# Clearance and the Hollywood Blacklist

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Abstract:

*This paper explores an aspect of the anti-Communist Hollywood Blacklist which has thus far received very little scholarly attention: the idea of clearance. Clearance refers to a secretive process through which Hollywood personalities could clear their names of anti-Communist suspicion and therefore continue to work in the industry – avoiding the dreaded Blacklist. The system was run in secret by journalist George Sokolsky with input from JB Mathews, Karl Baarslag, the American Legion, the movie studios, legislative committees, and many others. Hollywood personalities who had been accused of having Communist sympathies could write a letter explaining the allegations and apologising if necessary, accompanied by either testimony to a legislative committee or some form of pro-American act. These would be evaluated by Sokolsky or one of his connections, and the individual concerned would be ‘cleared’ to resume working for the motion picture studios. This paper explores the clearance system in detail, arguing that its broad application made a significant contribution to the collapse of the blacklist in the late 1950s.*

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Biographical Note:

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Writing to a motion picture company in 1952, Marlon Brando declared that “I am not now nor have I ever been a member of the Communist Party”.[[1]](#footnote-1) In contrast to the famous scenes of crowded hearing rooms where unfriendly witnesses were blacklisted or even imprisoned, Brando was able to write a private letter to enable him to escape further scrutiny and continue a career that brought him considerable fame and recognition. That letter constitutes Brando’s participation in ‘clearance’, a secretive process that operated alongside the Hollywood blacklist, but has yet to receive the same attention. The idea of clearance, which generally involved some combination of letter writing, patriotic acts, and an evaluation by an anti-communist expert, was used by more than 300 individuals in Hollywood to combat allegations of communist involvement and allow those individuals to keep their jobs.

Hollywood was a prime target for anti-communists in government (including the FBI and Senate and House Committees), and private groups including the American Legion, journalists, and the major motion picture studios. Between them, they created what was known as the blacklist – an informal list of actors, screenwriters, directors and other industry figures with supposed Communist Party links, who would not be employed by any major motion picture studios.[[2]](#footnote-2) Scholars and the film industry have given significant attention to the first phase of the Hollywood blacklist from 1947-1950, including the recent, film *Trumbo* about screenwriter Dalton Trumbo’s experience with the blacklist.[[3]](#footnote-3) The second phase of blacklisting has received less attention even though this phase threatened to ban hundreds of prominent Hollywood personalities, posing a significant threat to the film industry. It was prompted by *Counterattack*’s publication of *Red Channels* (co-authored by Vincent Hartnett and Ted Kirkpatrick), in June 1950 listing 151 names of alleged communists, a further round of HUAC hearings in 1951, and J.B. Matthews’ 1951 article in the *American Legion Magazine* ‘Did the Movies Really Clean House?’.[[4]](#footnote-4) The American Legion and other groups responded by picketing and applying other forms of pressure. Those who might have been denied employment represented important members of the film industry, including Garson Kanin, Judy Holliday, Michael Blankfort and Ruth Gordon. Suspicion was also cast on figures like Brando, Kirk Douglas and Elia Kazan. That expansion of the blacklist and its potentially damaging effects on not only the individuals but the film industry helped create another, more secretive process: ‘Clearance’. Clearance was an effort to mitigate the impact of the blacklist and has received comparatively little attention. In part, this is because clearance operated in the darkest area of what was already a shadowy endeavour perpetrated by private individuals in cooperation with the major motion picture studios and with tacit support from government institutions like HUAC and the FBI.

Journalist George Sokolsky, a syndicated columnist for Hearst and other newspapers and an ardent anti-communist, was the central figure in the clearance network. As a result, Sokolsky’s columns and personal correspondence contain subtle and overt references to the clearance work he was engaged in which provide important insights into the entire clearance process. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, regularly corresponded with Sokolsky, and contributed to the clearance process through that relationship. Sokolsky also had a long term relationship with J. B. Matthews, originally director of research for the Special Committee on Un-American Activities (Dies Committee), as well as with HUAC staff members, and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS). Gossip columnist Hedda Hopper, the American Legion, and American Business Consultants (ABC), a group funded by Alfred Kohlberg and staffed by ex-FBI agents, were also significant contributors to the blacklist. These, and other significant players operated a procedure which Sokolsky summed up in 1954 as a “set up which gave the dupe or innocent or even the Communist who changed his mind an opportunity to clear himself”.[[5]](#footnote-5) Despite that, and other occasional references to cleansing in his columns, Sokolsky in 1956 denied the existence of any form of clearance process, which highlights the secrecy in which clearance operated.[[6]](#footnote-6)

The process of ‘clearing’ Hollywood personalities who had been accused of having Communist sympathies or connections both allowed those individuals to remain working in the industry, and on a deeper level contributed to the decline of the blacklist by undermining its internal and external importance. As a rule, the clearance process consisted of three important elements: letter writing, a positive ‘American’ act, and a favourable evaluation.

# Historiography

Scholarship on the Hollywood blacklist can be divided into three broad schools of thought. The dominant view, which is best described as the ‘victim-centric’ view, treats the left as victims of the blacklist, and often focusses on how the blacklist had a negative impact on its victims’ careers and lives. Often this approach involves detailed personal accounts of those who were blacklisted and how they suffered, for example ‘Millard Lampell: Blacklisted’ by Ronald D Cohen, and *Dalton Trumbo: Blacklisted Hollywood Radical* by Ceplair.[[7]](#footnote-7) Stefan Kanfer’s *A Journal of the Plague Years*, and Victor Navasky’s *Naming Names* typify this approach, with an overwhelming focus on presenting the left as victims, and the right as villains.[[8]](#footnote-8) In contrast to that approach, some scholars view anti-communists as harbouring legitimate concerns about Communist influence in the United States. Books like *Not Without Honour* by Richard Gid Powers, and articles by John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, argue that anti-Communists, including those involved in the blacklist, responded appropriately to the real threat that Communism presented.[[9]](#footnote-9) Powers, for example “came to see in anticommunism America at its best.”[[10]](#footnote-10)

A more recent development in the historiography has seen a move away from moralistic questions and a greater focus on the motivations, fears, and long-held attitudes that contributed to the anti-communist ideology. John Sbardellati’s work on the FBI falls into this category, as does Larry Ceplair’s *Anti-Communism in Twentieth Century America*, and Jennifer Frost’s monograph on Hedda Hopper.[[11]](#footnote-11) One of the distinguishing characteristics of this type of work is a desire to change the focus of the scholarship to issues beyond ‘victims’ and ‘villains’. These authors give consideration both to the goals and actions of anti-communists and their targets, rather than imposing a moral judgement which has the potential to cloud the authors analysis. An analysis of clearance will require this more balanced or ‘even-handed’ approach in order to understand a relatively unexplored part of Hollywood and anti-communist history.

Despite these developments in the historiography, clearance has not yet been given a detailed explanation. Where it is mentioned, it tends to be in passing, and depends heavily on two key sources: Merle Miller’s *The Judges and the Judged,* and John Cogley’s *Report on Blacklisting*.[[12]](#footnote-12) These two works, published in 1952 and 1956 respectively, were the first major exposés of the blacklist and, along with the works of Elizabeth Poe Kerby are often the sole source of information about clearance. [[13]](#footnote-13) Thomas Doherty’s *Cold War, Cool Medium* is one exception to this – Doherty argues that the blacklist ended as a result of several small victories for free expression, and includes the Cogley Report’s puiblication in 1956 as one of those victories. [[14]](#footnote-14)

Other authors have explored clearance in a much more piecemeal way. Clearance had three important elements: letter writing, a positive act or testimony, and a favourable evaluation. Ceplair focussed on the letter writing and evaluating, emphasising the role of the American Legion, but not the positive act.[[15]](#footnote-15) Likewise, Navasky focussed substantially on the letter writing scheme, with a small notation of the evaluation system and no comment on the idea of a positive act or testimony.[[16]](#footnote-16) The inconsistent nature of this scholarship is representative of the wider issue already noted that there has not yet been a detailed analysis of clearance.

# The Clearance Network

Those who had been blacklisted looked for a way to rescue their careers. Hollywood personalities from a wide range of professions like composer Dimitri Tiomkin, director Fred Zinneman, singer/actor Harry Belafonte and screenwriter Joseph Mankiewicz, found themselves forced to demonstrate their loyalty. Sokolsky, Matthews, and a range of their associates in government, the American Legion, and the Motion Picture Studios pioneered the system of clearance to help them accomplish that.

Writing in his column ‘These Days’ in 1954, Sokolsky gave one of the few explicit acknowledgements of the program of clearance which existed in Hollywood in the early 1950s.[[17]](#footnote-17) “Since April 1951, a two phase program developed in Hollywood which is probably the best example of cleansing an industry of a heavy Communist infiltration”.[[18]](#footnote-18) Sokolsky then detailed the second phase of that process, “the effort to bring back to positive Americanism men and women who had once been Communists or who had been associated with Communist activities”.[[19]](#footnote-19) That effort to ‘bring back’ or clear people tainted by Communism was undertaken in relative secrecy by private-public networks, with Sokolsky at the centre. This network was able to draw on information from a range of private and public groups and individuals to encourage letter writing, declarations of patriotism and overt patriotic acts by those accused of harbouring communist sympathies. These actions would then be evaluated by Sokolsky and a few close associated, before clearance would be given to the Hollywood studios to continue employing the individual under suspicion.

The clearance network was, by and large, a secretive endeavour undertaken by a small group of people. In 1956, John Cogley, with support from The Fund for the Republic, published a report called *Report on Blacklisting* which purported to expose some of the workings of the network.[[20]](#footnote-20) Cogley argued that Sokolsky was the “most acceptable of experts” when it came to blacklisting and clearance.[[21]](#footnote-21) He further describes Sokolsky as a “grey eminence” and a “chief justice” on the supreme court of blacklisting, as well as a “court of last appeals” and “universally accepted father figure”.[[22]](#footnote-22) Cogley was clearly convinced that Sokolsky played a major role in clearing artists to return to work in Hollywood.

When the Cogley Report first appeared, Sokolsky and other individuals disputed what was said about them enabling HUAC to label it as “not worth the paper it is printed on”.[[23]](#footnote-23) In a statement to a HUAC hearing specifically about the Cogley Report, Sokolsky denied the existence of any clearance network, and was highly critical of the report as a whole.[[24]](#footnote-24) Sokolsky claimed that the idea of a clearance board was “weird, and wholly untrue”.[[25]](#footnote-25) Sokolsky did admit in his statement, however, that he and other anti-communists, had helped to ‘rehabilitate’ some three hundred men and women in Hollywood by urging them to write letters of explanation to their employers to counter allegations against them.[[26]](#footnote-26) Sokolsky and others who testified before HUAC argued that they were not involved in any vetting or clearing activity, but rather encouraged people to take action to clear their own name. That approach tallies with a letter Sokolsky wrote to Karl Baarslag in November 1951, stating “we shall all have to learn that we are not high priests who can hand down absolution” and that “clearances are none of our business…a man can only clear himself”.[[27]](#footnote-27) The denials during the Cogley hearings appear to be a case of semantical differences used to protect and hide the clearance process.

Sokolsky’s correspondence and newspaper columns reveal more substantial involvement than what he admitted in 1956. Sokolsky’s columns made occasional reference to a ‘program’ to give “the dupe or innocent, or even the Communist who had changed his mind an opportunity to clear himself”.[[28]](#footnote-28) As early as June 1952, Sokolsky was openly writing about a program of clearance in cooperation with the American Legion, which “has given them a chance to clear themselves, and in many respects…succeeded where Congressional Committees have failed”.[[29]](#footnote-29) While the columns themselves do not give details on whether Sokolsky and others were involved in casting a judgement on the individuals who took part, the repeated use of the term ‘program’ suggests that Sokolsky had a more involved role.

Sokolsky was clearly involved both in receiving clearance letters, and in passing evidence of clearance to motion picture studios. In March 1951, Sokolsky telegrammed Ward Bond asking him to “convey to John Wayne, Hedda Hopper and others that there is chagrin at treatment of Larry Parks. My information is that record will show he came clean”.[[30]](#footnote-30) In March 1952, Sokolsky wrote to Matthews saying “This letter is sent for your files and information. It is to be treated confidentially. Similar letters will be sent to you from time to time addressed to officials of all companies”.[[31]](#footnote-31)

The information that Sokolsky was able to pass on the studios came from a variety of sources. On March 26 1953, Sokolsky received a letter from James O’Neil, Director of Publications at the American Legion “enclosing herewith, for your files and information a copy of a letter from Stanley Rubin”.[[32]](#footnote-32) In a similar vein, Roy Brewer, a leading anti-communist union figure as head of IATSE (International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees), wrote to Sokolsky in May 1952 about a collaborative effort with Ward Bond for “a careful study of the statements, letters and testimony which have been sent to us by your office”.[[33]](#footnote-33) The letters and statements pointed to in that correspondence refers to the significant number of clearance letters written by those accused of having Communist affiliations or beliefs. There are numerous examples of Sokolsky receiving letters, advice and statements for him to view and distribute as part of his role in the clearance network.

## The Individuals

Alongside Sokolsky, a number of other private individuals played important roles both in collecting and distributing information to other places in the network. Matthews became involved in the blacklisting and clearance processes through his involvement with the Dies Committee as a witness in 1938 and then as director of research in 1939, resulting in an investigation of Hollywood in 1940 and inclusion of industry figures in final reports for the Dies Committee.[[34]](#footnote-34) Matthews served as the Dies Committee Director of Research on the recommendation of Hoover and Sokolsky, with whom he already had formed a close relationship.[[35]](#footnote-35) Matthews also played an important part in triggering the second phase of blacklisting with his article ‘Did the Movies Really Clean House?’.[[36]](#footnote-36) That role, and his subsequent work in the blacklisting industry gave Matthews access to a massive amount of information, something noted in the Cogley Report as a vital source, “Best of all, Sokolsky had at his command the results of his friend J B Matthews’ long research into the field of communist infiltration”.[[37]](#footnote-37) Sokolsky’s correspondence with Matthews shows a great deal of information changing hands, with Matthews, for example, sending Sokolsky lists of people with “more than casual affiliations with Communist front organisations”.[[38]](#footnote-38) The most common interaction between the two came from the exchange of clearance letters written by accused communists. Typically, Sokolsky would send letters to Matthews for his files, ask him to treat them confidentially, and warn that more letters would arrive from time to time addressed to various motion picture studios.[[39]](#footnote-39)

Another individual with whom Sokolsky had extensive contact with was Karl Baarslag, who worked for the American Legion and later as a consultant for HUAC and research director for Joseph McCarthy’s.[[40]](#footnote-40) In August 1952, Baarslag wrote informing Sokolsky that he had finally had a whole day to devote to reading the clearance letters forwarded to him by Sokolsky.[[41]](#footnote-41) Baarslag evaluated the letters sent to him, including “Eight or nine of the letters are from people who quite obviously are completely blameless”, and another fifteen or so against whom “no charges of any kind were ever made by any competent government agency”.[[42]](#footnote-42) For Baarlsag this left “a hard core of about fifty-five letters from Hollywood personalities with front records varying from little or no importance to lengthy and impressive records going back over a period of years”.[[43]](#footnote-43) In regard to those individuals, Baarslag comments that the letters they provided were “quite disturbing and disappointing” with little or no regret, contrition or admittance of past mistakes.[[44]](#footnote-44) Baarslag provided a calculated and careful evaluation of the claims to clearance made by a significant number of Hollywood personalities vital to the clearance process. Before studios and the media would accept someone as ‘cleared’ they needed some form of assurance that that person deserved clearance.

Roy Brewer made similar evaluative comments in a letter to Baarslag, which was forwarded to Sokolsky and James O’Neil at the American Legion.[[45]](#footnote-45) In regard to a specific individual, Marvin Miller (a moderately successful actor) Brewer commented that his clearance letter was “complete, forthright and honest”.[[46]](#footnote-46) Brewer informed Baarslag that Miller would be receptive to any further questions, and to “please let me hear from you if there is anything else you feel should be done, and also whether or not you feel as I do about his statement”.[[47]](#footnote-47) Brewer had similar discussions with Sokolsky, including one about Kanin and Gordon, about whom Sokolsky wrote to Brewer “I told them that the first two letters they wrote were not quite adequate and they are now writing a third incorporating all the material in the first two plus some additional material I suggested to them”.[[48]](#footnote-48) Bond (himself a Hollywood actor) Hartnett, and a range of others became involved to a lesser extent in the clearance process. Sokolsky had contacts all over the Hollywood landscape that he used to extract small amounts of information to allow him and his closer contacts to run their clearance operation effectively.

## The Groups

Three private groups in particular, American Business Consultants, the American Legion and the motion picture studios, had important, yet very different roles in the clearance network. The American Legion was an important participant in both the blacklist and clearance. James O’Neil in particular played an important role both in collecting and distributing information.[[49]](#footnote-49) O’Neil and Matthews frequently exchanged copies of clearance letters.[[50]](#footnote-50) O’Neil also commented to Sokolsky on aspects of the clearance program, that “the repudiations and denunciations of communist affiliation and communist party fronting will mean little unless they include solemn assurances that those involved will never be weak again”.[[51]](#footnote-51) Correspondence between O’Neil and Sokolsky shows examples of clearance letters and comments on those letters flowing in both directions.[[52]](#footnote-52) Like Sokolsky, O’Neil testified before HUAC in 1956 about efforts to ‘rehabilitate’ industry professionals. While denying being involved in any form of ‘clearance’, O’Neil testified that “The Legion has made a major contribution in helping to re-establish a climate of employment for the innocent, the stupid and the repentant guilty”.[[53]](#footnote-53)

The studios were an important participant in the clearance network, and ultimately benefitted from being able to use the best people in their movies while keeping up anti-communist appearances. The majority of the clearance letters that circulated between Sokolsky, Hoover, Matthews, O’Neil and others were destined for the motion picture studios, including MGM and Twentieth-Century Fox. Spyros Skouras, head of Twentieth-Century Fox, was quoted in the Cogley Report saying he regularly consulted with Sokolsky and “as a result was collecting all allegations against his employees and inviting them to arm him with ‘written, signed, explanations or denials’”.[[54]](#footnote-54) Nate Spingold at Columbia Pictures claimed to have been working on a similar program for over a year.[[55]](#footnote-55) The studios both participated in, and benefited from the process, and provide an important justification for the existence of clearance.

## Government Involvement

On the government side of the equation, the clearance network extended deeply into several important government areas, including HUAC, the SISS, and the FBI. Benjamin Mandel, himself a former communist, worked for the Dies Committee, HUAC and the SISS, using these roles to supply large amounts of information for use in the clearance process. Having become research director at HUAC in 1947, Mandel played a crucial role in the hearings on Hollywood which started the first blacklist. In 1949, he wrote to Sokolsky “If you are interested in film personnel for a follow up article, you will find material enclosed. JB [Matthews] may give you more”.[[56]](#footnote-56) In March 1949, Mandel wrote “In view of the fact that you are the most widely read of anti-communist writers, I am taking the initiative in channelling in to you, material and ideas which may be of some service”.[[57]](#footnote-57) In July 1949, Sokolsky responded “I hope you keep sending me your little notes and memoranda. I use a great many of them but do not often reply to your letters”.[[58]](#footnote-58) Mandel clearly funnelled a lot of information to Sokolsky on a variety of topics and individuals which contributed to the blacklist and to the clearance process.

The clearance network had high level contacts in the FBI. Sokolsky was in regular contact with Hoover, including regular letters from Hoover to Sokolsky in praise of his columns.[[59]](#footnote-59) Sokolsky’s FBI file also contains a letter with the sender redacted, presumably from Sokolsky, delivered to Louis B Nichols at the Department of Justice and FBI, enclosing clearance letters from employees of Twentieth-Century Fox.[[60]](#footnote-60) The letter states that “This particular method is beginning to bring results, and I think should be encouraged unless it is found that the statements are not truthful”.[[61]](#footnote-61) The file contains numerous examples of clearance letters, many of which were also sent to Matthews and the American Legion.[[62]](#footnote-62) Hoover responded to those letters, although the recipient of Hoover’s letter is redacted, acknowledging receipt of the clearance letters.[[63]](#footnote-63) In 1953, Hoover wrote to someone within the FBI that “Sokolsky has been very friendly to the Bureau over a number of years” and that “every possible courtesy” was to be extended to him.[[64]](#footnote-64) Sokolsky’s relationship with the FBI provided another source of important information for the clearance network to supplement that coming out of the House and Senate committees.

The clearance network was extremely complex and secretive, but the private correspondence between key players presents a clear picture of a small group of anti-communists working in the movie industry to clear accused communists. Sokolsky was the central figure in this endeavour, with close support in particular from Matthews and the American Legion. Together, they drew on a diverse range of sources to collect and distribute the information needed to make it possible to rescue some viable film talent with the intention of maintaining the blacklist as a threat to ensure compliance.

# Clearance in Practice

## Outline of the System

In order for an individual to be ‘cleared’, he or she generally needed to fulfil three important requirements: write a letter, undertake a positive ‘American’ or anti-communist act, and satisfy the ‘experts’ who evaluated their clearance. The most important part of this system was the letter writing, a technique repeatedly referred to by Sokolsky in his columns. In particular, Sokolsky emphasised the need for people to take initiative in clearing themselves.[[65]](#footnote-65) The second important step in obtaining clearance was to testify before HUAC, the SISS or provide information to the FBI – in Sokolsky’s words “an overt act to prove publicly his bona fides”.[[66]](#footnote-66) Sometimes, rather than testifying this would take the form of joining an ‘American’ organisation, or taking up “an attack upon the Communist infiltration of our country”.[[67]](#footnote-67) The final element in obtaining clearance was satisfying an expert, often Sokolsky himself, that the letter and accompanying action were enough to show that you should be allowed to return to work. Cogley in his report noted that the letters required “a court to sit in judgement” and that Sokolsky was the “Chief Justice” of that court.[[68]](#footnote-68)

## Letter Writing

The letter writing system that developed through Sokolsky and his contacts was the cornerstone of the clearance operation. In 1951 the American Legion promoted “an honest and sincere admission of all past front activities on grounds of carelessness or bad advice, lack of time or facilities to check, and similar reasons.”[[69]](#footnote-69) This ‘admission’ or explanation generally took the form of a letter addressed to the motion picture studio(s) that employed that person. Numerous examples of these letters can be found in Sokolsky’s files, as well as those of the FBI and the American Legion. Sokolsky was clear that for the letters to be acceptable they had to be a complete explanation, as he explained to James O’Neil: “A person who states in advance that the letter written is incomplete has not written a letter that could be used”.[[70]](#footnote-70) The Cogley Report contained an explanation of the template most followed in writing their letters.[[71]](#footnote-71) This included “statements that he had not known the organisation was a front, had clearly been ‘duped’, and as a loyal American citizen violently opposed Communism.”[[72]](#footnote-72)

The letters that remain available closely follow the pattern laid out by Cogley, and resembled each other in key respects. This similarity is likely due to some form of template or ‘coaching’ by people involved in clearance, although the available evidence does not disclose this part of the process. The most common recurring line that can be found in practically every letter written is the denial of Communist Party membership as stated by Brando.[[73]](#footnote-73) Kirk Douglas’s letter contained a variation on the same theme “I am not now, never have been and will never be a member of the Communist Party or any affiliated or related group nor have I ever contributed any funds to any such organization”.[[74]](#footnote-74) In fact, of the 92 available letters, 69 contain a statement of some kind that the author is not a communist. Of those, 55 us the same terminology as Brando or Douglas, or a very close equivalent. The recurrence of that same phrase in sixty percent of the letters is strong evidence that there was some form of coaching or template being used by many of those seeking clearance.

Another important element of the clearance letters was a clarification of the associations or connections that had led the individual to having communist affiliations. This generally took two forms: a denial of the accusation, or a clarification and apology. Both of these can be seen in Brando’s letter.[[75]](#footnote-75) On the subject of an accusation of a link to the Waldorf Astoria Peace Conference, Brando states “To the best of my knowledge, I did not attend the Peace Conference, and to the best of my knowledge I gave no authority for the use of my name”.[[76]](#footnote-76) By contrast, on the subject of an accusation of a financial contribution to the Civil Rights Congress 1949, Brando says “I believe that a contribution was solicited in connection with this group, and this, to my best knowledge and belief, was the group to which I gave the contribution. I am sorry, in view of my present knowledge, that I made this contribution to this group”.[[77]](#footnote-77) Noted playwright, screenwriter and actress Ruth Gordon wrote a letter with a point by point analysis of 21 different accusations levelled at her, most of which she outright denied with statements such as “This again is absolutely untrue” and “I was never a member of this organisation”.[[78]](#footnote-78) These denials and clarifications were important because they provided a written record for the clearance network should that individual be found to have lied, or minimised their associations to allow themselves to return to work. The clarification of accusations feature in every single one of the 92 letters available, suggesting that this element was an integral part of the clearance process.

Writing to Sokolsky in 1952, Baarslag shed light on the formula to which most authors conformed.[[79]](#footnote-79) Baarslag outlined a template followed by most of the letters, beginning with an exposition of the ‘victim’s’ patriotic contribution which is usually “a tear jerker of the first order”.[[80]](#footnote-80) This is followed by laughing off unimportant allegations, a defence of any allegations where the alleged front is also supported by prominent anti-communists, and an “amnesia brush off” of the really bad allegations.[[81]](#footnote-81) Sokolsky’s response to this letter gives it greater credibility as he admits that “as regards your criticism of the letters, I think what you say is quite correct, but in view of the nature of the program, these letters take on an altogether different meaning”.[[82]](#footnote-82) That meaning cannot be garnered from Sokolsky’s letter, but his acknowledgement of Baarslag’s analysis suggests that the letter writing scheme was not reliant on sincerity so much as conformity with a process in order to clear some of the people who were still wanted by the industry.

A close analysis of the available letters demonstrates the widespread nature of the process, as well as the calibre of people who were affected. Of the 92 letters surveyed, the Official Academy Awards Database of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences (the Oscars), shows that 50 of the letter writers had, at a minimum, been nominated for an Oscar.[[83]](#footnote-83) The intended recipients of the letters also tell us something of their importance. Forty-five of the ninety-two are addressed to top executives at Loew’s Inc., a parent company of MGM, while a further five are addressed directly to MGM. Another ten are addressed to top executives at The Stanley Kramer Company, ten to Twentieth Century Fox, six to Paramount Pictures, and ten to Columbia Pictures. These statistics emphasise the clearance was not a small-scale operation restricted to less important players. On the contrary, it was conducted at the highest level of the motion picture industry, encompassing the industry’s major executives.

## A Positive Act

Crucial to the viability of the blacklist was another key requirement that Sokolsky and other members of the clearance network demanded from letter writers: identifying others with communist affiliations or a willingness to “do an overt act to prove publicly his bona fides”.[[84]](#footnote-84) The network members preferred that individuals testify against their colleagues, but other public acts could sometimes meet the acceptability threshold. Sokolsky, Brewer, Bond and Hartnett all emphasised the need for those seeking clearance to do more than just write a letter. In the case of actress Kim Hunter, Hartnett suggested “concrete, pro-American acts” must supplement a statement acknowledging mistakes.[[85]](#footnote-85) Sokolsky wrote to Bond stating that “they must recognise that confession is not simply a matter of stating that one has been a communist; the very nature of the confession must include an attack upon the Communist infiltration of our country”.[[86]](#footnote-86) This general approach had the support of the American Legion, who wrote in 1951 of “a duty to denounce those who roped them in…a categorical and unequivocal repudiation of all enemy fronts with which they have been connected…some sort of assurance against being used as chumps again by designing enemy swindlers”.[[87]](#footnote-87) The Legion favoured a public act because it fitted its own public campaign in support of the blacklist. The Legion needed to convince its members and the public that the blacklisted individuals had made amends to demonstrate the effectiveness of its boycott program.

These positive ‘American’ acts or denunciations of communism took a number of different forms. In the case of Garson Kanin, Sokolsky suggested preparing an anti-communist or pro-American play for the theatre.[[88]](#footnote-88) Michael Blankfort attempted a pro-American act by releasing a pro-American statement to HUAC in May 1951.[[89]](#footnote-89) In his statement, Blankfort claims his citizenship “is one of the most cherished things in my life”.[[90]](#footnote-90) He poetically argues that “In the long run, the free have triumphed over the enslaved” and that this means “opposition to the closed society as practiced in Russia today”.[[91]](#footnote-91) Blankfort claimed that he had had no relationship with any left-wing group since leaving New York in 1937, and that his position was made clear in his 1942 book *A Time to Live* which had been highly praised as an “honest and courageous soul-searching and a re-affirmation of American democracy”.[[92]](#footnote-92)

Stanley Rubin, screenwriter and producer, backed up his letter to Twentieth Century Fox executive Spyros Skouras by testifying to HUAC in March 1953. In that testimony, he expanded on his claim to have never been a member of the Communist Party by rejecting allegations that he had attended Communist Party meetings.[[93]](#footnote-93) As part of Rubin’s testimony, he admitted attending three or four ‘study sessions’ run by Louis Lantz who was a colleague at Columbia Pictures.[[94]](#footnote-94) He was questioned in depth about that group, and other alleged Communist links, which he responded to with detailed answers including the names of others who he believed to be involved.[[95]](#footnote-95) He finished his testimony by repeating “I am not now and never have been a member of the Communist Party” and emphasising that he had placed a statement to that effect with his employer and the FBI.[[96]](#footnote-96)

## Evaluations

The final step in the clearance process was the evaluation of the letter and/or public act by the so-called ‘experts’. The Cogley Report placed particular emphasis on this stage, repeatedly referring to Sokolsky as a “Court of Last Appeals”, “Chief Justice” or “grey eminence”.[[97]](#footnote-97) Sokolsky was not the only one to offer opinions on the value or otherwise of the letters and efforts of those seeking clearance. There was not a clear hierarchy or court like structure for evaluating clearances. Sokolsky was the most common evaluator, but his work was supplemented by others including Baarslag, Brewer, Matthews, Hartnett, Hoover, O’Neil, and Bond.

Sokolsky repeatedly demonstrated through his own correspondence that he was involved in evaluating clearance letters. In 1952 he wrote to Brewer that Kanin was working on a satisfactory letter, and “now understands the mistakes he made”.[[98]](#footnote-98) In a similar vein, O’Neil passed a letter on to Sokolsky in June 1952 on the subject of film producer Lester Koenig from Frank Freeman at Paramount Pictures.[[99]](#footnote-99) Freeman noted that Koenig had pled the 5th amendment when testifying before HUAC, and so would not be credited for the project ‘Roman Holiday’ of which he was an essential part.[[100]](#footnote-100) Freeman further suggests “It is my belief…that upon Mr Koenig’s return to America after the completion of the picture, he will appear before the House Un-American Activities Committee of his own accord and will then and there answer the questions which he refused to answer at the hearing in Los Angeles in 1951”.[[101]](#footnote-101)

The evaluations provided an essential part of the system by regulating who was able to gain clearance. It was not so much a case of accepting or rejecting letters for reasons of sincerity, but rather ensuring that all those seeking clearance followed through the process in the correct manner. As is clear from the nature of the letters, they did not require a great deal of information. The evaluations provided a check on the power of simply writing a letter by providing a mechanism through which the individuals running clearance could keep a close eye on ensuring that those seeking clearance jumped through all of the required hoops.

For the clearance process to succeed without weakening the anti-communist purge, the three elements had to operate in concert. In particular, the HUAC or FBI testimonies and the evaluations by clearance experts played an important role in ensuring that the gateway provided by the letter writing facet of the operation could not be used indiscriminately by everyone on the blacklist. The checks provided by these subsequent steps were presumably designed to make the process harder and prevent the unrepentant members of the Hollywood left from avoiding damage to their career by simply writing a letter. The public fervour that had produced the blacklist could not be allowed to dissipate, nor could the blacklist become too visibly porous if ideological conformity was to be ensured. The regular correspondence between participants shows that the intention was to ensure that gaining clearance could not be achieved by following a simple formula without some public sign of repentance to shore up the blacklist rather than undermine it. Ultimately, despite their best attempts to protect the integrity of the blacklist, clearance resulted in an undermining of the blacklist which coincided with a general decline in anti-communist attitudes and ultimately helped bring an end to the blacklist by 1960.

# Impact

The end of the Hollywood blacklist was not the result of a single event and cannot be pinpointed to a particular date. Rather, it seems clear from existing scholarship that the end of the blacklist is best explained through a multi-causal approach. Larry Ceplair has pointed to was a national mood change in the late 1950s, evidenced by Kennedy’s election, San Francisco protests against HUAC and the crediting of Trumbo for his work on *Exodus*. [[102]](#footnote-102) Donald Critchlow and Thomas Doherty both provide interpretations which suggest that the end of the blacklist began earlier, pointing to film industry figures defying the blacklist in the mid-1950s, and the ‘open secret’ of Trumbo’s pseudonym winning a 1957 Oscar for *The Brave One*.[[103]](#footnote-103) [[104]](#footnote-104) Outside of the film industry there was also a decline in anti-communist attitudes, including the 1954 Senate censure of McCarthy, the 1957 Supreme Court ‘Red Monday’ decisions and Nikita Khruschev’s 1959 visit to the United States. Rebecca Prime provides another alternative explanation, suggesting that blacklisted professionals exiled to Europe were an integral part in the collapse of the blacklist, through making successful films which, were it not for the blacklist, would have been made in Hollywood and contributed to the American economy.[[105]](#footnote-105)

These explanations are, however, only based on what was publicly visible. The scholarship has failed to take the opportunity to dig deeper into the issue and provide a more detailed explanation that includes perspectives from within the blacklisting community and the blacklist structure that an examination of the clearance process reveals.

The detailed account of the clearance system which the scholars writing about the blacklist have generally neglected opens up a new perspective on the collapse of the blacklist. Based on the information now available, clearance needs to be added to the list of factors as a major *internal* cause of the collapse. The blacklisting system relied on two key things to retain its effectiveness: a system of active compliance and rigorous enforcement that actively excluded suspicious individuals; and a public perception that the system was justifiable. The public dimension is particularly important, because the motion picture studios would have no real incentive to continue their role in the scheme without public support. From an external perspective, the blacklist relied on the public’s desire to keep communism and communists off their screens. Internally, the blacklist relied on its own coherence, and on being as correct as possible as often as possible. Clearance weakened both the internal and external dimensions of the blacklist in a way that undermined its effectiveness and its ability to coerce unwilling participants.

At its most basic, the public dimension of the blacklist relied on a very simple public message that ‘Person X is a communist. Therefore, you should refuse to see any movie that Person X is involved in’. The blacklist relied on simplicity and accuracy. As clearance began to take hold in the early 1950s, mixed messages started to be sent to the public, being told that someone is a communist, and then seeing them appear with industry approval in a film. Being or not being a communist no longer appeared as a stark difference or an irremediable evil.

The blacklist was a major undertaking for a large group of people, and relied heavily on their commitment, voluntary or otherwise, to enforcing the blacklist. While isolated exceptions or errors could not significantly impair the blacklisting process, the scale of the clearance program suggests a greater challenge to its efficacy. Sokolsky himself suggested in 1954 that “about 300 persons connected with the industry took advantage of this opportunity to set themselves straight”.[[106]](#footnote-106) That number was repeated in Sokolsky’s testimony to HUAC in 1956.[[107]](#footnote-107) By any measure, that is not an isolated exception, but rather a widely-used escape route that others in the film industry could discover through the sudden reappearance of these people in the industry. The issue became one of scale. At its earliest point, the blacklist effectively consisted of 10 individuals – the members of the Hollywood 10 who refused to testify before HUAC on their communist affiliations. The number of blacklisted individuals grew rapidly from there, with 151 names published in anti-communist tract *Red Channels* alone.[[108]](#footnote-108) In a similar way, the number of individuals obtaining clearance eventually included at least three hundred (and possibly more) as suggested by Sokolsky. The fact that clearances grew as the blacklist grew suggests that once the list moved beyond the obvious and admitted communists, it began to run into difficulty. Not only did it become more difficult to prove that accused persons were actually communists, but it became much harder to keep them from re-entering the industry through clearance.

The sheer number of those obtaining clearance created three hundred holes in the blacklist-erected barrier to employment, visible internally and externally to journalists like Elizabeth Poe Kerby, civil libertarians like the ACLU, and eventually to the Fund for the Republic. As public anti-communism diminished, the clearance system began to allow film industry workers, previously accused of communism, especially high profile actors, back on to the big screen. The scale of clearance may also have helped to make those involved in the blacklisting process aware of its loss of support, and indeed the extremely limited influence communists may have had on the industry for those genuinely concerned about the issue. Given what scholars have since discovered about the nature of the communist threat, which Ceplair and many others believe was significantly exaggerated, the scale of clearance may have convinced those actively involved in both the blacklist and clearance about the futility of their ultimate goal.[[109]](#footnote-109) Clearance is likely to have shown those involved for other than ulterior motives how few of the accused communists actually had communist leanings or beliefs, and therefore undermined the rationale for the whole system.

# Conclusion

Clearance is an area of anti-communist and blacklist history that has been largely neglected in modern scholarship. That neglect is probably related to the ambiguity of the clearance system. Clearance does not fit well into the conventional scholarship’s good v evil model, and does not clearly support either of the dominant models of scholarship that posit anti-communism as an unnecessary evil on one hand, or as a necessary response to a real threat on the other. Clearance was a more secretive system than the blacklist because it did not rely on public actions and indeed sought to avoid public knowledge in contrast to boycotts, pickets, and pamphlets ‘naming names’.

Despite the reluctance shown by most scholars to engage with clearance, the analysis here shows it was an important part of the wider system that deserves recognition. That a clearance system existed is not in doubt. George Sokolsky and his regular correspondents left behind sufficient evidence which, although scattered and occasionally piecemeal, allows a picture to be drawn of a widespread yet secretive network encompassing both public and private individuals and groups. That system, including high levels of government, the media, and law enforcement created a system that allowed some of those accused of being communist or having communist influences to clear their names and retain or reclaim their jobs. For those who managed to get clearance, this went some way towards mitigating the harm caused to them by the blacklist. Moving beyond the narrative of how clearance operated, study of clearance carries further importance for the light it can shed on the gradual collapse of the blacklist from the exposure in the Cogely Report to ongoing discussion and defiance to open flouting in 1959 and 1960. Clearance helped to undermine the blacklist both internally and externally by poking three hundred holes into a system that relied on being holeproof. Because of that substantial impact, clearance deserves a central place in any explanation of the blacklist, its effects, and its collapse.

1. Marlon Brando to Loew’s Incorporated, Attention: Nicholas Schenck, 8 July 1952, p 1, Box 694, George Sokolsky Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford, CA [hereafter Sokolsky/HI]. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Paramount Pictures, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Twentieth-Century Fox, The Stanley Kramer Company and Columbia Pictures were all involved in the blacklist. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Jay Roach, *Trumbo*, Biography, Drama, (2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. American Business Consultants Inc., *Red Channels: The Report of Communist Influence in Radio and Television*, 22 June 1950; J.B. Matthews, ‘Did the Movies Really Clean House?’, *The American Legion Magazine*, December 1951, 12-13, 49-56. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. George Sokolsky, 'These Days: Those Hollywood Reds', *The Washington Post and Times Herald*, 6 September 1954, 11; see also George Sokolsky, ‘Communists in Hollywood’, *The Washington Post and Times Herald*, 3 June 1954, 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. ‘Investigation of So-Called ‘Blacklisting’ in Entertainment Industry – Report of the Fund for the Republic, Inc. – Part 1’, Hearings Before the Committee of Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Eighty-Fourth Congress, Second Session, July 10-11 1956, (Washington: GPO, 1956) p 5288. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Ronald D. Cohen, “Millard Lampell: Blacklisted,” *American Communist History* 9, no. 3 (2010): 293–313; Larry Ceplair, *Dalton Trumbo Blacklisted Hollywood Radical.*, Screen Classics (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Victor S. Navasky, *Naming Names* (New York, NY: Penguin, 1981); Stefan Kanfer, *A Journal of the Plague Years*, [1st ed.]. (New York, Atheneum, 1973). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Richard Gid Powers, *Not Without Honor: The History of American Anticommunism.* (New York: Free Press, 1995). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. John Earl Haynes, “The Cold War Debate Continues: A Traditionalist View of Historical Writing on Domestic Communism and Anti-Communism,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 2, no. 1 (2000): 101. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. John Sbardellati, “Cold War, Culture War: The FBI and the Battle over Film Propaganda” (ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2006); Jennifer Frost, *Hedda Hopper’s Hollywood: Celebrity Gossip and American Conservatism*, American History and Culture (New York University Press, New York, 2011); Ceplair, *Anti-Communism in Twentieth-Century America*. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. John Cogley, *Report on Blacklisting: 1-Movies*, The Fund for the Republic Inc., New York, 1956; Merle Miller, *The Judges and the Judged,* (Doubleday, 1952).

John Cogley was a journalist, was the editor and a columnist for *Commonweal*, a liberal catholic journal, and was a project director for the Fund for the Republic [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Elizabeth Poe, ‘The Hollywood Story’, *Frontier*, May 1954. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Thomas Patrick Doherty, *Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCarthyism, and American Culture*, Film and Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 231. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Ceplair, *Anti-Communism in Twentieth-Century America*, 123. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Navasky, *Naming Names*, 90–91. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. George Sokolsky, ‘These Days: Communists in Hollywood’, *The Washington Post and Times Herald*, 3 June 1954, 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Cogley, *Report on Blacklisting*. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Ibid., pp 127-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Cogley, *Report on Blacklisting*, p 128. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Anthony Lewis, ‘’Clearing’ Board on Actors Denied: O’Neil and Sokolsky Testify They Help to ‘Rehabilitate’ Performers Tied to Reds’, *The New York* Times, 12 July 1956, 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. William Edwards, ‘3 Deny Aiding ‘Clearance’ of Accused Reds: Hit Fund for Republic Report as False’, *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 12 July 1956, 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Edwards, ‘3 Deny Aiding ‘Clearance’ of Accused Reds’. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. George Sokolsky to Karl Baarslag, 5 November 1951, Box 18, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. George Sokolsky, ‘These Days: Those Hollywood Reds’. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. George Sokolsky, ‘These Days: The Lists of the Wicked’, Working Copy, 28 June 1952, p 1, Box 180, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. George Sokolsky to Ward Bond, 26 March 1951, Box 26, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. George Sokolsky to J.B. Matthews, 22 March 1952, Box 695, The J. B. Matthews Papers, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Duke University [Hereafter JBM/Duke]. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. James F O’Neil to George Sokolsky, 26 March 1953, Box 93, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Roy Brewer to George Sokolsky, 12 May 1952, p 1, Box 260, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. *Communist Front Organisations,* Appendix Part IX. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Sbardellati, “Cold War, Culture War,” 230. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Matthews, ‘Did the Movies Really Clean House?’. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Cogley, *Report on Blacklisting*, 129. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. J.B. Matthews to George Sokolsky, December 1947, Box 87, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. George Sokolsky to J. B. Matthews, 22 March 1952, Box 695, JBM/Duke. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. “Karl Baarslag, Author And Ex-Congress Aide,” *The New York Times*, January 14, 1984, sec. Obituaries, http://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/14/obituaries/karl-baarslag-author-and-ex-congress-aide.html. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Karl Baarslag to George Sokolsky, 20 August 1952, Box 18, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Roy Brewer to Carl Baarslag, 15 July 1952, Box 29, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. George Sokolsky to Roy Brewer, 21 July 1952, Box 29, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. ‘James F. O’Neil, 84, Published Magazine of American Legion’, *The New York Times,* 31 July 1981, sec: Obituaries, available from: http://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/31/obituaries/james-f-o-neil-84-published-magazine-of-american-legion.html, accessed 22/09/2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. J. B. Matthews to James O’Neil, 3 April 1953, Box 695, JBM/Duke. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. James O’Neil to George Sokolsky, 15 April 1952, Box 93, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. James O’Neil to George Sokolsky, 15 September 1952, Box 93, Sokolsky/HI; James F O’Neil to George Sokolsky, 26 March 1953, Box 93, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Lewis, ‘’Clearing’ Board on Actors Denied’. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Cogley, *Report on Blacklisting*, p 125. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Ibid., p 125. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Benjamin Mandel to George Sokolsky, March 25 1949, Box 85, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Benjamin Mandel to George Sokolsky, 24 June 1949, Box 85, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. George Sokolsky to Benjamin Mandel, 18 July 1949, Box 85, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. ‘George Sokolsky’ – FBI file, available from https://archive.org/details/GeorgeSokolsky, accessed 21/09/2016, Part 1, pp. 33, 36, 43. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. ‘George Sokolsky’ – FBI File, Part 1, p 94. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Ibid., part 1, p 94. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. ‘George Sokolsky’, FBI File, Part 1, p 110. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Ibid., Part 1, p 193. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Ibid., Part 1, p 252. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. George Sokolsky, ‘These Days: The Case of Elia Kazan’, Working Copy, 21 April 1952, p 2, Box 179, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. George Sokolsky to Roy Brewer, 21 July 1952, Box 29, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. George Sokolsky to Ward Bond, 26 December 1951, Box 26, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Cogley, *Report on Blacklisting*, pp 127-128. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. ‘Innocent or Guilty’, Reprint of ‘Communism in the Entertainment World’, from January 1951 issue of ‘Supply of Trends and Developments Exposing the Communist Conspiracy’, published by National Americanism Commission Sub-Committee on Subversive Activities, American Legion, p 4, Box 18, Folder 68, Church League of America Collection of the Research Files of *Counterattack*, The Wackenhut Corporation and Karl Baarslag, Tamiment Library Archives [Hereafter Church League/TAM], TAM.148. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. George Sokolsky to James O’Neil, 13 June 1952, Box 261, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Cogley, *Report on Blacklisting,* ‘How to Write a Letter’, pp. 144-157. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Ibid, p 144. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Marlon Brando to Loew’s Incorporated, Attention: Nicholas Schenck, 8 July 1952, p 1, Box 694, JBM/Duke. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Kirk Douglas to Loew’s Incorporated, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Attention: Marvin Schenck, 5 September 1952, p 3, Box 694, JBM/Duke. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Marlon Brando 8 July 1952, pp 1-5, Box 694, JBM/Duke. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Marlon Brando 8 July 1952, pp 2-3, Box 694, JBM/Duke. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Marlon Brando 8 July 1952, p 3, Box 694, JBM/Duke. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Ruth Gordon to Nicholas Schenck, Loew’s Incorporated, 21 July 1952, pp 1-9, Box 695, JBM/Duke. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Karl Baarslag to George Sokolsky, 20 August 1952, pp 1-4, Box 18, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Ibid, p 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Ibid, p 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. George Sokolsky to Karl Baarslag, 24 August 1952, Box 18, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. For more information, see the ‘Official Academy Awards Database’ available at http://awardsdatabase.oscars.org/ampas\_awards/BasicSearchInput.jsp. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. George Sokolsky to Roy Brewer, 21 July 1952, Box 29, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Vincent Hartnett to Arthur P Jacobs, 15 May 1953, Box 59, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. George Sokolsky to Ward Bond, 26 December 1951, Box 26, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
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88. George Sokolsky to Roy Brewer, 21 July 1952, Box 29, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. Michael Blankfort, ‘Statement – Michael Blankfort’, Copied May 9 1951, pp 1-11, Box 694, JBM/Duke. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
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91. Ibid, p 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. Ibid, p 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. ‘*Communist Methods of Infiltration (Education): Hearings Before the Committee of Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session, February 25-27 1953’*, (Washington: GPO, 1953), 912. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Ibid, p 913. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. Ibid, pp 913-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. Ibid, p 921. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
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99. Secretary to the Director of Publications, American Legion [James O’Neil] to George Sokolsky, 17 June 1952, Box 96, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. Frank Freeman to James O’Neil, 9 June 1952, p 3, Box 96, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Frank Freeman to James O’Neil, 9 June 1952, p 4, Box 96, Sokolsky/HI. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. Ceplair, *Anti-Communism in Twentieth-Century America*, 191. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. Donald T. Critchlow, *When Hollywood Was Right: How Movie Stars, Studio Moguls, and Big Business Remade American Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 106. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Ibid., 231. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. Ibid., p 162. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. George Sokolsky, 'These Days: Those Hollywood Reds', *The Washington Post and Times Herald*, 6 September 1954, 11 [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. Lewis, ‘’Clearing’ Board on Actors Denied’. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. American Business Consultants Inc., *Red Channels: The Report of Communist Influence in Radio and Television*, 22 June 1950. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. Ceplair, *Anti-Communism in Twentieth-Century America*, 215. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)