Who is 'New Zealand'?

Publics in Aotearoa/New Zealand General Election Discourse

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A thesis submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington in fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of Masters in Media Studies

Victoria University of Wellington

2016

Acknowledgements

Each individual relies on a vast social web. It is impossible to name everyone who made this work possible.

With that in mind, and in alphabetical order, I would like to acknowledge:

Judith and Bruce Anderson

Hera Lindsay Bird

Sue and Bill Bradford

Anita Brady

Vita Bryant

Robbie Bunker

Uther Dean

Don Franks

Sandra Grey

Kassie Hartendorp

Gayaal Iddamalgoda

Sarah Johnstone

Robyn E Kenealy

Alison Laurie

Bill Logan

Heleyni and Marika Pratley

LaQuisha Redfern

Benedict Joseph Reid

Ruth, Emily and Andrew Russell

Dylan Sofa

Annette Sykes

Fetuolemoana Tamapeau

Rangimoana Taylor

Teresia Teaiwa

Sonny Thomas

Peter Thompson

Leilani Viseisio

Jenny White

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Abstract

2011 saw the lowest voter turnout in Aotearoa/New Zealand since women won the right to vote (Vowles, 2014). This decline in participation aligns with trends elsewhere in the Anglosphere (Ailes, 2015; Hansard, 2015). This organic crisis poses new questions for notions of the 'public sphere' and 'publics' – the forms of political engagement with citizens in a mass-mediated society. Fraser (1990) contends that in theorising the “limits of actually existing late capitalist democracy” (p. 57), we need a notion of pluralised and contesting 'publics' (ibid). The project asks how political parties named the 'public' (or publics) in the 2011 and 2014 Aotearoa / New Zealand General Elections. In order to consider the dominance of these political articulations, research will also consider whether these invocations of 'the public' found coverage in the national press. This is not intended as a sociological examination of actually existing publics, but an examination of dominant encoding (Hall, 2001). This analysis tests the thesis that *dominant cross-partisan electoral discourses defined the 'public' in terms of dual identification with productive work and capital, in opposition to named subaltern publics*. This formulation suggests that workers are called to identify with capital, following from Gramsci's (2011) theorisation of bourgeois hegemony. Research begins with a content analysis of party press releases and mainstream coverage during the 2011 & 2014 General Elections, when official discourses hailing 'the public' are intensified. Content analysis quantifies nouns used for publics – for example, 'taxpayer', 'New Zealander', or even 'the public'. From this content analysis, the project proceeds to a critical discourse analysis, which seeks to historically contextualise and explain the patterns in content. Reworking Ernesto Laclau's (2005a) theorisation of populism to factor in the left/right axis (which Laclau considered outmoded), this critical discourse analysis considers what 'public' alliances are articulated, and what political programmes these articulations serve.

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Research question(s)	Data	Method	Theoretical framework
How did political parties invoke the 'public' (or publics) in the 2011 and 2014 Aotearoa / New Zealand General Elections?	All parliamentary party press releases and national newspaper coverage over the last two weeks of 2011 & 2014 General Elections.	Content analysis identifying nouns.	Context of “democratic deficit,” question of 'publics' in this crisis of democracy.
What degree of representation did these articulations find in the national press?	Selected 'typical' and 'atypical' releases and articles.	Critical discourse analysis.	Hegemonic constitution of 'peoples'.

Introduction

2011 saw the lowest voter turnout in Aotearoa/New Zealand since women won the right to vote (Vowles, 2014). The Civics and Media Project, a “non-partisan, cross-institutional initiative”, suggests that “civic engagement in New Zealand is under threat” (Civics and Media Project, 2016). Declining public participation in civic institutions has been termed a “democratic deficit” (Beetham 2002; Grey and Sedgwick 2013). This local decline of participations aligns with trends elsewhere in the Anglosphere (Ailes, 2015; Hansard, 2015). This crisis poses new questions for notions of the ‘public sphere’ and ‘publics’ – how citizens engage politically in a mass-mediated society. Fraser (1990) contends that in theorising the “limits of actually existing late capitalist democracy” (p. 57), we need a notion of pluralised and contesting ‘publics’ (ibid). Recent international trends have seen the emergence of new populist movements opposing neoliberalism. These include left-reformist electoral campaigns; Syriza's election in Greece, Bernie Sanders' campaign in the US and Jeremy Corbyn's successful leadership bid in UK Labour (Dean, 2016, p. 1-25). Conversely, right-wing populist campaigns have found new electoral

currency; UKIP's Brexit campaign in the UK, Trump's campaign in the US. My research considers whether these international populist trends have found mainstream expression in Aotearoa/New Zealand electoral discourse, using an adaptation of Ernesto Laclau's (2005a) framework for examining populism, factoring in the left/right axis which Laclau considered outmoded. This research project seeks to identify how specific 'publics' are invoked within political frameworks such as populism. The project asks how political parties named the 'public' (or publics) in the 2011 and 2014 Aotearoa / New Zealand General Elections, as elections are a period of intensified appeals to publics. In order to consider the dominance of these political articulations, research also considers whether these invocations of 'the public' were covered in the national press. This is not intended as a sociological examination of actually existing publics, but an examination of dominant encoding (Hall, 2001). This analysis tests the thesis that *dominant cross-partisan electoral discourses defined the 'public' in terms of dual identification with productive work and capital, in opposition to named subaltern publics*. This formulation suggests that workers are called to identify with capital, following from Gramsci's (2011) theorisation of bourgeois hegemony. Research begins with a content analysis of party press releases and mainstream coverage during the 2011 & 2014 General Elections, a period when dominant political actors seek consent from their 'publics'. Content analysis quantifies nouns used for publics – for example, 'taxpayer', 'New Zealander', or even 'the public'. From this content analysis, the project proceeds to a critical discourse analysis, which seeks to historically contextualise and explain the patterns in content. This critical discourse analysis considers what alliances are articulated, and what political programme these articulations serve.

Political background

My examination of local manifestations of the 'crisis in democracy' draws on normative notions of the "public sphere" or pluralised "publics." The notion of 'publics' is informed by Nancy Fraser's (1990) complication of Jurgen Habermas' public sphere theory. The 'public sphere' was initially theorised as a space of common democratic deliberation, where inequalities were bracketed, and which has been disrupted by 'refeudalisation' under late capitalism (Habermas, 1962). Critical scholars contend that the 'public sphere' in Aotearoa/New Zealand is undermined by increasing privatisation of media, with a lack of support for critical journalism undermining the space for public participation (Hope, 1996; Hope, 2012; Thompson, 2011). Conversely, many argue that the 'public sphere' never truly existed, as it

involved exclusions from its inception – along class, race, gender and national lines (Fraser, 1990). Fraser concedes that the public sphere, as an egalitarian space, has never truly existed, but upholds it as a normative ideal (p. 78-79). Her work seeks to theorise “the limits of democracy in late capitalist societies” (p. 56), with the normative aim of conceiving a “post-bourgeois public sphere” (p. 58). For Fraser, the “bourgeois public was never *the* public” (p. 61), but was rather disrupted by “subaltern counterpublics” from the start (p. 67-68). Although focusing on dominant bourgeois discourse, rather than “subaltern counterpublic” discourse, my analysis considers the hailing of ‘publics’ along pluralised lines – national, ethnic, gendered et al. This analysis also considers the disavowed ‘nonpublics’ in dominant discourse. The ‘nonpublic’ was coined to consider power relations deemed outside the ‘public sphere’, particularly class relations in the factory, not considered a space for democratic deliberation (Negt and Kluge, 1972, p. 39). My analysis uses the terms ‘public’ and ‘nonpublic’ more broadly in reference to the way communities are *invoked* or *disavowed* in dominant discourse, for example the term ‘foreigner’ which disavows a community as outside the national ‘public’. With record-high non-voters in Aotearoa/New Zealand recently dubbed the “missing million” (Williams, 2014), the concept of ‘nonpublics’ may assist in considering relationships between political discourse and growing disenfranchisement.

My research also examines whether recent international populist trends have found expression in Aotearoa/New Zealand electoral discourse. This project's consideration of potential populist articulation draws on Gramscian theorist Ernesto Laclau's (2005a) framework for understanding ‘populist reason’. For Laclau, the ‘people’ is the “central protagonist of politics (p. 249). Populism in constituting a ‘people’ is not a particular kind of political movement, or a pejorative term, but is rather necessary to various degrees for any political articulation (p. 117). Jovanovski (2016) calls Laclau's framework into question, examining populist projects in Southern Europe, and dubs these projects a form of ‘radical centrism’ that fail to challenge the structural nature of capitalism. Gurhanli (2013) also contends that populist figures like Italy's Berlusconi trouble Laclau's thesis, as they do not pose a structural challenge to the prevailing regime. Taking these critiques of Laclau's ‘centrism’ into account, my analysis considers to what degree populist articulations pose a challenge to the prevailing regime. Laclau (2005a) defines “populism” in contrast to “institutionalism” - while institutionalism limits discourse to forms that keep social structures intact, populism polarises discourse between the ‘people’ and some opposing group

(p. 81). As neoliberalism is the prevailing organisation of capitalism in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Kelsey, 2016), my analysis defines 'institutionalist' articulations as those which seek to keep neoliberalism intact, while populist articulations polarise 'the people' with the neoliberal elite. However, in addition to Laclau's populist/institutionalist axis, my analysis factors in the left/right axis which Laclau considered outmoded.¹ In particular, my methodology distinguishes between left-wing and right-wing populism, which Laclau (2005a) considers less important than the moment of "radical *anomie*" which is not specific to left or right-wing politics (p. 88). The difference between left-wing and right-wing populism lies in the nature of 'the people' constituted to challenge the neoliberal elite. Whereas left-wing populism defines its 'people' through subalternity (wherever power exists a challenge will emerge), right-wing populism defines its 'people' through the nation-state. As the nation-state is a cross-class alliance, this formation cannot fundamentally challenge capitalism. As Indian Marxist Jairus Banaji (2016) argues in relation to India's right-wing "communalist" movement, neoliberalism and nationalism both serve right-wing purposes, each disarming the working class in different ways:

Neo-liberalism disarms the working class economically, destroying its cohesion in an industrial, economic sense. Racism, communalism and nationalism... do the same in more insidious ways, destroying the possibility of the working class ever acquiring a sense of its own solidarity and of what it really is (Banaji, 2016).

For Laclau (2005a), a 'people' is constituted through *demands* (p. 74-75). My analysis frames demands through Fraser's (2005) three-dimensional framework of (cultural) *recognition*, (economic) *redistribution* and (political) *representation* (p. 305-306). For example, the slogan 'recognise the union, pay a living wage'. Workers are *recognised* as a people, or a public, with legitimate demands. Political *representation* occurs through the union. Finally, the slogan demands economic *redistribution* through

1

In the 1970s, Laclau (1977) distinguished between left-wing and right-wing populism, defining right-wing populism as that which supports the dominating class (p. 173). However, my own definition of right-wing populism (as specifically nationalist) contradicts Laclau's politics, as Laclau supported Peronism (Keucheyan, 2015), a deeply nationalist project. I also consider his early definition of right-wing populism (that which supports the dominating class) to be a tautological truism within Marxist politics, lacking adequate explanatory value. Furthermore, this was before his epistemological break with classical Marxism (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985/2001). His post-Marxist framework for analysing populism (Laclau, 2005a), which my analysis employs in considering alliances, does not distinguish between left-wing and right-wing populism. My taxonomy is therefore distinct both from Laclau's 1977 definition and his 2005 non-definition of 'right-wing populism.'

improved wages. A working-class 'people' is thus constituted through demands. In contrast, political actors may appeal to members of the same group through the slogan 'stop beneficiaries from ripping off the taxpayer'. The slogan makes a demand for *redistribution* of wealth, away from welfare recipients. The slogan also implies that the state is failing in its job of *representing* the taxpayer, by spending money wastefully. Finally, the taxpayer is *recognised* as a legitimate, productive citizen. The 'taxpayer' is a cross-class coalition – theoretically every citizen must pay taxes, but implicitly only 'productive' citizens do (an ironic mystification, given that capitalists have more capacity to evade taxes than beneficiaries). Therefore unlike the previous working class slogan, a cross-class 'people' is constituted in opposition to subalterns. A people is defined not only by its sociological position, but its political allegiance, which is constituted through demands.

Methodology

My analysis begins with a content analysis of a) party press releases and b) mainstream election coverage. Kimberley Neuendorf (2002) defines content analysis as a 'scientific' method, a quantitative method that can be reproduced or verified (p. 2). However, content analysis cannot necessarily identify how audiences may respond (Newbold et al 2002, p. 80). In Hall's (2001) framework, my analysis is more focused on the moment of hegemonic 'encoding' than audience 'decoding', as encoding (or text production) is a locus of institutional power (p. 189-212). However, some comparisons between electoral discourse and public behaviour are discussed – through polls, final vote, and surveys of non-voters, as an indicative rather than conclusive measure. A fuller analysis of audience response requires a more ethnographic approach, which is outside the scope of this project.

My content analysis compares party press releases with mainstream press coverage, to identify which formal political discourses of 'the public' are structurally privileged. The content consists of two batches; press releases by parties with seats in parliament (National Party, Labour Party, Green Party, New Zealand First, Māori Party, Internet-MANA, ACT, United Future), and front page electoral coverage in major national newspapers (NZ Herald, Dominion Post). Nzherald.co.nz and Stuff.co.nz (website of the Dominion Post) are among the top 10 ranked websites in New Zealand in terms of hits (Alexa, 2014), making them platforms for dominant political discourse. The analysis seeks nouns for 'publics' across all sources, applying a consistent coding schedule to all content (Appendix). This analysis is restricted

to the last two weeks of the 2011 and 2014 General Elections, both to study official discourses of the 'public' in a period of democratic deficit, and to ensure available comparable data (especially given the wide range of parties selected). I draw press releases from the archives of party websites, however the extent of these archives is inconsistent. Where archives are lacking, I contact the parties for press releases over the defined period. Finally, Scoop is used as a last resort, as an online source which prints all press releases unedited.

My content analysis began with a draft list of nouns intended to correspond to 'publics' or 'nonpublics' – e.g. 'New Zealander', 'worker', 'taxpayer', 'foreigner'. After manually checking this list of nouns against the content, the coding schedule is expanded to incorporate unanticipated terms. Once reworked, the coding schedule is consistently applied across all content. The coding schedule includes 14 categories (Ethnic, Economic, Gendered...) and 213 individual nouns (Appendix). I quantify nouns, and make brief qualitative notes for future reference; e.g. whether 'families' are associated with violence or nurturance.

Content analysis generally seeks to group individual *units* of texts into broader *categories*, for ease of analysis (Stemler 2001). However my unit of analysis, the specific noun, must be treated individually. The terms 'taxpayer' and 'beneficiary' could sociologically refer to the same person (as beneficiaries pay consumption taxes), yet the ideological inflections of these terms are distinct. Therefore while broader categories of analysis are certainly employed, the individual nouns (or units) are more crucial to this analysis. Quantitative analysis is conducted manually, as the batch is relatively small and requires some qualitative assessments: e.g. whether 'Kiwi' refers to the people, the bird or the bank.

This analysis produces the background needed for an informed qualitative analysis of the discursive construction of 'the public'. Whereas the content analysis is only drawn from the last two weeks of the 2011 and 2014 General Elections, examples for critical discourse analysis are drawn from a wider pool of parliamentary coverage, to provide context and comparisons.

The presentation of findings is broken into three chapters. Each chapter outlines an aspect of the quantitative findings, before proceeding to critical discourse analysis of selected examples. The first chapter works to characterise the discourse of the two major parties, National and Labour – including

any commonalities and divergences between them. The second chapter considers whether dominant parties recognise subaltern groups, and whether any articulations of subaltern agency are visible in the texts. Finally, the third chapter considers the relationship between major parties and national press, particularly in terms of constructing the national political 'centre'. This critical discourse analysis seeks to test the hypothesis that *dominant cross-partisan discourses defined the 'public' by dual identification with productive work and capital, in opposition to named subaltern publics.*

Figure 1

Chapter 0: Historicist and Analytic Methodology

This chapter outlines three key aspects of my methodology and theoretical framework; 3) a content analysis of party press releases and national press coverage, 2) contextualised by local historical background, 1) understood through Communist Theory. Anthropologist Levi-Strauss (1963) suggested that certain “institutional forms,” such as the “*father*,” may have a “**zero value**” - they provide the structure of structure, the meaning that allows meaning (p. 35, 159). Before my empirical investigation into *bourgeois discourse*, I first establish the 'zero-level' of my investigation; the prior discursive elements that allow me to speak (Figure 1). Building on the work of Marxists and other critical theorists, this project assumes the global dominance of *white-supremacist capitalist patriarchy* (bell hooks; 1981), its localised form in *colonisation* of Aotearoa / New Zealand (Evan Poata-Smith; 1997), and a recent *neoliberal* phase of capitalism defined by flexibilisation and privatisation (Kelsey, 2016). My analysis investigates how political actors within this regime hail a *people*, or *public*, and whether this call serves to *reproduce* or *interrupt* the prevailing discursive regime.

I. Communist Theory

My analysis is informed by prior Marxist critique. Marxism is often rebuked for an overemphasis on economic determination (see Laclau and Mouffe, 1985/2001). As Engels conceded in a letter to J Bloch, this stress on the economic was partly a compensation for perceived limitations in the left literature of the time:

Marx and I are partly responsible for the fact that at times our disciples have laid more weight upon the economic factor than belongs to it. We were compelled to emphasize this main principle in opposition; to our opponents who denied it, and there wasn't always time, place and occasion to do justice to the other factors in the reciprocal interaction (1890/2006).

In place of this 'economism', Laclau and Mouffe (1985/2001) conversely elevate ideological hegemony (or discourse) as the "precise terrain" for social relations (p. 67). Similarly Foucault (1972) elevates discourse analysis as a method in itself, rejecting 'allegorical' readings such as historicism (p. 138-139). While drawing heavily on Laclau and Foucault's work, I suggest this elevation of discourse throws out the baby with the bathwater² - as Boucher (2008) contends in a critique of post-marxism, discourse "becomes the quasi-transcendental ground for an expanded conception of politics and history" (p. 87). Discourse analysis becomes a totalising theory, subordinating economic determination. As David Harvey (2005) suggests, elevating any moment as solely determining is potentially "dangerous" or at least misleading (p. 194-196).

2 In defence of clichés: The concept of recovering a baby from dirty bathwater strikes me as a powerful metaphor for grappling with often complex, contradictory intellectual history – separating the value of anti-capitalism from the sometimes misguided prejudices of its theorists, for example. I find this metaphor particularly powerful because its flipside, the cliché, is a horrifying Gothic metaphor: imagine the parent or caregiver accidentally sending a baby to the ground, out the window, down the drain. If we chuck out the baby with the bathwater, is there still a chance to recover the baby? Have we permanently injured the baby, and can they still lead a healthy life? Or is the baby irrecoverable? Can we live with ourselves when we realise what we've done?

In American revolutionary Thomas Carlyle's words, supporting the abolition of slavery, but asking whether its abolition may lead to new forms of economic precarity: "The Germans say, "you must empty-out the bathing-tub, but not the baby along with it." Fling-out your dirty water with all zeal, and set it careening down the kennels; but try if you can keep the little child!" (Carlyle, 1849; quoted in Wilton, 2007).

Figure 2

Figure 3

David Harvey (2005) draws six 'moments' of historical determination out of Marx's work – Relations to Nature, Modes of Production, Technology, Social Relations, Reproduction of Daily Life, Mental Conceptions of the World / The Semiotic (p. 193-196; Figure 2). Each of these moments can serve to 'reveal' the others (p. 194-196). Harvey's model contrasts both with Laclau and Mouffe's elevation of

discourse, and the classical Marxist³ assertion that the economic moment determines in the “last instance”. Academically, Harvey's model implies that Cultural Theory (including discourse analysis) and Political Economy should inform each other. Fairclough and Graham (2002) argue for the relevance of 'critical discourse analysis' in revealing certain structuring principles of global capitalism (p. 187). They further assert that Marx was a “discourse analyst *avant la lettre* [before the term was invented]” (p. 225), as he analysed the interconnection of discourse and other social moments (p. 187), critically analysing the categories of political economy for what they exclude. My project focuses primarily on discourse, which in Harvey's model falls under the 'semiotic' moment (the production of meaning through signs), examining secondarily how this interacts with the dominant political-economy (Figure 3). This theoretical emphasis does not assume that discourse is the sole historically primary element, it simply happens to be the structural element my analysis begins from. Discourse is an element of ideological hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985/2001; Hall, 2006).

Hegemony first entered socialist discourse with the Russian slogan “proletarian hegemony in the democratic revolution” (Lih, 2006, p. 96-101; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 50). This slogan meant that proletarian revolutionaries should monopolise “democratic” tasks such as universal suffrage and anti-colonial liberation, rather than simply focusing on “economic” slogans (ibid). Italian Communist Antonio Gramsci famously developed this notion while imprisoned by Mussolini's regime, sketching ideas that now form the basis of *hegemony theory*. Gramsci's focus shifted from simply proletarian hegemony, to bourgeois hegemony, developing the notion into a more pervasive theory of class rule; cultural, political, and economic (Lih, 2006, 100-101). In this sense hegemony theory is a development of the classical Marxist theory of the state. Marx and Engels held that the economically ruling class in any regime must also be the politically ruling class (Engels, 1884). Gramsci argued that political rule, in order to last, requires a combination of *coercion* and *consent*, so in his formula:

state = political society + civil society, that is, hegemony protected by the armor of coercion
(Gramsci, 2011c, p. 75).

Gramsci contrasted this more expansive view of the state, incorporating the liberal ideal of the “ethical state” legitimated by popular consent, with the “gendarme or night-watchman [police officer] state”, which would only guard private property (ibid). With bourgeois hegemony, *civil society* becomes an

3 See Althusser (1962), Engels (1890/2006).

independent “state without a state” (ibid). Class rule is not just a matter of direct physical violence, but *ideological hegemony*. Although Gramsci was a Leninist, this focus on sophisticated 'democratic' hegemony is arguably more relevant to 'liberal democracies' (such as Aotearoa/New Zealand) than the experiences of the Russian revolution. It's also a less optimistic theory – as Lih (2006) observes, the term 'hegemony' in socialist theory develops from the confident notion that “we can use proletarian influence over other classes to achieve great aims” to the more pessimistic⁴ notion that “the influence of the bourgeoisie over even the proletariat keeps us from achieving very much” (p. 101). Gramscian theorist Ernesto Laclau (2005a) defines hegemony as “nothing more than the investment, in a partial object, of a fullness which will always evade us because it is purely mythical” (116). While I consider this a one-sided⁵ definition, it serves as a definition of the *consensual* component of hegemony – the investment of encompassing social meaning in a partial symbol, for example the idea that what's best for the national leader (a partial symbol) is best for everyone (the fullness of social existence). This research project asks how dominant parties seek consent. Gramsci describes the (discursive and political) superstructure as the skin of the (economic) structure, necessary to survival:

There is a necessary and vital connection between structure and superstructure, just as there is between the skin and the skeleton in the human body. It would be silly to say that a person stands erect on his [*sic*] skin rather than his skeleton, and yet this does does not mean that the skin is merely an appearance and an illusion – so much so that the condition of a flayed person is not very pleasant (Gramsci, 2011b, p. 157).

Cultural superstructure and economic structure are necessary to each other. Hall (2006) contends that while it may be reductive to say that ideas are determined in the “last instance” by economics (p. 28), determination by social structure in the “first instance” seems more appropriate (p. 44); we enter a social structure before we figure out how to respond. This is the basis of a “Marxism without guarantees,” which recognises the “limits” of a social formation, but does not feign god-like predictive powers (p. 44).

4 This theoretical transformation occurred in Mussolini's jails, arguably similar to the growth of the Frankfurt School in the wake of the Third Reich (Jeffries, 2016), with fascist ideology posing a challenge to classical Marxist theories of social progress.

5 Laclau's insistence on elevating discourse over other historical moments leads him to theorise the consensual aspects of hegemony, while neglecting the material aspects; application of force, deprivation of resources.

Without economically determined guarantees, the question of political agency is renewed (ibid). While cautioning that the structure/agency question may be a Gordian knot, Bieler and Morton promote a *historicist* approach (2001). Following Gramsci, historicism is not about establishing “universally valid” laws, but exploring action within “particular historical limits” (p. 22). Historicism emphasises *time* in the interaction of agents and structure – to put it simply, “Some structures are the consequences of actions by people in the past” (p. 9). Certain structures, like feudalism or capitalism, are deeply embedded and unlikely to change at a given point in time (p. 10). “Objective” simply means “universal subjective,” or universally recognised by people – for example, the nation-state emerges as a “universal subjective” or “humanly objective” fact at this point in history (p. 22). The aim here is not to make an argument for or against the possibility of agency. In a distinction crucial for media analysis, Stuart Hall (2001) distinguishes between the moment of hegemonic “encoding,” or production by dominant media, and “decoding,” or reading by publics – the moment of decoding may be oppositional, negotiated or may reproduce dominant hegemony (p. 189-212). This project focuses on the moment of “encoding,” the discursive attempt to ensure consent for the political-economic structure. At the macro-level, my analysis assumes that *capitalism* is a deeply embedded structure (p. 26), or to borrow a reworking from bell hooks, “white supremacist capitalist patriarchy” (1981). At a meso-level, the analysis assumes that *neoliberalism* is the prevailing world-system for organising capitalism (Cox 1987, p109; cited in Bieler & Morton, 2007, p. 23), characterised by international flexibilisation, financialisation, and attacks on working-class organisation. While the recent global financial crisis has seen neoliberalism thrown somewhat into question internationally (Kelsey, 2005), this has largely meant injections of capital or small policy changes followed by a return to business-as-usual (p. 244). In this international context, my analysis considers whether the articulations under scrutiny reveal unity in neoliberal discourse, or seek to constitute a ‘people’ that may fracture the prevailing discourse.

This project analyses hegemonic invocations of ‘peoples’ through Laclau’s contradictory reading of populism. Laclau (2005a) defines populism not as a particular kind of movement or ideology, but rather as a “political logic” operating to various degrees throughout modern political discourse (p. 117). Conversely, Laclau draws a distinction between “populist” and “institutionalist” articulation: while

institutionalism limits discourse to forms that keep a community intact, populism polarises discourse between the 'people' and some opposing group (p. 81). Although it falls outside the scope of my current research project, the New Zealand National Party's award-winning (but electorally unsuccessful) 2005 General Election campaign provides a useful working example of populist political logic, both because of the stark rhetoric employed, and because leaked emails explicitly discuss the strategy (Hager, 2006). Don Brash had recently won party leadership. As campaign strategists worked to "repackage" Brash, his die-hard economic liberalism was increasingly seen as a liability, unpopular with voters (p. 61-62). Public Relations strategists advised simple and polarising discourse; "National stands for the BEST and Labour is destroying New Zealand" (p. 42). Even Roger Douglas, a key architect of neoliberalism, suggested ambiguously populist slogans: "Equal opportunity for all New Zealanders, not just the favoured few" (p. 45). This nationalist-populist rhetoric sat uncomfortably with the economic and social liberalism of the political actors employing it, but was seen as a more effective way of winning votes than openly articulating their political programme (p. 61-62). In a leaked private email to Brash, PR consultant Matthew Hooton explained the strategy:

I just hope you... don't think I am a populist. I'm not. I'm a right wing academic neocon [neo-conservative] ultra. I just believe in winning too (Hager, 2006, p. 42–43).

While National's policy strategy was institutionalist in Laclau's terms (the maintenance and extension of neoliberalism and neoconservatism) their PR strategy in 2004-2005 was avowedly populist. To win, political strategists must constitute a 'people', defined by a "chain of equivalence" and a "frontier" of antagonism; an 'us' and a 'them' (Laclau 2005a, p. 81). In 2004, National's populist rhetoric sharpened – identifying a 'them' – with the infamous Orewa speech (Hager 2006, p. 79-96). National had lost votes to New Zealand First, which was exploiting fears about immigration (p. 83-84). Campaign strategists privately discussed the need for a "big populist issue," and settled on a "dog-whistle" concerning treaty settlements and "race-based funding," asserting that Māori were receiving special privileges (p. 83-88). National's polls doubled after this controversial speech, shooting from around 20 to around 45 percent (p. 79). The following year, this rhetorical strategy was boiled down to its essentials in the infamous "Iwi/Kiwi" billboard (p. 181-183), which identified National's constituency positively as "Kiwi" and Labour's negatively as "Iwi." This essentially dichotomises New Zealand with its indigenous people. This is one stark example⁶ of a more general logic – for Laclau (2005a), some logic of "equivalence" is

6 Although I've used a politically negative example to demonstrate Laclau's concepts, it's important to

necessary for all political articulation (p. 18), and the “equivalential” chain always requires a “frontier” of difference or antagonism (pp. 93). Brash and his strategists invoked a cross-class⁷ chain of equivalence between Pākehā New Zealanders, defined by a frontier of antagonism with Māori. Following Laclau's arguments, my research project seeks to establish the chains of equivalence and frontiers of antagonism articulated in dominant electoral discourse – the competing and convergent articulations of 'us' and 'them'.

In addition to Laclau's distinction between 'institutionalist' and 'populist' discourses (which are interdependent rather than mutually independent), I suggest a further distinction, between left- and right-wing populism⁸ (Figure 4). Whereas right-wing populism names an antagonism between nation and elite, left-wing populism names antagonism between subaltern subjects and the elite. Left- and right- populism are divided by their distinct alliances, and more crucially by the promise of liberation/wholeness they each offer; the promise of an uncontaminated nation-state, or the promise of human emancipation from oppression and exploitation. These frameworks are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Parties may fluctuate between Institutionalism, Left-Wing and Right-wing Populism as tactics. Political tactics will be studied empirically, with an aim to ascertain dominant tendencies.

underline here that he does not use the term 'populism' pejoratively; his work is a defence of the category, albeit on the basis that it runs throughout all political articulation.

⁷ National's post-Orewa polling success was most pronounced among low-to-middle income men and the elderly.

⁸ Although this distinction between left-wing and right-wing populism represents a partial departure from Laclau as noted in Footnote 1, I find Laclau's abstracted framework useful for thinking through alliances in a refoundationalist fashion. My own adaptation of the framework is primarily developed as a critique of Anglosphere politics, where nationalism is arguably more regressive than in subaltern regions (Laclau's own sympathies lay with Latin American populist movements).

Three competing political frameworks

Figure 4

In close connection with Laclau's theorisation of the 'people', my analysis also employs the notion of contesting *publics*. This is a complication of Frankfurt School theorist Jurgen Habermas' work on the *public sphere*. Habermas understood the *public sphere* as a space, separate from the state, where private citizens communicate and deliberate (1964, p. 49). This notion largely originated in the bourgeois revolutions from the 18th century onwards (p. 50-52). "Public authority" was associated with the emergence of modern capitalist nation-states (p. 51). Conversely, for Habermas, state authority is not a part of the public sphere (p. 49). Rather, the "liberal" or "bourgeois" public sphere requires that private citizens retain some freedom from state supervision; both in the cultural-political realm, and in the economic (p. 52-53). This notion of a deliberative public sphere, semi-autonomous from the state, is closely connected to the notion of civil society, which Gramsci ambivalently⁹ terms the "state without a state" (2011c, p. 75). In their 2001 preface to the 2nd edition of *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, reflecting on the failure of Eurocommunism and the abandonment of class antagonism by much of the establishment 'Left,' Laclau and Mouffe critique Habermas' notion of a deliberative public sphere:

⁹ Perry Anderson contends that the "slippage" in Gramsci's use of terms like civil society, particularly whether it is a part of the state or opposed, is "neither accidental nor arbitrary" (1976). When I say that Gramsci's conception of civil society was ambivalent, I mean this in the strict sense; both positively and negatively valenced, internally contradictory, with different possible outcomes.

“Unlike the Habermasians, we do not see [antagonism] as something that undermines the democratic project, but as its very condition of possibility” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. xviii). Laclau & Mouffe's critique of Habermas coincides with a certain Habermasian (or post-Habermasian) school, feminist scholar Nancy Fraser's formulation of “subaltern counterpublics” (1990). Fraser contends that “competing counterpublics” – nationalist movements, peasant uprisings, women's organisations, working-class organisations – disrupted the false unity of ‘the public sphere’ from the start, not from the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries as in Habermas' description (p. 61). Unlike Laclau and Mouffe, Fraser defends the deliberative public sphere as a normative ideal, although not one that has ever existed (p. 56-57, p. 78-79). However, crucially, she argues that pluralistic and contestatory forms are necessary for this ideal, rather than the notion of a single public unified by a false ‘we’ (p. 66-67). This certainly chimes with Laclau and Mouffe's emphasis on antagonism as necessary for radical democracy, and Laclau's critique of the false ‘we’ constructed by ‘Institutionalism’. My project focuses neither on the public sphere, nor on subaltern counterpublics, but on the way dominant political actors seek to invoke ‘publics.’ This pluralised conception (from ‘public’ to ‘publics’) allows consideration of the various relationships between constituency and political programme, and whether political actors offer competing or convergent programmes.

While keeping Fraser's ‘counterpublic’ in mind as a necessary political step beyond the scope of this work (i.e. the emergence of subaltern agency), my analysis hinges rather on the *public* and *nonpublic*. This follows from Negt and Kluge's (1972) assertion, in critiquing Habermas' public sphere theory, that “actual rule operates—in full accord with the image of it evidently held by workers—in a nonpublic manner” (p. 289). Negt and Kluge use “nonpublic” to refer to productive relations of the factory (p. 39), a dictatorship excluded from the bourgeois sphere of democracy. My project uses ‘nonpublic’ more broadly to include all human elements excluded in order to produce a bourgeois-legitimated *public* – honest, hard-working, participating, respectable citizens of a capitalist state. This follows from Foucault's (1980) suggestion of a central (and perpetually enforced) contradiction between “the proletarianised common people and the non-proletarianised common people” (p. 14). In other words, so long as they obey the law and do not disrupt production, workers can be considered legitimate bourgeois citizens – the nonpublic is often defined by criminality and active non-recognition, including prisoners, vagrants, and proletarians who resort to illegal methods.

The prison system is a key site for the production of nonpublics. For Foucault (1977), the prisoner is the “common enemy” of society (p. 90). The prisoner is even cast as outside society (p. 110), or outside ‘the public’ in our terms. In post-colonial societies, this division particularly serves as a racial caste system. Alexander contends that with the collapse of Jim Crow in the US, mass incarceration emerged as a new racial caste system (p. 2). Like previous caste systems, this sought to ensure poor white support for the ruling class – unlike previous caste systems, it required ‘colorblind’ rhetoric in the wake of the civil rights movement (ibid). Poor whites were won to Republicans through “law and order” rhetoric (p. 43-48). Now, while whites are just as likely to use and take illegal drugs according to self-reporting surveys, 90% of drug offenders sent to prison are African American (p. 98-99). Similar patterns apply in Aotearoa / New Zealand; alongside the move from ‘assimilation’ to ‘biculturalism,’ an expanding prison system houses a 50% Māori population, compared with around 13% of the general population (Smith, 2014a). Alongside directly controlling potentially rebellious populations such as ethnic minorities, the prison system must also have “lateral effects”, regulating the behaviour of the ‘lawful’ public (Foucault, 1977, p. 95). The nonpublic defines the legitimate public by negation, and unlike Fraser’s ‘counterpublic’, the nonpublic does not *necessarily* emerge as a self-organised constituency. The nonpublic is the scapegoat or nightmare used to regulate the public.

This project examines how the public is interpellated, rather than how actually existing publics respond. *Interpellation* refers to the way a subject is hailed, or called into being, by power – in Communist Louis Althusser’s (1971) classic example, a person turning around when a police officer cries “Hey, you there!” (p. 174). Power names a subject, and the subject recognises herself. Michel Foucault famously outlined how systems of categorisation, rather than simply describing, naturalise a whole world-view (Brady and Schirato, 2010, p. 9). Feminist and poststructuralist theorist Judith Butler (1993) extends Foucault’s theory by dealing with the psychic or psychological aspects of ‘subjection’, the making of a subject by power (Brady and Schirato, 2010, p. 22). Butler (1993) notes that Althusser’s formulation leaves out the possibility of agency or disobedience, that the law might be refused or ruptured (cited in Brady & Schirato, 2010, p. 22-23). This moment of resistance is coterminous in media analysis with Hall’s (2001) notion of “oppositional decoding” (189-212).

However, the subjective member of the public, as thinking, feeling, fighting, despairing individual¹⁰, is absent from my analysis. The 'people' as historic agent is also absent. Rather, the project maps out bourgeois taxonomies of 'the public,' as subject, in electoral discourse. The *subject* is not so much a person, as a place in discourse where a person may enter:

"The subject" is sometimes bandied about as if it were interchangeable with "the person" or "the individual." The genealogy of the subject as a critical category, however, suggests that the subject, rather than be identified strictly with the individual, ought to be designated as a linguistic category, a place-holder, a structure in formation (Butler, 1997, p. 10).

It is crucial that the police officer, in Althusser's formulation, is an emissary of the state; subjects form in relation to power. An early work by Marx, *On The Jewish Question* (1884/2009), provides some grounding for this investigation of publics, as both singular and plural, with the singular 'we' defined in relation to the nation-state. Marx, who was himself Jewish, wrote this piece as a critique of theologian Bruno Bauer, who unlike Marx opposed civic rights for Jewish citizens (Cooke, 2013). While reproducing anti-semitic stereotypes universal to the writing of the time, Marx both welcomed *bourgeois citizenship* as a secularising step, and criticises its "egoistic" limitations:

The contradiction in which the religious man finds himself with the political man is the same contradiction in which the bourgeois finds himself with the citizen... The decomposition of man into Jew and *citizen*, Protestant and *citizen*, religious man and *citizen*, is neither a deception directed against citizenship, nor is it a circumvention of political emancipation, it *is political emancipation itself*, the political method of emancipating oneself from religion... *The sole bond holding [citizens] together is natural necessity, need and private interest, the preservation of their property and their egoistic selves* (Marx, 1884/2009; emphasis mine).

Marx argues various collective subject-positions (Jew, Protestant) are brought together through the broader, secular subject-position of the 'citizen' (ibid). Further, Marx theorises the *limits* of bourgeois citizenship, limiting the economic 'Rights of Man' to essentially bourgeois rights, the right to own and exploit (ibid). In the wake of the bourgeois revolutions, the ideal citizen is the secular bourgeois citizen. The modern citizen, like the public, emerges with the bourgeois revolutions; a collective subject-position, defined in relation to the capitalist state, with democratic rights and responsibilities. Following Marx's enquiry into the category of the 'bourgeois citizen', this research project asks; what are the limits

¹⁰ Except perhaps in the form of my own prejudices.

of the public? What is the class character of this formulation? What and who is silenced in naming the public? Who is the 'we'?

The analysis investigates whether political articulations invoke a transformative left counterpublic, or an 'enclosed' public reconcilable with capitalism. Jodi Dean (2016) reverses Althusser's claim that the individual is interpellated as a subject, so that instead power interpellates the subject as an individual (p. 74). This apparently slight reversal allows Dean to consider the *subject* as collective, as crowd, rather than individual (p. 88-89). Dean claims that the crowd is "the opportunity for politics" (p. 7). This is less Foucault's disciplined, juridical subject than the sovereign historical subject decentred by Foucault's account (1972, p. 199-211), in Žižek's¹¹ terms the "spectre haunting Western academia" (1999, p. 1). Bourgeois power seeks to "enclose" the collective subject as an individual, ranked against other members of the crowd (Dean, 2016, p. 81). This projects seeks the 'enclosures' in discourse, the individual discursive particularities that avert the emergence of a collective communist subject – while also remaining open to the possibility that certain politicians or journalists may hail a more transformative leftist counterpublic.

¹¹ Given the broader political thrust of this project, it may be worth noting here that I consider Žižek's recent comments on refugees in Europe an unacceptable capitulation to right-wing populism (see Kriss 2015a; Kriss 2015b). However, Žižek's earlier academic work is hard to avoid when it comes to the psychoanalytic dimension of ideology theory.

II. Specific Historical Background

This project conceives of discourse as 'historically specific' (Korsch, 1938), i.e. best understood in social context, not purely through an empirical investigation of formal textual features. Research must therefore be grounded in a broader analysis of macro-level, historically embedded power structures. Late historian Tony Judt speculated in his memoir that the coming century was likely to see an increasingly violent policing of citizenship and the nation-state:

We are entering, I suspect, upon a time of troubles... Being “Danish” or “Italian,” “American” or “European” won’t just be an identity; it will be a rebuff and a reproof to those whom it excludes. The state, far from disappearing, may be about to come into its own: the privileges of citizenship, the protections of card-holding residency rights, will be wielded as political trumps. Intolerant demagogues in established democracies will demand “tests”—of knowledge, of language, of attitude—to determine whether desperate newcomers are deserving of British or Dutch or French “identity.” They are already doing so (Judt, 2010, p. 15).

My analysis defines the *nation* as an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1982), a cross-class identification with the state. As an ‘established democracy’, Aotearoa/New Zealand is one testing-ground for the hypothesis of a narrowly policed notion of citizenship. Capitalism and parliamentary ‘democracy’ were established in Aotearoa/New Zealand through colonisation. The twentieth century saw both deep shifts and deep continuities with the pattern established by colonisation – most significantly for this analysis, urbanisation of the majority of Māori, and a shift towards neoliberalism in the last decades of the century. Donna Awatere (1984) contends that colonisation and capitalism have been facilitated partly through a ‘white alliance’ between Pākehā workers and capitalists (p. 34). This project therefore investigates what cross-sector coalitions are sought in mainstream political discourse, and whether these coalitions seek to disrupt or reproduce the prevailing political-economic system.

For David Harvey (2014), “accumulation by dispossession” is “the hallmark of what capital is really about” (p. 55). In Aotearoa/New Zealand, as in many other nations, the establishment of capital (and generalisation of wage-labour) first required the bloody dispossession of land from the indigenous people (Poata-Smith, 1997). Whereas the “first phase” of colonisation saw the partial exclusion of Māori from production (where Pākehā workers had the primary access to work, and Māori were forced into isolated rural areas), the second phase saw “proletarianisation” of Māori, particularly the rural-urban

migration of the post-war boom (p. 174-175). This fed into a second wave of militant resistance from the late 1960s, during which radical urban Māori combined forces both with other radical urban currents and with older rural Māori collectives (Hokowhitu, p. 360). After momentous struggles including the 1975 Māori Land March, the 1975 Treaty of Waitangi Act laid the basis for further reforms – although these arguably excluded many urban Māori (ibid). Meanwhile, the economic downturn of the 1970s infamously saw Dawn Raids on Pasifika “overstayers” (Anae, 2012), continuing the pattern whereby the European settler-state policed the boundaries of citizenship. After a period of social upheaval that continued into the 1980s, the Fourth Labour Government finally cemented the cultural-economic trajectory for the coming decades. While the government accepted progressive reforms in the field of cultural recognition; Homosexual Law Reform, the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal, the establishment of the Ministry of Women's Affairs; it was also a key architect of introducing neoliberal restructuring to Aotearoa / New Zealand (Rudd and Roper, 1997). In feminist scholar Nancy Fraser's (2005) terms, gains in cultural “recognition” were traded for losses in economic “redistribution.” While the Waitangi Tribunal has redistributed some funds, these are marginal in a period of declining real wages (Poata-Smith, 2004). Trends in inequality have been entrenched; while certain tribal authorities benefited economically from increasing legal recognition, “the vast majority of Māori families have borne the brunt of [neoliberal] economic restructuring” (p. 216). The general wealth-to-income ratio has expanded at an even greater rate than income disparity (Rashbrooke, 2015, p. 52). My analysis therefore explores this stratification of subjects under neoliberalism, between a recognised *public* and an unrecognised *nonpublic* (whether defined economically, ethnically, or in other terms).

Shifts in the dominant print media landscape have reflected broader shifts in political-economy, particularly the commodification of 'publics'. During nineteenth century colonisation, early regional newspapers were less nationally integrated than today (Hope, 1996, p. 13-14). Instead, they tended to be backed by regional businesses and politicians, with explicit editorial lines reflecting these interests; “Editorials also contained occasional outbursts against Māori, vagrants, unions and politicians from other provinces” (p. 14). In the late nineteenth and early-mid twentieth century, with the rising cost of mass printing, politicians gave way to companies, but these tended to still be politically conservative (p. 15-17). From 1960, family companies gave way to more centralised monopoly capital (although protectionist policies ensured local ownership), facilitating a growth of critical journalism and political

commentary – although “mass media also provided government and business elites with the opportunity to manage news events” (p. 19-20). In the 1970s, media coverage of rising class, gender and ethnic liberation struggles undermined the “national imaginary,” in both liberal and conservative variants (p. 21). Finally, the neoliberal assault from 1984 saw “convulsive takeover activity” and centralisation of media by transnational conglomerates (p. 21-23). Habermasian researcher Wayne Hope contended in 1996 that with the cross-partisan “neoliberal revolution” in Aotearoa / New Zealand, and the associated centralisation of media ownership by corporate conglomerates, public space has contracted and “a counter-hegemonic public sphere has yet to arrive”¹² (p. 21-30). Under the current National government in Aotearoa / New Zealand, support for public media has further retreated (Thompson, 2011). As of 2016, the two major newspaper companies NZME and Fairfax are merging, meaning that both of the national newspapers will be owned by one company, and journalists’ jobs are likely to be cut (Peacock, 2016). My analysis considers whether this increasingly corporatised media environment offers space for critical commentary, or reproduces dominant political discourse.

We live in a historical period typified by “democratic deficit,” decreasing participation in mass and civic organisations (Beetham, 2002, p. 55-56; Grey and Sedgwick, 2012, p. 4). This pattern of contraction in public participation has played out in the electoral sphere. Electoral parties have centralised from ‘mass’ parties to ‘electoral-professional’ parties (Davis, 2010, p. 34-39). Edwards (2008) contends that this shift towards professionalisation has been facilitated by increased parliamentary funding, and decreased funding from business and trade unions, making parties less dependent on their membership (p. 4-11).

12 More recently, Hope (2012) has suggested that new communications technology, particularly the internet, may open up new space for public discourse (p. 28, 45). However, Cameron Slater’s Whale Oil, the most popular NZ political blog, acts as a third-party “attack dog” for National Party insiders, according to leaked emails (Hager, 2014). While official channels ran a generically positive campaign under the slogan ‘Building a Brighter Future’, Slater carried out attacks on the party’s political enemies (p. 28-36). Slater is also paid by tobacco companies, and various other monied interests, to attack their critics under the pretense of non-partisan commentary (p. 77-88). Given the prominence of Slater’s blog in the new media environment, this may cast doubt over the potential for the internet to serve as a deliberative democratic ‘public sphere.’ Jodi Dean (2003) contends that rather than idealising the internet as a public sphere, or complaining that the medium falls short, the internet should be seen as a zero institution, a meta-frame that “enables myriad conflicting constituencies to understand themselves as part of the same global structure even as they disagree over what the architecture of this structure should entail” (p. 106). Unlike the democratic state, the internet favours “contestation” over “consensus” (p. 108). In any case, my research will centre ‘official channels’, the respectable faces of dominant political articulation, rather than the excesses of “attack politics” through third parties.

At the same time, businesses are more likely to fund both major parties (p. 5). As Neil Davidson (2015) contends in an analysis of neoliberal political economy, if we conceive of the bourgeoisie as a “series of concentric circles,” actual business owners sit at the centre, with more administrative roles radiating outwards. In this conception the state is largely the bureaucratic wing of capital, including politicians in ruling parties. My analysis will partially assume, and partially test, the notion of a constitutive cleavage between the majority of politicians and the majority of voters; politicians as representatives of bourgeois hegemony.

In 1992, Aotearoa / New Zealand held a referendum on adopting a Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) system, which gives more space to smaller parties. Miller (2015) notes that the electorate’s “plague on both your houses” attitude, after Labour and National governments had both implemented neoliberal reforms, led the electorate to support MMP (p. 87-88). In fact, voters generally did not understand the specifics of MMP (beyond proportionality), and were urged by both major parties to reject it, yet 85% of voters supported change to the electoral system, with 71% specifically preferring the MMP option (ibid). A 2011 referendum again affirmed MMP (p. 98-100), although only 25% of CEOs supporting retaining it and 65% supported scrapping it (NZ Herald, 2011). My analysis considers whether minor parties take advantage of MMP to promote oppositional causes, in particular whether they invoke a counterpublic that may disrupt the dominant neoliberal terms of rule.

Political Science researcher Jack Vowles notes that voter turnout in the 2011 General Election reached the lowest level since 1887, before women gained voting rights (p. 1). Turnout has generally decreased since 1946, with the exception of the period 1975-1984 (p. 2). Vowles suggests that this could be attributed to public perception that elections have predetermined results, weak policy differences on the left-right axis, limited community engagement by parties, and/or lack of support for civic education (p. 22-24). Aeron Davis’ survey *Political Communication and Social Theory*, while focused on the UK, outlines some patterns and frameworks for analysing political communication in this period. In line with other literature, Davis refers to a breakdown of party affiliations; “traditional links between parties and voters, based on socio-economic ties, have declined” (Davis, 2010, p. 35) This project contends that the situation is more partisan and class-divided than Davis’ formulation; the capitulation of the political left, the defeat of the working class. Traditionally right-wing constituencies have not been hollowed out.

Based on New Zealand General Election surveys in 2008 and 2011, non-voters are likely to be young; low-income; Māori, Pasifika or Asian; or some combination of the above (Statistics New Zealand, 2014a). Labourers are the least likely occupation to vote, followed by unemployed workers – at around 35-40% of non-voters (ibid). Non-voters are more likely to cite political disengagement (eg “it makes no difference which party is in government”) than a perceived practical barrier (ibid; Figure 5). Very similar patterns are reported in the UK (Ailes, 2015; Hansard, 2015). Educational level is less of a predictor than income or ethnicity (ibid), perhaps casting doubt on civics education as a solution. Non-voters have been termed the ‘missing million’ (Williams, 2014). This project examines whether and how members of the ‘missing million’; youth, low-income workers, and racially oppressed groups; are invoked (or disavowed) by parties and press.

The Civics and Media Project, a “non-partisan, cross-institutional initiative”, suggests that “civic engagement in New Zealand is under threat” (Civics and Media Project, 2016). The project recommends the strengthening of civics education, public interest journalism, and resources and initiatives for adult New Zealanders (ibid). The emphasis on civics education implies an unstated normative dimension that New Zealand's civic institutions are sound, and simply need to be promoted more. High school teacher Bronwyn Houliston noted that Māori and Pasifika students were often politically engaged, yet alienated from dominant civic institutions (p. 7). If these institutions are structurally designed to serve dispossession, civics education may not foster engagement. Conversely, Senior Lecturer Carwyn Jones suggested an alternative solution: “Change the power structures from outside to create a new model of citizenship” (p. 11). Sandra Grey of the Tertiary Education Union suggested that “we don't need to reach a complete consensus, because if we do it will make life hard for those who live outside it” (p. 6). However, the conclusions of the project emphasised civics education (p. 2), limiting participation to existing institutional forms.

This project considers the institutional limits on political participation using the concept of *Disciplined Democracy*. Disciplined Democracy is a term that has been coined in relation to Burmese ‘democracy’, where disciplinary measures limit the ability to challenge the ruling party (Mon News, 2010). ‘Disciplined Democracy’ is an enforced form of political representation that actively limits the terms of participation (ibid). While Aotearoa/New Zealand may enjoy more political freedoms than Burma, my research

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project uses the concept of 'disciplined democracy' to investigate the bounding of legitimate public participation by press and parties. The formulation emphasises *Discipline over Democracy*, using Discipline in Michel Foucault's (1977) sense: a method of power, an enforcement of norms (p. 184). Foucault suggests that disciplinary enforcement of the 'norm' may be "the new law of modern society" (ibid). My analysis considers whether press and parties limit normative discourses to existing institutional forms.

The analysis also considers whether political actors encourage more transformative engagement by counterpublics. For example, political actors hailing an alliance of working class Māori and Pākehā may challenge dominant invocations of 'the public'. Donna Awatere Huata (1984) contended in her influential work *Māori Sovereignty* that a 'restructuring of the white alliance' was ultimately needed, in our terms the formation of a new 'counterpublic' through alliance of Pākehā and Māori subalterns:

Set against our people has been the united strength of white people. The Māori now seeks to break that unity in the interests of justice for the Māori people... Gramsci's concept of hegemonic consciousness has relevance to Māori sovereignty. In hegemonic consciousness, a class puts its interests with other classes at a national level and establishes alliances with them. These alliances are necessary because changes cannot occur with the Māori on our own. White people have cut across class barriers to unite on the basis of white hegemony... To overcome this requires a restructuring of the white alliance (Awatere Huata, 1984, p. 34).

My analysis considers whether dominant coalitions, like the "white alliance", are maintained or disrupted in mainstream political discourse.

III. Analytic Methodology

This project studies how political parties and national press hailed 'the public' in the 2011 and 2014 Aotearoa / New Zealand General Elections. This is not intended as a sociological examination of actually existing publics, but an examination of how publics are hailed. A 'people' or a 'public' here is a place-holder in a wider ideological schema, a legitimization of a political programme. Research tests the thesis that *dominant cross-partisan electoral discourses define the 'public' in terms of dual identification with productive work and capital, in opposition to named subaltern nonpublics*.

My research begins with a content analysis of party press releases and mainstream election coverage. As a method, content analysis is primarily quantitative, and has been controversially described as "objective" (Macnamara 2005, p. 2). Political scientist and communications theorist Harold D. Lasswell (1948) influentially defined media content analysis with this formula, indicating the positive-empiricist framework that informed early media content analysis:

Who

Says What

In Which Channel

To Whom

With What Effect? (p. 37).

This arguably overstates the scope of content analysis, particularly its capacity to measure *effects*. Although this project analyses *who* (political parties) *says what* (naming publics) through *which channel* (press releases, national press coverage) *to whom* ('the public'), the *effect* of this cannot be comprehensively measured through an analysis of media texts. As Newbold et al contend, quantitative analysis of media data is not sufficient for understanding audience response:

There is no simple relationship between media texts and their impact, and it would be too simplistic to base decisions in this regard on mere figures obtained from a statistical content analysis (Newbold et al 2002, p. 80).

As previously mentioned, this project is more focused on the moment of hegemonic 'encoding' than audience 'decoding' (Hall, 2001, p. 189-212). However, some comparisons between electoral discourse and public behaviour are discussed – through polls, final vote, and surveys of non-voters, as an indicative rather than conclusive measure. A fuller analysis of audience response requires a more

participatory approach, which is outside the scope of this project.

Media content analysis seeks a 'scientific' approach to media analysis, seeking to avoid confirmation bias. Influential researcher Kimberley Neuendorf (2002) defines content analysis as follows:

Content analysis is a summarizing, quantitative analysis of messages that relies on the scientific method ... and is not limited as to the types of variables that may be measured or the context in which the messages are created or presented (cited in Macnamara, 2005, p. 2).

Although not claiming my overall project is 'objective', I endorse Neuendorf's definition of content analysis as quantitative and 'scientific'. Researchers can test quantitative hypotheses about content, and the results could be reproduced by someone with a different ideological bias. For Neuendorf (2002), content analysis is separate methodologically from qualitative analysis (p. 5-7). My own prejudices as a young, Pākehā, male-assigned, queer, communist student may affect qualitative interpretation of data, but should not affect the quantitative results of a content analysis. A National Party supporter could also prove (or concede) that a certain number of terms are used a certain number of times, although our political interpretation of these findings may differ. The quantitative dimension helps to ground this political analysis in a clear 'map' of the discursive terrain, patterns in political articulation that may not be pre-conceived within an ideological lens.

The content consists of two samples; press releases by parliamentary parties (National Party, Labour Party, Green Party, New Zealand First, Māori Party, MANA, Internet Party, ACT, United Future), and electoral coverage in major newspapers (NZ Herald, Dominion Post). This quantitative survey is restricted to the last two weeks of the 2011 and 2014 General Elections, both to study official discourses of the 'public' in a period of democratic deficit, and to ensure available comparable data. Newspaper data is drawn first from the microfilm of newspapers (to get an impression of layout, which may be relevant to assessing political priorities), and then from online databases (making it easier to compare large quantities of data). All but one¹³ of the parliamentary parties under analysis have press

¹³ The Internet Party, an apparently short-term formation that ran on a joint ticket with MANA in 2014 General Elections, does not have press releases on their website. The Internet Party is also the only party in this survey not to have any seats in parliament. However, as they ran a joint campaign with MANA (which had a single seat) they are a necessary part of this electoral survey; their press releases are available on Scoop and other

releases on their websites, however the extent of these archives is inconsistent. Where archives are lacking, I contact the parties in question, and finally consult Scoop (which reprints all press releases unedited). This survey covers a total of 514 political party press releases (310 from 2011, 204 from 2014), and (510 from 2011; 219 from 2014). I first compile the content into text documents, then quantify manually using spreadsheets. The focus on parliamentary party press releases and national newspapers, across two consecutive elections, both ensures that the content will be technically comparable (many parliamentary parties only began placing press releases on their websites very recently), and will capture dominant political discourse. As of 2014, 78% of people in Aotearoa/New Zealand access newspapers both online and in print, and 52% of people still read newspapers on a daily basis (NZOA, 2014; cited in CBB, 2016). Nzherald.co.nz and Stuff.co.nz (website of the Dominion Post) are among the top 10 ranked websites in New Zealand in terms of hits (Alexa, 2014). Therefore while this analysis cannot capture subjective audience reception, it can capture dominant discourse.

I prepare an initial list of nouns, then after manually checking the initial list of nouns against the content, expand the coding schedule to incorporate unanticipated terms. However, I keep terms that do not show up, as their absence is potentially significant in its own right. For example, I add the category 'partnership' on noticing that the National Party often uses this term. Conversely, I keep a full list of terms for gender and sexual diversity in the coding schedule, although these terms are rare to the point of nonexistence, as this absence itself merits commentary (particularly in terms of 'nonpublics'). Once satisfactorily reworked, the coding schedule is consistently applied across all content. My coding schedule includes 14 categories (Ethnic, Economic, Gendered...) and 213 individual nouns (Appendix). These nouns are not meant to correspond to objective sociological categories, but rather to dominant political invocation of 'publics'. The terms 'taxpayer' and 'worker' could in many cases refer to the same person, yet the ideological inflections of these terms are distinct. Again, this project analyses *signifiers* of the public, not the *signified* public. This project is not investigating subaltern experiences of race and gender for example, but the way subjects are racialised and gendered. While quantifying nouns, I make brief notes for future reference; e.g. 'youth' is often used in close connection with 'crime'. I also compare party press releases with mainstream press coverage, to identify which party-political formulations find mass circulation.

There are two main visual methods used to present the quantitative data: pie charts to compare isolated key terms, and tables to present larger samples of data. Pie charts present the polarities in the data: comparisons between terms like Māori and Pākehā, Men and Women, or Workers and Capitalists. The comparison seeks their *relative* rather than *absolute* popularity – e.g. which of the terms 'Men' and 'Women' are used more often, rather than how often each term is used overall. These binary comparisons may help to establish the *frontiers* of political articulation (Laclau, 2005a), the 'us and them', or perhaps the coalitions between different sectors. Whereas I use pie charts to illustrate comparative percentages, I used tables to present raw numbers. This helps in comparing a range of sources, a range of terms, and including the absences in discourse (nouns never used).

From this content analysis, the project proceeds to a critical discourse analysis. Articles are selected which in some way typify the data; if the terms 'we' and 'workers' are often used together by a party, I select a party press release where this happens particularly often, to examine the political function of this formulation. Again, the quantitative data is drawn solely from a strict time period (last two weeks of 2011/2014 General Elections) to ensure comparable data. However, qualitative examples are drawn from other points in recent NZ parliamentary history, to provide context and comparisons. This critical discourse analysis centres on political *demands*, a central category in the political constitution of a people (Laclau, 2005a, p. 74-75). Demands are analysed in part through Nancy Fraser's (2005) framework of (cultural) *recognition*, (economic) *redistribution*, and (political) *representation*. For the purposes of this analysis; *representation* includes 'misrepresentation,' established civic forms of delegated authority which may fall short of democratic ideals (the two-party system, for example); *redistribution* includes all forms of complex wealth distribution, including neoliberal upward redistribution or 'maldistribution'; and *recognition* includes 'misrecognition,' as in semiotic violence. The reason for this conflation is simple; this project focuses on dominant institutions (which may incorporate popular demands), rather than on the liberation movements Fraser centres. Take the slogan "end race-based funding for Maori", used by Don Brash in the lead-up to the 2005 election. This slogan demands an end to a form of cultural *recognition* for Māori. The slogan further implies that the existing political regime does not adequately *represent* Pakeha, the legitimate public. Finally, the demand to end state funding concerns economic *redistribution* (or perhaps an end to redistribution). Conversely, the slogan "Honour

the Treaty [of Waitangi]”. In this slogan, Māori are *recognised* as a legitimate public. The slogan also implies that iwi leaders, who first signed the Treaty, legitimately *represent* Māori politically. Finally, the slogan implies that the Treaty has not been honoured, as Māori have been dispossessed, and therefore makes a demand for *redistribution* of economic wealth. Understanding these slogans requires an application of political context, demanding a qualitative analysis to understand the results of the content analysis.

An isolated *democratic demand*, when met, can become inscribed into the prevailing regime (Laclau, 2005a, p. 77). By contrast, a plurality of demands that constitute a 'dichotomic frontier' in society are considered *popular demands* (p. 73-86). According to Laclau, the difference between an 'institutionalist' and a 'populist' framework lies in the difference between a discourse that assumes the wholeness of a community and one which “divides society into two camps” (p. 81). My analysis therefore considers whether political demands seek to polarise or unite constituencies. The analysis further considers whether these constitutions of political (dis)unity can be easily inscribed into the existing totality, or whether they call the totality into question. In particular, the project considers how competing political programmes negotiate the terms of *neoliberalism* (at a meso level) and *white-supremacist capitalist patriarchy* (at a macro-level): whether and how these structures are acknowledged, reinforced, questioned, challenged. Kelsey (2015) suggests that at an international level, the “neoliberal consensus” is beginning to fracture, although New Zealand remains largely “cocooned” (p. 175). Further, any departure from neoliberalism must be wholesale, as it is a “robust regime” that cannot be challenged in piecemeal fashion (p. 125). My analysis considers whether official political discourse shows any signs of fracture in the “neoliberal consensus,” and if so, whether alternative political programmes are suggested. This analysis of programme considers how competing political actors appropriate ‘floating signifiers’, popular terms whose meaning is ‘indeterminate’ (p. 131), which competing political projects can appropriate in service of their programme (p. 131-138). The project asks whether competing political articulations simply reproduce the terms of the broader global terrain, or whether they hail a ‘people’ (or ‘counterpublic’) that may disrupt this common frontier. The analysis focuses on national print media, as a locus of dominant-hegemonic political articulation. This is not to say that the content is only ‘traditional media’ – many press releases are now sent out exclusively online – but that it concerns official political discourse rather than the unofficial and unregulated.

I have outlined a number of *a priori* frameworks. This may give the impression that this project's reasoning is circular, begging the question: what data would trouble my hypothesis? In 2008, a small outfit called the Workers Party¹⁴ ran in national elections with the slogan "Workers should be running the country" (Workers Party, 2008). If a major parliamentary party made such a call for proletarian power, this would undermine the thesis that *dominant cross-partisan electoral discourses defined the 'public' in terms of dual identification with productive work and capital, in opposition to named subaltern nonpublics*. To pose the case less starkly, if a major political actor named polarisation between rich and poor, with an appropriate programme to address this polarisation (whether reformist or revolutionary), this could also prove a left-wing exception. By contrast, a polarisation between capitalist nation-state¹⁵ and elite may interrupt neoliberal institutional discourse, but counts in my taxonomy as 'right-wing populism' (Figure 4). My first chapter will consider the dominant political discourse of the two major parties (National and Labour).

14 I was a member of the Workers Party, and remain a member of the Workers Party's successor organisation Fightback.

15 By nation-state I refer here to colonial New Zealand. Conversely I do not intend to damn the politics of Māori Sovereignty, a stateless 'nationalism' that may serve to disrupt white-supremacist capitalist patriarchy. This possibility will be investigated in particular relation to the MANA Movement.

Source: Statistics New Zealand

Figure 5

Chapter 1: Institutionalism and Right-Wing Populism

This chapter characterises the discourse of the two major parties, National and Labour, particularly in terms of their relationships to nationalism. The chapter begins with the findings of my content analysis concerning pronoun usage (**Section I**). Ruling party National is the most likely party to use first-person collective pronouns – ‘we’ or ‘our’ – rather than third and second person pronouns (Figure 6). This invites the question of who ‘we’ are politically. In absolute terms, the most commonly invoked public across parties is ‘New Zealander’. I therefore suggest that the major party ‘we’ stands for the *party representing the nation*, or the part representing the whole. In considering the ‘nation’ as a common field of political discourse, my analysis defines the ‘nation’ as an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1982), a discursive formation inviting cross-class identification with the bourgeois state. My critical discourse analysis seeks to identify how the competing parties appropriate the ‘floating signifier’ of the nation, a term that can be appropriated by competing political actors (Laclau, 2005a, p. 131-138). This analysis also examines the converse terms for ‘New Zealander’, which may reveal aspects of competing programmes – the ruling National Party is the most likely party to use the term ‘international’, using this term 30 times in the data surveyed, while the opposition Labour Party is most likely to use the term ‘foreign(er)’, using the term 35 times (Figure 8). My critical discourse analysis considers these distinct terms (‘foreign’ and ‘international’) through Laclau’s distinction between ‘institutionalism’ and ‘populism’ (1985, 2005a, 2005b). For Laclau, institutionalism naturalises differences (such as class, race, gender) as positive facts that can be administratively addressed by the regime without a need for social antagonism (2005a, p. 81; 2005b, p. 48), whereas populism polarises differences (2005a, p. 81). The analysis will demonstrate that National’s ‘institutionalist’ terminology represents a form of *bourgeois internationalism*, whereby the interests of international business are identified with the interests of New Zealand business, and therefore ‘the public’ as a whole. Conversely, Labour’s references to ‘foreign’ threats represent a kind of Right-Wing Populist opposition, failing to distinguish between migrant labour and international capital.

This analysis considers how each party constitutes the national ‘we’, before expanding on the comparison of ‘international’ and ‘foreign’ terminology. Critical discourse analysis begins with the National Party (**Section II**). In addition to the cross-partisan representative ‘we’, close analysis of press releases will demonstrate that the National Party tends to use a confident executive ‘we’, singularly and

competently mediating between social interests. In a neoliberal inflection of institutionalist discourse, the National Party 'we' offers a *managerial* voice, which elevates management principles to a general ideology (Klikauer, 2013), in this case implying that managing a nation-state is akin to managing a business. As Laclau offers Disraeli's One Nation Conservatism as an example of 'institutionalism', I also compare National Party discourse with One Nation Conservatism. One Nation Conservatism emphasises the *nation* as a site of reconciliation between competing interests, also a feature of National Party discourse. However, National Party discourse emphasises social mobility over directly addressing poverty, a departure from classical One Nation Conservatism. The National Party's institutional-managerial discourse is also *bourgeois internationalist*, promoting integration with neoliberal international institutions – particularly promoting international trade agreements. For the National Party, participation in the international neoliberal regime is best for New Zealand business, and therefore all New Zealanders. The National Party's institutional discourse invokes a *national* public, yet one whose interests are equated with those of international capital, erasing social contradiction through institutional wholeness.

Having examined the discourse of the ruling party, I move on to a critical discourse analysis of the main Opposition party, Labour (**Section III**). The findings suggest that Right-Wing Populism is Labour's dominant discourse. Labour's 'we' has a stronger 'they', a passionate site of identification in a polarised discourse. Labour often refers negatively to 'foreign' actors. This move displaces economic anxieties onto racialised 'foreign' nonpublics, i.e. scapegoating. As a demonstrative example, my critical discourse analysis examines a recent controversy over Labour's commentary on the housing crisis. Growing tensions in the housing market demand political response; in Marxist terms. the contradiction between *use value* and *exchange value* (Harvey, 2014), whereby working class access to houses is undermined by profitable fluctuations in price. Neither of the major parties identifies class contradiction as a driving factor. National denies the existence of a housing crisis. Conversely, Labour focuses only on the 'Chinese surnames' of buyers (Gibson, 2015). This failure to distinguish between economic migrants and international capital results in controversy over racism (ibid). Recent migrants are highly unlikely to vote (Statistics New Zealand, 2014a), a fact which may be associated with the scapegoating of 'foreigners' as a nonpublic. Labour's *Right-Wing Populism* seeks to rouse discontent without challenging the bourgeoisie at home. The two parties therefore employ distinct bourgeois invocations of

a *national* public. Having characterised the dominant invocations of 'publics' across the two major parties, the following chapter proceeds to consider how dominant discourses 'recognise' subaltern identity.

Party pronouns 2011-2014

(rank: 'We'/'Our' most to least common)

Figure 6

Party pronouns 2011-2014 cont'

(rank: 'We'/'Our' most to least common)

Figure 6

1. Who are 'we'?

This chapter focuses on the two major parties: the ruling National Party and Opposition Labour Party. The analysis first surveys pronouns, which tend to imply identity; a collective pronoun groups people together, a singular pronoun individuates, and can offer clues as to gender identity. I focus on how the pronouns group parties *with* or *apart from* others; the question of 'us' and 'them'.

National strongly prefers first-person collective pronouns ('we', 'our') to third person ('they') or second person pronouns ('you'). This is the strongest preference of any party, with National's first-person collective pronouns at a combined 83% of their pronouns (Figure 6). The main Opposition party, Labour, sits around the middle of the spectrum, with combined first-person collective pronouns at 66%, and 'they' used about twice as often as the National Party (ibid). Minor right-wing populist party New Zealand First has the strongest 'they', at 57% of pronouns surveyed (Figure 6). The ruling party's strong preference for first-person collective pronouns ('we' and 'our') invites the question of who the 'we' is in dominant discourse.

Across all categories – National/Ethnic, Economic, Gendered et al – parties were most likely to hail 'New Zealanders' as their principle public. 'New Zealand' is *the* public that parties claim to represent, with the exception of the MANA and Māori Parties who each name 'Māori' as their main constituency. MANA and Māori could be considered exceptions in their emphasis on an ethnic basis for constituency, however this would ignore the way Pakeha identity may be concealed by the dominant category New Zealander (to be discussed further in Chapter 2). I argue therefore that the dominant cross-partisan 'we' stands discursively for the *party representing the nation*. Parties insist that 'we' best understand the concerns of ordinary New Zealanders:

Labour MP Grant Robertson: "Like most New Zealanders, we know tough decisions need to be made to get *our* country back onto a sustainable path" (Robertson, 2011c; emphasis mine).

National MP Craig Foss: "*Our* across-the-board tax cuts also mean there's more money in the pockets of older New Zealanders" (Foss, 2011; emphasis mine).

Although these quotes cover distinct policy areas and parties – Labour on environmentalism and National on taxation, respectively – they share a common discourse; the first-person collective

pronoun invites a representative link between the party and the nation. The party understands what is best for the nation, the concerns of ordinary citizens, and acts accordingly.

In both National and Labour articulations, the *national-parliamentary* form of representation is the primary and ideal form – tautologically, the New Zealand public is best represented by the New Zealand state. Bourgeois parliamentary democracy has a “zero value” in Levi-Strauss' (1963) sense, assumed as the common basis for discourse, usually unstated. It therefore provides a cross-partisan basis for the 'we'. Each party places a claim on this common field of representation. This common discourse helps construct an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1982), a national constituency bringing together individuals or communities that could be constituted on different, competing grounds –e.g. as a working-class constituency, an indigenous constituency, a gendered constituency. Because this common discourse invites working-class identification with the national ruling class, my analysis considers the *bourgeois nation* (New Zealand) as a common ground of discourse.

This chapter hinges on who 'we' are politically, or what 'we' major political players invoke. The critical discourse analysis will focus on press releases by the two major parties, and proceed from their specific uses of pronouns to a broader consideration of how they constitute the national public. While the 'we' of major political players overlaps substantially – with the bourgeois nation as the primary glue – specific parties articulate more specific discursive relations between public and party. The analysis will consider these distinctions in terms of Institutionalism and Populism, which for Laclau (2005a) are the two key poles of political articulation.

II. National's managerial 'we'

This chapter has outlined the notion that the first-person collective pronoun in party press releases implies a representative link between party and nation. However, this demands further expansion and specification through critical discourse analysis. The National Party's use of the 'we' pronoun has some distinct inflections, implying a competent mediator between competing interests. My critical discourse analysis will consider this 'we' in terms of Laclau's formulation of 'institutionalism' (1985, 2005a, 2005b). As Laclau offers Disraeli's One Nation Conservatism as a key example of 'institutionalism', I compare National Party discourse with the discourse of One Nation Conservatism, a classic discourse of the English Tories. One Nation Conservatism emphasises the *nation* as a site of reconciliation between competing interests. In a neoliberal context, National Party discourse tends to emphasise social mobility over directly addressing poverty, a departure from classical One Nation Conservatism. I argue that National's inflection of Conservative institutional discourse implies *managerialism*, the elevation of private sector management principles to a general ideology (Klikauer, 2013), in this case the assumption that the role of government is to promote private sector expertise. The National Party's institutional discourse is also *bourgeois internationalist*, promoting integration with neoliberal international institutions. Statements tend to equate the interests of capital, the state, and the public, as interdependent interests that must be reconciled through correct administration. Prime Minister John Key typifies the official National Party discourse in his relatively 'apolitical' media engagement (often appearing on entertainment media rather than current affairs), implying an absence of social or political conflict. The National Party's institutional discourse invokes a *national* public, erasing social contradiction.

Laclau mentions Disraeli's 'One Nation' as an example of an Institutional totalis (1985, p130; 2005a; p. 81). Before proceeding to a critical discourse analysis of National Party 'institutionalism', I will outline features of One Nation Conservatism to contextualise this analysis. The intention here is not to claim that Key or the National Party are traditional 'One Nation Conservatives', but rather to consider the ways in which Disraeli's classic articulation of Conservatism can help to explain Institutional discourse in general. One Nation Conservatism traditionally holds that the wealthy have a "duty of care" to the lower orders, a form of *noblesse oblige* (Dorey, 2010, p. 49). Benjamin Disraeli, the original theorist of One Nation Conservatism, expressed concern about economic inequality forming 'Two

Nations' (p. 52-53). Crucially, while some degree of inequality is inevitable, conflicts can be reconciled within the common ground of the 'nation' (p. 51-57). For Laclau (1985), the institutionalist logic of One Nation Conservatism found a later expression in the Welfare State (p. 130). Differentiability must be reconciled, and cannot be allowed to threaten the prevailing system (Laclau, 2005a, p. 81). Notably, One Nation Conservatism has been described as a "pragmatic" project, driven partly by the need to court working class publics, as the nineteenth century saw the extension of the franchise to male workers (Dorey, 2010, p. 55-57). This is where One Nation Conservatism, and perhaps actually-existing-Institutional discourses in general, depart from the classical liberal "gendarme or night-watchman [police officer] state," which would only protect property; as in Gramsci's (2011c) account, the "ethical state" forms to achieve popular consent (p. 75). In examining post-Thatcher conservative discourse, Dorey (2010) expresses concern that "regardless of the Conservative modernisers' genuflections towards One Nation Conservatism, Britain will remain two, increasingly divergent, nations" (p. 182). In line with Laclau & Mouffe (2001), I assume the "ineradicability of antagonism" (p. xvii), not in the Conservative sense that inequality is natural, but in the sense that antagonism is the "condition of possibility for democratic politics" (p. xviii). Rather than seeking reconciliation, I assume that the economic interests of labour and capital are irreconcilable. My emphasis is therefore on examining institutional conservatism as an impossible discourse that seeks to foreclose antagonism, rather than the likelihood of conservatism actually erasing economic inequality.

The National Party often implies an 'ethical state' (using Gramsci's term), an aspect of One Nation Conservatism (Dorey, 2010). Press releases outline a number of areas where the ruling party doesn't simply preserve private property, but acts in the *national interest*. In some cases, the National Party employs a 'we' that blurs the line between party and nation:

We are a nation with some of the most spectacular and unique coastlines in the world and we need to recognise the importance and value of these marine habitats (Smith, 2014b).

Here environmental conservation is understood as a *national* priority, uniting an entire "imagined community" with a common 'we' (Anderson, 1982). This *national* discourse is relatively cross-partisan, also used by the Labour Party and Opposition parties (see **Section III**). However, I suggest that where the National Party offers a more party-specific discourse, distinct from the other parties, 'we' indicates an institutional differentiation; 'we' as opposed to 'you', rulers as opposed to ruled. The National Party's

executive discourse implies managerialism, the elevation of private sector management principles to a generalised ideology:

[M]anagerialism's perilous central doctrine is that differences between a university and a car company [or even a government] are less important than their similarities and that the performance of all organizations can be optimized by the application of generic management skills and knowledge (Klikauer, 2013, p. 5).

The National Party accepts as 'common sense' the notions that private sector actors promote efficiency, that the role of government is to pave the way for business, under the assumption that business will ultimately serve national interests. A National Party release on broadband policy explains that the party has established private sector infrastructure, promoted competition, and thereby served the general interest:

We have established four public-private partnerships for the Ultra-Fast Broadband initiative and one for the Rural Broadband Initiative...

We have also improved regulations to encourage competition...

We have the framework and the partnerships in place, *but Labour are saying they would unpick the whole thing* (Joyce, 2011; emphasis mine).

This 'we' is exclusive, distinct, individual, referring to the party as distinct from other actors. Yet the 'we' is also a mediator, negotiating with business for the good of the community as a whole. Labour is portrayed as pursuing special interests that undermine the general interest, as in One Nation Conservatism (Dorey, 2010, p. 51). At times National Party releases explicitly refer to balancing competing interests:

We also can't ignore the major economic opportunity that continuing global oil demand stands to provide New Zealand...

We will remain focused on energy efficiency, renewable energy, the exploration of *our* natural resources and the pricing of carbon as *we manage our environmental responsibilities and realise our economic opportunities* (Parata, 2011a).

The party is a national actor, over and above the various sectional interests. The genuflection toward environmental responsibilities implies reconciliation, the mediation of competing interests for the common good; the demands of oil barons and environmentalists somehow reconciled. The notion of reconciling competing interests through the 'nation' sits at the core of One Nation Conservatism (Dorey,

2010, p. 52). As with Laclau's (2005a) account of institutionalism, the limits of articulation lie at the limits of the community, rather than polarising the community in a populist fashion.

The National Party 'we' is a *managerial* voice, offering generalised coordination, ensuring business growth, making cuts where necessary. Science and Innovation Minister Wayne Mapp announces success in a project of internships for undergraduate students:

We have huge demand from businesses so this year we have decided to award 341 internships instead of the 200 we initially intended...

Many of the interns from previous years later found jobs with the business (Mapp, 2011).

Students and businesses mutually benefit, as a result of competent mediation by the government. The Tertiary Education Union has criticised recent education policy for only prioritising marketable areas of education, an approach which has led to cuts (TEU, 2013). Mapp's release typifies marketisation in its emphasis on private sector internships, yet the discourse is one of growth rather than cuts. *Neoliberalism*, like parliamentary representation, provides the *zero value* of announcements; the assumed terms of social engagement (Levi Strauss, 1963), never named as the driving factor in education policy. PM John Key expresses the aspirational project that ideologically justifies a neoliberal programme for education:

We have a clear plan to build a better education system and make sure New Zealanders learn the skills they need to succeed in the 21st Century (Key, 2011a).

Although focusing on education, this line also implies the nature of National's programme for addressing poverty; workers must become 'employable', skilled, high-wage, deserving. National offers social mobility, rather than redistribution. This is a departure from classic One Nation Conservatism, which tended to recognise that many were poor through no fault of their own (Dorey, 2010). However the emphasis on addressing poverty by changing the behaviour of the poor, without curbing the rich in any way, matches UK post-Thatcherist conservative discourse (p. 182).

Terms like "partnership" and "mixed" equate corporate interests with the general interest. The National Party often employs a discourse of 'partnership' in its press releases. In the press releases surveyed,

the National party uses the term 'partnership' not only in endorsing the controversial Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement, but also terming Charter Schools as Partnership Schools (Parata, 2014), referring to 'partnership' between employers and unions in the Christchurch rebuild (Wilkinson, 2011), promoting Public-Private Partnerships for broadband internet (Joyce, 2011), 'BlueGreen' partnerships with business to conserve the environment (Smith, 2014b), partnership with businesses in the primary sector (Guy, 2014) and "New Zealand's first-ever Public Private Partnership contract for a state highway" (Brownlee, 2014). 'Partnership' operates at meta-discursive level, framing various policies. Through 'Partnership', inequalities are bracketed, business joins and serves the community, and the ruling party secures appropriate contracts. Similarly, the National Party terms its programme of partially privatising state-owned assets a "mixed ownership model" (Joyce, 2011), subtly implying a partial departure from neoliberalism along the lines of 'Third Way' discourse¹⁶ which maintains neoliberal defaults.

Dorey (2010) notes an emphasis in UK Post-Thatcherist conservative discourse on the 'third sector', community organisations filling gaps left by the state and business (p. 182). This departs discursively from the neoliberal emphasis on the individual, without challenging the fundamentals of neoliberalism. The National Party similarly emphasises 'community' organisations as a mediating force between economic and social imperatives. Press releases advertise a "Community Response Fund" for voluntary groups responding to the Christchurch earthquake and Global Financial Crisis (Parata, 2011b) and a "Community Conservation Partnership Fund" for natural heritage groups (Smith, 2014c). Although these are reconcilable with neoliberalism, they offer an apparent buffer. Through these isolated conciliatory forms, the ruling party attempts to reconcile social demands with the prevailing regime. Associate Minister for the Community and Voluntary Sector Hekia Parata (2011b) is quick to emphasise that, by relying on community rather than state organisations, the "red tape" of state involvement can be avoided – implicitly, budgets can remain austere through the outsourcing of social tasks, often to voluntary labour. The National Party's regular use of "Community" offers a kind of euphemism for the

Initially a project of Labour Parties and associated theorists (Giddens, 1998), Third Way discourse seeks a path between social democracy and neoliberalism, which arguably embeds neoliberalism further (Kelsey, 2016). I suggest that this discourse has since been adopted by conservative parties in light of the unpopularity of neoliberalism.

retreat of the welfare state.

In a neoliberal context, the National Party's programme can be characterised as *bourgeois internationalist* (cooperating across borders with business interests). National was the most likely party to use the term 'international' (Figure 8). The interests of international business are equated with the interests of New Zealand business, and therefore the interests of the nation as a whole:

Mr Key said enhancing and growing New Zealand's *international* trade links was a key part of our plan to build a stronger economy and create more jobs with higher incomes (Key, 2011c; emphasis mine).

The term 'international' most often occurred in reference to international trade agreements. Press releases promote the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (Groser, 2011a), the Thailand-NZ Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (Groser, 2011b), a Free Trade Agreement with Korea, and a WTO Agreement (Joyce, 2014d). Kelsey contends that such trade agreements are a global form of "economic constitutionalism," binding future governments to a neoliberal regulatory model (p. 208). For Stephen Joyce, Minister of Economic Development, these agreements mean that "*our* exporters can compete on an equal footing in other economies and further lift *our* exports" (Joyce, 2014d; emphasis mine). The first-person collective pronoun invites the reader to understand that what benefits New Zealand business; in this case, international regulatory integration; will benefit New Zealand as a whole. Similarly when discussing debt reduction, Joyce uses first-person collective pronouns to articulate a chain of equivalence:

With the current global economic uncertainty, it is crucial for *us* to get back in surplus quickly, and reduce *our* borrowing sooner rather than later. Kiwis know that means controlling expenditure, encouraging companies to grow, and building new infrastructure from the mixed ownership model, rather than more debt (Joyce, 2011; emphasis mine).

Through the terms 'we' and 'our', the interests of business are equated with the interests of all New Zealanders. The reader, not necessarily wealthy, is expected to identify with the concerns of business. Notably, the paragraph actually blurs crucial economic facts; stating public debt must be curbed, when New Zealand's public debt is relatively low (IMF, 2014), and our private debt is much more significant (Hunt, 2014), a problem which might imply curbing the housing boom or increasing incomes. Cognitive

linguist and political theorist George Lakoff (2004) notes that facts can be less important than cognitive 'frames' for understanding political discourse (p. 73). In Joyce's above formulation, the precise economic nature of debt is less important discursively than the 'we' which binds the economic interests of state, capital and civil society. Instead of a collection of disparate people who have competing class interests, the nation is often imagined metaphorically as a family (p. 5). Joyce's call for discipline ('reduce our borrowing', 'controlling expenditure') may imply a conservative *strict father* model, whereby the father must ensure discipline for the ultimate wellbeing of the family (p. 40).

Beyond the content analysis, further media sources indicate the relationship between the leader's persona and the political programme of institutionalism. Dorey (2009) notes that David Cameron's election was a key moment in the UK Conservative Party's consolidation of post-Thatcherist discourse (p. 260). John Key's persona, criticised as apolitical (Brown, 2011), similarly gives expression to the National Party's contemporary institutional discourse. Key thrives on 'non-political' media appearances to shore up his popularity, courting publics through entertainment media (ibid). One critic has complained that Key's media persona represents not only an "absence of politics," but a "Politics of Absence" (ibid), operating as a kind of empty vessel that publics may project their aspirations onto. Other commentators have described Key's persona as the "CEO of NZ Inc" (MacDonald, 2016; KAROL, 2013; Pablo, 2012). Laclau (2005b) asserts that in the ideal Institutional form, which is impossible yet tendentially lurking, "politics is replaced by administration and the traces of social division disappear" (p. 48). Key's apparently 'apolitical' media persona, rather than distracting from the National Party programme, gives expression to this programme. If government is simply the administration of objective (unchallengeable) social difference, publics do not necessarily require interrogation of their leaders by an engaged media. Key is a friendly boss, a competent manager integrating the private and public sectors, a politician from a world that has left politics behind; New Zealand after Fukuyama's End of History (whereby class and ideological conflict has come to an end, with social and economic liberalism prevailing over all competitors).

III. Labour's nationalist 'we'

This chapter has covered how the nation-state is the primary site of identification for the two major parties. The critical discourse analysis seeks to identify the distinct ways the two major parties seek to appropriate the 'floating signifier' of the nation. Drawing on Laclau (2005a, 2005b), critical discourse analysis has demonstrated that the ruling party articulates an *institutionalist* discourse whereby the ruling party serves the national interest, by doing what is best for business. The next section argues that Right-Wing Populism is the dominant discourse of Opposition parties, particularly Labour. Opposition parties were more likely than their Government counterparts to refer negatively to 'foreign' actors. The Labour Party displaced economic anxieties, denied by National, onto racialised 'foreign' nonpublics. In the case of the housing bubble, a growing crisis demanded response, driven by the contradiction between *use value* and *exchange value* in Marxist terms (Harvey, 2014). Neither of the major parties identified class contradiction as a core element of the housing crisis. Whereas National denied¹⁷ the existence of a housing crisis, Labour's response to bourgeois internationalism displaced the economic contradiction through an ideological contradiction between local and foreigner. Labour failed to distinguish working-class migrants from international capital, focusing on Chinese 'surnames' (Gibson, 2015), a racial rather than economic characteristic. Labour's *Right-Wing Populism* sought to rouse opposition to neoliberalism without fundamentally challenging the common terms of the regime.

Like the ruling party, Labour's use of 'we' and 'our' indicates a representative relation between party and nation. However, Labour's invocation of the 'we' has a more negative 'they', where it's often a passionless site of bureaucratic specification for the ruling party. The following quote, on partial privatisation of power companies, is typical of mainstream oppositional discourses in 2011 and 2014:

[The assets] are *ours*, we already own them. *We* don't want them sold and *we* don't want Australian bankers pocketing \$100m as *they* clip the ticket during the sale (Goff, 2011; emphasis mine).

Labour's 'we' is at once more expansive and more particular than National's – whereas National's 'we' indicates what the party will do for New Zealand, Labour's 'we' identifies New Zealand with the party, excluding foreign elements. Labour's statements against asset sales use a nationalist 'us and them'

17 As of late August 2016, Key has conceded the existence of a housing crisis after years of pressure (Satherly, 2016). However, Key evaded responsibility for the crisis, blaming the previous Labour government (ibid).

discourse:

Is that the future we want --- a future where the electricity we use every day to power *our* industry and heat *our* homes is more expensive because foreign buyers want to squeeze all the profit *they* can out of *our* country? That's what will happen if a National government is re-elected (Cunliffe, 2011a).

Residential power prices have already increased exponentially in the decades since the Fourth Labour government's commercialisation of State-Owned Enterprises in the 1980s (Figure 7), which strictly speaking, kept the ownership in the hands of the New Zealand state. However, the crucial point here is that while National's 'we' was confidently managerial, Labour's 'we' invokes an abandoned, disenfranchised public, anxious about the actions of the neoliberal ruling party. National's 'we' is the executive wing of an objective, differentiated totality; the Institution. Labour's 'we' is a site of identification in a battle. *They* have betrayed *us*, and *our* day of reckoning will come.

For Laclau (2005a), polarisation is the key difference between Institutional and Populist articulation – populism constitutes a 'people' defined by a dichotomous frontier, disrupting the wholeness of Institutional articulation:

The difference between a populist and an institutionalist totalization is to be found at the level of

these privileged, hegemonic signifiers which structure, as nodal points, the ensemble of a discursive formation... in the case of populism: a frontier of exclusion divides society into two camps. The 'people', in that case, is something less than the totality of the members of the community (p. 81).

Although 'New Zealand' is the dominant cross-partisan site of identification, a 'floating signifier' in Laclau's terms, for Labour this is a site of polarisation rather than a site of reconciliation. This polarisation can be most clearly identified through the opposing term, the term of nationalism-by-negation; not 'New Zealander', but 'foreigner'. The Labour Party is the most likely party to use the term 'foreign(er)' in the content surveyed, using the term 35 times, followed by the other Opposition parties; MANA, the Greens and New Zealand First (Figure 8). The ruling National Party never uses this term, more likely to use the term 'international'.

Figure 8: National & ethnic terms, party releases 2011-2014

100: National & ethnic	ACT	Green	IP	Labour	MANA	Maori	National	NZF	UF	Total
101: New Zealand(er)	25	161	10	203	78	39	380	86	21	982
102: Kiwi	2	10	0	111	1	1	25	5	2	155
103: Nation (national)	0	7	1	23	18	16	30	2	2	97
104: Citizen	0	0	0	3	3	2	2	2	0	12
105: Pakeha	1	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	5
106: Maori	2	0	0	20	163	100	67	10	0	362
107: Non-Maori	0	0	0	0	2	3	0	0	0	5
108: Australia(n)	1	0	0	49	7	1	35	7	0	100
109: Pacific (Pasifika)	0	0	0	56	16	10	46	0	0	128
110: Samoa(n)	0	0	0	17	2	0	16	0	0	35
111: Cook Islands	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
112: Tonga(n)	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
113: Niue(an)	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
114: Fiji(an)	0	0	0	1	0	0	11	0	0	12
115: Tokelau(an)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
116: Middle East(ern)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
117: Asia(n)	0	0	0	1	0	3	17	1	0	22
118: Chinese	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	4
119: Europe(an)	0	0	0	2	4	1	3	1	0	11
120: British	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
121: Africa(n)	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	3
122: America(n)	1	3	0	3	3	1	2	1	0	14
123: Migrant	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	4
124: Refugee	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2
125: Foreign(er)	0	13	0	35	14	8	0	12	0	82
126: International	0	2	4	11	9	4	30	0	0	60

For the opposition parties (Greens, Labour, MANA, New Zealand First), foreigners are an economically parasitic nonpublic, threatening and undermining the nation. In addition to sale of power companies into "foreign ownership," Labour expresses concern about the sale of farmland to a Chinese buyer (Parker, 2011). The potential New Zealand buyer in this case was Michael Fay, one of the ten richest men in

New Zealand, having making substantial profits from the privatisation of telecommunication and rail infrastructure (Bennett, 2012). Privatisation does not necessarily move assets into 'foreign' hands so much as capitalist hands, both local and international. However, Labour maintains the primacy of the local/foreign divide over the class divide, never naming 'capitalists', 'millionaires'¹⁸, 'billionaires', 'corporations' or 'big business' as threats. Their only mention of 'investors' unfavourably contrasts "foreign investors" with "Kiwi investors" (Cunliffe, 2011b), and their only mentions of 'bankers' specifies "Australian bankers" (Goff, 2011a). This balances the courting of a dispossessed public with the need to remain business-friendly, perhaps keeping in mind that businesses still fund both major parties (Edwards, 2008, p. 5). Questions of economic (mal)distribution are displaced through national (mis)recognition.

A controversy in 2015, outside of the content analysis but useful in contextualising the content, provides an example of Labour's right-wing populist discourse. Labour housing spokesman Phil Twyford released a leaked report, covering around 4,000 Auckland house sales by one firm, underlining that 39.5% of those purchases were conducted by buyers with "Chinese surnames" (Gibson, 2015). Twyford considered this "staggering evidence" of offshore purchasing, although there was no way of differentiating between Chinese New Zealanders and overseas investors (ibid). Labour quickly received a backlash from members of the Chinese community for "half-baked" figures and for treating Chinese buyers as "scapegoats" (Walters, 2015). By defining economic exploiters as foreign, specifically Asian, this gesture also implied a certain national identification for legitimate home-owners: 'Kiwi', implicitly European-descended, and apparently incapable of predatory economic behaviour. Keith Ng (2015) underlined the stereotypical, ethnically defined public and non-public implied by Twyford's account:

The subtext of this story is that people with Chinese-sounding names are foreigners full of cash who are buying all our houses and chasing hardworking Kiwis out of their homes. This is straight-up scapegoating (ibid).

Labour's emphasis on nationality fudged the economic contradictions at the heart of the housing crisis. As Sue Bradford (2016) notes in a discussion of left housing strategy in Aotearoa/NZ, xenophobia like Twyford's "can provide a 'quick hit' for popular support, but comes at the expense of promulgating an

¹⁸ Exception: Labour MP Kelvin Davis referred to Kim Dotcom as a "multimillionaire" in an interview (see Chapter 3 discussion).

understanding of the deeper structural dynamics at play” (p. 159). Bradford notes that although a number of community groups are organising resistance to the neoliberal housing agenda, groups are largely fractured, often lacking a common language (p. 145-166). With the collapse of the housing boom lurking on the horizon, systemic analysis of the housing market should seek to clarify the relations mystified by Labour's xenophobia. For Harvey (2014), housing bubbles are a “perfect example” of the contradiction between *use value* and *exchange value* under capitalism (p. 23). If we consider housing as a right, we must place the 'use value' of houses first, their capacity to provide shelter (p. 18). However, the exchange value of houses, their price and profitability, moves into the “driver's seat” under capitalism (p. 17). As housing is a speculative commodity – usually purchased through debt – property bubbles are a regular feature of capitalism (p. 21). In the 2008 US housing crisis, “the pursuit of exchange value destroyed access to housing as a use value” (p. 21)

Figure 9: House prices vs income

(Source: Statistics New Zealand, REINZ, Housing New Zealand, 2014)

The housing crisis presents a challenge that both major parties are apparently unwilling to address. Critical political economy may help in understanding their reticence. In Aotearoa/NZ, the housing bubble has yet to burst at the time of writing. House prices in Auckland quadrupled from 1991-2014, and wages

have not kept up (Figure 9). The growth in *exchange value* already undermines the *use value* of housing; decreasing numbers of people can afford housing. Recent years have seen a drop in homeownership to just below 50% of the adult population (Statistics New Zealand, 2014b). The same period has seen a 25% spike in homelessness (Amore, 2016). Although the government does not collect comprehensive stats on ownership of housing, data from Land Information New Zealand indicates that only 3% of buyers and sellers are foreign tax residents (LINZ, 2016). Harvey (2014) notes that many middle-class 'consumers' gain (precarious) wealth from the housing bubble, not only super-rich investors: "housing asset values have become important political objectives for larger and larger segments of the population and a major political issue because the exchange value for consumers is as important as the exchange value earned by producers" (p. 20). Herein lies the contradiction for major parties; how to address the housing crisis without alienating voters who benefit from the boom; likely to be older and Pākehā, also demographics likely to vote (Statistics New Zealand, 2014a; Statistics New Zealand, 2014b). Rather than alienate this relatively privileged public, the major parties evade the problem. While the ruling party denies the tension entirely – John Key has claimed there is "no housing crisis" (Moir, 2015) – the main opposition party displaces it through the ideological contradiction between 'local' and 'foreign'. Growing social and economic contradictions among the people; between property owner and vagrant, mortgagee and lender, landlord and tenant; are safely displaced onto a nonpublic, an 'Other', defined through racial rather than economic characteristics. This tendency to externalise social contradiction onto 'foreigners' may be associated with the high representation of recent migrants in non-voting statistics, with over 60% of recent migrants not voting (Statistics New Zealand, 2014a). Those who "[d]o not feel they belong to New Zealand" are also heavily represented in non-voting statistics (ibid).

National and Labour's apparently distinct responses to the crisis both give tacit leeway to local capital, which otherwise may be destabilised by left-wing responses to a growing political-economic crisis. Yet in Labour's discourse, "a frontier of exclusion divides society into two camps," Laclau's (2005a) precondition for populist as distinct from institutional articulation (p. 81). Whereas National's institutional discourse is *bourgeois internationalist*, Labour's Opposition discourse is *bourgeois nationalist*. Although Labour's economic populism may appeal to left-wing or subaltern publics, their specific focus on the threat of *foreign* over local capital venerates the purified singular nation-state, a cross-class alliance, as

solution to the uncertainties of international capitalism. This is *Right-Wing Populism*. Although Labour's is a weak populism – perhaps lacking a sufficiently compelling leader figure, which for Laclau is “inherent to the formation of a 'people'” (p. 100) – they use the formulae of populism, the dichotomous yet imprecise terms (migrants are confused with international capital). Populism emerges from a notion of unfulfillment, a need for restoration of wholeness:

From the very beginning we are confronted with a dichotomic division between unfulfilled social demands, on the one hand, and an unresponsive power, on the other. Here we begin to see why the *plebs* sees itself as the *populus*, the part as the whole: since the fullness of the community is merely the imaginary reverse of a situation lived as *deficient being*, those who are responsible for this cannot be a legitimate part of the community: the chasm between them is irretrievable (Laclau, 2005a, p. 86).

The nation, as common site of identification, offers a hinge for such polarising discourse without threatening the class basis of the common regime. As Gurhanli (2013) notes in comparing Laclau's categories with those of conservative political theorist Michael Oakeshott, populist discourse can opportunistically manipulate the status quo rather than radically subverting it (p. 35). I contend that the difference between Institutionalism and Right-Wing Populism is more tactical than strategic, both hailing publics in support of local bourgeois power.

Chapter 2: Recognition of the Subaltern

Having established features of dominant party discourse, my analysis now moves on to consider its discursive relationship to subalterns. This chapter demonstrates a tendency of dominant discourse to officially 'recognise' culturally subaltern groups, while splitting these groups into (recognised) economic elites and (unrecognised) economic subalterns. This analysis is framed by a 'tripod' of subaltern publics; Racialised, Gendered and Economically defined publics. Culturally subaltern groups (Māori, women) are named more than dominant groups (Pākehā, men); dominant groups are invisible, default, implicit in generic terms like 'New Zealander' or 'taxpayer'. This is the dominant norm across both party and press coverage in 2011 and 2014: a 'common ground' for politics. Having established this pattern in the content, the chapter proceeds to critical discourse analysis in an attempt to reveal underlying power structures.

The National Party's official discourse on 'Māori Affairs' enacts a programme of *bourgeois hegemony in the field of cultural recognition* (**Section I**). The Party rushes for 'settlement', seeking to foreclose the articulation of indigenous grievances. Yet over a period of increased settlement, inequality has only increased. The National Party emphasises cultural recognition of an economically privileged layer, without adequate measures to address the poverty of most Māori. The National Party's programme for women also trades recognition for redistribution (**Section II**). While the party celebrates formal equality, and recognises the achievements of bourgeois women, poor and working-class women do not find the same recognition. Rather, poor women are attacked through categories such as 'beneficiary'. Press coverage also equates working-class identity with masculinity, despite the feminisation of poverty and the fact that the majority of union members in Aotearoa/New Zealand are women (Ryall & Blumenfield, 2014; p. 9). As in Nancy Fraser's (2005) account of feminism, the movement gains recognition without redistribution, in a "tragic" bargain which defangs feminism and other social movements (p. 299).

Economic categories tend to be more generic than explicitly Racialised and Gendered categories, with classless terms like 'the market' and 'the economy' rife in dominant discourse (**Section III**). Without specification of class relations, these generic terms reify economic relations as simply the terrain of existence, rather than a historically specific social relation that could be overturned. Conversely, the bourgeoisie is assumed to be a universal class, as the interests of business are equated with the

interests of New Zealand as a whole. Content in 2011 briefly diverges from this norm with the emergence of the MANA Movement, a party which articulates a Left-Wing Populist polarisation between 'rich' and 'poor'. While MANA at times reflects the dominant Right-Wing Populism of Opposition parties (emphasising national over class division), the party also articulates a nascent Left-Wing Populism, seeking an alliance between Māori and Pākehā publics on the basis of working-class constituency. Even as a minor party, MANA finds some mainstream media coverage for its challenges to the inequalities fostered by neoliberal capitalism.

Figure 10: 'Maori' / 'Pakeha' 2011-2014

I. Recognition of the Indigenous subaltern

The section begins with a quantitative comparison between 'Māori' and 'Pākehā' as terms in dominant discourse. Pākehā are largely invisible, at 1% of party mentions and 6% of press mentions (Figure 10). As in Sara Ahmed's *Phenomenology of Whiteness* (2007), whiteness is a "habit" (p. 149), a "background to experience" (150), even a surrounding "space" (157). Black and brown bodies, or Māori bodies in this case, "interrupt" the space of whiteness (153), are "noticed" in a way that white bodies are not (157). Whiteness already exists, unnamed, embedded in generic terms like 'New Zealander'. Pākehā emerge only in relation to Māori – in 2011, 8 out of the Herald's 9 references to Pākehā refer to members of MANA, a party founded and led by Māori (to be discussed in **Section III**):

"Pakeha candidates John Minto and Sue Bradford" (Collins et al, 2011), "Hone's date with Pakeha" (Crispe, 2011).

Counterintuitively, the dominant group is the least visible, only emerging in relation to the subaltern group (in this case Pākehā only emerge in a party with Māori leaders). By contrast, the ruling party continuously reasserts recognition of the subaltern, albeit on terms that reproduce dominant bourgeois terms. The National Party's official discourse enacts a programme of bourgeois hegemony in the field of cultural recognition. Three press releases released on the same day, the 12th of September 2014, outline the National Party programme of recognition, redistribution and representation for Māori: 'Treaty and Māori Affairs policies released' (Finlayson, 2014), 'National targets more skills training for Māori'

(Joyce, 2014a), and 'Ten key initiatives to boost Northland¹⁹ Economy' (Joyce, 2014b). Variations on the term settle ('settling,' 'settlement') appear 11 times in the short document 'Treaty and Māori Affairs policies released' (Finlayson, 2014). The piece underlines the speed of settlement, boasting of more settlements per year than the previous Labour government, and a target of finalising settlements in 2017. As Veracini (2012) contends, settler-colonial polities have largely shifted from direct repression to "incorporation by recognition" (p. 8). This shift seeks a final "settled" resolution, in contrast to more open-ended approaches (p. 9). While this release may be partly intended for iwi publics, the call for final resolution may also be intended for discontented Pākehā. National's release states that settlement "is good for iwi and good for New Zealand" (Finlayson, 2014), implying a distinction between 'iwi' and 'New Zealand', thereby embedding the invisibility of Pākehā identity, cloaked under the national category. The release adds that the process will "allow us to move forward as a nation" (Finlayson, 2014), underlining how 'settlement' serves the nation as a whole. Recognition of indigeneity is desirable so long as it immediately abolishes itself: through recognition, the indigenous figure is assimilated into the diverse, yet unified nation-state. Whereas the Pākehā citizen is always-already the neutral subject of the national project, the Māori citizen may be recognised on the condition that she give up her struggle for recognition.

Finlayson (2014) outlines a notion of economic redistribution when he states that settlements "provide iwi with an economic base to build on." All Māori have iwi whakapapa ('tribal descent'), and many are affiliated to modern iwi organisations. However, National's emphasis on 'iwi' arguably prioritises bourgeois iwi leaders over the majority of Māori. Historical context may help to contextualise this partial recognition: constitutional lawyer Annette Sykes²⁰ (2010) contends that the National Iwi Chairs Forum, established as "first in the queue to sit at the Masters table," (p. 4), is a self-elected body that has helped entrench "a new Māori hegemony" implementing neoliberalism (p. 8-17). Rather than broader redistribution, National recognises indigenous leaders with bourgeois economic interests. Over a period of increased 'settlement,' inequality has only increased within Māori communities (Poata-Smith, 2005). The National Party's stated programme for economic redistribution centres on two key mechanisms:

19

Māori comprise 32% of the Northland population.

20

Sykes would later stand as a candidate for the MANA Party, which had not formed at the time of writing *The Politics of the Brown Table* (2010).

private profit from iwi land ownership, and skills training (Finlayson, 2014; Joyce, 2014a; Joyce, 2014b). The party underlines skills training, with the Māori and Pacific Trades Training Initiative expanding by 2000 places (Joyce, 2014). Over half of Māori and Pasifika workers are considered to work in 'lower skilled' occupations (SNZ, 2013). Many of these jobs are essential: manufacturing, cleaning, care work (ibid). National's economic programme for Māori assumes the low value of these lines of work, and rather than raising wages for 'lower skilled' workers, proposes upskilling. National's Māori Affairs policy also outlines limited economic concessions to social policy – e.g. expanding free early childhood education, increased health funding to fight diseases (Finlayson, 2014). These minor social concessions must be placed in a broader historical context. In Gramsci's terms, the National Party operates as a “hegemonic” organisation, rather than a simply “economic-corporate” fraction – implementing policy not just to meet bourgeois economic needs, but to seek consent from subaltern layers (Gramsci, 2011b, p. 179-180; p. 183-184). Maintaining state power requires that superstructures are developed to carry out these broader social tasks, “or else the state will fall apart” (p. 197). National's social policies remain firmly within the monetary and fiscal regime of neoliberal capitalism (Kelsey, 2015). Limited amounts of capital are allocated for treaty settlements, healthcare and education, without challenging the economic base. Alongside these limited social policies, National proposes controversial policies that extend capitalist exploitation - “Encouraging minerals exploration and oil and gas exploration” is promoted as necessary to economic development in Northland, without acknowledging local concerns about sustainability (Joyce, 2014b). A Waitangi Tribunal report has criticised the National Party's Te Ture Whenua bill, trumpeted in these press releases, as commercialisation of Māori land without sufficient consultation (Bootham, 2016).

Recognition and redistribution are both mediated through a particular form of *representation*. In the closing paragraph of his Treaty and Māori Affairs policy release, Finlayson (2014) underlines that the government will continue to work with “iwi leaders,” taken to represent Māori as a whole. Indigenous scholar Brendan Hokowhitu argues that this limited form of recognition casts the majority of urban Māori as a “corrupted and inauthentic form of Indigeneity,” in part because poor and working-class urban Māori represent more of a threat to capitalism (p. 362-265). The majority of Māori remain dispossessed, and disengaged from parliamentary politics, overrepresented in non-voting statistics (Statistics New Zealand, 2014a). Fundamentally, Māori subjects can only be recognised so long as the terms of

neoliberal capitalism remain unchallenged. This means recognising a selected economic layer, iwi leaders, as authentic indigenous subjects. As in Nancy Fraser's (2005) account of the “tragic historical irony” of contemporary feminism (which she claims is also relevant to other social movements), redistribution is traded away for partial recognition (p. 299). Whatever is good for the bourgeoisie is good for Māori, and for New Zealand: the part represents the whole.

Figure 11: 'Women' / 'Men' 2011-2014

II. Recognition of the Gendered Subaltern

Broadly, comparing 'Men' and 'Women' reveals similar results to 'Māori' and 'Pākehā' – a greater tendency to name the subaltern group (Figure 11). Parliamentary parties invoke women as publics, through 'women's issues'; Women's Refuge (King, 2011), celebrating the right to vote (Goodhew, 2014) and equal pay (Delahunty, 2011). However, 'men' are named proportionately more than 'Pākehā' – even reaching 35% in press coverage, compared to 6% for Pākehā. Gender minorities are not mentioned at all (a point that will be expanded in Chapter 3). In some situations men are named in relation to women's rights; e.g. Labour MP Kelvin Davis asserts that “men should own domestic violence as a male problem” (Pagani, 2014). In these cases, the dominant emerges in relation to the subaltern, as in the discursive relationship between 'Māori' and 'Pākehā'.

However in other cases, the term 'men' is used more broadly or generically. In 2011 and 2014, the Labour Party leaders referred to the Pike River miners as 'men' (Goff, 2011; Cunliffe, 2014). This is unobjectionable on its own – the miners who died were men, in a male-dominated industry – however it indicates a more subtle tendency to equate masculinity with working-class identity. For example, *New Zealand Herald* article on Labour's electoral failings focused on a photo op in a West Coast mining town, emphasising an assumed relationship between working-class and male identity: “[MPs] obliged reporters' requests for muscular union-style poses” (Young, 2014c). The article then noted a recent poll showing male support of under 20%, indicating that their “muscular union-style poses” were ineffective at winning over men (ibid). Finally, the implied association between gender and class was made explicit:

Friday's DigiPoll gender breakdown showed that only 18.4 per cent of men supported Labour, an incredible low for the party founded by and for organised labour (ibid).

The reporter assumes an association between organised labour and masculinity. However, the majority of union members are women (Ryall & Blumenfield, 2014; p. 9). This has been the case for over a decade (ibid). Press criticism is premised on an out-dated conception of class composition; assuming a majority-male union movement, which has not been the case for more than a decade. 'Women' and 'workers' are treated as distinct publics, arguably reflecting the separation of *recognition* and *redistribution* in ruling discourse, whereby recognition occurs on bourgeois terms. The relationship between gender and dominant political *representation* is debatable – unlike other culturally oppressed groups, women are about as likely as their male counterparts to vote (Statistics New Zealand, 2014a). However, in future surveys of non-voters, it may be worth investigating the role of double-oppression in political disenfranchisement – whether low-income women (dis)engage, considering that women are overrepresented among low-income groups.

The National Party political programme for women matches their programme for Māori: *recognition without redistribution*. Women's Affairs Minister Jo Goodhew outlines this programme in a release commemorating women's suffrage. Goodhew genuflects towards the nation, in keeping with the discourse that must run through all dominant political articulation:

We are all proud that New Zealand was the first nation in the world to grant women the vote on September 19th, 1893.

After an acknowledgement that there is still a ways to go, Goodhew commemorates women who have succeeded on terms acceptable to the bourgeoisie:

Today I have been inspired by our talented women who are leading innovation in science, business and society.

While these gains in bourgeois democratic rights may be a progressive result of prior feminist struggle, they do not necessarily address the concerns of multiply-oppressed women. Around 56% of solo parent families live in poverty, and 84.2% of those families are headed by women (Dwyer, 2015). Unlike women in business, solo mothers are not honoured by Jo Goodhew. National Party releases

euphemistically refer to “support[ing] beneficiaries into work” and aiming to reduce benefit numbers by 25% (Bennett, 2014), indicating this punitive approach to solo parents performing the unpaid child-rearing necessary to reproduce social relations. As with Māori, a selected layer of women are recognised, while poor women are punished.

Figure 12: 3 most common economic terms

III. Emergence of the economic subaltern

The Economic sphere is a distinct field of discourse from the Gendered and Racialised spheres, requiring a slightly distinct method. Although I also apply critical discourse analysis as in the previous sections, distinct aspects of the discourse require signalling. Whereas Gender and Race appear through specific categories of oppression ('Women', 'Māori'), Economic categories are largely generic – business, the market, the economy, jobs (provided by 'job creators'?). Instead of beginning with the polarities, I begin simply with the most common generic terms, before concluding with an examination of the rare²¹ discursive polarities.

21

In previous cases I have generally merged the 2011 and 2014 data, as the patterns were consistent. However in this case, party releases in 2011 saw a major deviation from the dominant pattern: the emergence of 'the poor' as a significant category, in a field which tended to use more generic, less class-conscious categories. For now I am noting this more polarised language and bracketing it for later discussion.

Across all party and press coverage, the 'Economy' was the most common term (tied with 'Business' in 2014 press coverage). While it may seem intuitive that 'the economy' is the most common Economic term, it has an ideological inflection, concealing and naturalising class contradiction beneath a generic term. From a different political perspective, 'Critical Political Economy' rather than 'the economy' might seek to specify the power relations of capitalism. One article defends 'the economy' from critics, as an abstract force over and above social actions:

Opposition parties seek to portray the economy as heading into a parlous state. It is not. The economy created 82,000 new jobs in the past year.

In this formulation, a set of social interactions – employment of workers by capitalists, trading of goods and services, transactions in the field of fictitious capital, imposition of laws and regulations – are not specified, and are rather homogenised under the generic category of 'the economy'. Causal and historical interactions are not clear, e.g. whether this growth in jobs is new, what the usual fluctuations in employment are, how government policies relate to growth, what industries have seen growth (or contraction), whether the new jobs are permanent or precarious. Instead of explaining any specific interactions between social actors, the writer simply attributes an apparently positive development to 'the economy', before moving on. Commodity exchange appears to take on its own venerated form of historical agency, independent of the people participating. As Lukacs (1923) describes in his account of reification ('thing-ification'), social relations assume a 'phantom objectivity':

[The commodity structure's] basis is that a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a 'phantom objectivity', an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people.

Whereas Gender and Race oppression are uncomfortable truths that can perhaps be rectified through recognition, the 'market' is natural, universal, simply the space we inhabit. In Gendered and Racialised discourse, the subaltern group is more visible than the dominant. In mainstream Economic discourse, the line between subaltern and dominant, the existence of any stratification, is largely invisible.

Media coverage largely assumes identity of interests between readers and business, indicating *bourgeois universality*. A front-page banner before the 2014 election emphasises the \$12 billion promises from the two major parties. This emphasises the fiscal cost over other economic impacts. Conversely, New Zealand's public debt is relatively low (IMF, 2014). The impact of policies on inequality,

or private debt, do not occupy the same default position as fiscal policy. Kelsey (2015) notes that the embedding of fiscal (or monetarist) policy was a key part of neoliberal entrenchment in Aotearoa/NZ (p. 190). The default emphasis on fiscal policy implies that the reader, as a New Zealander, must identify with the interests of business. The interests of business are identical with the interests of the nation as a whole: this 'Institutional' discourse in the press is closely comparable with the ruling party's discourse covered in Chapter 1.

Business most clearly emerges as a constituency in the pages of the *Business Herald*. This is not complimented by a section on the labour-force, a larger section of the population than 'business' (primarily CEOs and other bourgeois figures). An annual Mood of the Boardroom survey, focused on the views of chief executives, carries a headline that explicitly articulates the premise of bourgeois universality: "Business confidence bodes well for everyone" (Business Herald, 2014). 97% of those surveyed prefer a National government (ibid).

Figure 13: Asset sales "bonanza"

The New Zealand Herald

BUSINESSHERALD

Bankers in for \$100m bonanza

VOTE 2011

SOE PROFILE 5 SOLID ENERGY

WHAT IT'S WORTH
Estimates late last year

Macquarie: \$1.7b
Forsyth Barr: \$1.7b
Statement of corporate intent: \$3.3b

\$1.7b - \$3.3b

THE COMPANY
Produced 4 million tonnes of coal last year, half of which was exported and most of that high value coking coal used in steel making. Has reserves of up to 2 billion tonnes, mostly lignite, in coal fields throughout the country. New projects underway or in the pipeline include bio-diesel, coal seam gas, coal to fertiliser and coal to liquid fuels using lignite. Inside runner to

Today:
Finance sector bonanza

Yesterday: Who could buy in

Tuesday: How the SOEs rate

Monday: Buying in volatile times

Saturday: Hard sell on Air NZ

by Grant Bradley

Brokerage fees and other expenses could cost up to \$100 million for the state-owned enterprises tagged for partial sale if National wins the election. The Government says those firms that want the business must keep fees down but, based on previous deals of public assets, the costs of sale were typically up to 2 per cent.

With signs the hoped-for \$5 billion to \$7 billion from the sale of four energy companies and more of Air New Zealand may be heading towards the lower figure, this equates to \$100 million. The sales are expected over a period of three to five years.

Merchant banking sources said brokerage fees by themselves could be as high as 2 per cent but this would depend on how hard the Government would push them down.

On top of that would be legal, accounting and promotion costs but these would not scale up as brokerage

LEARNED

If National is re-elected four energy SOEs are in line to be partially sold as will more of Air New Zealand. The Herald has spotlighted the companies and issues surrounding their possible listing during the past week.

While coverage largely cloaked business interests under generic categories like 'the economy', the *Business Herald* openly celebrates neoliberal victory with the headline "Bankers in for \$100m bonanza" on the controversial asset sales policy (Figure 13), opposed by around two thirds of voters according to

a Citizens-Initiated Referendum (Rutherford, 2013). Democracy seems incidental: what's best for business is best for everyone, whether they like it or not. This disconnection between democracy and policy may help explain why poor and working-class citizens increasingly disengage from the electoral process (Statistics New Zealand, 2014a).

While the Business Herald asserts the interests of the bourgeois public, MANA in 2011 represents the partial emergence of the subaltern as counterpublic. MANA formed from MP Hone Harawira's split from the Māori Party, over that party's economic concessions to the ruling National Party (Watson, Hartevelt, 2011). Populist discontent crystallised around the leader-figure of Hone Harawira, particularly in his electorate Te Tai Tokerau – populist movements tend to form around a leader-figure, who gives expression to discontent (Laclau, 2005a, p. 100). In the ferment of the party's 2011 formation, the party embodied a range of sometimes contradictory political currents. MANA in some respects reproduced broader Right-Wing Populist discourse, referring negatively to 'foreign' interests, alongside a nascent left-wing populism that departed from dominant Opposition discourse. I have discussed how nationalist ideology can displace class contradiction (Chapter 1). A Foreign Policy press release by MANA explicitly counterposes progressive internationalism with National's bourgeois internationalism:

MANA believes that the relationships between Aotearoa New Zealand and other peoples and countries must be shaped by our ethics of solidarity and manaakitanga and our vision for a just future, not by the interests of major powers and their corporations, as happens now... New Zealand governments send troops fight the super-powers' wars in other countries but fail to condemn abuses of human rights, especially of indigenous peoples, elsewhere... Mana stands for an ethical foreign policy (MANA, 2011).

As previously mentioned, content analysis reveals that 2011 party releases deviate²² from largely

²² Labour Party references to Insurance also grew in 2011, with 62 mentions (Table 2). These all concerned the aftermath of the Christchurch Earthquake, and associated insurance crisis. Labour repeated the following policy prescription in each press release on the topic: "Resolve the insurance gridlock... Intervene in the insurance market as a last resort... Establish an independent insurance commissioner." As this policy statement leaves policy prescriptions at a very general level, limits direct intervention to a 'last resort', and does not identify the broader systemic issue of neoliberalism, I do not consider this a major departure from prevailing discourse.

Labour also used the term "Business" 37 times in 2011 (Table 2), however these mentions were

generic Economic terms – the emergence of 'the poor' as a public. The newly formed MANA Movement was nearly single-handedly responsible for this deviation, with their 133 mentions²³ of 'Poor' or 'Poverty' distantly followed by the Green Party's 16 mentions (Figure 14). MANA was also the most likely party to name 'workers' and 'unions', terms which imply more working-class agency than the potentially paternalistic emphasis on 'poverty' (ibid). Further, MANA was the most likely party to use explicit terms like 'the rich' or 'capitalists' for dominant groups, indicating a left-wing populism absent elsewhere (Figure 14). Whereas many parties name 'Small Business' (cloaking pro-business policies behind a generic populism), only MANA in 2011 named 'Big Business'. Whereas race "interrupts" the surrounding space of whiteness (Ahmed, 2007, p. 153), class terms like 'rich' and 'poor' interrupt the surrounding reified space of "economics.". According to Kelsey (2015), any departure from neoliberalism must be wholesale rather than piecemeal (p. 125), which partly requires naming the systemic problem: MANA was the only party in my survey to name 'neoliberalism'. These polarising terms interrupt bourgeois universality, highlighting counterposed economic interests rather than identification of bourgeois interests with broader interests.

Although the press in 2011 generally used 'classless' economic terms (Figure 12), coverage of MANA in 2011 reproduced their left-wing populist rhetoric. A *Herald* headline announced, "Mana fills void as rivals drift to the centre" (Davison, 2011). On November 25th, eve of the 2011 election, the front page of the New Zealand Herald announced MANA's party promise: "Tax the rich and feed the poor." Another article, albeit one tucked away as a minor story, explained:

The Mana Party's "parasites on poverty" tour - an extension of leader Hone Harawira's war on poverty - highlighted what he said were major hits on poor people's lives (Tahana, 2011).

As a minor party, MANA contested the dominant neoliberal terms of representation. Instead of dichotomising cultural recognition with economic redistribution, MANA sought an integration of cultural and economic demands (e.g. recognition of Treaty rights, taxing the rich to feed the poor), requiring an appropriate form of political representation: what Nancy Fraser (2005) calls a "three-dimensional politics" (p. 305-306). Harawira (2014) called for an alliance of progressive Pākehā with the Māori Sovereignty movement, harking back to the historical alliance between the Labour Party and the

favourable, indicating a need to remain business-friendly.

23 This is even notable considering MANA sent less press releases out than Labour and National, yet MANA made up 82% of mentions, or 133 out of 156.

Ratana Movement. In understanding this discourse, it's worth highlighting the contentious historical context for such an alliance. In her influential work *Māori Sovereignty*, Donna Awatere (1984) warned of the challenges of bicultural political alliance. Awatere's description of the Pākehā far left was harsh, but resonant:

The left in this country is worse than fragmented. It is dust which unhappily drifts between trade unions and the student unions, subject to every whim of wind and puff of change (p. 50)

Awatere attributed this weakness to the purism and individualism of far leftists (ibid). Conversely, she also noted the emphasis on communal ownership and collective decision-making on the left, traits shared with the Māori sovereignty, movement which may offer a basis for alliance (ibid). MANA attempted at such an alliance. The party articulated working-class constituency in bicultural terms, naming "*te pani me te rawakore* (the poor and the powerless) as their constituency. Annette Sykes, MANA Candidate for Waiariki, stated in a press release "We are quite clear: we are a party of the left and we are Kaupapa Māori focused" (Sykes, 2011). Similarly, in an interview with the *Herald* Sykes explained the relationship between working class and Māori constituency:

We're really clear that we are a party for the poor and dispossessed, and unfortunately in my [area] 62 per cent of the unemployed are Māori. But there's also a burgeoning Pākehā poor, and they don't have support (quoted in Davison, 2011).

MANA's electoral strength lay in the Māori electorates, particularly Hone Harawira's Te Tai Tokerau. Prominent Pākehā leftists such as Sue Bradford and John Minto campaigned in General seats, although they campaigned for the Party vote rather than an electorate vote, appealing to a broader Pākehā public. However, they lost by a wide margin, and the Party vote at 0.9% was marginal. While the party drew on a significant Māori counterpublic in Harawira's electorate, it was unable to forge an alliance with a broader working-class Pākehā counterpublic. After the apparent failure of this strategy in the 2011 election, Hone Harawira sought a new alliance with Pākehā Kim Dotcom in 2014 (to be discussed in the conclusion of Chapter 3).

Figure 14: Economic terms, party releases 2011

200: Economic (2011)	ACT	Green	Labour	MANA	Maori	National	NZF	UF	Total
201: Taxpayer(s)	2	4	12	5	0	15	6	0	44
202: Household	0	0	9	0	0	3	1	0	13
202: Homeowner	0	0	6	0	0	1	0	0	7
203: (First-time) Home Buyer	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
204: Rent(er)	0	6	0	5	5	0	0	0	16
205: Landlord	0	1	4	1	0	0	0	0	6
206: Homeless	0		3	0	1	0	0	0	4
207: Investor	0	1	5	3	0	0	0	0	9
208: Speculator	0	0	1	2	0	0	3	0	6
209: Profit(s)	0	1	8	4	0	0	6	0	19
210: Business	6	8	37	11	2	16	11	0	91
211: Small Business	4	4	0	0	0	1	1	0	10
212: Big Business	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	5
213: Entrepreneur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
214: Company	0	8	8	6	2	11	6	1	42
215: Corporation	0	1	0	5	0	0	0	0	6
216: Millionaire	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	4
217: Billionaire	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
218: Capitalist	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
219: Banker	0	0	6	1	0	0	3	0	10
220: Finance	0	0	6	5	0	4	1	1	17
221: Insurance	0	0	62	3	0	9	0	0	74
222: Real estate	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
223: Subcontractor	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	4
224: Rich	0	5	5	34	1	0	1	0	46
225: Poor (and Poverty)	0	16	6	133	1	0	0	0	156
226: Inequality	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
227: (Economic) Class	0	0	4	1	2	0	3	0	10
228: Worker	0	5	21	37	14	9	4	0	90
229: Beneficiary	0	0	1	35	0	6	0	0	42
230: Unemployed	0	0	2	9	0	0	1	0	12
231: Professional	0	0	4	2	0	4	1	1	12
232: Struggler	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
233: Bludger	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
234: Union	0	2	2	13	7	8	0	0	32
235: Industry(ies)	2	7	26	12	9	26	7	2	91
236: Job(s)	0	24	64	32	9	44	14	0	137
237: Public private partnership(s)	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
238: Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement	0	5	1	14	0	7	1	0	28
239: Economy(ic)	4	21	77	37	2	95	6	6	248
240: Market	0	7	26	9	0	21	2	0	65
241: Capitalism	0	0	0	2	0		1	0	3

Chapter 3: Political convergence and the production of Nonpublics

Chapter 1 argued that dominant political articulation, and even dominant opposition discourses are shaped by identification with 'New Zealand'. This chapter expands on this point, outlining enforced characteristics of the national political 'centre'. This chapter argues that the 'centre' is in large part defined by exclusion of illegitimate publics and political forces. According to the content analysis, major parties are more likely to name their rivals' potential coalition partners than their own. The chapter will argue that this contributes to a sense of political risk, i.e. that minor party extremists may jeopardise the political centre; the neoliberal capitalist nation-state. Right-wing parties and business voices also tend to portray MMP, which benefits minor parties, as a political risk (NZ Herald, 2011). Similarly, the two major parties each try to claim a centrist public space, both less likely to self-identify as 'left' or 'right' than identify their rivals as such.

Chapter 3 also argues that the press socially construct the political 'centre' in their political reportage. The press are unlikely to use first-person pronouns outside of quotes, and more likely to use third-person pronouns, indicating a tendency to stand 'outside' the political process (in keeping with genre conventions which imply 'objectivity'). Conversely, a critical discourse analysis reveals that press tend to reproduce the existing political spectrum, taking cues from official sources. For example, while press cover both minor and major parties, they are more likely to report on 'sensational' minor party figures, reproducing the major party tendency to portray minor parties as political extremists: both the National Party and the major newspapers emphasise sensational figure Kim Dotcom, who backed minor party Internet-Mana, over the politicians in that party.

My critical discourse analysis proceeds to characterise three ways that press and major parties together produce a bounded, legitimised political public. I use the term *Disciplined Democracy* in reference to a normative limitation on the terms of public participation; social movement activity (such as the Occupy movement) is portrayed as dangerous or unnecessary, while the act of voting is encouraged. Publics therefore are hailed to legitimate existing political forms, rather than contest them. I coin the term *Secular Heteronormativity* in reference to the tendency of political parties to avoid²⁴ explicit references

24 The rare explicit references to sexuality were an exception that proved the rule, often discussing sexual liberalism as a political liability (Tapaleao, 2014), a point that the discussion of Secular Heteronormativity will

to either religion or sexuality, leaving heteronormativity unchallenged, while idealising ‘the family’ as a normative space outside the public sphere. Finally, the chapter examines the production of an expanding criminalised nonpublic, mainly black and brown (Māori make up 50% of the prison population), across partisan boundaries. This criminalisation also overlaps with political disenfranchisement, with prisoners deprived of the right to vote, and black and brown subjects generally unlikely to vote (Statistics New Zealand, 2014a).

expand on. While there were other gaps in the nouns surveyed, for example references to disability, this active and explicit disavowal was notable. My survey of nonpublics is not necessarily comprehensive and could be expanded.

Figure 15: Major party references to minor parties, 2011-2014

Major parties vs minor parties

This chapter is focused on the enforced shape of the political 'centre' in Aotearoa/New Zealand. However as noted in Chapter 1, a positive term can often be understood best through its negation. This section therefore begins with the operation of casting parties out of the 'centre', into political extremities of right and left. Examining major party references to minor parties in the 2011 and 2014 Elections, major parties only tend to name their rivals' potential coalition partners, not their own potential coalition partners (Figure 15). Understanding the reason for this emphasis requires a qualitative examination. In one press release, National MP Bill English warns that a left-wing coalition would be fiscally irresponsible: "Labour, the Greens and Dotcom.... would introduce five new and unnecessary taxes and create a surge of wasteful government spending" (English, 2014). At the outset of the election campaign, Attorney General Chris Finlayson warns about the potentially risky "hydra" of a left coalition:

"Cut off Phil Goff and up shoots David Shearer and Hone Harawira. Saw off David Shearer and up springs David Cunliffe and Laila Harre."

"The fragmentation on the left hasn't made the hydra weaker," said Mr Finlayson "only more unstable if it can force its way into power again" (Young, 2014a).

National is more likely to name Kim Dotcom than the party or candidates he backed (English, 2014; Joyce, 2014c), a tactic I will return to at the conclusion of this chapter. ACT leader Jamie Whyte refers to a potential left coalition as a "Frankenstein" at the outset of his campaign (Whyte, 2014a). Opponents of MMP in the business community view it as leading to dangerously unstable government (NZ Herald,

2011). Nationalist, anti-neoliberal minor party leader Winston Peters is particularly seen as a threat to stability (ibid). Press also tend to emphasise sensationalist minor party figures and the associated risks, a point that will be expanded in the section on press coverage of parties. Although minor party ACT benefits from MMP, ACT voters tend to oppose MMP (Miller, 2015, p. 102), arguably because it is seen (by both supporters and opponents) as a curb on the neoliberalism of the major parties. MMP is perceived across the spectrum as offering opportunities to leftist and anti-neoliberal parties.

Labour also tends to name National's potential coalition parties rather than their own, suggesting that National will enter into coalitions with dangerous partisans of the right. Labour MP Grant Robertson warns that the Prime Minister's association with minor party ACT enables neoliberal privatisation: “[Key should] cut ACT adrift. But he won’t because he can’t. He will need ACT’s support to sell our state assets” (Robertson, 2011a). In common, the parties seek to claim the political ‘centre’ through exclusion of extremist elements.

Figure 16: Political ideology, party releases 2011-2014

1400: Political ideology	ACT	Green	IP	Labour	MANA	Maori	National	NZF	UF	Total
1401: Left	3	0	0	0	9	3	3	0	0	18
1402: Social Democratic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1403: Socialist	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
1404: Communist	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3
1405: Anarchist	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1406: Right	8	0	0	0	17	2	0	0	2	29
1407: Neoliberal	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
1408: Conservative	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
1409: Fascist	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Political ideology

Content analysis of explicit ideological terms finds a similar result: parties are more likely to name their rivals' supposed political ideology ('left' or 'right', 'socialist' or 'neoliberal') than their own (Figure 16). National and Labour generally stay away from language about 'left' and 'right'. National calls their rivals left-wing three times in one press release, warning that the “Left hits “Peak Spending”” (English, 2014). Labour only calls their rivals right-wing once, but neither party self-identifies ideologically. Even MANA, the only party to openly self-identify as 'left-wing' in the content surveyed, names the 'right' nearly twice as much, and is the only party to name 'neoliberalism'. Although this indicates a rare left-wing populism, it also indicates the general preference to label rivals politically rather than self-identifying. Only ACT, a

firmly neoliberal party, self-identifies as right-wing more often than it accuses its rivals of being left-wing – articulating an explicit strategy of pushing National rightwards (Whyte, 2014a). The only reference to 'communism' comes from right-wing populist party New Zealand First, associating National's privatisation plans with the 'communist government of China', as buyers include Chinese-owned companies (Peters, 2011). Alongside underlining the xenophobia of right-wing populism, this also indicates the sometimes counterintuitive logic of anti-partisanship: Peters associates a right-wing policy with the far-left, both perceived as politically extreme violations of the 'centre'.

With the exception of some minor parties then, the terrain of self-identification is generally 'non-partisan' – any partisanship is regarded as a liability. A cross-partisan consensus upholds the centre as a safe zone. Māori Party leader Tariana Turia articulates this dominant non-partisan ideology the day before the 2011 election, implicitly defending their agreement with the ruling National Party:

Our future wealth and wellbeing is too precious to enter into rhetorical wars of rich against poor; left versus right; tories versus socialists (Turia, 2011)

Turia's term 'our', as with previously covered first-person collective pronouns, stitches together a national coalition, in this case defined by its rejection of political partisanship. Conversely, the only party to refer explicitly to the political 'centre' is minor party ACT: whereas 'left' and 'right' are named and cast out by major parties, the centre is implicitly the unnamed surrounding space. This unnamed surrounding centre-ground is arguably analogous with the rarely-named dominant publics discussed in Chapter 2; Pākehā, men, and capitalists.

Press pronouns

Chapter 1 discussed how major parties tend to use first-person collective pronouns (we, our), often blurring the line between party and nation. By contrast, press sources only tend to use the first-person collective pronoun when quoting from parties. Outside of quotes, journalists are far more likely to use third person pronouns, specifically 'they', referring to subjects of reportage, particularly voters or politicians:

“a combined 49.2 per cent -- either thought [Jamie Whyte] would make no difference or didn't know or refused to answer, suggesting *they* simply don't know much about him” (Armstrong, 2014a), “A “no surprises” policy requires departments to tell their ministers when information on

which *they* might be questioned is to be released” (Fisher, 2014), “[National] could form a Government with its current support partners, Act, United Future and the Maori Party, assuming *they* return to Parliament” (Young, 2014b).

This relatively ‘neutral’, unemotive use of the third-person pronoun positions journalists *outside* parliamentary processes. This is in keeping with genre conventions, implying objectivity. However, I suggest that the uncritical empiricism of news coverage limits its capacity for political enquiry; they are ‘outside’ parliament, yet their political horizons are limited to existing political processes and statements. Moreover, the implied objectivity naturalises existing political processes. As Aeron Davis (2010) contends, in defining the ‘social construction of politics’ model of press-politician relations: “Reporters have become one key component of the social and cultural construction of the political centre and the business of politics itself” (p. 73). Press report on the ‘horse race’ of parliamentary politics, never offering a philosophical position that challenges the terms of bourgeois democracy itself (a point that will be expanded in the section on ‘Disciplined Democracy’), thereby actively ‘bounding’ the political centre. While the press refer far more often to ‘left’ and ‘right’ politics than the parties themselves, this of course refers exclusively to existing parliamentary parties, meaning that the existing political system operates as the limit of political discourse. While the press as a whole may offer a relatively non-partisan, external account of official democratic proceedings, they may also unconsciously collude with the major parties in framing the political ‘centre’, helping limit the terms of legitimate public participation to existing bourgeois democracy.

**Figure 17: Parties & leaders,
coverage by press 2011**

Parties and leaders	Total
National (Party)	2648
(National Party leader) John Key	2066
Labour (Party)	2434
(Labour Party leader) Phil Goff	925
Green (Party)	1517
ACT	905
Maori Party	356

**Figure 18: Parties and leaders,
coverage by press 2014**

Parties & leaders	Total
Labour (Party)	525
(National Party leader) John Key	491
National (Party)	480
Green (Party)	249
(Labour Party leader) David Cunliffe	237
(New Zealand First leader) Winston Peters	176
(Internet Party backer) Kim Dotcom	165
(Conservative Party leader) Colin Craig	112

Press coverage of parties

Drawing out only the most commonly referenced parties, it initially seems the press cover both major and minor parties proportionately to their voter share, with the Greens as the largest minor party (Figures 17, 18). John Key, the Prime Minister, is the most common source in both elections, covered about twice as often as the two successive Labour Party leaders (ibid). However the proportionality becomes less clear when focusing from individual minor party leaders. Minor party leaders are not covered proportionally to their public support: in 2014, the press was far more likely to cover Internet-Mana backer Kim Dotcom than party leaders Laila Harre (Internet Party leader) or Hone Harawira (MANA leader). Controversial figures Winston Peters and Colin Craig also crowd out Green Party leaders (Figure 18), despite the Green Party being the third largest party. The press tendency to emphasise ‘sensational’ minor party figures possibly helps create the impression of extremist threats to the centre. Headlines include “Dotcom’s last chance to win credibility” (Armstrong, 2014b), “Gamemakers [Dotcom et al] wreak havoc but leaders battle on” (Trevett, 2014), and “Spectre of resurgent Peters...” (2011). Minor party personalities are portrayed as clowns or as dangerous, compounding the major party narrative of competing threats to the ‘centre’.

Characteristics of the 'centre'

While apparently disagreeing over which political forces pose a threat to the 'centre', major parties and press both apparently guard the centre against political threats. It may therefore be worth establishing the characteristics of the political 'centre'. While there may be significant overlap between majority opinion and centrist discourse, I contend that 'the centre' is more framed by the “zero level” of discourse, the unstated institutional premise: the capitalist nation-state. According to Roy Morgan polls, 41% of New Zealanders were concerned about Economic issues in 2014, with the most important Economic issue being 'Poverty / The gap between the rich and the poor' (Roy Morgan, 2014). Although the actually-existing public expresses paramount concern about 'the gap between the rich and the poor', they are hailed not on an economic or class basis, but on a national basis – as New Zealanders. Although the press may retain some critical distance from individual parties and politicians, I will contend they reproduce and actively enforce the limits of the cross-partisan political 'centre': 1) *Disciplined Democracy*, a bounding of legitimate public participation to voting, 2) *Secular Heteronormativity*, a discourse that leaves normative sexual & religious assumptions unchallenged and 3) *Criminalisation/Racialisation*, the production of a growing criminal nonpublic.

I. Disciplined Democracy

'Disciplined Democracy' is an elite-endorsed form of political *representation*, in which Discipline predominates over Democracy, actively limiting the terms of participation (see Chapter 0; Mon News, 2010). I define Discipline in Michel Foucault's (1977) sense: an arrangement of bodies in service of power, an enforcement of norms (p. 184). This section will argue that the press limit the terms of Disciplined Democratic participation to engagement with existing institutions, particularly the act of voting, which legitimates the parliamentary system through active consent. Meanwhile, the press chastises or ignores other forms of political activity.

The most explicit articulations of Disciplined Democratic norms emerge in response to non-voting. Three opinion pieces from the Herald and Dominion Post argue for the virtues of existing democratic forms: "Divorcing democracy not an option, despite fatigue" (Bowron, 2014), "A world of reasons to vote" (Dominion Post, 2014), and "It is your decision, don't give it away" (Herald on Sunday, 2014). All three articles note the declining rate of participation, which hit a record low in the 2011 General Election. However, instead of calling for rejuvenated or expanded civic engagement, the editorials simply call for more disciplined participation in existing institutions. After running briefly through a number of possible contributors to the crisis in participation, one editorial states: "Yet finally the responsibility for the low turnout must fall on the non-voters themselves. They are wrong to consider their choice meaningless" (Dominion Post, 2014). For the *Dominion Post*, non-voters are simply wrong. A *Herald* editorial also bluntly dismisses reasons given by non-voters to Statistics New Zealand, such as a disbelief that voting would make a difference: "None of these is a good excuse" (Herald on Sunday, 2014). Non-voters' subjective reasons to reject the options are dismissed outright: it is nearly self-evident that any informed citizen in their right mind would *want* to participate, so these individuals must not be in their right minds. Conversely, while these editors encourage voters to participate, they also place an extensive range of limits on which forms of participation are appropriate, legitimate and permissible. This is perhaps starkest in the contrast between two articles published on November 25th (eve of Election Day), 2011:

Figure 19: NZ Herald conceptions of democracy

Remember who owns the election

Tomorrow we take part in a long and glorious tradition to determine the future

This much is certain: better bullets than ballots. We vote tomorrow because we can. It's the gift of our history. In Syria and Egypt, they will fight. Because they must. They are making their history now. While we are making our private choices, people will be shot on the streets and in the squares of Syria and in Egypt, fighting to get what we take for granted. Hobson brought the franchise with him. It was ours from the start.

When this country was born in 1840, it was already 2000 years old. Our history was here from the start. Strands from Egypt, Judaea, Greece, Rome, Scandinavia and 2000 years of English history – faith, science, politics, law, engineering, philosophy, art, manners – we got the lot, off-the-peg, a mission of notices in which we could roam, redecorating here and modifying there but spared the need to build our place from scratch.

So, tomorrow, when you vote, spare a thought for the 'folks' who have built our place from scratch.

to sign the Magna Carta and those long ago Norsemen who took their parliament to England and the Romans and Plato and the Chartists and Cromwell and Churchill and Thomas Paine and our social DNA. They're the architects of our attitudes. They fought our battles for us. They're the reason we're voting, not fighting. We don't have to fight. Indeed, you could argue we don't even have to think. Borrowing \$200 million a week for the last 24 months or thereabouts has insulated us from many of the world's ugly new realities. There've been no riots here, no fires, no flames, no battles in the streets. Our Government hasn't had to do what the Greeks and the Romans and Spanish are compelled to do. They've had to slash and burn, hack and chop, cut and cancel. We haven't. Not yet. A bit of trimming, some tightening of the belt, a little judicious pruning and that's it.

No one's really worried. Not yet. Life goes on and little squabbles flare but, basically, we feel reasonably safe, secure and cozy. Thanks to all these cash cows out in our paddocks, we've been able to borrow and cope. If they (the cows) didn't moo what they do, too well, we wouldn't have scored all that cash. But we have. And that's a very good thing. Make no mistake. The air bag of income has cushioned us. It meant we've had a soft (or softish) landing, rather than the violent collision between the state and the people we've seen unfold in Athens. But, wait. There's less. Coming soon to a budget near you. On this much, all the parties currently using our money to sell us their policies seem

This is the worst economic crisis in our lifetimes.

Peter Dunne

to agree. "This is the worst economic crisis in our lifetimes," Peter Dunne said that yesterday morning during a minor party leaders radio debate. And all the other leaders concurred.

However, differed their solutions may be, they all identify the same problem. So do Mr Key and Mr Goff. Both say the world is grimmer than which we may yet go. What does the right to form a government have as well change their name to 'Vote'?

Because each in their own way is saying we'll be going on a very strict dollar diet in the next little while. One way or another, they'll be cutting our cash resources. That's how it is now, here, there and everywhere. Basically, every politician in the world has got the same job today. They're all bawling the baby who's been put down in debt and hoping like heck it won't throw up all over them.

Quite why anyone would want the job is a moot point. But someone will get it. And we will choose who that will be. Not as they are striving to do in Syria and Egypt but quietly, peacefully, with no tear gas or bullets being fired at us. There'll be no winners standing between us and the polling booth. The only important vote'll encounter is our own indifference.

Our past has bequeathed us a franchise. Our future will be determined by it. And we have two choices tomorrow. We can choose who we vote for and also how we vote.

There's a range of cues on the matter Mr Goff issues a bit. Mr Key, prefer SM. Others want Proportional Voting. Some favour the FPTP. Putting aside the merits of each, there is another, even more important issue. Our control of the process.

Values are under change, the politicians will be deciding that, and elected. They may take with them a change of radio. The choice will be theirs, not ours. A vote for change will ensure a second referendum, with MMP tested against one of the alternatives. It means we'll control the evolution of our personal democracy. Let the politicians address the economy. But the elections belong to us.

MORE OPINION ONLINE

David Farrer: Almost too early to make a call. And I guess, back to the voters, against whom Goff has been so vocal. Go to <http://nzherald.co.nz> to <http://nzherald.co.nz>

BEST OF THE WEB
NZHERALD.CO.NZ

YOUR VIEWS

New Zealand goes to the polls tomorrow for a general election. Have you made up your mind on who to vote for? To send in Your Views, go to nzherald.co.nz/yourviews.

Rowen: One thing that has come across loud and clear is John Key is not good at debating and is no good under pressure.

Lesley: I guess for me, what I don't like the most is Goff's snark, forced "jokes" and unnatural demagogues.

Sophie: Phil Goff is doing a fantastic job as Opposition leader and a campaign trail in his first time for Labour.

Sharon: Let's hope the NZ public finally wakes up to the Government's inadequacy before Saturday.

Smithy: I have always been a bit of a supporter but as long as it's a balling the wheels I will vote for Peters.

Geoff: The two qualities I admire in leadership are integrity and honesty. I don't find either in Mr Key.

Sally: Guess who will benefit most from removing GST from fruit and vegetables. It won't be the crop. Amazingly, I agree with Home. It's just a popularity stunt.

Supermarket giant Progressive Enterprises is considering filling in

Council within rights to evict Occupy squatters

A more important tenet of democracy is at stake than letting protesters stay, writes Patrick Mulligan

Auckland's version of the worldwide "Occupy" movement, an eclectic grouping of grievances presumably united by the shared experience of slum sleeping bags and primitive toilet facilities, has been camped out in Arden Square for over a month.

Dispute until recently arbitrated

First, the article "Remember who owns the election" (Hopkins, 2011). Contrary to my own prejudices, Hopkins does not identify the bourgeoisie as 'owning' political processes. Rather, the democratic system was "ours from the start" (ibid). Conversely, this is accompanied with the article "Council within rights to evict Occupy squatters," (Mulligan, 2011), indicating that our democratic rights do not extend to civil disobedience. These articles, and their juxtaposition (Figure 19), draw clear distinctions between Disciplined and Undisciplined political participation.

In fact, the range of disciplined forms of democratic participation are limited to one basic action; casting a ballot. Even the valorisation of democracy movements in the Arab world serves to shore up this limited notion of participation:

In Syria and Egypt, they will fight. Because they must. They are making their own history now... people will be shot in the streets and in the squares of Syria and in Egypt, fighting to get what we take for granted (Hopkins, 2011);

New Zealand is apparently past the need for revolutionary social movements. Hopkins underlines that "Hobson brought the franchise with him" (ibid), apparently not considering the contrast between colonisation and popular revolution as a basis for democracy. Whereas Egyptians are making their

history, New Zealanders presumably sit at the end of history, in a teleological Eurocentric account. Representative capitalist democracy is the apex of social progress. Meanwhile, attempts to organise a popular movement in Aotearoa/NZ are mocked as “an eclectic grouping of grievances presumably united by the shared experience of damp sleeping bags and primitive toilet facilities” (Mulligan, 2014). For Mulligan, sleeping in an urban tent is not an action befitting a New Zealand citizen; Occupiers are a nonpublic, albeit perhaps a relatively harmless one. The fact that one of Occupy’s key issues – inequality – overlaps with popular concern merits no mention (ibid). As Butler (2013) contends, long-term occupations of public space assert the political primacy of dispossessed people’s material needs:

We cannot presume enclosed and well-fed space of the Polis where all the material needs are somehow being taken care of elsewhere... Rather, we not only have to bring the material urgencies of the body into the square, but make those needs central to the demands of politics (p. 123).

Hopkins notes the significance of the crisis (“This is the worst economic crisis in our lifetimes”), which underlies the material needs asserted by Occupy, but insists that the franchise is all we need. Contrasting examples of social movement activity – the celebrated Egyptian social movement, the derided local social movement – serve as a contrast to the political maturity of the vote.

In contrast to these misguided souls, a number of editorials and opinion pieces hail a kind of Disciplined Democratic citizen, explicitly as a response to the crisis of conventional democracy. A particularly strange opinion piece contends that early voting is somehow an affront to democracy, arguing that voters must keep up with daily coverage and leave their decision until polling day:

Unless you were dead set in your political ways and absolutely sure that nothing would deter you from voting for your political party of choice, surely it would be “unwise” (to use a catchword of this election campaign) to cast your vote early... Keeping up with politics requires real time investment... a commitment to read, listen, watch and process current affairs on a daily basis, even if what you may hear isn’t very nice (Bowron, 2014, parentheses in text).

Implicitly, existing press coverage is adequate, and any distaste or disengagement incurred is the problem of the non-voter. Bowron warns that citizens may be abandoning “civil and human rights” (ibid), but makes no effort to explain what’s wrong with casting early votes based on policy platform, or party loyalty, or simply due to accessibility requirements. Mysteriously, voters are abandoning the spirit of

democracy if they don't make a decision on Polling Day, informed by up-to-the-minute reports. For all Bowron's dramatic talk of "taking up arms against a sea of our own troubles" (ibid), her overall prescription apparently expects the voting public to be pliable, non-partisan, law-abiding, centrists who could be swayed based on the latest polls or reports – this 'centrist' figure is cast less as a symptom of a converging political spectrum, than the ideal democratic citizen. Although parties do not show the same interest in non-voters as the press, they do in some ways hail a similar kind of Disciplined Democratic public – as outlined at the beginning of the chapter, major parties tend to cast partisanship as a threat to the centre, apparently calling on a non-partisan public. For the editors and major parties then, the Disciplined Democratic citizen is relatively non-partisan (perhaps frightened by the minor parties), does not participate in social movements, makes their decision based on objective daily updates on parliamentary developments, and most importantly, *ticks a box in a voting booth*, a legitimization of the existing bourgeois democratic form.

Figure 20: Gender/sex/sexuality, party releases 2011-2014

300: Gender, sex, sexuality	ACT	Green	IP	Labour	MANA	Maori	National	NZF	UF	Total
301: Women	0	6	0	35	1	6	35	0	0	83
302: Men	0	2	0	7	0	3	2	1	0	15
303: Intersex	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
304: Gender-Diverse	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
305: Lesbian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
306: Gay	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
307: Bisexual	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
308: Transgender	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
309: Cisgender	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
310: LGBT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
311: Queer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
312: Straight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
313: Heterosexual	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Figure 21: Religion, party releases 2011-2014

1000: Religious belief & community	ACT	Green	IP	Labour	MANA	Maori	National	NZF	UF	Total
1001: Muslim	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1002: Christian	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1003: Jewish	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1004: Atheist	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1005: Believer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1006: Faith (communities)	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	4

II. Secular heteronormativity

The most striking thing about discussion of sexuality in the 2011-2014 General Elections is that there isn't any; whereas women are named more than men, queer/trans folk are simply not named, let alone naming heterosexuals (Figure 20). Heterosexuals are perhaps analogous with Levi-Strauss' (1963) *father* at the zero-level of discourse (p. 35). Sexuality and (trans)gender are apparently not considered important election issues by any party, even the parties with progressive policies. Religion is also not mentioned (Figure 21). I call this combined construction of a 'centre', free of troubling challenges to religious²⁵ or sexual mores, *secular heteronormativity*.

Prime Minister John Key typifies the evasive approach to queer politics evinced in secular heteronormativity, justified openly through courting competing publics. When Key voted against the Civil Union Bill in 2004, he said this was due to his constituency's views rather than his own (Trevett, 2012). Before the 2011 election, Key refused to indicate whether he would support same-sex marriage rights at

²⁵ I don't intend here to imply that all religious groups are anti-gay; liberal churches were a key part of the coalition that won marriage equality in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Heather, 2013). However, I suggest that the avoidance of both religion and sexuality as worthwhile election topics indicates an exclusion of contentious topics I have termed 'secular heteronormativity'.

a forum held by conservative group Family First (ibid). As Family First opposes same-sex marriage rights, Key's reticence may have again been a calculated move in courting a conservative public. Finally, in 2012, Key indicated with a rather passive double-negative that he was "not personally opposed to gay marriage" (ibid). Nationwide polls repeatedly indicated general support for marriage rights, so Key's stance was politically safe in appealing to a broad public. Like all other parties and politicians, Key never referred explicitly to sexuality during the last two weeks of the 2011 and 2014

Figure 22: 3 most common family terms, party releases 2011-2014

Family terms	ACT	Green	IP	Labour	MANA	Maori	National	NZF	UF	Total
Child(ren)	8	107	1	130	82	16	95	5	0	444
(Family(ies)	1	21	0	100	47	36	67	7	1	280
Kid(s)	0	31	0	34	33	2	3	0	0	103

General Elections.

Although sexuality is not explicitly mentioned in electoral coverage, regular references to 'children' and 'families' imply a normative and pre-public notion of sexuality. In both elections, parties across the political spectrum invoke 'children' and 'families'. Some parties mention 'children' more often even than 'families', perhaps undermining the thesis that ideal publics are necessarily voters. The Greens in 2014 used 'children' and 'kids' more often even than 'Kiwis' and 'New Zealanders' (although 'New Zealanders' remain their single most common term for the public). We may expect that the ideal 'public' is the free citizen, the voter – hence the castigation of prisoners and non-citizens as nonpublics – however the invocation of the 'child' complicates this. Children do not vote. The idealised 'child' implies a kind of pre-existing innocent space where publics are formed, from whence publics enter into discourse, the non-politicised space of 'the family.' As Berlant and Warner contend, the heterosexual family is "prepolitical", located outside the public sphere (p. 553). Families both incubate future voters, and more crucially, members of 'the public' are assumed to have children. The invocation of children hails an assumed *parental* audience, including an extended audience who may not be parents but are assumed to care about 'our children'. Assumed parental publics seek to guard children against threats, and vote for the parties who will combat threats to their children. These threats are a moving target; the threat of poverty for left-populists (Bradford, 2011), of illness for major parties (Ryall, 2011), of homosexuality for conservative lobby groups (Family First, 2014). Whatever the specific threat, the concern for children crosses partisan boundaries, as a 'floating signifier' which all political actors seek to appropriate. Sociologist Joel Best (1990) suggests that as concerns about the future have increased in the risk

society of neoliberalism, a specific focus on the Child as “innocent” has also increased (p. 171-172). Queer theorist Lee Edelman (2004) contends that the Child is “the fetishistic fixation of heteronormativity” (p. 21). Of Labour’s 55 references to ‘poverty’ in 2011-2014, 30 refer specifically to ‘child poverty’. More dramatically, 59 out of 61 Green Party references to poverty in 2011-2014 specify child poverty (National makes no references to ‘poverty’ in the content analysed). Journalist Bryan Bruce’s avowedly ‘apolitical’ documentary on child poverty also received widespread attention in the lead-up to the 2011 election (TV3, n.d.; APNZ, 2011; Mullord, 2011). While this may reflect a genuine social crisis and the concerted work of groups like Child Poverty Action Group, the single-minded focus on the innocence of child victims may also imply a distinction between deserving and undeserving poor. While no child could deserve poverty, adults can be said to bring it on themselves. As the deserving/undeserving framework is a key ideological justification of poverty (Dorey, 2010), this approach arguably cedes ground to the right, attempting to avoid political-economic conflict through reference to the imagined pre-political common ground of ‘the family’.

The innocence of children gives way to the threat posed by youth, who become a nonpublic that must be normalised. Around 40% of 18-25 year olds in Aotearoa/New Zealand do not vote, compared with 5-6% of over 65s (Statistics New Zealand, 2014a). There may be a range of factors influencing this; youth unemployment, housing precarity affecting eligibility for enrolment, political failure to address youth concerns, or lack of interest. Applying a Foucauldian analysis to the treatment of youth in the Canadian criminal justice system, Eisler (2007) argues that rather than focusing on youths’ individual pathology, we must consider how the system produces “classifications of normal and abnormal, healthy and unhealthy, and acceptable versus unacceptable” (p. 103). While minor parties refer to youth rarely if at all, National and Labour refer to youth 25 times and 32 times respectively in 2011 and 2014. For both parties, the term ‘youth’ always occurs in combination with terms like ‘drugs’, ‘prison’, ‘offenders’ – a consistent association between youth and criminality. National Party press releases express concern about ‘youth offenders’, whose behaviour can be addressed through youth courts, youth prisons, targeted healthcare, and Youth Guarantee schemes in employment (te Heuheu, 2011). Labour focuses more than National on employment opportunities for youth, most often using the slogan “[u]se youth unemployment to fill the skills gap”. While this is a different emphasis to National, youth still appear as a problem that must be fixed, and both parties suggest employment as a fix. As Eisler (2007) notes, the

criminal justice system works in combination with other institutions to normalise youth (p. 114). Youth by definition are always dangerous and endangered, in contrast to children who are always innocent and endangered, or adults who may actually be productive citizens. Youth must be normalised, fixed, reintegrated into capitalist society, so they can become healthy productive adults. This discourse is *about* the youth problem, addressing adults rather than youth as an active public. Youth are thereby produced as a nonpublic, albeit one 'we' (implicitly adults) should be concerned about. Youth in this discourse confront a fork; to continue as a nonpublic, becoming criminalised adults after passing through youth courts; or to join the ranks of the respectable, productive public. Whereas children are always-already integrated into the prepolitical family, youth partially depart from this ideal into a dangerous 'nonpublic' space, and must be re-normalised.

Berlant and Warner (1998) contend that central to dominant political articulations of 'the public' is "something that cannot speak its name, though its signature is everywhere: national heterosexuality" (p. 548). This theoretical context is worth establishing before proceeding to a critical discourse analysis of selected articles. Although Aotearoa/New Zealand has granted formal equality to same-sex couples, the assumed "notion of privacy" (p. 547) in invocations of 'the family' cloaks the "memory" of sexual life necessary to challenging heteronormativity (p. 562). Explicit discussion of sexual and intimate relationships is absent, leaving dominant forms uncontested (while some may note that this is not what you'd expect in an election campaign, queer theorists and activists would respond that this relegation of sexuality outside the democratic 'public sphere' is part of the problem). As queer theorist Michael Warner (1993) underlines in coining the term, "heteronormativity can be overcome only by actively imagining a necessarily and desirably queer world" (xvi), in contrast to political articulations which leave normative assumptions unchallenged. Formal equality is also compatible with what Duggan (2002) terms 'homonormativity', an extension of heteronormative norms to same-sex relationships:

[homonormativity is] a politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions but upholds and sustains them while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption (p. 179).

While the recognition of same-sex couples may be a progressive step, the extension of formal rights assumes a certain kind of romantic relationship and a certain kind of queer subject. A young single,

urban person who is experimenting with intimate relationships, and has not settled into a monogamous relationship, is constituted outside the zone of familial comfort and the associated economic protections. Queer urban subjects are nonpublics in this discourse, unnamed as a constituency. By contrast, 'the child', as a venerated member of 'the family', is named and defended by all political players in appealing to an assumed heteronormative public.

Given this assumed heteronormative public, queer rights are perceived as a political liability. In a *New Zealand Herald* article on Pasifika voters, gay rights is openly discussed as a liability for politicians:

People still upset about Labour's gay marriage bill were considering giving their votes to the Conservatives and those with more radical views were now thinking of giving Internet Mana or the Greens the tick (Tapaleao, 2014).

In this extract, Pasifika voters who express homophobic and conservative views are assumed by media to represent the community as a whole. A 2011 Research New Zealand poll actually found that Māori and Pasifika participants were slightly more likely than Pakeha to support same-sex marriage rights; 66% of Māori-Pasifika participants in contrast to 61% of Pakeha (Research New Zealand, 2011). However, Pasifika and gay publics are discursively counterposed with each other. Common ground among oppressed groups is foreclosed (the term *fa'afafine*, referring to a Pasifika form of Third Gender, does not show up in the content), leaving politicians as the necessary mediators between competing publics. Politicians are therefore portrayed as walking a tightrope, between a homophobic constituency and a minority granted some rights in a secular regime. I call this negotiation between imagined publics *secular heteronormativity*: although the regime generally does not endorse open homophobia, political 'leaders' practice a calculated silence on both religious conservatism and the rights of gender/sexual minorities, in an attempt to shore up competing constituencies.

While sexuality is very rarely mentioned in the content under analysis, a 2012 controversy around Key was an exception that perhaps explains the rule. Appearing on a radio programme, *The Farming Show*, Key used a homophobic slur in ribbing host Jamie Mackay:

You're munted mate, you're never going to make it. You've got that gay red top on there (Stuff, 2012).

References to clothing as 'gay' call mainstream masculinity into question; in this case John Key jokingly

continued that Mackay's clothing called his credentials as a "centre-right, interested community member" into question (ibid). Given that lesbian, gay and bisexual²⁶ youth in Aotearoa/NZ are five times more likely than their straight peers to attempt suicide (Lucassen et al, 2012), many queer activists do not take the use of schoolyard insults like 'gay' lightly. Activists as geographically distant as Ian McKellan rebuked Key (Chapman, 2012). National Party leaks indicate that leaders' public appearances tend to follow the careful prescriptions of PR advisers (Hager, 2006), so it's unlikely this was an accidental slip. Rather, Key's appearance on *The Farming Show* was a conscious attempt to court a conservative public. Although the specific term 'gay' may not have been planned, it fits this broader discursive strategy of courting conservatives, in this case through use of a term that gay activists have underlined as doing harm.

In fact, even defence of Key's action indicates that it was a conscious effort to court a conservative public. An opinion piece by Karl du Fresne indicates the sneering attitude that enforcers of secular heteronormativity hold towards gay activists, with the headline "Gays being precious over PM's 'slur'" (du Fresne, 2012). Du Fresne cites "New Zealanders", the key cross-partisan public, as a presumably heterosexual and conservative audience:

I suspect most New Zealanders would have viewed the fuss with an air of worldly resignation. They have become well-accustomed to minority groups rearing up on their hind legs at every imagined slight (du Fresne, 2012).

Notably, queers apparently aren't the only "minority group" to alienate "New Zealanders", indicating that the term for a *national public* refers implicitly to dominant groups. Du Fresne also endorses and justifies the interpretation that Key is attempting to balance constituencies:

[He] was merely making an attempt to sound blokey in order to connect with that radio programme's audience.

How quickly his critics forget that he has ingratiated himself with gay men, too – for example, by speaking at the Big Gay Out rally in Auckland last February and posing for photographs with transvestites.

²⁶ Transgender youth were not explicitly covered in this survey.

That's what politicians do: pander to whichever group they happen to be addressing at the time (ibid).

While this argument coincides with my assertions about courtship of competing publics, du Fresne's comments leave this political cynicism naturalised and unchallenged. Du Fresne makes no attempt to claim that Key's slur was an accidental or thoughtless comment. He contends that it was a conscious attempt to court a public, and is therefore justified. For du Fresne, the job of a politician is to court audiences, not to stand on consistent programme or principles – in late politician Tony Benn's terms, politicians should be 'weathercocks' rather than 'signposts', prioritising popularity over principles (Farndale, 2009). A 'casual' slur on talk radio may serve to attract conservative audiences otherwise alienated by prevailing liberal attitudes, and is therefore appropriate. Du Fresne also further provokes the implied queer audience by using the term 'transvestite', a dated and medicalising term that has largely been superseded by 'drag queen'. This implies an ambivalent relationship between queers and the secular heteronormative regime; we (queers) will not be executed or imprisoned, we will be legally tolerated, even outrageous performances of Outness are tolerable in dedicated venues following a well-advertised timetable, so long as we tolerate the occasional public slur, for the 'Kiwi blokes' in the audience. Secular heteronormativity constructs the national 'centre' as a space excluding challenges to sexual and gender norms. Secular heteronormativity is a liberal regime in which some forms of formal equality are conceded, yet 'the family' remains unquestioned as the pre-political site of nourishment, and queer militancy risks alienating 'the (heterosexual) public'.

III. Criminalisation/racialisation

This research project has often focused on common political discourses that transcend partisan boundaries. The carceral state (Foucault, 1977), or the specific tactic of 'penal populism' (Pratt, 2007), is one such cross-partisan project. In terms of my thesis, the prison system produces a growing nonpublic, disavowed by the political establishment, defining the national public by negation. Although incarceration has fostered this barrier since its inception, the neoliberal era has seen an intensified form known as "mass incarceration" (Alexander, 2010). With the advent of 'colourblind' discourse in the US, mass incarceration provides an alibi for the deprivation of citizenship rights to (primarily) black and brown subjects, who form a growing reserve army of labour (Alexander, 2010; Smith, 2014a). Similarly in Aotearoa/New Zealand, 'bicultural' discourse masks a growth of Māori imprisonment, with Māori making up around 50% of prisoners compared to 13% of the general combination (Smith, 2014a). This production of racialised subjects as a nonpublic also extends to political disenfranchisement, with prisoners unable to vote and non-voters likely to be Māori or Pasifika (Statistics New Zealand, 2014a). To facilitate the neoliberal combination of cultural recognition with upward redistribution of wealth, the disciplinary apparatus has expanded exponentially. Smith's (2014a) account explains how the ruling class benefits from mass incarceration in Aotearoa/NZ: my account will consider how the ruling class seeks *consent* for this project. Criminologist John Pratt notes how public support for 'penal populism' has counterintuitively grown during a period with a declining crime rate (p. 36). Pratt suggests that penal populism offers a sense of "social cohesion" in a period marked by increasing economic precarity and decreasing participation in public institutions (p. 37-65). Coercion and consent, key elements of hegemonic state power, work in tandem here: consent of the lawful public is sought through the application of coercion.

Law and order rhetoric crosses partisan boundaries, with all parties competing to prove their toughness on crime. On the eve of the 2011 election, Labour appeal to the state's monopoly of violence as a function undermined by the cost-cutting ruling party:

They think if they sling enough mud, they will be able to shift attention from the fact they've been caught out cutting police recruits. But Kiwis won't be fooled (Robertson, 2011b; emphasis mine).

During the 2014 General Election campaign, reactions to a National Party announcement about “working prisons” underlined the cross-partisan enthusiasm for incarceration. Press coverage was unambiguous that prisoners would be paid a tiny fraction of the minimum wage: “Inmates can earn a small income -- about 60c an hour -- inside jails” (Davison, 2014). Spokespeople for the Greens and Labour endorsed “working prisons” in principle (ibid). A Green spokesperson supported the project “as long as the cheaper labour did not undercut the private sector outside,” a concern premised only on the rights of free labourers (ibid). No party expressed any concern about the employment rights of prison workers. Prisoners directed to work by the Department of Corrections are not considered employees (Morgan v Attorney General, 1965; cited in NPIP, 2016). Prison workers are therefore deprived of the basic rights ensured by the Employment Relations Act 2000 and Minimum Wage Act 1993, along with the deprivation of other fundamental rights of citizenship (NPIP, 2016, p. 86). In other words, the conditions of prison workers would merit the term 'slavery' if the workers were not already designated 'criminals'.

Angela Davis (2003) underlines how, paradoxically, the notion of depriving citizenship rights (like the minimum wage) requires the elaboration of universal rights as a political principle, beginning with the French and US revolutions (p. 43-44). The notion of depriving rights as a *punishment* stems from the elaboration of rights, where previously they were not assumed (ibid). While some liberal reformers sincerely consider prison labour a form of rehabilitation, rather than punishment, there is no *a priori* reason why rehabilitation should involve labour exploitation without the full rights of a citizen. Rather, this requires that people are designated 'prisoners', a nonpublic. This recognition (or nonrecognition) of prisoners as a nonpublic is universally accepted²⁷ in dominant political discourse. A press release from New Zealand First asserted that “Working prisons are not a breakthrough innovation – it's simply *common sense*” (Lole-Taylor, 2014; emphasis mine). This would appear to match Gramsci's notion of 'common sense' as the “average opinion of a particular society” (2011a, p. 173). As Foucault underlines, punishment must appear natural, above politics (1977, p. 106). Not only was National's policy supported by the 'Left', but parties further to the Right suggested it was too generous: “Two of the party's potential coalition partners, Act and the Conservatives, want the Government to take a tougher approach to criminals” (Davison, 2014). To the degree that parties *were* in competition, this competition

27 Although Māori-led party MANA had a policy of abolishing prisons, this was missing from coverage.

was less over divergent political programmes than assuring the assumed public that parties supported the “common sense” of expanding the carceral state. No party wanted to be seen as ‘soft on crime’. Further, media coverage served to emphasise this political convergence, with the headline “Left backs National's plan for ‘working prisons’” (Davison, 2014).

The cross-partisan consensus hails a law-abiding citizen, who wishes to see criminals punished, or more charitably rehabilitated through slavery. This cross-partisan support extends not only across the parliamentary ‘Right’ and ‘Left,’ but to liberal NGOs and academics working in the area. John Pratt, a criminologist focusing on ‘penal populism’ in NZ and internationally, endorses prison labour as a rehabilitative measure. JustSpeak, an NGO seeking prison reform, proudly announce that their pamphlets are “Printed by Rimutaka Prison printing press” (JustSpeak, 2014). Prison abolitionists have criticised this as endorsement of “slave labour” by the NGO (McRae, 2014). To understand how JustSpeak's reform programme could involve endorsing slavery, it is worth underlining the specific historic relationship between prison ‘reform’ and the carceral state. Foucault (1977) contends that prison reform “is virtually contemporary with the prison itself: it constitutes, as it were, its programme” (p. 36, cited in Davis, 2003, p. 40). Foucault outlines the ‘programme’ of prison reform, which has been fairly continuous from the inception of the carceral state to this day:

[N]ot to punish less, but to punish better; to punish with an attenuated severity perhaps, but in order to punish with more universality and necessity; to insert the power to punish more deeply into the social body (p. 82)

Reformers enshrine the production of a criminal nonpublic as a necessary evil, meaning that carceral logic is only further embedded by reformist discourse. The prisoner is the “common enemy” of society (p. 90), the ultimate nonpublic. Whereas foreigners may become citizens, and unemployed people may become employed, the prisoner is defined by the loss of citizenship rights. Even on release, access to housing, employment and other basic rights is limited by having a criminal record (Alexander, 2010; Smith, 2014a). The legitimate, law-abiding public has its position apparently secured through the creation of a growing class of unpersons. Conversely, the punishment also serves as a threat. Foucault notes the “lateral” impacts of punishment: “punishment is directed above all at others, at all the potentially guilty” (p. 108). The boundaries of the public are maintained through the threat of the nonpublic. The notion of securing publics against criminality also offers perceived security in the ‘risk

society' of neoliberalism (Pratt, 2007). As all parties and press converge around this production of a nonpublic, it is expressed as a universal 'common sense'.

Dotcom as a criminal threat

This chapter has previously discussed how parties tended to name their *rivals*' potential coalition parties and ideologies, rather than their own. In 2014, National perfected this strategy by referring to 'Dotcom', seen as a threat to the centre, more often than Internet Mana, the party he backed. In separate press releases from separate MPs, National referred to their rivals as "Labour, The Greens and Dotcom" (Joyce, 2014c; English, 2014). This is an interesting turn of phrase, as it mixes categories: two party names, and the financial backer of a third party who was not even standing as a candidate.

National's strategy worked out²⁸ in the mainstream media. Dotcom received more coverage in 2014 than Laila Harre, Hone Harawira, or their respective parties (Figure 18). In press releases, Hone Harawira still uses the left-populist rhetoric he had used in 2011:

The National government and its attack bloggers refer to the working poor as scum, bludgers and ferals, but it's clear the real problem is with the top 1% of income earners who get all the benefits of taxpayer funded facilities and services but don't pull their weight paying for them (Harawira, 2014)

This release was not picked up by the press, which was typical of 2014 Internet-Mana coverage. Whereas in 2011 the press reported directly on Harawira's leftist rhetoric (see Chapter 2), in 2014 MANA's left-populism was eclipsed by the ambiguous politics of Kim Dotcom. This alliance was controversial on both ends of the political spectrum; 1) for the socialist militant, Harawira was made a traitor by his association with Dotcom (Peters, 2014; Ferguson, 2014; Gregory, 2014); 2) for the bourgeoisie, I suggest, Dotcom was made a traitor by his presumed criminality and his alliance with leftist and Māori militants. It is the second half of this equation – the demonisation of Dotcom by his fellow billionaires and by bourgeois politicians – that this analysis focuses on.

28 It is worth noting here that the relationship between party press releases and newspaper coverage was not direct. While the press used similar discourse to the major parties, as noted in the Dotcom example, this often took the form of original writing by journalists or quotes from politicians (which closely matched the discourse of press releases). Therefore while press did not simply reproduce the content of press releases, major parties had an agenda setting role.

Dotcom's Pākehā status was highlighted more than any other Pākehā participating in the 2011-2014 General Elections. In fact, no other individual Pākehā was named as such in 2014, with the Māori Party and MANA making brief references to Pākehā as a broader class of people, but not singling Pākehā out (similarly in 2011, MANA candidates Sue Bradford and John Minto were singled out as Pākehā). ACT's Jamie Whyte described the Internet MANA coalition thusly: "Who are working as volunteers – the Maori²⁹, and who are getting paid exorbitant money – the Pakeha" (Whyte, 2014b). This appears to be the only time ACT express concern about Pākehā materially benefiting from exploitation of Māori. Similarly, other commentators identify Dotcom as a multimillionaire or billionaire, not terms used anywhere else in election campaigns: "[Harawira's rival candidate Kelvin Davis questioned] the relationship multimillionaire Kim Dotcom had struck up with the Mana Party" (Ihaka, 2014), "The worse thing about all these allegations is that they have all come from one source, the Internet Mana Party backed by the billionaire hacker" (Flavell, 2014). Accusations came not only from rival parties, but bourgeois commentators such as John Barnett, the CEO of South Pacific Pictures, who stood to benefit from copyright laws Dotcom violated: "[Dotcom is] a man with a criminal record who pays little or no tax in New Zealand and uses ill gotten gains to promote a personal agenda designed to influence legal outcomes." Dotcom was marked as foreign, criminal, and rich. ACT's Jamie Whyte also referred to Dotcom often as a "German fraudster" (Whyte, 2014b; 2014c; 2014d); a formulation combining foreignness and criminality. National Party MP Maggie Barry reportedly told Internet Party leader Laila Harre to "stop sucking on the German's purse" (Bowron, 2014). An opinion piece derisively referred to him as a "large German" (Pagani, 2014). Critics failed to explain why a German (or a large person) should be less credible than any other *tau iwi* (non-Māori/foreigner). It's hard to avoid a conclusion that this emphasis harks back to New Zealand's role in the first two world wars, with Germans depicted as inherently threatening to 'our democracy'. Dotcom was depicted as a threat to the centre, a foreign and illegitimate influence on public discourse.

Although dominant political actors repeatedly name Dotcom as a 'Pākehā' and a 'billionaire', this cannot be the crux of their objection – as previously covered, Pākehā billionaires fund both major parties, remaining largely unnamed in political discourse. Rather, Dotcom is marked and separated from the

29 A note on macrons: I have not used them where they did not appear in the original quote as written.

bourgeoisie first by criminalisation, and second by alliance with a left-wing indigenous movement. Harawira appears a hypocrite³⁰ for aligning with a bourgeois pakeha – Dotcom appears as a traitor to the bourgeoisie, eclipsing Harawira and the MANA Movement. Through this betrayal of the bourgeois nation-state, Dotcom emerges as a kind of warped mirror of international capital; a transnational arch-criminal, a leader of a Nonpublic³¹, a representative of risk society, a threat to the nation, and perhaps worst of all, a *German*. In an ironic twist on populist themes, this party with a widely demonised 'foreign' capitalist backer also campaigned against 'foreign' capitalist ownership alongside other opposition parties.

As a minor party, Internet-Mana used Dotcom's prominent criminalisation to highlight the broader issue of surveillance. On the Internet Mana Road Trip, Annette Sykes highlighted Dotcom's criminalisation as a point in his favour, in terms recalling the surveillance and criminalisation of Tuhoe (who Sykes has defended in court):

Families are destroyed when the cops come into your house with their guns. That's what happened to Kim Dotcom. I must say that was the only thing about him, I don't care about his money, that was the only thing that I really admired him for. Because when it happened he stood up for him and his kids and his family (Anderson, 2014).

Sykes advocated a cross-class alliance between Dotcom and a Māori counterpublic, on the basis of common experiences of surveillance and criminalisation. Given that Hone lost his Māori electorate seat in the 2014, it seems this attempted alliance around the surveillance issue failed. However, the NZ Herald referred to 'surveillance' 53 times in their coverage of the 2014 election, in contrast to 4 times in their 2011 coverage. All of these references occurred in articles dealing with the Internet Party's Moment of Truth event, designed to highlight mass surveillance. Although Dotcom eclipsed Mana's messages concerning inequality, this minor party was still able to influence mass media discourse, highlighting mass surveillance in an attempt to hail a subaltern counterpublic (apparently unsuccessfully, as MANA lost its only seat in 2014).

30 Harawira lost his seat, meaning that MANA lost its sole representative in parliament.

31 One moral panic during the Internet Mana campaign centred on teenagers chanting "Fuck John Key" at a Dotcom event, clearly transgressing limits of Disciplined Democracy.

Conclusion

A context of “democratic deficit” (Beetham 2002; Grey and Sedgwick 2013), or declining public participation in politics, poses challenges for theorists with a normative interest in popular agency. This project asked the questions, how did political parties named the ‘public’ (or publics) in the 2011 and 2014 Aotearoa / New Zealand General Elections? Secondly, what degree of representation these invocations of ‘the public’ find in the national press? As a possible answer, research sought to test the hypothesis that *dominant cross-partisan electoral discourses defined the ‘public’ in terms of dual identification with productive work and capital, in opposition to named subaltern nonpublics*. My analysis began with a content analysis of parliamentary party press releases and newspaper coverage in the last two weeks of the 2011 and 2014 General Election. My analysis identified the importance of the nation-state to dominant identification, with ‘New Zealander’ by far the most commonly hailed public, a more common site of identification than any explicit economic identification. I would therefore reconceptualise the initial formulation to say that *dominant cross-partisan electoral discourses defined the ‘public’ in terms of identification with **the bourgeois nation-state**, in opposition to named subaltern nonpublics*. As the bourgeois nation state is a cross-class coalition, this partially confirms the initial hypothesis, albeit in a refined form. My distinction between left-wing and right-wing populism, with the latter concept hailing the nation in opposition to institutional elites, helped analyse the divergent and common ground between dominant Government discourses and dominant Opposition discourses. Both articulations fail to challenge the dominance of capital, whether through identifying the interests of the nation with the interests of international capital in National’s case, or diverting attention from capital towards ‘foreigners’, including migrants, in Labour’s case. Having identified a central focus (the nation) through content analysis, my critical discourse analysis then characterised how this nationalist identification was constituted, the commonalities and divergences across parties, and the challenges that emerged. MANA briefly emerged as a left-wing challenger, hailing a subaltern counterpublic – *te pani me te rawakore* (the poor and powerless). The mainstream press tended to reproduce the existing parliamentary spectrum, and portrayed minor parties in a sensationalist fashion, but also reported on the policy concerns raised by minor parties.

Dominant discourse

With the exception of MANA and the Māori Party, 'New Zealander' was the most commonly named public across all parties. The first chapter considered how the two major parties, National and Labour, invoked a national public. The analysis focused first on pronouns, as an indicator of identity and allegiance. Ruling party National strongly preferred first-person collective pronouns – 'we' or 'our' – at 83% of their pronoun uses, the most likely party to use first-person collective (Figure 6). My analysis suggested that the major party 'we' stands for the *party representing the nation*. Critical discourse analysis therefore examined how each party sought to constitute this representative link.

The comparison considered how each party constitutes the national 'we', before critically examining these discourses. The analysis examined the converse terms for 'New Zealander', as a way of understanding the discursive limits of 'New Zealand'. The ruling National Party was the most likely party to use the term 'international', while the opposition Labour Party was most likely to use the term 'foreign(er)' (Figure 8). The National Party tended to use a confident executive 'we', singularly and competently mediating between social interests, in service of the nation. I considered this discourse through Laclau's 'institutionalism', which for Laclau is the opposite of 'populism' (1985, 2005a, 2005b). National Party discourse tended to emphasise social mobility over directly addressing poverty. In a neoliberal inflection of institutionalist discourse, the National Party 'we' offered a *managerial* voice, elevating private sector management principles to a general ideology (Klikauer, 2013). The National Party's institutional discourse can also be characterised as *bourgeois internationalist*, promoting integration with neoliberal international institutions. For the National Party, participation in the international neoliberal regime was best for New Zealand business, and therefore all New Zealanders; a neoliberal inflection of national discourse.

This analysis also considered whether the main opposition party challenged the dominant discourse. The last two years have seen the re-emergence of significant social democratic/left-reformist movements in the Anglo-European world; behind Syriza in Greece, Bernie Sanders in the USA, and Jeremy Corbyn in the UK (Dean, 2016, p. 1-25). Each of these countries has also seen the growth of right-wing populist movements; Golden Dawn (Greece), Donald Trump (USA), and UKIP (UK). My analysis suggested that a major left alternative has not emerged in Aotearoa/NZ. My framework defined

Right-Wing Populism in terms of polarisation between nation and elite, and Left-Wing Populism through polarisation between subaltern and elite (Figure 4). This distinction between left- and right-wing populism helped identify the degree to which nationalist articulation contested or enforced existing political structures. This distinction is not adequately considered in Laclau's (2005a) analysis of populism (Jovanovski, 2016; Gurhanli, 2013). Labour was the most likely party to use the term 'foreigner' negatively, using the term 35 times, failing to distinguish between international capital and migrant labour, and ignoring the role of local capital (Figure 8). This term polarised the political terrain along nationalist lines. Although this nationalist discourse called aspects of National's neoliberal 'bourgeois internationalism' into question, it did not contest the structural elements at the root of the neoliberal project. Rather than identifying the capitalist basis of the housing crisis (Harvey, 2014), New Zealand Labour scapegoated migrants with 'Chinese surnames' (Chapter 1). Therefore neither major party addressed the roots of the housing crisis, instead encouraging publics to identify with capital.

I suggest that these competing Institutional/Populist articulations are less differences of programmatic principle, than differences between Government (institutionalist) and Opposition (populist) discourses. While in government from 1999-2008, Labour began negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, and generally "served to embed neoliberalism more deeply" (Kelsey, 2016, p. 123-124). By contrast, over that period, the National Party resorted to anti-Māori populism (Hager, 2006), explicitly discussing this approach as a 'populist' electoral tactic in leaked private emails (ibid). When race-baiting failed, National spoke of an oppressed 'underclass' ignored by the Labour government, again a populist term (Berry, 2007). A content analysis of Key's speeches since 2007, published in *The Dominion Post*, found that he referred to "climate change" 121 times in 2007, and only 3 times in the last three years, indicating a shift after his election (Mitchell, 2015). This comparison suggests these discourses are more a function of Opposition and Government roles than permanent features of the respective parties. Whereas Government may benefit from the 'Institutionalist' discourse implying that differences are being competently mediated, Opposition may seek a populist polarisation demanding a change of government. However, my quantitative analysis only covers a period with Labour in opposition. A more longitudinal content analysis could more firmly establish to what degree party discourses are permanent features of the respective parties, or shaped by their shifting positions in parliamentary contest. In any case, both Institutional discourse and Right-Wing Populism invoke a *national* public,

keeping class contradiction safely hidden.

My analysis in the second chapter was framed by a 'tripod' of publics; Racialised, Gendered and Economic publics. Subaltern racialised publics, in particular Māori publics, were named more than Pākehā, the dominant group: Māori made up over 90% of references to either Māori or Pākehā in both party releases and press coverage. Qualitatively, the National Party's official discourse on 'Māori Affairs' articulated a programme of *bourgeois hegemony in the field of cultural recognition*. The Party rushed for 'settlement', seeking to foreclose the articulation of indigenous grievances. Yet over a period of increased settlement, inequality *within* Maoridom has only increased (Poata-Smith, 2005). The National Party emphasised cultural recognition of an economically privileged layer ('iwi leaders'), without adequate measures to address the poverty of most Māori. This is consistent with Nancy Fraser's (2005) analysis of contemporary feminism whereby gains in recognition have been traded for losses in redistribution (p. 299). Fraser herself identified that this bargain was "was not limited to feminism," and had a broader impact on social movements (299-300).

In keeping with the pattern of subaltern recognition, women were named more frequently than men, at over 60% of both party and press release references to gender. My analysis assumed again that the dominant group was encoded in terms like 'New Zealander'. Men were sometimes named in relation to women and feminism, whereas sometimes the term 'men' served as a signifier for working class publics. Like their programme for Māori, the National Party's programme for women traded redistribution for recognition. While the party celebrated formal equality, and recognised the achievements of bourgeois women, poor and working-class women did not find the same recognition. Rather, poor women were denigrated through categories such as 'beneficiary'. Press coverage also equated working-class identity with masculinity, despite the feminisation of poverty and the fact that the majority of union members in Aotearoa/New Zealand are women.

Economic categories tended to be more generic than explicitly Racialised and Gendered categories, with classless terms like 'the market' and 'the economy' rife in dominant discourse. These terms reified economic relations as simply the terrain of existence, rather than historically specific social relations of power. Conversely, the bourgeoisie was assumed to be a universal class, as the interests of business

were equated with the interests of the public as a whole (for example, the headline “Business confidence bodes well for everyone”).

The third chapter outlined enforced characteristics of the national political 'centre'. My content analysis found that major parties were less likely to self-identify as 'left' or 'right' than identify their rivals as such, indicating a common motivation to claim a centrist, non-partisan public space. Similarly, major parties were more likely to name their rivals' potential coalition partners than their own; just over 90% of Labour's references to minor parties named ACT, and all of the National Party's references to minor parties named the Greens or Internet Mana. This combined negative emphasis on minor parties may contribute to a sense of political risk, that minor party extremists may jeopardise the political centre. Neoliberal parties and business voices also tended to portray MMP, which benefits minor parties, as a political unstable risk to the neoliberal project.

I also argued that press socially construct the political 'centre' in their political reportage. The press were more likely to use third-person pronouns than first-person, indicating a tendency to stand 'outside' the political process. This genre convention implies an objective perspective, rather than political partisanship. However, the empiricism of press coverage limited the ability to challenge the terms of political representation, instead reproducing the existing institutional political spectrum. The relationship between party press releases and newspaper coverage was not direct: rather than directly reprinting press releases, newspapers tended to use similar terms independently of press releases, or interview party spokespeople (who often used very similar terms to press releases). Therefore while press releases were not directly reproduced, major parties had an agenda setting role. Further, while the press covered both minor and major parties, they were more likely to report on 'sensational' minor party figures. Controversial figures like Kim Dotcom, Winston Peters and Colin Craig received far more coverage than the leaders of the Green Party, the third largest party in Aotearoa/New Zealand. These limitations in dominant discourse may be further exacerbated in future by the merger of major media companies NZME and Fairfax, meaning that both major press groups will be owned by one company, and support for journalism may be further cut (Peacock, 2016). This coverage may discourage civic engagement for those alienated by dominant discourse. The Civics and Media Project suggested that support for public interest journalism should be expanded in Aotearoa/NZ, particularly through publicly

owned multi-platform media, to keep citizens informed and politically engaged (Civics and Media Project, 2016). Independently organised media can also assist the formation of critical counterpublics, independent of both the state and monopoly capital (Fraser, 1990).

Critical discourse analysis of party and press material established three ways that dominant discourses produced a bounded, legitimised political public. The analysis deployed the concept of *Disciplined Democracy* in reference to a normative limitation on the terms of public participation; social movement activity was portrayed as dangerous or unnecessary, while the act of voting was encouraged. Publics were therefore interpellated as compliant subjects, encouraged to legitimate existing political forms, rather than challenge them. Other forms of democratic participation were portrayed at best misguided, at worst dangerous (see Hopkins, 2011). In Gramsci's terms, "The "normal" exercise of hegemony on the now classic terrain of the parliamentary regime is characterized by a combination of force and consent which balance each other so that force does not overwhelm consent but rather appears to be backed by the consent of the majority" (1992, p. 155-156). When cops clear out Occupy Auckland, it is important that the operations of the New Zealand state appear to have majority consent; citizens must do their duty and vote.

I coined the term *Secular Heteronormativity* in reference to the avoidance of explicit references to religion and sexuality among political parties. This leaves heteronormativity unchallenged, while courting conservative publics threatened by a secular regime. Finally, I examined the production of an expanding criminalised 'nonpublic', with all parties enthusiastic about prison labour schemes which pay a tiny fraction of the minimum wage. This discursive and material production of a criminal Nonpublic seeks conversely to produce a lawful public, identifying with the state against subalterns.

The notion of 'publics' and 'nonpublics' proved useful in distinguishing between groups invoked by dominant discourse (particularly 'New Zealanders') and disavowed groups (eg 'foreigner', 'beneficiary'). My analysis found a strong overlap between groups scapegoated as nonpublics and the 'missing million' of non-voters. As previously mentioned, opposition parties scapegoated 'foreigners' for the economic crisis, overlapping with the overrepresentation of recent migrants in non-voting statistics (Chapter 1). The ruling neoliberal party 'recognised' economically privileged layers of women and Māori,

while working-class and impoverished communities – disproportionately women and Māori – were not recognised as a legitimate constituency (Chapter 2). Youth, again overrepresented among non-voters, were cast by major parties as a dangerous nonpublic that would have to be reintegrated into productive society (Chapter 3). Mainstream press coverage focused negative attention on non-voters per se (Chapter 3). Parties and press also produced queers as a nonpublic, primarily through silence, although the political regime has made some liberal concessions to queer social movements (Chapter 3). However research on non-voters has not factored sexuality in – further research is needed on the relationship between LGBT publics and dominant political discourse. My analysis does not comprehensively cover all potential (non)publics; for example, disabled people did not show up in the data, a point that could be investigated further. In producing nonpublics, dominant discourse hailed an assumed public of older, Pākehā, heterosexual, middle-class homeowners (or prospective homeowners/mortgagees), under the generic term 'New Zealanders'. This limited representation may contribute to the democratic deficit.

Challenges to dominant discourse

In addition to characterising dominant discourse, I argued that the MANA Movement sought to challenge this discourse. In my content analysis, economically polarised language was more common among 2011 party releases than anywhere else, particularly represented in MANA press releases. In MANA's formative 2011 ferment, the party at time reflected the dominant Right-Wing Populism of other opposition parties, yet also articulated a nascent Left-Wing Populism. In linking Māori and Pākehā publics on the basis of working-class constituency, MANA integrated demands for (cultural) *recognition* and (economic) *redistribution*, thereby requiring a new form of (political) *representation*; what Nancy Fraser (2005) calls “three-dimensional politics” (p. 305-306). MANA named its constituency as *te pani me te rawakore* (the poor and the powerless), a subaltern rather than national public. My distinction between Left-Wing Populism and Right-Wing Populism was therefore fruitful, enabling identification of a minority discourse of Left-Wing Populism. Despite a media environment that tended to exacerbate political convergence, MANA found coverage for its populist campaigning on ‘inequality’ (in 2011) and ‘surveillance’ (in 2014). Therefore while press reproduced the existing parliamentary spectrum, this included minor party concerns to a certain degree. However, Harawira lost his seat after the politically ambiguous alliance with Kim Dotcom, perhaps reflecting a perceived abandonment of principles.

This analysis suggests that a gap remains for a coherent left-wing party to engage popular discourse. While this party may employ electoral tactics, the 'quick fix' of poll-driven politics must be rejected, in favour of developing a cross-sectoral 'chain of equivalence' with a common programme. The party should seek to articulate the grievances and aspirations of those relegated to 'nonpublic' status in bourgeois discourse. The party should also develop an "affective infrastructure" able to collectively support the initiative of individuals (Dean, 2016). The party's common programme must integrate the three dimensions of (economic) *redistribution*, (cultural) *recognition* and (political) *representation* (Fraser, 2005). As discourse polarises between neoliberalism and racist nationalism, this party should also articulate a progressive internationalism.

We must also consider why existing left projects have so little currency. While the general public tends to consider 'inequality' important (Roy Morgan, 2014), left-wing political projects are marginal (even before the alliance with Dotcom, MANA failed to reach a broader Pākehā public). While this can be partly explained through the party and media mechanisms previously covered, understanding this dynamic may also require a participatory approach to considering ideology and working-class agency. My project consciously focused on media 'encoding', with questions of audience 'decoding' outside the scope of analysis (Hall, 2001). In academic-disciplinary terms, an 'audience study' could address these questions. Such a study may consider receptiveness to dominant messages; what range of media audience members use (including social media, television, radio et al); intertextual interpretation; whether social or family networks affect interpretation; membership in political parties; membership in 'non-political' voluntary organisations (churches, sports clubs); the role of preconceived beliefs; participants' assessment of the existing political environment; class, race and gender of participants; and at a general level, the role of situated interpretation. Having textually identified a gap on the political left in Aotearoa/New Zealand, a study specifically on the possibilities for communist or left-wing consciousness may consider receptiveness to counter-messages; access to alternative media sources; membership in non-parliamentary political groups; the role of oppositional decoding, and what political alternative participants may imagine..

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Appendix: Coding schedule

100: National & ethnic	Frequency	Contextual notes
101: New Zealand(er)		
102: Kiwi		
103: Nation (national)		
104: Citizen		
105: Pakeha		
106: Māori		
107: Non-Māori		
108: Australia(n)		
109: Pacific (Pasifika)		
110: Samoa(n)		
111: Cook Islands		
112: Tonga(n)		
113: Niue(an)		
114: Fiji(an)		
115: Tokelau(an)		
116: Middle East(ern)		
117: Asia(n)		
118: Chinese		
119: Europe(an)		
120: British		
121: Africa(n)		
122: America(n)		
123: Migrant		
124: Refugee		
125: Foreign(er)		
126: International		
200: Economic		

201: Taxpayer(s)		
202: Household		
202: Homeowner		
203: (First-time) Home Buyer		
204: Rent(er)		
205: Landlord		
206: Homeless		
207: Investor		
208: Speculator		
209: Profit(s)		
210: Business		
211: Small Business		
212: Big Business		
213: Entrepreneur		
214: Company		
215: Corporation		
216: Millionaire		
217: Billionaire		
218: Capitalist		
219: Banker		
220: Finance		
221: Insurance		
222: Real estate		
223: Subcontractor		
224: Rich		
225: Poor (and Poverty)		
226: Inequality		
227: (Economic) Class		
228: Worker		

229: Beneficiary		
230: Unemployed		
231: Professional		
232: Struggler		
233: Bludger		
234: Union		
235: Industry(ies)		
236: Job(s)		
237: Public private partnership(s)		
238: Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA)		
239: Economy(ic)		
240: Market		
241: Capitalism		
300: Gender, sex, sexuality		
301: Women		
302: Men		
303: Intersex		
304: Gender-Diverse		
305: Lesbian		
306: Gay		
307: Bisexual		
308: Transgender		
309: Cisgender		
310: LGBT		
311: Queer		
312: Straight		
313: Heterosexual		
400: Family, kinship, generations		
401: Family(ies)		

402: Whanau		
403: Senior		
404: Elder		
405: Older (person)		
406: Pension(er)		
407: Parent		
408: Mother		
409: Father		
410: Iwi		
411: Hapu		
412: Tribe		
413: Ngati...		
414: Child(ren)		
415: Tamariki		
416: Youth		
417: Rangatahi		
418: Kid(s)		
419: Baby (babies)		
500: Parties & politicians		
501: National (Party)		
502: Prime Minister (and National Party leader) John Key		
503: Labour (Party)		
504: (2014 Labour Party leader) David Cunliffe		
505: (2011 Labour Party leader) Phil Goff		
506: Green (Party)		
507: (Green Party co-leader) Metiria Turei		
508: (Green Party co-leader) Russell Norman		
509: New Zealand First		

510: (New Zealand First leader) Winston Peters		
511: Mana (Movement/Party)		
512: (Mana Party leader) Hone Harawira		
513: Internet (Party)		
514: (Internet Party leader) Laila Harre		
515: (Internet Party backer) Kim Dotcom		
516: Internet Mana		
517: Māori Party		
518: United Future		
519: (United Future leader) Peter Dunne		
520: ACT		
522: (2014 ACT leader) Jamie Whyte		
523: (2011 ACT leader) Don Brash		
524: Conservative (Party)		
525: (Conservative Party leader) Colin Craig		
526: Voter(s)		
527: Non-voter(s)		
528: Government		
529: Opposition		
530: (Wellington mayor) Celia Wade-Brown		
531: (Auckland mayor) Len Brown		
532: (Local) Council		
533: Dirty politics (lower case)		
534: Democracy		
535: MMP		
600: Corrections, Security, Criminality		
601: Police		
602: Justice (system)		
603: Corrections		

604: Prison(er)		
605: Criminal		
606: Offender		
607: Victim		
608: Survivor		
609: Judge		
610: Gang		
611: Defence		
612: Army		
613: Veteran(s)		
614: Terrorist / Terrorism		
615: GCSB		
616: Five Eyes (network)		
617: NSA		
618: Spy		
619: Intelligence		
620: Surveillance		
700: Medical(ised)		
700: Doctor(s)		
702: Nurse(s)		
703: Able-bodied		
704: Disabled		
705: Sick		
706: Addict(ion)		
707: Drug		
800: Education system		
801: Student(s)		
802: Teacher(s)		
803: Kindergarten		

804: Public school(s)		
805: Private school(s)		
806: Charter school(s)		
807: Partnership school(s)		
808: Tertiary (education)		
809: Lecturer		
810: Academic		
811: University		
812: Polytech(nic)		
813: Adult Community Education		
900: Professional designation		
901: Scientist		
902: Fisher		
903: Farmer(s)		
904: Economist		
905: Lawyer		
906: Ombudsman		
1000: Religious belief & community		
1001: Muslim		
1002: Christian		
1003: Jewish		
1004: Atheist		
1005: Believer		
1006: Faith (communities)		
1100: Non-specific		
1101: People		
1102: Public		
1105: We		
1106: Our		

1107: They		
1108: You		
1109: Everyone		
1110: Partnership		
1111: Society		
1112: Community		
1300: Regions within NZ		
1301: Auckland		
1302: Wellington		
1303: Christchurch		
1304: Dunedin		
1305: City		
1306: Town		
1307: Region(s)		
1308: Te Tai Tokerau		
1309: Electorate(s)		
1400: Political ideology		
1401: Left		
1402: Social Democratic		
1403: Socialist		
1404: Communist		
1405: Anarchist		
1406: Right		
1407: Neoliberal		
1408: Conservative		
1409: Fascist		