make them cautious ; they they were carried forward by the pressure of events.

This brings us to the last question: what was Department strategy? It is probable that the Department was grateful for any pressure which could be brought to bear upon the Cabinet to increase education expenditure, provided it did not tie the Government to a specific policy. No doubt departmental officers were anxious, as was the Executive, that the campaign should not get out of hand and jeopardise the close relations between the Department and the NZEI. What the strategy of both players could best aim for was the limited success of the campaign. As has been pointed out, their expectations were to be realised.

Information. The information content of this game situation follows closely the pattern established in the first Institute game situation, in that the Department and the Executive shared information to a very full extent. The membership, on the other hand, was playing from a position of partial information, though this was not a crucial factor. The importance of pooling information between the Department and the Executive is nowhere more in evidence than in this situation where all the factors in the game situation were adequately - if not confidently - controlled.

Coalition. It might appear that one has belittled the contribution made by the Institute membership to the successful gaining of the objectives of revaluation; this is not strictly accurate. Rather the aim has been to separate the objectives - which had been Institute policy since the days of the Atmore report[41] - from the actual campaign. The campaign itself was a success, which says a great deal for the organisation and enthusiasm which characterised it. The objectives were achieved by consultation between Department officers and the NZEI negotiators and not by the campaign itself, which acted as a catalyst.

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40. T.C.Schelling op.cit. p.28.

41. NZEI submission to the Commission on Education.

As for the campaign, the most important coalition was formed with the school committees and PTAs, who were most willing and energetic allies. The attempt to secure other community groups for the coalition was less successful but none the less important.

This concludes discussion of the Institute game. It is now proposed to return to the fields of administration to introduce the last of the primary games, the committee game.

III

The Committee Game - a "fixed-sum" Game. The committee game is played principally between the committees and the Boards, though the committees have access to coalitions with the Department, the local MP and the Minister of Education. Like the Board game, the committee game is concerned with administration. Although the pattern of relations is generally harmonious, the underlying pressures exhibit a certain jealousy of function which often leads to a conflict situation. The committee game therefore tends to be fixed-sum, though it should be remembered that relations differ from Education District to Education District. The game situation chosen here is concerned, typically enough, with buildings, and in it, the sum of gains is fixed; only one side can win.

BACKGROUND. In its annual estimates, the Board had provided for rebuilding part of a certain school. The school committee, however, had put forward a plan for remodelling those sections. With action imminent, the committee voted strongly in favour of remodelling and communicated this decision to the Board, stating that such a method would make possible considerably financial saving. The headteacher, it was reported, held a similar view. The Board's architect, however, believed that any financial saving would be short-term, for the building would still have to be replaced in the not-too-distant future. Seeking a compromise, Board members suggested a meeting between Board officers and committee members for the following month. At this meeting the committee showed itself quite adamant. For its part, the Board intended to go ahead with plans to rebuild,[42] and wrote to the headteacher for details to be put into the justification. Such had been the delay, however, that the scheme had to be deferred until the following year.[43] Having failed to gain satisfaction from the Board, the school committee had meanwhile contacted the local MP, who took the case to the Minister of Education, and presented a detailed argument in favour of the stand the committee had taken. Down through the departmental hierarchy, through the Regional Office and back to the Board came the school committee's case, but the Board's chief architect stood firm: the

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42. Each new building has to be justified in compliance with Treasury recommendations, see Chapter Six.

43. The programme for the coming year has to be forwarded to the Department in November of each year.

foundation of the present building might be solid enough, but the structure was 'so old and obsolete' that he could not recommend major remodelling as the committee had suggested. Following the architect's report, the Executive Committee of the Education Board reiterated its original view, suggesting the inclusion of the scheme for rebuilding in the following year's building programme.

The Regional Office, however, sent the scheme back to the Board, 'advising' its deletion from the programme until such time as 'investigations had progressed to the stage where a decision could be made as to which of the two schemes would be adopted.' Meanwhile, in the course of normal business, the school committee and the Board were still communicating. It is interesting that the committee offered a compromise, suggesting that if the wall between two existing rooms were removed to form an assembly hall, the committee's opposition to rebuilding might end. The compromise was doomed to failure, since the scheme was impracticable on safety grounds. The committee then made known its intention to press for the modernisation of the existing block and threatened to take the matter to the Director of Education for adjudication. At this stage the question took on a more overtly financial colouring. The Board plans, works and tenders sub-committee resolved that it could not agree to the 'expenditure from maintenance monies for remodelling'. This meant in effect that if the Department supported the committee, as appeared likely, then it would have to foot the bill for remodelling. The Board then informed departmental officers that it would agree to defer rebuilding if the Department would finance the remodelling which the committee requested.

The possibility of incurring additional expense did not appeal to the Department which still sought for a compromise solution. A joint inspection of the school building was undertaken, in which the chief architect of the Board took part, together with regional officers of the department and the headteacher. After a considerable amount of delay, it was stated that the Department would offer a counter proposal for the Board's consideration. When, after further delay, this arrived, it was simply a modified version for remodelling at less cost. The position had reached a stage of deadlock, since the Board refused to finance remodelling, even at less cost, and the Department refused to sanction rebuilding.

The deadlock was broken after a second visit to the Minister of Education by the local Member. Again the whole fact-finding process was repeated - down through the Department, the Regional Office and thus to the Board. The Minister finally proposed that the costs of remodelling be shared, with the Department paying by far the larger share. The Board accepted this solution, and thus after approximately two years the issue was resolved. It should be noted, however, that the Board was still in a position to delay remodelling, which it did. Whether this was a result of necessity or the spirit of revenge it is impossible to say; it is certain, however, that the decision to delay remodelling did not meet shocked disapproval at the Board meeting.

GAMES ANALYSIS. It would appear that an argument over whether a school - or a part of a school - should be remodelled or rebuilt should never have produced such controversy. Yet a games analysis shows that in fact much more was at stake.

Pay-off. In the beginning, the committee's motive for wishing to have the school remodelled was, it said, to save the taxpayer's money. In reality it was nothing of the sort. If the school were remodelled, it would gain an assembly hall in the process (i.e. its roll had declined and in the section to be remodelled one of the old classrooms could have been enlarged). It was for precisely this reason that the compromise proposal of removing the wall between two of the other classrooms was offered. Had this been acceptable, then the committee would have agreed to rebuilding, despite the cost to the taxpayers. Pay-off for the school committee then, is closely associated with the gaining of an assembly hall. For his part, the headteacher was chiefly concerned with the fact thatthe school roll was diminishing and if the Education Board were to rebuild a section of the school, it would reduce the overall size and thus remove any chance that the school might have of building up its roll once more, and therefore its grade. In common with the school committee, he would certainly have been anxious to obtain an assembly hall for the school; in fact it was probably the headteacher who put this idea in the committee's mind at the outset. Pay-off for the headteacher was connected with professional ambition.

As for the Education Board, the position it adopted is not difficult to account for in terms of pay-off. If the school were to be rebuilt, the finance would come directly from the Government; remodelling would come from the Board's maintenance grant. Again, if the school were rebuilt, the Board would be involved in very little maintenance outlay over the following five or six years. In addition to these practical grounds, more emotional ones existed. Whether a school is to be remodelled or rebuilt is primarily the Board's affair and the Board architect had recommended rebuilding.

Pay-off is a less useful concept in seeking to explain the role adopted by the Department. It was acting merely as the agent of Government (in the form of the Minister of Education). The Minister's own role, and that of the local MP, are explained in terms of political pay-off. For the former, pay-off meant satisfying the greatest number of voters, and for the latter it offered the opportunity to prove to local people that he was their champion.

Strategy. It will be noticed that the committee, in presenting its case to the Board, did so almost entirely in terms of 'saving the taxpayers' money'. Yet when it contacted the local Member, the Committee put equal stress on the gaining of an assembly hall. This would presumably be for two reasons. First, the Member would not be so naive as to imagine that a committee acted solely from the desire to save public money. Second, the Member was himself

a local man. He would be happy to see a local school obtain an assembly hall, and it would boost his image locally to have helped in the proceedings. In taking the matter outside the formal structure, the committee broke a fundamental rule of the game (see Chapter Four), and if it failed, it would have to pay the consequences. But it was not likely to lose in the process, since left to its own devices, the Board would not reconsider its attitude to the issue.

Once in the political arena, the game took on a different complexion. Strategy as far as the MP was concerned consisted not so much in securing the aims of the school committee as in appearing to press for those aims strongly. It was more the form than the substance that was important, and this is not to be wondered at since the political game is basically a spectator game. That the Minister too was more concerned with form is shown by the fact that when the Education Board delayed remodelling of the school and the Member asked in the House what could be done to expedite matters, the Minister replied that the problem was in the hands of the Board, who would no doubt deal with it as soon as was possible. He had played the part in the game demanded of him, and had lost interest. Strategy as far as the Board was concerned turned very much upon its belief that its own autonomy was threatened and the professional competence of its officers doubted. Further, it was not at all happy that the school committee had seen fit to make the matter a political issue.

Information. The sole issue at stake in reality was whether or not it was financially expedient to remodel or rebuild part of a school. Given that one proposal was to be preferred, it follows that one side in the game was acting from more complete information than the other, but which it was we will never know. The Board is probably more likely to have had the more accurate information. But both sides had good reason to present the cases they did; reasons which were in no way concerned with the accuracy of the information to hand. When the dispute reached the political level, complete information was almost an irrelevancy.

Coalition. In this game situation the Board was isolated. Because it was quite unable to secure a favourable result by its own efforts, the school committee decided to seek a coalition with the Minister and his own Department. The most straightforward method of doing this was through the local Member, because had the committee approached the Department, it could have referred the matter back to the Board without becoming involved. But, because the issue had already been made political when it reached the Minister, he was forced to act. The Department itself seems to have acted merely as an agent of the Government, and sought, without success, to bring about a compromise. This completes our analysis of a game situation in the school committee game.

Conclusions. There is nothing typical about the above cases in the sense that most matters arising in the administration (professional and administrative) of primary education are less contentious and are settled more amicably. Yet in the sense that the cases illustrate the kind of pressures and relationships which exist within the primary sub-system they are typical. It is as unrealistic to impute entirely selfish motives to any individual as it is to imagine people - especially those involved in decision-making - acting from pure altruism. Nevertheless a person's allegiance significantly affects his behaviour. Certain patterns of behaviour become associated with groups in certain situations and this lays the foundation for a games analogy, for games analogy is basically concerned with describing the pressures underlying these patterns of group behaviour.

Thus, in this section, we have attempted to fulfil the two objectives which were set in the Introduction, namely to describe the sub-system in detail, and second, to provide some general patterns of political behaviour, as a basis for the better understanding of democratic government in action in New Zealand.

SECTION THREE

The Post-Primary, or Secondary Sub-System.

Section Three is concerned with post-primary, or secondary education. It should be pointed out that both terms are in current use in New Zealand, though 'secondary' is gaining favour.* With the growth of tertiary education it is obviously the more logical term. It is impossible, however, for us to select one term and use it exclusively here. Both exist in the titles of the bodies we shall be discussing. Perhaps it is best to say that both terms are synonymous and, except in names and titles, quite interchangeable.

This section comprises four chapters and follows the pattern of Section Two closely. We shall deal first with the statutory decision-making bodies in local administration, the secondary school boards, in Chapter Eight. Chapter Nine will be concerned with the post-primary teachers' body, the PPTA, and Chapter Ten with the Department of Education, or those sections basically - though not exclusively - concerned with post-primary education, such as the Regional Offices. Chapter Eleven will, like Chapter Seven, offer some game situations which, it is hoped, will complete the picture of post-primary education by showing the sub-system in action.

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* In fact the term 'post-primary schools' was changed to 'secondary schools' by Act of Parliament in 1964. (Education Act 1964, clause 82).

Chapter Eight

THE SECONDARY SCHOOL BOARDS

Secondary schools are administered, at the local level, by secondary school boards, or boards of governors. Like Education Boards and school committees, these bodies have lost power over the years to the central Department. However, they have managed to maintain individual contacts with the Department and have been even more jealous of their autonomy than the Education Boards. The growth of the sub-system naturally eroded some of the value of this 'personal' contact and after the second world war, boards came together in an association intended to provide a means for collective action. But boards have shown themselves as averse to losing freedom of action to their own association as to the central Department. As a result, this body has not been very powerful.

The diverse nature of secondary education itself militated against collective action, and has been responsible for a wide range of interests among the boards. This diversity accounts for the existence of a second national body which has traditionally spoken for the technical high schools. But in recent years a definite pattern of co-educational, multilateral secondary schools has emerged.[1] The technical high schools are vanishing. It is thus reasonable to expect that collective action will prove more acceptable to secondary boards in the future.

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1. In its submission to the Commission on Education, the Department noted that: "The co-educational multi-course school is quite obviously the most natural way of providing post-primary education for all kinds in an area which can support only one school". With regard to co-education, the Department has never adopted a rigid attitude, but the general lack of women teachers prepared to teach in all-girls' schools makes single sex schools impracticable in some areas. In 1960 of the 150 post-primary schools in New Zealand, 106 (i.e. 71%) were co-educational. The practical reasons for the Department's predilection for the co-educational multilateral school are as follows:

   i) One large school is cheaper to build than two smaller ones.

   ii) It is increasingly difficult to find sites for schools in urban areas.

   iii) Larger schools are able to use staff more economically.

   iv) There is greater flexibility in a larger school for the provision of a wide range of subjects.

In this chapter it is intended to follow a pattern similar to that of Chapters Three and Four. Sub-sections will be concerned with: a brief historical introduction; structure and functions of boards; elections and membership; local relations; the boards' spokesman on national policy, the Secondary Schools Boards' Association (SSBA); finally mention will be made of the place of the Technical Education Association (TEA) in the secondary sub-system.

I

Initially secondary school boards were fairly independent. The 1877 Education Act was concerned only with primary schools, but a series of independent Acts about that time set up a number of local high schools, the governing bodies of which controlled land endowments. No control was exercised by the Department and - if we are to believe Webb [2] - inspection, until 1899 at least, was perfunctory. The continued growth of secondary education during the twentieth century however tended to bring new pressures to bear upon the system. In the early days, many students were interested in secondary education principally as a means to enter the university. This meant that university requirements exercised a commanding influence upon the curriculum of the secondary school. But with expansion, the old system was becoming increasingly unsuited to the needs of the average pupil. It thus became necessary for central authority (i.e. the Department) to act in order to broaden the curriculum. The failure of technical high schools, under the "pressure of popular demand", to offer a viable alternative form of education [3] made this action all the more pressing. Thus, if only for pedagogic reasons, secondary school boards were certain to lose some of their autonomy.

Yet there were other equally strong pressures upon board autonomy, the most important of which was brought to bear by the teachers. Until 1920 boards were responsible for teachers' salaries and under this system, "wide variations existed from one authority to another in scales of salaries of post-primary teachers. These salary scales were low and did nothing to raise the standard of qualifications among post-primary teachers". [4]

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2. Leicester Webb, The Control of Education, pp.118-121.

3. See Report of the Commission on Education, 1962, p. 79.

4. Submission of the Department of Education to the Commission on Education, 1962, quoted in the Commission's Report, p. 80.

Thus the Education Amendment Act of 1920 and the national grading scheme of the same year weakened board autonomy. Further, these changes made necessary a new basis for the financing of post-primary education: henceforth boards were reimbursed for the payment of salaries and received a capitation grant for administrative costs.

Nonetheless it is true to say, with the Commission on Education, that: "The autonomy of high school boards had never been curbed by central control to the same degree as that of the Education Boards".[5] After all, secondary schools had been centrally inspected - in however perfunctory a manner - from the start. Their right to determine courses of study had always been limited, to some extent at least, by the regulations concerning the instruction of free-place pupils. Thus, though their losses have been substantial, they have not matched those of the Education Boards. It is not loss of autonomy in these major areas which has caused concern among boards, but the loss on specific administrative capacities. Recent examples of such losses of power include:

(i) Appointments. In the 1948 Regulations, governing bodies could appoint grade Five teachers to positions of responsibility; the 1957 Regulations severely limited this power, making it subject to the prior approval of the Director.

(ii) Hostel management. The Regulations issued in 1948 gave boards the power to appoint a hostel manager. The 1951 Regulations severely restricted this power. More recently, regulations and directives have been issued relating to the rules of pay of housemasters and house tutors and the rents of houses and flats which they occupy.

(iii) Purchase of land for school purposes. Before 1949, the controlling authorities were empowered to purchase land for the extensions to school sites, and such property was vested in the controlling authority. Now, all properties to be acquired are purchased by the Ministry of Works, and the title is in the Crown's name. In 1958 departmental control was extended still further.[6]

It was in order to defend what was left after such encroachments that secondary boards turned increasingly to collective action, but we shall speak of the SSBA later.

II

Secondary schools may be placed under their own board, under

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5. Report of the Commission on Education, 1962, p.79.

6. See SSBA submission to the Commission on Education, 1962, op. cit.

the board of another secondary school, or under a secondary schools' council or similar scheme - in which case the school will still have its own board with authority in domestic matters and will appoint one member to the council in addition. The powers and duties of secondary boards are set out in a standard scheme of control which is revised from time to time.

Board Functions. In the revised standard scheme of 1961, one reads that:

> "Boards shall, subject to the Education Act and the regulations thereunder, and to this scheme, have full power from time to time to make, alter and rescind by-laws and rules for defining the courses and education in the schools, and also for regulating the discipline of the same, the conditions upon which pupils shall be admitted, and in general, touching all other matters, purposes and things regarding the school". [7]

Thus the boards have control over the management of the school and superintendence over all its concerns and property. They have the power to appoint, suspend and dismiss teachers and to determine the courses to be followed at the school. But each of these powers has severe limitations under the Education Act, regulations and scheme of control. To take one example, the boards' right to determine courses of study concerns only the 'optionals' and not the basic subjects. In reality there is not much variation among the courses of the secondary schools - except of course as between boys' and girls' schools.

In practice, the boards must exercise their powers in conjunction with the principal of the school. Subject to the 'general direction' of the board the principal regulates the selection and distribution of all textbooks and is responsible for the internal organisation of the school. He recommends the appointment and dismissal of teachers and allots duties. He must be consulted before appointments are made and may suspend a teacher for 'grave neglect of duty'. He is considered supreme over matters of discipline and may suspend any pupil, though he must notify the parents and report to the board. He cannot expel a pupil without the sanction of the board. "All these powers", the standard scheme states, "are held subject to the general power of the board". [8]

Obviously there is an overlap of functions. The Department's view is that:

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7. Revised Standard Scheme of Control for Secondary Schools, Wellington, Government Printer, 1961.

8. Ibid.

"It is generally assumed that the board is supreme on administrative matters and on appointment of staff (the principal must be consulted); and the principal bears the main responsibility in matters of curriculum, syllabuses of instruction, allocation of duties among staff and the control of pupils. Any attempt to be more clear cut than that should be deprecated. Obviously that school functions best when principal and board are in complete harmony". 9

Structure of Boards. Schools can choose a structure for their board within the following limits.

(i) Numbers: There should be between 9 and 11 members, but where a board controls more than one school, one or two additional members may be approved.

(ii) The board must include:

At least one member appointed by the Education Board.
At least four members elected by parents.

(iii) The remainder may include any of the following:

a) Additional members from either category in section (ii) - in fact it is now usual for boards to have more than the minimum number of parent representatives.

b) A member co-opted by the board itself.

c) Representatives of: local bodies in the area.
employers/employees of local industry.
old pupils' association of the school.
school committees of contributing schools.
university of the district.
other local groups or organisations of which the Minister may approve.

Thus the actual structure of the secondary school board is determined within the limits of a fairly set pattern. The schools under the Wellington Secondary Schools' Council for example (with one exception) have three members representing respectively the city council, the Victoria University of Wellington and the Wellington Education Board. Old pupils' associations are represented on four of the boards, contributing primary school committees on one, and employer/employee representatives on one.

III

Elections. Parents' representatives are elected on a postal vote. In the case of the Wellington schools, pupils address envelopes to their parents. The envelopes are sent out from the Secondary Schools' Council complete with voting papers and a reply envelope, which is not stamped. The response rate is not usually high, though it would compare favourably with school committee and Education Board elections. In the four elections held in Wellington in 1966, 36 candidates contested 23 places.

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9. Information for Principals of Post-Primary Schools, (pamphlet for a Wallis House Course, 1961), p.16.

Yet on occasions there is no election at all. This is chiefly because the local paretns' association often sponsors what amounts to a ticket. With the support of the organised parents, these candidates are often unopposed. Thus where the parents' association is not strong, contested elections are more likely. When an issue arises, over the treatment of certain pupils for example, elections are likely to be keenly contested. At one school studied, a dispute had arisen concerning the punishment accorded to one pupil. Nine candidates contested the six available places and the voting rate was above 63%. On the whole, it would appear that membership of a secondary school board is a more sought-after privilege than either school committee or Education Board membership - if participation at elections gives any indication.

Membership. If lay participation is encouraged by the breadth of power possessed by a body, this would partially account for the comparative popularity of secondary school boards. But an equally important factor is social prestige. Membership of the board of a good local school, especially in a country or small town area, is a distinct social asset. Although the parent representation on only eight boards was studied, the results, according to the categories used in Chapters Three and Four, showed the following.

Professional	14
Minor business	12
Clerical	14
Farming	0
Skilled	2
Unskilled	0
Domestic	0
Housewife	3
Retired	0
Total	42

Although no general evidence was available, the secretary of the SSBA was of the opinion that the composition of the above schools was reasonably typical of the general pattern in urban areas. Obviously in predominantly rural areas, the farming category would expand at the expense of the professional, minor business and clerical categories. Tradesmen are more strongly represented on the more technically oriented schools, but because of the expertise they bring, they would be welcome on any board. With regard to the 'Unskilled' category, the political and social inactivity of this group relative to other groups has been noted so often in other situations that it should arouse no astonishment here.

IV

Boards and Administration. There are three chief areas of board activity, namely works (building), staffing and finance. The majority of boards organise themselves in such a way as to cope with activity in these areas. Such organisation normally takes the form of committees or persons with delegated authority. In many of the larger schools the works committee is almost continuously active, so often are the schools in need of some building or minor repair work. Staffing is an area in which the board is not supposed to delegate authority, but such is the difficulty of obtaining staff that it is the area of most delegation in practice. If it were not, the system of appointments in this age of teacher scarcity would probably collapse. Thus the situation offers another example of New Zealand pragmatism sacrificing the rule for the system. The majority of boards appoint one of their number to represent them at the executive meetings of the Parents' Association. A few boards also have what they call 'education committees'. These committees prepare background information for board discussions on various aspects of the system, such as accrediting, the school certification examination and so on. Thus the majority of secondary boards offer a reasonably (sometimes highly) efficient system of administration. Further, they bring to administration the positive asset of local interest and effort. The chairman of one board controlling an urban girls' school estimated that, in conjunction with the Parents' Association, his board had raised over £40,000 since the Second World War. This may not be typical but it is far from unique and though it would be quite impossible to make any accurate assessment of a national figure over a similar period, there can be no doubt that it would constitute a very substantial amount.

Not all boards operate a committee system and not all boards are efficiently run. In a number the personality of the chairman makes delegation impossible. He retains complete control and is responsible for the only work which is done between the monthly board meetings. Board efficiency is hampered in other ways by personality factors. Most important of these are: personality clashes between strong-minded chairmen and principals; the domination of school and board by a strong- minded principal; the proliferation of what might be called 'status-seekers' - members, that is to say, who sit simply for the status they believe accrues to membership; and finally the appointees from Education Boards and local bodies, whose place on the board is sometimes due to reasons other than a desire to serve secondary

education. More often than not it is the parents' representatives, with the numerical majority, who supply the dynamism of a truly effective board. But they suffer the disadvantage of being 'new men' when their appointed colleagues may enjoy greater continuity of service.

What sometimes emerges is a three-year cycle in which newly elected members, eager and ambitious for the school, lack the confidence or ability to lead the board. Thus they tend to rely upon the direction of the principal or the 'old hands' within the board. With the second year, these members are less eager and ambitious and firmly under the control of the established members. By the third year they will either have joined the establishment or will sit out their terms and not seek re-election. Of course, not all boards follow this pattern, but by virtue of their composition, it is a condition to which all are susceptible. What can prevent the cycle emerging is a powerful parents' organisation.

Relations with the principal. It is convenient at this point to expand on the position of the principal vis-à-vis the board. There exists at the secondary level of the education system a power vacuum. When discussing the powers of boards and principals earlier in this chapter, a comment made by the Department was quoted, to the effect that it is 'generally assumed' that boards are supreme on matters of administration and on appointment of staff, and the principal in professional matters.[10] The final comment is worth reiterating: "Any attempt to be more clear cut than that should be deprecated". What this means, in effect, is that boards and principals must reach some understanding. But that understanding will be based more upon the personalities involved than upon the regulations, and will sometimes be the result of a trial of strength. Staffing, for example, is nominally a power of the boards, though the principal must be consulted. In fact, many principals have taken this power into their own hands, and their primacy is accepted by boards. As a consequence, the position has developed so that the strong-minded principal is almost a law unto himself in some situations. He may evolve long-term staffing plans of which the

10. Such statements seem to assume a generally accepted definition of 'administrative' and 'porfessional'. But no such definition exists, as the president of the TEA showed. When addressing the annual conference of that body in 1966 he stated: "There seems to be a growing acceptance on the part of lay members that what takes place in a classroom is a professional matter and, as such, is beyond the scope and authority of the governing body". "On the contrary," he argued, "what takes place in a classroom is very much society's concern!"(Dominion, Wednesday October 5th, 1966)

board has no inkling and bring pressure to bear on staff members to leave.[11] There are examples of teachers' positions being advertised many months before they have handed in their notice and examples of teachers being 'pressured' to state their future intentions formally long before the statutory two months prior to their departure. A principal can only take such action if he is sure that he has the backing of his board, and he will have its backing if he is seen to be acting for the good of the school. Of course no matter of school administration is divorced from the professional or educational needs of the school and the principal can obtain a similarly dominating position in most matters which concern the boards. The principal is responsible for the day-to-day administration of the school. He has the knowledge, experience and confidence to lead, and more often than not he will do so.

On the other hand, boards have also been known to take advantage of the power vacuum and expand their influence into professional matters, as the following example will show.[12]

Without exceeding its legal powers, one board had 'violated precedents and practices long established' by:

(i) Claiming the right to determine professional matters such as the institution of a course leaving certificate and scrutineering teachers' class allocations.

(ii) Allotting duties, such as fire drill, renting the hall or gymnasium, selling sweets at the tuck shop, to particular teachers, without reference to the headteacher.

(iii) Failing to invite the headteacher to committee meetings of the board.

Where boundaries are ill-defined, poaching is certain to occur from time to time and with an almost equal certainty it will result in conflict. By following events in the above case we are provided with an example.

When a new principal took over at the school in question he immediately sought to re-establish his authority and a dispute arose over the appointment of a new head of department. The principal had appointed one applicant but his decision was reversed by the board. Now although the board was legally entitled to take such action, in appointing its own choice it did not consult with the principal beforehand. This was not legal. Being informed later of what amounted to a <u>fait accompli</u>, the principal informed the Regional Office. With the assistance

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11. The PPTA is not always able to assist actively in such situations, as will be shown in Chapter Nine.

12. PPTA files, 1960.

of regional senior officers the principal was eventually able to re-establish his authority.

It is interesting to note that Regional Offices cannot interfere in such disputes until one party actually acts outside the regulations. In the above case the new principal spoke of a "feeling of impotence experienced by the staff because of the inability of the PPTA and the Department to find any chinks in the board's armour".[13]

In the majority of cases however boards and principals reach an understanding, and when they do, they possess a great potential for power in the local situation. This is not so much the case in matters of budgeting and general administration of funds[14] as in creating what might be described as a 'tone' or 'atmosphere' for the school.

Atmosphere of Secondary Schools. A considerable amount of criticism has been brought to bear upon the secondary sub-system alleging that the atmosphere in most secondary schools is authoritarian.[15] Much of this criticism is ill-conceived, but some comes too often from well-informed New Zealanders to be ignored. The subject of school uniform offers an example of an area in which a rigid attitude is often taken. Having secured the legal authority to enforce the wearing of school uniforms,[16] some schools have gone to unusual lengths to insist that the students wear a complete uniform, from standard white gloves for the girls to standard style shoes. The question of relations between the sexes at co-educational schools offers a further example of a rigid attitude enforced by principals and

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13. Ibid.

14. The financing of secondary education is set out in detail in Appendix 'D', part 11.

15. For example, visiting educationalist David Ausubel, speaking at the annual conference of the Justice Department in 1958, criticised post-primary education as being "unnecessarily repressive and authoritarian, and incongruous with the generally egalitarian spirit of interpersonal relations in New Zealand". He referred also to the "militaristic atmosphere of the school, the exaggerated deference to the teachers and headmasters, the

boards.[17] A third example in which the principal and his board can adopt a rigid attitude which will affect the climate of the school is in admissions. Although any pupil may attend the school of his parent's choice as of right, it is a right which is not always observed.[18] A number of schools have used their own methods of selection for some time. One school was operating "some special form of merit judgment" which, according to one observer, seemed to "add up to an attempt to raise the academic name of the school by accepting only those pupils who are sure things from the teaching point of view".[19]

There can be little doubt that some secondary schools are bastions of conservatism and conventionality and that the composition of the controlling boards is a contributing factor. "Since I was a school master for a short time", one New Zealand novelist commented, "I would rather like to have a high school of my own for a short term - of all my ambitions the least likely of achievement, since in my country a school board will always contain too many conventional, timid people and they appoint their own kind".[20] The increase of parent representation on the boards is having an effect however, and the atmosphere in many schools is becoming less rigid. But as has been pointed out, though parents' representatives might form a numerical majority, it does not always follow that theirs will be the prime influence.

Appointing a headteacher. The most important of all the tasks which the secondary board has to perform is one in which its competence is most open to question, namely the selection of a headteacher. Although candidates for selection have to meet certain requirements with regard to grading and experience, and although the Department is in a position to offer advice, a board

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17. One prominent educationalist, drawing from his own experience in teaching, claimed: "A boy is caned because he defied school rules and walked home with a girl; his explanation that this was his sister weighed not at all except against him as impertinent and irrelevant, the holy school rules say...'boys and girls must sit on opposite sides of the quadrangle for lunch and not communicate with each other in any way'; so the daring thing to do is to wave at your girlfriend and not get caught". (Marcus Riske, "We are What we Feel", Where Now , Critical Essays on New Zealand Education , Wellington Teachers' College, 1964.)

18. It should be noted that in this context a board has final authority in determining what pupils may enter its school or schools. (Letter from the Department of Education to the SSBA, February 9th 1962).

19. See H.W. Orsman, "School Enrolment", Comment No. 24, August 1965, p. 6.

20. Guthrie Wilson, Sweet White Wine, London, Robert Hale, 1956, p. 67.

is allowed a wide measure of freedom. It has been argued that such a decision must rest with the board, since the board controls the school and since it is the board itself which must work with the headteacher. However, it will almost certainly be without experience in the task of selection. Because principals often hold their posts for a considerable number of years, few boards are in a position to act from past experience. It is a decision of the greatest importance which can be taken only once. It is a decision which, under the present system, is taken by a body of laymen whose criterion is at best common sense and at worst prejudice.

In his novel The Incorruptibles,[21] Guthrie Wilson offers an interesting analysis of the selection of a new headteacher by the board of an Australian school. Since he was involved in legal proceedings in New Zealand following the publication of this book, it is possible to assume that a number of his comments were pertinent to the New Zealand setting. At all events, the process of selection which Wilson describes is the same as that operated by New Zealand schools and it is not unreasonable to assume that he was drawing on his New Zealand experiences. He endeavours to show how some members of the board adopted attitudes more as a part of some personal struggle with another board member than for their validity. It is well known that the interview has many flaws as a means of selecting candidates for certain tasks. Wilson points to the interview more as a consolidation of stands already taken. In short, the considerations taken into account by board members were by no means all educational. The author claims that the books is not about any people or situations in particular. Rather it is about:

> "...how democracy makes its appointments, and the extent to which preferences of members of an appointing authority are influenced by such extraneous circumstances as pressure groups, personal ambition, self-identification, and what happened in the woodshed. ...There is nothing peculiar about the appointment of a headmaster. The selection of a City Engineer, of a Prime Minister, or of any other position-holder dependent upon a majority decision, would disclose as many differing motives and creeds in the selectors, although it is doubtful whether as much heat is aroused...it is true that choler and contention seem to associate themselves with senior appointments to schools to a marked degree". 22

In his study of post-primary edministration,[23] Campbell felt that the making of appointments, especially to headships, was one area which could benefit from a weakening of local control.

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21. Guthrie Wilson, The Incorruptibles, London, Hutchinson, 1950.

22. Ibid, author's postscript

23. A.E. Campbell, The Control of Post-Primary Schools, Wellington, NZCER, 1948.

He felt that although the secondary board members concerned had strong claims to the power to appoint a headteacher, since it was they who would have to work with him through the years, they should have less autonomy in this matter. Only then could a "more objective attitude" be achieved which would give "more weight to strictly professional considerations".[24] Naturally any attempt to restrict the autonomy of secondary boards further would be strongly resisted, but opinion among post-primary teachers is hardening against local appointments, and a more rigid national system is a possible line of development for the future.

The position of Secondary Boards in the sub-system. "However autonomous these people are just agents of the government", one departmental officer commented of secondary board members. It is quite untrue to state that members are 'just agents of the government'. However it is certainly true that boards generally cling to their 'autonomy' with great tenacity. It is equally true, and of greater importance, that without departmental intervention at regional level, the whole scheme of administration would become unworkable. Many of New Zealand's secondary schools are extremely well-run; they attract men of high calibre to their controlling bodies and teachers of quality to their staff. Yet some are poorly-run; their board members are in constant administrative difficulties and their staff transitory. It is now proposed to discuss the national spokesman of the secondary boards, the SSBA.

V

The New Zealand Secondary School Boards' Association (SSBA) was formed in 1945 with a membership of some 20 boards. By 1965 it represented 178 schools. The objects of the SSBA are seen to be:

(a) To provide the means whereby the collective views of boards controlling secondary schools may be presented to the Government or to any other authority, commission or committee.

(b) To assist boards by the dissemination of information.

(c) To endeavour to improve the efficiency of schools and to increase the welfare of pupils and staff.

(d) To provide for any other matters relating to the status and power of secondary school boards. 25

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24. Ibid, p. 27

25. See the Constitution of the Secondary School Boards' Association.

Organisational problems. Despite the very substantial growth in membership, which is largely due to the general expansion of secondary education, the SSBA has no statutory recognition.[26] This means that the Association has no authority beyond that provided by the unity of its membership: "Unless we can speak with one voice - and forcefully - they're just going to ignore us", said an SSBA leader. Second, the SSBA suffers from a shortage of finance. The balance sheet of the Association as at 30th June 1966 showed total assets of £158. 2. 4d. Nothing sets a firmer limit upon the effectiveness of a pressure organisation than lack of funds. Third, the SSBA has been in no position to undertake background research to substantiate the claims of member boards. This has resulted in an inability to 'process' board demands. The effectiveness of any demand to a Government depends upon its justification and upon its overall effect in terms of finance. Put bluntly, no demand should be made which is not adequately supported by convincing background information. Nor should any demand be made which would result overall in a financial outlay which the Government could not reasonably be expected to bear. Fourth, the organisation of the SSBA has been characterised by inefficiency and lack of firm direction. The biennial conference of the Association has been largely ineffective. One Education Board representative, attending the 1963 conference, commented: "The number of delegates was excessive and much time was wasted because of attempts to please everybody".[27] Judging by the nature of the remits passed at the conference throughout the years, much thought has been given to teacher recruitment, to finance and to hostel building and maintenance. Unfortunately discussion has lacked a certain depth and bite, as is perhaps illustrated by the following remit which is fairly typical: "That something be done to remedy the great handicap suffered by schools that have no music room, gymnasium or assembly hall, and therefore nowhere for the school to gather indoors".[28]

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26. Strenuous efforts have been made to acquire statutory recognition. Under the Education Act 1964, the NZEBA have the right to pay, out of their general fund, "such amounts as the Minister may approve by way of annual subscription towards expenses incurred by that association in carrying out its purposes". (clause 28(2)). Under the Post-Primary Grants Regulations 1960, the secondary school boards are granted similar assistance. Auckland members pressed that the SSBA ask that these provisions be included in the Act, rather than in Regulations: "Our sole point in getting on the Statute Book is that whereas regulations can be repealed or amended overnight without any reference to interested parties, if we receive implied statutory recognition...then any amendment must come before the House and we shall have a chance at least to register some protest".

27. Taranaki Herald, September 19th 1963.

28. Remit from the Hastings High School Board to the 1957 conference. The stress is the present writer's.

Criticism of the organisation and in particular of the part played by its national conference came to a head in 1961. But because of a general feeling of insecurity concerning the likely proposals of the Commission on Education it was decided that no reorganisation could take place until the Commission had reported. As a result the 1963 conference followed the usual ineffective pattern. There were 14 pages of remits, upon which it was impossible to evoke intelligent and informed discussion. In fact, the great majority were local in nature and thus only of interest to a few. A further factor which contributed to the weakness of the conference was that it often became dominated by representatives who were Education Board members and principals who were present in their capacity of representatives of particular secondary boards. At the 1963 conference, one principal spoke 35 times and another 29 times.[29] Now the interests of secondary school principals and of Education Boards are by no means synonymous with those of secondary school boards. Thus the dominance of these groups at the national conference would act against the emergence of truly independent SSBA policies.

Some delegates have commented that the conferences exhibit an important paradox in their remits and discussions:

> "While there is a strong feeling that authority should gravitate to the local sphere in education, and governing bodies often complain about their wings being clipped, the proposals put forward by some of the bodies when assembled in conference are tantamount to an invitation to the Department to whittle away local powers...still further. Perhaps this is not the conscious intent of the boards concerned but that would be the ultimate effect all the same". 30

Perhaps this point can be exemplified by the following: at the 1959 conference, one college remit which was later discussed with departmental officers, asked that the Department draw up a uniform code of conditions for clerical employees of secondary boards. In reply the Department pointed out that this matter was entirely domestic and was the responsibility of the Association itself.

A fifth reason for SSBA weakness has been the structure of leadership. There has traditionally been little competition for Executive positions. That body was elected at the national conference and attention was paid to achieving geographical representation. This resulted in a searching out of people prepared to stand from unrepresented areas. There has also

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29. Report of the sub-committee on regional branches and the format of conference, SSBA Monograph 1964. (If such principals can influence the national association, their influence at the local board level would indeed be great.)

30. Nelson Evening Mail, September 11th, 1957.

been a marked continuity of membership on the Executive. In 1963 for example the Executive was re-elected man for man. A number of commentators felt this to be a sign of inertia rather than of respect.[31] But even when there was an election, the attention to geography resulted in the majority of members voting for people they did not know. As for officers, one man held the post of president for 15 years. It is difficult to imagine that leadership could maintain any purposeful drive under such circumstances.

Finally, as was pointed out earlier, the fact that each board sets such store by its individual treatment from the Department has resulted in a lack of desire for - if not suspicion of - collective action. Cooperation has not been as essential in the secondary sub-system as it has in the primary one. Thus a background of central leadership does not exist.

Regionalisation. Faced with these problems, the SSBA decided to 'regionalise'[32] its organisation. The idea of creating regional structures had been under discussion at least since 1961 but several developments led eventually to the adoption of the scheme. First, the suggestions for administrative reorganisation made by the Commission on Education would have affected the secondary boards adversely - or so board members believed. Thus it was felt that the onus was on the boards to put their own house in order if they were to withstand the external pressure. Regionalisation was part of their answer. Second, the Post Primary Teachers' Association (PPTA) had undertaken a similar, and seemingly successful, process during the early 1960s. In November 1963 a letter from the Auckland Grammar School board called for action from the SSBA Executive. In February and April of 1964 the Executive duly set up sub-committees to enquire into general organisational problems.

The first sub-committee, on regional branches and the format of conferences, claimed: "In our view the only satisfactory permanent solution of the problem...is to hold regional as well as national conferences".[33] It was felt that regions would have to be large enough to provide a real forum; small enough to avoid long and expensive journeys; sufficiently homogeneous to enjoy some community of interests and sufficiently well organised to maintain the closest links with the Department

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31. Report of the 1963 conference by the representatives of the Waiwhetu Girls' High School Board, SSBA files 1963.

32. That is, to create regional organisations as coordinating agents between individual boards and the national conference.

33. Report of the SSBA sub-committee on regional branches and conference format, SSBA monograph, 1964.

of Education and the national Association. With regard to the national conferences, it was held that only a set number of representatives of each region be permitted to attend and that some order of priority be established with regard to the remits to be discussed.

The second sub-committee set up by the Executive in February 1965 took some of the above suggestions further. This, the sub-committee on reconstruction, recommended that a full-time secretary be appointed with research and coordinating functions. It recommended that the Executive should henceforth be elected entirely on a regional basis, thus strengthening the chain of communication and improving the quality of members. It recommended a more detailed sifting of remits to the annual conference and an insistence that each remit be supported by factual justification.[34]

Following these reports, regional structures were created in five areas. The chief objective of such structures is to hold a successful annual meeting from which remits can be forwarded to the national conference, and the work of regional executives is geared to this end. If the SSBA intends to play a larger part in decision-making in the secondary sub-system, then its structural and coordinating machinery will have to be further improved. But at least a framework for such a development now exists.

A further response to the pressure for administrative reform in the education system has been the activity among secondary boards to unite into councils on the Christchurch and Wellington patterns. (See Chapter Eleven) These have not met with universal acceptance and several similar schemes have been mooted. The main area of contention appears to be the extent to which individual boards lose their freedom of action in a council system. Yet the necessity of some form of local cooperation has been recognised by all if only to provide the necessary secretarial services which schools are unable to provide individually.

Thus the secondary school boards have taken important steps to put their house in order, though many of the problems linger. The Executive is not held in great confidence by the individual boards because of their faith in individual action. The

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34. Report of the SSBA sub-committee on reconstruction, SSBA monograph, 1965.

leadership is not held in great confidence by the Executive, as is shown by the comparative lack of success of the (secondary) Standing Committee on administration. Members felt that the committee was conceived without their knowledge and set up without their consent. One member who had sat on Executive for a number of years complained when he heard of the committee: "This is all news to me". Thus leadership is still weak and on occasions the SSBA seems hardly more than an information agency.[35] It is inhibited in many instances by a lack of common policy and also by the fear that if it possessed a common policy, a number of its members would be reluctant to follow it. The fear is probably not without grounds. At the 1965 national conference, one remit read: "That the SSBA Executive or its officers shall not conclude any agreement with the Department of Education on matters involving or affecting financial grants or arrangements without first advising members".[36] The remit was lost, but it exemplifies the reluctance of individual boards to accept joint action.

Coordination with other bodies. Coordination between the administrative units, the NZEBA and the SSBA, is not considerable. It was encouraged by the Commission on Education's proposals for administrative reorganisation, when the NZEBA considered that a coalition of both organisations would strengthen its hand. But otherwise there does not seem to be sufficient community of interest. The leadership of each group is of course responsible to its membership and in the establishment of priorities for joint action, the membership of neither would happily countenance the passing-over of one of its own objectives in order to obtain an objective of the other group.

With regard to the PPTA, there is a greater community of interest. Yet even here the usual employer-employee dichotomy is apparent, especially on the subject of teachers' salaries. For example, one influential member of three post-primary boards and the chairman of the South Auckland Education Board was reported as saying: "Regarding the monetary awards, parents should be shown that teachers were well paid for the small amount of work they do comparable with other sections of the community".[37] This affects the priorities of the goals of the two Associations.

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35. In fact, the secretary of the Association saw his chief task as being "to disseminate information. That's what we're here for".

36. Report of the 1965 national conference, SSBA monograph 1965.

37. Waikato Times, March 18th 1958. The stress is the present writer's.

For example, both supported ancillary staffing, but the SSBA did not see the matter as being urgent. Several of its members expressed views to the effect that teachers were by no means overworked, and were not in urgent need of assistance. It is nevertheless true that many issues exist in which the two Associations could cooperate; the provision of houses for teachers at country schools and the education of the country child offer two obvious examples. But it has proved difficult to achieve a personal liaison at the highest level, for the SSBA president is not resident in Wellington. This is unfortunate, for as the SSBA secretary remarked: "We could go a long way with the PPTA on a number of issues".

It is difficult to assess the extent to which regional restructuring and larger units of administration will solve the problems of liaison and cooperation which have traditionally dogged the SSBA. The inability of boards to see their own problem in the wider context is still a prominent feature of the sub-system. The forwarding of a large bulk of conference remits to the Department by the SSBA continues because the leadership does not seem to be prepared to resist boards' remits itself. The Standing Committee on administration is not readily accepted by the membership who still prefer to deal individually with the Department. Therefore it has not strengthened the Association in the extent that the primary Standing Committee has strengthened the hand of the NZEBA. The pattern which emerged clearly from Section One with regard to non-government bodies was the relationship between effective organisation (a centralised system of internal decision-making) and the ability to influence government policy. If the SSBA is to influence government policy in a more substantial way than in the past, individual boards will have to give up a little of their autonomy and place less stress on their direct contact with the Department.

VI

This chapter cannot be concluded without reference to the Technical Education Association, which controls a small number of secondary schools. Its influence is not great and is waning, owing to the displacement of technical education in the secondary sub-system. At the annual conference of the TEA in 1965 only 21 secondary schools were represented, but from the president's speech, it is apparent that the TEA is loath to lose what influence remains to it in the secondary sub-system.

The Department of Education however, is anxious that the TEA should concentrate upon tertiary matters, and in addressing the conference, both the Minister and the Director stressed the importance of tertiary problems. During 1965 the Executive of the Association gave a great deal of thought to the future of the TEA and although it did not recommend that the Association withdraw from secondary matters and leave them to the SSBA, it did recommend the maximum of cooperation with that body.

The fact is that technical education is expanding very rapidly at tertiary level and dwindling at secondary level. TEA leadership has been oriented to the secondary level in the past, but eventually the tertiary interests will certainly predominate and the TEA will probably withdraw almost completely from the secondary sub-system.

CONCLUSIONS. The Secondary Board game.

Rules of the game. It should be stressed that secondary boards have not been placed under the same pressure as the Education Boards and yet they are powerful bodies. Consequently the ill-feeling which from time to time manifests itself in the Board game is much less apparent in the secondary board game. In addition, the setting up of Regional Offices has substantially improved communications between departmental officers and secondary boards, at least over important issues. As a consequence the rules of the game are more easily defined, though not necessarily more easily adhered to. There is some degree of stability - or so it is generally held - in the secondary sub-system. That is to say, most boards seem to believe that the structure of administration is not likely to be changed. It would thus appear to be a major rule that no frontal assault on the powers of secondary boards is permissible. Conversely, it also appears to be a rule that boards should not press for any marked increase in their own powers. Thus the rules of the secondary board game demarcate the areas in which the game is to be played; major structural changes are 'out of bounds', or at least, made to appear so.

Pay-off. For the secondary boards pay-off is often associated with the expediting of agreements already reached with the Regional Offices of the Department. In other instances it is concerned with securing a favourable reception to suggestions for some improvements. Almost invariably however, pay-off connotes gain for an individual board. Collectively boards have met the greatest difficulty in defining their goals. This is perhaps best illustrated by the manner in which the Standing Committee on administration was set up. It will be

remembered from Section Two that a joint committee on administration in the primary sub-system had met with considerable success. It will also be remembered that this committee was set up as result of a serious complaint by one of the Education Boards. Yet it was not the SSBA which was responsible for the post-primary equivalent. Early in 1961 a senior departmental officer suggested to SSBA leaders that a post-primary Standing Committee on administration be instituted. "We supported the idea", Association leaders wrote, "and you stated that you would like the initiative for the setting up of such a committee to come from the Association".[38] Accordingly, the president and secretary discussed the matter with the Executive and resolved to request that such a Standing Committee be constituted. Following the official request an official meeting took place in July 1961, at which the Assistant Director (Administration) confessed that in principle he was in favour of the scheme. To complete the set play, a remit was passed at the national conference of the SSBA later in the same year asking for the setting up of such a joint committee. In March of 1962, the Assistant Director (Administration) wrote to the Minister, setting out the functions of the proposed committee, and recommending that he 'consider the matter favourably'.

Strategy. "You must keep hammering away until something is done". This comment by a member of one board is a fitting summary to secondary board strategy. One case, taken from the files of the SSBA, offers a good example of this strategy in operation. It concerns faulty drainage in one wing of a large urban school which rendered the wing almost unusable in heavy rain, owing to flooding. On the 29th November 1959 a letter was sent to the Department asking that the rear quadrangle of the school be regraded. At the time a new wing was being constructed and the Department replied that the matter should be raised again when the work was completed. Two years later the board wrote again. The Department contacted the Ministry of Works, who discussed the matter with the City Council. Progress reports, designs and development plans moved hither and thither for over two years. Work was then begun; it continued over the next year, during which time requests had been made by the Department for additional finance. The Ministry of Works meanwhile had contracted the work out and tenders had to be called. Six years after the

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38. Letter dated May 25th 1961.

original letter had been sent, the board was informed that the Ministry of Works was "still working on the plans".[39]

Two things emerge from this example. The first is the sheer length of time involved in securing this improvement. The second is the obvious proclivity of the file concerned to become lost in the inter-departmental labyrinth.

The better to break out of that labyrinth, some boards, or their principals, have issued statements to the press. Unquestionably this tactic is deplored by departmental officers. It is against the rules. But it must be said that if the board has a good case, its action will almost certainly expedite matters. On the other hand it will not enhance the popularity of the board in question among departmental officers and is thus a dangerous tactic.

Information. As was pointed out earlier in the chapter, the SSBA regards one of its key functions to be the dissemination of information. It was pointed out that many boards were quite unaware of some of their entitlements and made little attempt individually to follow the implications of recently drafted regulations. As a source of information, the SSBA has become increasingly efficient in recent years. Having 'regionalised', it is possible that a two-way flow of information will be maintained - from Association to boards and vice versa. In the past, SSBA leaders have complained that boards have been uncooperative in supplying information needed to build up support for general demands. Information was not made available and policy statements were often ill-informed as a result: the new structure could improve this situation.

The flow of information from the Department does not appear to have been a factor of much importance in relations with the boards, but this was largely the result of an inefficient communications system between boards themselves. Yet in general terms, boards' attitudes and SSBA policy (not necessarily synonymous) are reasonably consistent, as will be shown in Chapter Eleven. This allows for a degree of predictability in the secondary board game which passes for a pattern of information. The setting up of the Standing Committee on administration has not helped matters as much as was hoped.

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39. SSBA files, 1966.

The leadership has become more informed on departmental problems, but is committed not to pass on its 'inside knowledge'.

Coalition. As has been stated, the PPTA is a natural partner for the SSBA in many situations of the game. Secondary education is a most important growth area in the system and the aims of the non-government bodies within the sub-system overlap to a considerable extent. Yet board members as a group are not entirely convinced that teachers are either as overworked or as underpaid as the latter maintain. Consequently the coalition is most effective in game situations which have to do with improving school facilities other than the lot of the teachers.

Coalition with other educational bodies is not frequent, though as will be shown in more detail later, moves to alter the structure of educational administration threw the SSBA and the NZEBA into hasty coalition. One is forced to conclude by referring once again to one of the central themes of this chapter. During the past, a lack of positive unity has robbed the Association of much of its usefulness as an ally as well as a negotiator.

Chapter Nine

NEW ZEALAND POST-PRIMARY TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION

Of all the organs of the education system, the PPTA is the best example of a role conscious pressure group. Born from the necessity of collective action on the part of post-primary teachers, the Association has continually been aware - some would say too aware - of its responsibility for the status, remuneration and working conditions of the individual teacher. Compared to the NZEI, the Association has travelled a rather thorny path. Its relations with the Department and Government have never been particularly good, and internally it has suffered a number of disputes and divisions. It is proposed to adapt somewhat the pattern used in Chapter Five. Four sub-sections deal with: the early history of secondary teacher organisations; the development of the PPTA since amalgamation; its structure; and finally, relations with other bodies.

I

On Monday January 9th, 1888, the Secondary Schools' Association held its inaugural meeting. In reality a conference modelled upon the English Headmasters' Conference, the Association represented only head teachers. Assistants, it was decided, would be allowed to attend, to take part in deliberations, but not to vote.[1] The chairman said of the conference: "I trust this will be the beginning of a series of similar meetings whose business it will be to look after the interests of higher education in this colony".[2] Although only a consultative body, the conference had been called to improve the bargaining power of the secondary schools, particularly with reference to the university, relations with which represented the chief problem area of secondary education. The stimulus behind the idea of collective action was simply a realization that one can bargain best from a position of strength. The chairman put it more colourfully: "May I say that hitherto we have been like the single sticks in the fable? This conference will bind the separate sticks into a bundle".[3] The Association, which met

1. Minutes book of Secondary Schools' Conference, 1888
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

intermittently thereafter, concerned itself chiefly with relations with the university.[4] In 1892 however, assistants were given the right to vote at the conference, and procedure was generally improved. As from 1895, the Minister of Education and the Inspector General of Schools were invited to attend.

It became increasingly apparent to assistant masters that the Association, as then constituted, was insufficiently dynamic in the bread-and-butter politics of status and salary. In 1908 the last combined conference of headmasters and assistants took place, and in the following year a separate Assistants' Association was formed. The 1908 conference witnessed the first public utterance of two themes which have for many years past been the basic currency of education politics at the post-primary level:

(i) "If the best men are to be secured for the school-masters' profession, the profession must be given a social and pecuniary equality with other professions".

(ii) "That the attention of the Minister of Education be drawn to the fact that some secondary schools are still in an unsatisfactory position with respect to finance and that he be respectfully urged to consider the advantages of improving their position".[5]

Although nascent pressures were obvious even at this stage, half a century elapsed before secondary teachers created for themselves an organisation sufficiently united to employ pressure - discreetly or overtly - with success. Owing largely to the diverse nature of post-primary education itself, the construction of a unified post-primary teachers' body was no easy task. For example, what remained of the Secondary Schools' Association organised itself in 1914 into the Secondary Schools' Principals' Association. At Wellington Technical College in the same year, technical day-school staffs discussed the possibility of forming their own association, and the following year the N Z Technical School Teachers' Association was registered. Movements towards unity were sporadic and met with varying degrees of success. In 1921, the Secondary Schools' Assistants' Association and the Secondary Schools' Principals' Association amalgamated to form the Secondary Schools' Association. In 1933, the TSTA and the SSA combined for the purposes of producing a joint journal, known as the Secondary Teachers' Association Journal, with a joint management committee.

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4. A.W. Short, Secondary Schools' Conference, (a monograph from the files of the PPTA).

5. Ibid.

But unification was not at hand, although the external pressures were still present, as is shown by the following quotation from the technical teachers' journal: "It behoves us all to unite, if only to defend ourselves and our cause against the attacks that are at present being made in many quarters".[6] Yet little enthusiasm could be roused in the rank and file for amalgamation. In the mid-thirties for example, a joint committee sat on amalgamation, and it was decided to put the issue to the vote among the membership. Less than one in three voted, and the STA Journal remarked: "It is impossible for the committee to carry out the wishes of members unless it knows what these wishes are".

II

Amalgamation. It was not until 1951 that the two main post-primary teachers' bodies were amalgamated; on May 13th of that year, an inaugural meeting was held at the Wellington Technical College at which 157 delegates were present. It would not be unfair to point out that much of the stimulus for this movement was to be found outside the post-primary system, in the strenuous attempts made during the late 1940s by the primary teachers' body, the NZEI, to incorporate the technical teachers within their own organisation. Had they succeeded in doing so, then unquestionably within a decade the teaching service would have been united, since the SSA could not have held out alone. To the continuing disappointment of some departmental officers, the unification of the secondary services put back a more general unification indefinitely. In 1953 a new journal appeared, known as the Post Primary Teachers' Association Journal - or simply the Journal; it seemed to give strength to the whole movement, membership of which became higher than ever. Apart from individual articles and letters in the Journal, the sole forum for the expression of rank and file opinion in the (NZ)PPTA, as it had become, was an annual conference, where each branch - representing an individual school - was represented. The effect was that once a year, a large disorganised body failed to get through its order paper, many remits of an important nature being shelved. The elected Executive was itself unable to give firm direction, since for geographical reasons, regular meetings were impossible. Power would really

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6. N Z Technical Schools Journal, Vol 1 No 1, August 1927. The particular attack which caused most consternation was an attempt by the Minister to emasculate the Technical Schools' Board.

seem to have rested with a body known as 'resident Executive', which was simply those members of Executive, four in number, who represented Wellington branches(and were thus conveniently based for meetings), together with the president and secretary. Yet this power was ill-defined and action poorly coordinated. Ehrmann tells us that: "Important differences will often be observed between the formal pattern of organisation and the methods by which decisions are usually reached. Behind a structure seemingly indicative of intensive membership participation, authoritarian decision-making may take place".[7] It is certain that decisions were taken in an autocratic fashion at this time, but they were not supported by the efficiency of structure necessary to make them dynamic. The overall result was a general incapacity for decisive action on a large scale.

Regionalism and after. In 1961, however, in response to the demands of activists, branches were organised regionally and the conference became a conference of the regions. Administration became generally more effective and probably more responsive to rank and file opinion. The regions were regulated by a document known as "Standard Rules for Regions", which provided for two kinds of meeting, the one a committee of branch delegates, and the other a general meeting. Regional representatives sat at the annual conference and also on the Executive. Later a committee of management was set up to replace the resident Executive. It was composed of four members elected by the Executive, and thus no longer confined to Wellington members. The struggle over School Certificate marking (1961-3) gave the new organisation a strenuous baptism; it consolidated the organisational improvements already made and showed the need for further refinements. The 1962 conference was considered to be a substantial improvement on its predecessors: "The much more manageable size was not the only factor in lifting the level of discussion; the delegates themselves were much better informed on detail and more sharply aware of issued".[8] An improved constitution was drawn up; the power-structure was clarified, making possible a two-way flow of information.

Yet regionalism offered no panacea; the effectiveness of any lobby is a function of certain internal alignments, and as the Journal points out: "An organisation which is based on

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7. See H.W. Ehrmann, "The Comparative Study of Interest Groups" in Interest Groups on Four Continents,(Ehrmann, ed.) University of Pittsburg Press, second printing 1960.

8. Post Primary Teachers' Journal (called hereafter simply Journal), Vol IX No 9, October 1962.

differences can result in loose confederation with built-in difficulties for united leadership and action",[9] The problem is not new: "Certain associations", we are reminded by Finer, "notably those that must negotiate for a whole profession or industry - are in a dilemma. Unity provides the only hope of successful negotiation, but there may be serious cleavages of interest inside the organisation".[10] The 'cleavages of interest' which had been the chief stumbling block to unification did not disappear with the advent of regionalism; they remain. Chief among the identifiable separate interests are those of male teachers, female teachers, principals, assistants, and of the staff of district high schools, Form 1 - 6 high schools, training colleges, country high schools, technical high schools and academic high schools. The threat from such a lack of homogeneity - namely the "possibility of dissatisfaction of groups of its members who feel that their interests are being neglected or inadequately represented"[11] is still present.

Nevertheless, within the last five years, the Association has become a negotiating body, in the sense that its policies now bind its members more effectively than was previously the case. Further, a committee structure, especially related to curriculum development, has been built up outside the Executive framework. Committees comprising interested and qualified members have been instituted in all the main subjects. These committees have been built up chiefly by the Association's present secretary, who provides them, through a permanent negotiating team, with a direct link with departmental thinking. Thus if any development is planned, say in the teaching of Social Studies, then the negotiating team, which consists of the president and secretary and sometimes of additional Executive members, will go to see the relevant departmental officer, with the chairman of the committee on Social Studies.[12] Thus to some extent minority interests, through these committees and through the regional organisations, can find some outlet for their grievances.

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9. Journal, Vol VIII No 9, October 1961.

10. S.E. Finer, "Interest Groups and the Political Process in Great Britain", in Interest Groups on Four Continents, p. 128.

11. Journal, Vol VIII No 8, September 1961.

12. This means of coordination has become increasingly important with the stress now placed on curriculum development by the Department, especially through its Curriculum Development Unit (see Chapter Six).

In brief conclusion, the binding of the many sticks into a bundle has not been as easy as was at first thought, though amalgamation was an important stage in the process. Subsequent developments appear to have strengthened the bundle.

III

Constitutionally, the supreme authority of the Association is the Annual Conference, which consists of all current members of the Executive, and representatives appointed by the regional organisations on the basis of two representatives for the first 160 members in any region and one additional representative for every additional 100 members.[13] Any member of the Association may attend the meeting and is entitled to speak, but not to vote. The regional representatives, it should be noted, are elected. The conference is held in the first week of the August holiday each year, the time and place being arranged by the Executive. The work of the conference is to adopt the report of Executive for the current year, to adopt the annual balance sheet and statement of accounts, and to appoint auditors. Further, results of the elections for president, vice president and members of Executive are declared. When this business has been duly completed, the conference gets down to the important work of discussing remits from the regional organisations. There follows 'any other business', at which special topics are brought forward for discussion and for which special notice is not required. In addition to the annual conference, special conferences can be called by the Executive, though six weeks notice of such a meeting has to be given to the regions.

Any group (i.e. one member or more) may apply to the secretary for registration as a Branch. It is within the Executive's discretion to grant registration, but it is not permissible for more than one branch to be registered at any one school. Every branch must be open to all Association members at the school but to nobody else. Each branch elects a chairman and secretary annually, and such other officers as it thinks fit (a social secretary, for example). The chairman is generally responsible for the supervision of affairs, and the secretary is in charge of all national and regional correspondence and acts as returning officer.

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13. See PPTA Constitution.

No branch is permitted to make a public statement which might appear to emanate from the national or regional organisation without the authority of a member of the Executive, neither is the Association responsible for any liabilities incurred by any branch unless as result of an Executive resolution. No branch is permitted to affiliate itself to any other association without the consent of the Executive. If a branch's registration lapses, it is deemed to be dissolved and the Association takes over all the assets of the branch.

The Regional Organisation is established by any group of branches in the same geographical area. The Executive has the authority to grant registration and determine boundaries 'from time to time by resolution'.[14] Each regional organisation must be open to all branches within its boundaries. The region is the effective link between branch and Executive. It must therefore discuss matters referred to it by the Executive and consider remits from its branches, forwarding those of which it approves. The regional organisation meets 'at such times as it shall determine',[15] but at least once a term, and at these meetings the ruling body, a committee, presents its report. This committee is composed of a chairman, secretary and treasurer (or secretary/treasurer), and the elected member of Executive, plus such other officers as may be determined locally. Put bluntly, the committee runs the region's affairs, the chairman, as at branch level, having a supervisory and coordinative function, the secretary conducting most of the business with Executive and the branches, and acting as returning officer. During the year, the regional organisation is supposed to appoint representatives to the annual conference; to 'originate discussion and stimulate interest'[16] in all matters concerned with education and especially matters concerning secondary and technical education; and to supply to the Executive a yearly report on its activities. Before that date, the region holds an annual meeting at which its committee is elected. Following this, the region must forward to the secretary of the Association the names of its officers and an audited statement of accounts, plus a budget for the current year. The Executive provides funds to the regions to help finance their activities, the amount depending upon the

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14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

number of paid-up members in the region. However, the Executive, 'at any time in such manner as it may deem fit',[17] may conduct an examination into the affairs of a region, and convene a general meeting of the regional organisation.

As is the case with branch organisations, the regions are not permitted to issue statements purporting to come from the Association without the authority of the Executive, though they are in a position to release statements on their own initiative.[18]

It should be noted at the outset that although Executive members are elected on a regional basis, they are not regional representatives. It is no accident that the constitution speaks of regional 'delegates' at the annual assembly, but of regional 'members' being elected to the Executive.[19] It seems plain that regionalism, as it has so far developed, has tended to blur the edges of the inherent divisions within the Association, without itself becoming a source of division.

The Executive consists of a president, a senior vice president (who is in fact the immediate past-president), a junior vice president, a secretary and (since regionalisation) 19 other members. It is required to meet at least once each term, the president normally acting as chairman; 12 members form a quorum for Executive meetings. Procedure at such meetings is laid down in the form of a standing order. The Executive has 'complete power over and control of all the business of the Association'.[20] It can appoint and remove agents and committees, and may delegate to them full Executive powers either generally or for a particular purpose or time. "The Executive shall have power to and may do all things deemed to be necessary and expedient for the fulfilment of any objects of the Association."[21] It determines disputes and differences

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17. Ibid.

18. This system has its drawbacks as is shown by the following. On Friday 25th November 1966, the day before the general election, a member of the Wellington regional council disclosed to the Dominion newspaper the fact the council intended to suggest 'stop-work' talks to the national Executive to complain against increased Government aid to private schools. Yet apparently the agenda of the relevant meeting contained no reference to stop-work meetings. One branch passed a motion dissociating itself from the decision. It is apparent then that important decisions are still taken without reference to members, despite the new regional system. Access to the press gives scope for 'playing politics' at the regional level, a sport frequently indulged in.

19. PPTA Constitution, op. cit.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

between members and regions. The Executive exercises a virtually complete control over funds and finances generally. Resolutions of the Executive are binding upon members of Executive whether they were present at the relevant meeting or not. The president and junior vice president are elected annually by a secret ballot of members; other members of the Executive are also elected by secret ballot within the regions. The secretary is appointed at the pleasure of the Executive upon its own terms. If a vacancy occurs for a president or vice president during the year the Executive will appoint the replacement. Other vacancies are filled by regional secret ballots. Executive membership exhibits a considerable degree of continuity, but its 'representativeness' is open to question. Of its twenty-one members, eight are principals; only two members are women and only four do not come from the larger cities. As is shown in diagram 3.1, Executive has been dominated for fairly long periods by the same individuals. A number of these have tended to hold rather militant views on the Association's role. They have had a disproportionate influence on PPTA policy (see Chapter Eleven).

3.1 PPTA Executive Turnover

Area beneath line A : Executive members in 1956
Area immediately beneath line B : Members first elected in 1957
Area immediately beneath line C : Members first elected in 1958
Area immediately beneath line D : Members first elected in 1959
Area immediately beneath line E : Members first elected in 1960



The diagram contrasts significantly with that representing NZEI Executive turnover (diagram 2.4). Taking the year 1959-60 as an example, 11 members of the original PPTA Executive (i.e. 1956-7) were still sitting, compared with 5 on the NZEI Executive. Again, in 1963-4, 7 members on the PPTA Executive had been sitting for 5 years or longer compared with 3 on the NZEI Executive. Further, one member who sat on the PPTA Executive in 1966 was a member in 1956. A fact which does not emerge is that at least one PPTA Executive member, having progressed to the presidency, returned to sit on the Executive after relinquishing the post of senior vice president.

The Executive is entitled to appoint sub-committees each year as it thinks fit. These sub-committees are addressed to a particular aspect of education theory or practice, on which they will usually produce a report for Executive and comment upon any remits for the annual conference which fall within their purview. The president, ex officio, is a member of all such sub-committees. The chairman of each of these sub-committees will nearly always be a member of the Executive. The bulk of a sub-committee's work is done by correspondence; it would need Executive discretion to authorise travelling expenses for a meeting.

In common with the NZEI, the Association possesses a Code of Ethics, which is for the use of all members, but particularly new members. Apart from listing the general moral 'responsibilities' of teachers, the Code enumerates acts of 'unethical conduct'; we discover, inter alia, that it is unethical to disregard any policy decisions of the annual conference or the national Executive which are 'for the common benefit of teachers'; to fail to use the utmost discretion when dealing with confidential information; to indulge in any statement or conduct which 'in the eyes of fellow members' could bring the profession into disrepute; to speak in derogatory terms of the work of any colleague; to punish a pupil unfairly; to accept new appointments without informing the school authorities; and so forth. There is no mention at all of what will happen to anybody who breaks this Code.

The constitution, clear as it may be, tells us little of the actual structure of power. For example, the committee of management is not even mentioned by name in the constitution. It comes into being, constitutionally, as one of the sub-committees appointed by Executive. In fact, it is the seat of power, being, as it is, in a position to influence Executive strongly, and to act on its behalf in emergencies.

An important contrast between the Association and the NZEI has been the position of the permanent secretary. Perhaps this is best illustrated by studying the minor crisis which occurred following the report of the past president of the Association in 1960. The nature of the dispute was over policy formulation. The secretary was of the opinion that the president could not create policy: "We either possess a policy or we don't, and if we do, the president follows it";[22] yet it would appear that

22. Executive Minutes, 1960.

the president was equally apprehensive about the secretary's proclivity for policy-making. He had written to the secretary following a meeting between the latter and the Minister,(the Hon P.O.S. Skoglund) , complaining that 'there was a good deal of criticism' of the meeting within the Executive. The secretary had retorted that he was employed by the Association and not by the Executive, and that in his role he should be as much concerned with policy as the president. He accompanied all deputations to the Minister because, he felt, he played a crucial coordinative role in the "hidden struggle all the time between the principals on the one side and the assistants on the other".[23] Yet the secretary was not in a position to negotiate on behalf of the Association,and departmental officers, knowing this to be the case, had treated him cooly. The whole position of who should wield power in the Association was thus brought into question. The dispute came to a head following a meeting between the president and the Minister at which the latter had suggested an independent enquiry into the subject of recruitment, provided that the Association was prepared to accept its findings. The president felt that such a solution would be acceptable, but the secretary had held that a president could under no circumstances commit the Association in advance to the decision of a committee.

Though the position adopted by the secretary can be considered commendably democratic, it was at the same time impractical. The Association had suffered too long from an inability to negotiate firmly and speedily. Eventually the secretary was forced into an unenviable position and tendered his resignation. Speaking to the full Executive, he claimed to be tired of a profession that was "full of jealousies, enmities...and the stab in the back".[24] Executive members, totally unaware of the power struggle and its ramifications, asked the secretary to reconsider his position, one member pointing out: "We are quite frankly a pressure group and one must expect tensions".[25] It is interesting to note the Executive's ignorance of the position one member spoke of the resignation as a 'bombshell', adding: "I had no idea that such matters were in the air at all".[26] It was thus apparent that power lay with the influential members of Executive. In the NZEI, on the other hand, the secretary has traditionally played an important part in policy formulation and decision - making. His position was far stronger vis-à-vis the Executive than was that of the secretary of the Association.

23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.

Today the PPTA secretary holds a key position within the power structure. By virtue of his accumulated experience and continuity of office, he is in a position to exert influence, provided that he possesses sufficient flexibility of personality to remain on good terms with influential Executive leaders. The present secretary has the great advantage of having been a teacher, Executive member and president himself. These factors must reinforce his position substantially. However, the result of the 1960 dispute was a reaffirmation of Executive leadership - which means in reality leadership by the committee of management. It has more real power than the old resident Executive had, for two chief reasons. First, its power and position have been legitimized - its authority is not based upon geography. Second, as stated, its hand has been strengthened by a greater degree of executive power. The resident Executive was not an actual part of the hierarchy, its existence depending entirely upon the fact that Wellington is the seat of government. Today there can be little question that although 'final decisions' rest with the Executive, this is little more than the 'power to approve': real power lies with the committee of management plus the secretary.

IV

Relations with the Department. In general terms, the policy of the PPTA has been to improve the lot of the secondary teacher. As has been stated, the PPTA regards itself as a pressure group, and has given much thought to methods of applying the greatest pressure in the most telling places to influence government and departmental thinking. It is only over the last two or three years that the Association has taken on obvious interest in the field of curriculum development, though individual teachers have always shown an interest in this area. As we have seen, the PPTA from its inception has been concerned with teachers' salaries first and foremost. There is little doubt, judging by Executive minutes, that it was the need for combined action in salary negotiations that set the seal on amalgamation. It is in the field of salary negotiation that great bitterness has been felt between the Department and the Association.

As far as the student of politics (as opposed to the educationalist) is concerned, policy becomes important when actively promoted. It would be true to say that it is not the content of the policy with which we are basically concerned but the means by which it is promoted. Thus in the discussion of policy it will be best if we remain in the fields of negotiation and implementation and restrict ourselves to the original aim of viewing the 'institution in action'.

In 1952 - the first year of the new Association - a salary dispute arose which brought into question several of the Association's policy aims. Chief among these were the desire to set up an independent Teachers' Tribunal to review salaries in place of the Government Service Tribunal, and the belief that a salary and status differential between the primary and post-primary service was essential.[27] The Government had accepted a new salary scale proposed by the Department which would in effect remove the salary differential between the services on first appointment. There can be little doubt that the Association saw the move as being part of a general scheme to unify the two teaching services; there can be equally little doubt that there were several senior officers within the Department who espoused such a cause. The preservation of a separate identity was a cardinal aim of the policy of the Association,and thus it was prepared to oppose the new scale not merely because of its alleged inadequacy. Yet its Executive was by no means unanimous, for the only means open to the Association to oppose was to present the case to the Government Service Tribunal (since no precedent existed for direct action - that is, a strike - and it is not likely that the membership could have been persuaded to accept such a course of action even had it been unanimously promoted by the Executive), and serious doubts existed as to the readiness of the Tribunal to give a favourable hearing to the Association's case. Obviously, to take the issue before the GST would conflict with the aim of securing an independent Teachers' Tribunal, and it was arguable that the loss of professional prestige resulting from arbitration would outweigh any financial gain. Faced with this dilemma, the Executive decided upon a policy of wait-and-see.

Consultation with a view to resolving the dispute was limited, because the Government and the Department were not prepared to make any worthwhile concessions. At an Executive meeting for example, the Minister of Education (the Hon R.M. Algie), explained that since agreement had already been reached with the NZEI, it would be impossible to change the structure of the proposed scale. However, he did point out that if the Association were to accept the proposed scale, it could press

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27. The Department intended to eliminate the open differential at the starting point of the salary scale, whereby the initial salary for post-primary teachers of minimal acceptable qualifications had been two steps in advance of the primary scale. The PPTA argued against this, since it meant that graduates in both services were initially paid the same, and therefore some were lost to the post-primary service.

for higher rates at a later date - 'in the right company at the right time'.[28] He went on to say that to take the case to the GST would cripple the chances for a Teachers' Tribunal,[29] and that in any case the Association's case would stand little chance of success before the Tribunal. In fact the Minister hinted - and one could not put it stronger than that - that the Tribunal might offer the Association less than was offered in the new scales!

At departmental level, negotiations were no more successful. The Director pointed out that the detailed substructure of the scale offered the only area in which compromise was possible. Any new suggestion from the Association would have to concern adjustments within the cost limits of the original offer, and the various factors of relativity observed in the initial offer would have to be reflected to a considerable extent. Variation in the basic structure of the scale would result in a new application from the NZEI, and any application exceeding the cost limits would have to go before the Tribunal. There was virtually no room for compromise, since only modifications to the scales could be concluded bi-laterally; any substantial change would have to be negotiated by all three parties. The Association was thus faced with a fait accompli. Its choice was plain; to accept a scale which had been agreed to by the Department and the NZEI or to take the issue before the Tribunal with little prospect of success. The Executive chose the latter course and lost its case. The new scales were accepted over a year after their inception; the salary increase was not back-dated. If at first sight it is difficult to see why this course was followed, there are two reasons. First, it illustrated in no uncertain manner the Association's readiness to resist unification of the teaching service. Second, it strengthened leadership within the Association itself. The fight was not completely in vain, for at the annual conference of the Association in 1953, the Minister declared for all to hear that unification was not longer a live issue.

Relations between the teachers' bodies. Relations between the PPTA and the NZEI are at their best where the interests of members do not conflict, especially the allocation to education of increased government expenditure.

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28. Executive Minutes, 1952.

29. It is uncertain whether the Government ever seriously considered setting up such a tribunal. Although the Minister used it as a bargaining counter, he told the NZEI Executive to "forget the Tribunal Bill for the time being, because at the present moment my colleagues would view it with disfavour". National Education Vol XXXIV No 371, October 1st 1952.

This principle is extended into areas such as state aid to private schools. A conference was held of all the major units of the education system to discuss the issue of state aid to private schools in 1956. Prior to the conference, the two teachers' bodies cooperated to a considerable extent in the preparation of their own representations to the conference, so that each knew precisely the thinking of the other. In what one might call 'neutral' disputes, where one side is engaged in a dispute with the Department on which the other is substantially unaffected, support can generally be expected. In the dispute over the marking of School Certificate papers, for example (see Chapter Eleven), when, the Association having refused to provide markers, the Department tried to obtain markers from outside sources. The Executive of the NZEI passed a resolution advising its members not to accept appointment as markers, thereby strengthening the Association's hand in its dealings with the Department. There are certain issues however, which divide the two bodies, the best example perhaps being the intermediate school.

The intermediate schools are staffed largely by primary teachers. There has been a considerable amount of discussion on the possibility of extending intermediate education upwards into Forms 3 and 4. Any such extension would be resented by secondary teachers and they have been consistently wary of intermediate schools. The nature of the problem was changed however with the introduction of Form 1-6 high schools which, as the name implies, are an alternative form of education for Forms 1 and 2. Naturally the new high schools would tend to be staffed by secondary teachers. For these reasons the PPTA and the NZEI have watched developments carefully in this area. But as stated, interest in intermediate schooling is by no means a new development for the PPTA. The matter was discussed heatedly at the annual conference in 1954, and a resolution was passed to the effect that the PPTA 'wished to be heard' in any decision on the future of the intermediate school. The Minister, Hon Mr. Algie, wrote to the Association in reply: "I have said on a number of occasions that I am satisfied that intermediate schools are an integral and valuable part of the school system"[30].

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30. Executive Minutes, 1954.

He went on to claim that he had made a full enquiry into the matter and would consult the Association and all groups concerned before embarking on any change in policy, such as extending them beyond Form 2. Largely on the Association's insistence, the New Zealand Council for Educational Research (NZCER) began a full-scale enquiry into the intermediate system in February of 1955. Before the results of the enquiry were published however, the Commission on Education made its report (1962). To the non-partisan in this issue, it would appear that the Commission was concerned, perhaps above all else, with linking the primary and secondary systems; not so much structurally (if it were so, then its stand is contradictory) but in content - it sought in other words an integrated and continuous curriculum. The Association greeted this recommendation with considerable pleasure. "The recommendation of the Commission on Education which has caused most interest in educational circles and received greatest support from the general public is undoubtedly that for beginning post-primary education at Form One".[31] The article goes on to say: "It is obvious that the concept has made such plain common sense to parents and governing bodies up and down the country that they have seized upon it with enthusiasm and have begun to press for its application in their districts". For the Association however, commencing secondary education at Form 1 was synonymous with the adoption of 1-6 high schools, and although there is evidence to support the proposition that many people were impressed with the Form 1-6 high school, the Department had announced plans to build such schools at Geraldine and Te Karaka before the Commission reported. Thus the report did not have the novelty that the Association claimed for it and it is likely that the reception of what the report had to say in this matter was not as unexpected as the Association claimed. But to suggest that the general public up and down the country would seize enthusiastically upon any new educational policy (especially when it was not new anyway) is plainly to exaggerate. Somewhat nearer to the truth of the matter is the statement made by the president of the Association in early 1963, following an exploratory meeting with representatives of the NZEI and departmental officials about Form 1-6 high schools, that "<u>the PPTA considers</u> these schools to be one of the most imaginative of the recommendations of the Commission on Education".[32]

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31. <u>Journal</u>, Vol X No 3, April 1963.

32. <u>Journal</u>, Vol X No 3, April 1963. The stress is the present writer's.

It is natural that the Association should lay such emphasis on these new high schools; they signify the extension downwards of secondary education in such a way as to secure more posts for secondary teachers. But it is patently incorrect to see them as the only means of starting secondary education at the age of eleven.

When eventually the NZCER survey of intermediate education was published (1964) it was not happily received by the Association. Its main fault was doubtless that, in general terms, it found much that was laudable in the intermediate schools. The Journal had this to say: "Its most significant discovery - that there are advantages in consolidation and good schools depend on having good headmasters - have always been thoroughly appreciated by post-primary teachers to whom the most remarkable features of the book have been its ecstatic reception in certain quarters and its neglect of any consideration of the Form 1-6 high school...which has patently altered the whole situation".[33] The report of the Commission on Education is seen by the Association to have effectively disposed of any arguments for extending the span of intermediate schooling. At the annual conference in 1965, however, the Minister (the Hon A.E. Kinsella), threw more light on what the Commission had actually recommended, pointing out that it was concerned with the content and not the organisation of Forms 1 and 2. Organisation, he said, was seen by the Commission as only a means to an end, the end being "clearly to link the primary and secondary school systems, first through an integrated and continuous curriculum, and then by various organisational changes. Thus the Commission quite clearly and firmly recommended the extension of the intermediate school system and the development of intermediate schools as junior high schools...It was not intended, however, that junior high schools would become part of the secondary school system or undergo any change in control."[34] The Form 1-6 high school, the Minister claimed, was chiefly for country areas where no intermediate school was possible.

Other points of issue between the two teacher bodies, if less current, are nonetheless deep. District high schools offer a good example. Not long after amalgamation, the PPTA Executive set up a committee on district high schools. The chief finding

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33. Journal Vol XI No 5, June 1964.

34. Minister's Address to Annual Conference, 1965.

of the committee was that relations between the primary headmaster of a district high school and the post-primary staff were often, if not usually, unhappy. The secondary departments of such schools saw themselves as mere appendages. One member of the committee pointed out: "The primary service is naturally in favour of the system: primary teachers have a vested interest in its perpetuation".[35] The school committee of such a school is advised by the primary headteacher, and parents consult the latter about their post-primary pupils, often on matters about which he is not likely to have much knowledge. The PPTA committee report also complained that money intended to be spent on the secondary department was sometimes diverted to the primary department.

Another example of dispute is to be found in the unification of primary and post-primary training. The Public Expenditure Committee investigated the administration of teachers' training colleges during the 1964-5 recess[36] and reported strongly in favour of joint colleges in which, even though the two branches were kept distinct, there was too much unification from the Association's point of view. The committee, the PPTA felt, was operating outside its terms of reference when it pronounced on professional matters. Though it might find joint-college systems cheaper, it could not judge them sounder, since more than economics was involved. There is little doubt that the Public Expenditure Committee can be used to further Government policy in a wider sense than is realised ; it has been used during the 1964-5 and 1965-6 recesses to show the bad economics of division between the primary and post-primary services in the fields of training and administration.

If we seek to discover a pattern in the policy clashes between the two teacher bodies, it is not necessary to look far. The policies of both seem to be motivated to an extent by self-interest. Perhaps this is best shown by the intermediate/Form 1-6 clash, where it is apparent to the onlooker that both types of school have much to offer and that the systems are far from being mutually exclusive. The clash on district high schools is also one of self-interest. In the issues of unified salary scales and coordination in training, another dimension to the self-interest model is added; such, also, is the case with attitudes to a unified teaching service. The NZEI is by far

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35. Report of the Committee on District High Schools, 1953.

36. Report of the Public Expenditure Committee, Wellington, Government Printer, 1965.

the larger body; the status of its members is also generally lower. Thus it stands to benefit indirectly from unification. It can effectively rationalise this situation by pointing out the benefits that would accrue to a unified profession, and the commensurate strengthening of the teachers' bargaining position. The PPTA on the other hand is equally anxious to defend its 'integrity' and 'independence'. It is no more difficult to rationalise such a position, as the Association has shown by maintaining that the special needs of secondary education would become 'swamped' in a united service, and that the secondary schools have more in common with the universities than with the primary schools. Perhaps a fitting conclusion to this discussion on the inter-relationships is offered by a circular sent to members of the NZEI from a branch of that body in Fiji, where, in July 1958, there was an attempt to establish a branch of the PPTA. Sympathy was expressed in the circular with the natural desire of secondary teachers to keep in touch with policies through their own organisation, but another consideration was stressed:

> "In the first place, the set-up here is distinct from that in New Zealand, and there is no political schism between primary and post-primary teachers. Here we are all New Zealand teachers, united in one representative body, and reasonably strong in bargaining power as a result. No primary versus post-primary tension has been discernible here, that is left entirely to the teachers' bodies in New Zealand, and, in fact, probably about half our financial members and most of our committee members would be eligible for membership of a local PPTA if one were formed. We have been happy and confident in our unity, and feel that it is educationally and politically sounder for all New Zealand teachers here to speak with one voice". 37

A reorientation of goals. It has been claimed in the past - with more than a little justification if one may judge from Executive discussion - that the Association has been interested far more in the status and remuneration of its members than in what was being taught in the classrooms. It should be said at the outset however, that a certain standard of 'working conditions' must be attained before it is reasonable to expect a teachers' organisation to pay much attention to professional rather than trade-union matters. The old Association journal could comment in 1953: "Why should the [Association's] magazine be dead? By all means let our interest in salaries,

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37. Circular from Fiji Branch of the NZEI, July 1958. The stress is the present writer's.

in inadequate buildings, in superannuation, in "trade union" activities increase; but let us also have articles which show that the chief goal of the teachers is the better education of young New Zealand;"[38] yet it was apparent that the chief interest of teachers as Association members (though not necessarily in the classroom situation) was the improvement of their conditions of employment. Judging from the articles given prominence in both the STA Journal and later the PPTA Journal, little was done to stimulate creative thought on matters of teaching method. In fact the STA Journal openly encouraged those teachers who were advising their students against becoming teachers themselves.

It was not until 1963 that the Journal, and the Association, began to think in a concerted manner of what had been claimed to be the 'chief goal' of teachers, namely curriculum development. In response to the University Entrance Board's announcement early in that year it was to establish a procedure and programme for the regular review of all school subjects, the Association felt obliged to "establish some sort of organisation to meet this situation. Accordingly the Executive at its June meeting decided to set up committees in all subjects based in different centres which would keep syllabuses at all levels under continuous review".[39] In fact, from the earliest days, organisations of secondary teachers had kept one eye on the universities, which for them were both a source and an end product. Many secondary teachers had been through universities themselves, and many more considered it their prime duty to prepare as many of their students as possible for university. "As the largest body of graduates in the country, the PPTA cannot countenance any lowering of the reputation of our universities".[40] As has been mentioned earlier in this chapter, the stress on study of curriculum and the structuring of an organisation to achieve this aim, have been welcomed by the Department, and a degree of structural coordination has been achieved under the umbrella of the newly created Curriculum Development Unit (see Chapter Six).

It is not apparent to the casual observer that the considerable amount of official consultation between the Association and the Department becomes almost insignificant when

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38. STA Journal Vol 11 No 1, April 1953.

39. Journal Vol X No 6, July 1963.

40. Journal Vol V No 1, February 1959.

compared with the semi-official and unofficial consultation. The Director, Dr. Beeby, wrote to the Association that: "The Association can have the ear of the Department at any time, but it is up to you to come along, to show the initiative and to give advice".[41] That consultation has become fuller over recent years is best illustrated by example. The following extract from the Journal concerns the new type of standard plan for secondary school building, known as the (second) Porirua Plan, the first of which was being used at Porirua in 1965:

> It should be made clear at the outset then...that this plan was not initiated by the PPTA, which was not consulted about it until preliminary drawings had gone a long way...However it [the PPTA] did insist that its expert committees be brought into consultation on their specialist areas and many meetings followed especially on libraries and laboratories. It is fair to say that, within the limits of money and space prescribed by overall financial policy, this consultation was frank and effective and many of the criticisms made by our negotiators were conceded and changes made". 42

This amounts to a considerable change from the 'old days', the article goes on to say, when 'consultation' amounted to their being told: 'Here is a plan, and if you do not accept it, the schools will not be built in time'. Consultation however has a dual effect. It subjects the Department, it is true, to pressure from a lobby; but if that pressure is to be effective, it must be completely coordinated. That is to say: "If the Association is to be consulted...and its views accepted, then members must clearly understand what has happened and direct any further criticism to the Association and not to the Department".[43] A further effect of genuine consultation which is of great importance is that it presents to the pressure group a good understanding of the factors which the Department must take into account in reaching its decisions; in buildings, for example, the position of the Ministry of Works, which exercises a controlling influence simply by being in a position to begin building at a particular time and insisting that any delay could prove to have disastrous consequences.

Looking back on the history of the Association, especially since amalgamation, one is aware of a basic question which seems to recur in many forms: what emphasis should the Association place on 'trade union' objectives as opposed to 'professional' ones? Around this key problem others have revolved concerning

41. Executive Minutes, 1955.

42. Journal Vol XII No 3, April 1965.

43. Ibid, the stress is the present writer's.

internal divisions, the representation of minority interests and the structure of leadership. The effect of such problems on the Association's bargaining position will be further discussed in Chapter Eleven, but it should be noted at this point that structural re-organisation has put the Association in a better position to solve them.

CONCLUSIONS: The Association Game.

Rules of the game. In no other game in the system has there been so much dispute and uncertainty as to the rules. At the bottom of the uncertainty is the traditional acceptance by the Association of its role as a pressure group. The PPTA has set itself goals and has considered almost any strategy to be 'within the rules' if it achieved its end. This approach has had an effect upon relations with the Department and with several Ministers of Education. The Hon R.M. Algie, for example, claimed in the election year of 1957 that the PPTA headquarters had sent a circular to branches suggesting that 'rebels' be placed at the back of public meetings to add spice to discussions on the subject of salaries. The Association denied these allegations, but the circular was withdrawn.[44] According to the generally accepted code, it is not permissible to taint education with politics. The PPTA had thus broken perhaps the most fundamental rule of the game. Obviously in dealing with a body which breaks the existing rules, a new order of rule is required. For some years the Association was the bête noire of departmental officers and a general feeling of ill-will existed. If a course of militancy is followed such consequences must be accepted.

Pay-Off. As has been stressed, the PPTA has traditionally sought to improve the conditions and remuneration of its members. Pay-off has been measurable in terms of its success in doing so. Yet in recent years it has been possible to observe a re-orientation of goals. By taking a greater interest in curriculum development, the Association has enlarged the area of cooperation between itself and the Department and pay-off for the Department in this field is much the same as that for the PPTA.

Strategy. The Association has probably given more thought to the strategies of direct and indirect pressure than any other player in the whole system. The PPTA recognise the teacher shortage as its greatest asset, its best bargaining counter.

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44. Dominion, August 2nd 1957.

By achieving solidarity among members, it has the ability - which on at least one occasion (see Chapter Eleven) it has threatened to use - to withdraw its services, and much thought has been given by Executive leaders to methods of escalating any issue; by at first some token withdrawal of services, then by opting out of extra-curricular activities, and eventually complete withdrawal of teaching services (i.e. strike action) by stages.

In general the Association, like the NZEI, seems to favour direct pressure, for this is seen to avoid public and parliamentary debate. But it has given much thought to more indirect methods. In recent years a special committee was set up to look into the cost of obtaining expert advice on publicity, and of employing a permanent publicity agent. It was also suggested that there should be short, regular press releases and news items "designed to create a favourable atmosphere and make the public receptive".[45] Press releases are often prepared on certain issues for use should the Minister fail to respond to any particular PPTA move. It is seen as being important to bring in an authority, usually neutral, which will be recognised by the general public. The Commission on Education has filled this role since 1960, when the public first became aware of its thinking. Such headings as "Commission's Recommendation Rejected" are regarded as excellent publicity. Another good tactic is to invoke patriotism. Such publicity usually takes the form of comparisons with 'overseas', and its theme is "Will New Zealand be content with Second Best?"

This attention to strategy has culminated in the preparation of a 'master plan' similar to the NZEI's revaluation campaign, to which the final touches were added in 1966. With variations, it can be used to support practically any Association objective. The 'master plan' reads as follows: a 'suitably condensed factual case' is prepared covering all aspects of the staffing situation. This is to be done on a national scale, attracting as little attention as possible. When the case is fully prepared, copies are to be sent out to the branches, which are to initiate a sustained campaign at a local level, making use of all the available local media. Public speeches to local organisations are to be prepared - the emphasis being placed on

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45. Executive Minutes, 1961.

the needs of the children, and of the country as a whole. When the 'ground swell' has started, further pressure is to be applied at regional level, through radio, television and public meetings in addition to the press. The final stage, following on from the regional advance, will be at a national level, with emphasis again on the mass media, and also on the national organisations headquartered at Wellington.

Overstressing their case is so much part of the Association game that it begins to take a hold on the players. The best example of this is the Association's position with regard to Form 1-6 high schools. Another failing of PPTA strategy has been its inability to select the best causes to champion. The regularity with which Ministerial replies begin: 'As you will know', 'I need hardly say' 'As you must realise' or 'It is well known to your Association that...' shows that rather than be selective, the Association has tried to turn every situation to its advantage.

In brief conclusion, Association leadership has never been totally convinced of the merits of direct pressure applied to the Department; it geared its organisation to indirect methods. But by increasing its efforts to influence curriculum development, the Association has made possible new strategies. These would be direct though based not upon threat, as in the past, but upon cooperation.

Information. When threat strategies introduce tensions into the game, they tend to minimise the flow of information. Threat strategies in a game of ill-defined rules tend to distort the content of information. Nowhere is this better brought out than in the Association game. During the 1950s the game was marked by a bitterness based at least in part on incomplete information. A cycle seemed to emerge of militancy producing incomplete information, incomplete information producing misunderstanding, misunderstanding producing bitterness and bitterness producing greater militancy.

Coalition. In matters of conditions of service, buildings, equipment and housing the PPTA has an almost permanent coalition with the SSBA. As was pointed out in Chapter Eight, there is a considerable degree of overlap in aims. There is little open rivalry between the two, even in issues on which they are opposed. Leadership in this coalition is usually seized by the Association. It is able to secure support for most of its stands because of the pressures exerted within the SSBA organisation by post-primary principals.

On matters of government expenditure on education and teachers' salaries, coalition is often possible with the NZEI. But as was pointed out when we dealt with that body, the government is often able to drive a wedge between the partners, to 'Balkanise' the coalition. There are a number of goals and strategies which conflict, thus coalitions tend to be transitory.

One is left with the impression that although they may express genuine grievances, the PPTA claims have been overstated too often in the past; that strategies have lacked the sophistication of those of the NZEI. Perhaps much of this has resulted from poor organisation and a resultant breakdown in communications between membership and leadership. To some degree the Association is fighting old battles. "Secondary schools", it was once said, "are in a sense on trial. Their success depends upon whether they are able to convince people of their necessity".[46] Today the secondary schools are recognised as being essential; secondary teachers no longer have to overstate their case to make themselves heard.

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46. Report of the Formation of the NZEI, printed in Auckland, 1883.

Chapter Ten

THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION: A SECONDARY VIEW

As was the case in Section Two, it is necessary in this section to pay some attention to the officers of the Education Department before discussing their role in the post-primary games. In doing so, we are faced with precisely the same problems and the rationale underlying the procedure to be adopted has already been offered in Chapter Six; it is proposed to follow much the same pattern in this chapter. That is to say, we will be concerned here with the Department's controlling and coordinating machinery in the post-primary sub-system. The three sub-sections will deal with the inspectorate, the chief means of professional coordination and control; the Regional Offices and finally the Standing Committee on administration which, together, form the chief means of administrative and overall control and coordination.

I

Like its primary counterpart the inspectorate forms an obvious starting point for any discussion of the post-primary 'work' of the Education Department.

The post-primary inspectorate is centred in the three Regional Offices of the Department and also in Hamilton, but is organised in other respects similarly to the primary branch.

Functions. The Commission on Education saw the functions of the post-primary inspectorate as being to:

> "Conduct regular inspections of secondary schools and departments and report upon their efficiency, to pay visits to all secondary schools private as well as state, for the purpose of checking the course of study undertaken and the standards of work achieved in sixth form classes, and to carry out an annual assessment of all secondary assisting teachers". [1]

Like his primary counterpart however, the post-primary inspector has taken on the role of "an adviser and a professional leader"; [2] in recent years this development, like a number of others, was brought about largely by the introduction of a new curriculum in 1945 based upon the report of the Thomas

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1. Report of the Commission on Education, 1962, p. 604.

2. Submission of the Education Department to the Commission on Education, 1962.

Committee. The technical and secondary inspectorates were amalgamated, and district high schools came under secondary inspection. Functionally speaking, the major task of the newly reorganised inspectorate was to explain the new curriculum to teachers and to assist in its implementation, professional leadership in other words. However, the duties of reporting on the efficiency of the schools and of grading teachers were continued. Thus the inspectors' workload was increased, for the post-war years brought steadily expanding rolls, which meant more schools to report on and more teachers to inspect. The increase in rolls was responsible for a syndrome of problems associated with the appointment of a number of younger, less experienced principals and heads of departments, and the need to fill teaching positions with people who were often inexperienced or ill-trained. Professional leadership thus took on crucial proportions. In-service training naturally offers an important weapon for the inspector's armoury, but as is the case in the primary service, it is difficult to offer professional guidance at any level and through any medium whilst still being called upon to carry out an increasing amount of routine inspection of schools and of teacher grading.

Grading and Inspection. As was stated in Chapter Six, the teacher bodies are the main supporters of the present system of grading. The Commission on Education also made this point:

> "Inspection and grading have a decisive bearing on the professional advancement of teachers and are known to excite strong feelings. Yet apart from one or two submissions urging total abolition, the Commission received from the people who must submit to inspection and grading, the teachers themselves, no detailed appraisal of the schemes at present in operation for the assessment and grading of primary and secondary teachers, nor were any alternative schemes proposed". 3

For its part, the Department is conscious of the drawbacks of the present system. It has attempted to make the inspector's load lighter - the annual grading of Grade V teachers has been abandoned and the reporting of schools has been made a quinquennial affair, but the central problem remains, as one officer pointed out a decade ago: "I would say this to teachers. We have to get rid of inspectors as traditionally envisaged. You are full professional people and you should carry the full responsibility for your job. We, the Department, will exercise our control anywhere the job is not being done". He envisaged

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3. Report of the Commission on Education, 1962, p. 601.

a complete change in the function of inspectors - they should become purely a body of advisors: "They are a fine body of people, but the dice are loaded against them". [4]

For its part the Commission suggested that the amount of routine work undertaken by the inspector should be considerably reduced. In its interim report the Commission suggested that grading should be biennial, but in its final report the recommendation was that grading be a triennial affair. It also recommended that secondary teachers be exempted from grading for the first six years of teaching, after which time they could hope to be at the point of entry to Grade 111. "A secondary inspectorate freed from the restrictions imposed upon it by its present rigid timetable of annual visits", the Commission concluded, "would be able to add greatly to its work in the in-service training of secondary school teachers". [5]

The report on the work of each school which the inspector makes every five years is a fairly lengthy document and is concerned with staff, organisation, buildings, equipment and the quality of work in the various subjects taught. Such reports could be most useful to the school concerned, but it is well known that many schools do not use them [6] and their usefulness is seriously impaired by the speed with which they are of necessity prepared. Several officers within the Department have suggested that a school inspection should be carried out "only when circumstances appear to demand it". [7]

Coordination through the inspectorate. Although it is true that the inspector is uniquely placed as a coordinating agent, his influence in the post-primary sphere does not appear to be as great as that of his primary counterpart. There are a number of reasons for this, most important of which is the position of the post-primary school itself. Each school, as we have seen, is in many ways an autonomous unit. Its only relationship - apart from such schools as operate within a council system - is with the Education Department. It has direct contact and thus less need to rely upon the inspector as a coordinator. The inspector is an important link in the chain of information, however, and is used by the Regional Offices in conjunction with the inspecting accountant to supply background information where a dispute has arisen in any school. A second reason why

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4. PPTA Journal Vol 11 No 2, March 1956.
5. Report of the Commission on Education, 1962 ,p. 606.
6. Department's submission to the Commission on Education .
7. Ibid.

the post-primary inspector has less coordinative influence than his primary counterpart is to be found in the relative salary structures (and therefore status and prestige). Principals of large post-primary schools are often better paid than post-primary inspectors, and it is probable that this fact would influence the relationship between principals (and heads of departments with aspirations) and the inspectors. Further, as has been pointed out earlier, the post-primary principal is lord of his own domain. In sum, the post-primary school is usually larger and more autonomous than the primary school; coordination is not as detailed as in the primary sub-system and therefore is of less concern to the inspectorate.

This is not to deny that the inspector plays an important part in coordinating the post-primary sub-system, but rather to demarcate the area in which this coordination principally takes place. It is in the field of curriculum and teaching method that the inspector plays his most important part - the field, that is, of professional leadership. Post-primary inspectors are subject specialists, and this is an important fact. They are able to give specific assistance and a degree of understanding based upon experience within a particular area. It is not only in the classroom situation that the inspector's coordinating influence is felt, but through his formal and informal contacts with PPTA subject panels. He is an important coordinator in curriculum development in a number of ways.

In Chapter Six we discussed the difficulties involved in the primary inspector's task; much the same difficulties exist for the post-primary inspector. Some have also seen a danger inherent within the concept of professional leadership by a person responsible for grading - the danger of "Departmental paternalism". It can be argued that through the inspectorate the Department could control teaching methods to the extent of severely cramping the freedom of the individual teacher. Several individual submissions to the Commission on Education made the point that 'advice' given by the person who decides upon one's grading may be difficult to evaluate on its intrinsic merits. Such is the quality of leadership in the Department of Education that the conscious application of such 'paternalism' is unlikely. Yet a reaction on the part of teachers to the possibility of the over-application of professional leadership may colour relations between inspector and indivisual teacher to a considerable extent.

The danger is real and will continue to exist while grading itself continues to exist. Under the present system the only safeguard against 'paternalism' would appear to be the quality of departmental leadership.

With the expansion of the inspectorate and the setting up of the Regional Offices, such problems of coordination as existed have, to a considerable degree, become internal to the inspectorate. That is to say, the main difficulty is to coordinate those inspectors who have personal contacts with the schools and those at Head Office who are basically concerned with policy-making. Periodic meetings of senior inspectors and news bulletins do not take the place of the close liaison that once existed between the Chief Inspector, his inspectors in the field and the individual schools. Thus coordination in the post-primary field is largely a matter for the Department of Education itself. The machinery for fairly close coordination exists, but liaison between the component parts, inspectors have argued, shows a need for improvement.

Another problem which the Department faces and which, if not strictly related to coordination, nevertheless has repercussions in that area, is that of recruitment of inspectors. It is often pointed out by individual secondary teachers and by the PPTA that because the salaries of post-primary inspectors have been traditionally lower than those of top principals, the standard of recruitment has been lower than that in the primary service. They go on to point out that this has meant that leadership in the Department has traditionally devolved upon ex-primary inspectors, and that as a result department leadership over the years has been oriented to the primary service.[8] It is also stated that many of the post-primary inspectors have come from teaching careers in the more academic, and usually single-sex, post-primary schools and that they have little understanding of the problems involved in teaching the less academically able pupils in the large, co-educational urban schools.

Thus if professional leadership is to be meaningful, not only has the inspector to be freed of much of his workload but his status has to be substantially improved. When with comparative ease a capable teacher can obtain a senior post of responsibility or principalship, he is not likely to be drawn to a career

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8. It is now (June 1966) a fact however that both the Director General and the Assistant Director General (Professional) are from the secondary service.

involving "disruptions of the normal personal, family and social mode of living and also a degree of separation from close contact with former friends and teaching colleagues".[9] Yet the over-riding consideration, in terms of the values espoused by the main players within the system, should be to adjust the inspector's responsibilities so that he has more time to spend on constructive work.

The position of the post-primary inspector, his problems and aspirations, are best summed up in the words of a Director of Education, Dr. Beeby, who said:

> "From the very nature of things, the inspector is always walking a knife-edge, and he is always in danger of spoiling his job by swaying a bit too far to one side or the other. He cannot, for example, divest himself of his policing functions, but he has to combine these with the new function of professional leadership. Somehow or other, he does it, but the two functions do not lie easily together. There is little that I can do to help new inspectors strike a reasonable balance, but some of their older colleagues probably can help them. The inspector, again, must continue to take some responsibility for the standards in the schools, but he must also leave some responsibility for standards to the individual teacher, and to the profession as a whole. If the inspector leaves the whole responsibility for standards to other people, he is not doing his duty; but, if he errs in the other direction, he can threaten the professional quality of the service. Again, the inspector finds himself in difficulty when trying to decide how far he is the mouthpiece of the Department, committed to the promulgation of Departmental policy, and how far he has, as a professional man, the right to inculcate his own ideals and methods in education. This decision cannot always be a very easy one, but perhaps I can help you by saying that I believe every inspector has a right to his own philosophy of education and to a good measure of freedom in putting forward his own ideas in the schools. It naturally follows, of course, that every teacher also has a right to his own philosophy and to all the freedom he can reasonably be given in putting that philosophy into practice. There are of course, in the Public Service, limits beyond which variations are not acceptable, but these limits are much wider than is commonly thought by people outside the service. The achieving of a proper balance clearly depends upon the wisdom and the judgment of the individual inspector, but it may help you if I say that, when you are genuinely in doubt which road you should take, you should, if you must err at all, err in the direction of taking more freedom rather than less, and of giving teachers more freedom rather than less; you should under-inspect rather than over-inspect, and you should risk giving principals and heads of departments too much responsibility for standards rather than too little. You have a duty not to run counter to broadly established Departmental policies, but you also have a duty to act as professional men and women, with all the freedom that implies".[10]

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9. Department's submission to the Commission on Education, 1962.

10. An address by the Director of Education to the inspectors of post-primary schools, 1958. Quoted in the Department's submission to the Commission on Education, 1962.

The problems of coordinating without unduly controlling are considerable. Grading has its obvious advantages: it extends egalitarian concepts into fields of appointment and promotion. But it prevents the inspector from fulfilling what he sees to be his most important task - that of enlightened professional leadership. Leicester Webb made the point that the education system lost the capacity for self-criticism when the inspectorate was centralised.[11] Undoubtedly the present system encourages conformism and however talented a body of men the inspectorate may be, ~~the~~, the dice - as it was said, are loaded against them. Finally, if teacher recruitment - one of the perennial problems - depends upon professional status, one might well query if the status of teachers will ever be high while grading continues. Many of John Vaizey's[12] suggestions for raising the status of the British teacher are accepted policy in New Zealand. Yet grading - which does not exist in Britain - continues, and New Zealand teachers continue to be most concerned about their status.

II

At first glance, the Regional Offices can be viewed as discharging somewhat similar functions in the secondary sub-system to those performed in the primary sub-system by the Education Boards: they coordinate the secondary system at regional level. Another similarity between the Regional Offices and the Education Boards is that decisions taken by both usually take the form of applying prescribed regulations. Yet in fact the Regional Offices enjoy a far greater delegation of power in most areas.

Structure. The structures of the three Regional Offices differ slightly and, since they are a comparatively recent development, are subject to further alterations.[13] There is a degree of similarity between the structure of the Education Boards, the Regional Offices and - to an extent - the Head Office. This is not accidental, for when the then Director, Dr. Beeby, strengthened the administrative side of Head Office (see Chapter Fourteen), the newly created Assistant Director (Administration) made it his policy to suggest that the Boards rationalise their organisations along similar lines to the Department's, so as to

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11. Leicester Webb, The Control of Education, passim

12. John Vaizey, Education for Tomorrow, in the Britain in the Sixties Series, Penguin, 1962, pp. 98-108.

13. The writer visited each of the Regional Offices. Many, though by no means all of the following observations on structure, however, are based on the position at the Wellington Regional Office.

make for better coordination. Of the divisions of the Regional Office, a number deal with either purely routine matters or matters concerning internal administration and are therefore of little relevance to this study. Such would be the property supervision division, the stores division and the administrative division.[14] This leaves the buildings, transport, teachers' and accounts divisions, the architectural staff and the inspecting accountants. The buildings division was discussed in Chapter Six;[15] it remains to describe the work of the other divisions, with the exception of the architect's branch: the subject matter of the last would not be of great relevance to this study.[16]

Transport division. This division is responsible for supervising the routes operated by the Education Boards and paying the costs of school transport in both primary and post-primary spheres. Despite its title however its main function is to administer secondary school bursaries.

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14. The property supervisors, for example, authorise and supervise maintenance and minor capital works at secondary schools, institutes of technology and child welfare institutions. They have an 'immediate authority' for work costing up to £150. The primary function of the Stores branch is the purchase and supply of basic equipment and stores for secondary schools and secondary departments of district high schools. Since the Department of Education is classed as a 'requisitioning Department', it is required to purchase anything above £5 in value through the Ministry of Works.

15. As far as post-primary schooling is concerned, it is the Regional Office, which constructs the regional building plan, though individual boards will be consulted. Stress has to be placed upon the statistics of forward planning and to this end the investigating officer compiles detailed figures of likely expansion in the secondary field. The principals of the various schools also prepare similar sets of figures based upon the rolls of contributing primary and intermediate schools. There is seldom much discrepancy between the two sets of figures. From these statistics, the buildings divisions will calculate accommodation requirements according to a code, which lists the numbers and types of 'teaching spaces' permitted according to the size of the roll.

16. The actual planning and design of new secondary schools follows wherever possible a national basic plan. Since the second world war, there have been four such plans, known as the Henderson, Porirua and Nelson plans, the last having been in use since 1958. In 1965 however work began on a school at Porirua in which a new design was used, following consultations with the PPTA's specialist committees.

"Departmental regional architects" we are told, "are, in the main, fully engaged in the preparation of briefings to Ministry of Works or to private architects for additions to existing secondary schools, school hostels, child welfare institutions, special schools and kindergartens. Private architects are not employed without obtaining Ministry of Works approval and all sketches and working drawings are cleared by the Regional Architect before tenders are called." (Some Functions of the Regional Office, Notes for the Public Expenditure Committee, Southern Regional Office of the Department of Education, March 5th, 1965.)

As we discovered in Chapter Four the Education Boards are responsible for primary school transport in the first instance the transport division of the Regional Office acts merely in a supervisory and permissive capacity. Yet transport regulations are highly complex. Apart from bus routes, Boards can pay an allowance on train fares in certain cases; they can pay a 'capitation and conveyance' grant to parents who take a group of children to school by car. In Taranaki the Department owns a boat which is used for transport purposes and in some country areas where the children ride to school there is a horse-back allowance. With regard to the post-primary schools, the branch allocates buses which are placed under the control of the principal.

It has been pointed out that it is the transport sector which attracts most public enquiry and criticism. If an Education Board, or a secondary school, is unable to accommodate a particular request because of the regulations, then the request is

respect of any child who would otherwise have to walk more than 3 miles to either the nearest school or bus route. In addition, it is possible to obtain an academic bursary for any child who is suited to an education which the local school is not able to provide. Such bursaries are awarded following an assessment by the inspectorate, a report by the teacher and a letter from the parents specifying the nature of the course they would like their child to take. If the inspector's assessment is not favourable, there is little the parents can do, except, of course, to send the pupil to board at cost. It is felt necessary in many sectors of New Zealand's economy and administration to give additional assistance to the rural population and its aspirations. The academic and technical bursaries' system offers a good example of a scheme which seeks to provide some sort of equality for the country child. But it should be noted that it falls short of providing real equality, for the town child usually has the opportunity to go to a school with academic or technical specialisation, whereas the country child of low ability can attend such a school only if his parents are able to provide the finance. Five different bursaries, dependent upon the student's course and year of study are payable, and their administration is entirely in the hands of the transport division of the Regional Office.

Accounts division. This division acts as a clearing house for the checking, approving and dispatch of all certified payment vouchers received from other divisions, by scheduling all certified vouchers to Treasury. Other functions include: the preparation, payment and recording of all travelling and miscellaneous claims (e.g. office expenses, telephone rentals, transfer and removal expenses) arising in the region; authorisation and payment of subsidies and grants to Education Boards and secondary schools; payment of district office staff fortnightly salaries; maintaining records of outstanding commitments and expenditure incurred by the district and collation of annual estimates of expenditure for Head Office's reference.

In the main, the accounts division is responsible for approving payment vouchers to Treasury for payment of grants for specific purposes to Education Boards and secondary boards which have already been approved or which are governed by regulations. The accounts branch also prepares and controls some general payments to Boards. These are:

(i) The primary maintenance grants to Education Boards made monthly on the basis of 1/7d per square foot of total floor space.

(ii) Grants recommended by the District Senior Inspector of Secondary Schools for additional secondary equipment.

(iii) Refunds to Education Boards of subsidy payments made to primary schools for equipment and books.

(iv) Maintenance of secondary schools. Accounts branch makes payment to secondary school boards on claims submitted by the boards through the property supervisor.

In all financial matters, whether specific or general, a very firm line is taken by officers in charge, one of whom religiously stated: "After all, we're dealing with Government expenditure".

Teachers' division. This is the largest of the divisions of the Regional Office and it comprises four sections: the salaries and staffing, grading, superannuation, and administration sections.

Numerically the largest and certainly the most complex is the salaries and staffing section. It is concerned with the pre-audit of all salary changes for all primary and post-primary boards. A detailed record is kept for each teacher which includes information on increments supplied by the secretary of the council or board concerned. The ascertainment of a teacher's basic commencing salary is difficult enough [18] but when a profusion of salary increments have to be taken into account -on commencement and at later dates - the process becomes exceedingly complex: there are motherhood increments; there are increments for every four years spent out of teaching and a double increment at the end of the first two years' teaching. In addition to salary increments, some teachers are eligible for removal expenses. Teachers taking their first country service position are eligible; teachers being promoted are eligible if they held their last position for more than three years; teachers coming out of country service having completed the quota in full are eligible and teachers forcibly transferred are eligible. There are also salary bars and country service bars to be taken into account and exceptions to the latter on grounds of age or ill health. Staffing procedures are somewhat less complex, though

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18. Especially where qualifications have to be aggregated, as is very often the case in New Zealand.

by no means simple.[19]

The grading section is responsible for keeping an accurate, up to date record of each teacher's grade - salaries of course, are based upon grading.[20]

The administration section is concerned with the payment of school committee incidental grants and the payment of all teachers directly employed by the Department (in correspondence schools, schools for the handicapped and so on).

The superannuation section of the Regional Office acts as an agent for the Government Superannuation Board. Both the superannuation and administration branches are concerned with fairly straightforward administration, but owing to the shortage of staff the superannuation scheme is not efficiently administered and a number of complaints are received in this area.

Even the above outline gives some indication of the complexity of the work in the teachers' division. To run smoothly it requires skilled officers in key positions. One staffing and salaries officer has said that the many intricacies are virtually incomprehensible to a person who has not 'grown up with' the system. Thus length of service is seen to be essential, and yet staff turnover in this division in the Wellington Regional Office is considerable to say the least.

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19. Post-primary school staffing is worked out on a basis of teacher-time units, that is teaching half-days, but various additional allownaces are made with regard to size and the amount of sixth-form work for example. Primary schools, on the other hand, are staffed for the year ahead on their average roll in the first four weeks of the third term. But there are exceptions to be taken into account; an expected growth in the roll of one school might hold up that school's grade and therefore affect its staffing. A provision also exists whereby extra staff can be obtained during the year; for every additional forty pupils one additional teacher is provided. The effectiveness of this scheme is impaired by its inflexibility, for if there are thirty-nine extra pupils no additional teacher is provided unless further growth is quite certain in the near future. Intermediate and district high schools are staffed according to the roll on March 1st of the current year.

20. Post-primary teachers are graded on a 1-5 scale. Grading is calculated on a mark scored out of a possible 100, of which 20 are awarded for qualifications, 20 for experience and 60 for 'teaching ability'. A mark of 44 or more takes a teacher to grade 2; 60 or more grade 3; 78 or more grade 4 and 91 or more grade 5. There is no salary difference until grade 4 is reached (with the proviso that it is possible for some grade 3 teachers to obtain positions of responsibility). Posts of responsibility are also graded - A,B,C,D. Principals are graded 5 and above but are not inspected and regraded. Each primary teacher is issued with an inspector's report. Depending upon length of service he will be placed in one of four divisions (A,B,C, or D). Each division is structured 1-9 and teachers are classified according to teaching ability (see Chapter Six).

Inspecting accountants. These officers have three mean functions:

(i) To act as advisers to secondary boards on any specific matter about which a board has approached them. This is obviously a key role in the secondary sub-system and an understanding of and sympathy with the failings of lay boards is essential. "We have no more trouble dealing with them than any human has dealing with other humans", one inspecting accountant pointed out. His is nonetheless a role which demands an ability to help people with the smallest degree of fuss. Like the inspectors, the inspecting accountants are important coordinators.

(ii) To visit every school during the year to gain as complete a picture as possible of the financial situation in each school. Five-year records are maintained of all revenue and expenditure with a detailed break-down. This means that the inspecting accountants are the only group of people within the sub-system with a detailed knowledge of the financial situation of each school and of the personalities involved in management. They have access to the board minutes and thus have a considerable fund of information.

(iii) To conduct special investigations where some unexpected difficulty has arisen in any particular school. But the inspecting accountants are not auditors; they are concerned with managerial problems and not 'peculation'.

In short, an efficient inspecting accountant is an asset to the Regional Office, enabling it to act often from fairly complete information and providing it with the means to act promptly and unobtrusively.

Coordination within the Regional Office. The work of the various branches of the Regional Office is coordinated by the Regional Superintendent, the regional executive officer and the assistant regional executive officer. The role of Regional Superintendent is important, especially in achieving coordination between the various local organs in the education system and building up a spirit of confidence and good-will between them. As the Department of Education has stated:

> "The Regional Superintendent is the fully accredited representative of the Director, with both professional and administrative responsibilities. In association with the District Senior Inspectors and their staffs, both primary and post-primary, it is his function to give educational leadership in his region, to teachers, parents, controlling authorities and the public, to give support to other professional officers...and to do what he can to create a feeling of common purpose, and build up mutual understanding between primary and post-primary inspectors and teachers, administrative and professional officers, members of controlling authorities and officers of the Department, teachers' colleges and the schools, etc.....Good teamwork among professional and administrative officers is essential at the local as at the national level, and it is a function of the Superintendent to foster it". 21

21. Submission of the Department of Education to the Commission on Education, 1962, quoted in the report of the latter, p.117.

The Regional Superintendent and his senior officers are, in fact, in a unique position within the region to promote the continuity of education and cooperation between all levels. "In point of fact", one Regional Superintendent claimed, "the Regional Superintendent is the only person...strategically placed to do this in a comprehensive way". Although the Director-General might initiate such a responsibility in a broad national sense, the Regional Superintendent, through direct professional and personal relationships within his region, discharges this responsibility. The following are some of the methods by which coordination is achieved in professional fields:

(i) Conferences are called and dialogue initiated between primary and post-primary inspectors.

(ii) Continual discussions are held with principals, inspectors and teacher organisations.

(iii) Direct relationships are maintained with local branches of the professional bodies.

(iv) Press statements and public speeches are often made, stressing regional objectives.

(v) Continual emphasis is placed, within the region's in-service training programmes, on syllabus links between the primary and post-primary sub-systems.

(vi) The Superintendent gives a personal lead in his own subject area.

Administrative coordination is more institutionalised yet it, too, depends for its effectiveness upon the ability of the Superintendent and his colleagues to impart a sense of common purpose among all concerned. Armed with delegated financial authority much the same as the Director-General's, the Superintendent is well placed to foster good will among the statutory authorities and local bodies.

Most decisions, in fact, involve a strong element both of professional and administrative considerations, and it is such decisions which the Regional Offices are particularly suited to take, or to advise on. The amalgamation of certain secondary schools in the South Island offers an example of an act professionally justified and economically and administratively sound. "It is doubtful", one administrator noted, "whether such developments would ever have been promoted in the absence of a Regional Superintendent".

At a more routine level, senior officers are concerned with the smooth running of the system within the region. Perhaps the best method of describing the form this function takes, is to look at the work undertaken in a typical day.

Below are a number of problems which found their way to the desk of an assistant regional executive officer on one day:

(i) A secondary school principal had overdrawn £2,000 having incorrectly coded part of a wages sheet. There had been no knowledge of this mistake at the time, and the effort was being made to rectify the matter promptly and unobtrusively at the regional level.

(ii) A dispute had arisen between the Regional Office and Head Office concerning the application of the free text book scheme in a specific school. The Regional Office is sometimes more sympathetic towards 'special cases' than is Head Office. In this instance, a boys' school and a girls' school had been merged, but the roll of the former had dropped so that the roll of the amalgamated schools was little higher than that of the old girls' school. This meant that there was little opportunity to develop the separate courses for boys and girls which are a common feature of such schools unless the Department were to provide more than the statutory number of textbooks, which is based on the size of the roll.

(iii) Investigation had disclosed that a groundsman in a particular school was being substantially overpaid; again, this problem would be solved at the regional level.

(iv) One school was trying to obtain new tennis nets under the 'classroom equipment renewals' scheme and presented a very convincing 'justification' to the effect that since the courts were used for instruction (in tennis) they could be classified as a classroom!

(v) An enquiry from a private school concerned with the workings of the new state-aid regulations.

(vi) A dispute with a school over the working hours of its groundsman.

(vii) An internal dispute at a certain high school over library expenditure. It was known that the real issue was one of personality; the Principal and the Chairman of the board had been mutually antagonistic for a long period, and the Chairman had at length asked the Regional Office to investigate the school's administerative structure, with a view to smoothing out the points of contention.

(viii) A letter from a teacher who complained that she still regularly received cheques from a school whose employ she had left some considerable time before. On enquiry, it was discovered that cheques were also being sent to the secretary of the same school on behalf of another ex-member of staff. These cheques were being put into the school safe by the secretary, who did not know what to do with them, but had not informed the Regional Office. Some time later another complaint came from a member of staff from the same school, to the effect that deductions from his salary were not being paid into his building society in time to draw a dividend, though the time lag between pay-day and the closing date for the dividend was considerable.

There are examples of inefficiency which the Regional Office is powerless to prevent; it must be borne in mind that the Department at no level possesses the power to dismiss an employee,

official or member of a secondary school board. In these and other matters, the Regional Office must use great tact. The application of detailed procedures at the local level causes misunderstanding and acts of minor maladministration, but in solving the inevitable operational problems, good functional relations have to be preserved. With its detailed knowledge of individual schools and the personalities involved, the Regional Officers are well placed to attempt this task: "Ours is the problem", said one Regional Superintendent, "of solving problems at the tadpole stage".

III

On matters of policy, individual secondary boards and the SSBA have traditionally dealt directly with those in a position to change policy, namely the senior officers at Head Office. It has already been shown that coordination and communications within the sub-system have not been of a high order. It was in an attempt to improve this situation that the Standing Committee on post-primary administration was set up with functions similar to those of its primary counterpart. It became, in other words, a negotiating body which sought to bind individual boards to a common policy.

At this point we might look at the composition and functions of the Standing Committee in some detail, since it offers a good example of a genuine attempt to improve the coordinations of the sub-system by 'improvement'. The Committee operates as follows:

(i) It is representative of the Department, the SSBA and the TEA. Its function is to provide consultation and negotiation between the Department and the Associations on projects or proposals submitted to it for consideration and report..

(ii) Normally it is the task of the committee to make recommendations to the Director of Education. It has only such powers or authority to make final decisions as are given to it by the Department and the Associations at the point where a matter is referred to it for consideration.

(iii) It consists of three representatives of the Department and the SSBA and one representative of the TEA, all appointed annually. Committee members who are unable to attend meetings may be represented by nominated deputies. The committee has power to co-opt on a unanimous vote.

(iv) When a committee member ceases to be on a governing body, his membership of the committee terminates.

(v) The chairman is appointed by the Director from among the members.

(vi) The committee has the right to appoint sub-committees and joint inspectorates to carry out fact-finding investigations.

(vii) The committee can take no action on any proposal without the prior consent of the Department and the Associations.

(viii) The proceedings of the committee are confidential to members and to the Director.

(ix) The committee holds meetings at least bi-annually.[22]

Thus a consultative and negotiating body was created which brought together the spokesmen of the secondary schools' boards and the officers of the Department of Education. It was hoped that the organisation of secondary boards themselves would thereby be improved and that decisions taken by board representatives in the joint committee would be binding upon members. By 'institutionalising' the secondary boards, it was also hoped, no doubt, to channel criticism by individual boards into the system rather than into newspaper columns. As for joint committee members, it was felt that they would have to exercise a "special responsibility to be discreet in any statements they may make publicly".[23] It is interesting to note - and we will be returning to this point later - that the Department is well aware of the advantages to be gained from bargaining with a strong body, for that body will be able to speak for all its members and will usually do so in a controlled manner.

Having thus outlined the most important controlling and coordinating machinery employed by the Department in the secondary sub-system, it remains to apply our 'games' conclusion.

CONCLUSIONS. The Department game.

Rules of the Game. The secondary sub-system depends, in the most fundamental manner, upon mutual cooperation and understanding. Thus diplomacy is a key rule, especially in the administrative sector.

In its attitude to secondary teachers, the Department has been guided by the realisation that its policies can best be fulfilled if teachers are consulted at each stage. One post-primary teacher wrote in his submission to the Commission on Education: "Every effort should be made to keep teachers informed about and interested in the ideas, plans, policy, organisation etc., of the Department - but no such process takes place". To teachers, the submission continued, the Department

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22. Taken from departmental files, March 1962.

23. Ibid.

was simply 'Big Brother', and spheres of contact were limited to areas of conflict, such as salaries and grading. The submission concluded: "In fairness I must add that when I sought out information on the attitude of the Department towards certain ideas of mine I received a full and encouraging reply". It is generally true that the Department has been traditionally willing to allow participation in policy formulation. But this was a negative attitude. Over recent years, more especially since the Commission reported, it has become a rule of the Department game to encourage involvement in policy formulation. This is a far more positive approach, and constitutes an important development in the rules of the Department game.

Pay-Off. As usual, departmental pay-off is closely related to the efficient and economic running of the system, and the preservation of its stability. It must be pointed out, however, that staffing shortages at Head Office and the Wellington Regional Office seriously impair the achievement of this pay-off. Not only is the administrative process slowed down, but ill-will is created as a result of the length of time involved in securing even minor works. Undoubtedly the Regional Offices have increased the efficiency of the system generally and have lent a certain cohesion to education at all levels within the respective regions.

Strategy. 'Involvement', it will be remembered, was seen to be an important rule of the Department game. Following this rule, departmental strategy has been to increase the machinery for the involvement of non-government bodies in the formulation of policy. Specific strategies have been the great increase in stress placed on curriculum development and in-service training in the professional sphere and the creation - on departmental initiative - of the (post-primary) Standing Committee in the administrative sphere. As has been pointed out before, this is a two-sided strategy. It not only involves non-government bodies in some degree of policy formulation, but it acquaints the leadership of these bodies with some of the political and economic factors involved in policy decisions. Thus it produces - naturally in varying degrees - an understanding of the departmental position. The onus for balancing the desirable and the feasible is thereby shared between non-government leadership and the Department. This strategy has not been completely successful but it appears to have created a substantially different atmosphere.

The strategy of involvement depends to a very large extent upon its acceptance by the PPTA and the SSBA. As we have seen, poor organisation and an alleged departmental preoccupation with primary education have militated against any complete acceptance in the past. But there are signs of improvement in the situation.

Information. Involvement, of course, presupposes a sharing of information, and the Department has shown itself willing to grant reasonably complete access to information. Yet if this process is to be useful, the increased access to information should be reflected in the goals of the non-government bodies. A statement of objectives by the Department, particularly in the sphere of curriculum development, has certainly produced such an effect on the curriculum goals of the PPTA. The policy of the SSBA appears to be based on a more adequate awareness of the overall situation, as is illustrated by changes in its attitude to council systems and schemes for joint secretariats.

Coalition. In Chapter Six we noted a fairly detailed pattern of coalition as far as the Department was concerned. In the secondary sub-system, organised pressure is restricted to only two groups of importance, the PPTA and the SSBA. As a consequence, coalition is less detailed and less important. As has been observed, the Department, in its capacity as a government agency, has been prepared to 'use' one teachers' body against another in salary negotiations. The Minister of Education also sought to drive a wedge between the SSBA and the NZEBA when they stood together against the Commission on Education's - and later the Minister's - proposals for reorganisation. Yet it is only to be expected, one concludes, that where there is so much disagreement among bodies of non-government opinion as to the allocation of funds, a Government Department would seek support from some at the expense of others, for its own purposes.

This concludes discussion on the secondary aspects of the Department of Education and also on the players in the secondary games.

Chapter Eleven

SECONDARY GAMES

Following a pattern similar to that adopted in Section Two, we have discussed the main players in the secondary games in some detail. In the final chapter of the present section we shall continue to follow the pattern by selecting a game situation from each of the main games in the sub-system and analysing them in depth. There are two main secondary games. We shall call them the Association game and the secondary boards' game. It is proposed to deal first with the Association game.

I

When speaking of the Institute game, we categorised it as a variable-sum game. The stress in the game, it will be remembered, was placed upon coordination and cooperation. This has been less true, in the past at least, of the Association game. Here, pay-off has been more closely associated with status, and co-operation has therefore been slight. Thus, until recently at least, the Association game has tended to approximate to a fixed-sum game. As has been pointed out, the increasing attention paid both by the Association and the Department to curriculum development provides better prospects for cooperation between the two, and for the creation of a mixed motive, if not a variable-sum game. But we must deal with the past and our game situation, as bitterly contested perhaps as any other in the system, is fixed sum.[1]

BACKGROUND. The game situation concerns the rates of pay for markers of the School Certificate Examination. It originates in a complaint made by the Wellington regional organisation of the PPTA that the rates of pay had not been altered since 1957 and that no machinery existed for regular review. The Government had obviously given some thought to the complaint and decided to increase the rates. Timing his statement for the annual conference of the PPTA in 1961, the Minister (the Hon B. Tennent) told representatives: "I am pleased to announce that yesterday, Cabinet approved increases of up to one shilling a script for marking papers". Conference did not share the Minister's

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1. It was pointed out in Chapter Seven that the game situations used in this work illustrate not so much the normal pattern of relations, but the pressures within the system. The game situation above, because it was bitterly contested, provides a clear view of these pressures, but it would be wrong to imagine that relations between the Association and the Department (and the Minister) are normally as bitter as they became in this game situation.

pleasure. A resolution was passed: "That this conference recommends to members of the (NZ)PPTA that they do not offer their services for the marking of school certificate scripts for 1962 unless the rates of payment are increased to the satisfaction of the National Executive by the end of the first term of 1962". [2] This was no sudden decision. By postponing their proposed action until 1962, the movers were allowing time for negotiation. This presupposes a degree of planning.

Then next move was to inform the Department of Education of conference's decision officially, and a meeting with senior departmental officials was soon arranged. The Director made the point that the increases proposed by the Minister, which were in the order of 25%, put New Zealand marking rates above those in many overseas countries including the United Kingdom. Thus he could not see any 'shadow of justification' for discussing the PPTA's proposals with the Minister.

Thus the essence of the issue was clearly defined. The teachers' representatives thought that their services in School Certificate marking were worth more than the Government had offered. The Department was convinced of the adequacy of the proposed increases and refused to contemplate any further additions.

In December of 1961 the issue took on a new complexion. The Department had apparently been convinced that PPTA leaders would reverse conference's call on members to withhold their marking services. But with the passing of time, it became increasingly obvious that markers would not be available. Meetings were held between senior departmental officers and leading members of the PPTA Executive, and at one of these a serious misunderstanding occurred: PPTA representatives came away feeling they had been threatened by the Director. Perhaps a more important misunderstanding occurred later in a telephone conversation between the Association president and the Director, (and in a subsequent letter putting on record what had been said over the telephone). Departmental officers felt that both men had expresseda desire to reverse conference's decision to withhold services. Further, they were convinced that the president had stressed the likelihood that Executive would take the necessary action.

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2. All quotations in the Association game are from the files of the PPTA unless otherwise stated.

But the president could take no decision himself. He merely sent a copy of the Director's letter to all Executive members. In a covering note, the president pointed out that he was not one to "quail before any idle threat from the Department": he nonetheless recommended that Executive withdraw from the conference's decision.

To Executive members, unaware that any telephone conversation had taken place, the letter seemed a deliberate challenge to the Association. Members felt they were being called upon to reverse a conference decision "as if we were some junta". Further, the Director had asked for the Executive's reaction by February - that is, the beginning of the school year. Now the Executive was not due to meet until March, and its members felt they were being pressured into giving an answer by post, without prior discussion. Those with influence on the PPTA Executive were not noted for their moderate views. For them, and therefore for the whole Association, the issue took on a new dimension at this point. Teachers were being bullied. The marking dispute became a Holy Crusade. On January 29th the president wrote a spirited letter of 'defiance' to the Director.

From the bewildered reaction of departmental officers to this letter, it is not difficult to comprehend that the whole issue was based on a breakdown in communications and a complete misunderstanding. Their reply was circulated to Executive members. It was dismissed as being an interpretation of events "by those with whom we are dealing in a manner which suits their purposes". Ranks had closed by this time and the actual point at issue long since forgotten. "The most important thing now", one member pointed out, "...is that on no account should we budge one inch".

Having apparently failed to win over the teachers' leaders from the conference's extreme decision, the Department altered its tactics. It sought to drive a wedge between the Association itself and the markers. In answer to a PPTA letter on February 26th, which comprised the results of a survey on hourly rates for marking, the Director wrote that marking had "never been regarded as a matter for negotiation with your association or any other body". Thus the subject was not one for negotiation, and was not a matter for the PPTA anyway! Executive reaction to this was one of bitter defiance. It was decided in future to deal directly with the Minister of Education.

In order to strengthen its hand, the PPTA at this stage sought to hold a referendum, the results of which would, it was hoped, make favourable publicity. This move was opposed by some of the more militant as being an 'abdication of leadership'. Any vote against the Executive, they held, would be a blow to concerted action in general. They spoke of the "possible veto of a conference decision by a minority". It is put forward here that the 'minority opinion' they feared, belonged to the markers themselves! However, the survey was undertaken. The questionnaire was not particularly well constructed[3] and its conclusions were never used to any effect by the Executive.

In the meantime the Minister had agreed to accept a deputation from the Association. The Hon B. Tennent pointed out at the subsequent meeting that he was satisfied that no case existed for any increase beyond his original offer. He went on to point out that even if such a case existed, he would not act under pressure. He also spoke of releasing a statement to the press on the matter, but promised to notify the PPTA before doing so. Immediately the Association began to prepare a public statement of its own, probably with a view to acting before the Minister. Its eventual publication was prompted not by notification from the Minister but by a 'leakage'. The dispute received some slight attention in the 'Inside Column' of the Dominion. That evening the Association's press release was headline news, and the following day the Minister released his statement to the press. There began a period of press warfare, of release and counter release, in which each side accused the other of bad faith and of 'bullying' tactics.

By this time, the Association had decided to contact the Prime Minister, with a view to sending a deputation. Mr. Holyoake replied on May 14th that he would like to think that his door was always open and that any organisation or person who asked to see him could do so . Yet since his attitude in the matter was precisely in accord with that of his Minister, he continued, there was no point in his receiving a deputation from the Association. Complete deadlock had been reached. This was a state of affairs not at all suited to Association leaders. If the Department were forced to think of other

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3. For example, the third and most significant of the three questions read: "Will you if offered appointment as a marker by the Department stand by the conference decision and reply in the following terms: "I am willing to act as an assistant-marker at the fee of 7/6 per three hour paper (or 5/- per two hour paper)! Yes/No". The bulk of markers would certainly have been prepared to agree to less than 7/6 per paper, and yet would have wanted at the same time to support the Association's right to negotiate in this matter: how were they to vote? In fact the survey showed very little beyond that the great majority of members supported their Association, but whether on the grounds of increased remuneration or the right to negotiate will never be known.

methods of marking School Certificate papers, it might be successful. The Association needed a fresh initiative and this was provided by a PPTA press release calling for some form of arbitration. In private, the Minister offered a 'one-man board of enquiry' to look into the matter the following year but gave no firm declaration that any recommendations would be acted upon. Thus the Executive eventually decided to place the matter before the Government Service Tribunal. (GST)

Argument at this stage centred around the competence of the GST to deal with the case. The Department considered that any decision taken by the Tribunal would be ultra vires: the Association piously denounced this 'utter contempt' for the GST. At the same time both sides were trying to persuade or dissuade likely markers from other sources (such as the NZEI, Association of University Teachers (AUT) and NZUSA).

When finally the Tribunal met, the Department claimed, in brief: first, the GST had no jurisdiction to prescribe fees for marking because such remuneration was not in the form of 'salary or wages'; second, the Tribunal could make no recommendations in respect of persons who were not employees of the Public Service or of the Education Service, and, in their capacity as markers, the persons concerned were neither. Therefore, the "application lodged by the (NZ)PPTA should be struck out for want of jurisdiction". In parliament and in the country the argument continued. A debate in the House [4] caused a considerable stir; it also presented the Opposition with an opportunity to attack the Government on a broad front - an opportunity which did not go begging. One of the most telling points was made by the Hon Walter Nash: if the teachers were prepared to take the matter to arbitration, why was not the Minister! A Government member, however, diverted further debate by attacking the Association's leadership.

It is impossible to gauge the public reaction to these events with any precision. Perhaps Whim Wham comes close to giving an indication in his "Other Qualified Persons" [5]

> "The Minister leads his task force
> To breach the Teachers' ranks:
> Well may their champions waver:
> The Minister turns their flanks.
>
> Sir, it's the stupidest battle

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4. NZPD, August 1st, 1962.

5. Christchurch Press. August 4th, 1962.

However it's lost or won -
When a few bob more would make us SURE
Of seeing the job well done".

Perhaps it was the combined effect of public opinion, the Department's inability to obtain a satisfactory team of markers, and a realisation that the dispute had been going on for far too long that prompted the Prime Minister in August to accept a deputation of the Combined State Services Organisation. The deputation contained the Association's secretary and president. The Prime Minister had with him the Minister of Education and senior departmental officers The meeting was a stormy one but it ended with the Prime Minister promising to discuss the matter in Cabinet. [6]

By this time, the annual conference of the Association was due to take place, and since the Minister was to address the assembled delegates, it became imperative that some acceptable plan be advanced; plainly he could not go to the conference empty-handed. In fact, the tone of the Minister's conference speech was conciliatory. He asked two questions: had the post-primary teachers been as diplomatic as they might have been; and had the Minister been as diplomatic as he might have been. He went on to say: "I am prepared to say here and now that there have been occasions when I have not been as diplomatic as I might have been". He put this down to his own natural bluntness: "One does not usually make friends by speaking as plainly as I did - I knew I was running a risk but felt it was my duty to do so". Then he pointed out that the teachers had not been as diplomatic as they could have been, saying that conciliation had been out of the question because the PPTA had issued a direct threat. However, the Minister offered to set up a one-man board of enquiry and virtually promised that the Government would accept his findings. He concluded by asking new members of the Executive to come to his room afterwards, so that he could shake them all by the hand. "Let me repeat that I am only too willing to help you rectify the position", he concluded.

In late August, the Prime Minister informed the Combined State Services Organisation that the Cabinet was willing for an independent board of enquiry to be constituted. A three-man board of enquiry, representative of the Department and the Association, with a magistrate as chairman, was eventually

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6. By this time it had become apparent that the GST would find itself unable to act in the matter.

constituted to: "Examine the adequacy of the scales of remuneration for Chief Examiners, Assistant Chief Examiners and Assistant Examiners for School Certificate examinations and to recommend to the Minister of Education any changes in the existing rates which the Board may consider reasonable and proper".

The Board of Enquiry, unavoidably delayed, sat in February 1963 [7] and reported in May of that year. Its chief recommendations were that a fee of 6/- should be paid per three hour paper and 4/6 per two hour paper. This was the only viable compromise, since the Minister had offered 5/- and 3/9 and the Association had demanded 7/6 and 5/-. The Government notified its full acceptance of the Board's recommendations. By July all was settled; the Director wrote to the Association that the Department had agreed to the Association's request for a triennial review of marking rates and by August, the Minister was closing his letters to the president of the Association with his 'kind personal regards'. The battle was over.

GAMES ANALOGY.

Pay-Off. [8] The concept of pay-off for the PPTA, though remaining fairly constant in essence, developed in interesting ways in appearance. As far as the Association was concerned, pay-off was initially concerned with securing a better rate of remuneration than was being offered by the Government for a service undertaken by some of its members. Yet there was a rapid development from this position. First, the game became chiefly an Executive one and pay-off became associated with preserving the integrity of the Association.[9] One member put it: "We are a trade association exercising our honest and democratic rights". Second, the dispute became more general and more bitter; it came to symbolise the whole struggle between secondary teachers and the Department. Pay-off thus became a concept of greater emotional implications: "On no account should we budge one inch in our attitude". Finally, the whole dispute dragged on too long. Pay-off developed eventually as a concept of 'peace with honour'.

For the Department, pay-off developed along similar lines.

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7. The Association had, in the meantime, released members from their obligation not to mark School Certificate papers. Thus there were sufficient markers in 1962.

8. As in Chapter Seven, the concept of 'rules of the game' will be omitted, since it has been sufficiently developed during the course of this section.

9. It is important to note that one cannot differentiate between 'Executive' and 'membership' positions in the Association game as one can in the Institute game. This is because, as this game situation shows, the PPTA Executive is prepared to adopt a militant position in its dealings with departmental officers.

The Department believed that the proposed marking rates were sufficient and its initial response to PPTA demands was made in these terms. But when it could not persuade the Association's Executive to overrule the decision of the conference, then the struggle took on more serious proportions. Implicit within the concept of pay-off, as far as the Department was concerned, rested the idea that the PPTA had no right to negotiate on behalf of the markers. The right to prescribe marking rates was the Department's. Following the misunderstandings between the Director and the Association president, the departmental attitude hardened still further and, as with the PPTA, pay-off became associated simply with the defeat of the opponent. That the concept described a full circle and came back to a desire for compromise was probably a result of the Department's inability to find sufficient replacement markers of a high calibre for 1962.[10]

The Minister became involved as the result of a direct approach by the Association. Pay-off for him (and for the Cabinet) had obvious political connotations. The Government's position had to be preserved at all costs. Consequently it could not give way in the face of direct threats. It had to restore the harmony of the secondary sub-system. But it could achieve this pay-off by two methods. First, it could destroy the PPTA's position by calling its bluff and thus reestablish departmental ascendancy. Second, it could seek a compromise. The Minister would appear to have chosen the first method at the outset, but to have come round to the second with the persuasion of his Cabinet colleagues. On the surface then, two stages of pay-off appear as far as the Minister was concerned.

Strategy. The strategy of the PPTA can be understood only if one recollects from Chapter Nine the structure of leadership and organisation. Both were susceptible to domination by militants. In the first instance, the resolution which caused the conflagration was promoted by the Wellington regional organisation. Later it was a Wellington branch which opposed the idea of a referendum. It organised a deputation to Executive leaders on this issue and its representatives raised the matter at full Executive with a view to blocking the scheme. Again, when matters were all but settled only the Wellington region expressed displeasure at the arrangements, considering that the Executive decision to permit members to offer themselves as

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10. Though, as will be seen, long-term prospects were not so dismal.

markers in 1962 was a "retreat from principle unworthy of the Association". PPTA strategy was initiated by this militant group, and its influence through its representatives on the Executive was considerable though not alwyas decisive.[11]

Association strategy showed the hand of militancy at a number of turns. The Executive was by no means unanimous in the first instance in its opposition to a withdrawal from the conference's decision. The president claimed that several members agreed with his view that the Executive should withdraw, especially since "things were looking far brighter" for the Association generally. When the Director's letter, putting on record the telephone conversation, was circulated to Executive members, a number conceded that the Department's case was a good one. Others pointed out that marking offered good experience and that "most of it is done in school time anyway". To other members the idea of any direct action (i.e. the withdrawal of services) was abhorrent. "Anything which smacks of 'down tools' for teachers finds no favour with me", said one member.

The militants, took a different point of view. They saw the Department's move (i.e. the Director's letter) as having two objectives: first, to get the boycott on marking reversed and second to regain the initiative in the game situation so as to dictate play in the future. By demanding a reply within a fairly strict time limit, so the militants held, the Department was 'pressuring' the Executive. If the latter gave way, the Association's whole position vis-à-vis the Department would be threatened. The militants made efforts to influence the president. One wrote: "I am concerned lest you put a foot wrong...between Executive meetings the Association is in your hands. I hope you make the right decision". Another stressed that to give up something which "up to now we thought worth fighting for would, I am afraid, mar your year in office".

Most Executive members felt that they were being threatened by the Department. A number - perhaps the majority - also felt that "to undertake the reversal of a conference decision on a policy matter" was a very grave responsibility and one which they were loath to take upon themselves. It was against this background that on January 29th the president wrote his letter of spirited defiance.

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11. Prior to the reorganisations of structure, the Wellington members had played a most significant part in Association affairs. They had also been influential in the actual reorganisation but had perceptibly lost power as a result. It is conceivable that they saw the marking dispute as a vehicle upon which they could reestablish their influence.

The decision to discontinue negotiations with the Department and deal directly with the Minister cannot be seen as militant in itself. It was simply the logical outcome of events. It had been decided to 'fight' the issue and the Department had declared that it did not regard the matter as one for negotiation. If the dialogue were to continue, the Association would have to divert its attention to the Minister. However, the Hon Mr. Tennent fully supported his Department: Government intended to take no action. "No responsible Government could take any other attitude", he argued.

It was at this point that the Association began to lose the initiative in the game. When its last tactic - the attempt to see the Prime Minister - failed, deadlock followed. Now as was pointed out earlier, this state of affairs could not be beneficial to PPTA strategy. Reports circulated that the Department was investigating the possibilities of multiple-choice questions which, over the long run, could be marked much more cheaply and quickly by machine. For the time being, the Department was trying to encourage markers to volunteer. As far as the PPTA was concerned, the position could only deteriorate. It was these considerations which prompted the Association to present its case to the GST, having failed to agree with the Minister upon any form of conciliation. It was from this initiative that an acceptabled solution eventually arose - a solution which enabled the Association to withdraw its threat and the Minister and the Department their refusal to accept the Association as spokesman for the markers.

Department strategy seems at first to have been based upon the firm conviction that marking fees were satisfactory, a conviction for which Treasury was able to offer sound support. Yet senior officers were quite adamant on this point from the outset. Doubt existed - and still exists - as to the Department's next moves in the game. We shall be looking at the position in some detail a little later. But certainly a misunderstanding occurred and the Director's letter to the Association's president provoked an obviously unexpected response.

Somewhat later, it will be remembered, the Department refused to recognise the PPTA's right to negotiate on the marking issue. There were sound reasons for this stand. After all, not all markers were PPTA members and as the GST ruling showed, in their capacity as markers the persons concerned were not employees of the Education Service nor of the Public Service. Yet the Department does not appear to have adopted this tactic at the outset. It obviously hoped to settle the matter through the Association Executive in the first instance, whether that body was

representative of markers or not. A stiffening of the departmental attitude later was not surprising; the game had taken on a more unpleasant aspect.

The Minister's strategy was motivated by a desire to seek a settlement with as little additional expenditure as possible. Unfortunately the dispute took on a certain uncharacteristic personal bitterness and this initial strategy was reinforced by the desire to achieve a political victory. An important facet of the Minister's strategy was his refusal to act under pressure. In itself this is a completely reasonable attitude for a Minister to adopt but, in this instance, it was adopted in such a way as to provoke the Association still further. The main discrepancy in the Minister's strategy was that initially he categorically denied that markers had a genuine grievance. Yet in addressing the 1962 conference he declared his willingness to help the Association "rectify the position" as regards markers' fees, thus acknowledging the existence of a grievance. In addition, both the Minister and his Department eventually acknowledged the Association's right to negotiate on behalf of School Certificate markers. One can only conclude that this move was forced upon them by political considerations.

Information. The structure of information in this game situation is of great significance. In the first instance, it will be remembered that the Director and the president held a telephone conversation concerning the likelihood of the Executive's reversing the decision of the 1961 conference to withdraw marking services in 1962. We know that the president himself was in favour of such a move and that he recommended it to other Executive members. It seems likely that he led the Director to believe that such a move was indeed probable. If this is an accurate assumption then it would follow that the Director should ask for a definite answer by February (i.e. the beginning of the school year). In such a position, the president could not write to Executive members that he had already given their decision to the Director. He simply circulated the Director's letter which certainly did not put all of the conversation on record. Thus all parties were acting from incomplete information. The Director was assuming that the president had accurately assessed the Executive's reaction; the president himself was acting from a similar assumption; the Executive had no knowledge of the assurances given the Director by the president. The result was a complete misunderstanding. Executive felt that the setting of a time limit was simply a pressure tactic. Yet in all probability the president had accepted February as a reasonable deadline in his conversation with the Director.

A less serious misunderstanding surrounded a meeting between Executive leaders and senior officers of the Department. The Director, according to Executive leaders, had said that there would be no difficulty about getting markers. This, they felt, was a direct challenge. Yet Department officers claimed that the Director had said there would be no difficulty in obtaining markers provided it was left to individual markers to make their own arrangements. This phrase allows for an entirely different interpretation of what was meant. In no way does the statement carry the threat implicit in the former one. Again, incomplete information led to a misunderstanding of the opponent's position. Both sides felt themselves threatened.

This brings us to one final source of misunderstanding. In the Director's letter circulated to Executive members, he mentioned the "great educational and political implications" which would follow a withdrawal of marking services. In such circumstances, he wrote, "considerable additional regulations might have to be drafted". Now this could be taken to mean many things: in fact it seems intentionally obscure. But what it meant to Executive members was that the Department would conscript teachers as markers as a condition of their employment. Incomplete information led Executive members to place the worst interpretation upon the phrase.

The nature of available information is important to the final settling of the dispute. In the course of the negotiations with the Prime Minister, the latter spoke strongly against the PPTA's threat of direct action, but was moved to ask his Minister why he was not prepared to accept arbitration. The Minister replied that the matter had never been one for negotiation. Yet the Prime Minister did not know of the Minister of Education's offer of a one-man tribunal, and when this point was raised, the Prime Minister retired from the meeting for 20 minutes with his advisers. He had not been given complete information and, sometime after his return, offered to discuss the matter in Cabinet, obviously feeling that the Government's position had been undermined.

Thus the nature of available information offers the key to an understanding of the bitterness which characterised the marking dispute. Incomplete information, caused by breakdowns in communication, was the source and reinforcement of the struggle.

Coalition. The outcome of the game situation depended to a very large extent upon the ability of the players to build coalitions. In the first instance, it was imperative that the Executive, having decided to take a stand, secure the fullest support of the membership. As the issue developed this became increasingly less difficult. Second, it was necessary to secure public support, especially when the press releases began. To this end, the Executive prepared schedules of pay rates per hour for markers. It contacted the Educational Institute of Scotland and the English teachers' body (NUT) to achieve some adequate basis of comparison. The information gained was used to secure public support. The questionnaire was used for similar purposes, but as stated, it did not have a great deal of impact.

A more important coalition was with the Opposition in the House of Representatives. The opportunity for a concerted attack upon the Government was seized by Labour and undoubtedly very real pressure was put on the Government from this source.

A coalition of at least equal importance in the game situation was formed with the various other educational groups - the NZEI, NZUSA, and AUT, and with other bodies such as the Public Service Association (PSA) - to ensure that they did not provide markers and thus destroy the PPTA's bargaining position. It should be pointed out that such support as the Association mustered - and it was considerable - in no way reflected the justice or otherwise of its original claim. Rather it reflected a support for the PPTA's right to negotiate for markers and even more for the right to obtain a hearing from a properly constituted tribunal. This point is best brought out by the resolution passed by the Executive of NZEI: "That members be recommended not to offer their services as markers until the right to have the case heard by a competent tribunal has been cleared".[12]

For its part the Department (and the Government) failed to break the coalition between markers and the Association Executive. It was probably more successful in securing public support but a major consideration in deciding strategy in the final stages of the game must have been its failure to create a coalition with a sufficient number of replacement markers of high calibre.

This concludes discussion on the Association game. The second part of this chapter deals with the secondary boards' game.

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12. NZEI Executive Resolution, July 1962.

II

One is faced with an immediate problem in trying to present a game situation to illustrate the pressures involved in secondary board Department relations. The problem is to find such a game situation. There has been no biting issue between boards as a group (i.e. the SSBA) and the Department, rather a general uneasiness on the part of the former due to their obvious loss of autonomy over the years, especially in areas such as secondary school hostels. Issues between the individual boards and the Regional Offices tend to be local in nature and to be indicative of the general situation only in the widest sense. There is one general dispute which has been of importance over the years however. It has to do with administration. Like most of the administrative games it tends ultimately,to be fixed sum. That is to say, in the final analysis it concerns the exercise and possible redistribution of a reasonably constant amount of power (see Chapter Seven). Yet the day-to-day administration of secondary education is based, to an even greater extent than is the case in the primary sub-system, upon cooperation between the Department and the boards. Also, it is probably true that there is more widespread recognition of the role of the secondary boards than the primary ones. Thus the secondary board game tends to be fixed sum; but the stakes, so to speak, are not as high as in the Board game.

BACKGROUND. In Chapters Four and Seven we noted the importance of disputes over the administrative structure: they have not aroused the same bitterness in the secondary board game. The game situations have not produced the same dedicated play because pay-off has never been as clear-cut. However, the issues are linked and have been seen by many as two sides of the same coin. As far as the secondary sub-system is concerned, the form of administrative control became an issue following the Labour Education Minister's (the Hon Peter Fraser's) Education Amendment Bill of 1938.[13] It accepted the main recommendations of the Atmore report (see Chapter Four) in seeking to abolish Education Boards and to create 12 district boards with authority over both primary and post-primary schools, thereby replacing post-primary boards with school councils of more limited power. But when

13. This Bill was not proceeded with owing to the outbreak of war.

in 1940 Horowhenua College was established, the issue was shelved by constituting the school nominally a technical high school - and thus placing it, for the time being, under the control of the Wellington Education Board.

The post-war growth of the district high school, however, made it imperative that a solution to the issue of control be found, and it was in this atmosphere that the Department of Education and the Auckland Education Board agreed to allow the NZCER all facilities to study the problem in a detached way. Detached perhaps, but the Council's Director, A.E. Campbell, was well aware that his findings would have general policy repercussions. Though the system of control of public schools which existed in Auckland approximated more closely to the conditions envisaged by the Atmore report than did the system in any other District, it nevertheless could hardly be considered to offer a true test case. Campbell was fully aware of this and took it into account in drawing his conclusions.

Campbell concerned himself with the continuity of the system, especially in the following aspects:

(i) curricula, methods and internal organisation;

(ii) the general attitudes of primary and post-primary teachers to each other;

(iii) the arrangements under which children pass from the primary or intermediate school to the post-primary school;

(iv) teaching conditions;

(v) the external organisation of the school system;

(vi) the movement of teachers between the services.

To what extent, Campbell asked, would control by a regionally unified council improve continuity in these important areas? Curricula, methods and organisation were exclusively the responsibility of the Department of Education and would thus not be affected. As to attitudes between the teacher bodies, Campbell was of the opinion that unified control would not be of significance: "Many assistant teachers are very little aware of forms of local control".[14] The problems of transferring from a primary or intermediate school to a post-primary school, it was concluded, were also little affected by any administrative form - they went far deeper. Teaching conditions, again, were chiefly the responsibility of the central Department and would not thus be affected. With

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14. A.E. Campbell, op. cit., p. 19

regard to the remaining categories, Campbell felt that too little evidence existed for any definitive statement.

One tactic common to the secondary board and Board games is to stress that local control is synonymous with local interest and pride. To this argument, Campbell attached little significance, noting: "Local interest appeared to vary from place to place in almost complete independence of the system of control".[15] The factors which were of importance, he felt, were the character of the school itself, the quality and attitude of the staff, and the ability of the principal to get on with the public.

Campbell felt that a regional authority would be in an unfortunate position unless considerable additional delegation took place. The individual school boards are "apt to be resentful if the Board turns down a request on its own initiative without sending it to the Department, and to think that the Board should always go on fighting their case when a request has been declined by the Department".[16] In general terms, it would be hard to gauge the effects of an intermediary stage in the post-primary administrative process, but in the case of the Auckland Board, delay undeniably existed - requests had to wait until the Board met before they could be forwarded to the Department.

In concluding his study, Campbell wrote against unification of control at the regional level. "Post primary opinion", he remarked, "remains, as it has always been, fairly solidly against local unification of any kind". He continued: "If unification of control were adopted as a general policy, the dominant feeling in the post-primary schools would undoubtedly be that it had been imposed from the outside <u>without adequate reason</u>".[17]

Thus an independent enquiry had rejected the notion of unified regional control as far as post-primary administration was concerned. Yet at the next opportunity, namely the Commission on Education, the Department again proposed a regional set-up. Though the plan allowed for only slight loss of autonomy for the secondary boards in the first instance, it was not acceptable to those bodies. Neither was the Commission's compromise proposal. The Minister persevered with the original departmental scheme however, and the Public Expenditure Committee, mentioned earlier in the context of the Board game, also concerned itself with the

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15. Ibid, p. 29.

16. Ibid, p. 36.

17. Ibid, p. 44. The stress is the present writer's.

administration of secondary schools. It felt that no major change in the administrative system was necessary, though it did recommend some improvements.[18] The most significant of these was that although it was desirable that each school should have its own board, to promote efficiency and economy of operation the Department should foster schemes for joint provision of accounting and, in some cases, secretarial services. The boards could continue to be independent, except that a small executive committee representative of all participating boards would supervise the joint staff.

It remains to be seen what action will be taken on this report. It also remains to be seen whether the Minister will persevere with his somewhat maligned plans for a regional council system, but so far, the secondary boards, like the Education Boards, have successfully opposed the move.

GAMES ANALOGY. As has been indicated, of all the education games, the secondary boards' game is the most poorly organised and the most difficult to follow. Yet there is an identifiable pattern - albeit general - to which behaviour in this diffuse game tends to correspond.

Pay-Off. The secondary boards have never been as ambitious collectively as the Education Boards. They at no time occupied as pre-eminent a position as the latter and their loss of power has not been as extensive. Quite apart from historical considerations, the practical difficulties of collective action have shown themselves to be more acute in the post-primary sub-system, as we have seen. Pay-off is thus measurable in terms of the preservation of the powers and position of individual boards. The importance attached by boards to their 'direct' and 'individual' contact with the Department (or its Regional Offices) cannot be overestimated. First and foremost for secondary boards then, is the preservation of the status quo in post-primary administration. Of almost equal importance is the desire on the part of the boards (and the PPTA) to retain the independence of the secondary sub-system. Spokesmen for the boards and the PPTA have often claimed that secondary schools have more in common with the universities than with primary schools. As long as present attitudes continue, it is unlikely that any administrative reorganisation which threatens the 'separateness'

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18. Report of the Public Expenditure Committee, Wellington, Government Printer 1966, pp. 20-22.

of secondary education would be acceptable to the SSBA.[19] During recent years another consideration, demanding collective action, has been important - how to make the system more efficient. Secondary boards have known that if they could not find an answer to this themselves, the Department would be driven to attempt to reorganise the system on its own terms.

Pay-off for the Department is, as usual, concerned with the economy and efficiency of the system. It is probably true that departmental officers are more convinced of the advantages of the secondary boards and more wary of their political power, than they are of Education Boards: no departmental officer has been accused of trying to abolish secondary boards. Thus pay-off for the Department is concerned with preserving some semblance of local control in the interests of maximising local efforts, especially fund-raising, yet restricting it to areas in which its operation is compatible with the overall efficiency of the sub-system.

Strategy. Board strategy in this game situation has been almost entirely defensive. As stated, secondary boards are not sufficiently well coordinated to mount a sustained attack, besides which they are comparatively content with the existing situation. Yet pressure has been brought to bear, if largely indirectly, and the secondary boards have reacted. Prior to the report of the Commission on Education there was little general support among secondary boards for the 'Christchurch system'. Under this scheme, schools in a locality formed a joint council which provided a pool of capital and secretarial services for all the schools involved. True, rather pale imitations had been set up but the widespread adoption of the scheme that many educationalists had expected and hoped for did not materialise. With the publication of the Commission's report however, secondary school boards saw their autonomy in jeopardy. At a meeting of the SSBA Executive in September of 1962, members declared against the Commission's proposals and in favour of the extension of the Christchurch system. Yet nothing is more revealing than the way in which the leadership undertook this strategy of 'putting their own house in order'. The secretary of the SSBA wrote to the Department for information on the running of the Christchurch system declaring:

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19. Though it should be noted that certain individual secondary schools - notably those in Southland - have managed to work in close harmony with the district Education Board.

"Hitherto boards have shown no inclination to adopt the Christchurch system and the change in attitude at the Executive was surprising. Enquiries I have received from boards show clearly that they now wish to know more about the Christchurch system and are prepared to consider its adoption". 20.

It is strange that the Association should have sought this information from the Department. There were two reasons for this: first, the Department's information service is far better than that of the SSBA - the former would have more extensive data; second, the SSBA leadership considered that if it were to win over the Executive and eventually the Association to acceptance of the Christchurch scheme, then information from a 'neutral source' was indispensable.

In fact, the general adoption of the Christchurch system no longer seems likely. Auckland boards have shown themselves opposed to any restrictions upon their individual autonomy. In addition, they have good grounds for believing that the system would be inapplicable to Auckland with its considerable number of schools. Nonetheless important steps have been taken to release principals from their duties as secretaries to their school boards and to replace them by a system of joint secretarial services run by groups of schools. Yet secondary boards have only partially succeeded in putting their own house in order. Nothing but the wide adoption of joint schemes along the lines of the Christchurch system or the system outlined in the report of the Public Expenditure Committee will be sufficient, if the boards are to secure their efficiency pay-off.

Departmental strategy has been to withdraw from the advanced position taken by the Atmore report and the Education Bill of 1938. but to keep some pressure on the boards. One of the most important developments in departmental strategy has been the increased emphasis on unification, thus bringing it into direct conflict with SSBA strategy. The Commission stressed the cramping effect upon the pupil's education brought about by the divisions in the system, especially between primary and secondary. Perhaps the Commission's most important recommendation was that the curricula should be coordinated to a far greater extent and that secondary education should begin at age 11 for all children. Despite the assertion to the contrary implicit in Campbell's earlier study,

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20. Letter to the Department, October 17th 1962.

the Minister and certain of his senior officers appear to have seen administrative reorganisation as essential to this development.

The Commission's proposals with regard to administrative reorganisation were seen by the Minister to be "a long way from the unified district council that was proposed under the Atmore report. It is, if you like, district cooperation but not district unification".[21] Secondary boards were not as convinced of this as the Minister. Administrative unification seemed a logical goal of departmental strategy.

Perhaps the Minister and his Department had no illusions as to the reception the Commission's proposals would be accorded by the SSBA, for the Minister told Executive members that if they did not approve of the proposals, then a definite challenge existed for the Association "to devise reasonable means of dealing with the problems".[22]

Thus departmental strategy, as usual, has to do with the efficient running of the sub-system. But in this case it appears to have been reinforced by the belief that the co-ordination through the system as a whole which the Commission demanded can be brought about better through greater administrative coordination.

Information. The secondary board game could be called a game of attrition. It has been going on for a long time and the powers of secondary boards have been chipped away slowly. In this situation information is a general commodity. Indeed the structure of information in this game situation is very basic. The secondary boards will oppose virtually any scheme to reorganise the system which offers the likelihood of unification or of their losing power. It is not known to what extent influential departmental officers - or indeed the Minister - are wedded to concepts of close coordination or unification at regional level, but secondary boards tend to believe the worst. This attitude suits board strategy. The information content of strategy might not be high yet there is a certain consistency which allows for strategic moves.

Faced with a weak organisation, the Department has even less complete information from which to act. Yet the boards, individually and collectively, exhibit a patterned stability of

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21. Notes prepared for the Minister for a meeting with the SSBA Executive November 2nd 1962.

22. Ibid.

behaviour which is almost as dependable as complete information. The setting up of the Standing Committee on (secondary) administration does not seem to have been as effective in disseminating information as could have been hoped, but perhaps this is more an indication of the organisational problems confronting the SSBA than of a lack of desire to share information.

Coalition. The concept of coalition is an important one in every education game, not least the secondary board game. Because the education system is democratic, any player has recourse to the full range of democratic tactics. Thus something approaching a consensus must exist for most moves, certainly the important moves. Now the plans for reorganisation of the administrative set-up espoused by the Commission and the Minister of Education have offended a number of players in the education games. We have seen already that the NZEBA and the SSBA formed a coalition after the Commission's report in order to combat its recommendations collectively. Although one could cynically - and probably accurately - point out that this coalition was somewhat one-sided and that secondary boards stood to gain little from it, it is nonetheless an important precedent.

But in this game situation the SSBA had a coalition with the PPTA - again not a strong one from the former's point of view. Although the PPTA would like to see secondary boards relieved of some of their powers - appointment of headteachers for instance - they would be prepared to support SSBA on the issue of reorganisation for one reason. They appreciate that a number of educationalists have spoken in favour of a complete unification of education services (at primary and secondary levels). Administrative 'coordination' can be seen as a step to administrative unity. Administrative unity can be seen as a step towards complete unity.

For its part, the Department was virtually without allies. No consensus existed among players in the secondary games for reorganisation. It would also appear to be true that there was a certain general mistrust of departmental motives.

CONCLUSIONS. As has been pointed out, the game situations viewed are not typical in the sense that they reveal the normal routine of education administration. Less contentious issues are the norm. Yet the above are typical in that they show the pressures which shape relationships within the sub-system.

They reveal that behaviour is patterned to a considerable extent by one's conception of one's role. They reveal that by adopting certain predictable strategies, players set in motion seemingly inevitable sequences of play.

It will be remembered that two objectives were set in the introduction: to present an overall picture of the education system in its own right and to provide a background for an analysis in depth which - it was hoped - would shed further light on the workings of democratic government in New Zealand. These tasks have now been completed as far as the main body of the education system is concerned. It remains to consider some of the more 'political' aspects which, though peripheral in the structural sense, are nonetheless of great importance. It is to this area that we must now turn.

SECTION FOUR

The Political Process and the Education System

To complete this picture of the education system, it is necessary to draw in its 'political' side. It is true of the education system as of any other sector of government that it does not exist in a vacuum. Thus an important section of the education system has to do with matters not basically educational but political.

To deal adequately with this aspect of the system only a minimal use of games theory will be made. In Section Four we are no longer dealing principally with educational games, for it is in this area that the education system intersects with the political system and most of the players with whom we shall deal are basically concerned with the political games. Therefore any extension of games theory into this area would involve a complete reorientation of the concepts developed in Sections Two and Three. A set of new postulates would have to be established concerned with 'the political games'. Such a reorientation is obviously beyond the reasonable compass of a study based primarily on the education system.

Writers have attached varying degrees of importance to the many aspects of the political process, but most would agree that any general discussion would have to include the following: public opinion, pressure groups, the mass media, the political parties and the structure of government itself. Each of these offers a field of study in its own right and can boast a considerable amount of scholarship. But this study is concerned with the politics of education in New Zealand and will treat with these aspects only in so far as they are important to the subject at hand.

Thus this section is intended to deal with the 'political process' within the framework of three Chapters, the first of which, Chapter Twelve will deal with public opinion, pressure and the mass media. Chapter Thirteen will deal with parliament and the political parties and finally Chapter Fourteen will deal with the governmental process - the role of the Department, the Minister, Treasury and the Cabinet.

Chapter Twelve

PUBLIC OPINION, PRESSURE AND THE MASS MEDIA

This Chapter will deal with the three aspects in the title in separate sub-sections.

I

Writers such as Key[1] have distinguished between 'general' and 'specific' publics - that is, between those who need have nothing more in common than the sharing of a particular territorial area and those united by a special interest in certain issues. This division is particularly helpful to the subject at hand, because it enables a distinction to be made between the attitudes of the considerable number of New Zealanders[2] who are actively concerned with educational matters, serving PTAs, school committees, secondary school boards and Education Boards, and the inactive and apparantly complacent general public.

Few other spheres of socio-political activity offer comparable prospects for a specific public actually to participate. Yet participation has not necessarily produced a knowledgeable specific public for education or 'education public'. This is because each sector of the system is fairly self-complete and is, in fact, often in competition with other sectors within the system. One might conclude that although the education public is unusually active, it is also highly disunited.

The lack of interest shown by the general public in education can be taken for a reasonable satisfaction with the existing state of affairs. The chief importance to the education system of the general public is that, in the last analysis, it forms the audience before which the education games must be played. It is the final arbiter, and its values, noted in Chapter Two, form - to some extent - the bases of the rules of the games.

Having identified the two publics, it is now intended to study them in more detail.

The Education Public. An obvious starting point for this discussion is the parent-teacher or home and school movement. There are two distinct aspects of the parent-teacher movement, national and local.

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1. V.O.Key, Jnr., op.cit.

2. In 1960 the New Zealand Council for Home and School and Parent-Teacher Associations boasted a membership of some 65,000 (Report of the Commission on Education, p.36).

At the national level, PTAs are organised into the NZ Council of Home and School and Parent-Teacher Associations. This body was set up in Auckland in 1951 with the following objectives:

"(i) To promote the welfare of children and young people.

(ii) To bring into closer relationship the home and school, that parents may cooperate in the education of the child.

(iii) To foster the growth of the Home and School and Parent-Teacher Federations or similar organisations.

(iv) To cooperate with all school governing or controlling authorities or associations of such bodies in all matters pertaining to the welfare of children and young people.

(v) To represent to the appropriate authorities and the general public such united efforts as will secure for every child the highest advantages in physical, mental, social and spiritual education."[3]

The Council holds an annual convention, often addressed by the Minister and the Director General, to which all interested persons are invited. Beneath the Council are the provincial federations, to which local associations are affiliated. Because most PTAs have been inward-looking, and more concerned with the local situation, the idea of federation has not met with wholehearted support. Not all provinces possess a federation and not all federations are affiliated to the Council. Of the the 12 federations affiliated in 1965 only three, Marlborough, North Otago, and Southland, were from the South Island. Further, only one South Islander sat on the Executive.

The Council is organised around an Executive which meets quarterly and a number of sub-committees which meet spasmodically. Each sub-committee is assigned a particular area.[4] Each sub-committee reports back to the Executive and eventually to the Council. Like all voluntary bodies, the Council has great difficulty in finding sufficient finance to run its affairs. Unlike the NZSCF, the Council receives no government assistance, and this has continually been a bone of contention. In 1959 for example the Council made an offical complaint to the Department of Education: it was rejected on the grounds that the Council was not a fully representative body.[5]

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3. The Home and School and Parent-Teacher Handbook, New Plymouth Avery Press, n.d.

4. In 1965, for example, sub-committees were set up on parental responsibility; children's shoes; textbooks and allied topics; provincial teachers' colleges; school equipment; medical examination; television and publicity; and constitutional matters.

5. In 1959 no South Island federations were affiliated.

But as has been pointed out, the real reason for the continuing departmental resistance to such a grant is apprehension as to the reaction of the NZSCF.

Despite this lack of funds the Council is far from inactive. In 1962 for example, a pamphlet was produced and printed entitled Education - Our Right and Our Responsibility. Twelve thousand copies were distributed (see Chapter Five). Unfortunately the pamphlet contained a number of factual errors and its impact was thus lessened. [6] In addition, the Council supports a bi-monthly journal entitled Parent and Child.

Lines of communication within the national movement, despite an encouraging continuity of leadership, are not firmly drawn, as is illustrated by the following. One headteacher in Wanganui wrote to the Department on behalf of the PTA at his own school, seeking the address of the parent body. He considered it important that the local PTA associate itself fully with the national body, but had been quite unable to make any contact with the Council himself.

Discussion at the annual convention ranges from the day-to-day problems of fund raising and administration to educational philosophy. It would not be unfair to comment that the convention as a whole seems more at home in the former. Remits passed at the convention are then followed up by the Executive, which organises deputations to the Minister, publicity campaigns and so on.

At the local level, each PTA has a constitution stating its name, objects, conditions of membership, methods of management, and names of officers. Usually standing and ad hoc committees are set up. Activities include meetings, study groups and assisting at school functions. In fact, concerts, picnics, auctions and so on are often organised by PTAs. Parents' organisations at both primary and post-primary levels are of great assistance to the system as fund raisers. The PTA movement as an expression of 'education-public' opinion. In his painstaking study of intermediate schooling in New Zealand, J.E. Watson of the NZCER notes:

> "Not so very long ago parents were regarded as nuisances in a school. A famous English headmaster was once moved to remark that boys were always reasonable, masters sometimes, parents never. When the main function of the school was to create literacy, there was no great need for a sense of partnership between parents and teachers, but with the acceptance of wider objectives, especially those relating to moral education, the primacy of the child's home has had to be reappraised. There are few more striking features of modern schooling than the effort now made to bring parents into the schools". [7]

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6. It was stated for example that only 39.6% of those entering the teaching profession held University Entrance, whereas according to the Director's Report for 1961, the figure should have been 49%.

7. J.E.Watson, Intermediate Schooling in New Zealand, Wellington, NZCER, 1964, p.378.

The effort which Watson notes has been met to a large extent by a corresponding desire on the part of parents to become involved.

Watson feels that the PTA movement has been chiefly responsible for the idea that the schools belong to the people. [8] The Commission on Education saw the role of the PTAs as being primarily one of "disseminating information about the schools and the process of schooling." [9] Yet without denying the connection Watson makes, one could argue that it was not the movement which created the idea but vice-versa. With regard to the Commission's statement, one could make the point that as well being concerned with taking the schools' problems to the parents, PTAs are also prone to bring parents' problems to the schools. In fact the PTA movement can in part be seen as an attempt by parents to reassert some kind of control over the education their children were receiving. One submission to the Commission on Education claimed: "To say I am worried about their [her children's] education would be sheer understatement. I am desperate to the point of tears. I believe that if a poll was taken to really find out what parents think and feel over the current teaching system, an amazing amount of dissatisfaction would be brought to light." Most parents, the submission continued, were convinced of the fruitlessness of complaint. It was perhaps partly in response to this kind of situation, aggravated by the declining influence of the statutory lay bodies, that the PTA movement grew. Perhaps the following illustrates this point. One PTA persuaded the local headteacher - somewhat against his wishes - to assist it in arranging a meeting where a panel of 'prominent educationalists' were to answer a list of questions compiled by the PTA. There were 47 questions covering the whole gamut of education policy. Typical questions were:

> Why are not the children taught languages from their first day at school?
>
> If successive governments have realised that primary classes are too large, why have they procrastinated for so long?
>
> Why are parents periodically asked to donate money for equipment?
>
> Why should staff meetings be held in school time?
>
> Could there not be meetings with the teacher to give parents the opportunity to discuss the methods of teaching being used?

The pattern that emerged from these questions resembled the one noted by the Commission; among the general submissions it received, there

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8. Ibid, p.385

9. Report of the Commission on Education, 1962, p.36.

were two distinct areas of concern. One was essentially practical and had to do with such fundamentals as the size of classes, the turnover of teaching staff, equipment, transport, teacher training and the like. The second concerned modern teaching methods and the basic tenets of the philosophy which was seen to underlie these methods. Such criticism, the Commission felt, was not always well-informed. "The purposes of the methods are only partially perceived and the whole is summed up by the general term "play-way" ...[a] term that has been much used by lay critics because by this means feelings of doubt and often disapproval, and even alarm can be conveyed." 10

Thus the PTA movement can be seen, to some extent at least, as an expression of concern over the general direction education has appeared to be taking, and as an attempt to reassert some kind of parental control. This state of affairs is by no means unique to New Zealand. Lerner and Heyer have noted a similar "rejection of the experimental basis of the [teaching] profession by the community at large."[11] They have commented of the American situation that: "In effect, the educator is not being asked but is being told by parent groups and public figures, the best methods for teaching." 12

There is nothing sinister in the idea of an education public seeking to exert some control over any aspect of education; but there will be much dispute as to the extent of the control it may legitimately seek to exercise locally, particularly in such specialised fields as teaching methods. There are some aspects of parental influence which - if not sinister - are indisputably harmful. Schools in the better-off urban and more especially suburban areas are sometimes subject to pressure from parents whose children are not enjoying the scholastic success these parents would like. The point has often been made that such pressures are slight in a non-selective system. But the New Zealand system has not been able to prevent the emergence of differences in status among secondary schools. Neither has it been able to prevent the dissatisfied parent from endeavouring to place his child in what he considers the best class in the primary school. In some schools the teaching staffs suffer considerably from these pressures at the beginning of the school year. No doubt the situation is worse in a selective system, but it would be incorrect to state that such pressures are totally absent from the New Zealand scene.

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10. Report of the Commission on Education, 1962, p.28

11. M.J.Lerner and R. Heyer, "A Study of the Critics of the Public Schools", Journal of Educational Research Vol.57, No.1, September 1963, pp 3-10.

12. Ibid. c.f. The submission to the Commission on Education which complained of the play-way system "introduced by Dr Beeby" and "the experiments he and his associates have made over the years, experimenting with human lives - our children." Play-way, the submission concluded, "is the cause of the chaotic conditions existing in education today."

Some PTAs tend to become dominated by these parents. Again, this state of affairs is not unique to New Zealand. One English headteacher, anxious to involve all parents in the work of the school, had this to say: "From the start we had sought a method of parental consultation which would not permit a majority or minority group to dominate the opinions of others. For this reason we discarded the idea of an organisation and turned our attention to an individual approach." [13] This bias, which is largely a social one, occurs most often in inactive PTAs. Overall, it is a disadvantage far outweighed by the benefits which the PTAs bring in their coordinative and fund-raising roles.

The school committee movement as an expression of education-public opinion. Watson, in his work on the intermediate schools, felt it questionable "how much they [school committees] now represent parental opinion, even though elected mainly by parents, especially since the growth of parent-teacher associations has provided a more articulate means for its expression." [14] He went on to make the point that the idea of the schools' belonging to the people was one which "even the most successful school committee in recent times has never managed to convey ... with conviction and appeal." [15] Watson's study was an exhaustive one yet it dealt strictly with intermediate schools and his comments would therefore have been written chiefly with urban and suburban areas in mind. [16] Yet in many country areas PTAs do not exist and it would certainly be wrong to assume that the schools do not 'belong to the people' in such areas. In some country areas committees have maintained the closest contact with parents and teachers. They have been able to assist in making their schools centres of the community and to instil not only a sense of ownership but in some cases of pride and responsibility. It could be said that, within the education system, no greater transfer of basic community values takes place than that between a rural community and its school where the committee is strong and well organised.

School committees can and do reflect the opinions and prejudices not only of the education public but of the general public - suspicion of the educational ambitions of Roman Catholics, for example. This is illustrated by a recent case in which a school with a dwindling roll was faced with the prospect of amalgamation with a nearby school. When this

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13. "Parents and the Primary Schools", by 'A Primary School Headmaster', Educational Research Vol.VII, No.3, June 1965, pp.229-235. The stress is the present writer's.

14. Watson op.cit., p.384.

15. Ibid, p.385.

16. Further, committees of intermediate schools were, at the time of Watson's study, constituted differently, and were less representative of parents with children at the school in question.

was suggested, local Roman Catholics offered to lease the school to the Marist Brothers. The school had room for more than 200 pupils but had a roll of only 66 at the time. It was claimed that leasing to the Marist Brothers would alleviate over-crowding in nearby Catholic schools. The school committee strongly opposed the Catholic request and arranged a meeting of parents at which the following resolution was adopted:

> " That this meeting of parents and residents of the ...school district protest emphatically to the Wellington Education Board against any proposal to close or lease the school or any part of the school to any private educational institution. Furthermore, this meeting upholds the traditional State system of free, compulsory, and secular education."[17]

An addendum to the resolution was also passed. It read: "That this meeting of householders pledges its full and active support to any action the school committee may take in defence of the people's rights for free, State and secular education." [18] Chapter Seven, it will be remembered, offers other examples of the way in which school committees can reflect local views and prejudices.

The Education Public and the Secondary Schools. The controversies surrounding primary school methods are only faintly reflected at the secondary level. Perhaps because they serve a wider area, perhaps because they have a higher status, post-primary schools have never 'belonged' to the community in the way that many primary schools have. The voice of the education public has been less clamant in the secondary sub-system, if only because it lacked unity. But the Commission on Education noted a number of important streams of criticism. There were parents who claimed that school standards were low, that they no longer offered an adequate preparation for university. [19] This criticism of standards was also made by some employers and training college and university personnel. Others claimed that the School Certificate examination was too rigorous and that an alternative of a lower standard should be set up. Finally the Commission noted that: "Criticism crops up from time to time over such things as school uniforms, prefects, military training, corporal punishment, school government and other matters relating to the control of pupils. The basic accusation is that in these matters the secondary schools are too authoritarian." [20]

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17. Dominion, May 31st, 1961.

18. Ibid.

19. The Commission's Report noted: "The plainest evidence of this attitude is visible in the large cities, where there is pressure from such parents to have their children enter schools that have a reputation for maintaining high academic standards." p.42.

20. Report of the Commission on Education, 1962, p.45.

In his book, Watson uses four categories of parent, the fourth of which he describes as the group that 'provides most of the helpers'. This, roughly, is the education public. He sees two sub-groups, those who are informed, intelligent and insistent cooperators and those "whose pleasure comes mainly from helping [their children's] school with [their] labour." [21] One would like to see a third sub-group included, namely those who become dissatisfied with the system and whose activity and interest stem from this dissatisfaction. A feeling of civic responsibility, it might be added, is a relatively strong characteristic of the whole group.

The General Public. Not a great deal of study has been aimed at public attitudes to education, though there have been some interesting forays in the United States. Lerner and Heyer [22] offer an appraisal of much of this work, concluding that most public criticism represents a desire to return to traditional goals and methods. Their own research indicated that tolerance for new methods came from the socially better-integrated, the more wealthy and - significantly - the better educated. F.W. Terrien[23] surveyed 5% (639 persons) of those on the voting list in New London, Connecticut. He tested the public's attitude to the necessity of a good education with the following two questions: "Just how necessary is a high school education for life in the world today?"; "How necessary is a college education?" 82.3% of the sample thought a high school education "very or completely necessary" as compared to 15.8% who thought a college education necessary. Terrien broke the results down to show that the younger group of respondents were more convinced of the necessities of education; higher occupational ratings were better informed and saw the necessity of a high school education; persons in the lower educational group were less convinced of the benefits of education.

Terrien pointed out:

> "The results of this survey indicate that the educational institution is one for which there is strong vocal support. There obtains towards it a consistent transfer of democratic values, so that the product of the institution is, within generous limits, considered to be a 'right' of the people, and to be properly under public control. The effect of the verbal support, however, is minimized by a well-recognized indifference on the part of the people to the actual functioning of the institution which could best be combatted in the public view, by better school-community relations." [24]

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21. Watson, op.cit., p.380.

22. Op.cit.

23. F.W.Terrien, "Who Thinks What About Education", Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol.18, Summer 1954, pp. 157-168.

24. Ibid. In answer to the question: "Are you actively interested in one or more of the city's schools?", 76.5% answered in the negative, and only 21% in the affirmative.

Terrien concluded: "Education has the generalised good will - as yet insufficiently cultivated - of nearly all the people" and that the "best-defined feelings of local responsibility are directly correlated with occupation and education levels within the community." [25]

A comparable study was undertaken in New Zealand in 1954 by Havighurst.[26] This study showed that no major differences in attitude among parents towards education were significantly related to the sex, socio-economic status, or urban/rural environment of respondents. Small differences were apparent among these groups, but Havighurst felt free to conclude that: "The New Zealand community does not have large groups with profoundly different attitudes towards education." [27]

One of the principal findings of the study was that parents see three school functions as being more important than the teaching of the 'three Rs'. These three functions were: the development of moral character; the development of good citizenship; the development of 'reasoning powers'. It could be argued that there is some bias in the findings because respondents were told: "This is not a question of how important these things are for your children, but rather how much emphasis you think the school should place on them." Parents were thus being asked a somewhat academic question. One can not know what the reaction would have been had they been told: "Schools can place more stress on one function only at the expense of one of their functions. Bearing this in mind, which functions would you like the school to stress in the education of <u>your</u> children?"

Probably Terrien's findings, that the great majority of people see a need for secondary education but far less see tertiary or university education as being necessary, would apply equally in the New Zealand setting. We can also take for granted the transfer of democratic values towards education. This is illustrated by the reception accorded to an idea sponsored by the Minister of Education (the Hon. Mr Algie), in 1957, that New Zealand should think seriously of setting up elite schools. The <u>Evening Post</u> commented: "We cannot guess whether the Minister of Education was serious when he mentioned the idea of special boarding schools for New Zealand's 'intellectual elite'; he told the Secondary School Boards' Association: "I have not the slightest idea how the

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25. Ibid.

26. R.J.Havighurst, <u>Studies of Children and Society in New Zealand</u>, Christchurch, CUC, Department of Education, 1954.

27. Ibid, p.7 of Chapter VII. Such differences as appeared between Maori and Pakeha were seen to equate with socio-economic differences. Like the lower social categories, Maoris tend to see education as an aid in overcoming their social disadvantages. They tend therefore to favour training for an occupation.

public would stand for it." Our opinion is the public would not stand for it. And quite right, too." [28] It would also be true to say, with Terrien, that in general, those who know most about the education system and who are most active within the system are those from the higher occupation groupings (see Chapters Three and Four and Appendix 'A'.) It would not be correct to equate educational rating with knowledge of and activity in the system in New Zealand, however, because higher education has not been equally available to all age groups and geographical groups. From Havighurst we have it that the New Zealand public exhibits a homogeneity of attitude and that it is not unaware of the benefits of a general education.

The Commission on Education also offers a description of the public attitudes to education [29] though, as has been seen, much of what it has to say is of more relevance to the education public than to the general public. Watson felt that a characteristic of the bulk of parents was a willingness "to accept what is offered". [30] One educational journal expressed itself similarly: "The general public is not very concerned - either through apathy or lack of knowledge. Possibly we should not expect anything better; we have done extremely little to inform them of the present problems." And again: "The general public sees enough products of our schools who can spell reasonably well not to be alarmed at the outraged cry of the occasional employer whose office boy is discovered to be an inefficient speller." [31]

Conclusions. It would be altogether wrong to ascribe to the New Zealand general public any positive role in decision-making in the education system. However, its opinions and prejudices provided, to a very real extent, the general specifications according to which the educational edifice has been built. For its part, the education public is the keystone on which the edifice is built. But important decisions affecting the very nature of the edifice are continually being taken, and the views of the public as a whole do not have a great deal of bearing upon them. Disunited, the education public has little opportunity to influence decisions: uninterested, the general public has little desire to do so.

Yet this should not obscure the fact that New Zealanders generally have a firm appreciation of their schools. Perhaps it would be fitting to conclude with a quotation from a nine year-old girl who, as part of

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28. Evening Post, September 7th 1957.

29. "Public Education in New Zealand: Some Governing Views", Chapter One of the Report of the Commission on Education, 1962.

30. Watson, op.cit., p.380.

31. STA Journal, Vol. 3 No. 1, March 1954.

a creativity test conducted by the NZCER in 1965, was asked: 'If all schools were abolished, what would you do to try to become educated?' She wrote: "I would say to the Government that we must have schools, so that all the people can learn things."

II

Lest the title of this sub-section 'Pressure' create a false impression it should be stated at the outset that the only really effective groups in the education system are internal and institutionalised. They are a recognised part of the decision-making process and have been dealt with already. Yet between these groups and the semi-organised and disorganised public, there is a discernible stratum of pressure activity, largely ineffectual though it might be. It is with this pressure that the present sub-section is concerned.

It is convenient at this point to distinguish between pressure and pressure groups. One is not concerned with theoretical distinctions or taxonomics but simply with degrees of organisation. When the term 'pressure group' is used, one assumes more than a consensus of opinion; one assumes a 'collection of action', and action, to some extent, depends upon organisation. It is intended to discuss first the pressures within the education system, then to look at those groups organised more or less specifically for the purpose of championing them.

Pressure. The submissions to the Commission on Education offer the most complete list of the pressures and pressure groups operating within the education system. The following were the most apparent pressures:

(i) Religious a) Those who advocated that the New Zealand system of secular education was too narrow in conception and therefore urged the inclusion of religion as a subject for instruction.
b) Those - chiefly Catholics - who desired greater financial assistance from the Government towards private education.

(ii) Social. Those who stressed the importance of training for citizenship. These submissions felt that more emphasis should be placed upon training for civic and social responsibility.

(iii) Technocratic. Those who advocated a 'new education for a new world', especially scientists and technologists, who wished to see more importance attached to these fields of study.

(iv) Welfare. These submissions felt that greater stress should be placed upon mental health and the emotional development of the child.

(v) Liberal. These submissions advocated increased guidance and counselling services in the schools and a wider curriculum to prepare the pupil for the increased leisure they felt would be a feature of life. Many of the arguments put forward by these submissions were directed towards combating delinquency in a 'progressive' manner.

(vi) Traditionalist. These submissions advocated a return to more formal methods, more especially in the primary and intermediate schools. Modern methods and lax discipline were deprecated and faith in the 'three Rs' reasserted.

(vii) Rural. Although there were, in fact, few submissions to the Commission on Education on matters of educating the country child, there has always been substantial pressure upon the system to accommodate the expectations of the rural community.

(viii) Internal. Submissions from bodies within the system concerning possible redistributions of power within the system.

Groups. Of the submissions to the Commission on Education, over 45% were from individuals. The remainder were from groups, distributed as follows:

Groups Making Submissions to the Commission on Education

Classification	Percentage of Total Group Submissions.
Educational	58
Business, commercial and industrial	3
Civic, welfare	6
Cultural, social, fraternal	9
Farming	2
Government Departments [32]	3
Propagandist [33]	3
Religious	16
Total	100

Finer uses two broad categories when describing pressure groups, namely promotional and propaganda groups. [34] The former are primarily concerned with the interests of their own members and the latter exist

32. These included the Milk Board and the Armed Services Joint Research Project 1960.

33. These included the NZ Alliance, Temperance Unions, Rationalist Associations and the like.

34. S.E.Finer, "Interest Groups and the Political Process in Great Britain", in Interest Groups on Four Continents.

primarily to advance a cause. The distinction is not clear-cut in reality, if one is to judge by the New Zealand education system. Although there is an obvious difference at the extremes - the PPTA or NZEBA, for example, on the one hand, and the Campaign for the Abolition of Corporal Punishment on the other - those in the centre are less readily classifiable. What is more, each group would claim with sincerity that it was primarily concerned with the well-being of education.[35] Within its limitations, however, the distinction has a certain value as a basis for further analysis.

Promotional Groups. The nature of pressure group activity in the education system is predominantly promotional. If one were to enumerate the most influential groups in the system, each - as has been pointed out - would be one of the organs of the system. This is not surprising; as Professor Webb has pointed out, pressure groups tend to become part of the hierarchy of government in the welfare state.[36] Having dealt in Sections Two and Three with the chief organs of the system, it remains to add such groups as the NZ Institute of Management, the NZ Institute of Engineers and the Federated Farmers. In seeking to influence education policies, these groups are primarily concerned with the expectations of their own membership.

At the time of the Commission on Education, no single or effective pressure group existed to speak for industry and commerce. Doubtless many of the leaders of this sector of society played a part in education individually, by sitting on secondary school boards and so on, but there was no nationally organised pressure. The many changes which had taken place in technical education since the war appear to have been planned and conducted by educationalists in response to their own view of changing circumstances and not to industrial or commercial pressures. The future development of technical education, for example, was outlined by the Minister of Education before New Zealand industry had begun to expand. As early as 1945 he wrote: "It seems certain that the technical schools ... must in future years prepare themselves to develop their senior work and to assume more the character of senior technological institutes."[37] When the first practical step to modernise technical education was taken, with the setting up of the Committee of Apprenticeship in 1947,

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35. This fact was acknowledged by the Report of the Commission on Education: "All the submissions ... have been raised not on narrow sectional grounds, but because it is claimed that the particular reform is essential both to the proper work of the school with the individual child and to the needs of society at large." p.20.

36. Interest Groups on Four Continents, p.247.

37. See Report of the Department of Education for the Year 1945, A to J, Vol. II, 1945.

this was a result of departmental forethought rather than of pressure.

The year 1956 was an important one for the development of technical education. Many of the developments which have since taken place, were decided upon in that year. Again the leading part was played

an expansion of the Nelson system of religious education, so that, given a religious basis, education could provide a "rock on which to build sound character and high endeavour".[38] Although the submission contained no discussion on how the Nelson system could be expanded, it spent more than a little time explaining the objectives of the Mothers' Union in general.

Other propaganda groups, such as those which sought the abolition of corporal punishment, exhibited clearly defined objectives. Yet too often they were poorly organised and based their case on incomplete information. In the case of corporal punishment, by no means all of its opponents seemed aware that it is the Education Boards and secondary school boards which are the controlling bodies. Too often, their shafts were aimed in the wrong direction. Groups 'in advance' of public opinion have, generally speaking, enjoyed little success.

In fact the majority of propaganda groups, in trying to influence educational decisions, suffered from four principal disadvantages: Lack of a favourable public image; lack of definition in objectives; lack of effective organisation; and lack of detailed information on the system.

Not all propaganda groups have been ineffectual. Those in favour of extending religious instruction in the state schools for example were better organised, their objectives, for the most part[39] were more clearly defined, their public image was favourable, and having been engaged in pressure tactics for many years, they have built up a fairly complete structure of information. In the early years of the twentieth century, in fact, the Bible in Schools League offered an almost unique example of a pressure group effectively organised in response to an educational issue. As A.J.S. Reid points out:

> 'In the 1914 election a Bible in Schools representative worked on the campaign committee of one selected candidate in each electorate. In subsequent elections the method was less direct, but the League did its utmost to make known the views of all candidates on religious education. Labour policy was explicitly for secular education and Labour candidates were therefore always opposed by the League. The Liberals, led by the Catholic Ward, did not fare very much better. But Reform leader Massey was an Orangeman and sympathetic to the Bible in Schools efforts, and his party went a long way to meet the League. As a result, the League's secretary could write in his report on the Reform victory of 1925:
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> > 'If the inner history of the election could be written and the active participation of the League remembered, it would be revealed that the overwhelming majority of members on the Government benches is due in no small measure to the work of the League.'[40]

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38. Submission of the Mothers' Union to the Commission on Education, 1962.

39. The reference here is to church groups and to groups such as the NZ Council for Christian Education and not to multi-purpose groups such as the Mothers' Union.

40. A.J.S. Reid, Church and State in New Zealand, op.cit., p.4. For a concise account - from an educational point of view - of religious pressures in education, see J.J. Small, "Religion and the Schools in New Zealand 1877-1963", Comparative Education Review, February 1965, pp. 53-62.

Under the Nelson system it will be remembered, Boards, with the authority to set school hours, could nominally close a school for half an hour each week to enable religious instruction to be given, if the school committee was in favour of such a step. But this position had so developed that some Boards were allowing secular teaching to continue in some classes while others were having religious instruction. This was obviously illegal. The root cause of uncertainty was that religious instruction had been growing up within a system expressly designed to exclude it. [41]

At the time of the Commission on Education the existing situation had been called into question. It was therefore necessary for the Commission to make a definitive recommendation on the future of teaching religion in state schools. The pressure groups supporting the extension of the Nelson system thus had an excellent opportunity to influence future policy. Yet the great majority of pressure groups within the education system were at best lukewarm to any extension of religious instruction. The NZEI for example was certainly not favourable to extension - though it officially claimed to be neutral - because of the likelihood of state teachers being called upon to teach religion. There was also a very deep sympathy among members of the education public - including members of the Commission - for the free, secular and compulsory system of education within which they had themselves grown up. The Commission recommended that the Nelson system be 'legalised' and somewhat extended to allow for efficient operation. Beyond this the Commission would not go, holding:

(i) There was a lack of consensus among the general public;

(ii) A non-sectarian approach to religious teaching was virtually unobtainable;

(iii) Members 'harboured considerable doubt' about the efficacy of 'classroom' teaching of religion;

(iv) Members saw the school's role in religious matters as being secondary. [42]

It is especially interesting to note, then, that despite these explicit recommendations, despite similar recommendations from the Department of Education in its submission to the Commission, despite the opposition of those directly involved - the primary teachers - the Education Act of 1964 (Section 80) allowed for the freeing of teachers from their normal duties to take part in religious instruction if they so desired. One can only assume that the Government decided that this step was politically expedient, and thus that the groups wishing to 'desecularise'

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41. Secondary schools, it should be noted, were not state schools in the legal sense, and there was thus nothing within the law to prevent their conducting religious observances.

42. Report of the Commission on Education, p.685.

the system had enjoyed a considerable success.

A second recommendation of the Commission reversed by legislation concerned the actual application of the system of religious instruction in state schools. The Commission recommended that parents who wished their children to participate in such instruction should be asked to sign a brief statement to that effect - to 'contract in', in other words. Government legislation, however, made it obligatory upon parents not wishing their children to participate to 'contract out'! [43] This offers one of the infrequent examples of external pressure groups successfully securing a 'propaganda-type' objective.

A second set of propaganda groups which have achieved some success are those supporting the extention of state aid to private schools. Chief among these were the Catholic groups, among which the Catholic Education Council for New Zealand, and the Holy Name Society were prominent. As was the case with the pressures behind 'desecularisation', the Catholic groups kept the issue of state aid before the public for a number of years, as will be seen when we deal with the mass media. Moreover, this indirect pressure was applied reasonably skilfully, seeking to present to the public the point of view that the Catholic community was not getting a 'fair deal'; it was paying for the education of its children twice over. "Give Us A Fair Go!" read the headline of a typical newspaper article. At the other end of the scale, Catholic groups sought, with a lot less skill, to apply direct pressure to convince the politicians of the justice of their cause. Prior to the Commission on Education, Catholic pressure for increased state aid suffered from lack of direction which permitted one lay group, the Holy Name Society, to take effective leadership. Its somewhat heavy-handed and militant approach offended many, including a Minister of Education (the Hon. Mr Algie). The main theme of this direct pressure was a scarcely-veiled threat to close Catholic schools and send the children to the already overcrowded state schools.

This split-level campaign caused those who opposed state aid to argue on two levels also. Two articles inserted in South Island newspapers by the Loyal Orange Lodge illustrate this point. The one refuted the Catholic case point by point and was headed "To the Contrary" and the second was headed "Political Suicide in State Aid". Most of the Protestant Churches, though opposed to state aid, refrained from actively campaigning. But there is little doubt that their views were known to the politicians.

In addition to those opposed to increasing state aid on religious

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43. See A.E. Fieldhouse, "Religious Education and Children", in The Currie Report - A Critique, the 1963 Lectures of the Association for the Study of Childhood, Wellington, 1964, p.24.

grounds, the Catholic pressure groups had to contend with fairly general mistrust among the public reinforced by the rigid historical division of church and state. One commentator has observed:

> In England, radical protestantism was but one tradition amongseveral and the pattern which gradually emerged was a rather confusing conglomeration of private and religious schools, the latter receiving certain types of assistance in return for meeting particular standards. In those countries (settled by Englishmen) where the dissenting sects came to present the dominant tradition, i.e. USA, Australia and New Zealand, a public, non-denominational school system became the norm, and while private schools, denominational and otherwise, were permitted to exist, they were barred from public assistance. In these countries, the idea of a rigid "separation of Church and State" early became a widely accepted pattern, and Protestants joined hands with the more secular-minded in enforcing this pattern. Religion or irreligion were to be private matters, matters of faith. Education was designed to produce a common national heritage and a democratic citizenry, but from the point of view of faith it was a neutral instrument."[44]

The Catholic concept of education does not fit easily into such a background. Most forcibly and authoritatively expressed in Pius XI's encyclical Divinus Illius Magistri (On the Christian Education of Youth), the Catholic view is that:

> "To be this [a fit place for Catholic pupils], it is necessary that all the teaching and the whole organisation of the school, and its teachers, syllabus and textbooks in every branch, be regulated by the Christian spirit, under the direction and material supervision of the Church; so that religion may be in very truth the foundation and crown of the youth's entire training."

This philosophy is alien to the average non-Catholic New Zealander who, like his counterpart in many countries, still cherishes a brooding suspicion of the Catholic Church.

Finally the Catholic pressure for increased state aid had ranged against it most of the major groups in the education system - the NZEI, the PPTA, the NZSCF, the National Council of Home and School and Parent-Teacher Associations and the NZEBA. Though it received lukewarm support from several peripheral promotional groups, no group of importance within the system offered any substanial support for the Catholics.

Prior to the Commissions's report, although governments had made certain concessions to the private schools, state aid had been a political 'hot potato'. Both parties, judging by parliamentary debate, would have preferred to leave matters to the Commission on Education, but although the latter recommended against increasing state aid, it specifically pointed out that the decision was in essence a political one. Not long after the Commission had reported, the Government took

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44. S. Rothman, "The Politics of Catholic Parochial Schools", Journal of Politics, Vol.25, February 1963, pp.49-71.

the initiative and state aid was indirectly increased by further tax concessions. The Government Member for Wellington Central, himself a Roman Catholic, said that Catholics regarded the increased tax concessions to those contributing to private education as a "departure from the policy so long established that the state would provide ... no financial support for private schools." [45] Once more one is left to draw the conclusion that political expediency was an important factor in this decision.

Others have written on the political overtones of the state aid issue. In their book New Zealand Politics in Action, [46] Chapman, Jackson and Mitchell considered state aid in the context of the 1960 General Election. They tell of a meeting held in Auckland prior to the election attended by 250 Roman Catholic educational and lay association representatives. Statements by Mr Holyoake and Mr Nash were read out to the meeting, the former appearing more favourably disposed to the Catholic position. The national president of the Holy Name Society called upon Catholics to "cast aside political affiliations on election day and vote for the man ... with principles and integrity who would see the justice of the cause of state aid for private schools." [47]

Yet the authors doubt that the issue had any immediate effect upon the voting. A detailed study of the marginal seat of Wellington Central, which fell to National, seemed to indicate little change in the traditional Catholic support for Labour. There were far more convincing grounds, it was felt, for proffering social rather than religious explanations of this and similar Labour losses, such as St Albans, Tamaki and Hastings.

Though the argument advanced is a convincing one, its implications are limited. One cannot conclude that because National failed to make inroads on the Catholic vote in 1960, the intention was not there. Still less should one conclude that 1960 offers a pattern for following elections. The authors acknowledge this point readily when they conclude:

> "The lay leadership, not to mention the hierarchy, have not yet taken the kind of measures which will make the parochial schools an important determinant of the voting of that 14% of our citizenry who are Catholic. That the time will come, the course of recent American and Australian history leaves no doubt. Already candidates and members on all sides are alerted and some have promised what action they can take as individuals. But in general it seems

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45. NZPD, July 17th 1963. For a detailed account of government concessions ~~see~~ Small op. cit.

46. R.M. Chapman, W.K. Jackson and A.V. Mitchell, New Zealand Politics in Action, London, Oxford University Press, 1962.

47. Ibid, p.103.

> doubtful whether more than a well-scattered thousand or two votes were in any degree affected in 1960 and it would be careless of fact to think these matters at all decisive." [48]

Thus there is no reason to reject the possibility that by increasing state aid against the wishes of the Commission on Education and practically the whole system, the National Government had in mind the Catholic as a voter and not as a parent. [49]

Another factor which probably weighed heavily on the Governments' decision was the increasing discomfort of the non-Catholic private school. Stretched to the limit of their financial resources, these schools have abandoned their former aloofness to state aid. The position of all private schools has deteriorated in recent years and those with personal contacts within the political parties, more especially the Government, would no doubt have strongly stated their case for increased aid.[50]

This completes the discussion of pressure in the education system. In conclusion, it should be reiterated that the most important pressure groups are internal and, to a large degree, promotional. Examples of pressure being successfully applied from outside the system are infrequent, but the groups which supported the expanding of the Nelson system of religious instruction in state schools and those which called for an increase in state aid to private schools have been important exceptions to the general rule. Yet these successes have to be seen in perspective. The state system is still avowedly secular and the concessions to supporters of private schools do not compare favourably with those in many other Protestant countries, as was pointed out in Chapter Two.

III

The mass media form an all-embracing system of communications which, to varying extents, makes people aware of the views of the government and the government aware of the views of the people. It therefore has two functions to fulfill, to report and to comment. It is intended to consider briefly the main media in New Zealand in an attempt to discern how fully they fulfill these functions.

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48. Ibid. p. 292.

49. State aid to private schools, it should be noted, was further increased a matter of weeks before the 1966 general election.

50. A More recent development of importance is the reorientation of the attitude of the Protestant Churches to state aid. Perhaps as result of ecumenism, perhaps as result of the obvious growth in stature of agnosticism, the Churches today seem able to find more in common with each other. The removal of Protestant opposition - or its political expression at least - has significantly altered the situation with regard to state aid.

Press. "The New Zealand press", it has been stated, "has a reputation for accuracy in its reporting, and this appears to be justified in general. There are probably no deliberate misrepresentations of what a speaker says; there may be misrepresentations due to an incomplete account of what was said ... Generally, however, it is fair to assume that the intention is for accuracy, and in much of the daily round of reporting, it is achieved." [51] Milne [52] has supported this contention and in fact it seems to be generally accepted.

Cleveland has pointed to a curious and striking similarity in both content and appearance of the 41 daily newspapers. [53] He accounts for this by the fact that all subscribe to the NZ Press Association and that each member newspaper agrees to telegraph to all other publications with a similar deadline an account of any event of importance within its area. Further, although the metropolitan press keeps a close and continuous contact with the legislature, this tends to be used simply as a "routine channel for news handouts." [54]

"Most politicians and public figures," Cleveland goes on, "are shrewdly aware of the possibilities of the press for influencing public opinion and testing its tolerances. They plant items in it and watch to see what happens; they use it to popularise their projects; they keep themsleves engagingly before its readers." [55] Thus because of a concern for accuracy and because the Government usually thinks it propitious, the essentially conservative press in New Zealand fulfils its

The reporting function can be seen as a negative one. This is not to deny that accurate reporting is important; it is an essential asset to any acceptable system of communications. But if there is to be any dialogue between government and non-government, the press must accept a role of informed commenting, or criticism in the truest sense of the word. Cleveland and many other commentators have noted a serious lack of informed criticism, especially upon domestic matters, in the New Zealand press. Comment is usually characterised by "gentlemanly behaviour", and a "lack of competition among the dailies" allows

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51. E.Warburton, "A Study of the New Zealand Press", Landfall, No. 31, September 1954, pp.167-202.

52. Milne, op.cit, p.17.

53. L. Cleveland, "How Free is the New Zealand Press?", Comment No.19, April-May, 1964.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. L. Cleveland, "How Impartial is the New Zealand Press?", Comment No.21, October-November, 1964.

them to indulge this respectability." [57] A factor of considerable importance which has tended to reinforce this lack of informed criticism has been the inability of reporters (for various practical reasons) to specialise. Thus the detailed knowledge which must form the basis of criticism is often lacking.

At a national level, it appears to be the case that the political system suffers from a lack of informed criticism. Education feels this loss as much as any aspect of governmental activity. The lack of commercial competition among newspapers could be viewed as symptomatic of a lack of competing culture goals. That is to say, a framework does not exist - or is not apparent - within which sustained and coordinated criticism might be levelled at a government. This lack of criticism from a cultural or philosophical standpoint in the daily newspapers is not made good by periodicals. Without denying the worth of publications such as Landfall and Comment, it is nonetheless true that no New Zealand periodical has the standing or circulation to provide the sustained high-calibre criticism which is so much a feature of most Western countries. The weekly Truth has traditionally shown an interest in education, but perhaps not the kind of interest best geared to benefit the system. [58] One educational journal has commented that this newspaper's policy is "hardly calculated to help our schools deal with the problems that invariably arise among a small minority of pupils. If Truth imagines that there is some sort of moral collapse in post-primary schools it is vastly mistaken ... if it wishes to raise standards, it could well look to its own." [59]

It would be wrong to conclude that because there is no sustained criticism at a national level, based on a philosophical or cultural standpoint, the press affords no facilities for criticism. The press does in fact stimulate dialogue between government and non-government in two principal ways. First, it does so simply by accurately reporting events. Naturally individuals and bodies involved will criticise a system: education is particularly well-endowed with such critics. Visits by overseas educationalists are an important source, an obvious example, perhaps being that of David Ausubel. [60] If such visitors, or New Zealand educationalists for that matter, criticise the system publicly, they will usually be reported in the press. More important

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57. L. Cleveland, "How Free is the New Zealand Press".

58. A recent Truth article, for example, was concerned with 'immoral conduct' among pupils of a co-educational school whilst travelling in an over-crowded school bus.

59. PPTA Journal, Vol.X, No.8, September 1963.

60. David Ausubel, The Fern and the Tiki.

perhaps, conferences of the various education bodies are reasonably fully reported. These gatherings are frequently critical of government policy and activity, though the criticism is often of a specialised nature.

The second form of criticism facilitated by the press is local, and is restricted largely to the physical side of education - buildings and amenities and the like. Within this admittedly restricted field, criticism is sustained and coordinated: further a framework for such criticism exists. This framework, which we might call 'cultural' posits quite simply that the more that can be done for the local schools the better. On local issues New Zealand's press can be highly critical of the government, the Auckland newspapers particularly so.

It would thus be wrong to view the New Zealand press as failing completely in its function as a critic of government and a stimulator of dialogue. The willingness of the local press to assist local branches of the NZEI in the Revaluation Campaign (see Chapter Seven) offers firm evidence in support of this view. [61]

The actual coverage of educational matters by the press follows an interesting pattern. The following table was compiled from education articles in ten newspapers over a ten-year period. A list of general categories was constructed and each article was analysed thematically and classified accordingly. [62]

A Classification of Educational Matters as reported in the New Zealand Press

	1956	'57	'58	'59	'60	'61	'62	'63	'64	'65[63]	Total
A	10	25	21	9	15	33	30	31	28	11	21
B	12	22	27	32	24	18	20	24	28	56	26
C	15	9	14	17	20	8	9	5	18	7	12
D	1	3	5	3	3	6	5	9	4	6	5
E	10	4	7	3	1	3	2	1	3	4	4
F	10	14	9	5	7	6	6	8	10	10	9
G	2	4	8	3	3	6	10	8	3	3	5
H	35	12	3	3	14	7	-	-	1	1	8
I	1	1	5	3	1	-	4	4	-	-	2
J	4	6	1	22	12	13	14	10	5	2	8

61. Several local newspapers, it will be remembered, offered to include regular 'Education Columns'.

62. Two factors of importance should be born in mind when interpreting the table. First, the 'local' factor: Auckland papers, for example, concerned about the siting of a new university building, might feature q disproportionate number of university articles. Second, the 'depth' factor: articles of substanially different sizes have been given the same value - there is thus no indication of the depth of comment.

63. These figures taken only as far as August.

Key to Categories

A. Teacher Status. Salaries, training and conditions of work of the teaching profession.

B. University. Siting and building of universities; staffing and salaries; students.

C. Educational. Examinations, curricula and the 'aims' of education.

D. Finance. Specifically on the subject of financing the education system.

E. Technical. All aspects of tertiary technical education.

F. Boards and committees. Either articles written on Education Boards, secondary school boards or school committees or articles in which their viewpoint on issues is given prominence.

G. Teacher bodies. Either articles written on the teacher bodies or articles in which their viewpoint on issues is given prominence.[64]

H. State Aid. Articles dealing specifically with the issue of state aid to private schools.

I Religious Education. Articles concerned with the teaching of religion in state schools.

J. Other. The above do not represent all categories used, but only the more important. Category 'J' is thus residual.

Thus a general pattern emerges in which universities and teacher status are the most 'newsworthy' aspects of the education system. Mention was made earlier of the importance to press criticism of the physical side of education. In articles on such matters the press almost invariably relies on comment from education bodies, especially Boards and committees. They would form a large proportion of the articles listed under category 'F'. Articles relating delinquency to educational methods and so on were not numerous, forming part of category 'C'.

The general pattern was sometimes upset, for example in 1956 when a high proportion of articles concerned state aid. This was in response to Catholic pressure, and counter pressure from within the state-schools system and from groups such as the Loyal Orange Lodge. The very large percentage of articles on universities in 1965 is explicable in terms of student agitation for better grants, but the siting of university buildings has traditionally caused much comment in the local press. It is interesting to note that articles featuring category 'C', which is wide, never account for more than 20% of the annual total. Articles written specifically on the aims of education - offering the sort of criticism which we have noted to be lacking - were so few that they had to be collapsed into the Educational category.

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64. Categories 'F' and 'G' are defined in part by source rather than subject matter. When source and subject category overlaps (e.g. the report of an NZEI statement on teachers' salaries) the article is categorised according to where the stress lies.

Radio. The pattern which emerges from this discussion of the press is similar to that which characterises the radio coverage of education. Yet radio provides a fuller service in many respects. The Director of the NZ Broadcasting Service wrote:[65] "Publicity for local efforts to promote school activites is frequently given in accordance with a defined policy interpreted by District Managers and Station Managers of the Broadcasting service. Most school councils or Board chairmen are aware of this and accordingly approach the local station authorities when occasion arises."[66] Thus at the local level the NZBC would be prepared to advertise on behalf of local schools and attempt to encourage public activity locally. Radio criticism at the local level, however, is non existent.

At the national level we have it from the Director of NZBS that: "The service has always felt itself under an obligation to promote public interest in education and has done so, year by year, by programming talks, talks series, and discussion on educational aims and policy in many practical and theoretical aspects."[67] The Corporation has continued with much the same policy. What this coverage amounts to in terms of actual programmes can be seen by what was broadcast in one year. In 1957, for example, talks included:

i) The New Zealand way in education

ii) Technical education (The main YC project: 5 series, 15 talks in all, given by 12 speakers.)

iii) Measuring intelligence (two talks).

iv) The teaching profession (in My Poor Boy, a series on the trials and rewards of various professions.)

Broadcast discussions included:

i) New Zealand handwriting.

ii) The role of museums today.

iii) What the community expects of the university.

iv) What the university expects of the community.

v) Are school uniforms desirable?

vi) Liberty or license at home and at school.

vii) Why do we have Intermediate Schools?

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65. It is only in recent years that the NZBS was granted Corporation status. Thus the following comments are based upon an institution which is still developing.

66. Letter from the Director of the NZBS to the Director of Education, dated December 12th, 1957.

67. Ibid. The stress is the present writer's.

Documentaries programmed during the year included:

a) Their guided years (a series of 12 broadcasts from 1YA and 1ZB - undertaken in conjunction with Auckland Parent Teacher Associations introducing the schools and their methods of teaching to parents.)

b) Teaching the young fry (school instruction in angling at Rotorua).

c) The National Library Service.

d) The Field Service - a Pupil-Exchange Scheme.

e) Visit to a nursery play centre.

Thus the NZBC offers good opportunities for the public to become informed. But the amount of criticism of government and of the administration which a publicly-owned corporation can permit is limited.[68] NZBC programmes are governed by much the same 'gentlemanly behaviour' and 'respectableness' which Cleveland noted in press articles. Yet in its capacity as a news agency the NZBC, like the press, would report any outspoken criticism of government policies by an informed source.[69]

Television. In the present age, television has become an exceedingly important means of mass communication. Used skilfully, television can create an impact on most members of the viewing public, even those who are watching simply because they are not of a mind to turn off the set. The NZBC claims to have shown one programme concerned with education in recent years. Entitled "Right of Reply", the programme featured an interview with the Minister of Education (the Hon. A. E. Kinsella). The Minister was questioned by a journalist with teaching connections and a teacher with connections in journalism. Apart from the normal news coverage, no other programme concerned with education has been shown.[70]

Cinema. The normal New Zealand film programme lends itself to the showing of short documentaries. There is a feature film which usually is shown after the interval. For the preceding 30 minutes or more "shorts" are shown, often in the form of a travelogue or documentary together with a cartoon. Eighteen year ago, the National Film Unit produced a documentary entitled "The First Two Years of School". No documentary dealing with educational matters[71] has since been produced. Thus nothing has been available for general release, and an important medium remains undeveloped.

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68. It is arguable that the political strength of a public corporation will be greater if it behaves independently. But cautious respectability on the part of the NZBC could be a consequence of the long departmental experience (in NZBS) of its senior executives.

69. In fact, the NZBC has only recently developed a fully independent news agency.

70. Further programmes, it appears, have been planned. See Chapter Fifteen.

71. Some years ago the NFU produced a short film for a Maori cultural body on pre-school education.

CONCLUSIONS.

The public, pressure groups, the mass media and the education games.

The object of this chapter has been to assess the importance to the education system of public opinion, pressure groups and the mass media. We have not yet assessed the extent to which the public acts upon the education system through political parties, but on the evidence of this chapter public opinion does not count for a great deal in education decisions. Certainly the dissatisfied parent can take an active interest in the affairs of the local school but more often than not he will be sucked into the administrative morass and his concerns for his child will become sublimated to fund raising. Yet even here some solace exists for the anxious parent. For example, he can help to create, stock and even staff a library for the local school, and to provide other facilities which might substanially alter the quality of the education provided at that school.

Thus the public as such has little influence on the more important game situations. People can become involved in the less significant administrative games, but on the evidence so far presented, they have no direct influence on significant outcomes beyond the fact that their egalitarian social values form the basis of the rules of the games played.

The effect of external pressures on the education games have also been comparatively slight. Certainly we have noted some examples of their sucessfully influencing the outcome of game situations, but even here the influence was countered by internal groups in such a way as to restrict the extent of the success substanially.

For their part, the mass media offer a generally uncritical coverage of the education games, which is characterised by what Mitchell has called a "uniform dullness" and an "absence of genuinely trenchant journalistic analysis." [72] If stimulating public interest were ever to become a goal of departmental strategy (or of any educational group strategy for that matter), then short documentary films made by the NZBC or the NFU would offer useful weapons.

Thus neither public opinion nor external pressure exercises much influence over the education system in any direct way. The mass media provide information but are not used either as a means of sustained criticism on the one hand or stimulating community interest on the other. It remains to assess the extent to which the political parties provide the community with an indirect means of controlling the education system.

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72. Austin Mitchell, Government By Party, Wellington, Whitcombe and Tombs, 1966, p.96.

Chapter Thirteen

In a democracy, where conflicts within society are institutionalised, parties compete by expressing differing views, and parliament offers a forum for the expression of those views. In this chapter, the first sub-section will deal with the political parties and the second with parliament. It should be remembered that education forms the core of this discussion and that no consistent attempt will be made to generalise about the functions of parliament and the parties, though from time to time some generalisations will be necessary.

I

Simply stated, politics concern choice - a choice, that is, between methods of solving a nation's problems. In a modern democracy the choice is said to belong to the nation as a whole when it selects, from among competing parties, the one which is to form the Government. If the choice is to be a real one, the alternatives must be reasonably clear. Thus parties act as agencies which define alternatives and clarify, or dramatise as Mitchell would put it,[1] the issues involved in the public's choice. It is proposed, therefore, to examine such differences as exist between the parties and their policies in the field of education and to assess the extent to which a parent could exercise any real choice between education policies when voting.

The first point to note is that although both parties consider it sound tactics to bring education into politics - in the sense that any shortcomings within the system offer the Opposition a stick with which to beat the Government -neither consider it proper to bring politics into education. A roughly bi-partisan approach to education has been aimed at and to a considerable extent achieved, at least since the Second World War. The following comment by a Minister of Education (the Hon Mr Algie), exemplifies the politicians' attitude: "The policies of the government and the opposition might differ in detail but not in principle. I do not think you can recall a time when education has been the football of parliamentary debate".[2]

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1. See his Government by Party, passim.

2. National Education, Vol XXXVII No 400, June 1st 1955.

In 1959 another Minister (the Hon Mr Tennent), made the same point: "There is more unanimity between the two parties on education than there is on any other subject".[3] This state of affairs has strong support from the majority of those active within the education system. From the administrative point of view it is easy to see that such an understanding has advantages. But from the public's point of view, it amounts to a denial of choice among policies, and of the benefit of new ideas which party competition might stimulate. Hence, when we look at the parties and their policies, it will be as well to remember that such differences as exist will be relatively minor ones.

Labour Party Policy. Labour party thinking on education is said to be formulated in conference. The annual conference creates of itself a number of committees which deal with all remits within a particular field or group of fields. Having reviewed all remits from branches, the committee makes recommendations to the conference and its recommendations are usually accepted, often without comment. Education has been coupled with a variety of topics for the purpose of committee discussion. In 1945 there was a committee on Education and Public Utility; later it became Social Security, Health and Education. By 1958 it was Education, Housing and Immigration. In the 1960s it has been Education and Justice, Education and Transport and Education and Housing.

To gain a place on such a committee a party member must be a recognised 'expert'. As far as education is concerned, a background in education administration or teaching is sufficient provided one is reasonably well known within the party. Although it is an obvious disadvantage that such a committee has to deal with more than one area, it is customary for each set of 'experts' on the committee to play the larger part in its own area.

Personal factors play an important part in the formulation of policy in this committee system. If a high-ranking official happens to have an educational background, his influence can be disproportionate. An interesting example of this occurred in 1965 when a remit came to committee demanding that the use of corporal punishment in secondary schools be restricted to principals only. The committee accepted this (as, later, did conference) with an amendment to the effect that first assistants should also be permitted to administer corporal punishment. The convener of the committee in 1965 was a first assistant at a large urban secondary school.

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3. N Z Parliamentary Debates. Vol 319, p.700 July 23rd, 1959

A limiting factor on the conference's ability to formulate policy is the general lack of debate after the committee has dealt with the remits. It might seem that the committee system must inevitably produce such a result and that a better method of organising the conference would be to select a small number of remits of obvious quality for general discussion, as is done at the National party conference. Apart from the difficulties of selection involved in such a method, there is no guarantee that it would produce richer and deeper debate. The basic reason for lack of debate on educational issues at the Labour party conference is lack of general interest.

The image of a party membership which meets periodically and draws up firm guide lines for policy which, to some extent, bind the leadership in formulating a programme, thus bears little relation to the actual situation. As Opposition, the Labour party only needs an education programme once every three years. In between elections, Labour members harry the Government on specific issues. An education programme is strictly a weapon designed for fighting elections, and is not the product of continuous background research. Perhaps it should be pointed out that this has been true of both parties in Opposition and not simply of Labour. Labour's education programme is drawn up by those members who have a specialised interest in education - usually three or four in number - within the framework of a caucus committee on education. It is seldom that the programme is evolved 'among the rank and file' at the conference. Yet there are instances of policy decisions arrived at in conference which have found their way into the Labour programme and which have actually been implemented by a Labour Government. The best example is perhaps the providing of free school text books, which was accepted by conference in principle in 1953. It was Labour policy in the 1957 election and was implemented by the 1957-60 Labour Government.[4] A second example is offered by the Commission on Education itself, the setting up of which was recommended by conference in 1955.[5]

There are of course more instances of conference decisions which were <u>not</u> implemented by Labour administrations, such as that in 1945 which sought the setting up of a Labour College with bursaries for members of the movement. By skilful direction at conference, the leadership can usually ensure that such

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4. It is interesting to note that the PPTA was opposed to the issue of free text books, and in negotiations stated that: "The value of our representations has been severely limited by the nature of the election promise made by the government". (PPTA <u>Journal</u>, Vol IV No 8, September 1958.)

5. Though in this case support was far more general outside the Labour party than in the case of the free textbook scheme.

recommendations are pigeon-holed.[6] Even where there is strong pressure from the membership for certain changes, the leadership can successfully resist them - should it choose - when the party eventually comes to power. This is illustrated by the neglect during the 1957-1960 tenure of office of the numerous recommendations by committee from 1952-1960 for the abolition of military training at state secondary schools.

Thus a more realistic assessment of a Labour education programme and its formulation would be:

(i) It is characterised by general support for the system as it exists.

(ii) It is in the hands of a few MPs who have specialised in education plus the party leadership.

(iii) Policy can originate either with these leaders or within the rank and file. But since it must be both generally acceptable and practicable, policy is more likely to originate within the leadership, with its more intimate knowledge of the political situation.

National party policy. As with the Labour party, the annual conference is said to exert considerable influence on policy formulation.[7] But the processes of formulation differ. Whereas within the Labour party the great majority of remits find their way to the annual conference and are dealt with in committee, there exists a 'sifting process' within the National party.[8] First, branch organisations are empowered to sift through all their remits to avoid duplication and, where possible, to reduce the overall number of remits. Second, the constituency organisations sift and coordinate remits which come through from their branches. Third, the regional organisations carry out a similar coordinative process with the remits they receive from constituency associations. As a consequence, remits which are forwarded to conference for discussion represent the cream of remits originally put forward. Pruned, polished and consolidated thus, remits to the national conference are, like those which have passed through the Labour conference's committee system, almost certain to be passed by the conference.

As is the case with Labour, there are important factors which limit the conference's ability to formulate policy. Lack of informed debate is one obvious disadvantage. Associated with this is the respect due to the party leadership as the Government.

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6. See R.S. Milne, op. cit., p. 229.

7. It has never actually been claimed that the National party conference formulates policy, though such a claim has been made for the Labour party conference (ibid, p. 222).

8. Ibid, p. 237.

That is to say, if the Minister of Education points out to the conference that a particular remit should not be carried because the country would not be able to meet the expenses involved in its implementation, the remit is almost certain to be lost. If only because the National party has formed the Government for long periods since the war, this has been a device more characteristic of National conferences.[9]

With regard to the weaving of various policies into a comprehensive education programme, the National party has enjoyed a distinct advantage over its opponents in the post-war era. Being the Government for such long periods it has been far more in touch with recent developments and - more important - prospective developments. Thus at election time when the party is drawing up its manifesto, it can have its education programme checked and enlarged by departmental officers. The National party's manifesto for the 1963 general election, for example, could promise that the Commission of Education's 10 year plan to improve the status of the teaching profession would be implemented within less than 10 years. In other respects however, the National party's education programme is formulated in much the same way as is Labour's, under the direction, that is, of the party's education experts - particularly, of course, the Minister - and other party leaders, in the caucus committee.

Thus if we are to contrast the policies of the major parties, the most meaningful way would be between Opposition and Government policy and not Labour and National policy. There are some fairly distinctive differences between the education thinking of the major parties, but these cannot accurately be said to lie within the realms of policies or programmes. Milne spoke of the devaluation of the word 'policy' in New Zealand, where it has come to mean simply an election platform.[10] Certainly neither party has sufficient research staff nor do they encourage continuous research by party members on a voluntary basis. Consequently no alternative source of educational expertise is available to the parliamentary parties, other than departmental officials. In addition, there is no New Zealand equivalent of the 'intellectual groupings' of British politics, the Fabian Society and the Bow Group. Thus there is no debate within the parties on educational issues on anything but an ad hoc basis.

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9. Milne has noted the importance of 'leadership devices' at the National party conferences and gives examples. (ibid, p. 240).

10. Ibid, p. 280.

It is not surprising, in view of what has been said, to note that neither of the major parties offers a very serious critique of the education system; the programmes of both are characterised by a general support for it. A truly radical approach to education is espoused only by the Social Credit Party, untroubled as it is by any immediate prospect of power.

Social Credit Policy. The position of the third party in what is normally considered a two-party situation can be a most important one. As the British Liberals have shown, such a party can do much to stimulate the thinking of the major parties. It would be true to say, however, that education has been one of the areas in which Liberal influence has not been great. New Zealand Social Credit, on the other hand, has been anything but subdued in its education thinking; indeed the party declared that education, after monetary reform, was its most important platform. Its programme for the 1966 general election, for example, received notices from the press such as : "Social Credit Pledges Vast Changes in Education". Extreme though such headlines were, the facts bore them out. The Social Credit programme envisaged the abolition of accrediting for University Entrance, replacement of the School Certificate in its present form, replacement of district high schools by Form 1-6 High Schools, 'substantial' increases in state aid to private schools, decentralisation of administration, substantial changes in teacher training and the introduction of summer schools.[11]

It would not be unfair to point out that little of this programme is original, but it does constitute a useful body of independent thought. If Social Credit candidates were to engage candidates from the major parties in public debate on aspects of their programme, the education system might benefit indirectly. Yet in past elections, as we shall see, education has played little part. Further, Social Credit policies owe much to the views of party 'experts' on the committees of the Dominion Council- to one teacher especially; it is doubtful if party candidates could supply detailed support for particular party policies in the field of education.

Mention was made earlier of distinctive differences in the thinking of the major parties. It is proposed at this point to discuss these differences. They belong not so much to the field of policies as to that of attitudes, and form part of what might be called the party images.

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11. Evening Post, July 26th 1966.

Labour Party Image. If Labour suffered from a 'cloth cap' image in education, Peter Fraser dispelled that perhaps for all time. Minister of Education in the Labour Government of 1935 he was one of the few Ministers to have convinced educationalists that the politicians were really concerned with education. As was pointed out in the Introduction it was in Fraser's years as Minister that the education system officially espoused social as well as scholastic objectives. In the minds of many middle-aged people, the Labour education image still glows with some of the lustre imparted by Fraser.

"That the system of free and secular education be reaffirmed". This remit from the annual conference of 1948, which constantly reappears on remit papers at Labour conferences, comes close to summarising the image Labour has sought to project in education. In 1963 the Labour election manifesto declared:

> "Labour believes...that every child whatever his level of ability, whether he be Maori or European, whatever his parent's income, and wherever his home may be, has a right to the full development of his powers. Labour also believes that our strength and adaptability as a nation, the raising of our living standards, our cultural progress, and the vigour of our whole democratic way of life depend as never before on a thoroughly adequate provision for education".

So firm a belief in free education means that Labour would probably be less likely to limit university admissions for example than would a National administration. Free education offers the key to upward social mobility and is thus very dear to Labour hearts.[12] In fact, education committees at annual conferences have often discussed proposals aimed at making the system more open.[13] The provision of free school text books by the Labour Government of 1957-60 can perhaps be seen as part of the same pattern.

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12. This was perhaps even more the case before the second world war. Harry Holland, for example, said: "Those of us who come from working class ranks...have suffered more than the average member of this House by reason of the lack of educational facilities in the days of our childhood and have greater reason to desire that our children...shall not suffer the disabilities which we have suffered". (NZPD, Vol 185 p. 601, quoted in R.W. Heath, op. cit., p. 41). Yet it would not do to over emphasise this point. When a National Prime Minister (Rt Hon K.J. Holyoake), received an honourary Doctorate at the Victoria University of Wellington, he said that he himself had not attended university-indeed had received no formal secondary education. But he was resolved to "ensure that children of the future would have every opportunity to develop fully their talents and faculties". (Evening Post, July 5th 1966).

13. In 1953 for example, one remit called for 'free and open' university education.

General support for the secularism of the state system of education could mean that Labour would have been less likely to legislate for the extension of the Nelson system (as the National Government did) in 1962 or to increase state aid to private education (as the National Government has done on more than one occasion since the Commission on Education reported.)[14] One cannot say this with any certainty however. Political expediency could have driven a Labour Government to act in much the same way. But judging from the views expressed by party members in conferences, it would have done so with reluctance.

Within the New Zealand context, Labour is a party of the left. Its own left wing therefore tends to hold extreme views in education as in other matters. The party has continually found it necessary to minimise the impact of such views. Remits such as the one in 1946 which demanded that the school curriculum be altered to include a 'history of working class leaders', and that of the following year which sought the removal from the curriculum of 'any trace of the capitalist philosophy' have to be subdued carefully. They have become less frequent in recent years.

Thus the Labour image, though not often clearly associated with individual policies [15] - much less whole programmes - does establish a pattern of probabilities for action.

National Party Image. The National party, much more than its major opponent, tries to project an image of empiricism - of an undoctrinaire 'sweet reasonableness'. This has resulted in a reputation for sound and economic administration rather than innovation.[16] In practical terms this means that the National party would be more likely to pose the question of whether the country could afford certain desirables. It is conceivable, for

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14. For a full account of government concessions to private schools see J.J. Small, op. cit.

15. Though free text books offer an exception to the rule.

16. This is illustrated, perhaps, by the Governor-General's speech on the opening of parliament in 1950. "In the fields of health, education and social security", he claimed, "my government will ensure that the monies allocated...are efficiently spent so as to return the greatest value in terms of the welfare of the people as a whole".

example, that a National Government might become convinced of the economic 'necessity' of limiting university admissions more easily than would a Labour Government in similar circumstances.[17]

A second aspect of the National party image in education is its tendency to support traditional methods and to question the trends of modern education. The conference which met only a week before the publication of the Commission on Education's report, for example, passed a remit demanding: "That greater emphasis be placed on discipline in the schools and less on the play-way method of teaching".[18] National members with an interest in education have spoken against 'play-way' when in opposition, though it is significant that when in office their disapproval appears to become subdued.

Closely associated with this general disapproval of modern methods is the belief that education's prime task to to produce good, orderly, productive citizens. We have already seen the introduction to the Labour party's 1963 election manifesto. The introduction from National's manifesto of the same year illustrates clearly the difference between the parties' education images.

"The National Government believes that our young people should be trained to use and develop their talents to the full; encouraged to realise that no real success comes without real effort; and willing to render loyal and faithful service to their country and their fellow men".[19] Time and again in conference debates and in official policy statements one encounters this emphasis on character building, developing good citizens, and training for service to the community. Often, as has been stated, this aspect of the education image of the National party has been associated with a belief in the virtues of traditional methods: a remit passed by the 1956 conference for example, noted that the present system of education was failing in its task and was in need of a 'complete review' which would restore the 'Three Rs' to their former dominant position.

A further aspect of National's education image which contrasts with that of Labour is its comparative responsiveness to religious pressures. There is a noticeable difference in the treatment

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17. It was a National Government which, in clause 109 of its Education Bill in 1964, proposed that any child who attained the age of 15 during the first school term of any year should be able to leave at the end of the preceding year. This would have obviously had the effect of lowering the school-leaving age and possibly of easing a situation of staff shortage.

18. Report of the NZ National party's 26th Annual Conference, 1962.

19. General Election Policy of the NZ National Party, 1963.

accorded to remits calling for the extension of the Nelson system or for increased state aid to private schools at the party conferences. At the National conference of 1962 for example, a remit was carried to the effect that:

> "...believing the factors which induced our forefathers in 1877 to legislate for free, compulsory and secular education do not apply today, the Minister of Education be requested to initiate talks with church leaders, the NZEI and the PPTA with a view to introducing legislation to permit the teaching in schools of basic Christianity". 20

Finally, just as Labour's left wing is often a source of embarrassment to the party leadership, so is the right wing of the National party to its leaders. The right wing of the National party espouses a 'backwoods' philosophy as far as education is concerned - the philosophy that Professor Somerset noted in Littledene - which holds that if the small one-room village school was good enough for grandfather, it is good enough for grandson.[21] It is not education, the backwoods philosophy has it, which makes the man, but effort. Mr. Hayman, National member for Oamaru, put the matter simply: "I, with other New Zealanders, resent the inference...that if we do not provide sufficient teachers to ensure that every person gets a secondary education, we will be falling down on a major job".[22] He felt that education would 'look after itself' and that Government should concern itself with "the production end, at the level on which our prosperity in the future depends".[23]

Education, for the 'bucolic backwoodsmen',[24] is largely a question of imparting certain basic skills and an industrious, loyal and contented attitude. At worst the application of this philosophy would totally restrict growth and initiative: at best it might fulfil the needs of an unambitious rural community.

No other party has a definite image in education. It is therefore intended to pass on to another area in which certain differences between the major parties are apparent. These are related to aspects of social and geographical background, and will be discussed under the general heading of party membership.

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20. Report of the NZ National Party's 26th Annual Conference, 1962.

21. H.C.D. Somerset. Littledene. Wellington, Whitcombe & Tombs, 1938, passim.

22. In this regard, Mitchell has pointed out: "In New Zealand no full-time Prime Minister of this century has been a graduate; some have made a political advantage of not having gone past primary school". ("A Tale of Two Houses", Comment No 22, January-February 1965, p.8,) Heath put it more acidly: "...on the whole educated New Zealanders have avoided politics as scrupulously as politicians have avoided education". op. cit., p. 71.

23. NZPD, Vol 312, p. 1211, July 26 1957.

24. Mitchell's phrase, loc. cit.

Party Membership. The general rise in the level of education appears to have been slower to manifest itself within the Labour party than the National party. Chapman, Jackson and Mitchell illustrate this point with the following table.

Education Levels of Candidates, 1960.[25]

	National		Labour		Social Credit
	Elected	Not elected	Elected	Not elected	
Primary	4	-	8	6	6
Post-primary	21	19	19	18	36
University	19	13	6	12	11
No information	2	2	1	10	27

However there are so many reasonable explanations of this, such as age of members, that the differences are not considered important by the authors. Yet a closer examination would elicit the fact that 13 of the National candidates were educated at the 'best' private schools (namely Christs College, Kings College and Wanganui Collegiate) as compared to one Labour candidate, whereas 15 Labour candidates were educated at technical high schools as compared to 4 National candidates.[26] Such a difference in educational background is likely to have some effect upon the educational values espoused by candidates and upon their attitudes to education - though in a social system such as New Zealand's the effect would not be very great.

Writing in 1947, Leicester Webb offered the following general comments concerning those elected to parliament by New Zealanders:

> "In rural constituencies, the odds are that the member will be a small farmer, resident in the district, with a record of service in local government and farmers' organisations. Almost certainly he will be more than 50 years old, and it is unlikely that his education will have proceeded beyond the elementary stage. His virtues are likely to be robust common sense, an intimate knowledge of the needs and problems of his constituency, and a long if limited apprenticeship to the business of government on a county council, a hospital board, or perhaps an education board. His weaknesses are likely to be a certain rigidity of outlook, a tendency to put local before national interests, and an inability to see beyond the immediate situation. The strength of small-farmer representation has been characteristic of New Zealand parliamentary life for half a century.
> Representatives of urban constituencies are more varied in occupational origin than representatives of rural

25. Taken from Chapman Jackson and Mitchell, op. cit., p. 146.

26. Ibid, p. 146.

constituencies, and usually have reached a higher level of formal education. As in almost all democracies, the legal profession is well represented. Next in importance among urban members, since the rise to power of the Labour party in 1935, are trade-union secretaries...Commerce and trade are fairly well represented but not so the manufacturing interest. Among urban as among rural members, the average age is well above fifty". 27

Some of Webb's comments are now out of date, as more recent work, such as Chapman, Jackson and Mitchell's (supra) has indicated - those on age and education being the most obsiously so. But from the point of view of education, Webb has made an important distinction between the urban and rural members. This point is supported by the following table, taken from bibliographical material on party candidates at the 1963 general election supplied by the National party.

Education Administration Background of Candidates. 28

	Urban %	Rural %
National party candidates with experience in education administration	17.9	33.3

Although corresponding figures were not available for the Labour party, there is no reason to suppose they would show a different trend. (i.e. that the rural member is generally more active in education administration). In fact, since promotion within the Labour party is on occasion linked with trade union service as well as community service, one could imagine the trend would be even more pronounced.

But if we are to accept that the trend is similar within the Labour party, then it is reasonable to assume that the administrative bodies of the education system are better represented within the parliamentary National party, because, as has been amply illustrated, Labour MPs represent predominantly urban electorates and National MPs rural electorates. 29 One can add to this the fact that the teaching bodies are more strongly represented among Labour candidates who fought the same election - in both urban and rural electorates.

Thus there are differences in background between National and Labour MPs. They should not be overstressed, for they in no way make up for the fact that the policies of the two parties have

27. Leicester Webb, "Politics and Administration", in H.Belshaw (ed.), New Zealand (United Nations Series), Chapter XIII, p. 27

28. The source for this table was biographical notes provided by the National party. The material relates only to the 1963 general election, though there appears no significant reason why these results should not be thought of as typical. 'Experience in education administration' means simply service on a school committee, PTA, secondary school board or Education Board. It might be pointed out that among these candidates were an ex-president and ex-Executive member of the NZEBA.

29. See the demographic map of New Zealand electorates, "New Zealand Voting Power", prepared by members of the Otago University Geography Department in the Evening Post, October 25th, 1966.

been so similar. It is likely, however, that the Labour members would be more firmly in support of social objectives for education and more aware of the problems of the large multilateral urban schools. Further, allowing for the fact that urban members are not as active in educational administration, Labour MPs would be less likely to sympathise with the aspirations of Education Boards and less aware of the needs of school committees and secondary school boards. National members, on the other hand, might be likely to place greater emphasis on scholastic excellence as the main goal of education, and to be more aware of the problems of educating the country child. Their experience on school committees, PTAs, secondary school boards and Education Boards is likely to make them better informed on administrative matters.

In conclusion, there exist certain differences between the images projected by the parties as far as education is concerned, and between the background of party members. These differences establish 'probabilities of action' in a certain set of circumstances or 'policy preferences' which can only be indulged <u>if the situation allows</u>. But in no sense could it be said that the parties offer the parent-voter definite alternatives as far as education is concerned.[30] Neither does this unanimity, this belief in 'keeping politics out of education' allow for a clarification of issues for the parent-voter. Milne's comment on the general party situation seems particularly applicable to education: "The fact is that New Zealand parties, since they lack any clearly thought-out body of middle-range policy, have no alternative but to offer a mixed bag of ad hoc proposals to the voter."[31] Within the specific context of education, one prominent educationalist remarked political parties do not consider an education plank to be an electioneering asset. "No political party", he went on, "has ever written a major educational proposal into its election platform, and some...have omitted education from their platforms altogether".[32] Although the parties have certainly given more thought to education since Combs wrote those words, it is still true that their policies are almost indistinguishable, and it would be wise to appreciate this.[33]

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30. Even R.W. Heath is forced to admit that "education has never been a prominent issue in New Zealand elections" (op. cit. p. 7). Seeking the growth of Labour's education policy prior to the depression he could discover little more than a call for a "uniform set of textbooks"! p.7.

31. Milne, op. cit., p. 280.

32. F.L. Combs, "The New Zealand Educational Institute", <u>NZJPA</u>, Vol VI No 1, September 1943, pp. 42-49.

33. See for example, "The Policital Parties and Secondary Education", PPTA <u>Journal</u>, Vol XIII No 9, October 1966.

"We have been too long
Dupes of a deep delusion! Some belike
Groaning with restless enmity, expect
All change from changes of constitutional power". [34]

II

As result of the strengthening of party discipline within the two-party system, the original role of parliament - the bringing to bear of a collection of reasonably well-informed, reasonably independent minds upon executive policy - has been subverted. Party discipline has, as it were, drawn the teeth of parliament. What remains to parliament is a 'checking capacity', in which MPs scrutinise each aspect of executive policy, but are not often able to force any significant alterations upon that policy.

The strength of parliament - its ability to check in other words - depends upon many factors, chief among which are the degree of independence possessed by Government backbenchers, the personality of the leader and the alertness of the Opposition - each closely associated with the strength of the Government's majority.

Government Caucus as a check on the Executive. The importance of caucus as a control device is unquestioned.[35] It has been stated that:

> "All legislation is really passed before it ever comes into this Chamber. The caucus of the Government party decides - and rightly so, I think - what will pass and what will not pass in this Chamber. What happens in this Chamber are mere formalities because the decisions have already been made outside the Chamber. I agree with that. There is no other way we can work...There are many conflicts and many bitter struggles. They do not take place in this Chamber. It is only gallery play that we see here. They take place in the caucuses". [36]

Thus without question caucus has become a "clearly defined stage in the process of legislation". [37]

Government education policy, more often than not arrived at in the Department of Education, is put to a most searching test in caucus. Mitchell has described the backbench MP as offering the "nearest approach to a national sounding board". [38] In caucus meetings the backbencher is quite free to voice his personal views and unless the Cabinet feels particularly strongly on certain issues, there would appear to be considerable opportunities for

34. Coleridge, Fears of Solitude, 1798.
35. See K.J. Scott, "Caucus - the Parliamentary Works Council", Public Administration Newsletter, Wellington, October 1955.
36. NZPD, 1954, p. 765, quoted Peter Campbell, op. cit.,p.206.
37. Government by Party, p. 59. See also Milne, op. cit., p.134.
38. Ibid, p. 21.

the backbencher to influence decisions. In Chapter Seven it was noted that the Minister of Education stated quite categorically his intention to experiment with the structure of administration. Yet he evidently was not supported by the National party caucus and when the Public Expenditure Committee investigated education administration it recommended against changes, although it had a majority of National party MPs. The National party caucus is particularly effective in stressing the rural point of view in educational matters.

It is not intended to discuss caucus or caucus committee structure in any detail.[39] It is sufficient to point out that the Government's caucus committee on education provides an opportunity for members interested in education to acquaint themselves with the problems confronting the Government and to become familiar with the details of administration. In this way the Minister is provided with informed spokesmen for parliamentary debates.

The Opposition as a check on the Government. The formal opportunities for the Opposition to check Government policy are as follows:

> "...the regular opportunities of discussion of legislation and parliamentary papers, of the Imprest Supply debates which allow more specific questions to be raised (though their numbers are now reduced from six to two), and of the Budget and Address-in-Reply debates for more general onslaughts. The Opposition can also put motions of censure on the Order paper, though the prospects of debate depend entirely on the Government's willingness to find time". 40.

But such formal controls are, in themselves, of no value. They depend for their effectiveness upon their being used skilfully by the Opposition. How effective, then, is the Opposition's check in educational matters? It has been noted that no firm 'party line' in education exists and therefore the opposition tends to concentrate upon individual matters and to oppose them in isolation. To do this, the Opposition must gather as much information as possible on each case. This is slightly easier for the National party in opposition because of the background of party members. The writer spoke to several MPs on these matters. One Labour MP who claimed to be interested in education answered the following questions:

> "(Question) Surely an MP would need to become quite well informed on educational matters if only in response to constituency pressure?

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39. Mitchell has done this in Government by Party, esp. pp. 53-65.

40. Ibid, p. 69.

(Reply) This may be true for the country member. I think it probably is. But most of those are National anyway. No, as far as we're concerned, this pressure just does not exist.

(Question) If he was interested in education, surely any MP, Government or Opposition, could become informed through contacts with the educational bodies. So could not any member put himself in a position where he could scrutinise Government policy on education and speak with authority on these matters - if he was prepared to make the effort?

(Reply) First of all, it ought to be remembered that we as the Opposition do not have access to departmental information, and at any time - but especially at election time - this is crucial. But to answer the question: yes, by his personal efforts, any Opposition MP with the interest could become reasonably informed. But do not underestimate the effort involved!"

Thus it would appear that the Opposition questions Government policy more on an ad hoc basis than through the conscious application of any party philosophy. Naturally this has important consequences for parliamentary debates.

Debate. As has been stated, debate in the House of Representatives has been characterised by Government/Opposition rather than National/Labour alignment. The Opposition has traditionally sought to attack the Government on such topics as the grants to the lay bodies, especially the school committees, the provision for teacher recruitment and training, the size of classes and the 'educational deficiencies' of the system (usually in the form of attacks upon 'play-way'). The Opposition, in its more general attacks, does not seem particularly well-informed and obtains most of its ammunition from the press or from those groups within the system offended either by existing conditions or proposed legislation.

The Government itself does not appear, in retrospect, to have been particularly well informed of the difficulties facing the system. It exhibited in addition a general complacency which seems to have survived the most adverse conditions in the education system. This is perhaps best exemplified by a statement made by Mr. Kinsella, a Member with 19 years of teaching experience who was destined to become Minister of Education: "There can be nothing basically wrong with an education system which produced such men as Sir John Salmond, Rutherford, and other great New Zealanders".[41]

The amount spent on education provides a perennial source of debate, the Government pointing to a continuing rise in expenditure and the Opposition retorting that expenditure is simply keeping pace with the increasing school population.

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41. NZPD, Vol 305, p. 421, April 19th 1955.

Thus many of the most important debates in education have been associated with the presentation of the departmental estimates.

Local problems offer another important source of educational debate. We have stressed the 'closeness' of the New Zealand MP to his constituents: he is obliged to voice local problems and aspirations in the House with some frequency.[42] In the period of the Labour Government (1957-60), references by members to specific local schools accounted for the following proportions of all references to education listed in the indices of the New Zealand Hansard (NZPD):

1958 : 26%
1959 : 12%
1960 : 21%

To throw more light onto the relationship between parliamentary debate and educational issues, eight Members (1 in 10) were selected at random from the 1957-60 parliament and a check was made, through the indices of the New Zealand Hansard, on the frequency with which the Members spoke on educational matters. The following table shows the results. In it, Members have been categorised according to party. The figures in parenthesis indicate how often the Members spoke on matters relating primarily to local schools.

Members of Parliament and Educational Issues, 1958-60.

	1958	1959	1960	Total
N	4(4)	-	3	7(4)
L	8(4)	3	5(2)	16(6)
N	8(3)	3(1)	1(1)	12(5)
N	1	4	-	5
L	2(1)	1	-	3(1)
N	4	3(1)	4(1)	11(2)
L	-	-	-	-
N	2	9	8	19
Total				73(18)

For the above Members, then, 25% of the educational business they raised in the House was primarily concerned with local schools. If one were to take into account school transport - also predominantly a local matter - the figure would be higher. Other educational matters in which the above Members showed interest were: in 1958 the free textbook scheme; in 1959 and 1960 the universities.

42. Perhaps there is no better example than the Member who, in 1964, suggested the siting of a university at Oamaru.

It is obviously very difficult to evaluate the quality of debate: any quantitative method of evaluation would be almost impossible. But if one were to look at what was actually said during debates on the Education Bill (1964) - surely one of the most important pieces of education legislation this century- one might get some idea of the approach of Members to general educational matters.

Apart from interjectors and raisers of points-of-order, there were 11 principal speakers to the Bill in its course through the House, 5 for the Government and 6 for the Opposition. Argument centred initially around the alleged haste with which the Bill was brought before the House. Opposition Members of the select committee on education made much of the fact that 51 of the original 207 clauses had been amended. They produced evidence to show that many educational groups complained of a lack of time in which to prepare their cases. Following this attack on select committee procedure, argument settled principally on the 'disciplinary clauses', which clarified the legal position of a teacher subjected to any complaint. The clauses in question were supported strongly by the Government - who cited the favourable attitude of the NZEI - and attacked by the Opposition - who cited the disapproval of the PPTA and the SSBA. This one issue aroused more debate than the whole of the rest of the Bill. Other issues which arose were concerned with the rights of Education Boards to sell school books and the control of hostels by secondary school boards. The only really 'educational' issue raised in the course of debate concerned the Form 1-6 high schools and this did not occupy the stage for long.

The debate was marked by bitterness and monotonously repetitive arguments bearing upon the disciplinary clauses, which caused the Speaker to interrupt at one point: "That is the fourth time I have heard that argument".[43] For Government Members the debate offered the opportunity to indulge in some hearty back-slapping on their party's achievements in education. For the Opposition, one important victory was gained when clause 109 of the Bill which, as has been pointed out, would have effectively lowered the school leaving age for many pupils, was amended. But this gain was achieved in the select committee and not in consequence of the House debate.

In short, the debate seems to have epitomised the willingness of New Zealand politicians to bring education into politics, but to keep politics out of education, for there appears to have been

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43. NZPD, Vol 341, p. 3064, October 30th 1964.

little debate on any of the 'educational' aspects of the Bill.

Parliamentary Committees. There are other means, however, by which Opposition Members can become informed on and exert some influence upon educational policy. These are the bi-partisan committees of the House, two of which have concerned themselves with education.[44]

Education Committee. The select committee on education concerns itself largely with Bills and as a consequence meets infrequently. When it does meet, its effectiveness is not universally accepted. In 1964 for example only two members sat through all the evidence presented. An Opposition Member, Mr. Edwards, complained bitterly about the Opposition's inability to influence the structure of the Bill in any important respect, and also of the treatment accorded to those educational bodies who were opposed to important clauses.[45] Another Opposition Member referred to the select committee as a "complete waste of time". Certainly these comments may be exaggerations. Mitchell offers the treatment accorded to the 1964 Education Bill by the select committee on education as an example of thoroughness.[46] The truth of the matter may be that although the select committee on education has the power to subpoena witnesses, question the Minister and departmental advisers, Opposition Members cannot actually exercise any effective check upon Government policy unless their position obviously reflects views held by important groups within the education system - as happened over clause 109 of the 1964 Education Bill.

Public Expenditure Committee. This committee, of recent origin, is set up each session by the House to:

> "examine the estimates to the House and to report what, if any, economies consistent with the policy implied in those estimates may be effected therein; to examine the public accounts and the accounts of such corporations, undertakings, and organisations as are in receipt of any money appropriated by Parliament, in such manner and to such extent as the Committee thinks fit, and to have regard to matters in relation thereto raised in the annual report of the Controller and Auditor-General or elsewhere, and to report thereon to the House or the Government; and to examine and report on any other matters referred to it by the House; the Committee to have power to sit during the recess and to adjourn from time to time and from place to place and to have power to appoint subcommittees and to refer to such subcommittees any of the matters referred to the Committee".[47]

Thus the committee "combines the functions of both the Public Accounts Committee and the Estimates Committee of the British House of Commons".[48] One of its first tasks was to conduct a review

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44. For a full discussion of select committees of the House see Government by Party, pp 72-77.

45. NZPD, Vol 341, p. 3982-3, December 1st 1964.

46. Government by Party, p. 73.

47. Standing Order 320 of the House of Representatives relating to Public Business.

48. Government by Party, pp. 79-80.

of educational expenditure. Sitting in the parliamentary recess, it took the committee two years to complete its report and the National Government has not yet had sufficient time to be judged on its willingness to act on the committee's final recommendations. But some indications of its general attitude may be drawn from its reaction to the committee's recommendations in 1965 with regard to teachers' college administration. Chief of these was:

"That, on economic grounds, primary and post-primary teachers' colleges operate as single teacher institutions and primary instruction be not segregated from post-primary teacher training".[49] This constituted a direct assault by parliamentarians upon certain of the shibboleths of the education system and it met with a firm rebuff. The Government commented upon this recommendation:

> "In view of the policy decision involved...the Minister of Education referred the matter to Cabinet. Cabinet approved Stage 1 of the Christchurch Teachers' College without prejudice to what form of college organisation is finally determined. The Education Department advises that the Committee's recommendation involves a number of complex issues and a great deal more study is necessary before Government could be committed to a change of policy". 50

Perhaps the role of the parliamentary committees is, like that of the mother body, one of checking rather than innovating. Used skilfully they can be of assistance to Government Departments, and in the case of education, to the bodies within the system.[51] But perhaps more important, they can bring more knowledge to parliamentary debate, bring more light to the conflict of ideas which Arnold has pictured as:

> "The darking plains
> Where ignorant armies clash
> By night". 52

CONCLUSIONS. Parliament, the Parties and the Education Games.

This chapter has sought to assess the role of the political parties and the place of parliament in the education system. It has been shown that the parties fail to offer the public any real set of alternatives and that neither they nor parliament as a body are important policy-formulators. But if one accepts that parliament is primarily a checking agency, one should be ready to admit that it is effective within the limitations imposed by 'keeping politics out of education'. It might be true that

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49. Report of the Public Expenditure Committee, Wellington, Government Printer, 1965, p. 36.

50. Report of the Public Expenditure Committee, Wellington, Government Printer, 1966, p.8.

51. The committee suggested to Education Boards, for example, that regular meetings between Board architects would provide a pool of knowledge for the solution of common problems. The Boards acted on this suggestion. In addition, the committee recommended to the Government that a regular (triennial) review of the cost-place figure in the White Lines scheme be conducted. This has also been accepted. These are significant improvements.

52 Quoted in W.H. Morris Jones, "In Defence of Apathy", Political Studies, Vol 2, 1954, pp. 25-37.

the New Zealand MP, like Joseph Chamberlain, tends to look at issues 'through the small end of a municipal drainpipe'. But it is also true that he is well aware of the problems of the schools within his constituency, and this is particularly true of the country member.

The importance of political parties to the education games is limited. The parties are engaged in a more general game - the political game - of which education forms a minor part. Occasionally an issue will arise which is of importance to both games. It is of obvious political value, for example, for an Opposition party to highlight teacher shortage. But because of the philosophy of keeping politics out of education, the games do not intersect frequently. Groups within the system do not appeal directly to the political parties, though they may from time to time take steps to ensure that the Opposition party is made aware of certain facts which they regard as important - as happened, for example, in the marking dispute (see Chapter Eleven). It should be reiterated however that when the parties play in the education games, they appear as 'Government' and 'Opposition' more frequently than as 'National' and 'Labour'.

With the parties 'on the bank' in the education game, it is clear that parliament's role is somewhat restricted. Yet as has been pointed out, bearing these restrictions in mind, parliament is reasonably active in the education field. True it does not formulate education policy, but through the awareness of the individual member - particularly in caucus, but also in House debate and in committee work - parliament is able to reflect community preferences and values. If the function of parliament is to tell the executive what the people will not put up with, this is of prime importance to all 'governmental' games, not the least the education games.

Judging from the field of education, one cannot but agree with Mitchell's view of parliament as a kind of second chamber "supervising legislation worked out within the administration and then thrashed over within the governing party."[53] Further it provides a very useful check upon actual administrative efficiency. Yet - again speaking only with regard to education - one is forced to express reservations about the other function of parliament according to Mitchell; that of providing a stage for the conflict between Ministers and Opposition. In education, conflicts of any depth are rare, and a stage for them is not earnestly sought: perhaps there are lingering doubts that not all the cast know their lines.

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53. Government by Party, p. 18.

Chapter Fourteen

THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT

The New Zealand education system is centrally controlled, and financed from central government funds. The well-being of the whole system therefore depends in the final analysis upon the relationships between the Department of Education, its Minister, Treasury - the controller of the purse - and Cabinet - the ultimate source of authority. It is to these bodies and the relationships between them that we must now turn our attention. The three sub-sections of this chapter will deal with policy-formulation (in general), the Department of Education as a policy-formulator and finally the political controls on policy.

I

The Nature of Policy. Much academic debate has centred around the basic concepts of administration, each new view bringing but partial insight. Appleby has noted a tendency for protagonists in the debate to abstract from the realities of administration "various shadows of parts of reality, and [to find themselves] able to do many things with these shadows which [they] could not do with the total reality".[1] A pertinent example of this is the distinction between policy-making and administrative decision-making. Appleby and others have attacked any attempt to make a clear distinction, feeling that no true separation exists between policy formulation and execution: "Public policy, to put it flatly, is a continuous process, the formation of which is inseparable from its execution. Public policy is being formed as it is being executed, and is being executed as it is being formed".[2] This argument has been reiterated within the context of New Zealand education by Dr C.E. Beeby who, when Director of Education, wrote: "Policy...not only determines ways and means but is in some measure itself determined by the ways and means chosen to put it into operation ...Some major adjustments will almost inevitably result from administrative decisions made within the rather sketchy framework of stated policy".[3]

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1. P.H. Appleby, Policy and Administration, Alabama, University of Alabama Press, 1949, p.2.

2. C.J. Friedrich and E.S. Mason (eds.) Public Policy, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1940, pp. 6-7.

3. C.E. Beeby, "Administration as an Art", NZ Journal of Public Administration, Vol 18 No 2, March 1956, pp. 3-14.

Nicholaidis has attached much importance to a correct understanding of what the term 'policy' actually signifies, stressing particularly its form, character and terminal objectives:[4]

(i) The form of policy offers a guiding rule - or set of rules - for present or future application in decision-making, thus providing a framework or pattern for solutions of problems.

(ii) The character of policy offers a pattern of goals and values which constitute a normative framework for action.

(iii) The terminal objectives of policy can be expressed in terms of stability, consistency and continuity in organisational operations.

Thus policy could be described as a set of rules for action, specifying organisational goals and values, and often prescribing the means for their attainment. Important among the objectives of policy will usually be stability, consistency and continuity. Described in these terms, it is hard to see anything exclusively political about it, or anything which precludes the participation of all but the politicians.

But as has been stated, policy cannot be understood without reference to its implementation. In a democratic system, policy is usually the result of compromise. Policy-makers "sail on rough seas of conflicting interests, personalities and values, where compromise seems to be the most useful and effective method of "muddling through". In this phase of administration, policy-making seems to be more a method of compromise and agreement than a method of rational articulation of means and objectives".[5] Nicholaidis posits here an interaction in which policy stimulates compromise and compromise defines the nature of policy. What is important however, is the point that in a democratic society policy-making is likely to be a procedure of compromise.

Education Policy in New Zealand. Policy decisions in education fall into two broad categories, administrative and professional ones. In both categories decisions are implemented at least in part by non-government bodies as well as by the central administration. As a consequence the most important aspect about policy is that it should be the result of compromise. Any policy decision which is implemented in an arbitary manner is simply not likely to succeed in a system such as that which runs New Zealand education. It was pointed out at the beginning of this section that education decisions were not taken in a vacuum, and that political considerations had to be taken into account.

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4. Nicholaidis, op. cit., Chapter IV.

5. Ibid, p.80. See also C.E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through", Public Administration Review, No 19, Spring 1959, pp. 81-96.

Yet it would be almost as difficult to foist a political decision upon the education system without taking educational considerations into account.[6] Most important among these - and most plainly stated - are the views of non-government bodies, such as the teachers' groups. Thus in the New Zealand education system, the natural democratic desire for policy decisions which embody compromise is reinforced by the necessity to accommodate the expectations of the non-government bodies involved in their implementation. As one educationalist has pointed out, ultimately teachers are the only agents through which changes in education can be brought about.[7] One of the themes of the present study has been to assess the importance of the various groups and interests in the education system to the making of decisions.

It is now proposed to assess the roles of the Cabinet, the Minister of Education and the Department of Education in policy formulation.

Cabinet as a Policy Formulator. It goes without saying that Cabinet's is the last word in important policy decisions. But it is generally accepted that Cabinet's role is a checking more than a formulating one in the politics of education. Cabinet embodies the policies of the political party which it leads. As we have already observed, it is not often that a political party will possess a distinctive policy for education. Therefore the Cabinet is not often called upon to initiate specific party policies. There have been important exceptions to this rule which were noted in Chapter Thirteen, but it is generally true to say Cabinet can only exhibit preferences for certain aspects of departmental policy and thus direct (but not initiate) policy. We spoke in Chapter Thirteen of 'probabilities of action' which distinguished the parties to some extent. It is reasonable to suppose, following that argument, that a National Cabinet would be more sympathetic to those policies of the Department of Education which sought to improve the lot of the country children. But there will usually be a number of more immediate considerations involved in each policy decision, and these preferences should not be overemphasised in policy formulation.

Once it has taken over the reins of government, it becomes increasingly difficult, though by no means impossible, for a Cabinet to formulate new policies in education even should it wish to do so, so great is its workload. Only consistent pressure from

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6. It might be argued that this, in fact, is done from time to time. Yet if it is done at all, it is done rarely.

7. G.W. Parkyn, Combs-Lopdell memorial lecture, 1964.

within the party - especially the parliamentary party - would cause a Cabinet to initiate policy changes. As we have seen this pressure seldom exists.

The Minister as a Policy Formulator. The Minister of Education, when he comes into office, inherits a certain situation not of his making. This is a fact which must be taken into account when one tries to assess the Minister's role in policy formulation. A second factor that needs consideration is that events beyond the Minister's control continually occur, especially since he is at the pinnacle of a structure the foundations of which are set in the expectations and ambitions of local schoolteachers and parents. Such a structure is not immune from unexpected convulsions. These factors limit the scope of action of a Minister intent on making any sweeping changes.

One of the most important single determinants upon the role of the Minister of Education is his personality. A Minister of strong personality with very definite ideas for educational changes could almost certainly initiate them if he had the backing of his Cabinet colleagues. An example of such a Minister was the Hon Peter Fraser. But if the Department of Education, or wide sections of non-government opinion within the education system, were opposed to his schemes, a Minister would have to be exceptionally strong-willed to carry the day, unless actually pressed on by his colleagues for political or financial reasons. It is noticeable for example that several Ministers of Education had attacked the 'play-way' system when in opposition, but no noticeable change in emphasis in teacher training was discernible after they took over the portfolio themselves. Further examples are offered by the Hon Mr Algie's attitude to the subdivision of the Auckland Education Board when in opposition and his consequent change in heart (see Chapter Two), and by the attitude of the Hon Mr Kinsella to the Regional Council Scheme for administration which he espoused but eventually dropped in the face of strong opposition (see Chapter Seven).

In fact it is generally accepted that the chief role of the Minister is to ensure the political accountability of the public servant. "The Minister's first task", according to Polaschek, "is to know what the people want, or, rather, to know what will meet with their approval; his second is to see that they get it".[8] Where there is no obvious clamour for change, Ministers might consider it expedient to make no major innovations in policy.

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8. R.J. Polaschek, Government Administration in New Zealand, London, Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 212.

In conclusion, the initiative can always rest with the Government in policy-formulation. But in reality Government can only effectively initiate major policy changes where it has a concrete policy which it wishes, for educational, political or financial reasons, to apply.[9] Not many educational policies are formulated in this way; the initiative for most of them lies elsewhere.

The Department of Education as a Policy Maker.

In "The Reluctant Elite" Roberts and Brookes tell us:

> "If Machiavelli were to search for the 40 or 50 citizens who rule New Zealand today, he would find them among the bureaucrats, public and private, who devise the compromises which government policy reflects. The increase in government's functions has thrust these men willy-nilly into the innermost circles of the ruling class". 10

With the increasing complexity of governmental activity, the authors go on, the Minister - usually an amateur after all - must depend increasingly on departmental advice. Now Roberts and Brookes are going a stage further than the Royal Commission of Enquiry into the State Services in New Zealand, (the McCarthy Commission), the report of which acknowledged that the departmental head was concerned with policy. "...in the sense of the functional, financial and personal problems arising in the organisation he directs; but not usually in the sense of political issues requiring the attention of the Minister".[11] Roberts and Brookes are claiming that senior public servants, in conjunction with other 'bureaucrats', are actually responsible, at least in part, for the policies they are called upon to administer.

There are a number of very practical reasons why the Department of Education should play a key role in policy formulation. The most important one is the failure of the political parties to evolve a set of long-term policy goals in education other than those of administrative efficiency. Roberts and Brookes see the Minister as "the government representative at the conference table... with no particular end in view, save to persuade and to assist the others to reach agreement".[12] This situation exists and is acceptable because "there is no longer any conception of a social ideal, no longer any party policy other than a set of set of vote-catching promises".[13] This argument is supported by the

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9. In addition, a Government exercises a power to chose between alternatives. Though this could not strictly be called 'policy formulation', it would enable a Government to select, for example, the siting of a new university. Educational and demographic considerations being equal, it could presumably make such a decision on a political basis.
10. Roberts and Brookes, op. cit.
11. Report of the Royal Commission of Enquiry into the State Services in New Zealand, Wellington, Government Printer, 1962, p.26.
12. Roberts and Brookes, op. cit.
13. Ibid.

evidence presented in Chapter Thirteen.

A second reason for the Department's dominant role in policy formulation is that it - and it alone - is in a position to discover the terms upon which compromise between the non-government groups is possible. Policy formulation is not likely to become less complex: if it is to continue to be based on compromise, the Department's role is not likely to become less important.

A third reason is that over the years the Department has learned to provide a system of education with which - as we have seen - the general public is reasonably satisfied. It has also managed to establish an equilibrium between the often conflicting aims of the pressures within the system; it has managed, in short, to balance the apple cart. As one writer has it:

> "The administrative hierarchy is an organ receiving messages of popular demands, many of them contradictory. It is an organ responding to such demands, reconciling them, and in the course of response injecting considerations of prudence, perspective and principle, including regard for other popular demands and aspirations than those expressed in the chorus of the moment. All this is a political process, much of it completed within the area of administration". [14]

Finally the necessity of continuity and consistency in policy formulation in an area such as education is obviously crucial; this fact tends to reinforce the Department's position. In this regard, the Hon J.R. Marshall offers what he considers to be the acid test of power in policy formulation. [15] When there is a change of Government, he says, there are changes in policy. Yet in education this has been the exception rather than the rule: politics, it is generally agreed, should be kept out of education!

Policy formulation in education is therefore largely in the hands of the Department of Education. It is intended now to discuss the structure of the Department itself and to analyse its capacities as a policy formulator.

II

We have already dealt with the controlling and coordinating mechanisms of the Department of Education in the fields of primary and post-primary education. In this sub-section it is proposed to discuss the structure, coordination and leadership within the Department in order to make some assessment of its role as a policy initiator and formulator.

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14. Appleby, op. cit., p. 92.

15. Hon J.R. Marshall, "Political Controls", in Bureaucracy in New Zealand, p. 54.

(i) Structure. The simple pyramidal design of organisations is complicated as far as the Department of Education is concerned by a number of factors. First, the hierarchy is split vertically into professional and administrative sectors. Second, it is split - again vertically - between primary and post-primary sectors. This split is formal in professional matters but only functional in administrative ones. Third, it is complicated by the existence of Regional Offices which do not fit easily into the basic pyramid design. Despite these complications, reasonably clear lines of authority flow downwards through the hierarchy. The organisation which that hierarchy controls is a considerable one:

> "Directly or indirectly, it controls the work of some 15,000 teachers and 450,000 children, and has working relationships with over 2,000 local and national bodies, ranging from the Senate of the University of New Zealand[16] to the Free Kindergarten Union and the smallest school committee. It carries out a host of functions all of which appear to be predominantly administrative in character. After the Ministry of Works, it has the biggest building programme in New Zealand, and, after the Railways Department, the biggest fleet of buses; it is one of the most prolific publishers in the country, and certainly the biggest boarding-house keeper; it stands in loco parentis to 3,000 wards of state, and is, by any standards, a sizeable farmer". 17

The Administrative Sector. The administrative sector of the Department of Education took on its current form comparatively recently. Prior to the Directorship of Dr C.E. Beeby, administrative officers were classed as 'clerical' and were looked upon, Dr Beeby tells us, as the "handmaidens of the professional officers".[18] There were 12 professional officers with salaries higher than or equal to that of the secretary of the Department, who held the senior position on the clerical side. There were 54 professional officers with salaries higher than or equal to that of the second-ranking clerical officer in the Department. The permanent head of the Department had to give approval to every bus conveyance contract and to every building proposal. He signed every communication with the Minister. When he became permanent head, Dr Beeby was aware that "senior clerical officers spent no small part of their time telling me, with infinite tact, what to tell them to do".[19]

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16. University administration has since changed fundamentally. Control of New Zealand universities has passed to the University Grants Committee.

17. C.E. Beeby, "Control of the Expert", in The Expert and Administration in New Zealand, NZIPA, Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 57.

18. This is not a new position, as Simon, Smithburg and Thompson point out: "Where a particular career group occupies the top positions within an organisation...a 'caste' structure may develop in the organisation, creating a gulf between the members of the career group and others - very like the gap between officers and men in military organisations", Public Administration, New York, Alfred Knopf, 1950, p. 343.

19. Beeby, op. cit., p. 58.

Dr Beeby felt that only by increasing the status of the administrators could he successfully fuse the functions of the two. His efforts to do so, he felt were in part thwarted by personalities and by the 'heavy drag of departmental habit and tradition'. But by appointing a most energetic personality to the newly created post of Assistant Director (Administration), Dr Beeby profoundly altered the position. "New desks, new carpets, new positions, new salaries and new functions flowed in on the clerical officers and, before long, any sense of inferiority from which they may have suffered as a class had gone".[20]

Whether Dr Beeby was successful or not in fusing the functions of the professional and the administrator is debatable. The position of the administrative sector after the above changes was improved substantially, but it has declined slightly since. This is perhaps only to be expected in a Department where the professionals - the educationalists - must hold the majority of key positions.[21]

The administration division, in the Regional Offices and in Head Office, controls and coordinates the work of the lay boards in the system. The officers are thus called upon to handle diplomatically members of the public (i.e. the lay boards) who are, to all intents and purposes, engaged in the same task as themselves but (for the most part) at a lower level. This is a task in which not all have succeeded.

The actual structure of the administrative sector of the Department of Education, as it was in the early 1960s, is set out in the Report of the Commission on Education.[22] Since then there have been several changes, though not of a major character. This study is not concerned with the details of the structure, but it should be pointed out there are few areas in which the administrative officer does not feel the breath of his professional colleague upon his neck. Only in the buildings and administration divisions can the administrative officer create for himself a position, an expertise, which is useful to the Department because it cannot be supplied by professionals.

The structure within each division are pyramidal, but their efficiency as a unit depends upon internal coordination. To this end, the Chief Executive Officer will usually build up a committee structure. In 'divisions', for example, the Chief Executive Officer holds fortnightly meetings at which his divisional executive officers and senior divisional officers are present.

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20. Beeby, loc. cit.

21. Though it should be noted that the Executive Officer Finance is an administrative office: thus administrative officers are never completely without influence.

22. op. cit., p. 121.

The venue of the meeting is changed so that each section of the division will act as host. One Chief Executive Officer said of these meetings: "It is quite a revelation. Someone may have had a particular problem on his plate all week, and at these meetings, somebody else - whom one would never have dreamt of asking in the normal course - will come up with the answer". Such meetings would seem to function best when no set pattern of procedure exists and the meetings are quite informal.

The Professional Sector. The professional sector is composed basically of two separate hierarchies for primary and post-primary education.[23] The detailed structure of the professional sector is also set out in the Report of the Commission on Education.[24] It is sufficient to say here that the hierarchies are built up around the two inspectorates and the specialist services. The hierarchies are headed by the Directors of Primary and Secondary Education and they have close contact with their senior inspectors. The hierarchies come together in the Assistant Director General who is responsible for the whole professional sector. In many formal - and many more informal - ways, the more senior professional officers combine, so that the split between primary and post-primary within the Department is more apparent than real.

But this has not always been the case. As we noted in Section Three, there has been a traditional belief among leaders of post-primary teachers that the Department was primary-oriented. It is hard to sustain this belief at the present time when both the Director General and the Assistant Director General are from the post-primary service, but this state of affairs is new. Primary teaching seems to have acquired an exciting image which has attracted educationalists, and it is far more in the public eye. The comparative salary structures, as has been pointed out, have placed the primary inspector more or less at the pinnacle of the service. But this is not the case in the post-primary service. However, with the increased attention being paid to the post-primary syllabus and with the favourable post-primary representation among the leadership, it should be possible to rid post-primary teacher leaders of this 'poor relation' complex. A structural trend of recent years has been to blur over the lines which separate the professional hierarchies. New bodies such as the Curriculum Development Unit have tended to create a stronger sense of common purpose between the two. This trend is certain

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23. In fact there are three hierarchies, the third being for technical education. But this is concerned with tertiary matters and is thus beyond the scope of this study.

24. op. cit., p. 120.

to increase with the stress now being placed on a unified curriculum. Put plainly the Commission on Education recommended that secondary education begin at age 11 in a system in which the great majority of secondary schools take in pupils at the age of 13. This fact will dominate the relationships between the primary and post-primary spheres for some time to come.

(ii) Coordination. An administrative structure is held in harness, is made productive by the efficiency of its internal coordination. Organisational structure seems to assume that coordination can best be secured by authority flowing downwards through a hierarchy. Most organisations, we are told, are designed deliberately in this fashion. "The oldest of them all, the Catholic Church, which has shown no uneasiness in the presence of hierarchies, is definitely organised in this way...in the matter of coordination, the Church has an admirable record".[25] Now the Department of Education was once also a simple hierarchy, but it has developed considerably, as we have seen, and has become a complex amalgam of sub-structures. To hold this structure in harness is no easy task. Several factors appear to be involved in assessing the effectiveness of departmental coordination; we shall deal with them separately.

Staffing. An essential ingredient of good coordination and an efficient flow of communication is adequate staffing. Yet in both its Head Office and in the Wellington Regional Office the Department of Education suffers from a chronic shortage of staff. In the Wellington Regional Office, staffing is the major administrative problem. There is usually an acute disparity between establishment and actual strength. Recruitment figures indicate that the great turnover of staff makes adequate training both exceptionally difficult and rather pointless. In some divisions of the Wellington Regional Office for example, over 60% of the staff had under twelve months' experience. Replacements take an average of about twelve weeks and one division claimed that as a result it would lose some 30 man-months of work during the year ahead.

The situation is not a great deal better at the higher levels. This is perhaps best indicated by the fact that one senior administrator suggested in 1965 that a permanent reserve of four or five officers be created which could be deployed as and where demanded. It was pointed out to him that the members of such a reserve force would not find time to deposit their coats in their

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25. Walton, op. cit., p. 102.

offices. They would be sucked into the system immediately, so great was the need: the reserve force would be in the front line the moment it was assembled!

Other Government Departments are in a similar position as far as staffing is concerned. One public servant felt this was due to Wellington's supposedly inhospitable climate. Less subjective explanations are available, but it is true that the Regional Offices at both Christchurch and Auckland are relatively free from staffing problems and it is not easy to find willing volunteers for transfer.[26]

Fragmentation. The Commission on Education noted in its report:

> "The Commission must emphasise that it is gravely concerned to find how badly served the Department of Education is by its accommodation in Wellington. Certain parts of a large Government Department may suffer no great harm from being situated at some remove from the centre of affairs but no such considerations can possibly justify the present fragmentation of the Department of Education into 22 different locations in Wellington". [27]

Although the accommodation problems of Wellington made prompt action impossible, the Commission went on, some efforts to improve the situation were quite essential. There have, indeed, been moves to bring together many of the agencies of the Department, but the position is still far from satisfactory, though one can expect it to continue to improve. As will be shown later, the most important feature of coordination in the Department of Education is that it occurs chiefly at a personal level. The use of the telephone is only a partial answer.

Communications. Ease of communication is another important factor in coordination. Communication may be described as the act of imparting information. Ease of communication then supposes a free flow of information - probably from a central source. But in the Department of Education, information is not fully centralised and communication becomes a question of knowing whom to approach for the information required. This situation has had the effect of enabling a number of talented individuals within the departmental machinery to make themselves indispensable in certain areas. Much of the background information on particular cases is not on record at all. Files give an inadequate insight to those not directly concerned with, or knowledgable on, the situation at hand. Yet even within the filing system,[28] the

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26. An indication of the staffing situation at the Head Office is offered by the following. In response to continued SSBA pressure, the Department began work on a handbook for secondary board members. The officer responsible died after a long illness. The new appointee, who gave the work first priority, was transferred on promotion before completing the task. There was no replacement at the time and work on the project lapsed.

27. Report of the Commission on Education, 1962, p. 116.

28. Filing practices differ between the British and New Zealand civil services. The former keep more detailed files, often expressing the views of officers on the matter in question. New Zealand public service files usually contain the original document only.

importance of personalised information[29] is clear. The efficiency of the system appears to hinge upon the knowledge of one person with twenty years experience. But even when he is present, locating a file is not always a straightforward task. A note from one senior executive officer read: "I have been trying to get the file dealing with the Dominion Federation of School Committees for two or three weeks...may I please have the past papers as soon as possible".[30] There are numerous examples of faulty communications. The Federation of NZ School Committees' Associations, for example, passed a remit to the effect that: "It is to be regretted that the written replies from the Hon Minister were so long delayed...the delay which has been experienced over the last two years in receiving official replies to the Federation's remits is serious, in our view".[31] The replies were delayed because they had become 'lost' in the departmental machinery. In all probability they had been put to one side and forgotten. There was a further example of the Department's not knowing the name of the newly elected secretary of one body two months after he had taken office. In addition to writing to the ex-secretary, the wrong address was used. Mistakes such as these are certain to occur where information is personalised in a situation of staff shortage.

More specialised information tends never to become centralised - a factor reinforced by the fragmentation of the Department. It is thus true that the flow of information is neither swift nor without impediment.

The communications system does function however. It is necessary for senior officers to create a system of personal contacts, so that by walking down the corridor to the right room or by telephoning the correct number, they can have the desired information and expertise placed at their disposal. This system has not only to be mastered by departmental officers but by outside pressure groups such as the teacher bodies or the NZEBA, if they are to get the fullest consideration.

A factor of considerable importance for departmental co-ordination - and indeed for policy formulation - is that this network of personal contacts, which is within limits vertical as well as horizontal, provides for the informal interchange of ideas.

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29. Knowledge gained through an individual's experience but not committed on record.

30. Note dated October 1960.

31. Report of the 23rd National Conference of the Federations of NZ School Committees' Associations, Invercargill, March 11th-14th 1960.

Procedural Coordination. Simon has offered a useful way of dividing the concept of coordination in two. He claims:

> "Co-ordination may be exercised in both a procedural and a substantive sense. By procedural co-ordination is meant the specification of the organisation itself - that is the generalised description of the behaviour and relationships of the members of the organisation. Procedural co-ordination establishes the lines of authority and outlines the spheres of activity and authority of each member of the organisation". 32

Procedural coordination within the Department of Education is achieved through a committee system at the centre of which is the Director's Meeting. When he became Director, Dr Beeby sought to improve the relatively poor - and largely unstructured - coordination between the administrative and professional sectors. He set up the Director's meeting, which normally consisted of 12-14 people: the Director himself, the two Assistant Directors, each with his 3 or 4 most senior officers, the Superintendent of Child Welfare, the Officer for Higher Education and the chief accountant, whose finger, Dr Beeby noted, had to be in every pie. There were representatives from the Regional Offices, and other officers could be invited for specific purposes.

In its early days the Director's Meeting enjoyed little success. Not until the early 1950s, when it began to take on a decision-making role, did the Meeting really succeed. From that time it became a most useful instrument of coordination. Any member wishing to bring a certain problem before the Meeting had first to prepare a paper ending with specific recommendations. This was duplicated and circulated to all other members in advance. Dr Beeby maintained that defence of one's paper and one's recommendations could be a gruelling affair. Disputed papers (there was no formal vote) were handed over to a sub-committee containing professional and administrative officers. Naturally the Director had the final word, but most decisions took the form of a compromise.

Matters which were purely professional or purely administrative were not dealt with through his channel, which was thus restricted to policy decisions - precedent-setting decisions in other words. In Beeby's time few major decisions or recommendations were made to the Minister without having been mulled over in the Director's Meeting at some stage. In addition, each member was obliged to prepare and circulate an annual report of developments, problems and expectations in his particular field. Thus each division had a firm knowledge of what other divisions were planning to do.

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32. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, New York, Macmillan, 1955, p. 140.

Its history shows that its success lay in its capacity to share decisions and not only information.

Over recent years the Director's Meeting has lost some of its capacity to formulate policy - a possible explanation of this will be offered elsewhere - though it still has an important role.

Around this core are to be found several other committees. There is, for example, the weekly meeting between the assistant Director General (Administration) and his three Chief Executive Officers for example - a high-level meeting at which policy in administration will often originate. Then at a slightly lower level, are to be found the divisional fortnightly meetings. Similar structures exist on the professional side. In addition, ad hoc departmental committees are set up from time to time to report on topical matters. These committees represent both sectors and discuss matters of common interest (such as school buildings, the administration of the free text book scheme and the like.

Substantive Coordination. The committee structure is thus detailed. Woodrow Wilson once noted that:

> "No lines of demarcation, setting apart administrative from non-administrative functions, can be run between this department and that department of government without being run up hill and down dale, over dizzy heights of distinction and through dense jungles of statutory enactment, hither and thither, through "ifs" and "buts" and "whens" and "howevers"."[33]

In the New Zealand Department of Education, Dr. Beeby made the same point: "There is a fluidity about jobs near the top of the Department, and the flow of duties from one to the other depends upon a complex set of personal relationships that defy systematic analysis".[34] Wilson, in general terms, and Beeby, speaking with specific reference to the Department of Education in New Zealand, make the point that in operation it is not easy to distinguish the 'administrator' from the 'professional'. Beeby argues this case particularly effectively and at some length in his paper dealing with the Department of Education.[35] His case is even stronger at the present time, for the Commission on Education stressed the urgent need for a unified curriculum and for the greatest possible consultation with the teacher bodies and departmental experts in areas such as school building. The emphasis was placed squarely and emphatically not so much upon coordination in procedural terms but upon an end product that was fully coordinated. It was thus essential for all within the Department to work together

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33. Political Science Quarterly, Vol 2, June 1887, p. 213.

34. Beeby, op. cit., p. 54.

35. Ibid.

not in achieving separate divisional goals but in achieving collective departmental goals.

This trend towards greater substantive coordination has been facilitated by the 'personalised' flow of information. Because it has always been a question of obtaining information from people rather than simply from sources, there has existed an informal structure of personal relationships which have criss-crossed the administrative-professional, primary /post-primary barriers. Departmental efficiency has been fostered and maintained at this personal level; it is on the personal relationships between its officers that departmental coordination has traditionally depended.

Having thus discussed the structure of the Department and the nature of the coordination to which it aspires, it is finally necessary to introduce the topic of leadership.

(iii) Leadership. Leadership in administration has been described as: "The ability to apprehend the changing purposes of an organisation" and as: "A set of personal qualities that are required for the coordination of the people working within an organisation".[36] But these and similar descriptions and definitions are not particularly helpful. What if those at the top of the hierarchy fail to apprehend the organisation's changing purposes, or fail to coordinate fully those beneath them, are the then no longer leaders? For the purposes of this discussion, the 'leadership' simply means the senior officers of the Department of Education.

The leadership comprises men with similar education backgrounds.[37] Although in training there is a great difference between the professional and the administrator, these differences are substantially modified by the process of formulating decisions collectively. However there are certain set relationships which cannot but affect the structure of leadership. The Director General is of necessity a professional. This can have the effect of subordinating the administrative officers to their professional counterparts, but the quality of personal relationships - especially at the upper levels - often counteracts this tendency to varying degrees.

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36. Walton, op. cit., p. 109.

37. The official directory for 1965, for example, shows the following: Director of Education: M A; Assistant Director (Prof.): M A, B Com; Assistant Director (Admin.): LL B; Chief Inspector of Primary Schools: MA, Dip Ed; Chief Inspector of Post-primary schools: M A, B Sc; Superintendent of Technical Education: Ph D, M I E E Superintendent of Child Welfare: LL B; Superintendent of Education (Auck): M A, Dip Ed Superintendent of Education (Wgton): M A. Dip Ed; Superintendent of Education (Chch): M A, Dip Ed.

Given that such a body of men exists, similarly qualified and with similar socio-economic backgrounds;[38] given that they often meet together formally and continually informally, it follows that they can take fairly important decisions collectively and more or less informally. Such has appeared to be the case with the Department of Education. Most observers who have had occasion to study the Department would agree that this is so and probably there would be a concensus among them as to which particular individuals - at any given time - were the most important in policy formulation - the 'policy-formulators'. Within the Department then, there exists a structure of leadership which is based largely upon the formal leadership pattern, but which operates most effectively at an informal level. Within this structure there will be one, or perhaps two or three individuals with drive and determination who can 'capture' this policy-formulating machine. An example of this is offered by one administrative officer who virtually rewrote personally the Department's submission to the Commission on Education with regard to the structure of administration.

There are two important non-political checks on the powers of the departmental policy makers, the first is largely circumstantial and the second appears to be inherent within the system.

The Department - an immutable philosophy? The cramping effects of the 'departmental attitude', or the 'public servant outlook', are often bemoaned in the New Zealand education system. But those who suffer from it are not only school teachers or board members. The leadership can be similarly restricted and this applies as much to the 'policy-formulators' within the Department as to a new Minister. In its submission to the Commission on Education, the Department agreed that its officers had "facilitated, guided and often initiated the education changes" of the modern era - but it strongly denied any official 'philosophy' of education. Yet this claim is not supported by the facts. The Department has traditionally supported - to choose two important examples - intermediate schooling and progressive teaching methods, in the face of considerable opposition. In many areas in fact, 'traditional' departmental approaches or attitudes are apparent.[39] It is not at all likely that a 'policy-formulator' within the

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38. F. Baker, "Advising Ministers", in Bureaucracy in New Zealand, p. 49.

39. The significant number of departmental professional officers with a training college background tends to reinforce a common - or 'traditional' approach to problems.

Department leadership could bring about a reversal of traditional policy without wide support.

Traditional policy may often be associated with practical matters. A good example of this is offered by policy with regard to co-education. Much educational research has dealt with the effects of co-education and the great majority of educationalists in New Zealand have spoken strongly in its favour. But sections of the general public have not been so well impressed. At Marlborough for example in 1959, local organisations consulted by the Marlborough College board were strongly in favour of the construction of two single-sex schools in their area. The Department informed the board - and others - that it was 'policy' to build no more girls' high schools in New Zealand. This 'policy', which was quickly associated in the minds of the board and of the Secondary School Boards' Association with the Department's co-educational 'philosophy', was in fact largely based on the impossibility of adequately staffing girls' high schools. Such practical concerns obviously play a large part in the departmental 'policy-formulator's' ability to initiate.

A.J.P. Taylor claims: "In my opinion, statesmen are too absorbed by events to follow a preconceived plan. They take one step and the next follows from it. The systems are created by historians".[40] It is thus perhaps wrong to imagine a code of attitudes and behaviour which is handed down from one departmental officer to the next, wrong to ascribe departmental action to some immutable philosophy. Nevertheless the continued efficiency of the education system depends upon an adroit balancing of pressures and the skilful application of limited resources. Those whose task it is to balance the pressures and apply the resources have a markedly similar background and training. Thus something of a pattern for departmental action can be discerned if the variables - the pressures and resources - are known. It is probably true that the historian, or observer, is more aware of the pattern than 'policy-formulators', but he did not create it.

The translation of policy. The above checks can be seen as chiefly circumstantial, in that they offer a check only if a 'policy-formulator' tries to act against them. There is a more important check upon the power of the departmental 'policy-formulator' in education which can be seen as inherent.

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40. A.J.P. Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, Penguin, 1964, p. 98.

Educational policy is implemented in the classroom. Whatever a Cabinet, Minister, Director General or inspector may decide, the only matter of real significance is the way in which that decision is implemented in the classroom. In education it is necessary not only to make decisions but to ensure that those who will carry out the decisions have the knowledge and the sympathy to do so. Thus an important paradox appears which is presented diagramatically below.[41]

4.1 Paradox of Educational Decision-Making



Thus those who have the nominal authority to formulate policy in reality have the least effect upon the end product. The success of policy must be gauged from its operation and not from its elegance of conception. Any policy then, to be effective, must be fully understood and supported by those in the key area of the hierarchy - those in the shaded areas. It should be noted also that both teachers and inspectors - but more especially the latter - are in a position to criticise and influence departmental decisions.

Thus there is a very real check upon the powers of educational 'policy-formulators': they are forced to submit their proposals to wide discussion and to gain the support of the majority of those involved.[42]

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41. Adapted from F.C. Lopdell, "Leadership in New Zealand Primary Education", a Wellington Institute of Educational Research monograph, July 1958.

42. The setting up of Regional Offices has reinforced the need for wide consultations. Regional superintendents are high-ranking officers who have a first-hand knowledge of the effects of certain policies within their own regions. They can thus exercise a moderating effect upon Head Office 'policy-formulators'.

The Departmental Head. Finally in this discussion of leadership one must make specific mention of the departmental Head - the Director General of Education. As has been pointed out, it is generally accepted that the departmental Head today has an important policy-making role to play. This should offer no surprise - least of all in New Zealand - where "division of labour is limited by the extent of the market and the consequent scale of operations".[43] In fact it is no longer credible that a departmental Head refrain from assisting greatly in policy-formulation.

It is also true that the departmental Head is no longer anonymous. This fact was recognised by the McCarthy Commission which commented:

> "He is sometimes required to defend in public the decisions which the Minister has taken. The public may jump to the conclusion that he is defending his own policies rather than those of the Minister, especially when it is suspected that he took the initiative in proposing those policies to the Minister. He needs therefore to acquire enough political acumen to combine frank discussion with his Minister in private with complete loyalty to his Minister in public".[44]

Thus the Director General forms an indispensable link between the departmental 'policy-formulators', of whom he may himself be one, and the Minister. His importance in this situation depends entirely upon his personality and that of the Minister. This can best be shown by comparing the directorship of Dr C.E. Beeby with that of Mr A.E. Campbell. Of the former one Minister of Education saw fit to remark that he had never regretted taking Dr Beeby's advice - which was continually offered. Of the latter the NZEI commented: "Mr Campbell has been a consolidator rather than an innovator, and while he earned the respect of teachers, administrators and politicians, was sometimes criticised for not being more venturesome". However, as the article very properly concluded: "This reflects a traditional conflict of opinion on the role of the Director of Education, whether he should be an innovator or an administrator".[45]

The different concepts of the Director General's role espoused by Beeby and Campbell are further illustrated by the relative importance in policy-formulation of the Director's Meeting. Under the former it enjoyed important policy-formulating functions, but these appear to have atrophied to some extent under the latter. Mr Campbell firmly supported the traditional concept of an anonymous and neutral public service which

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43. F. Baker, op. cit., p. 47.

44. Report of the Royal Commission on the State Services, 1962, pp. 278.

45. National Education, Vol 48 No 519, April 1966.

administers but does not innovate. One is forced to agree with the McCarthy Report that such a concept has lost much of its validity among the complexities and technicalities of modern government. But it is a tribute to Mr Campbell that although the Department of Education furnished the Commission on Education with full information, very little of this was biased towards known departmental attitudes - the bulk of it was quite neutral.

It is thus perhaps appropriate to conclude this sub-section by pointing out that the departmental Head can play a key role in policy-formulation. A Director General of Education can initiate, transmit, justify and administer educational policies, provided he has the requisite support. No other man is in such a position. But policy will continue to be initiated within the Department however much the Director General may regard his functions as administrative; this is in the nature of the politics of education.

III

The Minister of Education. The role of a Minister in modern government is the centre of some controversy. In his paper on the New Zealand Cabinet, the Hon J.R. Marshall gives a picture of the Minister as an initiator of policy and as being very much in command of his own department.[46] Earlier in this chapter, this view was rejected as far as the Minister of Education is concerned. Other New Zealand commentators have seen the Minister's role as one of ensuring the political accountability of the public servant.[47] Far from being necessarily lord of his own domain, these commentators have stressed the special difficulties confronting a Minister: he is rarely an expert in his field,[48] nor for that matter in the general techniques of public administration. Closeness to the people impairs his control of his department. He will often be preoccupied with personal representations and pressures. He has Cabinet and Cabinet committee meetings, attendance at the House, caucus meetings, official and unofficial deputations, and so on to keep him busy. In addition he will usually have to supervise more than one department.

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46. Hon J.R. Marshall, "New Zealand Cabinet", Political Science, Vol 7 No 1, March 1955, pp. 3-11.

47. See Polaschek, op. cit., p. 212: see also Government by Party, esp. pp. 111-116.

48. In fact, in education Ministers are sometimes ex-teachers and therefore, though they could not necessarily be considered experts, they may have more knowledge of the field than is usually the case with other Ministers.

His means of controlling his department are two-fold. First, he has his own political acumen gained from a usually wide experience in the political arena. Second, he continually received representations from individuals and from pressure groups. By these means he has an amount of political knowledge sufficient for him to weigh the advice offered by his departmental Head. But pressures and representations will also have been made to the Department and the departmental Head is thus in a position to take any contrary views expressed by pressure groups into account when passing on departmental advice. But Ministers with portfolios such as Education must undertake a great deal of travelling; first-hand experience of the effects of policy is therefore easy to come by.

Yet one may well question that, on the basis of the above, a Minister of Education can supply an effective check to his Department. After all, the political pressures which force themselves upon his attention are chiefly - though not entirely - local. The bulk of correspondence directed to the Minister is, as has been pointed out in another connection, to do with school transport. D.J. Riddiford made a similar point: "It is wrong to think that there is adequate criticism of government, either in its parliamentary or its bureaucratic sphere by the people who pester Ministers".[49] Further, it must be remembered that New Zealand Ministers are housed not with their Departments but in the Government Buildings. As a consequence the Minister is divorced from what Mitchell has called 'departmental chitchat', and contacts between the Minister and his senior officers become "rare and slightly formalised".[50] This can lead to the establishment of departmental and ministerial 'positions', making cooperation and consultation more difficult. It is therefore probably true to say that there is little inherent within the role of Minister which permits of other than rudimentary checks of political and financial expediency.[51] What exists beyond this must be supplied by the personal qualities of the man selected.

Selection of Ministers. If one can take the comments of Rt Hon K.J. Holyoake to indicate what considerations are usually involved in selection of Ministers,[52] then we know that:

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49. D.J. Riddiford, "A Citizen's Point of View", in Bureaucracy in New Zealand, p. 69.

50. Government by Party, p. 114

51. In Government by Party, Hon Mr. Shand claims that it is possible for a Minister to maintain a reasonable check "if [he is] prepared to burn the midnight oil". He describes his own method as being to select at random 10% of the matters sent up to him by his Department and to subject the selection to a detailed scrutiny, however minor the nature of the business. (p.116).

52. National party Ministers are chosen personally by the Prime Minister whereas Labour Ministers are appointed by the caucus. But if we are to believe Milne, the methods produce similar results. (Milne, op. cit., pp. 152-3).

"The first thing one looks for in a prospective Minister (there are many things so I am not going to rank one higher than another) are ability in debate and in general a good platform manner and he must have a certain popularity not only in his own electorate but throughout the country. A likely Minister must, of course, be respected within his own party. One looks for a man who has not become too involved in factions within the party which arise from time to time. If a member of Parliament passes these tests, he is weighed again on his capacity and ability to be a political head of a Department of State. Usually the person selected has over the years of membership in Parliament specialised in the sphere towards which he ultimately gravitates as Minister although this does not necessarily apply. The most important factor is to get people who possess original ideas, original thinking, initiative and sound judgment. However, I must admit that geographical considerations do play a part." 53

In recent years Governments have been fortunate to have had reasonably obvious choices for Ministers of Education. Mr Holyoake has advanced the type of considerations involved in selection, but one is perhaps permitted to question the relevance of such considerations for portfolios like Education. If there is an ex-teacher among senior Government members, he would be an obvious choice. Education does not appear to be the most popular portfolio. Commentators were not convinced, at the formation of the last National Cabinet in 1963, of Mr Kinsella's enthusiasm for the position. Indeed, he alone of Cabinet members saw the Prime Minister four times before the Cabinet was announced. Mr Kinsella's predecessor had been a dentist and an ex-member of an Education Board. His political career had more or less terminated in ill health and bitter wrangles with teachers (see Chapter Eleven). In fact no Minister in recent years other than Hon Peter Fraser has continued to greater heights after a period with the Education portfolio. Mr McCombs returned to teaching; Sir Ronald Algie forsook active political participation for the Speaker's Chair, and Mr Skoglund lost his seat in parliament. In reality, if a Government can boast of a senior member who was a teacher and who, in the House, has specialised in education debates, he is likely to become the Minister of Education. If he possesses the qualities Mr Holyoake has noted above, then so much the better.

The Personality of the Minister of Education. The difficulties facing a Minister in his task of checking administrative action have been outlined. To be effective he must establish a certain position in the system which it is now proposed to investigate.

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53. Rt Hon K.J. Holyoake, "The Task of the Prime Minister": part of a symposium entitled "Politics in New Zealand", Political Science, Vol 15 No 2, September 1963.

Support of Teachers. "The new Minister of Education, Mr Kinsella, is likely to be tested early in the new term, for it is expected that the various teaching organisations will each have a trial of strength with him".[54] It is important for the Minister, engaged as it would appear from the above, in a "delicate balancing act"[55] to impress the teachers with his understanding of their grievances: understanding must not only be felt; it must be known to be felt. A useful weapon in a Minister's armoury is probably to have been a teacher himself. To have been himself faced with an oversized class, to have grappled with problems of the young teacher, is to hold a considerable advantage in relations with the teacher bodies. A Minister must be prepared to consult regularly with teacher leaders and on an informal basis. This, if it is to be successful, must be sincere. One Minister was in the habit of having his secretary come into the room after meetings of this nature had been under way for about 10 minutes and remind the Minister of some 'imminent appointment' and thus terminate the meeting: he did not take them seriously. Another Minister expressed the view that 'chats' such as these prevented the build-up of any potentially dangerous dispute.

Support of lay bodies. The education system depends to a considerable extent upon non-government activity. School committees, Education Boards and secondary school boards might not appear to hold much power or influence in policy formulation but if they ceased to be active, the system would collapse. The Minister must exercise tact and patience in handling these bodies. Inevitably they want more in the way of financial assistance or delegated authority than the Government can give them and are likely to feel bitter when their requests are not met: they must be treated sympathetically. In 1962 for example, the Auckland Education Board claimed that conditions within the Education District, more especially at the Ardmore teachers' college, were exceedingly poor. Complaints made to the Department and to the Minister had no effect. "We are an important body", said one member, "how long are we going to continue to state claims and get nowhere?"[56]. Some time later another member claimed: "We have had no opportunity to put our case although we have extended 4 or 5 invitations to the Minister. Yet at a fortnight's notice, the Minister was prepared to come up to Auckland to put

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54. Auckland Star, December 28th 1963.

55. Ibid.

56. Dominion, March 7th 1962.

up a plaque with his name on it and attend a social function".[57] The Minister (Hon Mr Tennent), the Board member continued, had refused to come; so Mr Holyoake had been asked. "If this goes on much longer, we won't be asking Mr Holyoake, but Walter Nash!"[58]

Eventually the Minister made the trip to Auckland. He demanded that the Board members meet him in the ministerial rooms at the central post office: the Board resolutely insisted that the Minister come to them at Board offices. Both parties waited: neither budged. This was a most unfortunate incident, but it was within the Minister's power to have prevented it. One newspaper commented that the dispute "shows up a weakness in the fabric of New Zealand politics - namely a tendency for Ministers to be too easily accessible to every Jack-in-office with a chip on his shoulders".[59] But a sympathetic response and a willingness to look at the Auckland Board's problems at the earliest convenience was all that was required. The situation was allowed to get out of hand and to create antipathies which would have proved very hard to live with had Mr Tennent continued in office for much longer.

A Minister who wishes to win the support of the lay bodies must show somehow that he will work ceaselessly (bearing in mind his responsibilities as a Government Member) for education. Perhaps this is best illustrated by Cabinet's decision in 1964 to put back the 3-year teacher training scheme for 6 months. The Minister (Hon Mr Kinsella) maintained that this delay was necessary in order to increase teachers' college facilities and staff. The Chairman of the NZ Teachers' College Association called Mr Kinsella's argument 'patently absurd'. But it was generally felt at the time that the Minister was, of political necessity, defending a decision taken by the Cabinet possibly against his fondest wish. The Wellington Education Board, far from attacking the Minister, "decided to offer Mr Kinsella its fullest support in helping him 'recoup his position'".[60]

Cooperation with Department. When he takes over his portfolio, the Minister inherits a situation comprising on-going policies and established attitudes. If he has been a teacher, he cannot be considered a 'layman' and is certain to have some views of his own at the outset. His views have to be reconciled with the

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57. Auckland Star, April 14th 1962.

58. Ibid.

59. Dominion, May 11th 1962.

60. Dominion, August 19th 1964.

administrative 'realities'. These initial problems have to be settled if a good working relationship is to ensue. The attitude of some Ministers has been intolerant of the natural conservatism and reserve of the Department and senior officers have become hesitant and even sullen. Other Ministers and departmental Heads have established an uninhibited relationship which has been productive of ideas.

As most Ministers would testify, there can be something inherently rewarding about the Education portfolio: one spoke of his time as Minister as "...the finest years I have ever had". A Minister has to work especially hard, travel a great deal and use great tact in accomplishing his objectives. But for a person who takes pleasure in helping young people - and one assumes that Ministers who have themselves been teachers are of this category - it is undoubtedly rewarding. A Minister who wishes to establish a good working cooperation with his department must create an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding, must show to the senior professionals that his portfolio is of some personal significance to him. Above all perhaps, he must appreciate the value of his expert advisers on the one hand yet create for himself the necessary basis of factual knowledge to criticise them effectively on the other. One Minister spoke of the departmental Head as a man of 'brilliant perception and tremendous energy' but still felt obliged to travel about 1000 miles each week to 'strengthen his hand' against the Department. Finally a Minister must show himself prepared to stand by his Department when it is criticised. The principle of sauve qui peut, to which some Ministers have adhered in the past,[61] is not styled to build enduring confidence between Ministers and their Departments. Ministers of Education have been ready to support the Department, in parliament at least, when it came under attack. Even at a National party conference, Sir Ronald Algie told delegates who were debating a remit which attacked the play-way system of teaching, in simple and unequivocal language, that they did not know what they were talking about!

Spontaneity. Mr Holyoake, it will be remembered, stressed the importance of creative thinking for the holding of a portfolio. But senior officers of the Department would probably offer serious reservations. There exists a certain fear that, on the spur of the moment, a Minister might make a promise - or unguarded statement - in public which would bind it (the Department) to a

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61. See Polaschek, op. cit., pp. 221-4.

certain 'undesirable' course of action. Some Ministers excite these fears more than others in public servants.[62] By an unguarded statement, an impromptu creative thought, a Minister can set a precedent. Such precedents are invariably expensive. A Minister of Education will see many depressing sights on his travels, but rather than tilt quixotically at individual school roofs[63] he would perhaps be better advised to discuss such matters fully with departmental officers and Cabinet colleagues to assure redress on a national scale. Spontaneity is a doubtful asset to politicians, not the least to Ministers of Education.

The champion of education. The Minister is education's representative in the Cabinet. Within the limits set by external factors, the force of his personality and his standing among his colleagues will be of great importance in deciding upon education's share in national expenditure. The degree to which a Government becomes 'education-minded' is to an extent governed by the personality and authority of the Minister of Education. In recent years however, this part of the Minister's role has somewhat declined. The importance of education seems to be universally accepted and most nations seek to make ever greater provision for education within the national budget. This has become an 'external factor' which shapes Cabinet's thinking on education as surely as did the depression in the 1920s and 1930s.

Yet the character of the Minister continues to be of great importance in piloting through Cabinet and Cabinet Works Committee individual items of expenditure. In the dialogue with Treasury, his resolution is often crucial. In a wider context however, the Minister's standing and personality are also of importance. He must be prepared to support his own Department in inter-departmental wrangles with the Ministry of Works. These are

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62. One Minister was moved, on one occasion, to promise an audience that each of the main centres in New Zealand - 14 of them - would have a university. On another occasion, a Minister, in addressing a conference of would-be careers masters, advised them not to take on such a task unless they were provided with proper facilities, illustrating the importance of these from his own teaching experience. Departmental officers who, from the very nature of their task, were trying to implement the scheme with the least possible expense, blanched.

63. One Minister, visiting the South Island, was asked to inspect a school said to be in need of repair. His attention being drawn to the roof, the Minister prodded it with his walking stick, penetrating it immediately. The roof was replaced quite soon afterwards.

usually over minor issues but are important to the morale of departmental officers.[64] An extension of this principle is that the Minister, where possible, must pose as the champion of those within the education system:[65] In what a onetime senior administrative officer of the Department, S.T. Barnett, described as the "annual scramble for a cut in the public purse"[66] the Minister of Education is at a decided advantage. He has "all the weight of parents, school committees and boards 'in the scrum' or on the 'bank' " to support his demands. They usually do so energetically.

This completes discussion of the Minister of Education. He embodies the most direct form of political control over administration but also forms something of a bridge between his Department and the ultimate source of authority and finance, the Cabinet. If one were, by way of conclusion, to list the requisite qualities of a successful Minister of Education, the following would unquestionably be to the fore: patience, tact, energy and a professional background. But it would not be unduly cynical to conclude that, as far as most players in the education games are concerned, the greatest attribute of a Minister is his ability t secure more money for education.

Treasury and Financial Control. If the Minister can be imagined as affording a bridge between the Department and the Cabinet, then there can be no doubt of the identity of the 'wicked troll' under the bridge. In the eyes of educationalists this is the part played by Treasury. Others, however, see the matter somewhat differently:

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64. In one instance, the Department of Education was given a very considerable bill by the Ministry of Works for the groundworks to one secondary school. Upon investigations instigated by the Minister, it was discovered that the Department was being charged for the transportation of stones taken from the site to a new motorway, where it was being used as a base.

65. An example of what he can do is offered by the following. One secondary school asked that a nearby patch of wasteland be converted into playing fields. The Minister talked the matter over with departmental officers and was told that the Ministry of Works estimate was prohibitive. On being informed of this, the headteacher pointed out that local contractors were prepared to undertake the work for half the estimate quoted. The Minister and his officers eventually decided that provided the local contractor kept within the Ministry of Works specifications, there could be no objections to the work going ahead. On request of these specifications, the Department was told that none existed and that the estimate had been something of a guess. Thus a successful Minister must be ready to take issue with his colleagues if need be on behalf of the education system.

66. S.T. Barnett, "The Limitations of Decentralisation", in Decentralisation in New Zealand Government Administration, (Ed.) J.L. Roberts, London, Oxford University Press, 1961.

"The essence of the system is that there is a fixed point in the Parkinsonian process of continuous creation. Administratively Treasury is the sun, and in the management of the civil service it is here...that the ' focus of decision' lies. The preeminence of the Treasury has its drawbacks of frustration, of parsimony and so on, but it does provide the firmness of decision and that pervasive influence which leads to unity of basic attitude". 67

However viewed, Treasury is the most important by far of the checking devices upon the power of the Department. Traditionally, the Public Service Commission and the Audit Office have also checked the powers of the permanent Head. But the status of the former, chiefly concerned with questions of personnel, has declined - a process which has been accentuated by the growth of the Public Service Association with direct access to the Government. The latter is merely concerned with the act of checking and can impose no actual financial control.

Thus Treasury supplies the financial control over administration. The McCarthy Report saw this control as operating at three levels:

"First, by virtue of the Public Revenues Act, it promotes the complex systems of accounting for public revenues, expenditure and stores. Second, it plays an important part in determining how public funds shall be spent. Third, the Secretary to the Treasury is financial adviser to the Government. Though this last strengthens Treasury as a control agency, it is not the source of Treasury's authority". 68

Financial control, the Report tells us, goes far beyond ensuring that value is received for money spent. Though this is important enough, the Commission offers some objectives which it considers of more importance:

"...expertly appraising the public financial resources; directing these resources towards specific policy such as education and roading; balancing competing claims; planning and controlling to ensure that expenditure is contained within the limits determined by the Government; and, finally, co-ordinating public expenditure with the Government's broad economic and social aims". 69

General trends in government practice have tended to strengthen Treasury's hand. The consideration which the House as a whole - or indeed the Public Expenditure Committee - can give the annual estimates in these days of increased spending is limited. Cabinet itself, under a constantly growing burden of detailed work, must rely heavily upon Treasury both for prior scrutiny of departmental estimates and for the detailed investigation of individual items approved in principle.

Treasury control, then, is exerted at four points: 70

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67. J.L. Roberts, reviewing "Central Administration in Britain" in Political Science, Vol 10 No 2, September 1958, pp. 80-82.

68. Report of the Royal Commission on the State Services, 1962, p. 61.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid, p.66.

(i) In its reports to Cabinet through the Minister of Finance on the financial and economic implications of policy proposals.

(ii) In its scrutiny of programmes of capital expenditure based on departmental proposals.

(iii) In its scrutiny of the annual estimates. Treasury advises the Minister of Finance upon the allocations sought by the Departments and other agencies.

(iv) In its report to Cabinet through the Minister of Finance on departmental proposals involving certain kinds of expenditure, even when such expenditure is within estimates or programmes already approved.

In the field of education, Treasury control means an annual check on departmental estimates. It means a check on all policy changes necessitating additional finance and it means that all sizeable building works, after having already been approved in the annual building programme, must again receive a Treasury report.

There have been criticisms of this rigid control system, usually based upon the following arguments. Treasury has no responsibility for the overall success of any particular project upon which it reports. In making its decisions, it is forced to express value-judgements in areas in which it has no special competence. Projects are often subjected to repeated Treasury investigation and may be abandoned at a later stage even after having received Cabinet blessing at the estimates stage. Delays are caused by inadequate Treasury staffing and by inadequate knowledge or experience on the part of some Treasury officers. Finally, forward planning is not encouraged by this system.

The Commission on the State Services felt that it must obviously be frustrating for Departments to find that:

> "...projects which have been provided for in the estimates and planned with great care and skill are first delayed in the course of Treasury examination (possibly by a comparatively junior officer), then deferred, and sometimes finally abandoned - all on the basis of an adverse report made by someone much less expert in the particular field. Nor do we doubt that mistakes are sometimes made, with unfortunate results; that delays sometimes result in eventually greater expenditure; that sometimes the less worthwhile project is preferred to the better one. We have no reason to believe, however, that such instances would be typical". 71

No doubt the Commission is perfectly justified in claiming that 'abuses' of Treasury control are by no means typical, but the arguments stated above are inherent within the system of rigid Treasury control and are not associated simply with its abuses. The Commission showed itself well aware of this, claiming that the task of financial control, already too big for Cabinet, was

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71. Ibid, p. 67.

growing too big for Treasury. It suggested a greater degree of delegated authority to permanent Heads and greater provision for financial scrutiny within the Departments - within an approved estimate. It also put forward a suggestion that Treasury-trained Principal Finance Officers be attached to each Department.

This study is not so much concerned with Treasury control as an administrative procedure, but with the effect that such control has on education policy. One senior officer in the Department of Education made the point that it was difficult to see the role of Treasury in its true perspective. "Much of the comment on Treasury by people in other Government Departments", he explained, "is really an administrative equivalent of the mother-in-law joke". Other educationalists have not been so well-disposed, seeing Treasury's role as a purely negative one. There is control, they say, without planning. There is no positive management of resources within the framework of long-term educational goals. Treasury control is synonymous with political-economic expediency and is thus largely - some would say entirely - short-term.

Finally, Treasury control is criticised for its palpable inelasticity: much the same controlling process is exercised - usually on Treasury's behalf by the Department - irrespective of the amount involved.[72] Dialogues between Treasury and the Department of Education are difficult to initiate in the sense that one uses the language of economic expediency and the other educational desirability. Treasury does not have the knowledge to differentiate between projects on the basis of educational desirability neither does the Department have the knowledge to fit its own planning into the general economic framework.

What seems to result from this relationship is a situation in which the Department of Education must fight for each recommendation on its own merits, irrespective of its importance or otherwise to the overall programme and Treasury must attack each recommendation as vigorously as possible. "If they can get something deferred for six months", one educationalist remarked, "they regard this as a victory". Such a relationship may have its advantages for the day-to-day balancing of accounts but it has obvious drawbacks for long-term development in any field, not least that of education.

Yet it needs to be remembered that Treasury has no power to prevent any project from being undertaken. It can only

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72. The example can be cited of a technical institute which sought a piece of new equipment. A dispute arose between departmental officers and the controlling council of the institute as to which model should be purchased, the model proposed by the Department being £8 cheaper than that proposed by the council. The dispute continued for some months, at the end of which the council had an accountant look at the file of correspondence on the matter to assess its cost in work hours; it was estimated that the file had cost £53.

'recommend'. Although it is true that an adverse Treasury comment is difficult to overcome at the ensuing meeting of Cabinet or the Cabinet Works Committee, it should be pointed out that the Department of Education receives a copy of Treasury's report on any particular item before it is discussed at the Cabinet Works committee. Consequently the officers of the Department have a good opportunity to prepare the Minister to answer Treasury's criticisms. It is in situations such as these that the personal qualities of the Minister of Education play a crucial part.

Although in New Zealand, as in most countries, education has the generalised good-will of most of the population and therefore of the Government, Treasury's task is still one of limiting educational expenditure to items which could be classed as 'absolutely necessary'. Treasury is not associated with the success or failure of particular educational projects but with saving the country's money. Benjamin Franklin said that there is only one thing more expensive than education: ignorance. It is not difficult to imagine an officer of Treasury retorting that he and his colleagues were not interested in anything more expensive than education, but in something cheaper.

Cabinet. Political decision-making has been described as "a process...in which many unlike things are weighed on the same scales, and simultaneously".[73] It is the Cabinet's task to do the weighing and, ultimately, to make all the important decisions. In a democratic system the Cabinet must be swayed to a very large degree by its assessment of what the community wants and the nature of its programme will reflect some compromise between the aspirations of the particular social groups which the party represents and those of the community as a whole. Now, if politics is kept out of education, party policy will reflect few group pressures. If the general public has no apparent aspiration in education other than that the system should be egalitarian, Cabinet is relatively free from these pressures. Naturally there will be strong pressures from within the education system, but deprived of a party political outlet such pressure can be countered.

Thus Cabinet has to balance only two chief factors: what it thinks the country needs and what it thinks the country can afford. In such circumstances a Cabinet is not likely to approve any massive reallocation of expenditure to education unless it believes that the needs of the country have altered substantially.

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73. Appleby, op. cit., p. 13.

There can be no doubt that the launching of Russia's 'sputnik' in 1957 caused such a reappraisal in the United States but no similar movement is discernible in New Zealand. Certainly expenditure has substantially increased over recent years, but when one bears in mind that school population has likewise risen substantially, that the university population is also rapidly rising, that salaries to teachers at all levels have risen substantially as have building costs, one can see the increased expenditure in truer perspective.[74]

It is beyond the compass of this chapter to examine the functioning of Cabinet and Cabinet procedures. The topic has already been fully covered.[75] It is perhaps sufficient to point out that although Cabinet has to "transact a large volume of business with a minimum of delay",[76] through the use of its permanent and ad hoc committees and its skilled secretariat, Cabinet has the machinery to do this successfully. Further, Cabinet committees increase the effectiveness of the political control of administration. Public servants are called before them to justify proposals and comment on subjects under review. Thus a close liaison is established and Cabinet becomes reasonably well informed.

Cabinet is the supreme policy-maker; it is

> "...the apex of the administrative structure - the highest body engaged in the actual business of governing. As a committee of the senior members of the governing party it tries to give detail and specific content to the policy that gave the party victory at the elections; and as a meeting of the administrative heads of departments of State it supervises and attempts to coordinate the work of the public servants who carry out the policies amplified in Cabinet decisions". 77

Yet in education where, as we have seen, parties are usually elected without significant policy proposals, Cabinet's task is chiefly one of weighing up the availability of resources and the immediacy of particular needs. Unquestionably the most important factor in this equation is finance, and the controls exercised over education policy by Cabinet are basically financial and not

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74. Expenditure on education as a percentage of the gross national product rose from 3.75% in 1960 to 4.07% in 1965, yet in the same period total enrolments rose by more than 24%. (see "Parties' Education Plans Disappoint", by the President of the NZUSA, Evening Post, Tuesday 8th November 1966. For comparison, the United Kingdom spent 5.8% of the gross national product on education.

75. For example, Hon J.R. Marshall, "The New Zealand Cabinet", Political Science, Vol 7 No 1, March 1955; R.J. Polaschek, op. cit., esp. pp. 224-230; R.S. Milne, Political Parties in New Zealand, esp. pp. 157-164.

76. Polaschek, op. cit., p. 226.

77. Ibid, p. 224-5.

political.[78] Certainly Cabinet is the seat of power in government administration, but that power is largely associated with selecting between alternative policies and not with creating those policies. In education, Cabinet chooses and controls but seldom formulates policy.

CONCLUSIONS. The process of government and the education games.

Of the bodies and individuals covered in this chapter only the Department of Education is concerned almost exclusively with the education games. It is also concerned with political games but only as a means to an end. The Cabinet, on the other hand, is playing a series of intricate political games. For the Cabinet, it is education which is a means to an end - that end being the retention of power. The Minister is facing both ways: it is in his area that the games intersect and he is an important player in both political and educational games. But one must not forget that he is above all a Cabinet member and must support collectively-taken decisions in education with which he might personally disagree.

Treasury plays its own game, that of permitting the minimum expenditure of public money. This game can be viewed as having a negative pay-off but it is the game that Treasury has been set to play by successive Governments. It seems unfortunate that educational and financial pay-offs have been divorced, thus making for fixed-sum game situations between Treasury and the Department of Education at the expense of coordinated long-term planning.

The Department's success in the political game depends, as has been shown, on the strength of the strategic coalition between senior officers and the Minister and on the Minister's importance to the effective playing of political games by Cabinet. Thus the education system, with its games and endemic game situations, becomes part of a larger, more embracing system with its own games, strategies and pay-offs.

We have discussed each of the main groups within the education system and studied the relationships between them. Finally the education system has been placed in its political context. This completes the task of the present study. It remains only to draw in the threads of a conclusion and to offer some general comments on the workings of the New Zealand education system.

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78. An example of direct financial control is offered by S.T. Barnett in his paper "The Limitations of Decentralisation". One Finance Minister, acting on the authority no doubt of Cabinet, told him (Barnett) to cut the Department of Education's estimates for the year by a certain sum. But the Department has a long-established remedy for such a situation. Barnett simply asked the Minister to decide where the cut should come - teachers' salaries, transport of school children, school committees' grant - anything he cared to choose. The political repercussions of any such step were thus made obvious to the Finance Minister concerned. No more was heard. Barnett Concludes:"The scrum behind was too heavy." (p.27).

SECTION FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

Section Five is concerned simply with drawing some conclusions from the main body of the study. To this end, a model of the education system will be offered, which will indicate the way decisions are taken and the pressures to which the process is subjected. This will both draw in the main threads of argument from the main work and permit some criticism of the system.

Finally the study will be discussed in terms of the original objectives set and the technique of analysis employed.

The section will comprise one chapter - Chapter Fifteen, the Appendices and a Bibliography.

Chapter Fifteen

THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION

This, the final chapter, contains three sub-sections. The first will be concerned with creating a model of the education system and the way it makes decisions. This will, in effect, be a summary of what has been said in the main body of the work. The second sub-section will be in the form of a critique of this model. The writer will highlight what he considers to be some defects of the system and, where appropriate, discuss alternatives. The third sub-section will be more general in nature. It will seek to assess the place of this study - and studies of this kind - in the general attempt to understand the functioning of democratic government in New Zealand.

I

The Education System. Our study has shown the education system to be characterised by the following:

Political Control. The nature of political control is determined by the attitude of the political parties to education. As we have seen, this attitude is summed up by the phrase: 'keep politics out of education'. This attitude has restricted the possible development of opposing philosophies of education and of public debate on the general aims of education. It has also had a profound effect upon the nature of political control of the education system, which can be seen as being chiefly pragmatic and therefore, to some extent, short-term. A pragmatic approach by politicians results in controls which are basically financial. We have discussed the nature and extent of Treasury control already, and concluded that although it might be effective as a means of restricting expenditure it does not offer adequate scope for the planned development of education.

Another important facet of pragmatic political control is a desire not to upset the delicate balance within the system. This has made Governments more susceptible to pressures from within the system - exerted by groups which are, after all, firmly entrenched. "I am very much aware of the advantages of a frank, 'cards-on-the-table' policy", the Minister (the Hon Mr Tennent), told the NZEI. "I can assure you that it is my wish to follow such a policy as far as possible".[1]

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1. National Education. Vol 44 No 478, July 2nd 1962.

It is not possible for a Government to be completely frank with pressure groups at all times, but a considerable feeling of trust has been built up between successive Governments and a number of the educational pressure groups - that is to say, those within the education system. This policy has been fostered by the Department of Education, as has the 'open door' policy of successive Governments. Prime Minister Fraser made this point most forcefully in 1946: "Battering ram methods are not very effective if the door is open. That is the position today and teachers and educationalists should not, therefore, regard themselves as contending against conservatism or indifference on the part of those controlling "the education system". The question which teachers should pose themselves is: what could we, all pulling together, get done?"[2] Unfortunately for education, the pressures within the system too often act against each other and political control becomes more associated with 'keeping things running smoothly' than with 'getting things done'. The 'open door' policy unquestionably facilitates smooth running.

The Department of Education. Lack of government leadership in terms of political or social philosophy strengthens the hand of the Department in policy formulation. It means that the factors involved in reaching a given decision within the Department are often much the same as those involved in making a decision within Cabinet or caucus. Obviously there are occasions when this is not so, but nonetheless it is generally the case. Under such circumstances, the Department is the better able to make the necessary evaluations because it has more complete information and a wider administrative experience than the politicians.

'Involvement'. Given, then, that the Department controls the education system to a great extent - in the sense that policy is usually formulated by its officers - it should be remembered that the Department takes considerable pains to consult with those within the system who are directly concerned. J.E. Watson of the NZ Council for Educational Research, speaks of "...this desire of administrators for widespread involvement".[3] Department officers, Watson goes on, "have largely managed to expand the degree of professional autonomy and power that may be exercised by practising teachers".[4] The Department itself has expressed its faith in this policy of 'involvement':

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2. National Education, Vol XXVIII No 301, June 4th 1946. The stress is the present writer's.

3. J.E. Watson, "The Prestige of Teaching as a Profession", in Where Now, Wellington Teachers' College Students' Association, 1964, pp. 61-66.

4. Ibid.

> "On all matters affecting the general body of teachers, it is policy and practice to consult with the representatives of the teachers themselves before decisions are finally made; and this occurs both at the national level and at local levels. More than this, teachers increasingly share in the actual responsibility of making decisions". [5]

In fact, the Department goes on to claim that "the growth of consultation and of the machinery for it and of arrangements under which teachers themselves share in the making of decisions is one of the most remarkable features of the educational history of the last 20 years". [6] Neither has this policy of 'involvement' been limited to the teacher bodies: the Department "has always sought to apply the principle of consultation to build up the machinery of a working partnership"[7] in the field of education administration also. In both the administrative and professional sectors, the ubiquitous inspectorate helps to lubricate the machinery of involvement: the inspectorate's is a key function in this operation.

Teacher Bodies. Given ready access to the Department and government through the operation of the policy of 'involvement' and the 'open-door' policy, the two main teacher bodies within the system, the NZEI and the PPTA, have responded in contrasting fashions.

The NZEI managed to establish an excellent working relationship with the Department of Education before 1914. It was aided by the fact that pay-off for both the Institute and the Central Department could be described in similar terms: there existed, as has been shown, a considerable overlap of goals. In addition, in both the Department game and the Institute game in those days, the Education Boards were the opponents. Thus there was a ready coalition between the two. This relationship has had an inestimable effect on the Institute game ever since. In addition, being structurally sound and capably led, the Institute has always been in a strong bargaining position, a factor which the Department has recognised in its treatment of NZEI leaders, more especially its permanent secretary. The latter was very proud of the fact that his telephone could be connected immediately with that of the Director; his 'hot line'.

These good relations have been facilitated and reinforced at almost every turn by the fact that many departmental leaders have traditionally been ex-primary teachers and have thus listened sympathetically to teacher complaints and had first-hand

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5. Submission of the Department of Education to the Commission on Education, 1962.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

knowledge of teaching conditions.

Relations over the years between the NZEI leaders and the Department (and, to a slightly lesser extent, Government) have been efficient and friendly. Good use has been made by the former of the 'open-door' policy and consultations have been frank but seldom unpleasant.

The PPTA, on the other hand, has adopted a somewhat different approach and there are historical or organisational reasons for this. In the Association game, post-primary teachers, like their primary counterparts earlier, battled for better conditions. However their opponent was not a lay board but the Department. Thus in the Institute game, desires for improved working conditions produced a coalition with the Central Department; in the Association game similar pay-off brought only a conflict situation with the Department.

Organisationally the PPTA has been weak. Prior to 1952 post-primary teacher groups were inchoate. With the amalgamation of the main groups and the founding of the PPTA, matters improved but the structure was still poor. Departmental officers did not accord to PPTA leaders the same respect given to Institute leaders. The contrast was nowhere more marked than in the standing within the Department of the respective secretaries. Yet it must be added that this state of affairs only reflected the situation within the two bodies, for it will be remembered (see Chapter Nine) that one secretary of the PPTA was forced to resign through dissatisfaction with his position.[8]

In addition, the PPTA Executive has exhibited a greater continuity of structure - some members serving for more than 10 years - than has been the case with the NZEI. As some of these long-serving Executive members have been militants, the Association's attitude on several matters has been extreme. Chapter Eleven shows clearly what effect this can have in practice.

Further, we have noted that in the past the Department has tended to be primary-oriented, perhaps more in appearance than in reality - although it would be difficult to judge - and this has offended post-primary teachers. There has existed at times a jealousy and general coolness between the teacher bodies, and this has been reflected in relations between the department and the PPTA.

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8. The contrast is less marked at the present time because, as we saw in Chapter Nine, the present PPTA secretary is in a stronger position than his predecessors were.

Finally, the post-primary sector has enjoyed a period of great growth, both in numbers and - more important - in status. The raising of the school-leaving age and the report of the Thomas Committee (see Chapter Two) ushered in a period of unprecedented change for post-primary education. Future educational historians might well look back on the past two decades as the 'crisis years' in post-primary education. Naturally enough, friction has frequently arisen between the PPTA and the Department in such conditions. Deprived of valuable allies within the system, the Association has been more ready to 'politicise' its disputes much to the chagrin of departmental officers and the Government of the day. Thus the policy of 'involvement' and the 'open-door' policy have not been as effective in the post-primary sub-system. However, as has been stated, organisational improvements within the Association have been considerable and the leadership has become stronger and more able and is therefore better received by departmental officers. Moreover, the increasing interest in curriculum development has provided both the Department and the Association with the opportunity to cooperate in mixed-motive and variable-sum game situations. The whole relationship, in short, is undergoing change. But one must not overemphasise this point. The PPTA philosophy of 'politicising' disputes is still strong and thus fixed-sum game situations are still likely to occur.

The Lay Bodies. The history of New Zealand education tells, among other things, of the declining role of local participation. Although we have noted that it has been departmental policy to foster consultation and 'involvement' with lay bodies, we should not be blinded to the fact that this 'involvement' has taken place in a diminishing area. In Chapter Twelve the argument was put forward that the rise of the parent-teacher movement was in part a response to the declining role of school committees and Education Boards. But even this movement - at least at the local level where it has been most effective - has tended to associate itself more with the trivia of administration and fund-raising.

Thus the New Zealand education system is characterised by lay bodies which put in a great amount of work for education but which have little or no control over it. This is especially so in the primary sub-system.

This concludes the picture of the New Zealand education system, except to reiterate that as a system it is relatively immune from external pressures, other than financial ones. The only external pressures which appear to have had any marked effect upon the system are religious. The Commission on Education described the system as one of "extraordinarily close texture...

...which weaves together private effort and public service"; a "potent source of national strength and unity that we must make every effort to maintain and strengthen".[9]

Decision-Making in the Education System. The model below represents a statement in general terms of the decision-making process.

5.1 Steps in Decision-Making.[10]



In relating this model to the New Zealand education system, one can readily see that the first stage in the process - the recognition and statement of the problem - is facilitated by the very nature of the system. The problem is likely to be stated by either teachers or by lay bodies. In either case it will not be long before the Department of Education knows about it, either from the body concerned or from its far-flung inspectorate. The second state, the gathering of information, must be conducted by the Department. At this stage it has not only the inspectorate to help it gather the facts, but the various joint committees on which it sits with the bodies concerned. At an informal level, the Department will be subject to the views of the leaders of the bodies concerned.

Depending upon the nature of the problem, the Department can take a variety of steps in order to seek a solution. As the model shows, apart from the collecting and assessing of pertinent data, the Department must also take into account the manner in

9. Report of the Commission on Education, p. 69

10. Adapted from Nicholaidis, op. cit., p. 165.

which its own long-term objectives are affected. It must make an inventory of the means available for solving the problem and list and evaluate possible alternatives. In this process it is likely to make use of joint committees, on which interested parties are represented. The structure for such ad hoc committees is already in existence in the form of representative advisory bodies in nearly all spheres of education. The problem will be related to one such area and could become the responsibility of the relevant committee. This committee will usually have the task of evolving an efficient and reasonably certain to the problem. If the problem were of an obviously political nature, the Department would be likely to make any recommendations to the Minister and to Cabinet only. But usually the rational choice will be made after consultation with the interested parties and with any other Departments (especially the Ministry of Works) which might be involved. No choice can be considered rational unless it has taken fully into account the reactions of the various groups involved.

If the decision is an important one it will nominally be taken by the Minister or, if more important still, by Cabinet. In the latter case it will be subject to the financial pressures described in Chapter Fourteen.

Politics impinge upon the education system in two possible ways. First, the initial statement of the problem (though not of course its recognition) is sometimes made in the political arena. This will profoundly affect the nature of the goals to be accommodated in securing a solution. Second, it is possible for a group within the system which is seriously disturbed at some particular decision to 'politicise' the issue. The Education Boards, for example, did this very successfully when the Department of Education, supported by the Government, planned their abolition in the 1920s and 1930s. (see Chapter Four). But in the normal case, decisions will be taken under departmental guidance and in the light of the organisational goals of the Department.

II

Having thus presented a view of the education system and the way it makes decisions, it is proposed in this subsection to offer a critique of the system.

<u>The Functioning of the System</u>. It is intended to discuss the general efficiency of the system under four sub-headings.

A Professional 'Conspiracy'?

"For forms of government let fools contest.
Whate'er is best administered, is best".

No apology is offered for using Pope's often-quoted couplet - it is particularly relevant to the New Zealand education system. The politicians have, to a large extent, withdrawn from the wider issues of education; their place has been taken by the public servants. But doubts exist as to their ability to succeed in this role. It is true that any organisation, including a Government Department must be seen not as a unitary structure but as Nicholaidis has described as "...a complex entity consisting of multiple systems of loyalties and expectations, which may supplement, overlap or conflict with each other".[11] Nonetheless, within the complex system which is the Department of Education, there can be no doubt as to the preeminence of the professionals. Mention was made of Beeby's attempts to bolster the position of the administrative officers within the Department (see Chapter Fourteen). It was also pointed out that taking decisions collectively and often informally has tended to blur the distinctions between professional and administrator, but the conclusion of that section of Chapter Fourteen must be reiterated here: the professional officers continue to have the upper hand.

Now, if we relate this fact to our decision-making model, the effect of this position of professional dominance can be assessed. Key factors in a rational solution to any problem are obviously the alternative courses of action available and the accommodation of medium-term organisational goals. "The key function of setting institutional goals", Norton Long tells us, "is largely transformed by the departmentalisation of top personnel. This departmentalisation produces the representation not only of a special expertise but of those forces that give that expertise its importance in policy formulation".[12] Long gives an example of such a representation in an archdiocese of the Roman Catholic Church "...in a priest's representing a shrine devoted to the longshoremen or the police brass. Here the priest's position in the hierarchy might well depend on his putative influence with his constituency and his influence with his constituency on his ability to represent it in the decisional processes of the hierarchy".[13]

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11. Nicholaidis, op. cit., pp. 132-3.

12. Norton E. Long, "The Administrative Organisation as a Political System", in Concepts and Issues in Administrative Behaviour, S. Mailick and E.H. Van Ness (eds.), Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall Inc., 1962, pp. 110-121.

13. Ibid, p. 115.

With reference to the education hierarchy this means that organisational goals will be decided upon by ex-teachers in conjunction with other ex-teachers (i.e. inspectors) and, to greater and lesser extents, teacher organisations. This, in turn, profoundly affects the process by which alternative courses of action are assessed. Education administration has been described by one ex-officer of the Department of Education as 'administration of the teacher, for the teacher and by the teacher'.

In such a situation there tends to develop what has been described as a 'protective tribalism'.[14] Webb criticised the "numerous and ill-arranged regulations" of the Department of Education as manifestations of such a phenomenon.[15] A discussion between the Minister of Education (the Hon R.M. Algie) and the secretary of the NZEI makes the point more clearly perhaps. In 1952 there had been talk of consolidating the regulations with regard to primary teachers. The Department, however, made it known that it had no intention of consolidating. The NZEI secretary expressed his pleasure: he felt he might otherwise have lost his job, since "there are only half-a-dozen or so of us who can find what we want in the regulations". The Minister replied that even if they were to be consolidated, there need be no fears: they would still be virtually impossible to interpret.[16] The protective tribalism of the education establishment managed to survive even the effects of a commission's investigations, about whose findings the NZEI Commented: "We could not have said more; we could not have said it better. Page after page of the report is good Institute policy".[17]

Thus decisions made in the Department of Education are strongly influenced by the views of ex-teachers. We noted the extent to which such decisions, especially policy decisions, involved consultation with the internal pressure groups. One might add that the most important of these pressure groups represent teachers. There may be a tendency therefore to concentrate on <u>teaching</u> rather than on <u>education</u>, with its wider social and economic implications. This tendency may be reinforced both by the fact that senior officers have little time to assess the general educational needs of society and by the necessity imposed by the complex system of cross-pressures within the system to

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14. See Norton E. Long, "Administrative Communication", in <u>Concepts and Issues in Administrative Behaviour</u>, pp. 137-149.

15. Webb, op. cit., p. 104.

16. <u>National Education</u>, Vol XXXIV No 371, October 1st 1952.

17. <u>National Education</u>, Vol 44 No 478, September 3rd 1962.

consider only minor developments of policy at one time.

On the other hand, the dominant position of the teacher and the ex-teacher (the 'professional' or the 'expert' in other words), can hardly be seen as 'conspiratorial'. He has simply filled the vacuum left by the withdrawal of politics from education. He has, by consultation and involvement, made an extremely complex system function with reasonable efficiency. In addition, the public service generally is fairly representative of the total population: Mitchell concluded: "Far from being a power-hungry fraternity, or an administrative class born to rule, public servants are an accidental elite, without the shared social background, the arrogance...or even the self-realisation of an 'establishment'."[18]

But Leicester Webb noted that education systems are judged on their capacity to adapt.[19] One may doubt whether the education system will be able to adapt to the great occupational social and technological changes of the next twenty-five years if decisions are left solely to overworked public servants. As Long has pointed out: "The balance of forces working themselves out through the structures of most...organisations will be heavily biased towards the maintenance of the existing patterns and change will be along lines made easy by existing habits".[20]

Finer completed Pope's couplet in a manner which bears very much on this argument. In the final analysis:

> "...what is best must free men still decide
> Lest leaders gull them and officials ride".[21]

The Limitations of 'Involvement'. The Department and the internal pressure groups both have what the other required and both require what the other has. According to Finer,[22] the desiderata on both sides may be summed up as information, consent and administrative convenience. The pressure groups need the earliest intimation of official policy and access to the wider implications of their own 'interest' which only a government Department can possess. Further, they will often require some change in present policy and can only get this through the consent of the Department. Finally, since they have to exercise vigilance on behalf of their members in the event of policy anomalies, they require smooth and equitable administration.

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18. Government by Party, p. 40.

19. Leicester Webb, op. cit., p.2.

20. "The Administrative Organisation as a Political System", p. 117.

21. H. Finer, The Future of Government, London, Methuen, 1946 p. 148.

22. S.E. Finer, "Interest Groups and the Political Process in Great Britain" in Interest Groups on Four Continents, pp. 130-1.

For its part, the Department requires the technical insight of the pressure group.[23] Second, it requires consent to the chosen policy and would thus prefer to negotiate with a representative body. Finally, the Department will nearly always rely on the pressure group's help in administering the policy.

Thus there exists between the pressure groups and the Department a relationship of a nature fairly common to the Westminster-type democracy where "...these bodies and the Government Departments with which they principally deal create close and friendly personal contacts at all levels. The members and officers of the organisations, senior and junior, know their opposite numbers in the Departments and have ready access to them".[24]

Yet one must bear in mind that such a relationship is not natural - it has to be earned. "The organisations rely on the prestige they have acquired both with members and with Departments and on the confidence which the Departments have in the organisation".[25] Thus both sides have to trust each other and: "An organisation that misused confidential information or indulged in sharp practice would suffer immediately: the department would withdraw its confidence, and this would destroy the organisation's usefulness to its members".[26] In effect this means that by sharing information with the internal pressure groups the Department can, to some extent, silence them. By presenting the leadership of the NZEI, for example, with certain relevant facts concerning the difficulties involved in securing certain policies, the Department can blunt NZEI criticism. J.L. Roberts noted this tendency. "The citizen's function is to criticise government for not giving him what he wants. Associations tend to disarm criticism, by making the citizen a party to decisions he would prefer to attack".[27]

A particularly effective way of doing this is to set up joint investigation committees or joint inspectorates. A committee was set up in 1962 for example, composed of representatives of the main pressure groups - NZEI, PPTA, NZEBA, SSBA and TEA - and the Department to study ancillary staffing. Primary and post-primary sub-committees were then set up, reporting back to the parent committee. By 1963 the committee had reported in favour of increases in the scale of ancillary services in view of the

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23. As the Report on the Committee on Intermediaries, London, 1950, Cmd. 7904. stated: "Collectively, one of these organisations knows far more of government policy over a wide field than any individual can hope to attain to".
24. Ibid.
25. Finer, loc cit.
26. Ibid, p. 132.
27. J.L. Roberts, "Decentralisation and the Future", in Decentralisation in New Zealand Government Administration.

growing complexity of the teacher's task. No action followed the committee's recommendations and no public protest could be made by the bodies represented. The deliberations of all such committees are regarded as confidential to the Department and the various Executives involved. Of course, action must follow eventually, as it did in this case in 1966, but by thus involving the pressure groups, the Government is able to win itself more time. A similar procedure has been followed in matters of school committee incidentals grants and maintenance grants for secondary schools.

Even where the bodies concerned are not bound to semi-silence, action is not always prompt. In 1951 a curriculum review committee was set up representative of the Department, state and private secondary schools. Among other things, it recommended a new structure for the School Certificate examination of 'passes' in individual subjects rather than a single pass-fail on the aggregated results. Again no action has been forthcoming, though similar ideas are now espoused by the Department, the three major parties and the PPTA.

Finally, to be really successful, the policy of involvement must be practised in depth. One submission to the Commission on Education complained:

> "I am concerned about the relations between the Education Department and the teacher. I am not referring here to those at the level of the PPTA Executive but to those at the level of the classroom teacher as such.
> Every effort should be made to keep teachers informed about and interested in the ideas, plans, policy, organisation etc. of the Department - but no such process takes place".

The submission continued: "From what do the principles that guide our education policy emanate? Indeed what is the policy?" Finally: "The fact that I have to refer vaguely to 'The Department' is an indication of how it exists as an aloof 'They' to me and I am as interested in education administration as most others".

This failure to involve in depth was a problem which occupied the Commission on Education itself:

> "When we turn to the communication between the schools, the Department and the public, and communication within the school system itself...sources of mistrust become visible. To begin with...there has never been a full authoritative statement on primary aim and method from the Department of Education". 28

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28. Report of the Commission on Education, 1962, p. 34.

And again:

> "There is a danger...that the official point of view...is not generally appreciated by teachers, and there is some danger of confusion when, as at present, communications between the Department and the teachers rely heavily on word of mouth, as when an inspector discusses a teacher's work with him". 29

Finally, the Commission on Education concluded that: "Much needs to be done to make teachers better informed of departmental views on a wide variety of subjects connected with school organisation and teaching methods". [30]

It must be accepted then that there has been a failure to 'involve in depth; though one should not minimise the difficulties involved. Nevertheless, by making greater use in curriculum consultations of the subject pannels of the teacher organisations, the Department has made definite advances in recent years.

The problems are not so acute as far as the lay administrative bodies are concerned. Serious breakdowns in communication exist, but they are more the result of the organisational failures of the groups involved. Involvement is a policy which presupposes a fairly high degree of pressure group organisation, and as we have seen, some of the lay bodies have been poorly organised at the national level.

In organisational terms involvement has made the Department a more efficient decision-maker and policy-formulator, in that its view of problems has been enlarged. Involvement can also be seen as 'institutionalising' risk and responsibility by 'spreading the load' and facilitating the acceptance of decisions and delays. It helps in the solution of what Nicholaidis views as the crucial concern of decision making: how to "Select today a course of action which must be proved right tomorrow". [31]

Local Control in Perspective. In his introduction to Decentralisation in New Zealand Government Administration, J.L. Roberts suggests that academics are continually drawn to problems of central control because of a sentimental attachment to the concept of decentralisation. True though this may well be it has not prevented the continuation of a great debate among educationalists on New Zealand's structure of education administration. This debate, as we have seen (see Chapter Four) has tended to centre around the place of the Education Boards. More will be said of

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29. Ibid, p. 35.

30. Ibid.

31. Nicholaidis, op. cit., p. 193.

administrative reform later, but here we shall attempt to assess the properties and qualities of the Education Board objectively.

Education Boards have little connection with 'local control'. They neither control nor - with one possible exception - can they be considered local. They are regional and administrative.

An Education Board member cannot, except with the best will in the world, be considered representative. One has only to call to mind the low participation in school committee elections and the even lower participation in Board elections to come to the above conclusion. Education Boards have consistently fought efforts to elect their members on a base of universal suffrage.[32]

Yet an Education Board brings three definite contributions to the education system. First, despite the facts, there can be little doubt that the average parent, especially in the country, imagines that the Education Board offers some vestige of local control. What very little indpeendence the Board does have is highly prized by those within the system. School committeemen in our questionnaire sample, for example, strongly supported the Boards. 80% agreed that: 'Education Boards are an essential safeguard against central bureaucracy'.[33] Second, it provides a means whereby those who wish can serve the public in a very real way. A good general manager, by assisting Board members to concentrate their efforts in a particular area of administration, can combine the work of members with that of his officers to achieve an efficient means of administration. Third, and most important, the Education Boards provide a vociferous base to the education system.[34] They provide a great deal of the weight behind Barnett's 'scrum' in the battle for government funds.[35] They provide a means of keeping the Government reasonably active in the field of building and maintaining primary schools. Their spirit in keeping up 'the fight' is to be admired.[36]

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32. In the questionnaire sent to Board members, it will be remembered, 95% disagreed with the statement: 'Education Boards should be elected by the general public'.

33. Only 7% disagreed with the statement. Answering the same question, 98% of Board members were in agreement.

34. In his submission to the Commission on Education, L.J. McCarthy pointed out: "This is the strength of Education Boards - in that as informed laymen on educational matters - they can in open forum, make the community aware of the needs of local education and follow this up by direct representation to the government of the day".

35. If Board officers were to be replaced by public servants, it is possible that Governments would be freed from this continuous, noisy pressure, for Board members would then act merely in an advisory capacity.

36. In an interview one Board member told the writer that he was continually putting certain works into the building programme which were continually being "knocked back" by Treasury until eventually they would be accepted. "It's a hard life," he commented, "but if we didn't keep at them the jobs would never be done".

The school committees, which are virtually powerless, also contribute a great deal to the cause of education in the form of effort and finance. One could hardly say that a school committee 'controlled' the local school; neither has concrete suggestion been made from any authoritative source that it should.

The secondary school board is probably the nearest approach to local control in the New Zealand education system, but even here its powers are few. Control over appointment is an important power but it, like all the powers of the secondary school board - save appointment of the principal - is shared with the latter. Further, as has been shown (see Chapter Eight), the trend in secondary education is to larger groupings - such as the Christchurch and Wellington Secondary Schools Councils - in which the individual schools lose some of their freedom of action.

It should not be forgotten that New Zealand is a nation of 2,600,000 people. It is thus, numerically speaking, approximately the size of an English county. Decentralisation is therefore by no means an urgent problem. Further, those - and they are many - who believe that 'giving the schools to the parents' should be an administrative goal, might more accurately describe their objective as giving the schools back to the parents. It should not be forgotten that the early years of New Zealand education history were characterised by a hard-fought struggle to take the schools away from the parents! [37]

The real problem for New Zealand educationalists is not how to give local parents control of local schools, but how to maintain democratic control of a national system of education. As Fesler has pointed out with reference to 'big business': "We can either accept the bigness with its greater efficiences but seek to control its abuses and its extension beyond the point of increased efficiency, or we can indulge our nostalgia for the small units of the nineteenth century and atomise the existing concentration of functions". [38]

The effect upon decisions of conflicting internal pressures.

Nicholaidis [39] has argued that in every modern bureaucratic organisation the only way to attempt 'improvement' is through a series of simple, consecutive steps. Any all-embracing overhaul presents a triple danger. First, the outcome is unpredictable. Second, the larger the front upon which one

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37. See Leicester Webb, op. cit., p. 9.

38. J.A. Fesler, Area and Administration, Alabama, University of Alabama Press, 1949, p. 44.

39. Op. cit., Chapter 5.

'attacks', the more effective resistance becomes. Third, the larger the area in which overhaul is anticipated, the more the possibility of a deep and comprehensive analysis vanishes.

In the context of the New Zealand education system, this appears to be a particularly valid line of reasoning. Changes are undertaken one at a time, or at any rate, a few at a time. As was shown in regard to curriculum revision (see Chapter Six), the process of decision-making is a lengthy one, involving a great amount of consultation. Cross pressures within the system reinforce the 'inevitability of gradualness' as can readily be imagined.[40] If the interest of one group suffers from a particular change, it is necessary to persuade the leaders of that group of the necessity of the action. If and when this is achieved it is necessary to allow time for the leadership of the group to influence its members into finally accepting the change. This is well exemplified by NZEI's reaction to the Form I-VI high school (see Chapter Five).

If, on the other hand, a change is envisaged which permits groups within the system to form a coalition, there is little chance of its being implemented. When the Department of Education followed up the Commission's proposals for administrative reform, a coalition between the NZEBA and SSBA resulted, as we have seen. Despite assurances to the latter, the Department was unable to convince it that secondary board interests were not involved. It could not 'break' the coalition.

The 'personal' aspect of government in a system of internal conflict is of great importance. Good contacts bring greater influence to bear upon decisions. An example of the possible effects of 'personal' politics is offered by the following. A dispute arose among leaders of the SSBA as to the desirability of joint council schemes based on the Christchurch scheme (see Chapter Eleven). Some Auckland schools were opposed to the schemes and on a committee appointed on the subject in May 1964, they set out their views. Now the Public Expenditure Committee (1965-66) also looked at the question of the control of secondary schools. The chairman of the sub-committee concerned came from Auckland. The recommendations of the Public Expenditure Committee[41] followed closely the views of the Auckland minority within the SSBA, and the SSBA majority view was not adopted.

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40. The Minister of Education (the Hon Mr Kinsella) put it simply: "Any educational advance is bound to receive opposition". (Waikato Times, May 31st 1965).

41. Report of the Public Expenditure Committee 1966, p. 23.

On the other hand, where there is no personal contact the system does not take its decisions any more efficiently. Too often there is a breakdown in written communications. (New Zealand government is often conducted at a personal level and is likely to continue to be so in the foreseeable future.) If decisions are to be taken with objectivity, it is necessary for policy formulators to have access to as many points of view as possible.

Thus if one were to look for a pattern of successful decisions and policies in the New Zealand education system, they would be seen to be narrow in scope (in the sense of tackling only one problem), to be the result of negotiations between the groups concerned, and to have the generalised support of the system. The problems confronting the decision-maker in New Zealand education however, should not be underestimated. An illustration of what is involved is offered by the following rather optimistic extract from a report of a PPTA committee set up on Form 1-6 high schools in 1965. "It should be apparent that we have very few real problems. With goodwill and cooperation between the two major branches of the teaching profession, and the two branches of the inspectorate, as well as between the Education Boards and the committees of control and the Department, progress is very easy".

Improving the System. The years have seen a plethora of suggestions for and attempts at reform of the education system. The majority of them have been concerned with the administrative sector.

Structural Reform. Mention has been made of some of these attempts at reform in the body of this study. (They appear to originate from the fact that officers in the Department of Education have held the administrative structure to be inefficient.) The Minister of Education has noted that in important areas "...we have been forced to adopt temporary expedients or acquiesce in arrangements we knew were far from ideal".[42] Departmental 'regionalisation' he continued, was a necessary response to the expansion of the system, but it created a degree of duplication of functions with Education Boards, so that - as was calculated in 1962 - there was an administrative loss of £100,000 per annum.

Yet these arguments had been heard before. The same ground was fully covered by the Atmore Report over 30 years previously.

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42. A speech prepared for the Minister of Education for a meeting with the SSBA Executive, November 2nd 1962.

True, post-primary education had grown greatly since that time, but the suggestions of administrative reform in the 1960s were primarily concerned with the primary sub-system. In any case, A.E Campbell, when Director of the NZ Council for Educational Research, had written strongly against unified control from the post-primary point of view.[43] In fact it is a surprising feature of educational history that the same arguments have been used time and time again, and have been countered in the same way, in the quest for administrative unity. It is not proposed to deal in detail with the recommendations which have come from the Department; they are most clearly set out in the Department's submission to the Commission on Education. But one may refer to the comments of one senior administrative officer as exemplifying the traditional departmental attitude. "Personally I had no doubt that central control and local administration by Education Boards was wasteful".[44] But: "All that can be done at the moment is to make an 'administratively unnatural' situation work".[45]

As Barnett hinted, a factor of the greatest importance is that however 'unnatural' the system may be, however tedious, friction-inducing and expensive,[46] no Government has been able to promote major changes in the administrative structure. From the political point of view it is simply not worth the effort.

From time to time pressure has come from the lay bodies, especially the Education Boards, for wider powers. Justifications for such a development have been cogently expressed on a number of occasions.[47] But the 10 Education Boards, as Board members and officers would readily admit, are by no means equally efficient. Apart from the difficulties of budgetary control involved in extending their powers[48] one must face the fact that some Boards would not use their power judiciously. As has often been pointed out[49] the first step towards decentralisation is to strengthen the central agency. It is not feasible that any

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43. See the Control of Post-Primary Schools.

44. S.T. Barnett, op. cit., p. 29.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Submission of NZEBA to Commission on Education, 1962; Submission of L.J. McCarthy to Commission on Education, 1962; L.J. McCarthy, "Decentralisation in Education Administration", in Decentralisation in New Zealand Government Administration, pp. 56-74.

48. It should be remembered that Education Boards depend entirely upon government monies.

49. For example, Fesler, op. cit., p. 93.

major extension of the power of Education Boards could take place under a system in which inefficient Board officers or members could not be replaced by the central agency - that is, the Department of Education. It is unlikely the Boards would give up control of appointment and dismissal.

All these factors argue for the preservation of the status quo in education administration, or more accurately, that any changes should be minor ones. A.E. Campbell, in his study of the control of secondary schools, posed and answered a question of considerable significance to this discussion. "Is it worthwhile embarking on a scheme of administrative reorganisation that would involve a considerable disruption of established relationships and that offers no reasonably sure prospect of substantial educational gains?"[50] The answer Campbell gave was: "It would not be good policy to pay so high a price for a form of administration that might well prove to be no better than the system we now have".[51]

Preservation of the status quo need not be a negative approach however. It is essential that coordination in the existing system be maximised. One of the major forces acting in the opposite direction is the attitude taken by a number of departmental administrators. As Leicester Webb pointed out: "If a central department is hostile to local control, then local control will function badly".[52] Now although Education Boards may no longer represent local control in any strict sense, Webb's observation is still applicable to the Board system as it exists. A more positive attitude towards coordination could be fostered. For example, a statement from the Minister of Education - particularly in the present circumstances, where the Public Expenditure Committee has roundly opposed new administrative schemes - that within the foreseeable future, no major change in the administrative structure would be attempted, might have a most salutary effect upon the functioning of the system.

Reform within the Department. Another area in which suggestions for improvement have proliferated lies within the structure of the Department - and the structure of the public service as a whole. It would not be possible to accord these suggestions the attention they deserve within the framework of this study, but some reference to them must be made.

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50. A.E. Campbell, op. cit. p. 46. The stress is the present writer's.

51. Ibid, p. 58.

52. L. Webb, op. cit., p. 133.

L.J. McCarthy, for example, has suggested the conversion of the Department of Education into an Education Commission outside the normal public service controls - rather in the manner of a public corporation. The administrative staffs of the Education Boards and the Department would then be interchangeable and increased efficiency would thus result.[53] The desirability of such an objective has been fully recognised by the Department of Education, which made representations to the Commission on State Services on that subject.[54] It is outside the competence of this study to judge the administrative and constitutional repercussions of such a move, but educationally it might produce greater efficiency. Yet it would reduce the Education Board, in the face of a unified Education Commission service, to the role of a mere adviser. Thus, although the scheme might be favoured by Board officers, it is not likely to be more palatable to Board members than the Commission on Education's proposals.

Dr C.E. Beeby, when Director of Education, suggested the setting up of a new administrative division within the public service. Beeby felt that this offered a remedy for the expert-administrator dichotemy. He considered there was a virtue in "...fusing the functions of the expert and the administrator rather than in accentuating their differences".[55] Beeby suggested:

> "The new administrative division, as I see it, would be recruited from both the clerical and professional divisions; the only criterion would be that an entrant had shown capacity above the average in work of a truly administrative character. The dividing line between the clerical and administrative divisions might well come at about the £1,400 mark. The transition would not be easy to make and some first-rate clerks would never cross the barrier. The point at which the professional man would enter the administrative division could not be so definitely fixed. At some stage not too late in his career, a professional officer who had shown real promise as an administrator should be given the chance to enter the administrative division". 56

The particular advantage envisaged by Beeby is that once in the administrative class, a man drops for all time his expert or clerical label. "In such an administrative division I would expect movement within a department and between departments to be much more fluid than it is now".[57]

If Beeby's scheme were successful, it would bring to the Education Department officers with a greater variety of background.

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53. L.J. McCarthy, "Decentralisation in Education Administration", p. 71.

54. Report of the Royal Commission on the State Services in New Zealand, 1962, p. 278.

55. C.E Beeby, "The Control of the Expert", The Expert and Administration in New Zealand, N.C. Angus (ed.) NZIPA, Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 61.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid, p. 62.

It might destroy the concept of education administrative as being 'of the teacher, for the teacher and by the teacher'. But on the other hand, there would still be a tendency - reinforced by the attitudes of the teacher bodies - for the posts now called 'professional' to be occupied by ex-teachers. Beeby is aware of this, pointing out that an entrant to his administrative division,..."because of his particular background...would, of course, be more eligible for some administrative jobs than for others".[58] If such a tendency manifested itself it would no doubt be accentuated with time and the system might therefore receive little benefit. Power within the departmental policy-formulating process would probably still rest largely with the 'professionals' - or 'experts'.

Financial Delegation. One area in which there has been substantial agreement regarding reform is that of Treasury control. Without going into the wider implications of the negative aspects of that control, which have already been discussed, mention should be made of one positive step which could be taken to improve the efficiency of the system by making it less 'friction-inducing'. The Commission on Education noted that new schools of any size and any works exceeding the original estimate by 10%, although included in the already approved buildings programme, needed two additional Treasury reports, at the planning and putting-out-to-tender stages. "From the representations made to it...regarding the delays attendant upon the present Treasury report procedure, the Commission believes there is a good case for detailed investigation to see whether these can be removed or abated".[59]

The Royal Commission on the State Services suggested further delegations to Departmental Heads - this was acted upon - and the setting up of a parliamentary select committee for post-expenditure review to ensure higher standards of financial responsibility within Departments. This was also acted upon. These changes were to be accompanied by a lessening of detailed Treasury control.[60] As far as control of educational building is concerned this detailed control has not been relaxed. It is unquestionably a hindrance to sound relations within the education system. One can only reiterate what the Commission on Education suggested: such detailed control does not appear to be necessary and the question should be studied carefully.

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58. Ibid.

59. Report of the Commission on Education, 1962, p. 146.

60. Report of the Royal Commission on the State Services in New Zealand, 1962, pp. 71-73.

Conformity within a central system. One of the most serious complaints levelled against the New Zealand education system is that it provides for no variety. The fault lies in the fact that New Zealand's is a centralised system, so the argument runs. Leicester Webb, for example, states:

> "In a geographically isolated country this uniformity of expert opinion has led inevitably to stagnation of thought and to a slavish acceptance of established methods. Centralisation has also diminished the amount of informed lay opinion". [61]

And again:

> "With the centralisation of the inspectorate in 1914 the New Zealand education system lost the capacity for self-criticism; the restoration of that capacity is the greatest benefit that decentralisation can offer". [62]

In its submission to the Commission on Education, the Catholic Education Council for New Zealand stated:

> "The power over finance given to the Department of Education, and the subsequent social development of the national life, reflected in amendments to the legislation, have resulted in the formation of a monolithic educational structure, highly centralised in administration and uniform in its methods and aims...In almost every manifestation of its activity education is dependent upon government initiative...such uniformity in aims and methods and such dependence upon departmental activity for modification towards greater diversity and variety seem unworthy of our democratic community".

Yet unless one equates variety with disparity the system before 1914, when the inspectors were employed by the Boards, was not renowned for it. In any case, if variety and experimentation depend upon local control, New Zealand's education system will have to do without them, for local control of education is not feasible in the foreseeable future. Local and regional education bodies do not raise local funds and, as Roberts has pointed out: "Without financial power there can be no real local participation in government". [63] If it is wished to create wider variety and more experimentation within the education system, decentralisation must be put to the back of the mind. "Perhaps the beginning of wisdom in considering the problem of decentralisation," Roberts suggests, "is to realise that it is, in itself, without any inherent value". [64]

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61. L. Webb, op. cit., pp. 139-140.

62. Ibid, p. 157.

63. J.L. Roberts, "Decentralisation and the Future" in Decentralisation in New Zealand Government Administration, p. 126.

64. Ibid, p. 113.

Assuming that variety and experimentation are desirable in an education system - and in a democratic system one can safely assume this to be the case - the problem of catering for it remains. It is argued here that the greatest prerequisite to variety is money! This point can be illustrated by reference to the White Lines scheme (see Chapter Four). This scheme hoped to introduce some variety into school buildings but failure to reassess the cost-place figure regularly made such an objective impossible. Whoever authorises a school building in New Zealand today wants the cheapest product possible, within reason. Thus it is with the whole of education. If one is going to experiment, one needs surplus money. The Department of Education has no surplus money. Thus lack of variety and experimentation is therefore not necessarily a failure of centralisation. It is more readily explained in terms of finance: a country gets the education system it pays for.[65]

The words of the eminent Commonwealth educationalist Sir Fred Clarke are offered in support of the argument against the need for decentralisation:

> "It would appear that flexibility, diversity, sensitiveness to the local life, vigorous distinctiveness and suchlike desirable qualities have much less relation than we might suspect to the form of the administrative system. They seem to depend much more upon other factors, such as the quality and training of the teaching personnel, the degree to which the teacher is independent of local jealousies and prejudices, the extent to which he is supported and encouraged by the more enlightened members of his community and, above all, upon the philosophy of education which animates the whole system and finds its expression through the inspectors". [66]

The Reassertion of Politics. If more money were to be spent on education - and not just to keep pace with rising rolls - then one might expect more government interest in how that money was spent. This would bring politics into education and all that politics imply. One has to consider, then, whether this would be a wise move.

The argument for politics is as follows. Education is one of the most significant areas of government in any age. In both the Platonic and Aristotelian systems the regulation of education was a most important state function. It was regarded as being of the utmost importance because it was recognised as the principal means by which man could create the type of society he wished to

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65. This argument is perhaps exemplified by the visit to New Zealand of the late Dr Susan Isaacs just after 1945. She gave convincing lectures on a variety of new ideals and techniques. At one lecture she was asked: "How do you organise to do all that with a class of 50?" She replied simply: "You just don't have a class of 50".

66. Sir Fred Clarke, "Canada and South Africa", The Yearbook of Education, 1933, p. 513.

live in. A great many political writers since have seemed to believe that politics and education were inseparable. In modern times an American educationalist has noted:

> "The doctrine of schoolmen is that public education is and must be a unique, autonomous and non-political function, but this doctrine is not only inconsistent with reality and contrary to the requirements of a democratic polity; it is also self-defeating as a basis for effective strategy to achieve a viable public education system". 67

Another educationalist, speaking from the point of view of teacher bodies, argued that by adopting an 'ostrich' approach to politics, teachers and educationalists were harming their cause. "As a consequence," he continues, "there is no effective group that leaps to the defence of teachers when they are under attack". 68 He also makes the point that because their approach is through administrative rather than political channels, teachers never 'rock the fiscal boat' by asking for more than is possible within the given structure of government expenditure. Whereas, with a political approach, teachers might press for favourable changes in the actual structure!

Other educationalists concerned with the relationship between education and politics have reported in a similar vein. MacKinnon, in a Canadian study, castigated politicians for their attitude to education. It would be reasonable to expect, he felt, that public figures would have a genuine appreciation of and feeling for education. Any such expectation is over optimistic:

> "While many politicians have a genuine interest in education and would do all they could to improve it, there are others who are suspicious of it or of anything that smacks of culture. Some of them place political expediency above education; indeed it is often impossible for them to do anything else. Moreover the possibilities of pressure will often paralyse the executive. Most politicians regard educational problems as potential political dynamite, and will often resort to any tactic to keep them in the background". 69

In the United Kingdom there has usually been an obvious connection between educational developments and the thinking of the political parties. Kazamias offers a study in which he consistently relates the historical development of secondary education in England to the development of party philosophies. 70

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67. W.C. Sayre, "The Politics of Education", Teachers College Record, Vol 65 No 2, November 1963, pp. 178-183.

68. J.H. Fenton, "The Schools and Politics", Sociology of Education, Vol 38 No 2, Winter 1965, pp. 64-66.

69. Frank MacKinnon, The Politics of Education, Toronto, University of Toronto Press reprinted 1962, pp. 15-16.

70. A.M. Kazamias, Politics, Society and Secondary Education in England, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966.

But any study of English educational development would show an awareness of the relationship between education and politics. W.O. Lester Smith, for example, has remarked:

> "...there are educational issues about which opinion conforms pretty closely to the party alignment. For example, politicians of the right tend to believe in the values of an elite and to stress the importance of training for leadership; and they are therefore naturally inclined to support public schools and grammar schools. While the more egalitarian left are, as one would expect, usually opposed to separation at the secondary stage". [71]

In fact, recent events in England have shown these tendencies to be stronger than Smith supposed. The system of selection, supported by the Conservative party [72] has been attacked by both the Labour party [73] and the Liberals, whose spokesman on education described the 11 plus examination as a "sin against the three great principles in which liberal-minded people believe - against the freedom of the individual; it sins against equality and it sins against fraternity". [74] The Labour Government under Harold Wilson has taken steps to turn the English secondary sub-system into a non-selective one.

Kazamias offers further examples of political philosophy bringing about educational change. The Liberal Government of 1906 represented a party which had embraced the principle of state intervention on a considerable scale. Its progressive social and trade union legislation was matched in education by the provision of school meals, the provision of compulsory medical inspection, the provision of recreational activities and the first real steps towards a free-place system in secondary education. [75]

The place of religion in education also stimulated a dialogue between the political parties on educational matters, which perhaps came to a head in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth. In fact it would be difficult to overemphasise the political importance of the Education Act of 1902 (Balfour's Act) as a factor in reuniting the dissident Liberal elements to produce the famous 1906-14 Ministry.

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71. W.O. Lester Smith, The Government of Education, Penguin, 1965, p. 100.

72. Secondary Education for All:ANew Drive, London,HMSO, 1958.

73. See Challenge to Britain, Labour party publication, 1953.

74. Times Education Supplement, December 15th 1961.

75. Kazamias, op. cit., pp. 164-181.

Thus it can be argued that politics should play a part in education: the political parties of New Zealand should seek to engage in, rather than avoid, public debate on educational aims. It can further be argued that there are particular reasons why the political parties should concern themselves about education at the present time. Throughout the world, governments are being 'pressured' to take decisions about various aspects of educational policy. S. Encel, in an article in the Australian periodical Outlook points out that a "remarkable number of reports covering a wide range of questions" [76] have been produced over the last decade. Broadly speaking, the factors which have caused this pressure are four:

(i) The sheer problem of numbers.

(ii) The acceptance of the importance of education as a factor in general economic prosperity.

(iii) The recognition that education has a great influence on the social status of the individual.

(iv) The realisation that, with the declining role of the family in child rearing (due for example to the fact that many more mothers work), the school is being called upon to educate the child morally and socially as well as intellectually - to educate 'the whole child'.

The battles that inevitably arise from these pressures should be political for they involve such decisions as: the proportion of the national income to be spent on education; the apportionment of that expenditure between the competing sectors of education; the successful balancing of 'selection' and 'equality'; finally, the long-term aims of the nation's educational policies.

H.G. Wells saw history as a "race between education and catastrophe". If he was in any way right, the political parties cannot afford a bi-partisan approach to education. Its increasing importance demands the very fullest political discussion, for:

> "...as the economies of the advanced countries are increasingly dominated by scientific and technical innovation, education and economy become more closely geared, until the education system occupies a strategic place as a central determinant of the economic, political, social and cultural character of society". 77

Encel too has stressed the overriding importance of these considerations to the Australian situation where, he feels, the parties and the public have been basically unconcerned.

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76. S. Encel, "Education and Politics", Outlook, Vol 9 No 1, February 1965, pp. 8-10.

77. Halsey, Floud and Anderson, Education Economy and Society, New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, p.3.

"More and more people are becoming aware of the fact that economic and social position is increasingly dependent upon education, and that our society is moving towards more and more elaborate processes of selection of individuals for their occupational and social roles. As a result, old and new demands upon education, traditional and modern conceptions of its content and purpose, are all being thrown to the melting pot. The problem of standards assumes a new complexion because it becomes even more difficult to decide on a general standard. The American tradition of progressive education, derived from John Dewey, is under strain in the age of space exploration". 78

Finally, as John Vaizey has it:

"...to put it at its barest minimum, we are a wealthy society which can afford to give all children and young people the opportunity to stay off the labour market and off the streets; and we can spare enough adults to work with them. But a far stronger case for education can be found in the reasons why **we are wealthy; ours is** an affluent society because our knowledge of the physical and social world is expanding at a fantastic rate. Just to keep abreast of this expansion, to run the economy and the society that it permits, means that people have to know far more than ever before and to be far more flexible...

Education is not all-important; but it is, I think, much more important than it was, because it occupies a far greater part of an individual's life than ever before, and because without it more and more young people could not earn their living. It enables them to enjoy modern life and make more of it. It has become too, an avenue of social promotion...it has become virtually the avenue of social mobility". 79

In social terms, New Zealand is a relatively isolated country and not highly industrialised. Thus the acuteness of these developments will be blurred in the New Zealand situation; also New Zealand will have more time to respond. But many economists in New Zealand have expressed apprehensions as to the provisions for education. Professor F.W. Holmes, for example, stated before the Commission on Education:

"There are very strong economic grounds for a substantial increase in educational expenditure to raise the quality of education so that sufficient young New Zealanders will be adequately prepared to meet the economic challenges of the future...The crux of the matter is that New Zealand must be prepared to place more emphasis than it has in the past upon quality and efficiency - in 'the pursuit of excellence' as the Rockerfeller Report has termed it. Improvement of the educational system has a vital part to play in the achievement of these objectives". 80

Professor Holmes gave more detailed arguments to support his contention, stressing:

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78. S. Encel, op. cit.

79. John Vaizey, Education for Tomorrow, in the Britain in the Sixties series, Penguin, 1962, pp. 7-8.

80. Report of the Commission on Education, 1962, p. 26.

(i) The need for expansion of both manufacturing and servicing industries if production were to rise more rapidly than population.

(ii) The possibility that future development might have to take place in an atmosphere of less favourable terms of overseas trade.

(iii) The apprehension caused by a relatively slow rate of growth, indicating inefficient use of resources. By better educating the labour force - both by providing a broad general education of high quality and making better use of universities and technical colleges - the position could be substantially improved.

(iv) The need for economic flexibility, allowing for profitable transfer of labour. "The development of adaptability through education is, therefore, important both for the economy and for the individual, who might otherwise be confronted with unemployment through technological change". 81

Although some may not agree with Professor Holmes' suggestions, it is surely plain that the points that he raises - along with Vaizey, Encel, and Halsey, Floud and Anderson - should be fully and publicly discussed at the highest level; by means, that is, of a political dialogue in parliament!

In conclusion, the case is argued here for the 'politicisation' of education at all levels. Interest in education and awareness of its importance should be fostered if the community is to continue to safeguard its values through education. This can be done through the mass media. Television discussions and documentaries are an obvious means. Yet in this, as in the whole area of public relations, the Department of Education is not sufficiently active. In the Report of the Commission on Education great stress was laid on improving the image of the Department. A public relations officer was recommended to operate at a high level within the departmental structure. Although some action followed this recommendation, the appointment was not at all of the type envisaged by the Commission. One prominent educationalist in Wellington made the point: "I am told they have appointed a public relations man, but in all my dealings with them I have never met him or even heard of him, so he can hardly be very active". In the field of television, one producer, with the help of an educationalist-journalist prepared the script for the first of a proposed series of programmes on education. They approached the Department for approval and assistance. Senior officers approved in principle, but when the producer wrote formally for permission he received no reply and the programme was cancelled. Some time later he received a favourable reply.

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81. Ibid.

The series has been replanned and is likely to go ahead 'sometime in the future'. If education is to be 'politicised' the Department must reappraise its attitude to public relations entirely and must seek, with government approval, to promote educational discussion through the media.

If education is to be 'politicised', the system will have to make some positive response. It will be necessary for the educational groups to cooperate to a far greater extent. Joint action and joint pressure will have to be increased. This study has shown the education system to be a series of rather bewildering games, each with its own rules and goals. That education as a whole has suffered is more than likely. There have been suggestions for the establishment of an 'educational development conference';[82] if they were pursued the education system might benefit. If the groups within the system could agree to a series of objectives which all could support they would gain considerably in strength. If properly organised, a development conference could become a biennial or triennial affair, offering a solid organisational base for the criticism of government policy in education and firm suggestions for future development.

Any scheme to promote cooperation among the players within the education system is worthy of support. In Wellington, representatives of several professional groups within the system, including the AUT, PPTA, NZEI, NZUSA, the NZ Association of Teachers in Technical Institutes, and teachers' training college staff association, meet periodically to examine questions of common interest. If such a body could establish areas in which joint committees could sit and produce reports of use to all concerned, it could grow in stature. If it could even bargain successfully as a joint body with Government - and it could at least select areas in which success was likely - it could come to adopt a position of importance, gaining the confidence of the various memberships.

In sum, stimulation for the 'politicisation' of education would come from substantial increases in educational spending, thus focusing the attention of the parties on education.[83] The justification for such an increase is the enormous importance of education to New Zealand's future.

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82. This suggestion was discussed by the annual conference of the PPTA in 1965.

83. The financial control of education at the present time is so rigorous that political concern - except at the local level - is not necessary. Obviously increased spending on education would have to be considered in the light of the nation's overall economic situation. But the argument here is long-term.

This should not be read as implying any general criticism of the Department of Education, but as supporting the view put forward by Roberts that we should not think of ways of making administration democratic - it is "autocratic and must remain so". We should concentrate rather on ensuring that the political controls are exercised democratically.[84]

III

The Aims of this Study. In Section One the case was put forward for a basically empirical study of the New Zealand education system. Two aims were specified: that of providing a functional analysis of New Zealand education politics, and that of offering a basis for a better understanding of the working of New Zealand democracy in general. No primacy of aims influenced this study, for the two were mutually dependent. It was suggested that if one analysed in depth any sphere of government activity it would shed light on to the workings of democracy and it was further suggested that only by selecting one sector of such activity - one 'system' - and studying all its aspects could one put into perspective the various 'specialist' theories and conceptual frameworks which have characterised recent developments in the study of political behaviour.

Four basic features of New Zealand social and political culture were mentioned in Chapter Two: egalitarianism, conformism, particularism and pragmatism. They have been constant themes throughout the course of the present study. It is possible to expand on them at this stage, as far as the education system is concerned, although, as will be seen, the majority of the features mentioned below can be related back to the original four:

(i) A pervasive egalitarianism, supported strongly by an otherwise apathetic general public.

(ii) A very active but inchoate specific public - but in this case it is diverted by the system from the pursuit of wider objectives into administration and fund-raising.

(iii) An overdependence upon the public servant who, within the limitations of his background and training, fulfils his tasks admirably. Also, being a member of New Zealand's 'classless' society, he is as much influenced by culture-goals (such as egalitarianism) as the citizen.

(iv) A pattern of decision-making, built upon compromise and consultation within the system, which is characterised by an 'inevitable gradualness'.

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84. J.L. Roberts, "Decentralisation and the Future", p. 127.

(v) An uncritical, unphilosophical coverage by the mass media. Where the latter do critise, they do so usually on a local basis.

(vi) A political withdrawal in the sense that parties try to keep education 'apolitical'. This seems to be as much a result of a failure on their behalf to apply party philosophy to educational issues as of a belief that education should be 'above' party politics. 85

(vii) A stringent financial control which is exercised in great depth and which seeks primarily - if not solely - to limit expenditure to the minimum.

Techniques of Analysis. The use of a simplified 'games' theory has been of value in understanding the complex relationships existing between the various groups within the system. Also as a means of presenting the facts it has not been without its uses. It has emphasised the diverse nature of the education system and brought into sharp relief the great difficulties which confront the Department of Education - and indeed the other players within the system - in making the system function effectively. There are, however, basic limitations on the usefulness even of simplified games theory. Applied to one system, it is an effective and serviceable tool, but systems intersect. Political parties, for example, even when they discuss education, are playing a 'political' game, in which are involved completely different pay-offs and strategies. Their action is not really explicable in terms of education games.

With regard to the analysis of whole 'systems', certain practical problems should be mentioned. It is not easy to select a system of the right size. It was pointed out in Chapter One that the main considerations were to chose an area of governmental activity which was fairly self-contained, sufficiently compact to be manageable, yet large enough to enable meaningful conclusions to be drawn. Perhaps inevitably, the largeness of the system encourages generalisations and tends to blur over distinctions which those within certain areas of the system regard as most significant - there has been no treatment in the present study of the problems of intermediate schooling per se, for example. Likewise the compactness of the system sometimes makes it impossible to treat adequately the relations between players within the system and those outside. For example, there simply has not been the space in the present study to discuss the growth of tertiary and university education and the effect which provision for this

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85. Though, paradoxically enough, in a country where lip service is given to 'educating for democracy', the belief does exist - indeed is quite strong in some areas - that party politics, because they are 'dirty', should be kept out of education.

growth has had upon the allocation of government funds to primary and secondary education.

One can hope, however, that the 'education system' which has been used here has fulfilled its main purpose, though it should be borne in mind that education in New Zealand consists of much more than primary and secondary schooling!

CONCLUSION. Democratic systems of government are faced with an acute problem: they must seek to defend essential values as in the past, but in the near future they will be faced with a new enemy: efficiency. Scientific and technological developments may make increasing inroads into what have traditionally been regarded as the 'rights of the individual'.[86] Democratic values are certain to come into conflict with the goals of organisational efficiency, and this is of particular importance to education. First, education is an important and costly sphere of governmenta' activity. But second, and more important, it is the education system which will equip (or fail to equip) the child for life in a technological society; it is the education system which will develop in the child (or fail to develop) an awareness of basic democratic values and the resilience to defend them.

New Zealand's social isolation will probably safeguard it from the worst consequences of a technological progress which will surely outstrip any sociological assessment of its effect in human terms. But the country will have similar problems to solve nonetheless and the education system is the principal means through which it must solve them. Those who control the education system are basically concerned with balancing the pressures within the system: they have neither the time nor the background to evolve long-term policy objectives in education. The community, operating through the political parties, should reassert control over the education system if it wishes to preserve its values;

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86. How long will it be, for example, before it is possible to predetermine a child's sex - and how long before that 'right' passes from parents to central population planners?

it would be unreasonable to leave the decisions involved to the overworked public servants of the Education Department.[87] As Franz Kafka rather colourfully put it: "The hardest bones, containing the richest marrow, can be conquered only by a united crunching of all the teeth of all the dogs".[88]

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87. There is a persistent tendency to imagine that disinterest in education on the part of the political parties and the general public is the norm, but this is not at all so. One week prior to the British general election of 1964, an NOP survey asked people which issues they thought particularly important. 'Education' was ranked second, behind ' cost of living'. An analysis of a random sample of addresses by Conservative, Labour and Liberal candidates in the same election showed that education issues categorised as 'general policy' were dealt with by 89% of the Conservatives, 93% of the Labourites and 90% of the Liberals. (see D.E. Butler and A. King, The British General Election of 1964, London, Macmillan, 1965, esp. Chapter VIII). In contrast, of party pamphlets sent out in the New Zealand general election of 1960, only 31% (Labour) and 8% (National) mentioned education. (see Chapman, Jackson and Mitchell, op. cit., p. 151). Further, in the chapter dealing with campaign issues, Chapman, Jackson and Mitchell mention education once - in one very short sentence.

88. Franz Kafka, Investigations of a Dog.

APPENDIX 'A'

School Committee Questionnaire

The questionnaire for school committee members was conducted as follows. A letter was sent to the secretary/ general manager of each Education Board asking for an up-to-date list of the schools within his district and the addresses of school committee chairmen or secretaries. A rough estimate was then made of the number of school committees and committee members in New Zealand. Working on an average of seven members per committee it was calculated that a sample of some 80 - 90 committees was of manageable proportions. It was discovered that a sample of 1 in 25 school committees would give adequately representative results and would provide a total of 83 school committees.

The Boards' lists were then placed in alphabetical order and every 25th school was selected. This gave a population of 570 committee members.

A number of questionnaires corresponding to the number of committee members was sent off, each with a short covering note, to the chairman of each committee. In addition, each chairman received a longer covering letter which, among other things, asked him to raise the matter of the questionnaire with committee members and seek their fullest cooperation. Asking the chairman's help, it was felt, would stimulate a greater response.

The response rate was 63% : 359 questionnaires were returned completed. Only 4 committees failed to respond at all. One of these returned all questionnaires unanswered.

It should be noted that the sample was predominantly rural. As such it is representative of school committee membership but not representative of the school population.[1]

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(1) One urban school with 600 pupils would have a school committee of nine members. Two rural schools, each with 25 pupils, would have between them 10 school committee members.

The questionnaire, and complete results, are set out below.

School Committee Questionnaire

ABSOLUTELY ANONYMOUS

General Instructions: Unless otherwise stated, would you please put a CIRCLE around the appropriate number (that is, the number next to the answer you wish to give).(2)

1.	On your school committee, do you hold any post?	Yes	45
		No	55
	If "yes" then are you:-	Chairman	18
		Secretary) Treasurer)	27

2.a. Please give the name of your school: _____

b. Which education district is your school in (that is, which is your local Education Board)?

_____

3.	Have you a child attending the school of which you are a committee member?	Yes	87
		No	13
	If "no" then when you first joined a school committee, did you have a child attending the school of which you were a committee member?	Yes	89
		No	11
4.	How many years have you spent in school committee service, including your present term?	Less than 2 years 2-3 years	50
		4-5 years 6-7 years	31
		8-9 years 10-11 years	14
		12-13 years 14-15 years 16 years or more	5

5. When you first joined a school committee:-

did somebody approach you and suggest that you stand for election?	66
was it originally your own idea to stand for election?	24
were you co-opted onto the committee (or appointed by the Education Board)?	10

(Please note that you should circle only one number in answering this question.)

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(2) The format of the questionnaire has been slightly modified to permit the inclusion of the results, which are in the form of percentages of the total response, except in the second part of question 3 (which is a break-down of those replying "no" to the first part of the question) and question 6 (which is a break-down of those who, in question 5, stated that they had been persuaded to stand for election). It will be noted that the numbers referred to in the instructions have been omitted.

6. If somebody suggested that you stand for election was the person who made the suggestion:

A close friend or relation?	17
An acquaintance but not a close friend?	80
Somebody not previously known to you?	3

7. Before joining a school committee, were you an active member of the local PTA (or similar body) that is, did you attend most meetings or hold a committee post?

Yes	30
No	70

8. Over the past two years, how often has your Board member (Ward representative) contacted your committee to discuss issues of mutual concern?

Approx. once every month	5
Approx. once every 3 months	6
Approx. once every 6 "	11
Less frequently	40
Not at all	38

9. Below is a list of statements concerning education administration. At the side of the statements are five columns, headed Strongly Agree, Agree, No Opinion, Disagree, Strongly Disagree.

Would you please register your reaction to each statement by putting a cross "X" in the appropriate column:-

	Strongly Agree	Agree	No Opinion	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
School Committees should be given more opportunity to influence what is taught in the classrooms. (3)	4	14	5	50	27
School Committees should play a larger part in the appointment of head-teachers. (3)	12	31	7	37	13
School Committees should play a larger part in the appointment of teaching staff. (3)	5	30	5	46	14
The bulk of School Committee work is undertaken by one or two members. (4)	11	36	2	40	11
Too many people join School Committees because it improves their standing in the neighbourhood. (5)	3	10	11	47	29
School Committees have little idea of what the ordinary parent thinks about their school. (6)	3	19	4	54	20
It is usually the most active School Committee members who get themselves elected to Education Boards. (6)	5	34	41	15	5
Education Board officers should be public servants responsible to the Minister of Education. (6)	5	25	23	31	16
Education Boards should be given greater freedom in the designing, building and furnishing of schools. (6)	18	58	13	10	1
Education Boards are an essential safeguard against central bureaucracy. (6)	23	57	13	6	1

(3) Three respondents did not answer this question.

(4) Four respondents did not answer this question.

(5) One respondent did not answer this question.

(6) Two respondents did not answer this question.

10. Would you please indicate your age?

20-24	2
25-29	
30-34	40
35-39	
40-44	46
45-49	
50-54	11
55-59	
60-64	1
65 & over	

11. Please indicate your sex:-

Male	89
Female	11

12. Please circle the number which indicates the <u>last</u> grade or year of formal education you completed:-

Completed primary school	16
1 year secondary school	10
2 years " "	23
3 " " "	22
4 " " "	14
5 years " "	8
Training College (full time)	2
University (full time)	5
Other (please specify)	

.....
.....
.....

13. After you left school, what professional or trade training or further education (apart from full-time study at University or Training College) did you undertake? (7)

A. Technical/Commercial College:- Full time / Part time

Please specify nature of course.....
.....

B. University (degree or diploma course only):- Part time

Please specify nature of course.....
.....

C. Correspondence training:-

Please specify nature of course.....
.....

D. Other (please specify).....
.....
.....

14. Please state the industry, trade or service in which you are usually engaged. (If retired, please write retired, but state industry etc. in which you were formerly engaged). If you are a housewife, please write housewife. (8)
.. ..
.....

(7) 40% of the sample had undertaken some form of training or further education, mostly in the form of trade or commercial training at technical college or by correspondence.

(8) For occupational table, see below.

15. Please state your personal occupation (or, if retired, your former occupation) that is, the position occupied or work performed in the above industry, trade or service. (If you are a housewife please state your former occupation, if any). (8)
.....
.....

16. Do you hold any public elective office other than on a School Committee (on a River Board, Hospital Board or City Council, for example)?

Yes	11
No	89

If "yes" please specify: .....
.....

17. Are you on any other committees (for example, of any clubs, societies, associations, trade unions, or other educational bodies)?

Yes	64
No	36

If "yes" please specify the post held and the type of club, association etc., in which the post is held: (9) ..... .
.....

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

PLEASE RETURN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO:

S.J. INGLE,
C/- DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON,
P.O. BOX 196,
WELLINGTON.

Occupation Rating. The occupational groups used in this and the subsequent Education Board questionnaire were those used by Vandenburg, McCreary and Chapman in A Social Survey of Hamilton. (10)

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(8) For occupational table, see below.

(9) For a table based on this information see below.

(10) Marjorie Vandenberg, John McCreary and Murray Chapman, A Social Survey of Hamilton, Wellington, Victoria University School of Social Science, 1965, p.6. The writer would like to acknowledge the assistance given him in this and other matters arising from the questionnaire by Professor McCreary.

Occupational Status

Groups	Percentage of Total
Professional	9
Minor business	18
Clerical	20
Farming	40
Skilled	5
Unskilled	6
Domestic	2
Housewife	11
Retired	0

Social Activity Rating. The 'social activity' groups used in this and the Education Board questionnaire were devised by the writer. Most of the groups are self explanatory. The 'business' group represents organisations based on occupation and includes farming groups other than the Young Farmers. This last body was categorised as 'fraternal' as were all service organisations.

Social Activity

Groups	Percentage of Total
Business	17
Fraternal	8
Political	2
Civic, welfare	12
Social, cultural	16
Sporting, hobbies	25
Religious	10
Educational	10

APPENDIX 'B'

Education Board Questionnaire

The questionnaire for Education Board members offered few problems. In structure it was very similar to that used for school committee members: few modifications were necessary.

In this case a letter was sent to the chairman and the Secretary/General Manager of each Education Board, prior to the sending of the questionnaires. The purposesof the exercise were explained to each and the assistance of each was sought in much the same way as that of the school committee chairmen had been. The questionnaire forms were then sent to the Secretary/General Manager who was asked to distribute them at the next Board meeting. Each questionnaire form had a short covering note attached.

The total population of Education Board members in New Zealand is a little over 100. It was therefore possible to send a questionnaire to each member.(1)

Unfortunately the questionnaire was not well received by some Boards. One may assume that each of the Boards discussed the matter. It is known that two Boards engaged in vigorous debates both of which concluded with the questionnaires being distributed with a recommendation to individual members to complete and return them. A number did not do so. In addition, no responses at all were received from one Education Board which - so the writer was informed - brought the matter up before an Executive meeting of the NZEBA.

The objections, it appears, were first that the questionnaire sought information which in no way related to a member's capacity to succeed on the Board. Educational background, one irate Board member wrote, was in this category. Second, members' opinions were sought on topics which were being discussed between their organisation and the Government at the time.(2)

It is unfortunate that some members reacted unfavourably towards the questionnaire - it had been sought to make the latter as inoffensive as possible.

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(1) In fact, no questionnaires were sent to the Wellington Board members, of whom all except one had been interviewed. The interview schedule contained all the questions on the questionnaire form and forms were filled out on their behalf and included in the sample.

(2) The Public Expenditure Committee was investigating education administration at the time.

One can take some reassurance from the fact that the majority of members did reply and provided the writer with a great deal of information.

The response rate, coincidentally, was 63%: 67 completed questionnaires were received. The questionnaire, and complete results, are set out below.

BOARD MEMBERS' QUESTIONNAIRE

ABSOLUTELY ANONYMOUS

General Instructions: Unless otherwise stated, would you please put a CIRCLE around the appropriate number (that is, the number next to the answer you wish to give). (3)

1.	Have you a child attending any school under the control of your Board?	Yes	20
		No	80
	If "no" then when you first joined a school committee, did you have a child attending the school of which you were a committee member?	Yes	71
		No	29
2.	Are you still a member of a school committee?	Yes	26
		No	74
3.	How many years did you spend (have you spent) in school committee Service? (4)	Less than 2 years, 2-3 years	5
		4-5 years, 6-7 years	22
		8-9 years, 10-11 years	19
		12-13 years, 14-15 years, 16 years or more	54
4.	How many years have you spent on an Education Board, including your present term?	Less than 4 years	24
		4-7 years	25
		8-11 years	20
		12-15 years	16
		16 years or more	15
5.	When you were first elected to an Education Board:- did somebody approach you and suggest that you stand for election?		84
	was it originally your own idea to stand for election?		16
6.	If somebody suggested that you stand for election was the person who made the suggestion a close friend or relation?		9

(3) The Education Board questionnaire has been modified in a similar fashion to the school committee one - the numbers have been likewise removed. Again, results indicate percentages of the total response except in question 1 part two (which is a break-down of those replying "no" to the first part of the question) and question 6 (which is a break-down of those who, in question 5, stated that they had been persuaded to stand for election.)

(4) Six respondents, all ex school teachers, had not served on school committees and did not therefore reply to questions 1,2,3.

an acquaintance but not a close friend? 87

somebody not previously known to you? 4

and was the person who suggested that you stand, a Board member, or ex-Board member himself? Yes 18
No 82

7. Below is a list of statements concerning education administration. At the side of the statements are five columns headed, Strongly Agree, Agree, No Opinion, Disagree, Strongly Disagree.

Would you please register your reaction to each statement by putting a cross "X" in the appropriate column.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	No Opinion	Dis-agree	Strongly Disagree
Education Boards are an essential safeguard against bureaucracy.	80	18	0	2	0
There is too much duplication in the administration of education. (5)	21	41	2	32	4
Education Boards should be given greater freedom in school buildings. (5)	33	47	7	13	0
Education Board officers should be public servants responsible to the Minister of Education.	0	2	0	20	78
Secondary schools should be placed under the control of Education Boards. (6)	19	21	9	45	6
Education Boards should be elected by the general public.	2	3	0	48	47
Education Boards should be given greater freedom in the running of school transport.	36	49	3	10	2
Education Boards should be given more opportunity to influence what is taught in the classrooms.	7	17	5	63	8
Co-operation between Education Boards and officers of the Department of Education is better today than it has been for a long time.	36	54	10	0	0
Co-operation between Education Boards and school committees is better now than it has been for a long time.	41	54	5	0	0

(5) Two respondents did not answer this question.
(6) One respondent did not answer this question.

8. Would you please indicate your age?

20-24, 25-29	0
30-34, 35-39	5
40-44, 45-49	15
50-54, 55-59	29
60-64, 65 and over	51

9. Please indicate your sex.

Male	93
Female	7

10. Please circle the number which indicates the last grade or year of formal education you completed. (7)

Completed primary school	15
1 year secondary school	6
2 years " "	16
3 years " "	17
4 years " "	9
5 years " "	11
Training College (full time)	11
University (full time)	15

Other (please specify)

.....

.....

.....

11. After you left school, what professional or trade training or further education (apart from full-time study at University or Training College) did you undertake? (8)

A. Technical/Commercial College — Full time / Part time

Please specify nature of course.....

.....

B. University (degree or diploma course only) — Part time

Please specify nature of course.....

.....

C. Correspondence training

Please specify nature of course .....

.....

D. Other (please specify) .....

.....

.....

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(7) One respondent failed to answer questions 10-13 inclusive.

(8) 35% of the sample had undertaken some form of training or further education, mostly in the form of trade or commercial training at technical college or by correspondence.

12. Please state the industry, trade or service in which you are usually engaged. (If retired, please write retired, but state industry, etc. in which you were formerly engaged.) If you are a housewife, please write housewife. (9)

.....

.....

13. Please state your personal occupation (or, if retired, your former occupation) that is, the position occupied or work performed in the above industry, trade or service. (If you are a housewife, please state your former occupation, if any) (9)

.....

.....

14. Do you hold any public elective office (on a River Board, Hospital Board or City Council, for example)?

Yes	33
No	67

If "yes", please specify .....

.....

15. Are you on any other committees other than secondary school boards (for example, of any clubs, societies, associations, trade unions, etc.)?

Yes	72
No	28

If "yes" please specify the post held and the type of club, association, etc. in which the post is held. (10)

.....

.....

16. On how many secondary school boards do you sit? (11)

.....

17. Do you hold any position in the regional or national executive of the Secondary School Boards' Association?

Yes	10
No	90

Thank you very much for your co-operation.

S.J. Ingle, MA, Dip ED
C/o Department of Political Science
Victoria University of Wellington
P.O. Box 196
WELLINGTON

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(9) For occupational table, see below.

(10) For table based on this information, see below.

(11) The average Board member sits on 1.1 secondary school boards.

Occupational Rating. Using the same occupational groups as in the school committee questionnaire, the following results were obtained:

Occupational Status

Groups	Percentage of Total
Professional	28
Minor business	16
Clerical	4
Farming	52
Skilled	0
Unskilled	0
Domestic	0
Housewife	6
Retired	21

Social Activity Rating. Using the same 'social activity' groupings as in the school committee questionnaire, the following results were obtained:

Social Activity

Groups	Percentage of Total
Business	29
Fraternal	6
Political	4
Civic, Welfare	12
Social, Cultural	14
Sporting, Hobbies	17
Religious	9
Educational (12)	9

(12) It should be noted that the educational category does not include secondary school boards, on which the great majority of members sit ex officio.

APPENDIX 'C'

The following tables set out the results of elections to the individual Education Boards over the past 20 years. All elections, including by-elections, have been covered. Attention is called to the tables pertaining to the South Auckland Board, which was not set up until 1952 (until that time schools in the area were under the control of the Auckland Board). In fact, the first elections in South Auckland were held in 1953 and not in 1954. For the sake of convenience they have been grouped with the 1954 figures however.

Board members, it will be remembered, are elected as representatives of wards, each ward being formed by a set number of school committees. The representatives are elected by school committee members within the ward. The records contain many instances of high voting but few instances of a close fight, though on one occasion over 150 votes were recorded in one ward, the margin of victory being three votes.

In some Boards, a group of wards are voted for together. Thus, in a group of five wards, the five candidates with the highest votes are declared elected. It was our policy in such cases to calculate the number of seats contested by subtracting the number of seats from the number of candidates; the remainder indicates the number of contested seats. Hence if seven candidates put themselves forward for election in a group of five wards, it would be considered that two of the seats had been contested. The upward limit of seats contested is, it need hardly be said, the number of seats vacant.

Board: Auckland

1.



2.



South Auckland

1.

Line A = Seats vacant.
Line B = Seats actually contested
Shaded area shows proportion of uncontested seats.



2.

Line A = Number of candidates needed to fill vacant seats.
Line B = Number of candidates standing.
Shaded area shows surplus number of candidates.



Hawkes Bay

1.

Line A = Seats vacant.
Line B = Seats actually contested
Shaded area shows proportion of uncontested seats.



2.

Line A = Number of candidates needed to fill vacant seats.
Line B = Number of candidates standing.
Shaded area shows surplus number of candidates.



Taranaki

1.

Line A = Seats vacant.
Line B = Seats actually contested.
Shaded area shows proportion of uncontested seats.



2.

Line A = Number of candidates needed to fill vacant seats.
Line B = Number of candidates standing.
Shaded area shows surplus number of candidates.



Wanganui

1.


Line A = Seats vacant.
Line B = Seats actually contested
Shaded area shows proportion of uncontested seats.
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
A
5
4
B
3
2
1
0
A
B
1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964

2.


Line A = Number of candidates needed to fill vacant seats.
Line B = Number of candidates standing.
Shaded area shows surplus number of candidates.
32
30
28
26
24
22
20
18
16
14
B
12
10
8
A
6
4
2
0
B
A
1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964

Wellington

1.

Line A = Seats vacant.
Line B = Seats actually contested.
Shaded area shows proportion of uncontested seats.



2.

Line A = Number of candidates needed to fill vacant seats.
Line B = Number of candidates standing.
Shaded area shows surplus number of candidates.

(N.B. In 1952 there was no candidate at all for one seat.)



Nelson

1.


Line A = Seats vacant
Line B = Seats actually contested.
Shaded area shows proportion of uncontested seats.
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
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8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
A
B
A
B
1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964

2.


Line A = Number of candidates needed to fill vacant seats.
Line B = Number of candidates standing.
Shaded area shows surplus number of candidates.
32
30
28
26
24
22
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
A B
B
A
1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964

Canterbury

1.

Line A = Seats vacant.
Line B = Seats actually contested.
Shaded area shows proportion of uncontested seats.



2.

Line A = Number of candidates needed to fill vacant seats.
Line B = Number of candidates standing.
Shaded area shows surplus number of candidates.



Otago

1.


Line A = Seats vacant.
Line B = Seats actually contested.
Shaded area shows proportion of uncontested seats.
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
A
B
A
B
1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964

2.


Line A = Number of candidates needed to fill vacant seats.
Line B = Number of candidates standing.
Shaded area shows surplus number of candidates.
32
30
28
26
24
22
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
B
A
B
A
1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964

Southland

1.

Line A = Seats vacant.
Line B = Seats actually contested.
Shaded area shows proportion of uncontested seats.



2.

Line A = Number of candidates needed to fill vacant seats.
Line B = Number of candidates standing.
Shaded area shows surplus number of candidates.



Education Board By-Election Figures

	1946-50		1951-55		1956-60		1961-65		Total	
	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b
AUCKLAND	1	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	3	3
SOUTH AUCKLAND			0	0	2	1	0	0	2	1
HAWKES BAY	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	4	3
TARANAKI	1	1	3	3	3	3	2	1	9	8
WANGANUI	2	2	1	1	3	2	2	2	8	7
WELLINGTON	2	2	3	3	1	1	2	2	8	8
NELSON	1	1	2	1	3	2	2	1	8	5
CANTERBURY	3	1	2	2	1	1	0	0	6	4
OTAGO	3	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	4	3
SOUTHLAND	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	3	2
TOTAL	16	13	16	14	15	11	8	6	55	44

a = number of seats falling vacant.

b = number of seats contested.

It will be noted that, generally speaking, the by-elections usually produce a contest. There are two chief reasons why this should be the case. First, a by-election will attract the attention of most activists - it is not simply one election among a number. But second, and more important, a by-election will usually signify the departure of an established figure, a person whose reputation has probably daunted a number of would-be challengers on earlier occasions. The occasion thus presents itself for these challengers to fight out the succession.

Incumbency, in general terms, is a sufficient safeguard against defeat in the ordinary elections, but at nearly every by-election, there is no incumbent.

(1)

APPENDIX 'D'

SCHOOL FINANCING

1. Primary Schools

The main items of finance for primary schools are covered by the Education Boards' Grants Regulations 1959 and appropriate amendments, the present basis of payment for the various costs being:-

(a) A Grant to Education Boards for General Administration purposes

This grant is paid on a capitation basis on the number of pupils on the rolls of public schools in the district of the Education Board as follows:

Primary - Average number of pupils on the roll for the first four weeks of the third term of the year preceding the grants.

Intermediate and secondary pupils in district high schools - roll on the first day of March of the year of the grants.

The present rate of grant is £165 for each 100 of the first 10,000 pupils and £115 for each 100 pupils in excess of 10,000. The regulations also provide for supplementary grants, not exceeding 10 per cent of the total amount set out above, as may be determined by the Minister of Education with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance. In addition to the above amounts, Education Boards controlling teachers' colleges receive an additional sum at the rate of £4.10.0 for each student on the roll on the first day of March of the year in which the grant is made. This grant is used by the Education Board for:

Payment of salaries and expenses of the staff required to carry out its functions.

The travelling expenses of staff and Board members.

Light, heat and cleaning costs of Board premises.

Printing, stationery and advertising.

Postages, telephones, toll calls, etc.

Legal costs.

Audit inspection and insurance.

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(1) Appendix 'D' is very largely taken from a leaflet on the subject of school financing prepared for the use of departmental officers. Department of Education, Wellington, April 16 1964. Naturally the specific form of the financial regulations will alter from time to time, although one of the criticisms levelled against them is that they are not brought up to date sufficiently frequently. However, the basic structure of school financing is reasonably stable.

Purchase and maintenance of office furniture and equipment.

Miscellaneous Board expenditures.

The grant is reviewed from time to time to keep it in line with cost increases, the last major review being made in 1959, but subsequent adjustments have been made because of general wage increases.

(b) A grant for the Incidental Expenses of Public Schools

This grant is paid to Education Boards on a capitation basis to meet the day to day running expenses of the primary schools under their control. The present grant provides for payment at a rate not less than 17s.11d. and not more than £1.3.9 for each pupil (primary and intermediate), the present rates payable in the various districts being:

Auckland	17s.11d.
South Auckland	18s. 8d.
Taranaki	21s. 0d.
Wanganui	20s. 9d.
Hawkes Bay	18s. 8d.
Wellington	21s. 0d.
Nelson	20s. 8d.
Canterbury	21s. 4d.
Otago	23s. 9d.
Southland	23s. 9d.

These variations in rates make allowance for the sizes of schools in the various Education districts and for variations in cost for light, heating and water.

The regulations provide for the sum of 2s.9d. per pupil to be retained by the Education Board and used for:

purchase of books for school and class libraries up to an amount of at least 2s. per pupil;

the supply of stationery in necessitous circumstances;

the cost of teaching pupils to swim;

the cost of journeys for special purposes under conditions approved by the Minister;

the supply after consultation with the Senior Inspector of equipment and materials for various items on the curriculum;

the supply of equipment and materials for use on the recommendation of the Senior Inspector in special classes, hospital classes, health camps, education centres and speech clinics.

The balance of the Incidentals grant is distributed by Boards to their various school committees for use by the

Committees for the general expenses of the schools. The purposes on which moneys may be spent by school committees are defined in the Education (School Committees' Incidental) Regulations 1956. Generally these purposes are:

- costs of general school expenses, including chalk, duplicating materials, stationery and other school requisites;
- expenses incurred by the school committee in the transaction of its business;
- the payment of insurance premiums in respect of insurance against liability to which the school committee may be subject;
- the provision of cleaning equipment materials and sanitary services;
- the provision of toilet and first aid necessities;
- the cost of repairs to and operation of equipment;
- the cost of maintaining swimming pools;
- minor repairs to buildings;
- the heating and lighting of school premises and the supply of water.

In addition to the Capitation grant as outlined above, schools receive through the Education Board a refund of the cost of telephone rental paid by the school committee in accordance with the Incidental Expenses Regulations - these regulations provide for a refund of the cost of one telephone installed in all schools and for half rental where the telephone or an extension from the telephone is installed in the teacher's residence.

A further grant is paid to schools for the purpose of meeting the operating costs of swimming pools, the present rates of grant being:

for each pool without a filtration plant	£9 per annum
for each pool with a filtration plant with a capacity of up to 7,000 gallons	£15 per annum
for each pool with a filtration plant with a capacity of over 7,000 but not more than 15,000 gallons	£25 per annum
for each pool with a capacity of over 15,000 gallons	£45 per annum

A further capitation grant is paid in respect of the pupils on the rolls of district high schools, the present grant being £3.5.0 per pupil applied as follows:

- 10s. for the purchase of books for school and class libraries;
- 25s. distributed to the school committee for payment of incidental expenses,

30s. expended on the provision of books, materials and equipment for the teaching of the various subjects of the curriculum.

This district high school grant is supplemented by variable additional payments for heating up to a maximum payment of 5s.10d. per pupil, the variable rates being paid in line with the variations which are made in the primary portion of the grant. The present rates have been in force since February 1962.

(c) A grant for Manual Training (2)

This grant is paid to Education Boards at the rate of £1 for each pupil attending approved classes at Manual Training Centres and is expended on the provision of equipment and material for, and the cost of incidental expenses incurred in, the teaching of pupils of classes in nature study and science, woodwork, metalwork, cookery, and needlework, and on the making of grants to agricultural clubs and the provision of materials and equipment for and the cost of the incidental expenses incurred in the teaching of students attending technical and continuation classes.

Boards also receive a grant at the rate of £12 for each weekly teaching half day in technical and continuation classes, this sum being combined with the Manual Training grant mentioned above.(3)

(d) A grant for the Maintenance of Buildings and Equipment (4)

This grant, which is paid to Education Boards at the rate of 1s.5d. for each square foot of the total floor space in classrooms of public schools and Manual Training Centres, lecture rooms and laboratories at Teachers' Colleges, and for each square foot of floor area in assembly halls, dental clinics, teachers' and caretakers' residences, school bus garages, Boards' offices and workshops, is used as follows:

One-halfpenny of the total amount to be used for the replacement of obsolete furniture in schools.

Four-fifths of the balance to be applied towards the payment for the maintenance and repair of schools and related buildings, including the repair of furniture, equipment and fences.

The remaining fifth shall be used for all minor capital expenditure where the cost at any one time does not exceed £200 at any school, although the Board at its discretion may use part of this portion for maintenance expenditure.

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(2) The present rates of grant were established in 1955.

(3) This payment is made in respect of continuation evening classes held mainly in country districts.

(4) The present rate of grant was established in 1959.

(e) A grant for Training College expenses [5]

Capitation grants at the following rates are paid to Education Boards to meet the general running expenses of teachers' colleges. Present rates are:

£6.10.0 per student enrolled in Division A or Division C;

£7.15.0 for each science, commercial or homecraft student;

£18.0.0 for each woodwork or metalwork student.

In each case £1.10.0 per student must be expended on library books, the balance being available for:

Class materials and equipment;

Cost of office expenses, excluding salaries;

General expenses of colleges, including light, heat and water;

Expenses of museum classes;

Teaching of swimming and physical education;

Medical examination of applicants for admission to Teachers' Colleges.

In addition, a grant at the rate of £1 is paid for each student enrolled under a post-primary teacher studentship, 5s. of this grant to be spent on library books.

Provision is also made in the regulations under which the Minister may authorise additional grants not exceeding £1.5.0 per student where excessive cost of light, heat and water are incurred by any college by reason of its location or other factors.

(f) Free Textbooks [6]

Boards are given a grant of 3.10d. per pupil to cover the cost of supply of free textbooks to primary schools. In the primary service a number of textbooks, e.g. arithmetic and readers, are provided from the School Publications item and the grant is intended to cover the supply of other textbooks, mainly atlases, spelling lists and textbooks for English and social studies.

(g) Miscellaneous grants

In addition to the above block grants which are paid to Education Boards for expenditure at their discretion within certain defined limits, [7] grants are made to Boards on the

(5) The present rates of grant were established in 1961.

(6) The present rate of grant was established in 1963.

(7) The stress is the present writer's.

basis of a refund of actual expenditure incurred for the following purposes:

(i) Salaries and allowances of teachers

Staffing of schools and salary scales for teachers are fixed by regulation and Government Service Tribunal salary orders and payment by Boards is made to teachers accordingly, Boards being reimbursed the amounts actually expended.

(ii) Salaries of architectural staff

Boards are refunded the actual cost of salaries or wages of architectural staff, the establishment for such staffing being approved by the Director General of Education salary scales being fixed by the Education Boards' Employment Regulations.

(iii) Wages of Caretakers and Cleaners

Boards are refunded the actual cost of wages paid to caretakers and cleaners employed in schools, manual training centres and teachers' colleges. The refund is limited to wages at award rates of pay, the establishment allowed for each school being based on a schedule of hours agreed to between the Boards' Association and the Director General of Education.

(iv) Salaries of Clerical Assistants

Boards are refunded the actual cost of salaries of persons employed as clerical assistants to Headmasters of schools, the rate of payment and hours of employment being controlled by the Department.

(v) New Buildings

Boards are refunded the actual cost of new buildings, replacement buildings, land purchase and ground development, the procedure being outlined in the previous section dealing with school buildings and equipment. Each project is subject to specific approval.

(vi) Minor Capital Works, Furniture and Equipment

Boards are refunded the actual cost of approved minor capital works and for the cost of furniture and equipment which is supplied to schools in accordance with the basic approved issues for schools of various sizes.

(vii) Transport of Children

Boards are refunded the actual cost of school transport services.[8]

(viii) Board and Capitation Payments

Boards are refunded actual expenditure incurred in the payment of boarding allowances for primary school children and capitation payments made to parents in respect of transport of children to schools.

2. Post-Primary Schools

The main items of finance for post-primary schools are covered by the Post-primary School Grants Regulations 1960, the present basis of payment for the various items being:

(a) A grant to the controlling board for general expenses.

This grant, which is based on the weekly teaching half-day entitlement of each school (the weekly teaching half day entitlement is computed in accordance with the Education (Staffing and Salaries)Regulations), is paid to the governing bodies of post-primary schools for the following incidental purposes:

Expenses of administration;

Furniture, equipment and material for classes;

Libraries;

School books and stationery in necessitous cases;

Cleaning and sanitary services, heating, lighting and water supply;

Maintenance and repair of school buildings and grounds;

Replacement of plant and equipment used for the instruction of pupils;

Travelling allowances and expenses of teachers and pupils in connection with class instruction;

Expenses of interviews of applicants for appointments as teachers;

Expenses of teachers attending educational conferences or meetings at the request of the board and with the prior approval of the Director;

Expenses of break-up ceremonies and school prizes (this expenditure is subject to certain limits);

---

(8) As has been noted, all services must be approved by the Department.

Subscription to allied associations;

Subsidy of £1 for £1 expended from voluntary contributions on organized school games.

The present rates of grant, which have been operative from February 1st, 1962, are:

Number of weekly teaching half-days for each school under the Governing Body	Yearly payment of payment for each weekly teaching half-day		
	£	s.	d.
For the first 100 in normal day classes	18.	0.	0
For the next 100 in normal day classes	13.	10.	0
For all in normal day classes in excess of 200	11.	10.	0
For the first 400 in technical or continuation day or evening classes that are vocational	21.	0.	0
For all in technical or continuation day or evening classes that are vocational in excess of 400	10.	10.	0
For the first 400 in technical or continuation day or evening classes that are non-vocational	20.	0.	0
For all in technical or continuation day or evening classes that are non-vocational in excess of 400	10.	0.	0

Provision is made in the regulations for an additional grant to be paid to a new school during the first four years after establishment, the amount being limited to 20 per cent of the grant in the first year and 10 per cent of the grant in subsequent years. Provision is also made for the Minister of Education, with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance, to approve of additional grants where the cost of heating, lighting, water supply and swimming bath filtration costs are excessive or where special circumstances exist in the case of a particular school and a special grant is deemed necessary. This latter discretion is used mainly in connection with schools of small static rolls where the fixed rate of grant is inadequate for reasonable needs. Provision is also made under which the Minister of Education, with the approval of the Minister of Finance, can approve of a special grant for technical schools which are providing technical classes or courses of a special or advanced character. (9)

(b) A grant for Manual Training

This grant, which is paid at the rate of £1 for every

(9) To date this special provision has been used only for payment of a special rate of grant for the Pharmacy School which is attached to the Central Institute of Technology.

primary pupil enrolled for the purpose of attending approved classes for manual instruction is similar to that paid to Education Boards for the operating expenses of Manual Training Centres and is paid only for primary children attending classes attached to post-primary schools.

(c) Grant for Free Textbooks

Boards are given a grant on a capitation basis for the provision of free textbooks in post-primary schools. Rates vary considerably according to the type of course and level of instruction, the present variation being from £5.12.3 to £12.17.0 a pupil. Present rates have been payable since 1963.

(d) Miscellaneous Grants

All other finance for post-primary schools is provided by way of grants reimbursing them for actual expenditure incurred on various approved services or projects, the main ones being:

(i) Caretakers', cleaners' and groundmen's wages

Schools are refunded the actual cost of wages at award rates, the establishment for each school being approved by the Department.

(ii) Maintenance of buildings

Schools are refunded the actual cost of approved maintenance of buildings and services, all work being approved by the Department. Maintenance of buildings is supervised by a staff of Property Supervisors employed by the Department, who advise on the need for various maintenance works and who also act as technical advisers to the post-primary school Boards in the planning or carrying out of maintenance works.

(iii) Salaries of library assistants

Boards are refunded the actual cost of salaries of persons employed as library assistants, rates of payment and hours of duty being controlled by the Department.

(iv) New buildings

The Department refunds to Boards the cost of approved new buildings works. In many cases, however, new buildings projects are carried out by Ministry of Works, the cost being charged direct against the Department's Vote.

(v) Minor capital works, furniture and equipment

Boards are refunded the actual cost of minor capital works and the cost of supply of basic furniture and equipment which may be approved for supply to individual schools. A large proportion of the furniture and equipment needs of schools is, however, met by physical supply of the items from departmental stocks, bulk purchase having been arranged by the Department in accordance with Government Stores Control Board purchase procedures.

(vi) Board and bursaries

Boards are refunded actual expenditure incurred in the payment of boarding allowances, academic bursaries, secondary school bursaries and technical bursaries to pupils in post-primary schools. Rates and conditions of payment for these allowances are controlled by the Department.

Review of Block Grants

The block grant system of financing school activities is designed to give local authorities as much discretion as possible in the management of their own affairs and to place on each board the responsibility of living within its income. The system does mean, however, that the various grants are assessed on average costs and this in turn means that there will always be some authorities which have difficulty in meeting all commitments from the grant. The alternative is to accept a policy of refund of actual costs and there has been some demand for this, particularly in connection with such expenses as heat, light and water charges. These demands have been resisted by the Department, since it would be almost impossible to control wastage effectively and an increase in expenditure would result.

Block grants are reviewed from time to time, these reviews being undertaken by the respective Standing Committees on administration (primary and post-primary). The usual procedure is for a full investigation of costs to be made by a specially appointed inspecting team.(10) These teams report to the appropriate Standing Committee which in turn makes representations to the Department and to Government if it is considered that the investigation shows that an adjustment in the grant is desirable.

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(10) A review was being undertaken when this leaflet was being prepared, on the School Committees Incidentals grant. The inspecting team consisted of representatives from the Department, the Education Boards and the Primary Inspectorate. Following its recommendations, increases in the incidentals grant have been made.

Inspection of Accounts

The Department carries out a continuing inspection of the accounts of Education Boards and post-primary school boards for the purpose of ensuring that grant moneys are spent only on the purposes authorised by regulation or on the projects specially approved for the individual grants. (11) These investigations are carried out in cooperation with Government auditors and steps taken to ensure that there is no duplication of work as between the two groups. Audit of all teachers' salaries grants and consequently boards' payments to teachers is carried out by the Department under a delegation of authority given by the Controller and Auditor-General. Audit and examination of school committee activities is carried out by the controlling Education Board.

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(11) The stress if the present writers.

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OTHER SOURCES:

(i) Although the writer was obliged to refer to a number of other newspapers from time to time, the following provided the majority of background information from this source:

Auckland Star	(Auckland)
Dominion	(Wellington)
Evening Post	(Wellington)
Evening Sun	(Dunedin)
New Zealand Herald	(Auckland)
Otago Daily Times	(Dunedin)
Press	(Christchurch)
Southland Times	(Invercargill)
Star	(Christchurch)
Waikato Times	(Hamilton)

(ii) Written submissions to the Commission on Education 1962, of which there were over 400. These have been catalogued by the NZCER. In some cases, the written submissions were supplemented by the verbatim reports of all oral evidence, also to be found at the NZCER.

(iii) Files, and in some cases Executive minutes of NZEI, PPTA, SSBA and the Wellington Education Board.

Reports of the national conferences of the main educational bodies.

Departmental files dealing with NZEBA, SSBA, NZSCF, CHSPTA and with various specific topics. Also the writer was shown various 'case studies' on file at the Regional Offices.

Education files from the National and Labour parties, remits for and reports of annual conferences of the parties; manifestos for each post-war election.

(iv) The main educational journals of the teacher bodies and the Department of Education:

Education, Schools' Publication Branch, Department of Education, Wellington.

National Education, published by NZEI, Wellington.

Journal, published by PPTA, Wellington.

In addition, the earlier journals of the teacher bodies were used when dealing with the history of those organisations.

(v) The writer was fortunate enough to be able to arrange a number of interesting and informative interviews with people active in many areas of the education system. These included: a number of people active in school committee and PTA work; a number of officers and members of several Education Boards; members of secondary school boards; the secretaries of the NZEI and PPTA; the Regional Superintendents of the three Regional Offices and a number of their officers; each of the senior officers of the Department of Education whose activity is covered in this study; six Members of Parliament and ex-Members with interests in education; and finally four Ministers of Education, including the present one.

(vi) The two questionnaires sent to school committee members and Education Board members also provided much interesting information.