Richard Maximilian Luppi M.A.

Towards American Dependence: New Zealand's Developing Politico-Military
Relations with the United States of America, 1919-1942

Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in International Politics at the Victoria University
of Wellington.

13 June, 1977

To the Memory of John F. Hurd

But can't you hear the wild?—
it's calling you.

Let us probe the silent places,
let us seek what luck betide us;

Let us journey to a lonely land I know.
There's a whisper on the night-wind,

There's a star agleam to guide us,
And the wild is calling, calling ...

Let us go

From *The Call of the Wild*, by Robert Service

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to describe and explain a crucial transition in New Zealand's defence policy the outcome of which was that, instead of relying on the United Kingdom (and in particular the Royal Navy) for her Pacific security, New Zealand began to rely on the military and naval power of the United States in the Western Pacific. The study therefore focuses on New Zealand's developing politico-military relations with the United States in the context of the informal and then formal Anglo-American alliance between 1919 and 1942. There are three parts. The first investigates the events which led up to New Zealand's abrupt reorientation in 1940 from relying on Britain for her Pacific security to relying on the United States. In the course of this, British and American defence planning and co-operation for a possible war in the Pacific between 1919 and 1939 are examined in some detail. The second part deals with New Zealand's efforts to secure an American naval shield in the course of British and American negotiations to develop a combined British-Dutch-American defence against Japan between 1940 and 1942. The final part goes into the reasons for the change of defence policy and concludes that:

1. The fundamental cause was the British failure in 1919 and the immediately following years to challenge Japan for naval supremacy in the Western Pacific by establishing a Far Eastern Fleet. It was a consequence of this that in June 1940 Britain tried to get the United States to assume a major strategic responsibility in the Western Pacific by undertaking to dispatch an American fleet to Singapore if Japan joined in the war which had already broken out with Germany and Italy.
2. Australia and New Zealand, accepting the British grand strategy, prepared their local defences between October 1940 and March 1941 on the assumption that America would keep in step and send a fleet to Singapore.
3. Despite the failure of Britain's grand strategy between June 1940 and March 1941, America did assume strategic responsibility, particularly for the naval defence of New Zealand, in March 1941. In turn New Zealand, unlike Britain and Australia, consistently tried to meet the American point of view regarding a combined British-Dutch-American

Pacific defence plan. This was part of her continuing effort to secure an American naval shield in the event of war with Japan.

4. Britain and America were unable to agree on a combined British-Dutch-American defence plan before Japan entered the war in December 1941. This delayed the final realization of New Zealand's goal, pursued since October 1940, of gaining an American naval shield. The establishment of the ANZAC unified Pacific command area in February 1942 saw this goal at long last attained.

Acknowledgements

The author gratefully acknowledges much assistance. In particular he is deeply indebted to W.E. Murphy, Professor of Political Science, Victoria University of Wellington, for his personal encouragement, guidance and help in obtaining access to primary material held by the New Zealand Government. Others who have kindly provided the necessary primary and secondary materials and have helped in many other ways include: John Robertson, Secretary of Defence; Ian C. MacGibbon, Research Officer; Richard Barber, former Chief Librarian; and his successor, Mrs N.J. Reeve; staff of the Ministry of Defence Library, Wellington; Frank Corner, Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and Mrs Donnella Moss, Research Officer of his staff; and Miss Judith Hornabrook, Chief Archivist and her staff of the National Archives, Wellington.

List of Abbreviations

ABC-1	Anglo-American Military Staff Conferences (January-March 1941) Agreement or Report
ABDA	American-British-Dutch-Australian
ACNB	Australian Commonwealth Naval Board
ACNS	Australian Chief of Naval Staff
ACOS	Australian Chiefs of Staff
ADA	Anglo-Dutch-Australian
ADB	American-Dutch-British
ANZAC	Australia and New Zealand
BAD	British Admiralty Delegation, Washington
BMM	British Military Mission, Washington
CGS	Chief of General Staff
CID	Committee of Imperial Defence
CinC	Commander in Chief
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COS	Chiefs of Staff
Gov-Gen	Governor-General
NEI	Netherlands East Indies
NZ	New Zealand
NZCGS	New Zealand Chief of General Staff
NZCNS	New Zealand Chief of Naval Staff
NZCOS	New Zealand Chiefs of Staff
NZHC	New Zealand High Commissioner
NZNB	New Zealand Naval Board
PM	Prime Minister
PMA	Prime Minister Australia
PMNZ	Prime Minister New Zealand
PMUK	Prime Minister United Kingdom
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RN	Royal Navy
SSDA	Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
UK	United Kingdom
UKCOS	British Chiefs of Staff
UKHC	United Kingdom High Commissioner
US	United States of America
USCNO	American Chief of Naval Operations
USCOS	American Chiefs of Staff
USN	United States Navy

List of Maps

- Map I The Pacific Threat, 1919-1941
- Map II British-Dutch-American Pacific Defences,
October, 1940-December, 1941
- Map III Anglo-American Areas of Strategic Responsibility
in the Pacific, the ABC-1 Report, 27 March, 1941
- Map IV The Japanese Offensive into the Southern Region,
7 December, 1941-July, 1942
- Map V Allied Pacific Defence Areas, February, 1942:
The POA, ABDA and ANZAC Command Areas

Introduction

The visit of an American fleet to Auckland in 1908, the first such visit in New Zealand's history, gave a few far-sighted New Zealanders food for thought. They considered that some day the United States might assume Britain's traditional naval role in the waters of the Western and South Pacific. Japan was then an ally of Britain, but it was an uneasy and unequal alliance. Dating from 1905, it allowed the Royal Navy to concentrate largely on meeting the threat of the growing German navy in waters much closer to home.

This was a decided break with the traditional British policy of maintaining supremacy at sea against any possible combination of powers anywhere in the world. Neither Australia nor New Zealand welcomed this change. With Japanese naval power in mind, New Zealand urged Britain to provide in the Pacific an adequate naval shield. But it was no longer possible for the Royal Navy to maintain world-wide supremacy.

It was understandable, therefore, that some New Zealanders looked on the American Navy in 1908 as a possible alternative source of naval protection. The similarity of British and American political and cultural traditions made an American naval presence in Auckland much more congenial than a Japanese one. But any thoughts of relying on American naval support vanished with the outbreak of war in 1914. America demonstrated to the English-speaking world her dislike of "entangling alliances" by staying out of the conflict until well into 1917. As a possible ally of Australia and New Zealand in the Western Pacific in post-war years, America was therefore "written off".

For New Zealand this meant that there was no alternative to relying for legal support on the Royal Navy. So long as Japan did not become unfriendly, this situation was tolerable, for there was no other navy at all likely to become a threat. But the apparent compatibility of British and Japanese interests in eastern Asia and the Pacific which enabled the Anglo-Japanese alliance to survive was deceptive and fragile.

This thesis is a study of how New Zealand faced this situation and reacted to the crisis when the Japanese turned against their former allies, and how the hopes aroused in some New Zealand minds by the American naval visit of 1908 finally came to bear fruit in the Second World War.

Table of Contents

	Page
Abstract	iii
Acknowledgements	v
List of Abbreviations	vi
List of Maps	vii
Introduction	viii
Part I New Zealand, the United States and Pacific Security, 1919-1939	
Chapter I The Pacific Threat	1
Japan's Road to Empire	
Japan, Mistress of the Western Pacific	
The Manchurian Venture	
Into the Chinese Heartland	
Chapter II New Zealand and the Singapore Naval Base . .	18
New Zealand and the Imperial Fold	
Lord Jellicoe's Prophecy	
New Zealand, the Imperial Spur	
New Zealand, the Empire's "Doubting Thomas"	
Chapter III The American Retreat to the Pacific Triangle	72
American Pacific Security and Isolationism	
The Philippines, America's "Achilles Heel"	
Anglo-American Naval Co-operation	
Part II The Southern Encirclement, 1940-1942	
Chapter IV Towards a Combined British-Dutch-American Pacific Defence	105
Japan's Southward Swing	
New Zealand Looks to America and Seeks an ANZAC Defence	
America's Strategic Question	
Chapter V The Pacific: An American Strategic Responsibility	144
Japan Continues to Pursue the Establishment of a New Order in the Southern Region	
Australia and New Zealand Prepare for an American Fleet to Singapore	
The American Refusal	

Chapter VI The Pacific: A Joint Anglo-American Strategic Responsibility	207
---	-----

Japan Moves Towards War in the Southern Region	
New Zealand Seeks to Meet "the American Point of View" with Regard to a Combined Pacific Defence Plan	
Fresh Efforts Towards a Combined Pacific Defence Plan	

Chapter VII Meeting the Japanese Thrust: the ABDA and ANZAC Pacific Command Areas	257
---	-----

Japan Goes to War in the Southern Region	
New Zealand Secures Her American Naval Shield	

Part III Conclusion

Chapter VIII Towards American Dependence	280
--	-----

The Basis, 1919-1939	
The Re-orientation, 1940-1942	

Selected Bibliography	302
---------------------------------	-----

Appendices

A. New Zealand Local Defence-South Pacific Islands, 1939-1941	310
B. Australia and New Zealand Cruiser Strength, 1940	313
C. List of Initial Dispositions and Functions of Naval Forces—ADB Report, April, 1941 . . .	314
D. Hart-Phillips Agreement, 6 December, 1941 . .	317
E. Directive to the Supreme Commander, ABDA Area, 3 January, 1942	321
F. The Full and Final Text of the ANZAC Area Agreement, 10 February, 1942	326

Maps

PART I

NEW ZEALAND, THE UNITED STATES AND PACIFIC SECURITY,
1919-1939

Chapters I-III

Chapter I

The Pacific Threat

i Japan's Road to Empire

Japan's road to Empire began in the 1870s with her acquisition of local island territories and culminated in 1942 with control of almost the entire Western Pacific and Eastern Asia (Maps I and IV).¹ Such an impulse for territorial expansion had its roots deep in Japanese traditional beliefs and economic necessity, with its strongest adherents coming from the militarists of Japanese society.² The militarists, however, had not always been in full control of the government even though they historically enjoyed a tradition of political leadership. Counsels of prudence by the more liberal elements within the government had, at times, served as restraints upon their territorial ambitions with the result that Japan stumbled and faltered in her initial steps to Empire. With the gradual ascendancy of the militarists in control of the government, however, Japan gained rapid momentum on her road to Empire. Through the combination of ultra-nationalism, political assassinations and military conspiracies within an atmosphere of domestic economic ills, the militarists were finally able to gain full political power by 1936 and fix the nation on a unalterable course of expansion. Under the leadership of the militarists, Japan came under the grip of a war psychology. The nation became progressively indoctrinated through "thought education" and "spiritual mobilization" which convinced the masses of the need for expansion in terms of more land for emigration and secure sources of raw materials and markets. Moreover, the nation came to believe in the invincibility of Japan and her "divine" mission to construct a "New Order", the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere".³ By late 1941, therefore, Japan was ready to undertake her greatest step to Empire in World War II.

ii Japan, Mistress of the Western Pacific

Following the close of the First World War, tensions between Japan and the United States increased to a point where conflict in the Pacific appeared possible. Underlying these tensions were the expansionist policies of Japan, who at the outset of the First World War, had resumed her march to Empire. Taking advantage of the

favourable opportunity for expansion afforded by the Western powers' preoccupation with the outbreak of the European war in 1914, Japan, evoking the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, captured the German concession at Tsingtao on the Shantung peninsula in China and occupied Germany's colonial possessions in the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands. Japan then strengthened her position in these territories through intimidation and secret diplomacy. Presenting to a politically and economically ill China her "twenty-one demands", Japan obtained special rights, interests and concessions in the Shantung province, Southern Manchuria, and eastern Inner Mongolia. Moreover, Japan wrenched from Great Britain, France, Italy and Russia secret agreements of support for Japanese post-war claims to German rights in Shantung and the German Central Pacific islands in return for greater participation and assistance to the Allies in the World War. Having laid a solid foundation for her intended post-war claims during the war, Japan's position at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 was formidable. At Versailles, however, Japan encountered sharp opposition from the United States. Nevertheless, Japan was confirmed in her demands for German rights in Shantung and ceded control under a mandate from the League of Nations, of the former German colonies in the central Pacific (Map I). The United States, however, refused to accept Japan's territorial gains and the American Senate did not ratify the Versailles Peace Treaty. To aggravate the situation, the United States and Japan became heatedly engaged in a naval arms race following the Versailles Peace Conference and Japan continued to seek fresh areas for expansion in Siberia. All these problems persisted, thereby, severely straining Japanese-American relations and contributing to a highly volatile situation in the Pacific.⁴

By 1921, however, a solution to Pacific tensions through disarmament appeared possible. The United States, suffering from a national disillusionment over the origins of her intervention into the First World War and retreating into a policy of isolationism, was now only too eager to undertake naval disarmament and secure a final Pacific settlement.⁵ This desire was equally shared by Great Britain, who continually found herself in a dilemma over post-war tensions between Japan and the United States. Since 1905, Great Britain, experiencing the burdens of the global defence of her Empire, had relied upon the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to ease her naval defence commitments in her Far Eastern Empire.

However, British apprehensions concerning Japanese territorial designs in that area now led to a realisation of the paramount importance of improved Anglo-American relations. Aware that the existing Alliance impeded such progress, Great Britain sought to modify the Alliance so as to gain American acceptance and yet not arouse the hostility of Japan.⁶ The security of imperial interests east of Suez would, instead, now rest primarily upon the development of a first-class naval base at Singapore for the Royal Navy. Through an exchange of diplomatic notes between Great Britain and the United States, it was agreed that an international conference on the limitation of armaments and the settlement of Far East and Pacific problems should be held at Washington. On 11 August, 1921, formal invitations were sent from Washington to Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, China, the Netherlands and Portugal. Upon receiving the Washington invitation, Japan initially refused to attend.⁷ This was due to the objections of the militarists within the government who were unalterably opposed to anything which might divest Japan of her territorial gains. However, the militarists were no longer in a position to prevent the government from giving its later acceptance. Since 1919, the militarists had been steadily losing their influence relative to that of the more liberal faction within the government as a result of their post-war expansionist policies, particularly in Siberia. Their Siberian venture had overtaxed the Japanese economy and contributed to Pacific tensions with the net result of zero gains. As a consequence, the more liberal faction within the Japanese government began to attract wider popular support with their arguments for an easing of tensions with the United States, an end to the exhaustive naval arms race and a "peaceful" expansion of the Empire through commerce and diplomacy.⁸ The nascent liberal Japanese government, therefore, was able momentarily to redirect Japan from her road to Empire.

At the Washington Conference, which convened between 12 November, 1921, and 6 February, 1922, the competing politico-military objectives of Japan, Great Britain and the United States were successfully integrated into three separate but interrelated treaties. The first agreement to emerge from the conference concerned the future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Great Britain, with Japan's concurrence, had proposed to the United States that the Alliance be superseded by a three-power "arrangement" between Great Britain, Japan and the United States. The

British proposal, however, had amounted to nothing less than the existing Anglo-Japanese Alliance rewritten to include the United States. The United States, adamantly opposed to any "entangling alliances", had accepted Britain's proposed "arrangement" on the condition that France also be included. With France included, the American counter-proposal had amounted to nothing more than a loose multi-power arrangement which had no value other than to smooth Japanese pride over the loss of the alliance with Great Britain. Great Britain had accepted the American counter-proposal; for it enabled her to terminate the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in a form acceptable to the United States and yet not arouse the hostility of Japan.⁹ The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, therefore, was superseded by the Four Power Treaty on Insular Possessions in the Pacific. Under the terms of the treaty, Japan, Great Britain, the United States and France undertook mutual non-aggression "pledges" to:

- (a) Respect one another's rights in "relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean";
- (b) Meet in joint conference "for consideration and adjustment" of any "controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights which is not satisfactorily settled by diplomacy";
- (c) "Communicate with one another fully" if the rights of the contracting parties "are threatened by the aggressive action of any other power".

The treaty was to remain in force for ten years and then was to continue subject to the right of any of the signatories to terminate it upon twelve months' notice.¹⁰

The Conference then shifted its attention to the question of naval limitation. With the addition of Italy, those same powers concluded the Five Power Naval Limitation Treaty. The treaty provided for:

- (a) A ten year halt to capital ship construction;
- (b) Scrapping specified vessels in commission and under construction (United States, 845,000 tons; Great Britain, 583,000 tons; Japan, 435,000 tons). Under a replacement programme to begin after the ten year construction holiday, battleship tonnage

would be limited to: United States, 525,000 tons; Great Britain, 525,000 tons; Japan, 315,000 tons; France, 175,000 tons; and Italy, 175,000 tons. A similar ratio with lower tonnage limitation was also specified for aircraft carriers.

- (c) Limiting the tonnage of individual battleships and aircraft carriers to 35,000 and 27,000 tons respectively and the calibre of their guns to 16 and 8 inches respectively.

The treaty was to remain in force until 31 December, 1936, and might be terminated thereafter through two years' notice by any signatory.¹¹

The third treaty to emerge from the conference dealt with Far East problems. Both Great Britain and the United States had sought to check Japanese expansion in China, largely to preserve their own commercial interests there. As drafted by Great Britain, the United States had successfully introduced into the conference principles which formed the basis of the Nine Power Treaty on China.¹² Under the terms of the treaty, Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and China undertook to respect the sovereignty and independence of China and uphold the principle of the "Open Door":

- (a) "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China";
- (b) "to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity for China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government";
- (c) "to use their influence for the purpose of effectively establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China";
- (d) "to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states".

The remaining articles of the treaty bound the signatories not to support their nationals in seeking spheres of influence or "mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory"; to respect the neutrality of China; and communicate fully and frankly among themselves whenever circumstances seemed to require the application of the treaty.¹³

At Washington, Japan further agreed to restore the former German-leased territory in Shantung to China and allow an international consortium to participate in the economic development of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Moreover, Japan disclaimed any territorial designs in Russia and agreed to withdraw her troops from Siberia.¹⁴

Great Britain, the United States and the other western powers viewed the Washington treaties as a substantial check to Japanese militarism and a lasting contribution to peace in the Pacific. Japan had not only agreed to terminate the contentious Anglo-Japanese Alliance and undertake naval limitation but also renounced her territorial ambitions in Eastern Asia. Japan, however, had also successfully extracted her price: naval hegemony in the Western Pacific.¹⁵

In terms of Pacific security, Japan had made the greatest gain at the Washington Conference. As Chitoshi Yanaga explains: "from the point of her national policy and, more specifically her naval strategy, the Washington Conference was quite a success for Japan, as she checked America's first line of defence at Hawaii and Britain's at Singapore, leaving the vast expanse of the Pacific between the two points practically within her control, and also virtually controlling China's fate."¹⁶ Japan's major politico-military objective was secured through concessions obtained from Great Britain and the United States during the framing of the Five Power Naval Limitation Treaty which virtually ceded to Japan naval hegemony in the Western Pacific. Under the terms of that treaty, Great Britain, the United States and Japan agreed to restrict the tonnage of their capital ships to a ratio of 5:5:3, respectively. Although Great Britain and the United States retained a superiority over Japan in capital ships, the ratio of five to three was out of all proportion to their larger naval responsibilities, particularly those of Great Britain, in the other oceans. Should a threat emerge in Atlantic or European waters, Great Britain and the United States, therefore, would be unable, with such a capital naval force, to meet that threat and at the same time conduct a successful offensive against Japan in the Western Pacific. Moreover, Japan's strategic position in the Western Pacific was further enhanced by Article XIX of the treaty. With already highly developed first-class naval bases in the Western Pacific at Formosa and the Pescadores Islands, Japan was able to interject the provision of Article XIX

into the Five Power Treaty as a condition for her acceptance of the 5:5:3 (or 10:10:6) naval ratio instead of her initial demands for a 10:10:7 naval ratio.¹⁷ Under the terms of Article XIX, the United States, Great Britain and Japan were to erect no new fortifications or naval bases or take any measures which would increase existing facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, or to increase the coast defences of insular possessions in the following Pacific regions:

- (A) "the insular possessions which the United States now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands and (b) the Hawaiian Islands;
- (B) Hong Kong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean east of the meridian of 110° east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its territories, and (c) New Zealand;
- (C) The following insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wit: the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire."¹⁸

Thus, under the terms of Article XIX, Great Britain and the United States had agreed not to establish any additional fortifications or naval bases in closer proximity to Japan than the British zone of Singapore-Australasia and the American zone of Alaska-Hawaii-Panama, respectively. By relinquishing her right to fortify and develop major naval bases at Guam, the Philippines or the Aleutian Islands, the United States had further denied herself the ability to conduct a successful offensive against Japan in the Western Pacific; while, at the same time, making those territories vulnerable to Japanese attack.

Although not foreseen at the Washington Conference, Japan's naval hegemony in the Western Pacific was to be "ensured" by such latter events as: Great Britain's failure to complete the Singapore naval base until 1938; the United States' failure to undertake any programme of naval construction to meet treaty strength (tonnage) in capital ships until 1933; and most importantly, the emergence of Germany and

Italy as maritime threats to American and British security in Atlantic and European waters. As a result, both Great Britain and the United States were to suffer a serious decline in seapower which was to contribute to their disastrous defeats in the early phases of the Pacific war with Japan. The Washington treaties, therefore, had, indeed, ushered in a "new order of seapower"¹⁹ by conferring upon Japan naval hegemony in the Western Pacific.

iii The Manchurian Venture

Following the Washington Conference, Japan, under the leadership of liberal Cabinets, pursued a moderate foreign policy vis-à-vis the western powers despite the clamourings of her militarists for a more aggressive policy. As a member of the League of Nations, Japan played a respectable and sometimes distinguished role. Japan was also party to the 1928 Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand Pact) which renounced war as an instrument of national policy. Moreover, Japan continued with Great Britain and the United States to negotiate for full naval limitation; and at the 1930 London Naval Conference accepted limitations on her secondary vessels.²⁰ By 1931, however, the peaceful temper which had characterized Japanese foreign policy for almost a decade was suddenly shattered. Popular Japanese discontent arising from the world depression, western racial policies, and the extended naval limitations sparked the development of ultra-nationalist movements in Japan which joined forces with the militarists in denouncing the "weak" policies of the liberal government. Together, they urged upon their government a more aggressive Far Eastern policy in face of resurgent Chinese nationalism and Russian encroachment in Manchuria which threatened Japanese interests and her dreams of empire.²¹

On 18 September, 1931, the militarists seized the initiative by staging an "incident" on the Japanese controlled Southern Manchurian Railway. This action precipitated a clash between Chinese and Japanese troops resulting in popular home support for the Japanese Army's sudden occupation of Mukden and other key cities in Manchuria. Despite the continued protestations of the almost defunct Japanese liberal cabinet, wrought by terror and assassination, the Japanese Army continued its conquest of Manchuria and established the puppet state of Manchukuo in February, 1932 (Map I). By this time, hostilities had spread as far south as Shanghai where Japanese forces encountered heavy resistance

but achieved eventual success. With both sides now exhausted, a temporary peace was concluded at Shanghai in March, 1932.²²

These acts of Japanese aggression were not only a direct challenge to China but also to the western powers and the Washington treaties. Again, Japan was on her road to Empire but was now in a strategic position to pursue her imperial ambitions with little fear of western interference:

The Washington treaty [Five Power Naval Limitation Treaty] ensured Great Britain, the United States and Japan absolute superiority in the regions of primary interest to each of them. Of the three powers, Japan made the greatest gains in security for herself, and at the same time removed all possibility of interference with her national policies. When, in pursuance of an aggressive nationalism and in total disregard of the Nine Power Treaty to respect China's territory, that oriental power invaded Manchuria, Britain and America lacked the means to make an effective protest. At Washington they had surrendered the right to maintain adequate naval bases in the Far East and had agreed to a naval ratio that rendered successful intervention impossible.²³

The Chinese government had appealed on 21 September, 1931, to the League of Nations for assistance against Japanese violation of her neutrality and territorial integrity. However, without the willing support of its larger members, notably Great Britain and France, the League could do no more than timidly urge Japan to withdraw her forces from Chinese territory and appoint the Lytton Commission to investigate the matter.²⁴ Similarly, the independent actions taken by the United States and Great Britain were no more potent; for both were unwilling to consider the use of military force in order to uphold the Nine Power Treaty. The United States had merely responded by declaring her "non-recognition" of the state of Manchukuo and any treaty or agreements which impaired the treaty rights of the United States and the sovereignty of China brought about by means contrary to the Pact of Paris.²⁵ When this had failed to thwart Japanese aggression, the United States then attempted to "deter" Japan by extending the time period of her annual Pacific fleet manoeuvres and warning Japan that the western powers might cease to observe the Washington treaty on naval limitation.²⁶ Great Britain, on the other hand, had faintly protested about Japanese actions at the League of Nations and

urged that body to adopt the American non-recognition doctrine as its policy towards Japan.²⁷

In February, 1933, the League of Nations, after reviewing the findings of the Lytton Commission, branded Japan an aggressor nation and refused recognition of Manchukuo as an independent state. Japan later responded by withdrawing from the League of Nations and invading Jehol province. While Japanese forces were completing their conquest of Jehol, other forces moved south crossing the Great Wall and occupying the Peiping-Tientsin area in northeast China (Map I). Without the possibility of military assistance from the western powers, the Chinese Kuomintang-Nationalist government was compelled to seek terms with their invaders. By the terms of the Tangku Armistice Agreement of May, 1933, China acknowledged the loss of Manchuria and Jehol province and agreed to the establishment of a buffer zone in the Peiping-Tientsin area under Japanese control.²⁸ Having successfully challenged the western powers in China, Japan then proceeded to abrogate the remaining Washington treaties. In 1934, Japan announced her intentions to withdraw from the Five Power Naval Limitation Treaty unless her demands for full naval parity in capital ships with Great Britain and the United States were met at the forthcoming naval disarmament conference. When the London Naval Conference of 1935-1936 convened, Japan's demands were rejected outright by Great Britain and the United States; for their acceptance would have given Japan "unassailable supremacy throughout the Western Pacific and the China seas."²⁹ Japan thereupon withdrew from the Conference and set about constructing a naval fleet which by 1941 was to be more powerful than the combined Anglo-American Pacific fleets.³⁰ With the failure of naval limitation, beginning with the Washington treaties, to check Japanese militarism and expansion, the "two English-speaking nations began belated efforts to repair deficiencies in their naval defences."³¹ However, such efforts were to prove much too late. Due to the additional emerging threats of Germany and Italy to British and American security in the Atlantic and European waters and the deplorable state of British and American naval armaments, Great Britain and the United States were therefore compelled to cede to Japan "unassailable supremacy" in the Western Pacific:

Sixteen years of attempted limitation of naval armaments ... had ended with the great naval powers returning to virtually unrestricted competition. Efforts in behalf of naval disarmament based upon security ratios had begun with the scrapping of capital ships and agreements not to fortify Pacific bases. All attempts to bring about limitation ceased in 1938. Japan's rivals in that year were in a far less favourable position than they had been in 1921. Neither Great Britain nor the United States was any longer capable of protecting by force of arms territory in the Western Pacific. Both therefore, were to face humiliating and catastrophic defeats as a direct result of the concessions they had made at Washington in 1922.³²

iv Into the Chinese Heartland

The success of the Manchurian venture had only whetted the appetite of the militarists for a further expansion of Empire. Through another wave of political assassination and terror, the militarists were able to gain full control of the Japanese government by August, 1936, thus bringing to an end the remnants of political democracy in Japan. Under the leadership of the Army, the more extreme faction, the militarists were now determined to make Japan the unchallenged leader of Eastern Asia. Japanese foreign policy would now be guided by the Army's three step programme for the expansion of the Japanese Empire: the attainment of measures to counter Japan's traditional threat to her North, Russia; the eventual conquest of the whole of China; and expansion southward into the Southwest Pacific in order to secure strategic raw materials needed to support a self-sufficient modern war machine.³³ The first step was taken when Japan moved into closer relations with Germany and Italy and, on 25 November, 1936, signed the Anti-Comintern Pact directed principally against Soviet Russia.³⁴ The second step began in July 1937 with the opening of the undeclared Sino-Japanese War.

On the night of 7 July, 1937, another staged "incident" occurred near the famous Marco Polo bridge in the outskirts of Peiping, again involving a clash between Chinese and Japanese troops. Despite local efforts to settle the incident, pre-arranged Japanese reinforcements were hastily rushed to Peiping; and on 21 July both Peiping and Tientsin fell to Japanese forces.³⁵ Japan was now ready to launch her full scale offensive into Northern China.

At this early stage of the conflict Japan had planned only to occupy the five northern Chinese provinces and then spend the next few years exploiting their resources in order to strengthen her war machine for the eventual conquest of the whole of China. However, this piecemeal strategy was to fail miserably as a result of the unexpected vigour of Chinese resistance to Japan's renewed aggression. Popular Chinese demands for an end to Japanese aggression in China had compelled the Chinese Kuomintang-Nationalist government to seek a united front with the leading dissident factions throughout China. Thus, in 1936, an alliance between the Kuomintang-Nationalists and Chinese Communists was forged for the common purpose of resisting further Japanese encroachments into China.³⁶ Japan, therefore, was now to encounter an unprecedented national, rather than provincial, resistance which would develop into a protracted full-scale war between the two Asian powers.

After occupying the Peiping-Tientsin area, Japanese troops marched into Inner Mongolia, occupying Kalgan in Chahar province, thus severing China's principal northern communication line with Soviet Russia. Suiyuan province was then overrun and occupied. Other Japanese forces moved into Shansi province and, still deeper northwest, into Shensi province but were finally halted there by Communist forces. Faced with superior forces, in both numbers and equipment, Communist forces, employing guerilla tactics, frustrated further Japanese efforts to complete the conquest of Northern China. By August, 1937, hostilities had already spread to the Yangtze River valley. There the fiercest fighting occurred around Shanghai with the Chinese Army withstanding a superior Japanese force. By November, the Japanese were eventually able to drive the Chinese forces back towards Nanking, 150 miles up the Yangtze River valley. In December, Nanking, the capital of China, fell to Japanese forces. The fall of Nanking, however, did not end Chinese resistance, as the Japanese had hoped, for the Chinese had moved their government further westward to Hankow (Map I).³⁷

The Chinese central division had by this time divided Japanese strength and gained time for the Chinese to organize their forces for a protracted struggle. The Japanese, nevertheless, were determined to drive deeper into the Chinese heartland of central China.

In doing so, they encountered obstacles for which they were completely unprepared. Inland, the Japanese faced serious problems of supply due to meagre Chinese rail and road networks. Moreover, the rivers and canals, which constituted China's traditional highways, were navigable only during a part of the year. Thus, the Japanese advance was continually retarded, if not by the Chinese, then by their land. It took the Japanese five months to reach Hankow, on the upper Yangtze River, which fell in October, 1938. Nevertheless, the Chinese still retreated further westward into the deep and narrow gorges of the Yangtze River valley, finally establishing their permanent capital at Chungking (Map I).

Despite Japanese tactical victories, the Sino-Japanese war developed into a stalemate. The Japanese had badly miscalculated China's ability to resist. The Japanese continued to suffer heavy casualties and material exhaustion while Chinese resistance grew stiffer. Recognizing the magnitude of their problem, the militarists decided on a bolder policy in China. They were convinced that the western powers were unwilling to use military force to resist Japanese ambitions in China and that the Soviet threat to the north was sufficiently checked by the Anti-Comintern Pact. Japan's new China policy, as announced on 22 December, 1938, by the Japanese Premier, Prince Konoye, entailed the establishment of a "New Order in East Asia". Its objectives were to consolidate and exploit existing Japanese gains in China while bringing about the collapse of the Chinese government through economic "strangulation". This involved the complete eradication of all western businesses in Japanese-held China and the establishment of a third front in Southern China. To these ends, Japan set about ejecting all American and European commercial firms from the Shanghai International Settlement and elsewhere; seized the important Southern Chinese ports and cities of Canton, Swatow and Amoy; and instituted a naval blockade of the entire South China coast (Map I).³⁸

As correctly assessed by the militarists, the western powers, preoccupied with European problems, were unwilling to consider the use of military force in order to protect their commercial interests or stem Japanese aggression in China. Both Great Britain and the United States responded to this latest development in China by providing

financial loans to the Chungking government. In addition, the United States, again, attempted to deter further Japanese aggression by giving notice to Japan of her intention of allowing the 1911 American-Japanese Commercial treaty to expire in January, 1940. Thereafter, the United States would be in a legal position to employ full "economic" sanctions against Japan.³⁹

Throughout the spring of 1939, Japan sought to strengthen her position against the Soviet Union by entering into an alliance with the Axis powers. Japan's concern for her northern border had mounted since 1938 as the Soviet Union increased her aid to China and Japan became involved in a series of clashes with Soviet troops near the Manchukuo-Outer Mongolian border. Germany's offer of alliance, however, was on the condition that Japan ally herself against Great Britain and the United States as well as Soviet Russia. Consequently, this became a source of great debate and friction between the two principal factions, the extremists and moderates, within the militarist cabinet. The Army, exceedingly pro-German, was anxious to commit Japan to an unconditional alliance with the Axis powers; whereas, the more moderate Navy and civilian members opposed such a move. The moderates insisted upon an alliance directed primarily against Soviet Russia and refused to accept any commitments which might involve Japan in a war with Great Britain and the United States. Nevertheless, the Army pressed for the full military alliance demanded by Germany, and even threatened to negotiate separately to secure such an alliance. Upon this issue, neither faction would give way. The German government, exceedingly annoyed at this development, threatened to seek a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. This Germany did on 23 August, 1939, when she concluded, without Japan's prior knowledge, a Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union thus destroying the basis of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact. A week later, Germany invaded Poland and found herself, as anticipated, in another European war with Great Britain and France.

Germany's sudden desertion of the Anti-Comintern Pact was a stunning blow to the Army's prestige and leadership within the militarist Cabinet which resulted in a reshuffling of the Cabinet and a sharp re-orientation of Japanese foreign policy. In January, 1940, a compromise Cabinet, headed by the former Navy Minister, Admiral Yonai,

was established which now sought to devote its "total" energies to the China incident and a rapprochement with Great Britain and the United States.⁴⁰ However, the disastrous events which were to befall the democratic European powers in the Spring of 1940 were to offer Japan an irresistible opportunity for unlimited southward expansion and, thus, the possibility of war with Great Britain and the United States.

Footnotes

- ¹United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *Summary Report (Pacific War)* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 7.
- ²Louis Morton, *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, the War in the Pacific, US Army in World War II*. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1962) (hereinafter referred to as *Strategy and Command.*) , p. 46.
- ³Delmer M. Brown, *Nationalism in Japan* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1971), pp. 200-224.
- ⁴Paul H. Clyde, *The Far East* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 267-288. John M. Maki, *Japanese Militarism* (New York: Knopf, 1945), pp. 200-203.
- ⁵Jules Davids, *America and the World of Our Time* (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 118.
- ⁶A.W. Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1938), p. 178.
- ⁷Davids, *America and the World of Our Time*, pp. 118-120.
- ⁸Clyde, *The Far East*, pp. 282-288;
W.G. Beasley, *The Modern History of Japan* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963), pp. 208-213.
- ⁹Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States*, pp. 307-311.
- ¹⁰U.S. Congress, Senate, *Conference on the Limitation of Armament*, Senate Document No. 125, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, 1922, pp. 111-113.
- ¹¹*Ibid.*, pp. 93-110.
- ¹²Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States*, pp. 322-323.
- ¹³U.S. Congress, *Conference on the Limitation of Armament*, pp. 115-119.
- ¹⁴Chitoshi Yanaga, *Japan Since Perry* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949), pp. 425-427.
- ¹⁵James B. Crawley, *Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 28-29.
- ¹⁶Yanaga, *Japan Since Perry*, p. 427.
- ¹⁷Kenneth S. Latourette, *A Short History of the Far East* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1957), p. 523.
- ¹⁸U.S. Congress, *Conference on the Limitation of Armaments*, p. 97.
- ¹⁹For a classic study of the Washington Conference see Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *Towards a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1946).

- ²⁰Kenneth S. Latourette, *The History of Japan* (New York: the Macmillan Co., 1957), pp. 181-182.
- ²¹Ian Nish, *The Story of Japan* (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), pp. 141-156.
- ²²Clyde, *The Far East*, pp. 327-330.
- ²³Merze Tate, *The United States and Armaments* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948), p. 261.
- ²⁴Clyde, *The Far East*, p. 328.
- ²⁵T.A. Bisson, *American Policy in the Far East, 1931-1941* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), p. 22.
- ²⁶Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States*, pp. 427-433.
- ²⁷W.N. Medlicott, *British Foreign Policy Since Versailles, 1919-1963* (London: Methuen, 1968), pp. 118-120.
- ²⁸Clyde, *The Far East*, pp. 330-331.
- ²⁹Tate, *The United States and Armaments*, p. 190.
- ³⁰Samuel E. Morison, *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, Vol. III: *The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942* (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 20.
- ³¹Tate, *The United States and Armaments*, p. 194.
- ³²*Ibid.*, p. 196.
- ³³Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 50.
- ³⁴*Ibid.*
- ³⁵Clyde, *The Far East*, p. 353.
- ³⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 341-349.
- ³⁷Latourette, *The History of Japan*, pp. 236-238.
- ³⁸Clyde, *The Far East*, pp. 348-360.
- ³⁹Morton, *Strategy and Command*, pp. 51-52.
- ⁴⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 52-53; Albert Craig, John Fairbank and Edwin Reischauer, *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973), pp. 716-717.

Chapter II

New Zealand and the Singapore Naval Base

i New Zealand and the Imperial Fold

In 1919 New Zealand was exclusively oriented towards Great Britain, the hub of the British Empire. New Zealand neither possessed nor sought the establishment of political or military representation with any other country. Moreover, as a British Colony in 1840, and from 1907, a self-governing Dominion, New Zealand had enjoyed and selfishly guarded her Imperial relationship with Great Britain by traditionally advocating Imperial unity and opposing decentralizing forces within and without the Empire. In short, "most New Zealanders thought of external affairs in terms of Imperial unity and relied on British leadership of the Empire."¹ This exclusive orientation had given New Zealand the reputation of being the "most loyal of the Colonies and Dominions"² within the Imperial fold. The basis for New Zealand's exclusive politico-military relationship with Great Britain was not the product of a mother-complex or blind sentimental following of the Mother Country in Imperial affairs as some political observers have suggested.³ It can rather be largely explained, although not completely,⁴ in terms of the Dominion's sole dependence upon Great Britain and the Royal Navy for her Pacific security. With a 4000 mile coastline, meagre industrial capacity, small and scattered population and long and vulnerable sea communications (Map II), New Zealand recognized that she could not defend her territory or trade and that her Pacific security was bound up with that of Great Britain and the Royal Navy. As the New Zealand Prime Minister, Sir Joseph Ward, explained to the House of Representatives in 1909:

The fate and future of this country is not going to depend on eighty thousand men, or even one hundred thousand, or even two hundred thousand fully trained men; it is not going to depend upon who may land in New Zealand: it is going to depend on the victory of the British Navy in some place thousands of miles from the shores of New Zealand.⁵

In return for her Pacific security, provided by Great Britain in the form of a naval shield, New Zealand "energetically" contributed to Empire defence through a system of expeditionary forces and naval subsidies to the Royal Navy on the understanding that Great Britain

would fulfil her reciprocal Imperial obligation.⁶ The principle of dispatching expeditionary forces overseas for the defence of the Empire was first given real expression by New Zealand with the dispatch of 6,500 New Zealand troops for service in South Africa during the 2nd Boer War. In proportion to total population, New Zealand's contribution far exceeded that of any other British Colony and almost equalled that of Great Britain herself.⁷ Again, during the First World War, New Zealand dispatched from the South Pacific a total of 100,444 New Zealand troops for service in Gallipoli, Palestine and France for the joint defence of the British Empire.⁸ Characteristically, "in proportion to her population, she [New Zealand] provided more troops for active service than did any other overseas portion of the British Empire."⁹ With regard to naval subsidies, New Zealand, under the Australasian Naval Agreement of 1887, contributed about £20,000 a year towards the maintenance of an auxiliary Imperial Naval Squadron on the Australian Naval Station, two ships of which were stationed in New Zealand waters in time of peace. In 1903 the subsidy was increased to £40,000 and in 1908 to £100,000 a year. Moreover, when British naval superiority was challenged during the Anglo-German naval arms race of 1908-1909, New Zealand financed the construction of a battle-cruiser, H.M.S. New Zealand, and even offered to finance another to meet the threat to British seapower.¹⁰

Although New Zealand was generally content to rely upon the British leadership of the Empire to guide Imperial policy, she expected to be consulted and allowed an opportunity to voice her views concerning such policy, particularly on matters relating to her Pacific security. This was most clearly demonstrated by the Dominion's role in the formulation and implementation of Imperial defence policy between 1919-1942. During that period New Zealand's concern for her Pacific security intensified with the emergence of Japan as a major Pacific power at a time when Great Britain was facing the realities of her own reduced power within that area. New Zealand responded to these developments in two ways. Her first response, which came between 1919-1939, was an effort to assist and encourage Great Britain in the defence of her Far Eastern Empire.¹¹ This took the following forms: strong support for the establishment of a Far Eastern Fleet; financial contributions for the construction of a first-class naval base at Singapore and continued urgings for its speedy completion; and the assumption of

greater local Imperial defence responsibilities within her naval station. New Zealand's second response, between 1940 and 1942, was to reorient her defence policy relatively abruptly. The new direction was towards diminished dependence on Great Britain for military and naval security and greater dependence on the United States. In the early part of this period, from June 1940 to March 1941, this ran parallel to British efforts to persuade the United States to assume major strategic responsibility in the Pacific as the basis of a unified grand strategy. The kingpin of this was a proposal for the dispatch of an American fleet to Singapore in the event of war with Japan.

It was in this period that New Zealand moved to institute political and military representation in Washington, in recognition of Britain's inability to provide adequate forces to counter possible Japanese expansion southwards. With a direct voice in Washington, New Zealand could hope to initiate negotiations to establish an alternative basis for her future Pacific security. In addition, New Zealand endeavoured to secure an American naval shield by preparing local Imperial defences, in co-operation with Australia, which could not become truly effective unless agreement was reached for the dispatch of an American fleet to Singapore in the event of war with Japan. The United States, however, refused to accept Great Britain's conception of grand strategy and the Pacific became a joint Anglo-American strategic responsibility in March 1941. Great Britain and the United States then sought to formulate an acceptable combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan on the basis of the newly-agreed grand strategy. Falling within the area of American strategic responsibility in the Pacific, New Zealand, therefore, redirected her efforts, in April 1941, towards the speedy development of an acceptable combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan. New Zealand accordingly urged Australia to meet the American point of view regarding such a plan and, thereby, secure the American naval shield in the event of war with Japan. However, it was not until February 1942, after the outbreak of the Pacific war, that New Zealand finally secured the American naval shield through the establishment of the ANZAC Unified Command Area and, with it, her Pacific security. It is within the framework of the Imperial fold, therefore, that one must view New Zealand's response to the Pacific threat from 1919-1942.

ii Lord Jellicoe's Prophecy

Following the close of the First World War, Great Britain was faced with a potential threat to her Far Eastern Empire. The elimination of German seapower and the rapid growth of both the American and Japanese navies during the war had resulted in those states becoming, after the British Empire, the second and third strongest naval powers. Moreover, both Pacific powers were engaged in a heated naval arms race for naval supremacy and an early conflict in the Pacific appeared possible. It therefore became apparent to British authorities that certain measures would have to be taken in order to ensure the security of the Far Eastern Empire.

While British authorities in London debated the basis of postwar Imperial defence in the light of these Pacific developments, Admiral of the fleet and former First Sea Lord, Lord Jellicoe, in response to the recommendations of the 1918 Imperial War Conference, toured India, Canada, Australia and New Zealand in order to advise them on their postwar naval defences. Lord Jellicoe's Empire Mission (1919-1920) and recommendations to the Dominions and India revived the abortive 1909 scheme for the establishment of a "Pacific" or "Eastern" fleet which was shelved by the Admiralty just prior to the First World War. Lord Jellicoe clearly recognized that "sooner or later a fleet of a certain definite strength would be required either in the Pacific or in the vicinity of that ocean, and that the whole Empire Navy would need to bear a definite relative strength to that of Japan."¹² Jellicoe represented those elements in the Royal Navy which wished to establish British seapower in the Western Pacific on a scale which had never before existed: in essence, to successfully challenge Japan for the naval supremacy of that area. In this desire, Jellicoe "entered into a sphere never contemplated by the Admiralty and far beyond his terms of reference" with regard to postwar Imperial policy.¹³ Interestingly enough, however, within that "sphere" Jellicoe was able accurately to predict the disastrous events which were to befall the Far Eastern Empire as a direct result of Great Britain's early failure to contest Japan for naval supremacy of the Western Pacific:

Britain would not be able to dispatch any considerable naval forces to the Far East before the outbreak of war; secondly, that the ultimate aim of Japan would be to invade Australia, but that her initial move would be to

seize advanced bases in New Guinea and the islands to the east of that territory or in the Dutch East Indies; and lastly, that Japan would attack our own bases, notably Hong Kong and Singapore, either prior to or concurrently with the acquisition of the advanced bases....once they had captured that base Singapore they would paralyse to a very great extent the operations of the British Navy.¹⁴

On 20 August, 1919, Lord Jellicoe aboard HMS New Zealand, proposed flagship of the Far Eastern fleet, arrived in Wellington, New Zealand. In his advice to the New Zealand government, Jellicoe warned the Pacific Dominion that, although Great Britain and Japan were at present Pacific allies, "history records many instances of allies turning into enemies in a very short space of time". Jellicoe pointed to the fact that during the First World War there existed a great deal of "mutual distrust" between Great Britain and Japan. He recalled that "when requests were made to Japan for naval and military assistance, the latter was never forthcoming, and even when the former was given a price was always extracted." Jellicoe also drew attention to the fact that there currently existed elements of "great friction" between Japanese policy and the interests of the British Empire in the Far East. In this respect, Jellicoe made sharp references to Japanese actions in China—i.e. the Twenty-one Demands—and the possibility of Japanese southward expansion into the Netherlands East Indies (N.E.I.) which would severely threaten the security of Australia and New Zealand. It is "almost inevitable", Jellicoe prophetically declared, "that the interests of Japan and the British Empire will eventually clash", thus endangering the security of the Far Eastern Empire.¹⁵ In order to meet the Pacific threat, Jellicoe recommended the establishment of a Far Eastern fleet, which was essential for the future security of the Far Eastern Empire. Since the "Home and Far Eastern theatres of war are so far apart in these days of rapid movement and quick decisions", Jellicoe declared, "Correct strategy demands adequate [fleet] strength in both quarters."¹⁶ The Far Eastern fleet would consist of: eight battleships, eight battle-cruisers, ten light cruisers, forty modern destroyers, thirty-six submarines, three flotilla leaders, two depot ships, four submarine parent ships, three aircraft-carriers, twelve fleet minesweepers, one large seagoing minelayer and two fleet repair ships.¹⁷ Although Jellicoe recognized that his naval programme would entail substantial naval rearmament, he was confident that the cost could be met. He

proposed that the annual cost of about £20 million be shared in the preparation of: Great Britain 75%; Australia 20%; and New Zealand 5%. Canada and India were to contribute in other ways.¹⁸ In order for the Far Eastern fleet effectively to operate in the Pacific, Jellicoe also recognized the necessity for establishing a first-class naval base in that area capable of servicing and repairing the more modern designed post-Jutland capital ships;¹⁹ for no such base then existed east of Malta. Jellicoe, therefore, recommended that Singapore, as "undoubtedly the naval key to the Far East,"²⁰ be the site for the establishment of a fortified first-class naval base and headquarters for the Far Eastern fleet. In accordance with the general scheme, the Fleet Admiral recommended that New Zealand contribute to the Far Eastern fleet by developing her own local navy. Jellicoe advised the Dominion that she obtain: three light cruisers, six submarines and one small submarine parent ship for local naval defence. These ships, Jellicoe suggested, would be manned and maintained by New Zealand but in effect be part of the Royal Navy to be assimilated into the Far Eastern fleet when war appeared imminent. The local Navy would be administered, Jellicoe further suggested, by the Dominion through a Naval Board in peacetime; and in wartime, by the Admiralty through a British Flag Officer.²¹

Lord Jellicoe's apprehensions concerning the emerging Pacific threat and the inadequacies of British seapower in the Pacific merely reinforced the Dominion's long held anxieties concerning her Pacific security. Great Britain's reliance upon the Anglo-Japanese Alliance for the defence of her Far Eastern Empire since 1905, so that the Royal Navy could meet the German threat in home waters, represented a fundamental departure from her traditional naval policy of maritime supremacy. Prior to that time, Imperial naval defence had been based entirely upon a British policy of maritime supremacy; whereby Great Britain endeavoured to maintain the maritime defence of the British Empire "alone" and against any possible hostile combination. New Zealand had never fully accepted that fundamental departure from traditional British naval policy since 1905. Due to the Dominion's developing suspicions of Japan, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was viewed by New Zealand as a most unreliable and "unnatural" device for the defence of the Pacific Dominion. Clearly desired by New Zealand was her traditional naval shield, the Royal Navy. This desire had led to the Dominion's overwhelming support for the 1909 "Pacific"

or "Eastern" fleet scheme which was approved at an Imperial Conference that same year; and the dispatch of New Zealand's Minister of Defence, James Allen, to London in 1912 to register his government's stern disapproval of Great Britain's failure to implement the scheme. The absence of British seapower in Far Eastern waters was more sharply felt by the Dominion, however, during the First World War when New Zealand was forced to rely upon Japan for the defence of her territory and trade against a German naval force actively operating within Far Eastern waters. Again, at the 1917 Imperial War Conference, New Zealand complained of Great Britain's failure to meet her Imperial obligations in the Pacific and urged that a "strong naval power" be made available there as soon as possible.²² New Zealand, therefore, understandably endorsed Lord Jellicoe's recommendations for the establishment of a Far Eastern fleet to be stationed in the Pacific at Singapore. As Jellicoe reported to the Admiralty from Wellington, the New Zealand government was "particularly anxious to see a strong Far Eastern fleet developed as soon as possible....in this far-distant Dominion they are keenly alive to the importance to their existence of a powerful and efficient British Navy."²³ Guided by the fleet Admiral's recommendations, New Zealand established in March 1921 the Dominion Navy Board and the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy. A separate New Zealand Naval Station (Map II) was also designated; and the Dominion began to recruit and train its own seamen and maintain a small number of light cruisers and other local defence vessels.²⁴ Thus, having confirmed Jellicoe's belief that the "first and most vital essential for the defence of the Empire is a strong Navy", New Zealand eagerly awaited the forthcoming Imperial Conference for the British government's confirmation of the establishment of a Far Eastern fleet.²⁵

In London, however, Lord Jellicoe's naval scheme for the establishment of a Far Eastern fleet was repudiated by British authorities. The British government had been moving in the opposite direction—towards naval disarmament. The British Cabinet had decided in August 1919 to accept, in face of the naval competition, the one-power naval standard—parity with the next strongest Navy, the United States—as the future basis for the maritime defence of the British Empire. The British Cabinet clearly understood that: "Great Britain will no longer be supreme at sea, but supreme in European

waters and as regards the seas as a whole the supremacy will be shared with the United States." In essence, the British Cabinet had decided formally to renounce the traditional British naval parity with the United States. This momentous decision was prompted by the British government's desire, largely for reasons of economy, to end the Pacific naval arms race through naval disarmament "on the assumption that the British Empire would not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years." To this end, the British Cabinet instructed Lord Grey, former Foreign Secretary, to visit the United States in order to explore informally the possibility of reaching a naval accord with that country.²⁶ Thus, Great Britain considered it neither economic nor necessary to maintain adequate fleet strength in both home and Far Eastern waters. The security of the Far Eastern Empire, therefore, would have to rest upon the existing main British fleet. Upon this basis, the British Cabinet approved in principle, just four days prior to the convening of the 1921 Imperial Conference, the Committee of Imperial Defence's proposed recommendations and Far Eastern strategy.²⁷

The CID advised the British government that the Pacific, rather than European waters, would be the future centre of naval interest. They accepted, however, that the disappearance of Germany as a naval power and the adoption by His Majesty's Government of the one-power naval standard made it both unnecessary and impossible to provide British naval concentrations of adequate fleet strength in both European and Pacific waters. They, therefore, recommended that the main British fleet be stationed in European waters from where it could rapidly move to the Far East should war break out with Japan. The CID did acknowledge that during the period from the outbreak of war with Japan till the arrival of the British fleet in the Far East (phase I) Japan would have temporary naval superiority or command of the Pacific. During that period, estimated to be about six weeks, Japan would be able to carry out oversea attacks against British possessions in the Pacific. Nevertheless, they emphasised the need to distinguish between invasion and raiding attacks during phase I. Only until the Japanese fleet had succeeded in wresting from the Royal Navy permanent command of the Pacific, after the arrival of the British fleet in the Far East (phase II), did there exist the possibility that Japan would attempt an organized invasion of Australia or New Zealand. Thus, "so long as the main British battle fleet was

undefeated and could be moved to, and operate in, the Far East", the CID declared, the period of Japanese superiority (phase I) would be of "uncertain duration and liable to sudden extinction." In order for the main British fleet to effectively operate in the Far East, the CID clearly recognized the need for the establishment of a fortified first-class naval base in that area capable of servicing and repairing the fleet's more modern designed post-Jutland capital ships. The CID, therefore, recommended Singapore as a "secure place of concentration and repairing and supply base for the main British fleet." Like Lord Jellicoe, the CID well understood the strategic importance of that British naval port: "this....port stands at the western gateway of the Pacific, covering the main entrance to the Indian Ocean from the eastward, and flanking the route from Eastern Asia to Australasia. It occupies, in fact, to the British Empire in the East a corresponding position to Gibraltar in the West." Moreover, the CID perceived that, "were this port to fall into the hands of the enemy, it would increase incalculably the difficulties of operating with the British fleet in the Western Pacific and keeping open sea communication with Australia and New Zealand." The CID, therefore, also recommended that local defences at Singapore be strengthened so as to sustain the maximum anticipated scale of sea-borne attack during the period prior to the arrival of the British fleet (phase I).²⁸ This Far Eastern or "Singapore" strategy was to form the basis of Imperial strategic planning and adjustment until its total collapse in early 1942, with the fall of Singapore. In this respect, the strategy, in its very inception, was based upon a single threat to the British Empire, Japan. The possibility of a dual-threat to the British Empire arising from an additional European power or powers was discounted; for the CID expressed the view that "with the disappearance of Germany as a naval power, there is not the same chance as prior to the First World War of Great Britain being involved in a war with a European power, or a combination of European powers..."²⁹ With the unexpected rise of Germany and Italy as maritime powers and their involvement with Great Britain in another European war, this inherent flaw in the Singapore strategy, despite repeated adjustments, was eventually to give credence to Lord Jellicoe's prophecy of disaster to the British Far Eastern Empire some twenty years later.

Partly in order to prepare their postwar Imperial defence policy, and partly because of the need for decision, British authorities also gave sustained attention to the future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which was assumed to expire on 13 July, 1921. In doing so, they found themselves in a dilemma. They increasingly questioned, in light of Japanese territorial ambitions and Anglo-American relations, the wisdom of renewing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. They accepted that the Alliance had failed to restrain Japanese ambitions sufficiently in the Pacific. Moreover, they recognized that the existing alliance was a source of friction with the United States; for the American government tended to view the alliance as an "effective political shield" for Japanese imperialism.³⁰ Renewal, therefore, would severely strain relations with the United States at a time when improved Anglo-American relations were of paramount importance to the British government. Not only would it jeopardize the possibility of reaching a naval accord with the United States but also the prospect of future military assistance in the Pacific against Japan.³¹ Yet to denounce the alliance while Japan favoured renewal would also be imprudent. Great Britain would not only lose what little influence she held over Japanese Imperial ambitions but might even force that country into hostile alignment with Germany or Russia, or both. Moreover, denunciation of the alliance by Great Britain could also precipitate a serious rupture in Anglo-Japanese relations which would seriously threaten the security of her Far Eastern Empire; for until the Singapore naval base was completed British possessions in the Pacific would be vulnerable to Japanese seapower.³² In May 1921, the British Cabinet finally decided, just prior to the 1921 Imperial Conference, upon a possible solution to their dilemma. They would seek the convening of a Pacific conference for the discussion of Far East and Pacific problems in the hope of reaching some agreement with the United States, while assuring Japan that the alliance would not be suddenly terminated.³³

The 1921 Imperial Conference opened in London on 20 June 1921. Within the Imperial fold it was well known that both New Zealand and Australia attached great importance to the restructuring of postwar Imperial defence because of their common suspicions of Japan and dissatisfaction with British naval protection prior to and during the First World War. New Zealand Prime Minister, W.F. Massey, made this

point abundantly clear at the opening session of the conference by predicting that "the next naval war will be fought in the Pacific."³⁴ However, as the conference got under way, it soon became apparent to Massey that Lord Jellicoe's naval scheme for the establishment of a Far Eastern fleet in the Pacific would not be implemented by the British government. Instead, Arthur J. Balfour, Chairman of the CID, introduced the proposed Far Eastern or Singapore strategy by informing the delegates that Great Britain would be unable to maintain a fleet in the Pacific during peacetime and then suggested that: "In these circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that one of the most pressing needs for Imperial defence is that Singapore should be made into a place where the British fleet can concentrate for the defence of the Empire."³⁵ Prime Minister Massey, however, was not entirely satisfied with the proposed Far Eastern or Singapore strategy. What he clearly desired was British seapower in the Pacific and not just a Pacific fleet base. Although Massey understood the technical difficulties involved in operating the Royal Navy's post-Jutland capital ships in the Pacific without the completion of a modern fleet base at Singapore, he failed to comprehend why Great Britain could not immediately reinforce the Pacific with the Royal Navy's pre-Jutland capital ships: "We have heard repeatedly during the course of this discussion that there is practically no possibility of war...so far as the European waters are concerned...Personally...I am not able to see why some of the great warships that are at present idle in British waters might not be transferred to the Pacific."³⁶ Moreover, Balfour's later admission that the Pacific would be the future centre of naval interest did not appear to Massey as consistent with the principle that the main British fleet should be stationed in European waters even after the completion of the Singapore naval base.³⁷ Massey also expressed his apprehension over the British government's announced desire for naval disarmament and acceptance of a minimum one-power naval standard for Imperial naval forces. Aware of the importance of British seapower to New Zealand's Pacific security, Massey warned the British delegation that Imperial naval forces must be sufficient for the security of the "whole" British Empire and not just in "parts" as in the last war:

What ever may happen in the future, I do hope that there will be a sufficient naval force kept in order to maintain

the connections between the different parts of the Empire, and that was when there was a danger in our losing the last war....I feel very strongly after seeing what took place on the last occasion in the Southern Pacific upon the outbreak of war...I do think it would be unwise to leave the countries of the Empire—which means the Empire itself—absolutely unprotected.³⁸

As the conference focused its attention upon the future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance conflicting opinions immediately arose between the delegations. The Canadian, particularly, and the South African delegations, pointing to the importance of improved Anglo-American relations, argued that the Alliance should not be renewed; whereas, the New Zealand and Australian delegations, for reasons of security, urged renewal. Well aware of the increased naval strength of Japan and the present vulnerability of British seapower in the Pacific due to the lack of a modern fleet base in that area, the Western Pacific Dominions were concerned that non-renewal would transform Japan from a suspicious ally into a "formidable enemy". Although they both acknowledged that race and identity of interests made the United States a more preferable and natural ally, they also recognized her as a questionable ally due to her wartime declaration of neutrality and late entry into the First World War. In essence, they strongly doubted that the United States would enter into any formal commitment with the British Empire which would guarantee their Pacific security. Massey frankly admitted that he supported renewal on the basis of "what took place during the World War". Although Massey was prepared to modify his views, he did not believe that the preferable Anglo-American Alliance was possible:

I am prepared to take the American view into consideration. I do not want to leave any wrong impressions on that point...I would go to the length of saying that, so far as I am concerned, I am prepared to join in any well thought out alliance with America. Personally, I do not think that is possible, but what ever happens I hope the time will come when America and Britain will join together with no other object, than that of keeping the peace of the world and preventing war.³⁹

A "solution" to the developing deadlock within the conference was found when the British delegation announced to the delegates that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was not to expire on 13 July 1921 as previously assumed but would continue indefinitely with modifications, so as to

bring it into harmony with the League of Nations Covenant. This "disclosure"⁴⁰ enabled Great Britain to bring the Dominion onto parallel tracks by gaining their support for the calling of a Pacific conference in order to find a possible substitute for the alliance. The British government then immediately approached the American government on 8 July with a proposal for the convening of a Pacific conference to settle outstanding issues in the Far East and Pacific. The American government, now responding favourably to the British government's earlier overtures for naval disarmament, eagerly accepted the British proposal and informed the British government on 9 July of their intentions to convene a conference at Washington for the limitation of arms and the settlement of Far East and Pacific problems. Therein, the British delegation interrupted the proceedings of the Imperial Conference on 10 July with the timely announcement of an American proposal for the convening of a conference on naval limitation and the settlement of Far East and Pacific problems to be held at Washington.⁴¹ The nature of postwar Imperial defence, therefore, would be framed at Washington.

iii New Zealand, the Imperial Spur

The Washington treaties⁴² brought little comfort to New Zealand's traditional feelings of insecurity. The strategic situation following the Washington Conference left New Zealand exposed as never before. Great Britain had acknowledged Japan as the supreme naval power in the Western Pacific. In addition, Great Britain had failed in her efforts at Washington to draw the United States into some form of Pacific alliance; and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been subsequently replaced by the Four Power Treaty which lacked guarantees of mutual military support against future aggression in the Pacific. Moreover, those British capital ships scrapped as a result of the Washington conference were largely of the pre-Jutland naval design, without anti-submarine bulges. Thus, only a minority of British capital ships within the British fleet could now effectively operate in Far Eastern waters.⁴³ New Zealand, therefore, was without her traditional naval shield; for technically the Singapore strategy could not be implemented until the Singapore naval base was completed. This made the development of the proposed Singapore naval base project a matter of great urgency to the New Zealand government. As Prime Minister Massey declared in the New Zealand Parliament, following the Washington Conference:

....It is quite impossible to deal, especially in the Pacific, with naval defence without mentioning Singapore.... if we are going to maintain a fleet of warships in the Pacific, then there must be a naval base such as that which is proposed at Singapore...I know of nothing that is so urgent and so important from the point of view of Australia and New Zealand as a naval base at Singapore.⁴⁴

The vital importance of the development of the Singapore naval base to New Zealand's Pacific security was later demonstrated by the Dominion's efforts to assist and encourage Great Britain in the speedy completion of the naval base project. This took the form of the Dominion's almost singular financial contributions⁴⁵ to the Singapore naval base project and the continual "spur" she provided to successive British governments to complete the naval base project between 1923 and 1935.

The strategic implications of the Washington treaties to the security of the Far Eastern Empire were fully discussed at the following 1923 Imperial Conference in London. During the conference, the British delegation took the position that the development of the Singapore naval base was essential not only to the security of the Pacific Dominions but also for possible Anglo-American naval co-operation in the Pacific against Japanese aggression. Lord Salisbury, Deputy Chairman of the CID, pointed to the fact that the Washington treaties had the effect of "so far as the Western Pacific is concerned, the British Empire is left face to face with Japan; no one else, practically, will be there to intervene."⁴⁶ L.S. Amery, first Lord of the Admiralty, went on to explain that the Washington treaties had created a great zone of self-denial (Map I) which made it:

...impossible for the United States naval forces to operate in the Western Pacific at all. The distance from Pearl Harbour to the Philippine Isles is so great that no American battle fleet could cross it. The only way the United States Navy could reach the Western Pacific, either to co-operate with us or to defend their own territories single-handed against Japanese attack, would be...if it had a base at Singapore for its use.⁴⁷

Turning to the strategic importance of Singapore for the security of the Pacific Dominions, Amery continued to argue that Singapore was "actually the gateway to the Pacific." Moreover, it "lies directly on

the flank of any possible aggression against New Zealand and Australia from Japan." Therefore, "if we do not hold Singapore, not only would both the Indian Ocean and the Pacific be open to attack from Japan, but there would be no possible means of our reinforcing the outlying Dominions."⁴⁸ Amery then defended the Singapore strategy and challenged the view that Singapore could not hold out until the arrival of the British fleet:

Given the great distances of Singapore from Japan, given the existence of Hong Kong and its power to hold out—at any rate for some time—given the presence of a swift if not very powerful squadron in Pacific waters, aided by long range submarines, given the fact that the main fleet can go out normally in from four to six weeks, there is no reason to fear that Singapore could not hold its own against a powerful naval raid, or the raid of a navy with a small landing force, such as is likely to be directed against it.⁴⁹

Significantly, Amery did admit, however, that Japan could attack at the moment the British Empire was engaged against a possible European combination, thus delaying the dispatch of the British fleet to Singapore. In those circumstances, Amery frankly declared, "we should be in a position of extraordinary difficulty." Nevertheless, Amery was optimistic concerning possible American naval assistance in such an event:

Against such a combination we might find allies, and the fact that Singapore could hold out for a good many weeks, possibly for a good many months, might be a very strong inducement to a power like the United States to come in quickly and to go and help before the situation in the Far East had been entirely and irretrievably altered.⁵⁰

American naval assistance, therefore, was now viewed by British authorities as a possible remedy for the inherent flaw within the Singapore strategy arising from the possible development of a dual threat to the British Empire. Amery continued his argument by stressing the urgency for the development of the Singapore naval base. Without a modern fleet base at Singapore, Amery declared, the British fleet has "no mobility, no power to do anything to protect the Dominions that lie in the Pacific."⁵¹ The First Lord of the Admiralty then concluded his arguments on the subject by announcing his government's

decision to go ahead with the Singapore naval base project and urged the Dominions and India to contribute towards the cost.

While the South African delegation expressed their concern that the Singapore naval base project was either too costly or contrary to the spirit of the Washington treaties and provocative to Japan, the New Zealand and Australian delegations, understandably, strongly supported the British government's decision to go ahead with the naval base project. New Zealand Prime Minister, W.F. Massey, forcibly argued that there was "no reason at all" why the Singapore naval base project should not proceed.⁵² Massey contested the view that the naval base project was contrary to the spirit of the Washington treaties and, with regard to those utterances of "financial difficulties", argued that "we shall have to do a great deal more in the way of defence."⁵³ Massey urged the delegates to consider that: "...in the interests of British nations on the other side of the world, and, therefore, in the interests of the whole Empire,...we should have some better protection in the Pacific...I do hope that the proposal to go on with a British naval station at Singapore will be proceeded with...."⁵⁴ Massey was then able to inform the delegates that the New Zealand Parliament had already agreed to a preliminary vote of £100,000 towards the cost of the naval base project.⁵⁶ With the only serious opposition coming from South Africa, the 1921 Imperial Conference adjourned, therefore, on the understanding that work on the base would proceed.

By March 1923 work on the Singapore naval base had begun.⁵⁷ The site for the dockyard had been chosen and preliminary work commenced on roads, water supply and labour lines. Progress on the base project was reported to the British Government on 17 January 1924, and then, a few days later, the House of Commons was dissolved for the general election which brought the first Labour Government into office. When the House reassembled on 12 February, the Prime Minister was J. Ramsay MacDonald,⁵⁸ a pacifist, who believed that the security of the British Empire should rest upon other means than armaments. In the following months, the Labour Government, in the face of strong opposition from the Admiralty, decided to abandon the Singapore naval base project.⁵⁹ In a full explanation, MacDonald informed the

Dominion governments that his Government, having studied the matter in a much wider context than just strategy, was convinced that to proceed with the Singapore naval base project would have a most detrimental effect on its general foreign policy:

We stand as we have repeatedly stated for a policy of international co-operation through a strengthened and enlarged League of Nations, the settlement of disputes by judicial arbitration and conciliation, and the creation of conditions which will make possible a comprehensive agreement on the limitation of armaments. As stated in my letter of February 21st to Monsieur Poincaré, 'our task meanwhile must be to establish confidence and this task can only be achieved by allaying international suspicions and anxieties which exist today.

Apart from any other considerations we are convinced that if we were to embark on the creation of a great Naval Base at Singapore, the establishment of this confidence would be hampered and our good faith would be open to suspicion. Whilst maintaining the present standards in a state of complete efficiency, we take the view that to begin new developments that could only be justified on the assumption that would definitely admit that we had doubts in the success of our own policy, would be a serious mistake. We should almost inevitably as a result drift into a condition of mistrust and competition of armaments in the Far East. The Singapore Base is, it is generally admitted, urged only as part of a complete defensive Pacific strategy. The whole question would have to be reconsidered should the practical necessity arise for putting such a strategy into operation by reason of the condition of world politics and a return to attempts to provide Imperial security primarily by armaments, but in the opinion of His Majesty's Government that has not now arisen and it is our duty to try and prevent it arising. We have every confidence in our policy and we desire that it should be given the best possible chance of success. As an earnest of our good faith we have therefore decided not to proceed with the Naval Base at Singapore.⁶⁰

New Zealand received the British government's decision with utter dismay and promptly protested at the abandonment of the Singapore naval base project. In his "private" advice to the New Zealand Prime Minister, Lord Jellicoe, New Zealand's Governor-General,⁶¹ warned Massey about the policy of the MacDonald Government and its consequences to the successful implementation of the Singapore strategy:

Apart from the...fact that up to the present the League of Nations has not succeeded in preventing hostile action on the part of one nation against another...it seems to me to be opposed to common sense that the one nation which is entirely dependent for life and security upon the safety of sea communications, should take the lead in this

limitation of naval efficiency, upon such slender security as that at present afforded by the League of Nations...As is well known, we cannot now send a Battle fleet to Far Eastern waters, and therefore the Navy in those waters is entirely inefficient....⁶²

The main argument in favour of commencing work on the base, Jellicoe advised Massey, is "that the time required to complete it is so great. If the British government fails to obtain security by their method...It will then be too late to obtain that security by means of naval strength in Far Eastern waters." Jellicoe, therefore, urged Massey to protest to the British government. Although such a protest by the Dominions might not have any effect upon their policy, Jellicoe considered that Dominion "agreement with that policy will place a great responsibility upon the Australian and New Zealand Governments."⁶³ Massey needed little prompting, however, to accept Jellicoe's advice that a protest should be made by the Dominion to the British government. The vital importance of the completion of the Singapore naval base project to the New Zealand government was, after all, clearly demonstrated by Massey's stand at the 1923 Imperial Conference. Nevertheless, Jellicoe's intervention into the matter did result in a protest that was more carefully framed in naval terms, and much more strongly worded than the replies of any of the other Dominion governments.⁶⁴ On 11 March, 1924, Massey informed MacDonald that he could only "regret exceedingly" the British decision not to proceed with what is looked upon as one of the most important projects connected with its defence of the Empire. The British Government should remember, Massey continued, "that every country of the Empire and every citizen of the Empire are entitled to protection from the possibility of attack by a foreign foe." Massey then reminded MacDonald of New Zealand's initial offer of £100,000 towards the completion of the naval base project and that the people of New Zealand, separated from the heart of the Empire by 13 or 14,000 miles of sea, "realize what it means to be insufficiently protected." In this latter regard, Massey further reminded MacDonald that "we have not forgotten what the Royal Navy and the British Mercantile Marine suffered in the Pacific during the years of the great war, and we had hoped that the lesson taught then would not be so quickly forgotten." If the defence of the British Empire was now to depend upon the League of Nations, Massey considered that "it may turn out to have been a pity that the League was ever brought into being." "The very existence of the

Empire depends upon the Imperial Navy", Massey argued, "and if, in the event of war, the Navy is to operate successfully, it must have suitable bases from which to work and where repairs may be effected. The nearest suitable base at present is Malta which is 6,000 miles away, and therefore of no value for the purpose of capital ships in either the Pacific or Indian Oceans." Massey then concluded by "earnestly" protesting, on behalf of New Zealand, at the British government's decision to abandon the Singapore naval base project.⁶⁵

Despite New Zealand's strongly-worded protest, the MacDonald government announced to the House of Commons, on 18 March 1924, that all work would cease at Singapore. New Zealand's anxiety about her Pacific security did not last for long, however, for before the year had passed the British Labour Government had been swept from office by a general election and one of the first actions of the new Conservative Government under Stanley Baldwin was a decision, on 26 November, to proceed with the Singapore naval base project.⁶⁶ Accordingly, the Dominions were informed and those "most interested" in the naval base project were asked to make a financial contribution towards the cost, which would help to disarm some of the opposition to the base which still existed in Great Britain.⁶⁷ The New Zealand government received the British message with "great pleasure" and assured the British government that it "scarcely needed to reiterate that New Zealand fully realizes the importance of Naval Defence and is anxious to do its full share in this connection..."⁶⁸

Work now continued on the Singapore naval base and by March 1929, the dockyard site had been cleared, the main contract placed (The Jackson Contract), the floating dock was in position and work on the growing dock about to begin.⁶⁹ The initial contribution of £100,000 had come from New Zealand and a final settlement of £1 million, spread over a period of seven to eight years, was later finalized between the New Zealand and British governments, as New Zealand's full financial contribution towards the development of the Singapore naval base.⁷⁰

In June 1929, however, a second Labour Government, under J. Ramsay MacDonald, was elected in Great Britain. Committed to support the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and a policy of disarmament, this Government seriously questioned the Singapore naval base project;

but by now it was too late for the Labour leaders to reverse the policy of the previous Conservative Government. Too much work had already been started on the naval base and, apart from that, the contracts for the more important constructions had already been signed. Nevertheless, the MacDonald Government was in a position, at last, to slow down or postpone the development of the Singapore naval base.⁷¹ In early July 1929, MacDonald informed the Dominions that a special Cabinet Committee had been established to review the whole Singapore naval base project.⁷² Recalling MacDonald's previous action on the naval base project, New Zealand's anxiety about her Pacific security again increased. New Zealand's Prime Minister, Sir Joseph Ward, immediately informed MacDonald of the "greatest importance" that New Zealand attached to Imperial naval defence and, in particular, the Singapore naval base project. Referring MacDonald to Massey's views on the subject, as found in his telegram to the British government in March 1924, Prime Minister Ward emphasized that the New Zealand government held these views with equal conviction today, as clearly demonstrated by the Dominion's financial contribution to the naval base project. "In view of the vital considerations involved", Ward considered that the whole question of the Singapore naval base project be postponed until the next Imperial Conference in order to allow the Dominion the opportunity to express its full views on the subject.⁷³ In late July 1929, the CID met to consider the Singapore question. The High Commissioner for New Zealand, Sir James Parr, who was present at the invitation of the British government, reiterated his government's anxiety about the future of the Singapore naval base project, but MacDonald assured him that work on the graving dock (the Jackson Contract), the most important element for the implementation of the Singapore strategy, would continue. The need for all other installations at Singapore such as defences, docks etc., however, would be later reviewed.⁷⁴ The New Zealand government accepted this assurance with some relief; but no sooner had the Dominion received this assurance than the entire project was, once again, called into question. Without any prior consultation with the New Zealand government, the First Lord of the Admiralty, on 13 November, announced to the House of Commons his government's decision that while all the contracts for work on the Singapore naval base project that had been signed would proceed, the work would be slowed down and all work which could be, would be suspended, pending the outcome of the London Naval

Conference in January 1930.⁷⁵ Since the battleships replacement programme provided for in the Washington treaty and the size of individual battleships would be reconsidered, the MacDonald Government expected that the London Naval Conference could have an effect upon British needs at Singapore.⁷⁶ This action aroused the New Zealand government to protest most strongly to the British government, not only about the decision, which appeared to indicate "a distinct change of policy", but because "a decision of moment to New Zealand" had been taken without "prior consultation with the New Zealand Government."⁷⁷ The New Zealand Government further lashed out at the British Government, protesting that if such notification of a change of policy was "equivalent to consultation" then the Dominion Government could only express its complete dissatisfaction.⁷⁸ In addition Prime Minister Ward immediately dispatched his Deputy Prime Minister, T.M. (later Sir Thomas) Wilford, to London as New Zealand's new High Commissioner with instructions to defend New Zealand's interests regarding the Singapore naval base project.⁷⁹ New Zealand's sharp reaction did have some influence on British policy; for on 28 May, 1930, the British Government announced that it would seek "a definite and permanent settlement" of the whole Singapore question at the forthcoming Imperial Conference. In the meantime, the Singapore slow down would continue.⁸⁰ Awaiting the forthcoming 1930 Imperial Conference, New Zealand let the matter rest until then. The New Zealand Government, however, was determined that there would be no Dominion acceptance of a decision by the MacDonald Government to abandon the Singapore naval base project. The New Zealand Prime Minister would have some bargaining power at the Imperial Conference in the necessity for its ratification of the 1930 London Naval Treaty and the Dominion Government realized that this might prove a useful lever to ensure the completion of at least the more essential work at the Singapore base. By the time the Imperial Conference opened, therefore, New Zealand was the only Dominion, apart from the Irish Free State (which was not interested), that had not signified its assent to the 1930 London Naval Treaty.⁸¹

During the early sessions of the 1930 Imperial Conference, which opened on 1 October, the British Delegation immediately sought New Zealand's assent to the 1930 London Naval Treaty; pointing to the desire of the American and Japanese Governments that ratification of

the treaty should take place on 27 October, 1930. The New Zealand delegation, however, refused to take any action on the London Naval Treaty until the Singapore question was first discussed. Such was the urgency of the British Government that a special committee of the Imperial Conference, the Singapore Committee, was immediately established, consisting of Great Britain and those interested Americans, to discuss this question.⁸² The committee, which first met on 16 October, was chaired by Philip Snowden, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Other members of the British delegation included Arthur Henderson, the Foreign Secretary, and A.V. Alexander, the First Lord of the Admiralty. The Australian and New Zealand delegations included the Prime Ministers of both countries, J.H. Scullin and George Forbes, respectively, and their advisers. The other Dominions which had "expressed a wish not to take part in the discussions",⁸³ were not represented. After opening the meeting, Snowden immediately outlined the British Government's position which he declared had been "mainly prompted by financial considerations." Snowden frankly admitted that the British Government considered that it might be just as expensive to abandon the Singapore naval base project as to continue it. The British Government therefore proposed, Snowden declared, "that while the scheme for ultimately establishing a defended naval base at Singapore should not be abandoned, the Jackson Contract", involving the graving dock, "should be continued, and that apart from this, and such expenditure as might be necessary for the completion of the air base on the scale at present contemplated, the remaining expenditure required for the equipment of the docks and for defence works should be postponed for the next five years." The precise scale of those expenditures, Snowden added, would be determined in light of the outcome of the next Naval Conference on disarmament. Nothing in this proposal, Snowden argued, "would be lost from the Defence point of view" for "all present indications seemed to show that we should have freedom from war on an extensive scale for a good many years."⁸⁴ In this regard, the British delegation considered that Japan, who as a party to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, outlawing war as an instrument of national policy, and having just signed the 1930 London Naval Treaty, was unlikely to disturb the peace.⁸⁵ The New Zealand delegation, however, took the position that the whole Singapore naval base project should be completed without delay on the basis of the Admiralty's views regarding Imperial naval defence and its importance

to New Zealand's Pacific security. New Zealand's Prime Minister, George Forbes, "stressed the great importance attached in New Zealand to a defended Naval Base at Singapore." Forbes pointed out "that the whole Pacific Ocean would be practically defenceless without such a base" and that the New Zealand Government "felt that as long as the Base was not completed they would be at the mercy of anyone desirous of attacking them." Forbes also questioned whether much weight could, in reality, be attached to such treaties as the Kellogg-Briand Pact or the 1930 London Naval Treaty; for they "were in the last resort after all only ink and paper."⁸⁶ The British delegation accepted Forbes' argument, and that of the Admiralty, that from a "technical" standpoint the Pacific Ocean would be defenceless if the Singapore naval base was not completed; but considered that there was no risk of war in the near future and, therefore, "no danger in extending the time of completing the Base." Furthermore, if the international situation did deteriorate, the British delegation argued, work on the naval base could be accelerated. Forbes challenged the British delegation's argument by pointing out that "often in such a situation there was no time to complete large defence works, and without defence the Base was valueless." Moreover, Forbes, referring to the British delegation's view that there would be no chance of war in the near future, drew attention to the fact "that in many of the documents sent out to New Zealand there were references to many possible elements of future trouble." The New Zealand Government, Forbes declared, "regarded the fleet and Singapore as their main defence. They had been told by all the Naval Experts, including Lord Jellicoe, that the Base was a vital necessity and that without it New Zealand would be defenceless." Arthur Henderson, of the British delegation, assured Forbes that there was no intention of abandoning the Singapore naval base project but that "it was only proposed to take more time over completing it." Henderson considered that the real question for discussion, therefore, was whether the completion of the naval base was an urgent necessity; and argued that it was not, since there would be peace for many years yet to come.⁸⁷ The Australian delegation, although reluctant to take a full part in the discussions due to Australia's lack of financial support for the naval base project, accepted the British Government's position. Australia's Labour Prime Minister, J.H. Scullin, expressed his sympathy for Great Britain's economic difficulties and admitted that

he was not "greatly impressed by the suggestion that Japan might invade Australia." Furthermore, Scullin considered that "if there was a flare-up, it would not be in the Pacific" nor would it come like "a bolt from the blue." Scullin, therefore, expressed his Government's support for the British Government's proposal for slowing down some of the work on the Singapore base. The New Zealand delegation, however, obstinately held on to its position and, somewhat repetitively, restated the Dominion's concern. Forbes reiterated that in his opinion the necessity, or otherwise, of providing a defended naval base at Singapore was a question that should be left to the naval experts. The British Government's proposal to slow down work at Singapore, Forbes confessed, was a disappointment to the New Zealand Government. When New Zealand had undertaken to make a financial contribution towards the Singapore base, Forbes explained, the Dominion "had regarded it as an insurance in defence and as long as there was no defence they had no insurance." Sir Thomas Sidey, of the New Zealand delegation, also added that "New Zealand's contribution had been made on the distinct understanding that the Singapore scheme would be completed in eight years." Philip Snowden agreed that this had been the case but observed that the circumstances have since changed. "The situation was that the United Kingdom had come to New Zealand," Snowden declared, "explaining the changed circumstances and the necessity for economy and asked if agreement could be reached in the proposal for postponement." To this, Forbes could only reply that if the British position was put in terms of the existing need for economy, "he could say nothing"; but if the British position was based entirely upon the view as to the unlikelihood of war, he could not agree. Nevertheless, the position for New Zealand, Forbes was compelled to add, "was that they would feel more secure if the Singapore Base could be completed without delay". Snowden then expressed his gratitude to the Australian and New Zealand representatives for the manner in which they had received the British proposal adding that "he fully realised that some disappointment must be felt by the New Zealand Delegation." The committee, therefore, agreed, "the New Zealand Representatives doing so with reluctance", to accept the British Government's proposal.⁸⁸ The following day, Forbes announced to the Imperial Conference that New Zealand would ratify the 1930 London Naval Treaty.⁸⁹ Although not to New Zealand's entire satisfaction, the most direct danger to New Zealand's Pacific security had

thus been averted; for the British Labour Government had not repudiated the aim of eventually completing the entire Singapore naval base project and its more essential works were not affected.

New Zealand's position at the 1930 Imperial Conference was later fully justified by Japan's sudden invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and, soon after, her brutal attack upon the Shanghai International Settlement in 1932, all in violation of the Washington treaties, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Covenant of the League of Nations. These Far Eastern developments were viewed seriously in London and had an effect upon the development of the Singapore naval base. In February 1932, the British Chiefs of Staff (UKCOS) warned that the situation was "about as bad as it could be....the whole of our territory in the Far East, as well as the coastline of India and the Dominions and our vast trade and shipping, lies open to attack." The incomplete naval base at Singapore was in such a defenceless state, they asserted, that if Japan were to strike quickly Singapore might fall before the arrival of the British fleet in Far Eastern waters. Insisting that it would be the "height of folly" to perpetuate this defenceless state in the Far East, they pleaded that the "ten year rule" be abandoned and that "first priority" be given to Far East defences.⁹⁰ This recommendations was accepted by the CID in March 1932⁹¹ and in that same year, the British Government took steps to accelerate work on the Singapore naval base project, despite serious financial difficulties.⁹² By June 1935 the first stage of work on the defences at Singapore were due to be completed by 1936, or 1937 at the latest; and in July of that same year, the British Government authorized that work should begin on additional heavy gun emplacements and two more airfields, as part of the second stage of work on the defences at Singapore. With the completion of the second stage, British military authorities considered that Singapore would be able to hold out against the estimated scale of sea-borne attack until the arrival of the British fleet in Far Eastern waters.⁹³ The efforts of the British Government to complete the Singapore base were, understandably, much appreciated in New Zealand. When the Dominion leaders met informally in London, during the Jubilee celebrations in 1935, New Zealand's Prime Minister, George Forbes, took the opportunity to inquire as to the progress being made on the base. Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, was able to inform him

that the British Government was pressing ahead towards completing the base in an effort "to convert its character from one which was something of a liability to that of an asset."⁹⁴ Forbes expressed his Government's satisfaction with the progress of the work. He frankly admitted that, "as the Imperial Conference of 1930 had shown", the New Zealand Government was very much concerned about the developments of the Singapore base. Since then, however, "much work had been done on the base"; and the New Zealand Government "had had the advantage of conversations on the subject with Sir Maurice Hankey during his visit to the Dominion". "More recently still", Forbes declared, "they had received a report from the Commodore of the New Zealand Division, and they now knew that work was proceeding at a satisfactory rate."⁹⁵ By 1935, therefore, New Zealand was generally confident that the Singapore naval base project would be completed.

iv New Zealand, the Empire's "Doubting Thomas"

Ironically, just as the Singapore naval base project approached completion, doubts concerning the successful implementation of the Singapore strategy intensified within the New Zealand Government between 1936-1939. These doubts stemmed from the inherent flaw within the strategy which became increasingly apparent to the security-conscious Dominion. As the intentions of Germany and Italy became more manifestly hostile, the likelihood of the British fleet leaving Home waters unprotected in the event of hostilities with Japan in Far Eastern waters became progressively more remote. This stimulated the Dominion into examining in greater detail the threats to her Pacific security posed by a possible war with Japan in light of the now questionable Singapore strategy. Consequently, New Zealand was to assume greater responsibilities for her local defence and in so doing further assist Great Britain in the defence of the Far Eastern Empire.

By 1936 the Dominion's military advisers were already warning their Government that, given the possibility of an outbreak of war in both Europe and the Pacific, it was "more than doubtful whether the main British fleet would be dispatched to the Far East until a satisfactory situation in European waters was restored". Under such circumstances, they now feared that a European war could possibly extend the period before relief (phase I) from six weeks up to "two

years during which time a hostile Asiatic power....would be free to consolidate its control in the Pacific."⁹⁶ This prospect prompted the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff (NZCOS) to investigate more thoroughly possible Japanese threats to the Dominion's local security. In so doing, they became acutely aware of the strategic value of the various Pacific islands to their immediate north between the Japanese Mandated Islands and the Dominion (Map I). If seized by Japan, which would be an increased probability during an extended phase I period, the NZCOS were alarmed that they could then be developed by Japan into advanced naval and air bases from which the Dominion would be subject to intense, rather than sporadic raiding attacks upon the shipping and territory. On the other hand, if the islands were developed and defended by Imperial forces, they could serve as an effective screen for the detection and curtailment of enemy raiding forces en route to New Zealand, thus giving the Dominion greater defence in depth:⁹⁷

...the islands of Oceania lie along the route likely to be taken by any raider on its way to New Zealand waters. They flank the main Pacific trade routes and they provide centres from which a watch can be kept in war on activities in the Japanese islands. Furthermore, an enemy established in the southern group of islands will be within air range of New Zealand and Australia.⁹⁸

The NZCOS therefore advised their Government, just prior to the convening of the 1937 Imperial Conference, to ascertain how Great Britain intended to meet the possibility of a two-ocean war with a one-ocean Navy. Moreover, they advised their Government "that discussions between Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand should be instituted with the object of making a thorough survey of the strategic value of the various Pacific islands" to local Imperial defence.⁹⁹

The 1937 Imperial Conference which opened in London on 14 May, provided the first opportunity for a comprehensive review of Imperial defence in light of the now deteriorating situation in both Europe and the Pacific. In these circumstances, the New Zealand delegation was quick to express its doubts forcibly concerning the Singapore strategy. New Zealand's Prime Minister, Michael J. Savage, confessed to the British delegation that "the New Zealand government, after a study of the subject, were in some doubts as to the naval assistance

which could be expected from a fleet at Singapore in the event of a European war in which Japan was also engaged against us." Savage then demanded "assurance...that in the strategical plans of the United Kingdom the defence of the Dominions in the Pacific was considered equally important with the defence of the United Kingdom and that defensive strategy looked upon the Commonwealth as an indivisible whole." Savage frankly admitted that "there was a feeling in New Zealand that if the United Kingdom were hard pressed the Dominions in the Pacific would get little assistance from her."¹⁰⁰ The British delegation, however, sought to reassure Savage that Imperial naval strategy took into account both the security of the United Kingdom and that of the Pacific Dominions. Nevertheless, as they disclosed the basis of Imperial defence for a possible two-ocean war, the inherent flaw within the Singapore strategy became apparent to the New Zealand delegation.

In a review of Imperial defence presented by the British delegation, the UKCOS stressed the primary importance of the security of the United Kingdom. The defeat of the United Kingdom, they declared, "would destroy the whole structure of the Commonwealth, which in its present state of development could not long exist without the political, financial, and military strength of the United Kingdom. Each Member of the British Commonwealth would be left to fend for itself in its future relations with the victorious foreign Powers." The UKCOS did acknowledge that in "the Far East the security of Australia, New Zealand and India hinges on the retention of Singapore as a base for the British Fleet." They also admitted, however, that "the chief danger which Imperial defence has to face at the moment is that we are in the position of having threats at both ends of the Empire from strong military Powers, i.e., Germany and Japan, while in the centre we have lost our traditional security in the Mediterranean owing to the rise of an aggressive spirit in Italy accompanied by an increase in her military strength." Under these circumstances the UKCOS then proposed the establishment of a new naval standard in order to meet the possible exigencies of a two-ocean war posed by Germany and Japan: a fleet of "adequate" strength to serve as a strong deterrent to any threat to Imperial interests in the Far East and, "in all circumstances", a fleet in Home waters in case of a war with Germany at the same time. Although French naval power would assist

by neutralizing the threat from the Italian Navy in the Mediterranean, British parity with German naval strength would have to be maintained at all times. Thus, the strength of the British fleet to Singapore would now be dependent upon the United Kingdom's own home defence requirements. Taking this naval defence requirement into consideration, the UKCOS now believed that a fleet "approximately equal to that of Japan" could be dispatched to the Far East. The UKCOS, therefore confirmed that, in the event of a war with Germany, Italy and Japan, "the security of the United Kingdom and the security of Singapore would be the keystones on which the survival of the British Commonwealth of Nations would depend."¹⁰¹

The New Zealand delegation accepted the primacy of the first keystone—the United Kingdom—in regard to Imperial defence. Understandably, it was the security of the second keystone—Singapore—on which the delegation sought greater assurances. Acquiescing in the Admiralty's refusal to divide the British fleet by stationing the "sufficient force" at Singapore during peacetime, Savage then sought from the British delegation a "positive statement that a British Fleet of sufficient strength will move out to the Far East in the event of Japan taking offensive action against us, even if we are also embroiled in Europe."¹⁰² Such a "positive statement", the British delegation could not give the Dominion. Although the First Sea Lord, Admiral A.E.M. Chatfield, reaffirmed the vital importance of establishing a fleet at Singapore in the event of such a two-ocean conflict, he could only assure the New Zealand delegation that a fleet would be dispatched to Singapore, but that its strength and time of arrival would "vary with political and strategical factors" in Europe.¹⁰³ Chatfield explained that such a conflict could weaken the British position in the central area of the Empire—the Mediterranean. In a war with Germany, it would take the fleet at least thirty-five to seventy days to reach Singapore owing to its possible re-routing around the Cape passage instead of the Suez Canal. Moreover, these figures did not take into account when the fleet would actually depart from Home waters. Nevertheless, the First Sea Lord expressed his continuing confidence in the Singapore strategy and endorsed his Government's pledge that "no anxieties or risks connected with our interests in the Mediterranean can be allowed to interfere with the dispatch of a fleet to the Far East."¹⁰⁴

Although the New Zealand delegation accepted this British assurance "that adequate naval reinforcements will be dispatched to Singapore as soon as possible" after the outbreak of hostilities with Japan, the Dominion's suspicions were confirmed that there might ensue "a very considerable delay" until "the command of the seas had been assured in British waters."¹⁰⁵ This recognition prompted Savage to propose further discussions between British, Australian and New Zealand authorities with "the object of making a thorough survey of the strategic value of the islands in the Pacific...."¹⁰⁶ This proposal met with little interest from the British and Australian delegations. Both delegations, particularly the Australian, tended to minimize the strategic value of the Pacific islands within the Australian and New Zealand Naval Stations or Areas to local Imperial defence (Map II). They saw none of the Pacific islands as of much strategic value to the enemy or themselves; and considered it futile to attempt to defend them all against Japanese attack. Moreover, their present confidence in the Singapore strategy tended to blur the need for any expansion of local defences within the Pacific.¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, New Zealand's singular apprehension of a possible extended phase I, during which time Japan would have command of the Pacific, attracted continued interest in possible Japanese threats to New Zealand's local security. In so doing, New Zealand was to call attention to the inadequate state of local defences within her area and the need for an examination of local Imperial defence requirements throughout the Pacific. By 1939, New Zealand's doubts concerning the Singapore strategy would be fully shared by British and Australian authorities. A common effort, therefore, would then be made to examine the state of local Imperial defences and possible threats to Imperial interests throughout the Pacific during phase I.

Through extensive island surveys conducted by the New Zealand cruisers, HMS Achilles and HMS Leander, the NZCOS obtained supporting technical evidence for their belief in the strategic value to local Imperial defence of the various Pacific island groups on that northern island chain within the Australian and New Zealand areas.¹⁰⁸ The NZCOS concluded that the intensity of Japanese raiding attacks upon both New Zealand and Australia during phase I would depend upon whether they could halve the distance between the Japanese Mandated Islands and the Pacific Dominions by establishing advanced naval

bases in such islands or groups as New Caledonia, New Hebrides, Fiji or Tonga, all of which possessed first-class harbours and innumerable sheltered anchorages. Once there, Japanese raiding forces would be able to wage a sustained campaign against New Zealand and Australian trans-Pacific shipping and territory. Of the Pacific island groups, the NZCOS attached primary strategic importance to the Fiji Islands in regard to New Zealand's local security. This was due to their geographical position as the "gateway to fertile New Zealand islands" and value as an important South Pacific centre of air communications, military and commercial harbour (Suva), and cable centre between Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia and the Far East.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, the NZCOS viewed the Fiji Islands as an ideal forward defensive and offensive base for operations against Japanese to their north. They recommended to their Government that Fiji be developed as a focal point for a major air reconnaissance scheme throughout the South Pacific. They suggested that the use of long range aircraft and the establishment of advanced operational bases on Fiji and other Pacific islands would enable the intermittent surveillance of the Pacific islands and possible Japanese raiding incursions into the area.¹¹⁰ This air scheme brought immediate attention to the need for greater local defence co-operation with Australia, whose government was now also investigating an expansion of local defences. The NZCOS noted the lack of local defence co-ordination between the two Pacific Dominions and urged their Government to enter into a full exchange of information with Australia regarding defence policies.¹¹¹ The NZCOS also called attention to the inadequate state of local defences existing on certain Pacific islands within their Naval Station, particularly the Fiji Islands. In this regard, the NZCOS recommended to their Government that: the local defence force in the Fiji Islands be expanded; coastal guns be established at Suva; additional aerodromes be constructed; and that New Zealand should be prepared to reinforce the island group with land forces.¹¹² Although the New Zealand Cabinet fully endorsed these recommendations, the Dominion was unable to put them into effect until the British Government was fully consulted and its approval obtained. The Fiji Islands, like the other British island territories within the New Zealand Naval Station or Area, were not a New Zealand defence responsibility. They were under the political administration of the British High Commissioner of the Western Pacific, who, as also the Governor of

the Fiji Islands, was responsible only to the British Colonial Office for the territory's defence.¹¹³ Thus, in late 1938, the New Zealand Government informed Great Britain of the results of her independent Pacific island surveys, proposed air reconnaissance scheme and the inadequate state of existing local defences on certain Pacific islands.¹¹⁴ Very much impressed, the British Government, in January 1939, accepted New Zealand's later request for a Pacific Conference "on the defence of the Pacific in its widest aspects,"¹¹⁵ and proposed agenda for strategical discussions: the probable lines of Japanese action during phase I; the protective measures necessary within the two Pacific Dominions and their outlying Pacific islands during phase I; the means of co-operation between Australia and New Zealand; and the co-ordination of the broad defence policies between Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand.¹¹⁶ Moreover, the British Government suggested that the Conference be held in New Zealand.¹¹⁷ New Zealand's invitation of the Pacific Defence Conference, therefore, was an early expression of her doubts concerning the Singapore strategy which stimulated in her a desire for a local forward defence posture in order to meet the possibility of an extended phase I.

The Pacific Defence Conference convened in Wellington, New Zealand between 14 and 26 April, 1939. The importance which the New Zealand Government attached to the discussions was reflected in the Dominion's comparatively high level of representation at the Conference which included: Prime Minister Michael J. Savage; Deputy Prime Minister, Peter Fraser; Cabinet Ministers, W. Nash, F. Jones, D. Sullivan; Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department, C.A. (later Sir Carl) Berendsen; the NZCOS; and representatives from the Treasury, Industries and Commerce, and Civil Aviation Departments. The British delegation, headed by the British High Commissioner to New Zealand, Sir Harry Batterbee included: the High Commissioner of the Western Pacific and Governor of the Fiji Islands, Sir Harry Luke; Major-General P.J. Mackesy of the War Office; and Air Marshall Sir Arthur Longmore of the Air Ministry. Vice Admiral Sir Ragnor Calvin served a double role as both the representative of the Admiralty and head of the Australian delegation. The Australian delegation also included: Colonel V.A. Sturdee of the Australian Military Board; Wing Commander G. Jones of the Australian Air Board; and Captain E.C. Johnstone of the Civil Aviation Department.¹¹⁸

The first point the New Zealand delegation wished to have clarified was the position regarding the dispatch of the British fleet to Singapore in the event of war with Germany, Japan and Italy. Prime Minister Michael Savage, in his opening address to the Conference, recalled that at the 1937 Imperial Conference there had been a great deal of difference of opinion as to what would be the situation regarding the dispatch of a fleet to Singapore in the event of Italy also coming into a war with Germany and Japan. He suggested that it was this "worst possible situation" which the Conference must now assume in their strategic discussions.¹¹⁹ New Zealand's concern was not that a fleet would be sent, but again, its strength and time of arrival in view of the deteriorated politico-military situation in Europe since 1937. It was these uncertainties which the New Zealand delegation further questioned in order to foster the development of a realistic assessment of the possible scale of attack during phase I for local Imperial defence preparations within the Pacific. Mr Berendsen, of the New Zealand Delegation, reminded the British delegation that "from the time when the development of Singapore was first proposed, and certainly from the time of the New Zealand decision to contribute to its cost, it has always been clearly understood in all quarters that an adequate naval force would be based in Singapore during hostilities in the Pacific." The point worrying the New Zealand delegation, Berendsen continued, was that, in the event of hostilities with the three combined powers of Germany, Japan and Italy, the United Kingdom may "find it impossible to send a fleet of sufficient strength, particularly in the early stages of the conflict."¹²⁰ Berendsen went on to say that, at the 1937 Imperial Conference in London, New Zealand was informed that, in the event of a war with Germany and Japan, it would take at least thirty-five to seventy days for the fleet to reach Singapore and that there might even be "a very considerable delay" before the fleet could depart from European waters. Berendsen suggested that this "delay" would now be more considerable since Italy was now considered a likely belligerent along with Germany and Japan. He reminded the British delegation that, during this period (phase I), "Japanese forces would have unquestionable naval control in the Pacific, and the only limitation for all practical purposes to Japanese action during that period, seventy days plus X, would be the strength of the Japanese forces, their choice of objectives and the dictates of prudence and

caution that may be important in their minds." Berendsen emphasized, however, that he did not wish to be unduly critical but merely wanted the facts ascertained so that they could be examined "with a clear eye and a clear head."¹²¹ Moreover, Berendsen reiterated his Government's acceptance of the primacy of the first keystone—the United Kingdom—of Imperial defence. There was, Berendsen declared:

no disposition in any quarter of New Zealand to question the fact that in any war in which the British Commonwealth was involved the decision would be reached in the European theatre, and no-one in New Zealand would dream of suggesting that a fleet should come to Singapore if such a step might prejudice the situation there. We entirely realise that the defence of New Zealand depends on the defence of the Commonwealth...¹²²

Thus, New Zealand had to be prepared to face the risks in the Pacific, as Walter Nash added, "in order to make sure of the security of Great Britain"; for "ultimately it would not matter if New Zealand were all right if things in the North Sea and Atlantic were wrong."¹²³

Air Marshall Longmore, of the British delegation, admitted that the possibility of Italy's belligerency, alongside that of Germany and Japan, was an added factor that made it more difficult to determine the strength of the British fleet and its time of arrival in Far Eastern waters.¹²⁴ Nevertheless, the British delegation reassured both the New Zealand and Australian delegations that the British Government would dispatch a fleet to the Far East, regardless of Italy's future actions.¹²⁵ However, unknown to the New Zealand Government, this further British assurance was now based upon possible American naval assistance in the Far East rather than a British willingness to abandon her Mediterranean position. Great Britain's efforts to obtain American naval support for her second keystone—Singapore—resulted in an informal Anglo-American naval agreement in January 1938 for joint naval co-operation in the Far East, in the event of a common war against Japan. The possibility that the United States would have to assume major strategic responsibility in the Pacific, in the event of a war against Germany, Italy and Japan, was clearly recognized at the Anglo-American naval conference.¹²⁶ As the First Sea Lord, Admiral Chatfield, advised the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip, immediately following the conference: "Imperially we are exceedingly weak...If at the

present time, and for many years to come, we had to send a fleet to the Far East, even in conjunction with the United States, we should be left so weak in Europe that we should be liable to blackmail or worse."¹²⁷ New Zealand's doubts concerning the Singapore strategy, therefore, were well founded.

The conference then turned its attention towards the probable lines of Japanese action and scale of attack within the Pacific prior to the arrival of the British fleet to Singapore (phase I). The delegates agreed that Japan would, indeed, have the initiative during that period. Moreover, they were impressed by the large variety of objectives available to the Japanese in the Far East, Australia and New Zealand. It was generally accepted, however, that the main concentration of naval units from the Japanese fleet, during phase I, would be deployed in the Far East area, principally to destroy or capture the Singapore naval base and to meet the British fleet and gain permanent command of the Pacific.¹²⁸ It, therefore, became obvious to the delegates that Singapore should be prepared to meet this maximum scale of sea-borne attack. The vital importance of the retention of the Singapore naval base during phase I was recognized by all. Without that base, the British could no longer effectively operate in the Western Pacific. All local defence within the Pacific would then be subject to a possible maximum scale of attack. As Mr Ashwin, of the New Zealand delegation, explained: "We want to be perfectly certain as regards Singapore before we do anything else, because if that goes the rest is not much good."¹²⁹ The Australian delegation also accepted this assessment. Vice Admiral Sir Ragnor Calvin, speaking in the capacity as head of the Australian delegation, acknowledged that the "Singapore question causes us as much apprehension in Australia as it does in New Zealand. If Singapore fell there is no other base in the Indian Ocean or the Far East and it is not only Australia and New Zealand that will go but the whole of the Empire East of Suez."¹³⁰ The British delegation agreed that the defence of Singapore was of utmost importance and accepted prime responsibility for the defence of the naval base. They assured the New Zealand and Australian delegations that the British Government would "defend Singapore as one of the two keystones on which the survival of the British Empire depended."¹³¹ They informed the Pacific Dominions that the British Government intended to reinforce Singapore

with land and air forces from India and Iraq at the threat of war with Germany or Italy so "that Singapore will hold out against any scale of sea-borne Japanese attack pending the arrival of [British] Naval reinforcements."¹³² The Australian and New Zealand delegations accepted this British assurance. "On the basis that Singapore would be in a position to resist capture", the Conference then examined the scale of attack to which the Australian and New Zealand areas would be subject during phase I. The delegates recognized that this would largely depend upon the types of naval units that Japan would release from her main naval concentration in the Far East area for operations in the Australia and New Zealand areas and/or whether Japan had established advanced operational bases in or near those areas. This, in turn, would be dependent, the delegates further recognized, upon Japanese strategy as influenced by possible American or Russian intervention and the time of the arrival and strength of the British fleet to the Far Eastern waters. Uncertainties as to the importance of such factors upon Japanese strategy, however, forced the delegates to consider three possible scales of attack upon the Australia and New Zealand areas: a "maximum", "intermediate", and "most probable" scale of attack. A maximum scale of attack involved a large-scale invasion attempt upon Australia or New Zealand by Japan with a view to the permanent occupation of those territories. Since such an operation would necessitate the use of heavy capital ship cover, the delegates considered that this scale of attack would be "highly improbable", at least until Japan had secured permanent command of both the Pacific and Indian Oceans. A less ambitious or intermediate scale of attack involved an expedition, "supported by a naval force of sufficient strength" to deal effectively with Australian and New Zealand cruisers if encountered in Australian and New Zealand waters, whose objective would be temporarily to occupy territory on the mainland of Australia or New Zealand for the purpose of destroying some important centre of industry or military installation. Alternatively, the expedition might be for the purpose of taking and occupying an island for use as an advanced operational base for the operation of Japanese ships, submarine and aircraft within the Australia and New Zealand areas. The most probable scale of attack involved sporadic raids, supported by cruisers, armed merchant cruisers and submarines, upon shipping and territory within the Australia and New Zealand areas:

- (a) Use of cruisers and armed merchant cruisers for dislocating sea communications to the maximum possible extent. An operation of this nature would presumably also be undertaken by any German armed merchant cruiser which happened to be in the Pacific.
- (b) General employment of submarines in restricted or unrestricted warfare against merchant shipping at focal points, on the assumption that refueling facilities will be available to the Japanese in isolated islands.
- (c) The employment of one or more armed merchant cruisers with landing parties for occupation of some temporary refueling base, or for the destruction of island cable stations or other vulnerable points.
- (d) Cruiser raids against ports of Australia, New Zealand, and perhaps the more important islands of the Southwest Pacific, in sufficient strength to deal with British cruisers in these waters if encountered. Raids of this nature might also be effected by coastal bombardment, by air attack, by landing parties, or by a combination of these.

Such operations, the delegates acknowledged, would depend for their intensity on the ability of the Japanese to establish advanced operational bases in the Southwest Pacific. Having considered such possible courses of action open to Japan during phase I, the delegates agreed that the Pacific Dominions should prepare their local defences to meet the "most probable" scale of attack; although they acknowledged that the Pacific Dominions "would be advised to consider the making of preparations to meet a greater scale of attack".¹³³

The conference then focused attention upon the most probable lines of Japanese approach into the Australia and New Zealand areas. The delegates accepted the New Zealand delegation's assessment of the strategic significance, if not value, of the Northern chain of Pacific islands (New Guinea to the Society Islands) in the Australia and New Zealand areas to local Imperial defence. They recognized that Japanese forces en route to either Australia or New Zealand would normally pass through that island chain between New Guinea and the Fiji-Tonga Island groups (Map I). Moreover, they acknowledged that Japan might attempt to establish advanced operational bases on those Pacific islands and, thus, halve the operational distance between their bases in the Japanese Mandated Islands and the Pacific Dominions. This development, the delegates further acknowledged, would enable Japan to intensify her raiding attacks upon Australian and New Zealand shipping and territory. Since it was accepted as impossible to defend all those Pacific islands with land garrisons, the British and Australian

delegations agreed, at the suggestion and insistence of the New Zealand delegation, that those Pacific islands should form the basis of a major air reconnaissance and forward defence line for the protection of Australian and New Zealand shipping and territory within the South-west Pacific (Map II).¹³⁴ The principal focal points on the forward defence line were to be Port Moresby, New Guinea and Suva, Fiji. Responsibility for air reconnaissance and action on the forward defence line was divided up between Australia and New Zealand on the following lines: Australia: New Guinea, Solomon and New Hebrides Islands; New Zealand: New Hebrides, Fiji and Tonga Islands. Responsibility for the development and maintenance of the forward defence line followed the boundaries of their respective Naval Stations or Areas. Both Dominion delegations further undertook to survey and establish advanced operational bases in the island groups. Facilities at the bases were to include: flying-boat moorings, land plane and wireless transmitter facilities, and bomb and fuel supplies. Moreover, it was agreed that land forces should be established at the air bases in order to provide for their defence. The underlying accepted local strategy with regard to the forward defence line involved a sustained surveillance of that island chain through air reconnaissance and wireless communications (coastwatchers) in order to provide warning of the approach of enemy raiding forces so as to enable Australia and New Zealand naval and air forces to launch an attack; and at the same time, to provide information for planning evasive routes for Australian and New Zealand shipping.¹³⁵ To facilitate such a mutual defence, the Australian and New Zealand delegations further agreed that there should be a full exchange of information between their two areas in order to co-ordinate their military operations and defence policies.¹³⁶

The conference then examined the protective measures necessary within the Australia and New Zealand areas for the local defence of some of the more strategically important Pacific islands, Australia and New Zealand territory and trans-Pacific shipping against enemy raiding attacks during phase I. In surveying the local defences of the various Pacific islands within the Australia and New Zealand areas in order to determine their ability to resist capture and their possible use by enemy raiding forces, the New Zealand delegation, unlike the Australian delegation, undertook additional commitments for the defence of these islands. In contrast, the Australian delegation laid emphasis

upon the continental defence of mainland Australia, in relation especially to naval and air bases and port defences.¹³⁷ This reflected the "paramount" importance which New Zealand attached to the Pacific islands as bastions of the defence of Australia and New Zealand proper. This was a foremost New Zealand concern until 1942, when their defence was taken over by the United States (Appendix A). Moreover, it also reflected a fundamental difference of strategic interest between New Zealand and Australia. The delegates, accepting the arguments of the New Zealand delegation, recommended that the Fiji Colonial Government expand their land forces to the strength of one complete battalion, and provide the nucleus of a second; and undertake the installation of two six-inch coastal defence guns and searchlights at Suva. The New Zealand delegation agreed to provide the requisite officers and staff, and additional arms and equipment for the expanded land force; and to train the necessary personnel for the coastal defence battery establishment at Suva. Moreover, the New Zealand delegation stated that their government was prepared to maintain one Brigade Group in the Dominion for the immediate reinforcement of local land forces in the Pacific islands generally, and the Fiji Islands in particular. The New Zealand delegation also undertook to provide arms and equipment for an expanded local defence force in the Tongan Islands; and to dispatch a small land force to protect the trans-Pacific cable station on Fanning Island.¹³⁸ This undertaking was also accepted as necessary by the delegates at the Conference. With regard to the protection of trans-Pacific shipping, the delegates agreed that "evasive routing" and the "patrol" of principal shipping focal areas by Australian and New Zealand air or naval forces would be sufficient to deal with Japanese raiding forces which managed either to by-pass or slip undetected through the Australian-New Zealand air reconnaissance line. It was accepted that, due to the great distances and the wide dispersion of Pacific ocean trade, "evasive routing", rather than escort convoys, would be an effective measure for trade protection. It would be carried out, the delegates agreed, by Australian and New Zealand Naval Control Staff which would have the authority to determine the routes of shipping calling upon their ports. The Australian Navy Office, Melbourne, would control shipping in the Tasman Sea area; while the New Zealand Navy Office, Wellington, would decide the routes of shipping east of New Zealand. The delegates did recognize, however, that Japanese raiding forces would have far greater opportunities for attacking Pacific

shipping in the Australian and New Zealand focal areas, where the density of merchant shipping was the highest. The principal focal areas for Australia were located around the southeastern coast; and for New Zealand, the approaches to the principal ports of Wellington and Auckland (Map II). Nevertheless, the delegates agreed that the defence of those focal areas could be met by naval or air patrol within those areas. The delegates, therefore, were confident that, through the employment of the air reconnaissance line, "evasive routing" and the patrol of principal focal areas, shipping within the Australian and New Zealand areas would be given adequate protection during phase I.¹³⁹

The conference then drew attention to the question of Dominion "co-operation in the defence of the British Commonwealth after providing for the security of the Southwest Pacific." It was commonly acknowledged that the United Kingdom was bearing a heavy burden in providing forces for the defence of the twin keystones—the United Kingdom and Singapore. Although the New Zealand delegation was prepared to release the Dominion's naval forces to the Admiralty and expressed their Government's willingness to train pilots under the Empire Air Training Scheme, the delegation was reluctant to commit the Dominion Government, at this time, to the traditional role of dispatching land forces overseas for Empire defence.¹⁴⁰ The uncertainties regarding Great Britain's ability to provide for the Dominion's Pacific security, arising from the development of threats to the Empire in both Europe and the Pacific, forced the New Zealand Government into a non-committal policy regarding Empire defence. Such a policy, the delegation considered, would allow the Dominion time later to clarify the position in light of events in both Europe and the Pacific. As Walter Nash, of the New Zealand delegation, explained to the British delegation: there was "no limit to what New Zealand would do inside New Zealand to train men to defend New Zealand, and if they are trained to defend New Zealand, they are trained to defend other powers too, without making any commitments that will send men overseas."¹⁴¹ Again, this policy reflected the doubts which the Dominion held regarding the Singapore strategy and New Zealand security.

On 3 September, 1939, Great Britain declared war upon Germany and New Zealand immediately followed suit. The Dominion placed her naval

forces under Admiralty control and increased the New Zealand contribution to pilot training programme under the existing Empire Air Training Scheme. At the same time, New Zealand began to mobilize a "special military force for service within or beyond New Zealand."¹⁴² As suggested at the Pacific Defence Conference, New Zealand's willingness to participate fully in Empire defence by dispatching an expeditionary force overseas depended upon her assessment of the politico-military situation in both Europe and the Pacific. The British Government now proceeded to downgrade the Japanese threat. It set about convincing the Dominion of the effectiveness of certain Pacific "brakes" upon possible Japanese southward expansion and the continuing viability of the Singapore strategy.

At the London Prime Ministers' Conference in November, 1939, the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Halifax, speaking for the Foreign Office, encouragingly pointed out to the Western Pacific Dominions the present desire of Japan to improve her relations with both Great Britain and the United States as a result of the recent shake-up in the Japanese Government. Halifax then argued that it was "highly unlikely" that Japan would "venture upon any scheme of southward expansion". The Foreign Secretary explained that the recent Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, which was so instrumental in toppling the extremists from power in Japan, dealt a "severe shock" to Japan's programme for expansion by increasing the Russian threat to her northern border in China. Moreover, Japan also "has her hands far too full in China", Halifax (quoting His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo) declared, "and is too apprehensive of the United States in its present mood to think seriously of any move involving danger to Australia and New Zealand, or to territories in which those Dominions are interested." Halifax went on to explain that the recent hardening of American attitude towards Japanese policies in the Far East, as evidenced by the American denunciation of her trade treaty with Japan and the resulting threat to Japan of American economic embargoes, had now made Japan wary of future American reactions to her policies in the Far East. Thus, "As long as Japan remains uncertain of the attitude of the United States, this uncertainty affords a certain measure of security to interests which she might otherwise be tempted to assail." The Foreign Secretary then concluded his appreciation of probable Japanese policy by confidently assuring the Pacific Dominions

that "Japan will continue to concentrate all her efforts on the solution of the China incident. She will sit on the fence as far as the war in Europe is concerned, keeping her hands free to pick up whatever trade advantages it may offer."¹⁴³

New Zealand's apprehensions concerning her Pacific security were further allayed by the then Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, Admiral Chatfield, who assured the Pacific Dominions of the continued viability of the Singapore strategy. Chatfield confidently pointed out that "Singapore is a fortress armed with five 15-inch guns and garrisoned by nearly 20,000 men." It could only be taken after a four to five month siege by an Army of at least 50,000 men, asserted Chatfield. Since the Singapore naval base was so far from Japan, he continued to argue, a sea-borne operation of that nature, involving the movement of such a large army and its continued maintenance over such a prolonged period, would most certainly be forlorn, owing to its sudden interruption by the arrival of a British fleet. In those circumstances, the besieging Army, and not the Singapore garrison, would become the prisoners of war. Chatfield, therefore, discounted the possibility that Japan would "embark upon such a mad enterprise" since they were a "prudent people" and fully occupied in China. Nevertheless, Chatfield assured the Pacific Dominions that, should war also break out with Japan, they would only be subject to sporadic raiding attacks upon their shipping and territory prior to the arrival of a British fleet at Singapore. "The Admiralty accepts the full responsibility", Chatfield continued, "of defending Australia, New Zealand or Singapore from a Japanese attack on a large scale" and the Royal Navy, after containing the German heavy ships, "have forces at their disposal for these essential purposes."¹⁴⁴ Moreover, should Italy enter the European war alongside Germany, Admiral Chatfield reassured the Pacific Dominions that British interests in the Mediterranean would not take precedence over the defence of the second keystone—Singapore:

...we wish to make it plain that we regard the defence of Australia and New Zealand, and of Singapore as a stepping stone to these two Dominions, as ranking next to the mastering of the principal fleet to which we are opposed, and that if the choice were presented of defending them against a serious attack, or sacrificing British interests in the Mediterranean, our duty to our kith and kin would take precedence.¹⁴⁵

Unknown to the New Zealand Government, however, this further British assurance was now based upon the assumption that American naval assistance in the Far East would be forthcoming, rather than that the British would abandon their Mediterranean position. At a meeting of the CID, on 2 May 1939, Imperial naval strategy in the event of a war with Germany, Japan and Italy was fully discussed. Lord Stanhope, the then First Lord of the Admiralty, pointed out to the Committee that the withdrawal of the British fleet from the Mediterranean would seriously upset Great Britain's guarantees to Greece, Rumania and Turkey, and her alliances with Egypt and Iraq. Admiral Chatfield admitted that the dispatch of a British fleet to the Far East, at the exclusion of British interests in the Mediterranean, "would have to be decided at the time." If Italy did enter the war, Chatfield continued, Imperial naval strategy would be to knock out Italy quickly before Japan did irreparable damage in the Pacific. Such a strategy, Chatfield acknowledged, would depend upon the stationing of the American Navy in the Pacific. In response to these remarks, Sir Thomas Inskip, now the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, suggested to the Committee that such a strategy reflected "a considerable scaling down of our undertaking to the Dominions to send a fleet to the Far East in all circumstances." Hore-Belisha, the Secretary of State for War, also admitted that the strategy "amounted to a reversal of the basis of calculation previously used for determining the scale of [Naval] reserves necessary for Singapore." It was in fact a fundamental departure in Imperial naval strategy. The CID concluded their review of Imperial naval strategy by approving the recommendation of the naval staff that: "there are so many variable factors which cannot at present be assured that it is not possible to state definitely how soon after Japanese intervention a fleet could be dispatched to the Far East. Neither is it possible to enumerate precisely the size of the fleet that we could afford to send."¹⁴⁶ A British naval officer was sent to Washington the following month to confer with the American Navy Department. American naval authorities were then informed that Imperial naval strategy had been revised and that it was now unlikely that Great Britain would be able, as agreed in January, 1938, to dispatch a battle fleet to Singapore, in the event of a common war with Japan. American naval authorities accepted the revision of Imperial naval strategy and an "informal understanding" on global strategic responsibility between the British and American Navies, in the event of war with Germany, Italy

and Japan, was then agreed upon. Consequently, American military authorities, on the advice of the Navy Department, readjusted their war plans to "sustain the interests of Democratic Powers in the Pacific", in the event of a war with Germany, Italy and Japan.¹⁴⁷ Thus, with regard to Imperial Defence, Great Britain's "Mediterranean position" had in effect (though not explicitly) replaced by June 1939 the Singapore naval base as the second keystone upon which the survival of the British Commonwealth depended. New Zealand's Pacific security, therefore, would have to rest upon United States support in the event of a war with Germany, Italy and Japan.

Chatfield said in his memorandum of 21 November, 1939, it was very unlikely "that this bleak choice will arise during the next year or two"; for "Italy is neutral and may even become a friend." Chatfield then concluded by declaring that "there are no naval grounds, therefore, always assuming that the United States is our friend, which should prevent the despatch of Australian and New Zealand armies to the decisive battle fields, where their name stands so high."¹⁴⁸

Even before receiving Admiral Chatfield's memorandum, the Deputy Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, accepted the British Government's assessment of Japan's most probable future policies in the Pacific and the continuing viability of the Singapore strategy. Fraser admitted in London on 20 November, 1939, that the "present situation as it has in fact now developed is much more favourable than the worst contingencies contemplated in Wellington" at the Pacific Defence Conference. "...we have no immediate fear", Fraser added, "of serious delay or difficulty in despatching a substantial British fleet to Singapore, should hostilities develop in the Far East, nor indeed have we any immediate fear of any such hostilities in the Far East. It is for this reason, Fraser pointed out, "that the New Zealand Government have decided (of course in the absence of any serious deterioration in the meantime) to dispatch by mid-January the first echelon, consisting of some 6700 men, of the contemplated [New Zealand Expeditionary Force] Division."¹⁴⁹ Fraser warned, however, that future events in both Europe and the Pacific were highly unpredictable; and it was those events which would guide the New Zealand Government in her willingness to play a full part in Empire defence:

Japan may not always be involved in China; Japan may not always be suspicious of Russia; the United States may not prove a sufficient deterrent to Japanese action southwards and, indeed, if the Commonwealth and its Allies were to receive a serious knock in the course of hostilities, the whole international situation might become entirely liquid again. These considerations are not absent from the mind of the New Zealand Government, who will be guided in their war measures, in the first place, by their desire to play the fullest possible part in the common effort and, secondly, by circumstances as they arise and by the advice from time to time of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom (which they greatly value)....¹⁵⁰

The British Government's expectations concerning Japan's future policies in the Pacific and the European struggle proved to be essentially correct during the months of the "phoney war" in Europe and the relative calm in the Pacific. The New Zealand Government, therefore, devoted her sole efforts towards Empire defence by training pilots under the Empire Air Training Scheme, supporting the operation of the Royal Navy with their Naval Division, and despatching in January 1940 the First Echelon of the Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force to the Middle East. In the spring of 1940, however, British Far Eastern strategy was to be severely shaken by events in Europe. These were in due course to launch New Zealand into a re-appraisal of her defence needs which in war led to reliance on the United States rather than the United Kingdom for her Pacific security.

Footnotes

New Zealand and the Singapore Naval Base

New Zealand and the Imperial Fold

- ¹R.R. Cunninghame, "The Development of New Zealand Foreign Policy and Political Alignment", in *New Zealand's External Relations*, ed. by T.C. Larkin (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 18.
- ²J.D.B. Miller, *Britain and the Old Dominions* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966), p. 86.
- ³For an examination of this viewpoint of New Zealand-British relations see Angus Ross, "Reluctant Dominion or Dutiful Daughter? New Zealand and the Commonwealth in the Inter-War Years", *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, X, No. 1 (March 1972), pp. 28-43.
- ⁴Other factors which contributed to New Zealand's exclusive politico-military relationship with Great Britain were: New Zealand's economic dependence upon Great Britain for markets, capital and labour; the Dominion's close cultural identification with Great Britain; and her favourable historical experience with the Mother Country.
- ⁵W.D. McIntyre, "New Zealand and the Singapore Base Between the Wars," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, II, No. 1 (March, 1971), 3, quoting *New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD)*,
- ⁶*Ibid.*
- ⁷J.T. Henderson, *The Evolution of New Zealand Defence Policy, 1840-1939* (Wellington: Ministry of Defence, 1971), pp. 43-44.
- ⁸New Zealand Department of Statistics, *New Zealand Official Yearbook* (Wellington: Government Printer, 1975), p. 268. (The precise figure, however, is disputable. See A.H. McLintock, ed., *An Encyclopaedia of New Zealand*, Wellington: Government Printer, 1966, Vol. III, pp. 567-8.)
- ⁹Paul Knoplund, *The British Empire, 1815-1939* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1941), p. 738.
- ¹⁰McIntyre, "New Zealand and the Singapore Base Between the Wars", p. 3.
- ¹¹The Far Eastern Empire consisted of British territories within both the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. As Map II indicates, the Far Eastern Empire was subdivided into the East Indies, China (Far East), Australia and New Zealand Naval Stations or Areas.

Lord Jellicoe's Prophecy

- ¹²Stephen Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars*, Vol. I: *The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929* (London: Collins, 1968), p. 278.
- ¹³*Ibid.*, p. 279.

- ¹⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 278-279.
- ¹⁵Report by Viscount Jellicoe: Naval Mission to New Zealand, August-October, 1919, III, 3-4, AD11 17/2.
- ¹⁶A.T. Patterson, ed., *The Jellicoe Papers, 1916-1935* (London: Navy Research Society, 1968), II, 327.
- ¹⁷Report by Viscount Jellicoe: Naval Mission to New Zealand, August-October, 1919, III, 5, AD11 17/2.
- ¹⁸*Ibid.*, I, 15-17.
- ¹⁹Due to their anti-submarine bulges, the more modern designed post-Jutland capital ships were unable to make use of the existing graving docks, for both service and repair, at British naval ports within the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
- ²⁰Report by Viscount Jellicoe: Naval Mission to New Zealand, August-October, 1919, III, 8, AD11 17/2.
- ²¹*Ibid.*, I, 5-8.
- ²²M.P. Lissington, *New Zealand and Japan, 1900-1941* (Wellington: Government Printer, 1972), pp. 17-31.
- ²³Roskill, *The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929*, p. 283.
- ²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 284. See also S.D. Waters, *The Royal New Zealand Navy* (Wellington, War History Branch, 1956), Ch. 1.
- ²⁵Henderson, *The Evolution of New Zealand Defence Policy, 1840-1939*, p. 140.
- ²⁶Roskill, *The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929*, pp. 215-216.
- ²⁷S. Woodburn Kirby, *The War Against Japan, Vol. I: The Loss of Singapore* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957), p. 3.
- ²⁸Singapore Development of a Naval Base, CID, Memorandum No. 501M, 7 June 1921, PM 445/7/1, PT. 1, pp. 2-9.
- ²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 5.
- ³⁰Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States*, p. 275.
- ³¹As the War Office advised their government in October 1920, "We must not antagonize America" for our "military position in the Far East would be very embarrassing if hostilities with Japan occurred", Imperial Meetings, 1921, Minutes of Meetings of Principal Delegates, 8th Meeting, p. 9, 640-2.
- ³²William R. Louis, *British Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939* (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 20-47.
- ³³*Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.
- ³⁴Imperial Meetings, 1921, Summary of Proceedings and Documents, p. 26, G 40-2.

³⁵Imperial Meetings, 1921, Minutes of Meetings of Principal Delegates, 8th Meeting, pp. 11-12, G 40-2.

³⁶*Ibid.*, 11th Meeting, p. 3.

³⁷*Ibid.*

³⁸Imperial Meetings, 1921, Summary of Proceedings and Documents, pp. 26-32, G 40-2.

³⁹*Ibid.*

⁴⁰The date, 13 July 1921, was crucial to the entire issue of renewal. The Anglo-Japanese treaty or alliance provided that the alliance would remain in force until either party announced, one year in advance, its intentions to terminate the alliance. A complication arose when Great Britain submitted a declaration to the League of Nations in the previous year, 13 July 1920, stating that the alliance, if continued, would not conflict with the League's Covenant. Great Britain, therefore, reinterpreted her 13 July 1920 declaration as one of renewal with modification rather than one of intent to terminate.

⁴¹Louis, *British Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939*, pp. 74-78;

Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States*, pp. 290-293.

New Zealand, The Imperial Spur

⁴²See *supra*, (Chapter 1, pp. 6-13). New Zealand's role at the Washington Conference was slight. She participated with Australia and Canada as part of the British delegation. Hence, the only opportunity New Zealand had in expressing her views at Washington were at the meetings of the British delegation. No records exist of those meetings. Lissington, *New Zealand and Japan, 1900-1941*, p. 50.

⁴³Ian C. MacGibbon, "The Blue-Water Rationale: New Zealand's Naval Security Problem, 1919-1939". (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1971), p. 29.

⁴⁴New Zealand, Parliament, *New Zealand Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 200, (June 14-July 18, 1923), p. 728.

⁴⁵New Zealand was the only Dominion that made financial contributions for the development of the Singapore naval base. Other financial contributors were: the United Kingdom, The Straits Settlement, Hong Kong, the Federated Malay States and the Sultan of Johore. Although Australia demonstrated a deep interest in the completion of the base, the sporadic cancellations of the naval base project by British Labour governments caused that Dominion to divert her defence expenditures towards the development of her local Navy. McIntyre, "New Zealand and the Singapore Base between the Wars", p. 2.

⁴⁶Imperial Conference, 1923, Stenographic Notes of Meetings, 8th Meeting, p. 3, G 40-4.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 9th Meeting, pp. 10-12.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*

⁴⁹*Ibid.*

⁵⁰*Ibid.*

⁵¹*Ibid.*

⁵²*Ibid.*, 8th Meeting, pp. 17-18.

⁵³*Ibid.*, 11th Meeting, p. 8.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 4th Meeting, p. 27.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 11th Meeting, p. 8.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 8th Meeting, p. 14.

⁵⁷MacGibbon, "The Blue-Water Rationale: New Zealand's Naval Security Problem, 1919-1939," p. 52.

⁵⁸C. Northcote Parkinson, *Britain in the Far East, the Singapore Naval Base* (Singapore: Donald Moore, 1955), p. 24.

⁵⁹MacGibbon, "The Blue-Water Rationale: New Zealand's Naval Security Problem, 1919-1939," p. 69.

⁶⁰Secretary of State for the Colonies to Gov-ben, New Zealand, 6 March, 1924, PM 455/7/1.

⁶¹At the urgings of Massey, the New Zealand Government was able to secure from Great Britain the appointment of Lord Jellicoe as the Dominion's Governor-General in 1920. Jellicoe served the Dominion in that capacity until 1924 and, then later, as New Zealand's representative to the 1927 Geneva Naval Conference, adviser to the New Zealand delegation at the 1930 London Naval Conference and consultant, at various times, to the Dominion government on Imperial naval policy. In those ten years, Jellicoe served the Dominion's interests by acting as the government's principal spokesman in advocating the maintenance of a powerful British Navy. The fact that Jellicoe was allowed to play such an influential role in the development of New Zealand's defence policy clearly indicated the importance that New Zealand attached to her British naval shield and Pacific security.

MacGibbon, "The Blue-Water Rationale: New Zealand's Naval Security Problem, 1919-1939", pp. 240-249.

⁶²Jellicoe to Massey (Private), 7 March, 1924, PM 455/7/1, (1).

⁶³*Ibid.*

⁶⁴Although in not or such strong terms as New Zealand, the Australian government also protested at the British decision to abandon the Singapore naval base project. As for the other Dominions, Canada decided not to comment and South Africa enthusiastically supported the British government's decision. W.D. McIntyre, "The Strategic Significance of Singapore, 1917-1942: the Naval Base and the Commonwealth," *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, X, No. 1 (March, 1969), 77-78.

- ⁶⁵Governor-General, New Zealand, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 11 March, 1924, PM 455/7/1 (1).
- ⁶⁶McIntyre, "New Zealand and the Singapore Base between the Wars", p. 11; and "The Strategic Significance of Singapore, 1917-1942: the Naval Base and the Commonwealth", p. 79.
- ⁶⁷Secretary of State for the Colonies to Administrator of the Government of New Zealand, 4 December, 1924, PM 455/7/1 (1).
- ⁶⁸Administrator of the Government of New Zealand to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 8 December, 1924, PM 455/7/1 (1).
- ⁶⁹Parkinson, *Britain in the Far East*, p. 28.
- ⁷⁰McIntyre, "New Zealand and the Singapore Base between the Wars", pp. 12-13.
- ⁷¹Parkinson, *Britain in the Far East*, p. 28.
- ⁷²SSDA to Governor-General, New Zealand, 8 July, 1929, PM 455/7/1 (2).
- ⁷³Governor-General, New Zealand to SSDA, 15 July, 1929, PM 455/7/1 (2).
- ⁷⁴NZHC, London to PM New Zealand, 25 July, 1929, PM 455/7/1 (2).
- ⁷⁵SSDA to Governor-General, New Zealand, 12 November, 1929, PM 455/7/1 (3).
- ⁷⁶MacGibbon, "The Blue-Water Rationale: New Zealand's Naval Security Problem, 1919-1939", p. 108.
- ⁷⁷Governor-General, New Zealand to SSDA, 13 November, 1929, PM 455/7/1 (3).
- ⁷⁸Governor-General, New Zealand to SSDA, 15 November, 1929, PM 455/7/1 (3).
- ⁷⁹MacGibbon, "The Blue-Water Rationale: New Zealand's Naval Security Problem, 1919-1939", p. 109.
- ⁸⁰The Singapore Base, Memorandum by the Overseas Defence Sub-Committee of the CID, 4 June, 1930, p. 9, PM 455/7/1 (3).
- ⁸¹MacGibbon, "The Blue-Water Rationale: New Zealand's Naval Security Problem, 1919-1939", p. 112.
- ⁸²*Ibid.*, pp. 112-113.
- ⁸³Imperial Conference, 1930, Committee on the Singapore Base, Minutes of the First Meeting of the Committee on 16 October, 1930, p. 1, PM 455/7/1 (3).
- ⁸⁴*Ibid.*
- ⁸⁵Imperial Conference, 1930, Committee on the Singapore Base, Report, 27 October 1930, p. 1, PM 455/7/1 (3).

⁸⁶Imperial Conference, 1930, Committee on the Singapore Base, Minutes of the First Meeting of the Committee on 16 October, 1930, p. 5, PM 455/7/1 (3).

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 6-9.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 9-11.

⁸⁹MacGibbon, "The Blue-Water Rationale: New Zealand's Naval Security Problem, 1919-1939", p. 114.

⁹⁰McIntyre, "The Strategic Significance of Singapore, 1917-1942: The Naval Base and the Commonwealth," p. 83.

⁹¹Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, p. 11.

⁹²CID Imperial Defence Policy, Annual Review by the Chiefs of Staff, 1935, 29 April, 1935, p. 6, EA 11/53.

⁹³Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, p. 13.

⁹⁴Meetings of British Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 1935, Proceedings and Memoranda, 2nd Meeting, p. 3, EA 11/53.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, 3rd Meeting, p. 3.

New Zealand, The Empire's "Doubting Thomas"

⁹⁶Henderson, *The Evolution of New Zealand Defence Policy, 1840-1939*, pp. 244-245.

⁹⁷As early as August 1936, Colonel James Hargest, D.S.O., M.C., member of Parliament from Awarua, foresaw the development of New Zealand's forward defence posture. As he told the House of Representatives at that time: "the frontiers of New Zealand might be on the Pacific islands situated between this country and the northern part of Australia. I can imagine that a very powerful air force from New Zealand and Australia combined, based on that chain of islands from the Cook Islands to Samoa, Fiji and New Guinea would form, probably one of the best protective screens we could find, and that it would prove very much more effective than any force based in our ports." New Zealand Parliament, *New Zealand Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 246 (July 21-September 3, 1936), p. 546, (cited by Henderson, *The Evolution of New Zealand Defence Policy, 1840-1939*, p. 333.)

⁹⁸The Strategic Importance of the Pacific Islands, NZCOS Paper, 23 March, 1937, NA 22/4/13 (2).

⁹⁹Imperial Conference, 1937, NZCOS Combined Paper, 6 March, 1937, NA 22/4/13 (2).

¹⁰⁰Imperial Conference, 1937, Minutes of Meetings of Principal Delegates, 6th Meeting, p. 4, 640-8.

¹⁰¹Imperial Conference, 1937, Memoranda E (37) I, Review of Imperial Defences by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee of the CID, 22 February 1937, pp. 5-18, 640-8.

¹⁰²Imperial Conference, 1937, Minutes of Meetings of Principal Delegates, 7th Meeting, p. 9, 640-8.

- ¹⁰³MacGibbon, "The Blue-Water Rationale: New Zealand's Naval Security Problem, 1919-1939, p. 156.
- ¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*, Imperial Conference, 1937, Memoranda E (37) I, Review of Imperial Defence by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee of the CID, p. 19, 640-8.
- ¹⁰⁵Notes by C.A. Berendsen, Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department, N.D., PM 86/1/1.
- ¹⁰⁶Imperial Conference, 1937, Minutes of Meetings of Principal Delegates, 7th Meeting, p. 10, 640-8.
- ¹⁰⁷MacGibbon, "The Blue-Water Rationale: New Zealand's Naval Security Problem, 1919-1939," pp. 217-222.
- ¹⁰⁸F.L. Wood, *The New Zealand People at War: Political and External Affairs* (Wellington: War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1958), p. 75.
- ¹⁰⁹Defence Problems of the Fijian and Tongan Groups, COS Report, No. 16, 3 December, 1938, PM 86/1/1.
- ¹¹⁰Pacific Islands Report, COS Report, No. 6, 3 February, 1938, PM 86/1/1.
- ¹¹¹Liaison with Australia, COS Report, No. 13, 27 July 1938, AD 11 7/20.
- ¹¹²Immediate Action in View of Possible Crisis, COS Report, No. 19, January, 1939, PM 86/1/1.
- ¹¹³British island territories within the New Zealand Naval Station or Area included the Fiji, Tonga, Gilbert and Ellice Island groups, and various islands within the Line and Phoenix Island groups and Tuamotu Archipelago. At this time, the responsibilities of New Zealand for the defence of the New Zealand Naval Station or Area was limited to New Zealand proper and outlying territories under her political control, namely Western Samoa, Niue and the Tokelau, Cook and Kermadec Island groups. By November 1941, however, the New Zealand Government had assumed "full" defence responsibility for all British island territories, and "limited" defence responsibility for all free French island territories, within her Naval Station or Area. Political, Administrative and Defence Organization—New Zealand Station, 10 December, 1941, NA 030/68/10; Defence of British Possessions in the South Western Pacific—Assumption of Responsibility by New Zealand, 18 November, 1941, PM 86/1/1.
- ¹¹⁴PM New Zealand to Governor-General, New Zealand, 21 December, 1938, PM 86/1/1.
- ¹¹⁵Henderson, *The Evolution of New Zealand Defence Policy, 1840-1939*, p. 316.
- ¹¹⁶Bernard K. Gordon, *New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 98.
- ¹¹⁷Henderson, *The Evolution of New Zealand Defence Policy, 1840-1939*, p. 316.

- ¹¹⁸Pacific Defence Conference, 1939, Report, Introduction, 25 April, 1939, AD 11 12/22.
- ¹¹⁹Pacific Defence Conference, 1939, Verbatim Report of Proceedings, First Day, p. C3, PM 86/27/10 (1).
- ¹²⁰*Ibid.*, First Day, p. 10 I.
- ¹²¹*Ibid.*, First Day, p. D5.
- ¹²²*Ibid.*, First Day, p. E4.
- ¹²³*Ibid.*, First Day, p. S1.
- ¹²⁴*Ibid.*, First Day, p. F2.
- ¹²⁵Pacific Defence Conference, 1939, Report, paragraph 4, AD 11 12/22.
- ¹²⁶See *Infra*, pp.
- ¹²⁷Lawrence Pratt, "The Anglo-American Naval Conversations on the Far East of January 1938", *International Affairs*, XLVII, No. 4 (October, 1971), 757-758.
- ¹²⁸Pacific Defence Conference, 1939, Report, paragraphs 7-9, AD 11 12/22.
- ¹²⁹Pacific Defence Conference, 1939, Verbatim Report of Proceedings, First Day, p. H5, PM 86/27/10, pt. 1.
- ¹³⁰*Ibid.*, First Day, p. 62.
- ¹³¹Pacific Defence Conference, 1939, Report, paragraph 2, AD 11 12/22.
- ¹³²Comments on the Paper on Imperial Defence, With Special Reference to New Zealand, Drawn up by the COS Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, COS Report, No. 22, 4 April, 1939, PM 81/12/2.
- ¹³³Pacific Defence Conference, 1939, Report, paragraphs 9-18, AD 11 12/22.
- ¹³⁴Pacific Defence Conference, 1939, Verbatim Report of Proceedings, First Day, pp. C2, L2, Second Day, p. V1, PM 86/27/10 (1).
- ¹³⁵Pacific Defence Conference, 1939, Report, paragraphs 19-24, AD 11 12/22.
- ¹³⁶*Ibid.*, paragraph 102.
- ¹³⁷*Ibid.*, paragraphs 72-76.
- ¹³⁸*Ibid.*, paragraphs 27-50.
- ¹³⁹*Ibid.*, paragraphs 60-66.
- ¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*, paragraphs 85-99.
- ¹⁴¹Pacific Defence Conference, 1939, Verbatim Report of Proceedings, Second Day, p. VI, PM 86/27/10 (1).

¹⁴²New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs, *Documents, Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War, 1939-1945* (Wellington: War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1963), "(hereinafter referred to as *Documents*)", I, 17-34.

¹⁴³*Ibid.*, III, Appendix I, 531-533.

¹⁴⁴*Ibid.*, III, Appendix II, 535-536.

¹⁴⁵*Ibid.*, III, Appendix II, 536. This is cited in F.L.W. Wood, *The New Zealand People at War: Political and External Affairs*, in the "Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-45", (Wellington, War History Branch, 1958) as being the words of the then First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. But in the source cited here it is presented as a memorandum from Lord Chatfield expressing the views of the "United Kingdom War Cabinet at their meeting on 23 November, 1939..." It seems that somebody jumped to the conclusion that the "C" at the end of the memorandum must stand for "Churchill". The slight variation between the wording of the Wood volume text and the source cited here is explained by the requirement in the earlier volume, Wood's, to paraphrase British messages, which was relaxed for the later volume of documents. There is nothing in Churchill's memoirs to justify the attribution of this statement to him.

¹⁴⁶McIntyre, "New Zealand and the Singapore Base between the Wars", p. 19.

¹⁴⁷See *infra*, pp. 95-98.

¹⁴⁸New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs, *Documents*, III.

¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*, III, Appendix III, 538.

¹⁵⁰*Ibid.*, III, Appendix III, 539.

Chapter III

The American Retreat to the Pacific Triangle

i American Pacific Security and Isolationism

In 1919, America's Pacific Island Empire stretched 5000 miles across the Central Pacific from the Hawaiian to the Philippine Islands, as far north as the Aleutian Islands, and as far south as American Samoa. These possessions consisted of: the Aleutian, Hawaiian and Philippine Island groups and American Samoa, Midway, Wake and Guam Islands (Map I). The security of America's Pacific Island Empire had, since its founding in the late nineteenth century, rested upon a powerful battle fleet, supporting bases, strong local defences and a measure of de facto naval support from the Royal Navy in the Atlantic Ocean. Between 1919 and 1941, however, American Pacific security was deeply affected by a climate of opinion in America which dictated a virtual restructuring of America's security planning on the basis that the United States defend American territory "alone against any and all combinations of foreign powers"¹ and maintain an essentially defensive military establishment,² at a time when Japan was clearly emerging as a major Pacific power.

Following the First World War the United States not only avoided "entangling alliances" but also allowed her military strength to "decrease and decay to the point where it became tragically insufficient and, even more important, incapable of restoration save after the loss of many lives and the expenditure of other resources beyond man's comprehension".³ The Army during the 1920's and 1930's was, in effect, almost abolished.⁴ In 1920 the American Congress passed a National Defense Act which authorized an army of not more than 280,000 enlisted men but congressional appropriations were so small that the Army did not reach this maximum figure until 1940.⁵ Although the Army was less favoured than the Navy, due to public confidence in the oceans as a bulwark and the Navy as the only necessary line of American defence, less than half of the tonnage allowed by the Washington treaties was built! Moreover, Congress not only restricted the construction of strategically important naval bases which were deemed "provocative" but so limited the number of naval personnel that, at times, the Navy had to operate ships with only 80 per cent of their

proper complement. Not until 1933 was a programme undertaken to reach Washington treaty strength. Not until 1936 were steps taken to meet the challenge of the Japanese Navy. Although large appropriations were made in the following years, under the Roosevelt Administration, "American naval experts testified, shortly before the outbreak of World War II, that the Navy had only one-third the force needed to take the offensive in the Far East".⁶

By 1937, however, it was obvious to American military authorities and the Roosevelt Administration that the United States could no longer successfully defend her possessions in the Western Pacific, unilaterally and with the existing defensive military establishment. This realization resulted in an American military retreat from the Western Pacific to the Pacific triangle (Alaska-Hawaii-Panama Canal) and the incipient development of the crypto-Anglo-American Alliance. Within the restrictive confines of American congressional and public opinion, the Roosevelt Administration attempted to reverse American national policies by bolstering American military strength and nurturing the developing Anglo-American Alliance. It was not until late 1941, however, that the nation's military strength was considered sufficient, with the added assistance of the British and Dutch, for a reassertion of American military power in the Western Pacific in the hope of successfully defending American Far Eastern possessions from Japanese aggression. Nevertheless, the United States was to suffer serious defeats in the Western Pacific as a direct result of her two decades of military neglect.

The climate of opinion in America which was responsible for the American rejection of force and the deterioration of American Pacific security between 1919 and 1941 was American isolationism. This was a loose ideological doctrine of traditional unilateral-pacifist beliefs⁷ relating to American security: that the United States should not enter into any military alliances nor maintain forces capable of offensive operations. Central to the doctrine was the cardinal belief in an "impregnable fortress America": "that the United States could not be seriously affected by events outside her hemisphere".⁸ Understandably, for this reason the doctrine has had only a "fluctuating" influence upon American national policies.⁹ The doctrine's re-emergence and its ultimate repudiation between 1919 and 1941, therefore, arose from the domestic and foreign developments of that period. Chief among

these were: the First World War and the revisionist historians' interpretation of American intervention; the Great Depression and developing conflicts in Asia and Europe; the shifting balance of power in Asia and Europe; and finally the American entry into the Second World War.¹⁰

By 1917 most Americans believed that American intervention into the First World War was justified in view of Germany's threat to American security and disregard for American neutrality. The abandonment of American isolationist policies in that year was the climax of a "great debate" between the isolationists and interventionists which had gripped the nation since the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. However, immediately following the war the United States, once again, began to retreat into isolationism. This was largely due to a post-war disillusionment which swept the nation. Chiefly responsible were those "propagators of disillusionment", the revisionist historians, who conducted a sustained post-mortem on the origins of American intervention into the First World War. They argued that American intervention had not been due to a German threat to American security or German violation of American neutrality, but rather the evil machinations of America's allies, Allied propaganda, and American bankers and munition makers (the so-called "Merchants of Death", who tied their personal gains to the cause of Great Britain and France). Thus, America had not entered the war in 1917 in defence of her own national interests but was rather "duped" or "tricked" into intervention by conspiracies on the part of her allies and certain influential business interests in America. The revisionist historians commonly concluded that American security had not been threatened and that American involvement could have been avoided had she adhered to her policies of neutrality.¹¹ Through such writings, the revisionist historians restored and strengthened the American belief in an impregnable fortress America. Moreover, their writings engendered an American distrust of former allies, American banking institutions, and munition makers which played a significant part in the American rejection of the League of Nations. They also inspired the formation of innumerable peace groups throughout America, clamouring for the avoidance of future wars through disarmament, international law and neutrality legislation.¹² The revisionist historians, therefore, played a most significant role in the rekindling of American

isolationism following the First World War. As Manfred Jonas concludes: "...by removing the onus of war-guilt from Germany, the revisionists started a sequence of historical analyses that ultimately strengthened isolationist sentiment and offered documentation for the utterances of isolationist spokesmen."¹³

With the advent of the Great Depression in America and the developing conflicts in Asia and Europe isolationism in America reached a high intensity:

Certainly it was never a more lively issue....Yet it would be a mistake to interpret the intensity of isolationist sentiment during these years as marking a fundamental change in America's attitudes toward the outside world. Its basic motivation was the old desire to keep the political affairs of the United States as independent as possible from the affairs of other nations. Its basic premise was the old belief that America's most vital interests, the things worth fighting for, could not be destroyed by events beyond the seas.¹⁴

Suffering under the impact of the Great Depression in America (1929-1939), the nation was determined to devote its entire resources towards the solution of its economic ills and avoid military involvement in Asia or Europe which would distract the country from its "real" problems. In view of the nation's economic problems and security beliefs, it seemed proper to most Americans to consider America first and ignore the developing world conflicts as long as possible. When this appeared no longer possible, the United States, once again, attempted to "insulate" herself from possible military involvement in Asia or Europe by enacting Neutrality Acts (1935-1937) designed to reduce direct contact with belligerent powers and restricting the activities of those "Merchants of Death". On the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, isolationism in America reached its zenith with the American declaration of neutrality. Walled up in their "impregnable fortress", most Americans viewed the events beyond the seas with little concern about their national security:

The crux of this view...was the belief that the nation's self-preservation depended solely upon its own defensive power in protecting the Western hemisphere and not upon the British Navy or the balance of power....Consequently, even if Europe fell to Hitler and the British Navy were

captured or destroyed...the presumption was that America could survive, walled off from the world in her impregnable continental fortress.¹⁵

It was not until the American people began to comprehend that their security was tied to the outcome of events beyond the sea that isolationism began to decline in popularity and American policies gradually reversed. The years 1939 to 1941 witnessed another "great debate" in America between the interventionists and isolationists. During that period, the United States gradually abandoned disarmament for rearmament; and nullified the previous policy of neutrality by giving material assistance to nations engaged in the world conflict whose victory was considered vital to American security. Nevertheless, as late as 6 December, 1941, the very eve of the American entry into the Second World War, no more than 24% of Americans believed that armed intervention outside their hemisphere was vital to their security!¹⁶ Only after the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor, which shattered the myth of impregnable fortress America, was the isolationist doctrine totally rejected. It is within the framework of isolationism, therefore, that one must view the American response to the Pacific threat from 1919 to 1942.

ii The Philippines, America's "Achilles Heel"¹⁷

As has been said, after the First World War tensions between the United States and Japan increased to a point where an early conflict in the Pacific appeared possible. The Wilson Administration had strenuously opposed Japan's post-war claims at the Versailles Peace Conference and Japanese attempts to establish a foothold in Siberia. Moreover, the administration was deeply concerned with the quickening pace of Japanese naval construction and recurrent rumours that Japan was fortifying strategic positions in the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands, in violation of her mandate from the League of Nations.¹⁸ These events were of natural concern to the American Joint Board¹⁹ which, with the passing of the Atlantic threat to American security, had turned its full attention and energies towards the development of a post-war defence programme which would fully meet the still existing Pacific threat to American security, Japan. In a review of American Pacific defence in 1919, the Joint Board was painfully aware that the Philippine Islands, America's major Far Eastern possession, had been suddenly transformed into the weakest element in the entire American Pacific defence system as a result of the League of Nations' mandate

to Japan for control of the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands; for Japan now possessed strategic positions which lay outside the southern flank of the American fleet's vital sea communications to the Philippines and the Far East via Hawaii and Guam (Map I). The Joint Board, therefore, was now confronted with the problem of defending 5000 miles of exposed sea communications from Hawaii to the Philippine Islands. In view of the wartime advances made in military technology, their defence would be nothing less than formidable:

The remarkable wartime development of marine mines, automotive torpedoes, and submarines multiplied the difficulties involved in maintaining intact any long and exposed line of oversea communications. Air power, especially shore based air power, though still in its infancy, had already revealed immense potentialities for interrupting sea communications. And the mandated islands provided not only refuges for submarines but literally scores of havens for naval aircraft which in the event of war in the Western Pacific, might conceivably be loosed with devastating effect.²⁰

In the light of such developments and the existing state of American Pacific defences, it was obvious to members of the Joint Board that an American battle fleet could no longer successfully operate in the Western Pacific in the defence of the Philippine Islands, as envisaged in war plan ORANGE.²¹ "At one time", wrote Captain Harry E. Jarnell of the Navy War Plans Division, "it was the plan of the Navy Department to send a fleet to the Philippines on the outbreak of war. I am sure that this would not be done at the present time...it seems certain that in the course of time the Philippines and whatever forces we may have there will be captured."²² The Joint Board clearly recognized that the future security of the Philippine Islands, and other American Far Eastern possessions, was now dependent upon the immediate establishment of American naval supremacy in the Western Pacific. This they recognized as being primarily the development of bases in that area rather than capital ship construction; for an American building programme was already well under way which would successfully meet Japanese naval construction. If completed, the American 1916 wartime building programme of thirty-six capital ships would guarantee the United States decisive superiority over Japan in capital ships through 1924.²³ In 1919, the United States had already constructed sixteen capital ships under the programme, and was in the process of

completing an additional nineteen in that same year.²⁴ What was urgently required, therefore, was the establishment of a "Far Eastern Bridge", consisting of fortified supporting bases from Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, to the Philippine Islands. This would enable an American battle fleet, once again, to operate successfully in the Western Pacific in the defence of the Philippine Islands and other American Far Eastern possessions. In 1919, the only existing American fortified naval base west of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, was Cavite (Manila Bay), Luzon, in the Philippine Islands. Although Cavite, as well as Manila, was heavily defended with a concentration of heavy fortifications and gun emplacements in and around Manila Bay and its islands, especially Corregidor, the naval base was capable of making only minor fleet repairs. Since the American battle fleet would now have to fight its way across the Central Pacific to the Philippine Islands, the establishment of a fortified first-class naval base in the Western Pacific was now essential; for fleet repairs would surely be required before the fleet could then proceed to the Philippines and engage the main Japanese fleet in Far Eastern waters. Following an exhaustive study of naval base development in the Pacific by the Navy Department, the Joint Board unanimously endorsed the Navy's views that a fortified first-class naval base at Guam (Map I) was the "naval key that would facilitate the passage of the fleet to the Far East and discourage any major Japanese operations against the Philippines."²⁵ American military authorities clearly understood, therefore, that without a secure first-class naval base at Guam, capable of servicing and repairing the fleet after its initial fight through the Central Pacific, the American "fleet would be delayed, and its task would become the reconquest instead of the reinforcement of the Philippines."²⁶ Moreover, they agreed with the British naval analyst, Hector C. Bywater, as to the deterrent value of such a base at Guam to the defence of the Philippine Islands: "But for one factor, the fate of the Philippines in the event of an Americo-Japanese conflict would be a foregone conclusion. That factor is Guam...." Despite the enormous mass of Japanese-held islands, "no Power would venture to molest the Philippines while a strong American 'fleet in being' was based at Guam."²⁷ The Joint Board, therefore, recommended to their government in December, 1919, that a first-class naval base be established at Guam and that naval facilities at Cavite be modernized. In addition, the Joint Board recommended that Guam be heavily fortified with a

large Army garrison, submarines, and heavy gun emplacements and that local defences at Manila be substantially augmented. Following the approval by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, the Joint Board's recommendations, together with the General Board's²⁸ estimates concerning completion of the 1916 naval building programme, were then submitted to Congress the following year for confirmation and the necessary appropriations.²⁹

By that time, however, American isolationist sentiment, which had steadily emerged since the Armistice, reached the proportion of a popular American revolt against militarism. All efforts by the newly-elected Harding Administration to obtain the necessary appropriations from Congress ended in failure. Instead, the Administration was confronted in June 1921 with a joint congressional resolution calling for an international conference on naval disarmament. This now put American military authorities entirely on the defensive with regard to their post-war defence programme. Succumbing to internal isolationist pressures, and external pressures from Great Britain, the Harding Administration announced on 11 July 1921 its intention to convene an international conference at Washington for the "limitation of armament" and for "reaching a common understanding with respect to principles and policies in the Far East."³⁰ The nature of American post-war defence, therefore, would be framed in Washington.

The Washington Treaties³¹ were a severe blow to the Joint Board's plans for the defence of the Philippines, and other American possessions in the Western Pacific. The General Board of the Navy had advised the American delegation at the Washington Conference that, in view of America's larger naval responsibilities, a two to one superiority over Japan in capital ship strength was essential for the successful conduct of an offensive against Japan in the Western Pacific. Moreover, the General Board had emphatically insisted that the American delegation at the Washington Conference enter into no agreements concerning the non-fortification and development of Pacific bases. Pacific bases, the General Board had argued, was vital to the American fleet's ability to "cross the Pacific and operate in Far Eastern waters."³² They had specifically cautioned the American delegation against acceding to Japanese demands that bases in the Western Pacific be neutralized in return for Japanese acceptance of a naval limitation ratio. The General Board consistently held that, with a superior

fleet and Guam fortified and developed, the United States could "permanently dominate the Western Pacific and prevent Japan from hazarding a war" against the Philippines.³³ President Harding and the American delegation, however, were willing to cede to Japan naval supremacy in the Western Pacific in return for American naval supremacy in the Eastern Pacific. Noting the temper of American congressional and public opinion, they viewed their military advisers' recommendations as totally unrealistic in the face of such domestic political considerations. They recognized that the American people were unwilling to develop the required military capability for successfully defending the Philippines or upholding other American Far Eastern interests through force of arms. Thus the American delegation at the Washington Conference accepted a ratio of 10:6 (or 5:3) capital ship strength with Japan and acceded to Japanese demands for a freeze on American base development and fortifications in the Western Pacific. The Washington treaties, therefore, fatally weakened the strategic position of the United States in the Western Pacific to a point where she no longer possessed "the power to defend the Philippines or to support any other American Far Eastern policy."³⁴

In an examination of the strategic implications of the Washington treaties to American Pacific security, the Joint Board clearly understood that America's position in the Western Pacific had been so fundamentally altered that a complete review of American Pacific strategy and the preparation of a new plan for war with Japan was now required. To this end, the Joint Board turned to its Planning Committee. However, discussions among Army and Navy planners about the relative strategic value and costs of defending the Philippines in a war with Japan brought to head a serious dispute between the two services over the Island's role in American Pacific strategy. Whereas Army planners wished immediately to withdraw all local defence forces from the Philippines, except those necessary to uphold civil order, Navy planners wanted to maintain naval facilities, defences and local defence forces at Manila to the maximum extent permissible under Article XIX of the Five Power Treaty. The Navy's overriding concern for the non-abandonment of the Philippines was linked to its traditional desire to conduct an offensive, if necessary, against Japan in the Western Pacific. In this respect, the General Board of the Navy clearly recognized that Article XIX had only increased the strategic value

of the Philippines, for Cavite (Manila Bay) was the only existing fortified American naval base in the Far East for possible use by an American battle fleet in an offensive against Japan in the Western Pacific. Therefore, an offensive in the Western Pacific, the General Board realized, "would be contingent on American possession of Manila Bay."³⁵

Upon hearing of the Army-Navy dispute, Leonard Wood, Governor-General of the Philippines and former Army Chief of Staff "with influential friends in Washington", complained bitterly to the Secretary of War in February, 1923:

The assumption...that in case of war with Japan the Philippine Islands could not be defended, must be abandoned, and a long war waged to take them back and re-establish ourselves in the Far East was a fatal error. Such a course...would damage the prestige of the United States in the eyes of the world, would have a disintegrating and demoralizing effect upon our people and could end only in national dishonor. I feel sure...that when you and the President realize the effect of this on our future...., steps will be taken at once to see that the Army and Navy assume that the Philippine Islands must not only be absolutely defended but succoured by the fleet.³⁶

Whether as a result of Wood's intervention, or for other reasons, the Army-Navy dispute subsided and the Joint Planning Committee vainly sought to develop an American Pacific strategy which would successfully defend the Philippines. The ensuing war plan adopted by the Joint Board and, subsequently, approved by the Secretaries of War and the Navy in September, 1924, carefully avoided the question of the abandonment of the Philippine Islands. As envisaged in war plan ORANGE (1924), the United States would conduct "an offensive war, primarily naval", against Japan in the Western Pacific. The first concern of the United States and the initial mission of the Army and Navy would be to establish American sea power in the Western Pacific "in strength superior to that of Japan." This would require the use of a "main outlying base" in that area. The primary mission of local Army and Navy forces (i.e., the US Asiatic fleet³⁷) in the Philippines, therefore, would be to hold Manila Bay until relieved by the U.S. fleet³⁸ and 50,000 troops from the west coast of the United States.³⁹

In view of American military capabilities and objectives, war plan ORANGE (1924) was totally unrealistic. As Louis Morton explains,

The plan was really more a statement of hopes than a realistic appraisal of what could be done. To have carried out such a plan in 1925 was far beyond the capabilities of either service. The entire military establishment in the Philippines did not then number more than 15,000 men. The 50,000 men who, according to the plan, were to sail for the Philippines from the west coast on the outbreak of war represented more than one-third the total strength of the Army. Moreover, naval facilities in Manila Bay were entirely inadequate to support the fleet....only at Pearl Harbor, 5,000 miles to the east, was there a base even partially capable of servicing the major surface units of the Battle Fleet.

The advantages of distance and location, which gave the Philippines their strategic importance, were all on the side of the Japanese. Japan's southernmost naval bases were less than 1,500 miles from the Philippines, and Formosa was only half that distance away. An expeditionary force from Japan could reach Manila in three days; one mounted from Formosa or the Ryukyus could make the journey in a much shorter time. An American force, even assuming it reached the Philippines safely in record time, would require several weeks for the journey. By that time, the Japanese flag might be waving over Manila and the U.S. fleet with its [fuel] bunkers depleted would be forced to fight under the most disadvantageous conditions or to beat an ignominious retreat.⁴⁰

As the gap between America's political commitment to defend the Philippines and the forces available to do so became increasingly wider, war plan ORANGE was revised many times after 1924, and with each revision, the possibility of success became increasingly remote. The impetus for these re-examinations of war plan ORANGE largely came from the Army, and its growing conviction that the Philippines were, indeed, indefensible. This view was based upon many factors: the development of air power; inadequate American base facilities in the Western Pacific; Japan's possession of the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands and control of the line of communications across the Central Pacific; and the weakness of the American Navy in relation to that of Japan.⁴¹ By 1935, the Army was fully convinced that the Philippines were not only indefensible but a military liability as well.

The first revision of ORANGE came in October 1926 as an effort by the planners to correct the ambiguities in the 1924 war plan. The 1926 war plan clearly specified Hawaii as the point of assembly

for troops, supplies and convoys for the journal westward. Moreover, the assumption of the earlier plan that Army reinforcements could sail directly to the Philippines was dropped in the 1926 war plan. The planners now clearly recognized that the Marshall, Caroline and Mariana Islands would have to be brought under American control first, and bases established in one or more of those island groups in order to guard the line of communications between Hawaii and the Philippine Islands. Not satisfied with these changes, the planners proposed additional revisions in November 1926, with the result that the Joint Board authorized the preparation of an entirely new war plan. Although the 1928 ORANGE plan retained the original concept of a naval advance across the Central Pacific, it now allowed more time to assemble reinforcements and paid more attention to securing the line of communications between Hawaii and the Philippine Islands. Moreover, local defence forces in the Philippines were now reassigned a primary and secondary mission: first to hold the entrance to Manila Bay (Bataan and Corregidor); and second, the entire Bay area "as long as consistent with the successful accomplishment of the primary mission." The doubtful expectations on the part of the Army that the Philippines could be held, prior to the arrival of the American Battle Fleet, was clearly evident in the Army's estimates of the enemy's military capacity as compared to its own. Japan, they noted, could mobilize and transport a force of 300,000 troops to the Philippines in thirty days. Within seven days of an attack, Japan could have 50,000-60,000 men off Luzon, within fifteen days another 100,000. The U.S. Army, on the other hand, would have to meet this attack with the forces then present in the Philippine Islands: 11,000 troops of which 7,000 were Filipinos, a native constabulary of about 6,000 men, and an air component consisting of nine bombers and eleven pursuit planes. Under such circumstances, the best that was hoped for was a successful delaying action by local Philippine forces which would buy enough time for the Battle Fleet to arrive with the much needed reinforcements. To local commanders at Manila, however, this represented nothing less than a self-delusion on the part of military authorities in Washington. "To carry out the present ORANGE plan with its provisions for the early dispatch of our fleet to Philippine waters", wrote General Stanley D. Embick, Commander of the Corregidor garrison, in 1933, "would be literally an act of madness."⁴² This statement takes on an added significance from the fact that Embick had

designed and helped establish the early fortifications at Corregidor. By this time, Embick had become a leading spokesman in advocating the military abandonment of the Philippines since the American government was unwilling to provide the means for its defence; and his views were finding increasing support within the War Department. In a memorandum to his superiors, Embick pointed out that Corregidor

could probably withstand attack for about a year. But the defense of Corregidor was designed only to deny to the naval vessels of an enemy the use of Manila Bay. Its possession could not ensure the U.S. fleet a sheltered harbor in which to overhaul and repair major fleet units as long as an enemy could command the waters of Manila Bay from the land side. The Army's defenses in the Philippines were not strong enough to prevent a determined and aggressive enemy from reaching Manila by land in a short time and denying the use of the Bay to the American fleet. The best that could be hoped for in the event of war with Japan...was that wise counsels would prevail, and that the American people would acquiesce in the temporary loss of the Philippines until such time—2 to 3 years—as the fleet could return to Far Eastern waters.⁴³

Dissatisfaction on the part of local Philippine commanders with war plan ORANGE did not end with Embick's recommendation for a military withdrawal from the Philippines. Since the question of granting independence to the Philippine Islands was then being actively considered in the United States, there existed even less chance that Congress would approve the necessary appropriations for the successful defence of the Philippines. In March 1934, when the Tydings-McDuffie Act granting the Philippines their independence by 1946 was passed by Congress, the commanders of the Philippine Department and of the U.S. Asiatic fleet presented a joint letter to their respective Chiefs in Washington asserting that they could not carry out their missions under war plan ORANGE. "The tremendous strides made in the art of warfare since Manila Bay and Corregidor were selected as a base", they argued, "and the spectacular rise of Japan as a military power have nullified the supposed value of that base." Moreover, they pointed out that aerial and gas warfare, the increase in the speed and power of surface ships, and other factors had combined to make the defence of Manila Bay futile with the forces available.⁴⁴ Although the joint letter, together with General Embick's memorandum, resulted in another re-examination of war plan ORANGE, the Joint Board ruled against the Philippine Commanders and held that their mission

as stated in the war plan-- to hold Manila Bay-- would stand. In its decision, the Joint Board was repeatedly assured by Navy planners that reinforcements could be convoyed across the Central Pacific in time to avert disaster. Although Army planners were highly sceptical, on the advice of the War Department they did not force the issue with their naval counterparts.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, war plan ORANGE was revised in May, 1935. As in the 1928 revision, the planners gave greater attention to the need for securing the line of communications from Hawaii to the Philippine Islands. The American Battle Fleet and Army reinforcements were now to advance in "progressive stages" through the Japanese Mandated Islands, seizing in turn the Marshall and Caroline Islands and developing there bases needed to secure the line of communications to the Western Pacific. Although these changes did not affect the basic concept of the plan-- an offensive in the Western Pacific-- they represented a recognition on the part of the planners that greater time would be required for the United States to establish naval supremacy in the Western Pacific. This was now estimated to take one to two years.⁴⁶ In view of the doubts already expressed by the local Philippine commanders about their ability to hold Manila Bay, these revisions made war plan ORANGE even more unrealistic than before.

With the gradual re-emergence of an Atlantic threat to American security, the Army was fully to accept the obvious fact that the Philippines were, indeed, indefensible. Moreover, they were to view the Islands as a distinct military liability as well; by draining off limited American forces needed to defend the continental United States and the more vital areas in the Western Hemisphere from a possible two-ocean war. These views were to result in a resumption of the Army-Navy dispute over the role of the Philippines in American Pacific strategy which was to last for more than two years. The Army was to take the firm position that the United States should not attempt to defend or relieve the Philippines but instead adopt a strategic defensive along the Pacific triangle of Alaska-Hawaii-Panama Canal, whereas the Navy was still to cling to an active defence of the Philippines in order to retain a Far Eastern base for the conduct of an offensive against Japan in the Western Pacific. Unlike the earlier dispute, however, a solution to this one was to be found in Anglo-American naval co-operation.

iii Anglo-American Naval Co-operation

In recognition of the growing European threat to American security from Germany and Italy, together with Japan's unabated expansionist aims in the Pacific, the Secretaries of War and the Navy, in November 1935, called upon the Joint Board to re-examine the military position of the United States in the Far East. They apprehensively noted that "the cumulative efforts of successive developments during the past two decades have so weakened our military position vis-à-vis Japan that our position in the Far East is one that may result not only in our being forced into war but into a war that would have to be fought under conditions that might preclude its successful prosecution." As a result of the Secretaries' directive, and subsequent re-examination of war plan ORANGE by the Joint Planning Committee, Army and Navy planners found themselves locked, once again, in total disagreement over the future role of the Philippines in American Pacific strategy. The Army's position was argued strongly by General Embick, now Chief of the Army War Plans Division. Reliance on a base that is inadequately defended, he observed, is to invite national disaster. In a war with Japan, Embick argued, the Philippines would in all probability be lost as soon as the outbreak of hostilities. The best the United States would be able to do would be to advance progressively through the Japanese Mandated Islands. In effect, Embick declared, this meant that the Navy would be unable to reinforce the Philippines in time to prevent the Japanese from taking Manila Bay. American Pacific strategy, he insisted, should concentrate on holding the Pacific Triangle of Alaska, Hawaii and the Panama Canal (Map I). Such a strategy would place the United States in an invulnerable position and permit its military forces to conduct operations "in such a manner that will promise success instead of national disaster." Navy planners, on the other hand, were vigorously opposed to this view of Pacific strategy. All their planning was based upon the deployment of an American Battle Fleet in offensive operations west of Hawaii and acceptance of the Pacific Triangle as America's Pacific defence line would relegate the Navy to a strategic defensive in the Eastern Pacific. This difference of opinion regarding Pacific strategy was so fundamental that Army and Navy planners, unable to reach an agreement among themselves, submitted separate reports to the Joint Board as the basis for a revision of war plan ORANGE.

Army planners, recommending a withdrawal of American forces from the Philippines, pointed out that America's position in the Western Pacific had been growing steadily weaker as a result of many factors since 1919: the reduction of military forces in the Philippine Islands; the Washington treaties; the decline of American naval strength relative to that of Japan; and the present status of the Philippine Islands as a semi-independent state. Although they acknowledged that the naval limitations imposed by the Washington treaties would expire in December, 1936, Army planners felt that the American Congress and people would still be unwilling adequately to provide for the defence of the Philippines.⁴⁷ On the other hand, Navy planners, recommending a retention of American military forces in the Philippines, pointed out that Manila Bay was needed by the U.S. fleet to support American policy in the Far East. American national interests, they assumed, were those already announced: the Open Door policy in China; the maintenance of the balance of power in Asia; and the defence of the Philippines. Japanese policy, they argued, was one of progressive expansion, having as its objective the complete domination of the Western Pacific. The separate reports and recommendations of the Army and Navy planners hardly provided the Joint Board with the basis of a new war plan; and as constituted, there was little the Joint Board could do since it had no authority to compel either service to accept its decision on the matter.⁴⁸

The Army-Navy dispute over American Pacific strategy continued through 1936, when Japan joined Germany and Italy in the Anti-Comintern Pact, and into 1937. In November of that year, after Japan launched her full offensive into Northern China, the Joint Board, at the insistence of the Army Chief of Staff, ordered a re-examination of war plan ORANGE. They found war plan ORANGE "unsound in general" and "wholly inapplicable" to the international situation. In less than two weeks, the Joint Planning Committee still reported its inability to reach an agreement. Army planners wanted to draw up a defensive plan which would restrict American military forces entirely to the defence of the Pacific Triangle, thus providing for the security of the continental United States and the Pacific Ocean as far as Hawaii. With Italy and Germany clearly in mind, they pointed out that limited action and purely defensive operations in the Pacific might be required. Moreover, the American military force available for a two-ocean war, they argued, would

barely be adequate for assuring the defence of vital areas in the Western Hemisphere. To uncover these positions for an offensive in the Western Pacific, the Army planners declared, would be sheer folly. Navy planners, on the other hand, took the position that American Pacific strategy should not be limited to a purely defensive position on the Pacific Triangle but should aim at defeating Japan. Once war begins, Navy planners argued, American armaments and forces could be quickly increased to provide for both the security of the continental United States and for offensive operations in the Western Pacific. Moreover, should Germany and Italy become involved, Navy planners emphasized, the United States would surely have allies to provide the assistance needed by the U.S. fleet to maintain naval superiority over Japan and permit the projection of American naval power in the Western Pacific. Although as yet, they admitted, "the character, amount, and location of Allied assistance cannot be predicted", faced with continual split reports from the Joint Planning Committee, the Joint Board, in late December, turned over the task of working out a compromise in Pacific strategy to General Embick and Rear Admiral James O. Richardson, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.⁴⁹

During the course of their discussions, Admiral Richardson continually urged his superior, Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), to convince President Roosevelt of the need for allies.⁵⁰ Roosevelt, upon hearing of the Army-Navy dispute and recognizing himself the changing international situation, directed Leahy and the Navy War Plans Division to revise war plan ORANGE on the possible contingencies of a two-ocean war and co-operation with the Royal Navy. Roosevelt's executive directive stemmed from an invitation extended by the British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Ronald Lindsay, who, on instructions from the Admiralty and the Foreign Office on 27 November, suggested that the United States and Great Britain undertake naval staff conversations and a joint display of naval power as a deterrent to further Japanese aggression in China. Although the joint display of British and American naval power in the Pacific never materialized,⁵¹ owing to Great Britain's later pre-occupation with the developing Axis threat in the Mediterranean, Captain Royal E. Ingersoll, Chief of the Navy War Plans Division, was directed to London by Leahy and Roosevelt to explore with the Admiralty, on an informal and non-binding basis, Anglo-American naval

co-operation in the event of a common war against Japan. The Ingersoll mission was to lay the cornerstone of the developing crypto-Anglo-American alliance of 1937-1941; for Ingersoll's mission strengthened the belief that a Pacific war would render Anglo-American naval co-operation inevitable, and this affected Anglo-American strategical thinking in a general way until much more comprehensive plans were laid out during the Washington staff conversations in early 1941.⁵²

Arriving in London on 31 December, 1937, Ingersoll held naval conversations at the Admiralty, between 3 and 13 January, 1938, with Lord Chatfield, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, and Captain Tom Phillips,⁵³ Director of the Admiralty War Plans Division. During the discussions, the American and British naval planners agreed that, in the event of a common war with Japan, the United States and Great Britain should simultaneously dispatch Battle fleets to the Pacific in support of each other. As envisaged by the planners, the U.S. Battle Fleet would consist of ten capital ships with supporting naval units; whereas, the British Far Eastern fleet would consist of nine capital ships with supporting naval units. Together, this Anglo-American Pacific fleet would consist of nineteen capital ships in relation to Japan's ten. In order for the British and American Battle fleets to co-operate effectively in the Pacific, the British and American naval planners also agreed that their respective naval base facilities, ports etc. would be available for use by both the British and American Navies: "All waters of the British Commonwealth, including the Dominions, will be available for use of U.S. Naval forces and that all waters of the United States, including the Philippines, will be available for use of the British Naval forces." The initial movements of the two Battle fleets were also agreed upon. On the outbreak of war with Japan, the United States would dispatch the U.S. Battle fleet to Hawaii, from where it would then gradually advance through the Japanese Mandated Islands; whereas the British Far Eastern fleet would proceed immediately to Singapore. Since the two Battle fleets would be widely separated at first, and probably for some time, the British and American naval planners also agreed that there should be an immediate interchange of communication personnel, naval codes, etc., in order to facilitate effective strategical co-operation between the two Battle fleets. During the course of the discussions, the possibility of Germany's

entering the war on the side of Japan was recognized. The British naval planners viewed this possibility with great apprehension; for Germany was expected to attack Imperial trade routes in the Atlantic with "Pocket Battleships" and commerce raiders. Moreover, should Italy join Germany, the prospects were even more alarming to the British naval planners. These acknowledged to Ingersoll that the Royal Navy would then have to rely heavily upon the French fleet for assistance against Italy in the Mediterranean and put the bulk of its naval forces in the Atlantic. Under such circumstances, the British naval planners warned Ingersoll that "it would almost certainly be necessary to effect a considerable reduction in the British strength in the Far East." The American Navy, it was suggested, could then make up the British naval deficit in the Pacific in return for the security the Royal Navy would provide the United States in the Atlantic. However, this aspect of global strategical responsibility, the British and American naval planners acknowledged, would require later consideration in the light of future developments in Europe.⁵⁴

Having obtained from the Royal Navy the use of a secure Far Eastern fleet base, Singapore, and possible naval assistance in the Atlantic, Admiral Richardson was now able to convince General Embick of the continuing feasibility of an offensive against Japan in the Western Pacific. General Embick, on the other hand, now gained from Admiral Richardson a recognition of the primary importance of the Pacific Triangle, Alaska-Hawaii and Panama Canal, to American Pacific security. The two senior service planners, therefore, submitted a new war plan ORANGE to the Joint Board which was approved by the Secretaries of War and the Navy in February, 1938, thus ending the Army-Navy dispute over the role of the Philippines in American Pacific strategy. As envisaged in war plan ORANGE (1938), the United States, on the outbreak of war with Japan, would first assume a "position of readiness" or defence in the Eastern Pacific. After sufficiently providing for the defence of the continental United States as far as the Pacific Triangle, American military forces would then take offensive action against Japan from Hawaii, in a gradual advance through the Japanese Mandated Islands to the Western Pacific. Significantly, unlike earlier ORANGE plans, the Philippines were not to be reinforced. Their defence was now entirely to rest upon the existing peacetime garrison of 11,000 troops, plus the

native Philippine Army then being organized by General Douglas MacArthur. Moreover, local defence forces in the Philippines were now given the sacrificial mission of holding the entrance to Manila Bay (i.e. Corregidor and neighbouring islands) in order to deny that bay to Japanese naval forces.⁵⁵ By 1938, therefore, the United States had militarily retreated from the Far East and had begun to give primary attention to the security of the continental United States through Hemisphere defence.

With the rapidly deteriorating situation in Europe and the final emergence of a clearly defined Atlantic threat to American security in late 1938, the United States moved from a partial (ORANGE, 1938) to a general Hemisphere defence in order to ensure the security of the continental United States from the possibility of a two-ocean war. Immediately following the Munich crisis, President Roosevelt warned the American people on 14 November, 1938, of the dangers posed by a European and Asian war to the security of the United States and that the United States must be prepared to meet such threats to its security through the defence of the Western Hemisphere.⁵⁶ Although Roosevelt's declaration of national policy failed to elicit any significant response from the American people, it was a confirmation of the Roosevelt Administration's intention to reverse American Isolationist policy from a passive defence of the United States to an active defence of the Western Hemisphere through re-armament and military alliance. Having anticipated the President's formal enunciation of national policy, the Joint Board had instructed its Planning Committee, on 8 November, 1938, to undertake an explanatory study of the "various practicable courses of action open to the military and naval forces of the United States" should Germany, Italy and Japan threaten American security and interests in both the Atlantic and Pacific areas simultaneously.⁵⁷ Here, for the first time, was a specific directive to the planners to study the problems presented by a two-ocean war in which the United States would be opposed by a coalition of powers.⁵⁸ After five months of study, the planners submitted their report to the Joint Board in April 1938. With respect to the Atlantic area, the planners concluded that Germany and Italy would most likely direct their aggression towards a progressive encroachment into Latin America; initially through economic and political penetration that would reduce Latin American governments

to a subservient or colonial status, and finally through occupation and the establishment of military bases. Their first military move, the planners believed, would be to occupy the area around Natal, on the eastern bulge of Brazil, in order to strengthen their strategic position in the South Atlantic and launch direct attacks upon the Panama Canal. As for the Pacific area, Japan's objectives would be directed towards an early capture of the Philippines and Guam and the complete domination of the entire Western Pacific. In order to facilitate her programme, Japan would first have to neutralize the U.S. fleet. Prophetically, the planners pointed out that "a probable Japanese measure would be to damage major fleet units without warning, or possibly attempt to block the fleet in Pearl Harbor."⁵⁹ Confronted with such possibilities, the planners agreed that a successful defence of the Western Hemisphere was of primary importance to American continental security. They therefore recommended that vital areas within the Western Hemisphere-- the Pacific Triangle and Caribbean areas--be militarily strengthened with fortifications and naval and air bases. This was essential to ensure the security of the United States and provide for the successful defence of the Western Hemisphere.⁶⁰ Significantly, no mention was made of the Philippines in the measures proposed to prepare the United States for a possible war with Germany, Italy and Japan. Obviously, the planners did not consider the Philippine Islands, or other American Far Eastern possessions, as vital to America's Pacific interests. As the Army planners declared:

If the American government and people had so considered, they would never have consented in the Washington Conference to put the security of those possessions in pawn to the mere good faith of Japan, which even in 1922 was not on an irreproachable plane. If they had so considered, the Japanese denunciation of the Washington treaties would have instantly been followed by the impregnable fortification and garrisoning of the Philippines and Guam. If they had so considered, the Philippine Independence Act would never have been passed...Whether right or wrong, they have successively undermined the possibility of successful defence by the Army and Navy of these possessions.⁶¹

The planners, however, were astute enough to recognize, as later proved to be the case, that "emotionalized opinion, rather than... a reasoned adjustment of operations to the means at hand" might decide which areas would be defended and where American military and

naval forces would fight.⁶² In examining the various courses of action open to the United States in the event of concerted aggression by Germany, Italy and Japan, the planners clearly understood that the United States could not effectively defend both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans simultaneously with a one-ocean Navy:

In the event of such a concerted aggression there can be no doubt that the vital interests of the United States would require offensive measures in the Atlantic against Germany and Italy to preserve the vital security of the Caribbean and the Panama Canal. If this is done it will be necessary to assume a defensive attitude in the Eastern Pacific [against Japan]....

If the United States on the other hand should decide to undertake offensive operations [against Japan] by a Western Pacific advance, she must take due cognizance at all times of the situation and its potentialities in the Western Atlantic in regard to German and Italian activities...⁶³

On the question of American Pacific strategy, Army and Navy planners, once again, took contrary positions. The Army planners, increasingly concerned with possible German and Italian aggression in the Atlantic area, held that a defensive in the Eastern Pacific was the best possible course of action; whereas, the Navy planners, fortified by possible British naval assistance in the Atlantic area, held to their traditional desire for an offensive against Japan in the Western Pacific. In order to resolve their differences, the planners recommended that a series of war plans be developed, each of them applicable to a different situation in which the United States would have to meet the combined threats from Germany, Italy and Japan. All, however, would give priority to the security of the United States through Hemisphere defence. Army planners, moreover, urged that there be a policy decision by the President which "would determine the support that might be expected from the other democracies."⁶⁴ Having accepted the study, the Joint Board then directed their Planning Committee to prepare a new series of war plans, entitled RAINBOW, in order to distinguish them from the "colour" plans e.g. ORANGE which were all based upon American military operations against a single power. The most limited plan (RAINBOW 1) was to provide for the defence of the Western Hemisphere to the bulge of Brazil, 10 degrees South latitude. Two other plans were to provide alternatively for the extension of American military operations from that area either to the Western Pacific (RAINBOW 1) or to the rest of South

America (RAINBOW 3). The directive also called for a plan (RAINBOW 4) under the contingency that Great Britain and France would be at war with Germany and Italy and possibly Japan, in which case it was assumed that the United States would be involved as a major participant.⁶⁵

Although no Presidential decision was immediately forthcoming regarding the amount of military support that the United States might expect from the other democracies, Roosevelt clearly understood the need for additional planning and co-ordination with Great Britain for a possible two-ocean war. This understanding had prompted Roosevelt to request from the British government further naval conversations in order to concert British and American plans for a possible war with Germany, Italy and Japan. Thus, in June 1939, Commander T.C. Hampton, R.N., of the Admiralty War Plans Division, was dispatched under cover, as a travelling real estate agent, to Washington for informal talks with the American Navy Department.⁶⁶ In the discussions with Admiral Leahy, CNO, and Rear Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, Chief of Navy War Plans Division, at the Navy Department, Hampton informed the American naval planners that Imperial naval strategy had been revised as a result of the deteriorating situation in Europe since 1938. Hampton advised Leahy that Imperial naval strategy was now "to maintain a portion of their fleet in home waters and the remainder, except part of the China Detachment and Dominion forces, in the Eastern Mediterranean"⁶⁷ in order to meet the German Naval threat in the North Sea and the Atlantic and to help the French fleet tie down the Italian Navy in the Mediterranean. In the event of a war with Germany, Italy and Japan, Imperial naval strategy would then be to knock out Italy quickly and as soon as Italy was reduced and the Mediterranean secure, to send naval reinforcements to Singapore.⁶⁸ Thus, the British government, Hampton explained, could no longer promise what size Battle fleet would go to Singapore or when it would arrive.⁶⁹ The American Navy, therefore, would now have to assume major strategic responsibility in the Pacific against Japan. Leahy accepted, in principle, this division of global strategic responsibility. In reply, Leahy first warned Hampton that he could not commit the United States Navy to any definite agreement, but then advised the British naval planner that: "Broadly speaking, [if America entered the war] the U.S. fleet should control the Pacific and the Allied fleets

[British and French] should control European waters, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic...the U.S. fleet should move to Singapore in sufficient force to be able to engage and defeat the Japanese fleet if met with on passage."⁷⁰ Should the United States remain neutral, Leahy continued, the President would hold the U.S. Battle fleet at Pearl Harbor where its flanking position would keep Japan from attacking Australia and New Zealand.⁷¹

Having obtained from the Royal Navy an "informal understanding" with regard to global strategic responsibility in the event of a common war with Germany, Italy and Japan, the Navy planners' position regarding Pacific strategy was strengthened and, subsequently, the development of war plans for an offensive in the Western Pacific received high priority. Following the Anglo-American naval conversations, the Planning Committee recommended to the Joint Board that their directive be amended. They suggested that RAINBOW 4 be replaced by two war plans based upon the assumption that the United States, in "co-operation" with Great Britain and France, would be at war with Germany, Italy and Japan. One war plan would provide for a large-scale American effort against Germany; the other for a large-scale American effort against Japan:

The United States, England, and France opposed to Germany, Italy and Japan, with the United States providing maximum participation, in particular as regards armies in Europe.

The United States, England, and France opposed to Germany, Italy and Japan, with the United States NOT providing maximum participation in continental Europe, but maintaining the Monroe Doctrine and carrying out allied Democratic Power tasks in the Pacific.⁷²

The Planning Committee further recommended that this latter war plan, for a large-scale American effort in the Pacific, be given high priority by being moved up into the RAINBOW 2 position; where it "might conceivably press more for answers" than all other war plans than RAINBOW 1, the most limited war plan for the defence of the Western Hemisphere.⁷³ The Joint Board accepted their Planning Committee's recommendations and, on 30 June, 1939, issued a new directive for the preparation of the RAINBOW war plans according to the following revised specific situations:

A. RAINBOW 1:

Prevent the violation of the letter or spirit of the Monroe Doctrine by protecting that territory of the Western Hemisphere from which the vital interests of the United States can be threatened, while protecting the United States, its possessions and its sea-borne trade. This territory is assumed to be any part of the Western Hemisphere north of the latitude of 10° South.

B. RAINBOW 2:

1) Provide for the missions in A.

2) Under the assumption that the United States, Great Britain, and France are acting in concert, on terms wherein the United States does not provide maximum participation in continental Europe, but undertakes, as its major share in the concerted effort, to sustain the interests of Democratic Powers in the Pacific, to provide for the tasks essential to sustain these interests, and to defeat enemy forces in the Pacific.

C. RAINBOW 3:

1) Carry out the missions in A.

2) Protect American interests in the Western Pacific by securing control in the Western Pacific, as rapidly as possible consistent with carrying out the missions in A.

D. RAINBOW 4:

Prevent the violation of the letter or spirit of the Monroe Doctrine by protecting all the territory and Governments of the Western Hemisphere against external aggression while protecting the United States, its possessions, and its sea-borne trade. The Plan will provide for projecting U.S. Army forces as necessary to the southern port of the South American continent or to the Eastern Atlantic.

E. RAINBOW 5:

1) Provide for the missions in A.

2) Project the armed forces of the United States to the Eastern Atlantic and to either or both of the African or European Continents, as rapidly as possible consistent with carrying out the missions in A, in order to effect the decisive defeat of Germany, or Italy, or both. The plan will assume concerted action between the United States, Great Britain, and France.⁷⁴

On the outbreak of the European war in September 1939, Army and Navy planners were already engaged in developing war plans in terms of RAINBOW 2. Moreover, work on RAINBOW 2 continued on during the winter of 1939-1940. During this period of the "phoney war",

RAINBOW 2 appeared to be, as the planners had expected it to be, the war plan most appropriate to the military situation. Great Britain and France were at war with Germany. They controlled Northwestern Europe and Northern Africa. Their fleet controlled the Atlantic, and to a lesser degree the North and Mediterranean seas. Thus, no real threat to the Western Hemisphere existed from the European quarter. Under such conditions, an American offensive against Japan into the Western Pacific was entirely practical.

Planning for such an eventuality, however, proved to be more complex than that envisaged in ORANGE; now that the United States was charged with the responsibility of supporting other "Democratic Powers" in the Pacific, the planners first had to assume how far the Japanese would extend their control into the Southwest Pacific before the United States and the other Democratic Powers would be able to take action. Three alternative hypotheses were studied:

- 1) Japan had not begun to move southward from Formosa. The United States fleet might move to Manila Bay with detached units to Singapore, Cam Ranh Bay, and Hong Kong with ground troops either accompanying or following later to the Western Pacific. These acts, it was hoped, would prevent a war in the Pacific.

- 2) Japan had already taken Hong Kong and Cam Ranh Bay and had begun operations in the Netherlands East Indies. In this case the United States would react by moving forces to the Western Pacific, whereupon the Japanese would move against Guam and the Philippines.

- 3) Japan had already taken the Netherlands East Indies and isolated Singapore and was in a position to take the Philippines. In this case, as Army planners pointed out, "the principal advantage of Allied participation will have been lost and the problem becomes essentially that of an ORANGE war."⁷⁵

Since initial Japanese military operations into the Southwest Pacific appeared less likely under the first and third hypotheses, planning for RAINBOW 2 proceeded on the second hypothesis. In that case, the main movement of American military forces in the Pacific would be to Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. In order to secure that position before Japan extended effective control over that area, the planners clearly recognized that American military forces would have to be rapidly projected into the Western Pacific. Thus, American military forces would have to move to Singapore and

the Netherlands East Indies not by way of the Central Pacific through the Japanese Mandated Islands but by way of the South Pacific. Two principal South Pacific routes were contemplated by the planners: Hawaii to the Fiji Islands then westward north of New Guinea through the Moluccas to the Java Sea; and the more southerly route, Hawaii to the Fiji Islands and New Caledonia through the Torres Strait to the Java Sea. The joint tasks of U.S. Army and Navy, in concert with British, French and Dutch forces, would be to establish American military forces in the Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies area (the so-called Malay Barrier), obtain control of that area, and drive the Japanese out. The peace settlement would then entail Japanese evacuation of Hong Kong, the Philippines and Guam. In trying to harmonize American operations with those of the other "Democratic Powers", e.g. Australia and New Zealand, the planners encountered a number of important questions which remained to be answered before a fully operational plan could be developed. The Joint Planning Committee therefore recommended that the United States government should propose conversations with the British, Dutch and French governments.⁷⁶ Before the Joint Board could act on this recommendation, however, events in Europe were completely to upset American plans for an offensive against Japan in the Western Pacific and confront American authorities with a major strategic question regarding grand strategy.

Footnotes

The American Retreat to the Pacific Triangle

i American Pacific Security and Isolationism

¹Roy S. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, The War Department, U.S. Army in World War II* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1951), p. 36.

²Mark Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, The War Department, U.S. Army in World War II* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1950), "(Hereinafter referred to as *Chief of Staff.*)", p. 17.

³*Ibid.*

⁴J. Chalmers Vinson, "Military force and American Policy, 1919-1939", in *Isolation and Security*, ed. by Alexander De Conde (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1957), p. 59.

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶*Ibid.*; Watson, *Chief of Staff*, p. 15.

⁷Manfred Jonas, *Isolationism in America, 1935-1941* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 15.

⁸Robert Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in American Foreign Relations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 32.

⁹Selig Adler, *The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth-Century Reaction* (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1957), pp. 9-26.

¹⁰Jonas, *Isolationism in America, 1935-1941*, pp. 24-27, pp. 244-287.

¹¹Raymond Buell, *Isolated America* (New York: Knopf, 1940), pp. 37-65.
Donald Drummond, *The Passing of American Neutrality, 1937-1941* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1955), pp. 22-25.
and Jonas, *Isolationism in America, 1935-1941*, pp. 27-30.

The most prominent revisionist historians and their writings were:

Frederick Bausman, *Let France Explain* (London, 1922);

John Kenneth Turner, *Shall It Be Again* (New York, 1922);

Harry Elmer Barnes, *The Genesis of the World War: An Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt* (New York, 1926);

Harold D. Lusswell, *Propaganda Techniques in the World War* (New York, 1927);

C. Hartley Grattan, *Why We Fought* (New York, 1929) and *The Deadly Parallel* (New York, 1939);

Walter Millis, *Road to War* (New York, 1935) and

Edwin Borchard and William Lage, *Neutrality for the United States* (New Haven, 1937).

¹²Alexander De Conde, "On Twentieth-Century Isolationism", in *Isolation and Security*, Alexander De Conde, ed., (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1957), p. 22;

Robert Ferrell, "The Peace Movement," *ibid.*, pp. 82-106.

¹³Jonas, *Isolationism in America, 1935-1941*, p. 30.

¹⁴Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in American Foreign Relations*, p. 3.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 378.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 409.

ii The Philippines, America's "Achilles Heel"

¹⁷The Philippine Islands had long been recognized by American authorities as the nation's most vulnerable Pacific outpost. This realization was dramatically brought to life during the 1907 war scare between the United States and Japan. At the height of that crisis, President Theodore Roosevelt wrote that the Philippine Islands "form our heel of Achilles". Significantly the United States, thereafter, attempted to shield their Achilles Heel by constructing the nation's first outlying Pacific fleet base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. For greater details see Louis Morton, "Preparations for the Defense of the Philippines During the War Scare of 1907", *Military Affairs*, XIII, (Summer, 1949).

¹⁸Sprout and Sprout, *Towards a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene 1918-1922*, p. 98.

¹⁹The American Joint Board was the mechanism for Army-Navy co-operation which was established by the Secretaries of War and the Navy in 1903. As reconstituted in 1919, the Joint Board consisted of six members: the Chief and Deputy Chief of the General Staff, the Chief and Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy War Plans Divisions. Attached to the Joint Board was the Joint Planning Committee composed of members of the Army and Navy War Plans Division. The Joint Board was a purely advisory body whose functions were to advise the Secretaries of War and the Navy on strategic policies regarding national defence. Their recommendations, therefore, became national policy only on the approval of the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and at times, the President, as the nation's Commander-in-Chief. However, Congress, as the holder of the nation's "purse strings", could veto the action of the Secretaries and the President by withholding the necessary appropriations for the implementation of the Joint Board's recommendations. The Joint Board was later superseded by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff in early 1942. Watson, *Chief of Staff*, pp. 79-81, 97-100; Urs Schwarz, *American Strategy: A New Perspective* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1966), p. 18.

²⁰Sprout and Sprout, *Towards a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922*, p. 94.

- ²¹Joint Army and Navy "colour plans", or war plans, were designed to meet a specific national threat designated by a colour, which corresponded to the code name of the nation involved. Thus, ORANGE denoted Japan and war plan ORANGE provided the strategic concept and missions to be followed by the Army and Navy in the event of war with that nation. The first war plan ORANGE was drawn up as early as 1904 when Japan's sudden attack upon Russia threatened to upset the balance of power in the Pacific. Thereafter, war plan ORANGE was revised frequently according to changes in the international scene. Louis Morton, "War Plan ORANGE, Evolution of a Strategy", *World Politics*, XI (January, 1959), 222.
- ²²Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 25.
- ²³Sprout and Sprout, *Towards a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922*, p. 55;
William R. Braisted, *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922*, (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1971), p. 472.
- ²⁴Sprout and Sprout, *Towards a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922*, p. 52.
- ²⁵Braisted, *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922*, p. 475.
- ²⁶Earl S. Pomeroy, *Pacific Outpost: American Strategy in Guam and Micronesia*, (New York: Russell and Russell, 1951), p. 77.
- ²⁷*Ibid.*, "citing" Hector C. Bywater, *Sea Power in the Pacific: A Study of the American-Japanese Naval Problem*, (Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1921), pp. 263-265.
- ²⁸The General Board of the Navy was an advisory body within the Navy Department whose functions were to advise the Secretary of Navy on building programmes, naval bases, war plans and other policy matters.
- ²⁹Braisted, *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922*, pp. 475-476, pp. 515-518; Sprout and Sprout, *Towards a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922*, pp. 98-102.
- ³⁰Sprout and Sprout, *Towards a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922*, pp. 104-135.
- ³¹See *supra*, pp. 3-8.
- ³²Braisted, *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922*, pp. 592-595.
- ³³Pomeroy, *Pacific Outpost: American Strategy in Guam and Micronesia*, p. 81.
- ³⁴Dudley W. Knox, *The Eclipse of American Sea Power*, (New York: American Army Navy Journal, Inc., 1922), pp. 135-136 as "cited by" Sprout and Sprout, *Towards a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922*, p. 269.
- ³⁵Braisted, *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922*, pp. 679-687.
- ³⁶Morton, *Strategy and Command*, pp. 27-28.

- ³⁷The U.S. Asiatic fleet was no more than a collection of ships to show the flag in the Far East rather than a balanced or operational fleet.
- ³⁸In December, 1922, the American fleet was reorganized as the "U.S. fleet". The U.S. fleet was to consist of two principal fleet subdivisions, a Scouting fleet based on the Atlantic coast and a Battle fleet based on the Pacific coast. Of the eighteen battle-ships allowed by the Washington Conference, twelve were to form the heart of the Battle fleet, with the remaining ships, the oldest and slowest, being assigned to the Scouting fleet. The reorganization of the American fleet, which had been previously stationed in Atlantic waters, clearly demonstrated America's recognition of her then principal threat, that from Japan.
- Gerald E. Wheeler, *Prelude to Pearl Harbor, The United States Navy and the Far East, 1921-1931* (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1964), p. 71.
- ³⁹Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 29.
- ⁴⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.
- ⁴¹Louis Morton, "American and Allied Strategy in the Far East", *Military Review*, XXIX (December, 1949), 24.
- ⁴²Morton, *Strategy and Command*, pp. 33-35.
- ⁴³Morton, "American and Allied Strategy in the Far East", p. 24.
- ⁴⁴Morton, "War Plan ORANGE, Evolution of a Strategy", p. 239.
- ⁴⁵Maurice Matloff and Edwin Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, the War Department, U.S. Army in World War II* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953), (Hereinafter referred to as *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare*) , p. 3.
- ⁴⁶Morton, "War Plan ORANGE, Evolution of a Strategy", pp. 240-241.
- ⁴⁷Army planners correctly assessed the strength of American isolationism following the abrogation of the Washington Treaties in December, 1936. The Navy once again attempted to secure congressional approval for the establishment of a major naval base in the Western Pacific. To this end, Congress appointed a board, headed by Rear Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn, to investigate the matter. In December, 1938, the Hepburn Board submitted its report to Congress which recommended that a fortified first-class naval base be established at Guam in order to defend the Philippines and create "the most favorable conditions... for the prosecution of naval operations in the Western Pacific." However, after a heated debate, Congress rejected the Board's recommendation for fear of provoking Japan into a war. Morton, "War Plan ORANGE, Evolution of a Strategy", pp. 249-250.
- ⁴⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 241-245.
- ⁴⁹Morton, *Strategy and Command*, pp. 39-41.
- ⁵⁰Drummond, *The Passing of American Neutrality, 1937-1941*, p. 65.

- ⁵¹It is interesting to note that Roosevelt, in an attempt still to impress upon the Japanese the likelihood of Anglo-American naval co-operation in the Pacific, ordered three American cruisers to visit Singapore in February 1938 for the opening of that British Far Eastern fleet base. Waldo Heindrichs Jr., "The Role of the United States Navy", in *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941*, ed. by Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 213-214.
- ⁵²Pratt, "The Anglo-American Naval Conversations on the Far East of January 1938", pp. 745-759; Watson, *Chief of Staff*, pp. 92-93.
- ⁵³Captain Tom Philipps (later Admiral) R.N., was to be appointed Commander-in-Chief, British Far Eastern Fleet in October, 1941, and tragically lose his life, together with the nucleus of the British Far Eastern Fleet, H.M.S. *Prince of Wales* and H.M.S. *Repulse*, in early December, 1941.
- ⁵⁴Pratt, "The Anglo-American Naval Conversations on the Far East of January 1938", pp. 760-763; Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 68; and Stephen E. Pelz, *Race to Pearl Harbor, The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974), (Hereinafter referred to as *Race to Pearl Harbor*), pp. 193-194.
- ⁵⁵Morton, *Strategy and Command*, pp. 41-42.
- ⁵⁶Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, The Western Hemisphere, U.S. Army in World War II* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1960), p. 3.
- ⁵⁷*Ibid.*, p. 7.
- ⁵⁸Louis Morton, "Germany First: The Basic Concept of Allied Strategy in World War II", in *Command Decisions*, ed. by K.R. Greenfield (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1959), p. 12.
- ⁵⁹Morton, "American and Allied Strategy in the Far East," p. 29.
- ⁶⁰Conn and Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense*, pp. 8-9.
- ⁶¹Watson, *Chief of Staff*, p. 98.
- ⁶²Morton, "American and Allied Strategy in the Far East", p. 30.
- ⁶³Watson, *Chief of Staff*, pp. 98-99.
- ⁶⁴*Ibid.*; and Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 70.
- ⁶⁵Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare*, p. 6.
- ⁶⁶Pelz, *Race to Pearl Harbor*, p. 194.
- ⁶⁷James H. Herzog, *Closing the Open Door: American-Japanese Diplomatic Negotiations, 1936-1941* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1973), (Hereinafter referred to as *Closing the Open Door*), p. 45.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*

⁶⁹Pelz, *Race to Pearl Harbor*, p. 194.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*

⁷¹*Ibid.*, pp. 194-195.

⁷²Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare*, p. 7.

⁷³*Ibid.*

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 7-8. On brief analysis, RAINBOW 1, providing for the defence of the Western Hemisphere north of 10° South latitude, established the necessary conditions that had to be met before any of the other plans could be executed. RAINBOW 2 and 3 called for offensive operations into the Western Pacific, the former on the assumption that Great Britain and France would be allies, and the latter that they would not. In this respect, RAINBOW 3 established virtually the same conditions as ORANGE 1938. RAINBOW 4 also assumed that Great Britain and France would be neutral, presumably as a result of Axis military action, and therefore emphasized the defence of the Western Hemisphere against external aggression. Emphasis in this plan, as in RAINBOW 1, was on limited action to fend off any Axis threat to the Latin American republics. In neither case (RAINBOW 1 or 4) were major U.S. forces to be sent to Europe or to the Western Pacific. Morton, "Germany First: The Basic Concept of Allied Strategy in World War II", p. 16.

⁷⁵Herzog, *Closing the Open Door*, p. 50.

⁷⁶Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare*, pp. 9-10.

PART II

THE SOUTHERN ENCIRCLEMENT, 1940-1942

Chapters IV-VII

Chapter IV

Towards a Combined British-Dutch-American Pacific Defence

i Japan's Southward Swing

Extremists' Position Strengthened:— In the spring of 1940, the "phoney war" in Europe was suddenly and dramatically replaced by a German Blitzkrieg which completely destroyed Allied defences on the mainland of Western Europe. On 9 April, German forces rapidly overran Denmark and successfully invaded Southern Norway. Great Britain and France, preparing to meet the German offensive in Northern France, were caught by surprise. In an effort to stem the German thrust, the British Government hastily rushed an expeditionary force to Norway, only to suffer defeat. This stunning failure toppled the Chamberlain Government in Great Britain and, on 10 May, Winston Churchill took office as the nation's new wartime Prime Minister. Meanwhile, the German offensive had already been turned against the Low Countries and France. On 14 May, Dutch forces were compelled to surrender and the Netherlands Government fled in exile to London. On that same day, German forces broke through Allied defences in the Ardennes forest and sped towards the English Channel in an effort to cut off Allied forces in Belgium from those in France and to isolate French forces on the Maginot Line from those in the West. On 28 May, the Belgian Government capitulated. In desperation, Great Britain began the evacuation of forces from the Continent at the port of Dunkirk which withstood capture until 4 June. The following day, German forces launched a southward attack on re-formed French lines which quickly gave way. Confident of the eventual outcome of the European war, Italy declared war upon Great Britain and France on 10 June. On 17 June, the new head of the French Government, Marshall Henri Petain, surrendered to Germany.¹ In a final bid to gain complete mastery of Western Europe, Germany then turned her war machine upon Great Britain. Lacking the naval strength to launch an immediate invasion of the British Isles, Germany attempted to subdue the British through air bombardment and submarine attacks upon vital British shipping.² From July to September, the Battle of Britain raged. To many observers, Great Britain's chances for survival appeared slim.

The sweeping German victories which so sharply altered the political boundaries of Europe also had a fundamental impact upon the political scene in Japan by restoring the political influence of the extremists and bringing about the collapse of the moderate Yonai Government. Many of the more moderate naval and civilian members of the Cabinet, which had favoured a policy of détente with Great Britain and the United States since August 1939, gradually began to accept the pro-Axis views of the Army and its grandiose programme for expansion, as Germany gained victory after victory in Europe. Dazzled by the German successes, Army leaders came to believe in the invincibility of the Axis Powers and saw the unfolding of a "golden opportunity" for southward expansion into the weak and crumbling Dutch, French and British Colonial Empires in the Southwest Pacific. Only the United States, it now appeared to the Japanese, stood between Japan and her mastery of the whole of the Western Pacific.³ Taking immediate advantage of this favourable situation, the Army now sought to bring the China incident to a rapid close and expand southward. Succumbing to extremist pressure, the Yonai Government began to take bolder measures to effect the complete strangulation of China by eliminating all aid to the Chungking Government from French and British supply routes to the south of China. On 18 June, the day of the fall of France, Japan demanded from the Vichy French Government the end to the movement of all munitions and war material over the railway from French Indo-China into southern China. Three days later the French agreed and Japan won the right to station military observers in northern French Indo-China to supervise the ban. Japan then demanded that Great Britain close the Burma Road, the other principal supply route to Southern China (Map I). The British Government faced with serious threats to its home security and Mediterranean position, was in no position to resist, and in July Churchill acceded to Japan's demand.⁴ The Army now sought a complete re-orientation of Japanese foreign policy so as to launch Japan upon her southward swing. Only the moderate Yonai Government stood in their way. On 16 July the Army, now restored to its former position of leadership, forced the resignation of the Yonai Government and engineered the formation of a new Cabinet more favourable to its policies.⁵ The four principal ministers were: Premier, Prince Konoye; War Minister, General Hideki Tojo; Navy Minister, Admiral Zengo Yoshida; and Foreign Minister, Yosuke Matsuoka. While there were some

differences of view between the four ministers as to the nature and timing of the actual measures to be taken, there was no disagreement over the basic objectives for the new administration. All agreed that the chief objective of the new administration would be to establish a New Order in East Asia, now referred to as the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". Significantly, Japan's New Order was now to include a Southern Region consisting of Hong Kong, Burma, French Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines and New Guinea; and ultimately, India, Australia and New Zealand.⁶ Almost immediately upon taking office on 22 July, the Konoye Cabinet set about formulating a foreign policy for Japanese southern expansion—which was to lead Japan into a general Pacific war with the Western Powers.

ii Japan Plans her Southern Advance

The principal guidelines for Japan's future foreign policy were set down in a document entitled, *General Principles to Cope with the Changing World Situation*; which was discussed and approved by the Konoye Cabinet on 26 July and, the following day, by a Liaison Conference.⁷ Japan's main objectives, it was agreed, would be quickly to end the China incident; and to establish control over the Southern Region, by peaceful means if possible. To gain these objectives, Japan would concurrently undertake:

- 1) To continue the elimination of all aid to the Chungking Government by Third Powers;
- 2) To adopt a firm attitude towards the United States and, at the same time, to strengthen political ties with the Axis Powers (Germany and Italy) and to drastically readjust relations with the Soviet Union;
- 3) To take stronger diplomatic measures against the Netherlands East Indies in order to secure vital raw materials;
- 4) To intensify political, economic, and military preparations for war.⁸

Should Japan not be able to establish control over the Southern Region by peaceful means, it was fully accepted that force would then be employed. However, the decision as to how, when and where force would be employed, it was agreed, would depend upon "future conditions". In the event that the China incident had been generally settled and the situation at home and abroad permitted, Japan would seize a

favourable opportunity to resort to arms in the Southern Region. Should the China incident remain unsettled, Japan would endeavour by and large to avoid hostilities with Third Powers in the Southern Region. However, if the domestic and foreign situation developed in a particularly favourable way, force would be employed in the Southern Region even though Japan remained committed in China. Should Japan decide to go to war in the Southern Region, it was further agreed that she would attempt to confine her military moves to actions against the British Empire.⁹ It was hoped that the eventual defeat of Great Britain in Europe and a "resolute position" towards the United States would stem possible American military interference with Japanese military operations in the Southern Region.¹⁰ Nevertheless, it was accepted that thorough preparations for war with the United States would be made since "it may prove impossible to avoid war with that country".¹¹ With the acceptance of these "General Principles", the Konoye Cabinet committed Japan not only to a continuation of fighting in China but also broadening that conflict to include the Southern Region. The decisions of 26 and 27 July, 1940, therefore, constituted a "pivotal stage" in the metamorphosis of the China incident into a general Pacific war.¹²

iii New Zealand Looks to America and Seeks an ANZAC Defence

The German victories in Europe, culminating in the fall of France, shook the Singapore strategy into an almost virtual collapse as the result of the sudden alteration of the balance of naval power in European waters. With Italy's entry into the European war on the side of Germany and the fall of France in early June, the British Government was confronted with a serious weakening of the Mediterranean position and a painful choice with regard to her future strategic priorities. Without French naval support, the Royal Navy would have the task not only of ensuring the defence of the United Kingdom but also neutralizing the Italian Navy in Mediterranean waters. With this additional naval responsibility, the bulk of the British fleet would lose its mobility and be confined to European waters. Thus, a British fleet of "sufficient strength" would be unable to proceed to Singapore in the event of war with Japan, which now appeared increasingly likely. The British Government, therefore, was now faced with a most painful choice among strategic priorities: Should the British "Mediterranean position" be abandoned in order

to ensure the defence of the Far Eastern Empire in the event of war with Japan? In accordance with previous pronouncements of Imperial defence policy Singapore was to take precedence in defence over that of Great Britain's "Mediterranean position"; for that policy dictated that "the security of the United Kingdom and the security of Singapore would be the keystones on which the survival of the British Commonwealth would depend." This, however, was not to be the continuing policy of the Churchill government in June 1940. Instead, the British Government was now to endeavour to retain the "Mediterranean position" while secretly urging neutral America formally to assume the defence of the Allied Far Eastern Empire in the event of war with Japan.¹³ This policy was to form an essential feature of British grand strategy for the next ten months.

On 13 June, just prior to the fall of France, Churchill was compelled officially to inform the Pacific Dominions of the future basis of British grand strategy in light of the deteriorating European situation since the German spring offensive. Churchill freely acknowledged to the Dominion governments that, without the full economic and financial co-operation of the United States, the chances of defeating Germany single-handed were, indeed, remote. With regard to the defence of the Far Eastern Empire in the Pacific, the first problem, Churchill acknowledged, was now to ensure the security of the United Kingdom against concentrated attack and should Japan,

in spite of the restraining influence of the United States of America be taking the opportunity to alter the status quo in the Far East, we should be faced with a naval situation in which, without the assistance of France, we should not have sufficient forces to meet the combined German and Italian Navies in European waters and the Japanese fleet in the Far East. In the circumstances envisaged, it is most improbable that we could send adequate reinforcements to the Far East. We should therefore have to rely on the United States of America to safeguard our interests there.¹⁴

New Zealand's immediate reaction to Churchill's disclosure of British grand strategy was to result in such a sudden re-orientation from Great Britain to the United States for Pacific security that its exclusive political ties with Great Britain were to break under stress. In reply, the New Zealand Prime Minister, Peter Fraser,

informed the British Prime Minister that it marked a radical departure from the "understanding, reinforced by repeated and most explicit assurances, that a strong British fleet would be available to, and would, proceed to Singapore should the circumstances so require, even if this involved the abandonment of British interests in the Mediterranean." Nevertheless, Fraser confirmed his government's acceptance "in order to safeguard the position in the central and critical theatre of war" and acknowledged that the Dominion was "prepared to accept the risks which they recognize are inevitable if the most effective use is to be made of Commonwealth naval forces". At the same time, however, Fraser reminded Churchill that the whole of the Dominion's defence preparations, i.e. Empire and local defence, had been based upon the assumption that an adequate British fleet would proceed to Singapore in the event of hostilities with Japan; and "requested that the whole situation be reviewed should the position in the Far East become threatening". Recognizing that the Dominion's Pacific security was now to rest upon American seapower, Fraser then suggested that, "in the hope of strengthening the security of the Pacific and of reinforcing the representations already made to President Roosevelt on the behalf of the Allies", it would be advantageous if the New Zealand Government were to "send to Washington a Minister of the Crown on special mission", and then proposed to act accordingly if the British Government saw no objections.¹⁵

The British Government, however, counselled caution. They warned the Dominion Government that on the advice of Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador to the United States, the dispatch of a special mission to Washington would have little beneficial effect and might even be interpreted by American isolationists as "an effort to influence the forthcoming [November] Presidential election and to drag the United States into war."¹⁶ The Dominion fully accepted this line of reasoning and certainly did not wish to strengthen isolationism in America. The New Zealand Government, therefore, then suggested that the Dominion was now prepared to abandon the idea of a special mission and, instead, follow Australia's earlier example¹⁷ and establish permanent diplomatic relations with the United States in order to satisfy public opinion in New Zealand and to assist

discreetly in establishing as far as possible the principle that the United States cannot be disinterested in the isolated British communities in this area and to lead as delicately as possible to the active co-operation of the United States in assisting to preserve the political integrity and economic well-being of those communities.¹⁸

The British Government raised no objections to this course of action and, on 23 December, 1940, the United States gave its formal approval to the exchange of diplomatic representatives with New Zealand.¹⁹ The actual establishment of a New Zealand Legation in Washington, however, was not to be completed until February 1942.²⁰ In the meantime, the New Zealand Government would be content to work within the Imperial framework and the crypto missions and organizations of the developing Grand Alliance in order to secure the American naval shield.

iv Churchill's re-assurance and the Far Eastern Appreciation of the UKCOS

On 1 August the newly installed Konoye Government in Japan issued a public announcement of its future foreign policy to construct a New Order in "Greater East Asia" by swiftly concluding the China incident and advancing the national fortune "by taking a farsighted view of the drastic change in the international situation and by formulating both constructive and flexible measures to meet these changes."²¹ On that same day, Japan demanded that France permit her the right to send troops into the Tonking province (Northern French Indo-China) and to control the airfields in that region.²² About this same time, Japan also informed the Netherlands East Indies Government of its intentions to increase substantially its demands for oil and to send a mission to Batavia to negotiate a general settlement.²³ The announcement and implementation of this new foreign policy clearly demonstrated to the Western Powers that Japan was, indeed, now committed to southward expansion.

As requested by the New Zealand Government in June, the British Government responded to these developments by reviewing British Far Eastern strategy in light of the now threatening situation. In a personal message to both the New Zealand and Australian Prime Ministers on 11 August, as a foreword to a long Far Eastern

Appreciation then being prepared by the UKCOS, Churchill sought to alleviate New Zealand and Australian fears for their Pacific security. Churchill informed the Dominion Prime Ministers that the British Government was trying its best to avoid war with Japan "by conceding on points where the Japanese military clique can perhaps force a rupture and by standing up where the ground is less dangerous." Churchill, moreover, assured them that, although the American Government had not, as yet, given any understanding of military support,²⁴ "their main fleet in the Pacific must be a grave preoccupation to the Japanese Admiralty." If, however, Japan should declare war upon the British Empire, her first objective outside the Yellow Sea would probably be the Netherlands East Indies. A Japanese attempt to invade Australia or New Zealand, Churchill confidently declared, would be most unlikely, first because Japan is too absorbed in China, secondly, she would be gathering the rich prizes in the Netherlands East Indies, and thirdly, she would fear very much to send an important part of her fleet so far southward, leaving the American fleet between it and her homeland. In this first phase (phase I) of an Anglo-Japanese war we should, Churchill argued, defend Singapore, which ought to stand a long siege. We should also be able, Churchill confided, to base on Ceylon a battle-cruiser and a fast aircraft carrier which, with the Australian and New Zealand ships (Appendix B) which will be returned to you, should exercise a very powerful deterrent upon Japanese raiding activities (during phase I). Churchill then informed the Dominion Prime Ministers that the British Eastern Mediterranean fleet, which was presently being reinforced with first-class units, could then be sent through the Suez Canal into the Indian Ocean, or to relieve Singapore (phase II). Churchill emphasized, however, that he did not wish to transfer the fleet to the Far East, even if Japan declared war, until it was absolutely "vital" to the Dominions' security. "Such a transference", Churchill explained, "would entail the complete loss of the Middle East, and all prospect of beating Italy in the Mediterranean would be gone." Moreover, heavy attacks are expected on Egypt in the near future, Churchill continued to explain, and the British Eastern Mediterranean fleet is needed to help in repelling them. Nevertheless, Churchill, once again,²⁵ reassured the Dominion Prime Ministers that, should Japan declare war and set about "invading Australia or New Zealand on a large-scale, I have the explicit authority of Cabinet to assure

you that we should then cut our losses in the Mediterranean and proceed to your aid, sacrificing every interest except only the defence of the safety of this Island on which all depends."²⁶

On the following day, the 12th of August, the Pacific Dominions were given a full summary of the UKCOS Far Eastern Appreciation. They were informed that the Far Eastern Appreciation was based upon the following three assumptions: (1) Great Britain would, for the time being, have to retain a fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean; (2) Reliance could be placed on a measure of economic and material support from the United States but, as yet, American military co-operation could not be anticipated; and (3) the British Empire should go to war with Japan if she attacked the Netherlands East Indies and provided the Dutch resisted. With regard to the third assumption the views of the Pacific Dominions were sought, the British Government remarking that, although they appreciated the strategic disadvantages of a failure to meet a Japanese challenge in the Netherlands East Indies, the main question was

whether our limited resources in the Far East in combination with the Dutch resources in the N.E.I. would justify our taking action in event of a Japanese attack on the N.E.I. which would lead us into war with Japan. If our joint resources would justify such action, it would clearly be to our advantage to accept the consequences of war with Japan in the attempt to dispute a Japanese occupation of the N.E.I. If not, it remains to be considered what would be the consequences of an endeavour to avoid war with Japan on this issue.²⁷

In their Far Eastern appreciation, the UKCOS re-examined British Far Eastern strategy in light of the existing situation in the Far East. The UKCOS conceded that the earlier assumptions upon which British Far Eastern strategy had previously rested had been invalidated by recent events in both Europe and Asia which now made it "temporarily impossible" to dispatch a British fleet to the Far East; and seriously threatened Singapore, and the British Far East Area (Map II) in general. The earlier assumption that a British fleet could be dispatched to the Far East in the event of war with Japan within three months was, the UKCOS admitted, now no longer tenable due to the development of a direct threat to the United Kingdom, the collapse of France, and the necessity of retaining in European waters

a fleet of sufficient strength to match both the German and Italian Navies. Thus, until Germany and Italy are defeated or their naval strength drastically reduced, the UKCOS acknowledged, we shall be forced, in the event of hostilities with Japan, to defend our Far Eastern interests without an adequate fleet. Consequently, our Far Eastern strategy, the UKCOS declared, is now "to rely primarily on air power in conjunction with such military forces [land and naval] as can be made available", until a fleet again becomes available. The UKCOS admitted, however, that in the absence of a capital ship fleet such local defence forces would be unable to fully secure all Far Eastern interests during the extended phase I period. Our problem, therefore, the UKCOS declared, is to make the best dispositions of local defence forces in order "to secure the most important military interests without the cover which a capital ship fleet would provide." In this regard, the UKCOS drew attention to the increased scale of attack upon Singapore, and the British Far East Area in general. The earlier assumption that Singapore would be subject to a seaborne attack alone, the UKCOS acknowledged, was now no longer tenable in view of probable Japanese southward expansion and the development of overland threats to Malaya. The UKCOS went on to explain more fully that "Japan's ultimate aims are the exclusion of Western influence from the Far East and the control of raw materials in that area." Japan could not obtain that objective, however, the UKCOS asserted, until she had captured the Singapore naval base, "which will always be a potential threat to her southward expansion so long as the British fleet remains in being in any part of the world." Although an immediate attack upon Singapore was not discounted, the UKCOS believed that Japan, unless driven to extreme measures by her extremists or tempted by apparent Anglo-American military weakness, would continue to pursue her objective in stages so as to avoid the far-reaching effects of war with the British Empire and the United States. The UKCOS, therefore, considered that Japan's most probable future course of action would be a penetration into French Indo-China or Thailand, to be followed later by a sudden attack upon the Netherlands East Indies from where a direct attack would then be made upon Singapore. A Japanese penetration into French Indo-China or Thailand, the UKCOS advised, would provide Japan with advanced southern bases, thereby increasing the threat to Singapore and making the defence of Malaya far more difficult. Even so, the UKCOS accepted

that, under present conditions and existing resources, it would not militarily justify a *casus belli* with Japan. On the other hand, if Japan were to establish herself in the Netherlands East Indies, the UKCOS emphasized, "our whole defence system would be most gravely compromised." A Japanese occupation of the Netherlands East Indies, the UKCOS warned, would provide Japan with advanced southern bases for not only an attack upon the Singapore naval base but also upon vital air and sea communications in the Indian Ocean area. The security of the Netherlands East Indies, the UKCOS declared, is "an essential British interest, second only to the integrity of Australia, New Zealand and Singapore"; and their defence an important part in our future Far Eastern defence plans. With regard to the Australia and New Zealand Areas (Map II), the UKCOS contended that no serious threat to the territorial integrity of Australia or New Zealand would be likely in the event of a war with Japan, until Japan had first captured Singapore. "A Japanese major expedition to Australia or New Zealand", the UKCOS explained, "would be an extremely hazardous operation so long as Singapore remained available to us as a base for the fleet in being on the flank of their long lines of communications." Even if Singapore should be captured, the UKCOS considered, it was "unlikely that the Japanese would attempt to invade Australia or New Zealand, at least until they had consolidated their position in China and the Far East, which would take a very considerable time." Thus, the scale of attack upon the Australia and New Zealand Areas during the phase I period, the UKCOS suggested, would not be greater than that visualized at the Pacific Defence Conference in 1939, i.e., raiding activities.²⁸

In view of the increased scale of attack upon Singapore and the British Far East Area in general, the UKCOS, therefore, recommended that the Singapore naval base be given defence in depth by defending the whole of Malaya rather than merely concentrating upon the defence of the Singapore Island. This would require, the UKCOS suggested, a total of 336 first-line modern aircraft²⁹ in order to: meet an attack across the northern frontier of Malaya from Indo-China or Thailand and a seaborne attack on the coast of Malaya or Singapore Island; to deny the enemy the use of advanced southern bases in British Borneo; and to protect vital sea communications in the northern half of the Indian Ocean. The UKCOS

acknowledged, however, that "an exact estimate of the strength and dispositions of the air forces required" would depend upon an appreciation drawn up by British Far East Commanders in collaboration with service representatives from Australia and New Zealand, at a future defence conference. Moreover, the required aircraft, the UKCOS conceded, could only be met as a long-term programme due to pressing commitments elsewhere. Thus, until such aircraft could be provided, the UKCOS argued that "everything possible must be done to increase our land forces in Malaya". They suggested that the existing land forces in Malaya, nine Battalions, be immediately increased to a level of three Divisions, which could then be safely reduced to six Brigades, when the required air strength, 336 first-line modern aircraft, was met. With regard to the Netherlands East Indies, the UKCOS again emphasized that the whole defence problem in the Far East would be greatly facilitated if British co-operation could be obtained for the development of common strategies in the event of war with Japan. Moreover, the UKCOS expressed the belief that the existing Dutch air and naval forces³⁰ in the Islands would make "a valuable addition to the defence of our common interests in the Far East against Japanese attack." They suggested that the objective should be the development of a British-Dutch defence involving "full mutual support, pooling of resources, and arrangements for the rapid movement of troops to threatened points." The UKCOS, therefore, recommended that military conversations be held with the Dutch as soon as the situation permits.³¹

Both the New Zealand and Australian Governments accepted Churchill's reassurance and were in general agreement with the Far Eastern Appreciation of the UKCOS.³² The New Zealand Government informed the British Government that they warmly welcomed and appreciated "the assurance as to naval protection in Eastern waters, should the necessity arise."³³ The Australian Government thanked the British Government for "assurances regarding naval dispositions that will be made" in the event of an attempted Japanese invasion of the Pacific Dominions.³⁴ On the question of British military support to the Netherlands East Indies in the event of Japanese aggression in that area, the New Zealand Government believed that the British Empire could not afford, both militarily and politically, to remain inactive in the event of a Japanese attack upon the Netherlands East Indies. Militarily, the New Zealand

Government considered that "Japanese control of the Netherlands East Indies would surely and rapidly render untenable our position in Singapore and Malaya, and would thus certainly and perhaps irretrievably jeopardise the security of New Zealand, Australia, and all British possessions in the Pacific." The political aspects, however, appeared of even greater importance to the New Zealand Government in as much as they pertained to that more important question of possible American military assistance in the Pacific. As New Zealand further advised the British Government,

The political aspects seem...to be of even greater importance than the military...we must bear in mind that, in the event of a Japanese attack on the Netherlands East Indies in respect to which we took no action, there is a danger that the neutral world and particularly the United States of America, would be gravely disturbed by what they would regard as another instance in which we have considered ourselves unable to assist our friends against piecemeal attack and destruction. This would... be highly disadvantageous to us, especially if it militated, as it well might, against the possibility of our receiving assistance from the United States.³⁵

The Australian Government also recognized the military importance of the security of the Netherlands East Indies to the defence of the Far Eastern Empire in the Pacific. They considered that Japanese control of the Netherlands East Indies "would be a step towards neutralizing Singapore as a naval base"; and would so drastically affect "the strategic position of Australia" that Australia would almost inevitably find herself at war with Japan. Nevertheless, in view of the present military position of the British Empire in the Pacific and the present attitude of the United States, the Australian Government considered that military assistance to the Dutch, in the event of a Japanese attack upon the Netherlands East Indies, should be assessed realistically in light of the overall military situation at the time. They then suggested to the British Government that "the views of Empire should be put to the U.S.A. with a suggestion for adoption of a similar realistic attitude."³⁶

Churchill's reassurance and the Far Eastern Appreciation of the UKCOS, therefore, put British grand strategy on a more solid footing by quelling New Zealand and Australian fears for their immediate Pacific security and laying the groundwork for a local Far Eastern defence during an extended phase I period. Having done

this, the British Government continued to seek the active military co-operation of the United States, while the New Zealand Government now sought the development of a Australia and New Zealand (ANZAC) defence with the Southwest Pacific.

v . Towards an ANZAC Defence

New Zealand's immediate reaction to the deteriorating situation in the Far East and the Far Eastern Appreciation of the UKCOS was to seek fuller local military co-operation with her sister Dominion, Australia, against the mounting Pacific threat. As suggested by the UKCOS Far Eastern Appreciation, it was now necessary to prepare for an extended phase I period. The framework for an ANZAC defence in the Southwest Pacific had already been established, on the initiative of the New Zealand Government, at the Pacific Defence Conference in 1939.³⁷ The New Zealand Government, therefore, now sought to give that framework fuller form. In so doing, New Zealand was to merge with Australia in the development of an ANZAC local defence scheme within the Southwest Pacific.

On 12 August, the New Zealand Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, suggested to the Australian Prime Minister, R.G. Menzies, that military staff conversations be held between their respective Chiefs of Staff in Australia on common local defence problems; the time for such conversations to be arranged direct by those officers themselves. On 22 August, the Australian Government gave its assent to the New Zealand proposal.³⁸ Between 1-19 September, 1940, therefore, a series of military staff conversations were held in Melbourne, Australia, between the NZCOS and the Australian Chiefs of Staff (ACOS)³⁹ on the problems of the local defence of trade and territory within the Port Moresby-Vila-Fiji-Tonga Island and Tasman Sea areas (Map II). As a result of those discussions, an ANZAC local defence scheme for the protection of trade and territory within the Tasman Sea area was agreed upon. Apart from the positive result, however, the staff conversations revealed a fundamental difference of view with regard to local naval strategy which inhibited fuller ANZAC co-operation within the Southwest Pacific, in the event of a war with Japan.

The Australian and New Zealand military staff conversations largely centred around operational and strategical questions with

regard to the local defence of trade and territory within the Port Moresby-Vila-Fiji-Tonga Island and Tasman Sea areas in the event of war with Germany, Italy and Japan. This had been the possible scope for ANZAC local military co-operation in the Southwest Pacific, framed at the Pacific Defence Conference in 1939. At the very onset, however, the discussions revealed a fundamental difference of view between the NZCOS and the ACOS regarding the scale of attack that their respective Areas would now be subject to during the phase I period. The NZCOS confirmed their government's continuing belief that the New Zealand Area would still be subject to the "most probable" scale of attack, sporadic raiding activities, as visualized at the Pacific Defence Conference in 1939. The ACOS, however, expressed their government's belief that the Australia Area would now be subject to at least a medium or "intermediate" scale of attack during the phase I period. An "intermediate" scale of attack upon the Australian Area would involve a Japanese expedition, supported by naval forces of sufficient strength to deal effectively with both Australian and New Zealand naval forces (Appendix B), whose objective would be to temporarily occupy territory on the mainland of Australia for the purpose of destroying some important centre of industry or military installation. Alternatively, the expedition might also be for the purpose of taking and occupying an island or islands for use as an advanced operational base for sustained attacks upon Australian territory and shipping. The ACOS went on to explain that the scale of attack within the Australian Area had increased in as much as Japan may now occupy the Netherlands East Indies. With Japan in possession of those islands, the ACOS considered that the chances of a raid in force, amounting to a local invasion of the Northern Territory, with a view towards capturing the new naval base at Port Darwin, were great. Moreover, they considered that Japan, once in possession of those islands, could, without serious risks, institute a blockade of Australia, and make heavy attacks upon her shipping and coasts. The ACOS confirmed that they were now anticipating that Japan would deploy more than one cruiser squadron, aircraft carriers, and possibly one or more capital ships within the Australia Area during the phase I period. In addition, the ACOS further disclosed that the Australian Government was now actively preparing the Dominion to meet this greater scale of attack within the Australia Area. This anticipated increased scale of attack

within the Australia Area by the ACOS now had the effect of, among other things, shifting Australian local naval interests away from the Port Moresby-Vila-Fiji-Tonga Island defence line to that of a primary interest in the naval defence of shipping focal areas within the Tasman Sea area (see Map II). This stood in sharp contrast to that of the primary interest of the NZCOS in the naval defence of the Pacific Islands. As a result, it completely upset all previously-held Australian and New Zealand strategical thinking as visualized at the Pacific Defence Conference in 1939, with regard to local military co-operation within the Southwest Pacific, in the event of war with Japan.

The Australian Chief of Naval Staff (ACNS) now considered that a defensive local naval strategy, involving escort convoys for the protection of trade within the Tasman Sea area by Australian and New Zealand cruisers, would be essential in view of the greater anticipated scale of attack within the Australia Area. On the other hand, the New Zealand Chief of Naval Staff (NZCNS) held to the previous belief that an offensive local naval strategy, involving a concentration of Australian and New Zealand cruisers, in the defence of the Port Moresby-Vila-Fiji-Tonga Island defence line, would be effective for the protection of both trade and territory within the Southwest Pacific. These contrasting views with regard to local naval strategy, however, reflected a much larger difference of strategical thinking between the two Pacific Dominions; for it represented Australia's now overriding emphasis upon Continental defence as opposed to New Zealand's traditional preoccupation with Pacific Island defence. Unable to reach immediate agreement on a local naval strategy for the Port Moresby-Vila-Fiji-Tonga Island and Tasman Sea Area, in the event of war with Japan, the Australian and New Zealand Chiefs of Staff agreed that an operational scheme, for the co-ordinated defence of the Tasman Sea area only, should be established on the present basis of war with Germany and Italy and the existing "most probable" scale of attack, i.e. sporadic raiding activities. Once a local naval strategy was agreed upon, however, they further accepted that the operational scheme would then be put into effect for the larger area and on the basis of war with Germany, Italy and Japan. In view of the larger naval and air forces and corresponding operational staffs in Australia, the ACOS proposed that the Central War

Room, Melbourne, should be the operational authority for the co-ordination of Australian and New Zealand air and naval operations in the Tasman Sea area against enemy raiding forces. The Central War Room, Wellington, however, would retain the right to modify or disregard the operational instructions or dispositions received from the Central War Room, Melbourne, after informing the latter accordingly. This proposal was accepted by the NZCOS. The Australian and New Zealand Chiefs of Staff also agreed that a continued interchange of information and intelligence relating to their respective Areas should be instituted in order to ensure the closest military co-operation between the two Areas. This would take the form of lateral interchanges between the Central War Rooms, Melbourne and Wellington, and the Area Combined Headquarters, Port Moresby and Suva. The Australian and New Zealand Chiefs of Staff then concluded their military discussions by further agreeing that the proposed operational defence scheme should be immediately submitted to their respective governments for final approval.⁴⁰

On 4 October Peter Fraser informed the Australian Prime Minister, R.G. Menzies, of his government's approval of the ANZAC operational scheme for mutual defence of the Tasman Sea area, as agreed between their respective Chiefs of Staff. Fraser pointed out, however, that "no definite agreement was reached regarding the scope and control of naval operations in the event of Japan entering the war". Nevertheless, Fraser expressed the hope that further discussions between the ACNS and the NZCNS would remedy that situation. In the meantime, Fraser suggested that the "agreed procedure for co-operation between the Commonwealth and New Zealand forces should be introduced at the earliest possible moment."⁴¹ In reply, Menzies expressed his government's approval of the ANZAC operational scheme for mutual defence in the Tasman Sea area and informed Fraser that it would be put into effect on 19 October, 1940.⁴²

The development of an ANZAC local defence scheme in the Southwest Pacific, therefore, reflected New Zealand's desire to obtain a greater measure of local security from Australia against the mounting Pacific threat. Although not fully successful in this endeavour, New Zealand, nevertheless, was able successfully to impress upon Australia the need to co-ordinate future efforts and limited military

resources for the defence of mutual interests in the Southwest Pacific, in the event of war with Japan. This understanding was to form the basis of future ANZAC military co-operation.

Meanwhile, the situation in the Far East since August had further deteriorated. Japan had not only sent military forces into Northern French Indo-China but had also entered into a Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. Fortunately, however, these developments led to a further stiffening of the American attitude towards Japan which aided Great Britain in her efforts to obtain the active military co-operation of the United States in the Pacific. On 8 October the British Government was able to inform the New Zealand Government that recent reports from the British Ambassador to the United States, Lord Lothian, indicated a stiffening of the American attitude towards Japan and suggested an American desire for some form of concerted reaction to the newly-fashioned Tripartite Pact. The British Government went on to explain that, in a recent conversation between Lord Lothian and the American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, the latter suggested the idea of "private staff talks between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Dominion Governments concerned and the Dutch authorities on the Far Eastern question"; and that the British Government welcomed the American suggestion and urged that the military staff talks be held at the earliest possible date. The British Government informed the Dominion Government, however, that there existed in certain quarters of the American Administration an impression that should the United States find themselves at war with Japan, as result of such concerted action, the British Commonwealth might "stand aside". The British Government further informed the New Zealand Government that the British War Cabinet had considered this matter, and would certainly declare war upon Japan should the United States find herself at war with Japan, as result of such concerted action. The British Government then requested the views of the New Zealand Government on this most important matter.⁴³

Understandably, New Zealand warmly received this first indication of possible active American military co-operation in the Pacific and sought to encourage it further. In reply, the New Zealand Government informed Great Britain that they greatly welcomed "the possibility of still closer relations between the British Commonwealth and the

United States" and "warmly supported" the proposed military staff talks and were prepared to take part in them. Moreover, they emphasized that, in the event of the United States finding themselves at war with Japan as a result of the concerted action with the British Commonwealth in the Pacific, "they entirely and unanimously agree with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that the British Commonwealth should immediately declare war on Japan in alliance with the United States, and they undertake for their part to take the necessary action in such circumstances immediately."⁴⁴

On the following day, the British Government suggested to New Zealand that the proposed British-Dutch-American military staff conversations should be conducted on two levels: immediate preliminary discussions in London followed, as soon as possible, by further conversations in Washington on a more comprehensive basis where "broader considerations", i.e., global, would be reviewed; and in the Far east (Singapore) where "particular problems", i.e., local, might be discussed. The British Government then informed New Zealand that Lord Lothian had already invited the United States to send representatives to the forthcoming defence conference at Singapore,⁴⁵ or, if they considered that such a move would be too public, to arrange for their representatives to be present at the defence conference without actually attending the formal meetings.⁴⁶

New Zealand responded to the British Government's proposed procedure for the British-Dutch-American military staff conversations with immediate enthusiasm. On 11 October the New Zealand Government informed Great Britain that the New Zealand High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, with high ranking service personnel from each of the three services, would represent New Zealand at the proposed London Conference. In the Far East, the three NZCOS would represent New Zealand at the forthcoming Singapore Conference. As for the proposed Washington Conference, the New Zealand Government accepted the British suggestion that the British Delegation should also represent New Zealand since the Singapore and Washington conferences were expected to overlap in time.⁴⁷

By this time, however, the American Government began to have serious doubts concerning the practicality of holding immediate

military staff conversations in view of the impending November Presidential election and current unfavourable isolationist reactions to the Far East crisis. On 13 October the British Government was compelled to inform New Zealand that recent reports from Lord Lothian in Washington on the subject of military staff talks now indicated that the American Secretary of State considered it "necessary to proceed with great caution in view of the shock to U.S. public opinion of the realization of the possible consequences of deterioration of relations with Japan." The British Government went on to inform the Dominion Government that Cordell Hull was, for the present, opposed to American participation in any formal military staff conference at London, Washington or Singapore. Instead, Hull now contemplated, the British Government further advised New Zealand, "private conversations in London between [British-Dutch-American] service representatives for the exchange of information and for the discussion of problems as to common defence" in the Pacific.⁴⁸ After a consideration of the existing American domestic political situation, the British Government later informed New Zealand of its approach to the problem of American participation in military staff talks. Lord Lothian, the British Government advised New Zealand, had now been requested to inform the American Government that the British Commonwealth "appreciated the internal difficulties of the Administration as the Presidential election approaches, and we do not therefore press for anything like a Staff conference" at this time. Instead, Lord Lothian had been authorized to propose (the British Government further advised New Zealand) that: British⁴⁹ authorities invite the Dutch to exchange information with them at Singapore and London; that Admiral Ghormley⁵⁰ exchange information with British and Dutch authorities at London, and that, at a later time, British authorities would then proceed "unobtrusively" to Washington to continue to explore the problems of a common Pacific defence on a more comprehensive level, involving "no political commitments" and on a purely "hypothetical" basis. The British Government assured New Zealand that their approach would eventually lead to a comprehensive Anglo-American military staff conference at Washington⁵¹ and that future British planning would be based upon that assumption.⁵² New Zealand accepted the British assurances which were supported by later reports of active American military co-operation towards the development of a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence. Admiral

Ghormley, the British reported to the Dominion Government, was requesting information from British authorities in London regarding "full details of the base facilities at Singapore" and "what additional defence forces they would have to send to Singapore in the event of a U.S. naval squadron being based there." Moreover, the American Government had agreed secretly to dispatch a naval officer to Singapore to attend the forthcoming defence conference as an American observer. The New Zealand Government agreed, therefore, that all indications pointed to the fact that the United States "are prepared for a consideration of joint plans in the Far East when the political situation permits."⁵³

British grand strategy and active American military co-operation towards the development of a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence, therefore, was now to have a most dramatic influence upon New Zealand's policies with regard to British Far Eastern defence plans and preparations. In an effort to secure an American naval shield, New Zealand was to support British Far Eastern defence plans and preparations designed to lead to the dispatch, in appropriate circumstances, of an American fleet to be based on Singapore. In so doing, New Zealand was to be greatly assisted by her senior ANZAC partner, Australia. Australian efforts were to be co-ordinated, at this stage, on the common assumption of America's future acceptance of the British conception of grand strategy.

vi America's Strategic Problems

German victories in Europe during the Spring of 1940 completely disrupted American planning for an offensive against Japan in the Western Pacific and presented American military authorities with a major strategic question with regard to future Anglo-American planning. With the increased certainty, since April 1940, that the Allied forces would no longer be able to contain the Axis Powers in Europe and the Atlantic, Army and Navy planners had been forced to discontinue their planning on the basis of RAINBOW 2 and, instead, prepare a new joint war plan on the basis of the "worst possible situation." Accordingly, on 7 June, two days after the British evacuation from Dunkirk, the Joint Board approved their Planning Committee's draft of a new joint war plan on the basis of RAINBOW 4. RAINBOW 4, the "worst possible situation", visualized a "last ditch" unilateral

American defence of the Western Hemisphere from simultaneous attacks from Germany, Italy and Japan, following the defeat of France and the United Kingdom. This plan called for an American defensive in both the Pacific and Atlantic, until America had increased her military power (arms production, land forces, two-ocean Navy, etc.) to make possible limited offensive action within the Western Hemisphere.⁵⁴

Roosevelt, however, disagreed with his military advisers on the practicality of simply planning and preparing for the "worst possible situation". The President meant to continue to act on the assumption that the United Kingdom would not be defeated and that the Allied forces would still be able to contain the Axis Powers in Europe and the Atlantic, at least for the next six months. Roosevelt had followed, since the German offensive in the West, two policies which greatly disturbed his military advisers: making a show of strength in the Pacific in the hope of discouraging the Japanese from altering the status quo in that area; and furnishing military aid, particularly aircraft guns and ammunition, to the Allies at the expense of the armed forces that the United States was undertaking to train and equip for combat. This had run very close—as close as American domestic politics would allow—to the proposals that Winston Churchill had submitted to the President a few days after becoming Prime Minister. In a personal message to President Roosevelt, on 15 May, Churchill had requested, after informing the President of the deteriorating situation on the Continent and warning that the United Kingdom might give way, that the United States, for the present, undertake to do everything possible "short of actually engaging armed forces." In particular, Churchill had requested that the United States would lend Great Britain forty or fifty old destroyers, dispatch to Britain several hundred of the most modern aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, munitions and steel, and "keep the Japanese quiet in the Pacific, using Singapore in any way convenient." In reply, Roosevelt had assured Churchill that "he would facilitate to the utmost" the dispatch of American aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, munitions and steel to the Allies, and, with regard to Japan, pointed to the continued presence of the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.⁵⁵ Roosevelt, therefore, had endeavoured, since the German offensive, personally to shape American military policy and strategy upon the basic assumption that Britain would not be defeated and that the Allied forces would still be able to contain the Axis Powers

in Europe and the Atlantic, at least for the next six months. In this respect, Roosevelt, unlike his principal military advisers, was convinced that American security, ultimately, depended upon British fortunes in Europe.

With the fall of France on 17 June, however, Roosevelt's policies were called into serious question. The Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark, advised Roosevelt that, should the French fleet pass to German control, a major portion of the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor would have to be transferred to the Atlantic. Moreover, they warned Roosevelt that to release to Britain further war material, then in the hands of American armed forces, would "seriously weaken our present state of defence".⁵⁶ Recognizing that American security and future planning now depended upon a detailed assessment of Britain's chances for survival and ability to contain the Axis Powers in Europe and the Atlantic, Roosevelt informed the British Ambassador to the United States, Lord Lothian, on 17 June of his government's acceptance of the British proposal for Anglo-American military staff talks.⁵⁷ On 30 June the British Government confirmed Roosevelt's acceptance of the British proposal and suggested that the military staff talks be held in London. Roosevelt accepted the British suggestion but now expressed the desire, at this stage, for "technical discussions",⁵⁸ rather than formal military staff talks. Moreover, Roosevelt advised the British Government that it was essential, in view of the impending Presidential election, that there should be no publicity about the discussions, and that he was consulting the American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and his military advisers about the best method for holding the secret discussions in London.⁵⁹ In consultation with the American Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, Roosevelt proposed, as suggested by Lord Lothian, that a "Special Naval Observer" to London be appointed, as was done during the First World War. Both Knox and Stark agreed to the President's suggestion and, on 12 July, they recommended Rear Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and former Chief of the Navy War Plans Division, who was already fully informed on American naval planning and past Anglo-American naval discussions. The selection was approved by Roosevelt and Ghormley received detailed instructions from the Navy Department for the forthcoming London conversations. In addition

to Ghormley, Roosevelt also decided to send to London representatives from the Army. The selection fell upon General George V. Strong, Chief of the Army War Plans Division, and Major-General Delos C. Emmons of the Army Air Corps. Unlike Ghormley, however, the Army "observers" were to remain in London for only a few weeks.⁶⁰ The technical information gleaned by the American observer team regarding British military capabilities was fully to justify Roosevelt's basic assumption. Moreover, it was to contribute to the further development of the Anglo-American Alliance; for American military authorities were to be confronted, for the first time, with Britain's war-time conception of grand strategy.

Sailing aboard the American merchant ship, U.S.S. *Britannic*, the American trio arrived in London on 15 August. The meetings were to focus upon many matters of possible Anglo-American planning and co-operation, particularly with regard to the British and U.S. fleets. In order to quell possible isolationist reaction in America, however, the meetings were referred to officially as those of "the Anglo-American Standardization of Arms Committee". The American trio, at the very outset, made it clear that their powers were limited to discussion and recommendation to American authorities in Washington. Even so, the importance that the British attached to their visit was reflected in the composition of the British group, which included Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound (First Sea Lord), General Sir John Dill (Chief of the Imperial General Staff), and Air Chief Marshall Sir Cyril Newall (Chief of Air Staff). It also appeared in the efforts made to impress upon the Americans the British views of global strategy.⁶¹

In the discussions, the British Chiefs stressed the vital importance of the United Kingdom and the Middle East to British strategy. Of primary importance, however, was the security of the United Kingdom. This, the British Chiefs confidently declared, could be met by British forces alone:

The security of the United Kingdom is obviously vital, and must be our primary consideration, although we do not underrate the grave threat with which we are faced, in view of our numerical inferiority in the air and Germany's occupation of the Continental seaboard, we are confident of our ability to withstand any attacks on this country, and our whole policy is based on this assumption.⁶²

Outside the United Kingdom, the British Chiefs stressed the vital importance of the Middle East to the defeat of Germany. To hold the Middle East, the British Chiefs maintained, was essential for their long-range plans for the defeat of Germany. These plans, the British Chiefs informed the Americans, called for the bombardment and blockading of Germany, especially in the hope of creating an acute shortage of oil. Moreover, they called for the employment of naval forces in amphibious operations "against the widely extended coast-line of our enemies whenever opportunity offers". At the present stage of the war, the British Chiefs further informed the Americans, the immediate British aim was the elimination of Italy from the war:

We regard the elimination of Italy as a strategic aim of the first importance. The collapse of Italy would largely relieve the threat to the Middle East and free our hands at sea to meet the Japanese threat, while at the same time increasing the effectiveness of the blockade against Germany.⁶³

Nevertheless, the British Chiefs emphasized that the ultimate British aim was the defeat of Germany, and would remain so whatever might happen in the future:

Although Italy is our declared enemy and other Nations may be dragged into the war at Germany's heels, Germany is the mainspring of enemy effort. Whatever action may be necessary against any other country must, therefore, be related to our main object, which is the defeat of Germany.⁶⁴

Admiral Ghormley then framed a question which clearly brought out the British Chiefs' ideas on how they expected to achieve their aims. Ghormley asked "whether the Chiefs of Staff considered that the final issue of the war could only be decided on land". Sir Cyril Newall replied

...that in the long run it was inevitable that the Army should deliver the coup de grace. We hoped, however, for a serious weakening in the morale and fighting efficiency of the German machine, if not a complete breakdown, which would make the task of the Army much more easy.⁶⁵

This clearly indicated to the Americans that air and naval power,

rather than land forces, were to continue to play a primary role in British plans for the defeat of Germany and Italy.

Up to this point, British strategy did not involve any explicit assumptions as to what the United States would do. Another pertinent question from Admiral Ghormley, however, was to bring out the British Chiefs' conception of grand strategy. Admiral Ghormley asked

...whether, in making their plans for the future, the Chiefs of Staff were relying on receiving the continued economic and industrial support of the United States, and whether they counted upon the eventual active co-operation of the United States.⁶⁶

On this question, the British Chiefs were not so candid. Sir Cyril Newall replied

...that in our plans for the future we were certainly relying on the continued economic and industrial co-operation of the United States in ever-increasing volume. No account, however, had been taken of the possibility of active co-operation by the United States since this was clearly a matter of high political policy. The economic and industrial co-operation of the United States were fundamental to our whole strategy.⁶⁷

Although the British Chiefs denied that they took no account of the possibility of the active military co-operation of the United States, they were, nevertheless, "at pains to explain how much they needed and hoped for American support in the Pacific to underwrite their precarious position in the Far East." The British Chiefs informed the Americans that British Far Eastern strategy had, until recently, rested upon two assumptions: "first, that any threat to our [British] interests would be seaborne; secondly, that we should be able to send a fleet to the Far East within three months." These assumptions, the British Chiefs acknowledged, had been recently invalidated. First, because Japan now threatened to expand into Southeast Asia, from where they could launch a land invasion of Singapore; and second, because the United Kingdom could no longer expect to dispatch a fleet to the Far East. These developments, the British Chiefs confessed, had not only altered British plans for defending Singapore, which now required holding the whole of Malaya as well, but had left

the British heavily dependent upon the U.S. fleet. It was "very much in the British interest", Sir Dudley Pound declared, that the U.S. fleet should remain in the Pacific. As Sir Cyril Newall further observed, active American military co-operation would be of "immense value" if war did break out in the Pacific, for "the support of the American battle fleet would obviously transform the whole strategical situation in the Far East."⁶⁸ The British Chiefs' proposal that the United States underwrite the security of the Far Eastern Empire in the Pacific by assuming major strategic responsibility in that area in the event of war with Japan was not foreign to British and American strategical thinking in view of the pre-war "informal understandings" between the British and American naval staff. Moreover, unknown to the British, those "informal understandings" had given rise to the development of American plans—RAINBOW 2—which provided for such a contingency. Those "informal understandings" and American plans, however, had all been based upon the assumption that Britain and France would be able to contain the Axis Powers in Europe and the Atlantic, which was later invalidated by events in Europe since the German offensive in May 1940. The American strategic question with regard to grand strategy, therefore, was: where should the main American military effort now be directed in co-operation with the British: in the Atlantic or the Pacific? Much would now depend upon an American assessment of whether the United States could heavily rely upon British ability to contain the Axis Powers in the Atlantic and Europe in order for the United States successfully to conduct an offensive against Japan in the Western Pacific.

Following the close of the exploratory Anglo-American discussions, Generals Strong and Emmons remained in London through the height of the Battle of Britain. Impressed by British coolness and resolve under heavy attack, they returned to Washington on 20 September confident that Britain would survive. From their first-hand reports and those from Ghormley in London, American Army and Navy planners were now convinced that Great Britain would not experience defeat and that there existed no "immediate" threat to the Western Hemisphere from the Axis Powers in the Atlantic quarter. The Army and Navy planners now reasoned that:

Germany and Italy could not launch a major military attack against the Western Hemisphere until they had defeated Great Britain and gained naval control of the eastern Atlantic. It now appeared that British naval power based on the British Isles could be maintained at least for another six months. Even if the Axis Powers then gained control of the bulk of the British fleet, it could take them six additional months to assimilate British naval strength and prepare it for offensive operations across the Atlantic. The United States, therefore, probably had at least a year's grace in which to complete its military preparations.⁶⁹

During that year, the United States could also afford, the Army and Navy planners now agreed, to maintain the U.S. fleet in the Pacific to deter Japanese aggression and continue to furnish military aid to Great Britain.⁷⁰ The Ghormley-Strong-Emmons mission to London also had important implications for more long-term American planning. RAINBOW 4, which was based upon the assumption that both France and Great Britain would be defeated, was now shown to be clearly obsolete. Thus, the way was now opened for further American planning with the British.

Now confident of Britain's ability to resist defeat, the Roosevelt Administration continued its efforts, within the confines of American isolationism, to speed up American military preparations and buttress Britain as the remaining bulwark against the military might of the Axis Powers. The need for active military co-operation—short of war—with Britain, however, was shortly to be stimulated by events in the Far East.

vii First Steps Towards Joint Anglo-American Planning and Co-operation

As the German offensive in Europe appeared to be blunted, the military situation in the Far East took a turn for the worst. On 22 September, after continued French resistance to Japanese demands, Japanese troops marched into Northern French Indo-China, thereby obtaining valuable bases for further southward expansion. Four days later, Japan concluded a Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. By that agreement, Japan acknowledged the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a New Order in Europe; and the two European Powers acknowledged, in turn, Japan's leadership in the establishment of a New Order in Greater East Asia. Moreover, the three powers agreed to "assist one another with all political, economic

and military means when one of the Contracting Parties is attacked by a Power at present not involved in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict."⁷¹ Aimed directly at the United States, Japan considered that the Pact, by raising the spectre of a two-ocean war, would deter the United States from interfering on Britain's behalf in Japanese efforts to establish a New Order in the Southern Region.⁷² The Tripartite Pact, however, only brought the American Government to a fuller realization that those threatening forces in both the Pacific and the Atlantic were leagued in a common purpose, and that the attainment of their objectives equally endangered American, as well as British, interests and security. As such, the formation of the Pact was an important factor in bringing the two Anglo-Saxon democracies closer together, particularly with regard to Pacific defence.⁷³ Contrary to Japanese expectations, therefore, the Pact had the effect of drawing the United States closer to Britain for the development of a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence against further Japanese southern expansion.

In retaliation to Japan's incipient southward advance and entry into the Tripartite Pact, the United States immediately responded by putting an embargo on all iron and steel scrap exports to Japan.⁷⁴ In addition, the American Government sought the implementation of additional immediate and more long-term countermeasures to Japan's recent moves. In consultation with the British Ambassador on those matters, the American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, pointed out to Lord Lothian "that Japan would, as a most ordinary precaution, find it necessary to assume that whether or not the United States and Great Britain have express or definite agreements with regard to naval and air bases across the Pacific to and including Singapore, the special relations between these two countries are such that they could overnight easily establish cooperative relations for the mutual use of these bases."⁷⁵ The possibility of encouraging this belief, Hull considered, could very well deter Japan from further aggression and expansion. With regard to more long-term countermeasures, Hull then inquired from Lothian whether the British and Dutch would be willing to hold military staff conversations with the United States on the problems involved in common action for defence against Japan, without political commitment.⁷⁶ Encouraged by this stiffening of American attitudes towards Japan and first indication of possible

active American military co-operation in the Pacific, Great Britain now sought to bring their policies towards Japan more closely in line with that of the United States. In another personal message to the President on 4 October, Churchill informed Roosevelt of the British War Cabinet's decision to reopen the Burma Road to China and suggested that an American naval squadron, "the bigger the better", be dispatched to Singapore as a deterrent to further Japanese aggression; and that the occasion might also be used to initiate military staff conversations between British, Dutch and American military authorities for a common defence against Japan.⁷⁷ Although Roosevelt and his advisers held conflicting views regarding the advisability of dispatching an American naval squadron to Singapore,⁷⁸ the Administration still wished to pursue the subject of military staff talks with the British for the development of a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence. On that same day, the American Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, advised the British Ambassador, Lord Lothian, of the significance and importance of the American proposal for military staff conversations on Pacific defence. Lothian then solicited from Welles his views regarding an acceptable procedure for the holding of such conversations. Welles considered that the military staff talks should be held in Washington, but admitted that there would be some difficulty in getting a Dutch expert to Washington soon enough. As a partial solution to this problem, Lothian then suggested that preliminary military staff talks could be held immediately in London and then, continued on, in Washington. In reporting his conversations with Welles that day, Lothian advised the Foreign Office that Washington was certainly the right place for the military staff talks, "if only because the fact that they were being held would certainly become known" to the Japanese. The British War Cabinet accepted Lothian's suggestion. The British Government then instructed Lothian to suggest to the American Government that immediate preliminary military staff talks be held in London and then, as soon as possible, continued on in Washington on a more comprehensive basis. The American Government was also to be invited to send representatives to the scheduled defence conference at Singapore, where "particular" problems would be discussed concurrently with the talks in Washington.⁷⁹ By this time, however, rumours got around in Washington that important military conversations were to take place with the British on Pacific defence. In view of the fact that both

the American and British Governments confirmed those rumours, it appears likely that the leakage of information was intentional and meant to act as a deterrent to further Japanese aggression. Although it may have served that purpose, it certainly did give rise to immediate isolationist reactions against the Roosevelt Administration. During the very height of the Presidential campaign, Roosevelt was now accused by his leading political opponents of undertaking secret American commitments with Britain and dragging the American people into war. As a result, the Administration had to backtrack about holding immediate military staff talks with the British.⁸⁰

On 9 October, when the British Ambassador went to discuss the subject with Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State urged Lothian to impress upon the British Government the present necessity for the Administration's extreme caution with regard to the holding of military staff talks. The Administration, Hull advised Lothian, wanted to prevent the political opponents from using the present Far East crisis to support their thesis that the President was deliberately provoking war with Japan. The Administration did not wish, therefore, for the United States to participate, for the present, in any formal military staff conference at London, Washington or Singapore, since the Press would certainly find out about it and exaggerate its importance.⁸¹ Instead, Hull suggested to Lothian that British, Dutch and American services representatives in London should hold private conversations among themselves for the exchange of information and discussion of problems as to a common defence against Japan.⁸²

The British Government accepted the existing American domestic political situation, and sought to offer a solution to the problem of American participation in military staff talks. On 16 October Lord Lothian informed Cordell Hull that the British Government appreciated the internal difficulties of the Administration as the Presidential election approached its conclusion and, therefore, did not press for anything like a "staff conference" at this time. Instead, the British Government now suggested, Lothian further advised Hull, that British authorities invite the Dutch to exchange information with them at Singapore and London, that Admiral Ghormley exchange information with British and Dutch authorities at London, and that, at a later time, British authorities then proceed "unobtrusively" to Washington to continue to explore the problems of a common Pacific defence on a more comprehensive level, involving "no

political commitments" and on a purely "hypothetical" basis.⁸³ In reply to the British suggestion, Hull informed Lothian that, after consulting the President, he could only reiterate that, for the present, the American Government considered that the military conversations should be confined entirely to an exchange of information, since it wished to be in a position to say that it had undertaken "no new commitments" with the British Government. Hull added, however, that the American position might change in two or three weeks' time.⁸⁴ In this way the Roosevelt Administration felt itself free during the remaining period of the election campaign, to refute all charges that the Administration had made or was making secret commitments with the British. Nevertheless, the American Government also recognized the need for active American military co-operation with the British for the development of a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence, and the British suggestion to problems of American participation in military staff talks was, therefore, accepted, tacitly if not formally. On 17 October Admiral Ghormley was instructed by the U.S. Navy Department to exchange information and ideas regarding naval co-operation on Pacific Defence with the Admiralty in London. Moreover, on 23 October, at the request of the British Government, arrangements were made to have Commander F.P. Thomas, U.S.N. secretly attend the scheduled defence conference at Singapore as an official American observer.⁸⁵ In addition, American military planners began to prepare the "American position" for the anticipated Anglo-American military staff conference at Washington, which was expected to commence immediately following the American Presidential election.⁸⁶ By late October, 1940, therefore, the movement towards the development of a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence, or southern encirclement of Japan, had begun.

Footnotes

- ¹Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare*, pp. 11-12.
- ²Robert A. Divine, *The Reluctant Belligerent: American Entry into World War II* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), p. 88.
- ³Morton, *Strategy and Command*, pp. 53-54; Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, p. 43.
- ⁴Divine, *The Reluctant Belligerent: American Entry into World War II*, p. 92.
- ⁵Herbert Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor, The Coming of the War Between the United States and Japan* (New York: Atheneum, 1963), (Hereinafter referred to as *The Road to Pearl Harbor*) , pp. 76-80.
- ⁶Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 58.
- ⁷A Liaison Conference "was an informal body consisting of the service chiefs, the principal civilian ministers, and other high government officials, and served as a link between Imperial General Headquarters and the Cabinet. The same body when it met with the Emperor on more important occasions and under more formal circumstances was known as the Imperial Conference", *ibid.*
- ⁸*Ibid.*, p. 59.
- ⁹Robert Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of the War* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 151-152.
- ¹⁰William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 5.
- ¹¹Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 59.
- ¹²Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of the War*, p. 153.

New Zealand Looks to America and Seeks an ANZAC Defence

- ¹³The British Government's decision on this matter can certainly be understood in light of the "informal understanding" with the American Government since 1937 over the possibility of American naval assistance in the Pacific. Moreover, the strategic thinking of Churchill certainly influenced this feature of British grand strategy: in particular, his almost obsessive interest in the outcome of the struggle in the Middle East. Writing about the period just before the outbreak of the Pacific war, Churchill, himself admitted that: "...the confidence which we felt about Home Defence did not extend to the Far East should Japan make war upon us. These anxieties also disturbed Sir John Dill [Chief of the Imperial General Staff]. I retained the impression that Singapore had priority in his mind over Cairo. This was indeed a tragic issue, like having to choose whether your son or your daughter should be killed. For my part, I did not believe that anything that might happen in Malaya could amount to a fifth part of the loss of Egypt, the Suez Canal, and the Middle East. I would not

tolerate the idea of abandoning the struggle for Egypt, and was resigned to play whatever forfeits were exacted in Malaya. This view also was shared by my colleagues." Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. III: *The Grand Alliance* (London: Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1950), p. 379.

- ¹⁴SSDA to UKHC, Wellington, 13 June, 1940, PM 87/2/1. Again, it is interesting to relate this aspect of British grand strategy to Churchill's pre-war strategical thinking regarding the defence of the Far Eastern Empire in the Pacific against Japan. In March 1914, as First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill advised the House of Commons that if British seapower were ever destroyed the Pacific would be entirely at Japan's mercy. In that case, Churchill suggested that "the only course of the five millions of white men in the Pacific would be to seek the protection of the United States." *Parliamentary Debates* (House of Commons), Vol. LIX (March 2-March 20, 1914), p. 1934.
- ¹⁵Governor-General, NZ to SSDA, 15 June, 1940, PM 62/3/1.
- ¹⁶SSDA to Governor-General, NZ, 7 July, 1940, PM 62/3/1.
- ¹⁷The Australian Government had established permanent diplomatic relations with the United States as early as April 1939, and in March 1940, Richard Casey was formally appointed as Australia's Minister to the United States. Alan Watt, *The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938-1965* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 29-30.
- ¹⁸Governor-General, NZ, to SSDA, 9 July, 1940, PM 62/3/1.
- ¹⁹Hull to Butler, 23 December, 1940, PM 62/3/1.
- ²⁰The New Zealand's Government's delay on this matter was due to the problem of determining the most suitable person to fill the position of New Zealand's Minister to the United States. Prime Minister Fraser, who was of the opinion that a Cabinet member should fill the position, was unable to make the final choice between two high ranking Cabinet members, F. Langstone and W. Nash. Langstone had been earlier promised the post; but his political rival, Nash, also desired it, although he was reluctant to leave his "power base" in Wellington. With Fraser's final decision in November 1941, the New Zealand Legation in Washington was fully established by February, 1942. It consisted of: New Zealand Minister to the United States, Walter Nash; New Zealand Air Attaché, Group Captain L.M. Isitt; New Zealand Naval Attaché, Acting Commander C.W.M. Vereker R.N.; and New Zealand Army Attaché, Lt Col W.H. Pharazyn. PM 62/3/1; PM 62/3/8.
- ²¹Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, p. 5.
- ²²Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, p. 96.
- ²³Langer, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, p. 7.
- ²⁴See *infra*, pp. 125-31.

- 25Despite Churchill's reassurance, his comments at the meeting of the British War Cabinet on 8 August, 1940, which considered the UKCOS Far East Appreciation and authorized his reassurance to the Pacific Dominions, clearly revealed that his strategic thinking had not changed since June 1940. While making very plain his commitment to the maintenance of the British position in the Mediterranean, Churchill argued that: "If a full scale invasion of either Australia or New Zealand was threatened the situation could be retrieved by the intervention of the United States. Indeed, if the United States had previously made it clear that they would not tolerate the invasion of Australia and New Zealand, the Japanese would never take the plunge." Raymond Callahan, "The Illusion of Security: Singapore 1919-1942", *Journal of Contemporary History*, IX, No. 2 (April, 1974), 83. Churchill's reassurance, therefore, can largely be explained in terms of his desire to lull the Pacific Dominions into a sense of security in order to support his efforts with regard to British grand strategy and maintain their commitment to Empire defence in the Middle East.
- 26SSDA to UKHC, Wellington, "PM to PM", 11 August, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- 27SSDA to UKHC, Wellington, 12 August, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- 28Appreciation by the UKCOS on the Situation in the Far East, August, 1940, SSDA to UKHC, Wellington, 12 August, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- 29Air forces then in Malaya consisted of a total of 88 first-line aircraft.
- 30These included: 144 first-line aircraft; and two cruisers, seven destroyers and sixteen submarines.
- 31Appreciation by the UKCOS on the Situation in the Far East, August 1940, SSDA to UKHC, Wellington, 12 August, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- 32The only report of the UKCOS Far Eastern Appreciation in which there was a difference of view between the Pacific Dominions concerned that of the probable scale of attack upon the Australian and New Zealand Areas during the phase I period. The Australian Government contended that their area would now be subject to a greater scale of attack than that of raiding activities; while the New Zealand Government accepted that her area would not be subject to any greater scale of attack than raiding activities. This difference of view was to fundamentally affect the development of full ANZAC defence co-operation in the Southwest Pacific. See *infra*, pp. 118-122.
- 33Governor-General, NZ, to SSDA, 7 September, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1). The NZCOS had advised their government that Churchill's reassurance of fleet support, in the event of a Japanese invasion of the Pacific Dominions, was "most heartening and relieves our fear that in the present circumstances it would be impossible to release a British fleet for service in the Pacific which would be adequate to deal with the Japanese fleet." Comments by the NZCOS on the Appreciation of the Situation in the Far East, prepared by the UKCOS, COS paper no. 51, 3 September, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- 34PMA to SSDA, PMNZ, 30 August, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1).

- ³⁵Governor-General, NZ to SSDA, 7 September, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ³⁶PMA to SSDA, PMNZ, 30 August, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ³⁷See *supra*, pp. 49-57.
- ³⁸PMA to PMNZ, 22 August, 1940, AD 11 7/20.
- ³⁹The Australian and New Zealand Chiefs of General Staffs did not attend. The military staff conversations in Melbourne, Australia, therefore, were held only between the Australian and New Zealand Air and Naval Chiefs of Staff.
- ⁴⁰Review of Naval Policy Consequent Upon Visit of the Chief of the Naval Staff to Australia, Memorandum for Minister of Defence, NZ, from NZ Naval Secretary, 10 September, 1940; Report of Discussions Between the ACAS and NZCAS held at 1415 hours, on 19 September, 1940, 23 September, 1940, Air 130/3/2.
- ⁴¹PMNZ to PMA, 4 October, 1940, Air 130/3/2.
- ⁴²PMA to PMNZ, 15 October, 1940, Air 130/3/2.
- ⁴³New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs, *Documents*, III, 29-30.
- ⁴⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.
- ⁴⁵Subsequent to the recommendation made by the UKCOS in their August (1940) Far Eastern Appreciation, the convening of a defence conference had been the subject of much discussion between the British, Australian and New Zealand Governments between 5 September and 8 October, 1940. It was eventually agreed that the defence conference should be held at Singapore, rather than at Melbourne, Australia, and was scheduled for 22 October, 1940.
- ⁴⁶SSDA to UKHC, Wellington, 9 October, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁴⁷Governor-General, NZ to SSDA, 11 October, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁴⁸SSDA to UKHC, Wellington, 13 October, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁴⁹In this dissertation, as in other writings, the word "British" can be used in two senses: in one as pertaining to the United Kingdom, in another as pertaining to the British Empire as a whole. When necessary more distinctive terms will be used but the reader should be able to determine the proper use of the word "British" from the context in which it is used.
- ⁵⁰Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, U.S.N. had been sent to London as a U.S. naval representative for exploratory conversations in August, 1940, and had remained there as Special Naval Observer-London. See *infra*, pp.
- ⁵¹Great Britain's assumption proved correct. After the American Presidential election, Roosevelt did agree to the convening of a secret Anglo-American military staff conference at Washington. See *infra*, pp.

- ⁵²SSDA to UKHC, Wellington, 16 October, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁵³SSDA to UKHC, Wellington, 27 October, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁵⁴Conn and Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defence*, pp. 30-35.
- ⁵⁵Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, pp. 13-20; Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. II: *Their Finest Hour* (London: Cassel and Co. Ltd., 1949), pp. 22-24.
- ⁵⁶Watson, *Chief of Staff*, pp. 110-111.
- ⁵⁷Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, Vol. I (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970), p. 350.
- ⁵⁸Apparently, this was due to Roosevelt's awareness, after possible consultation with Lord Lothian, of Churchill's later fear that: in any formal military staff talks between British and American planners, at that time, American planners would direct the discussions and planning solely upon the question of the transference of the British fleet to transatlantic bases, in the event of a British defeat; and that should such discussions and planning become known to the British public, it would weaken confidence in Great Britain at a time when all should brace themselves for the supreme struggle. Apparently, Roosevelt also shared this later fear. *Ibid.*, pp. 353-354.
- ⁵⁹*Ibid.*, p. 354.
- ⁶⁰Watson, *Chief of Staff*, p. 113; Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 78.
- ⁶¹Watson, *Chief of Staff*, p. 114.
- ⁶²Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, p. 23.
- ⁶³*Ibid.*
- ⁶⁴*Ibid.*
- ⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. 24.
- ⁶⁶*Ibid.*, p. 22.
- ⁶⁷*Ibid.*
- ⁶⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.
- ⁶⁹Conn and Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defence*, p. 65. See also *The London Observer*, *The Journal of General Raymond E. Lee, 1940-1941*, London: Hutchinson, 1972, *passim*.
- ⁷⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.
- ⁷¹Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, pp. 103-104, pp. 119-120.

- ⁷²F.C. Jones, *Japan's New Order in East Asia: It's Rise and Fall, 1937-1945* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), "(Hereinafter referred to as *Japan's New Order in East Asia*)", pp. 193-196.
- ⁷³Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, p. 48.
- ⁷⁴Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, p. 106.
- ⁷⁵Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, p. 39.
- ⁷⁶Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, II, p. 112.
- ⁷⁷Churchill, *The Second World War*, II, p. 440.
- ⁷⁸Churchill's suggestion that an American naval squadron be dispatched to Singapore as a deterrent to further Japanese aggression was, after much debate within the Administration, finally rejected by Roosevelt. Cordell Hull, Sumner Wells, Admiral Stark and General Marshall were all vehemently opposed to such a move. Only Henry Stimson, Secretary of War, and Dr Stanley Hornbeck, principle State Department Adviser on Far Eastern affairs, appear to have favoured it. In contrast to his addresses, Roosevelt was undecided. He continued to be interested in the British suggestion as late as 29 November, 1940 but, apparently, acceded to the warnings of his military advisers by that time.
- Herzog, *Closing the Open Door*, pp. 82-87; Roberto Quinlan, "The United States Fleet: Diplomacy, Strategy and the Allocation of Ships (1940-1941)," in *American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies*, ed. by Harold Stein (Birmingham, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1963), pp. 169-176.
- ⁷⁹Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, II, p. 113; SSDA to UKHC, Wellington, 9 October, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁸⁰Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, p. 47.
- ⁸¹Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, II, pp. 113-114.
- ⁸²SSDA to UKHC, Wellington, 13 October, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁸³SSDA to UKHC, Wellington, 16 October, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁸⁴SSDA to UKHC, Wellington, 22 October, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁸⁵Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, p. 128; SSDA to UKHC, Wellington, 27 October, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁸⁶On 12 November, 1940, shortly after the Presidential election, Admiral Stark, C.N.O. recommended, in a detailed memorandum to the Secretary of Navy on future American National Policy (Plan Dog), that "as a preliminary to possible entry of the United States into the conflict, the United States Army and Navy at once undertake secret Staff Talks...with the British military and naval authorities...." Both General Marshall, U.S. Army COS, and President Roosevelt accepted this recommendation and, on 30 November, Admiral Stark personally requested the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, to send military representatives to

Washington for the anticipated Anglo-American military staff conference. On 2 December, British authorities informed Admiral Ghormley of their acceptance of the American proposal for military staff talks at Washington. The sudden death of the British Ambassador to the United States, Lord Lothian, however, caused some delay in arranging an immediate military staff conference at Washington that year. As a consequence, the Anglo-American military staff conference was eventually scheduled to begin on 29 January, 1941; which it did, and concluded on 28 March, 1941. Herzog, *Closing the Open Door*, pp. 108-109, 225; Watson, *Chief of Staff*, pp. 119-125.

Chapter V

The Pacific: An American Strategic Responsibility?

i Japan's New Order in the Southern Region

The Japanese mission to Batavia, which had been sent in September, met with little success in obtaining larger quantities of raw materials, particularly oil, from the Netherlands East Indies. The Japanese Delegation, led by Ichizo Kobayashi, a member of the Japanese Cabinet, had demanded, among other things, that the Dutch Government give Japan oil concessions in the Netherlands East Indies and supply Japan with three million tons of oil annually, for the next five years.¹ This quantity of oil represented forty per cent of total Dutch production and five times as much as Japan normally obtained from the Netherlands East Indies.² The Dutch authorities, however, flatly refused the delegation's demands. They informed Kobayashi that Japan's economic requirements was not a matter for the Dutch Government, and insisted that the delegation discuss the subject with the commercial companies concerned. By that time, however, the British and Americans were exerting diplomatic and economic pressure upon the companies. Secretly guided by the British and American Governments, therefore, the commercial companies refused to grant oil concessions to Japan and, on a six month basis only, agreed to supply Japan with about half of the oil and other raw materials that the delegation had originally demanded. Eager to obtain for Japan what raw materials the delegation could, Kobayashi signed an agreement on 12 November with the commercial companies concerned, thereby obtaining for Japan some increase in the supplies of oil fuel, bauxite, tin and rubber. Those amounts, however, fell far short of what the delegation had hoped to obtain, and Kobayashi's failure to persuade the Dutch to provide Japan's full economic requirements only spurred the Japanese Government into taking bolder action with the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies. In January, 1941, another Japanese mission, headed this time by Kenkichi Yoshizawa, also a Japanese Cabinet member, was dispatched to Batavia.³ On 16 January, the Japanese delegation now demanded, among other things, that the Dutch give an unconditional promise that the Netherlands East Indies would provide designated quantities of war materials to Japan, admit a greater number of

Japanese nationals to the Netherlands East Indies, permit exploration for oil and other minerals in the Indies, including those areas reserved for the Dutch Government, assist in the creation of joint Indo-Japanese enterprises in the Dutch Islands, permit a Japanese fishing fleet in Dutch territorial waters with shore-based fishing stations; and finally allow more Japanese ships to engage in coastal trade and to use closed harbours in the Dutch Islands. These additional Japanese demands accorded with Japan's plan for acquiring complete control over the economic life of the Netherlands East Indies, as formulated by the Japanese Cabinet on 25 October, 1940. Nevertheless, the Dutch authorities, despite the lack of formal assurance of military support from Britain and the United States, again stoutly resisted the demands. They stiffly rebutted the delegation's insinuation that the Netherlands East Indies belonged to Japan's "New Order". Recoiling from the Dutch rebuke, Yoshizawa advised Tokyo that the use of armed forces was now necessary to achieve Japanese goals in the Netherlands East Indies. The Japanese Government, however, was not militarily prepared, as yet, for a possible war with both Britain and the United States. The Japanese Government therefore accepted its position in the Netherlands East Indies, and, by the end of February, reduced its demands to more modest and reasonable proportions.⁴ Japan's diplomatic failure with the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies only spurred the Japanese on to take bolder action in French Indo-China and Thailand, where, for political and geographical reasons, resistance would be much less. Seizing the opportunity for expansion in those areas, brought about by the outbreak of a heated border dispute between the French and Siamese which Japan had helped to instigate, Japan now thrust herself forward as a mediator between the two countries. Despite warnings and advice from both the British and American Governments, the Thai Government eagerly, and the Vichy Government not so eagerly, accepted Japan's offer to mediate in the border dispute. As a prelude to a final settlement of the conflict, a cease-fire agreement was signed on board the Japanese cruiser Natori in Saigon harbour, on 31 January.⁵ An entrée having been thus obtained, a conference was then held in Tokyo on 1 February by Japanese authorities in order to determine the best method of using the local conflict for the promotion of national objectives within the region. It was then decided that both French Indo-China and Thailand should be compelled to accept the settlement that Japan

would propose, and that armed force would, if necessary, be used to compel the French in doing so. Afterwards, Japan would then, it was agreed, proceed to conclude economic, political and military accords with both countries. In particular, the Japanese desired from both the use of strategically important bases and ports for an eventual southern advance upon Singapore, via the Malayan peninsula.⁶ On 7 February, 1941, the Franco-Siamese negotiations began in Tokyo and, after much intimidation from Japanese authorities, the French and Siamese accepted Japan's proposed settlement on 11 March. By the terms of the treaties, France ceded to Thailand about one-third of Cambodia, in addition to the districts formally a part of the Laos Protectorate. As expected, Japan extracted from the French and Siamese, as the price for mediation in the dispute, acceptance of an additional agreement whereby Japan guaranteed the "final and inviolable" character of the settlement, while both the Thai and Vichy Governments further agreed to conclude no arrangements with third powers which might involve them in any political, economic or military collaboration, directly or indirectly, against Japan.⁷ By this agreement, Japan had effectively deprived those Asian countries of the means of successfully resisting further Japanese penetration and exploitation. In short, Japan had taken a bold and successful step towards bringing French Indo-China and Thailand into the orbit of her New Order. Having achieved some measure of success in the Far East, Japan then launched her planned diplomatic offensive in Washington.

Fully conscious, since October, 1940, of Anglo-American efforts intended to achieve her southern encirclement, and aware of the obvious failure of the Tripartite Pact to deter such a development, Japan now sought a diplomatic understanding with the United States in a further effort to prevent American interference in the establishment of her New Order in the Southern Region. On 8 November the Konoye Government in Japan had appointed Admiral Nomura, who had been ousted from the Japanese Cabinet by the extremists in 1939, as Japan's new Ambassador to the United States. Nomura was widely known in America as an advocate of peace and friendship between Japan and the United States and was liked and respected in American naval circles.⁸ His appointment was therefore warmly received in Washington and viewed by American authorities as a favourable omen

for the improvement of Japanese-American relations.⁹ On 11 February, 1941, Nomura took up his post in Washington and was instructed to open negotiations with the United States in order to obtain a general settlement in the Pacific.¹⁰ On 8 March, after receiving detailed instructions, Nomura entered into negotiations with Cordell Hull in an effort to find some formula for peace in the Pacific.¹¹

ii Japan's Northern Flank and New Order in the Southern Region

Having launched her diplomatic offensive in Washington, Japan then attempted finally to resolve her position with the Soviet Union by opening negotiations directly with the Soviet Government. As early as November, 1940, Japan had sought to reach some form of understanding with the Soviet Union which would secure her northern Manchukuo border and thereby facilitate full and uninhibited expansion into the Southern Region. Since that time, Japan had attempted to open negotiations with the Soviet Union, with Germany as intermediary. But these efforts had met with little success. The German Government, which was contemplating an attack upon the Soviet Union, was only interested in persuading Japan to commit herself to an attack on Singapore before Germany turned on the Soviet Union. Since Japan would not commit herself to a possible war with both Britain and the United States until she had at least resolved her position with the Soviet Union, the German proposal was repeatedly rejected by Japan and the possibility of a Russo-Japanese understanding diminished. By early March, the Japanese Government was convinced that it should open negotiations directly with the Soviet Government. A direct approach to the Soviet Union was therefore made by Japan and met with measurable success.¹² On 13 April, 1941, Japan and the Soviet Union entered into a Neutrality Pact, whereby each power pledged neutrality for the duration of the conflict should the other "become the object of hostilities on the part of one or several third powers". The Pact was also accompanied by a Frontier Declaration, by which the Soviet Union pledged to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Japan's northern territory, Manchukuo, and Japan gave a similar undertaking to respect the Soviet Union's Far Eastern territory, the Mongolian People's Republic.¹³

Having diplomatically secured its northern flank the Japanese Government then held a conference on 16 April at Imperial Headquarters, Tokyo, in order to examine the progress made since July, 1940, towards the establishment of a New Order in the Southern Region, in accordance with the "General Principles". The Japanese were aware that in some areas efforts towards the establishment of a New Order in the Southern Region had met with surprising success, while in others, results were frustrating. They recognized that Japan had succeeded in drastically readjusting her relations with the Soviet Union, thereby securing the northern flank. Moreover, they further recognized that Japan had made considerable progress towards bringing French Indo-China and Thailand under full control. On the other hand, they acknowledged that Japan had also encountered since October, 1940, concerted British, Dutch and American opposition to the New Order in the Southern Region. In this regard, they drew attention to stubborn Dutch resistance to efforts to obtain greater supplies of raw materials from the Netherlands East Indies and to bring those Islands within the orbit of a New Order. American economic embargoes on iron and steel scrap exports to Japan were also a source of great concern. In addition, they pointed to the progress made towards the southern encirclement of Japan. They viewed with great concern the past and present movements of British, Dutch and American forces in the Pacific and discussed every bit of intelligence and gossip regarding the defence discussions held at Singapore, Batavia and Washington. By this time, the Japanese were convinced that a definite military understanding had been conceived by the British, Dutch and American Governments.¹⁴ After much discussion and debate, the conference finally agreed that the July 1940 programme for the establishment of a New Order in the Southern Region was still viable, but that greater effort should be made to hasten Japan's control over the area. Again, it was accepted that Japan would continue to use diplomacy first, instead of armed force, to achieve her objectives. Nevertheless, it was now accepted that Japan would have to resort to war with both Great Britain and the United States should their efforts for establishing a New Order in the Southern Region become seriously threatened by the imposition of further economic embargoes and intense military encirclement by Great Britain, the United States and the Netherlands.¹⁵

iii The Singapore Defence Conference

The Japanese Government's growing concern for their southern encirclement was understandable in view of combined British, Dutch and American efforts, since October 1940, to prepare and plan their Pacific defences against a Japanese southern advance. Since that time, the British and Dutch had been constructing an elaborate air defence line around the Japanese Empire and fortifying their naval and air bases, while the Americans retained the U.S. battle fleet at Pearl Harbor in order to deter any possible Japanese counter-action. Against this background of defence preparations, the British and Americans had also been forging a joint Anglo-American strategy on which later to base a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan. The first step in that effort was taken at Singapore where, in anticipation of future Anglo-American military staff talks, the "British position" was more clearly prepared.

As previously arranged, a defence conference was convened at Singapore on 22 October, 1940, under the chairmanship of Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, Commander-in-chief (C-in-C), China Station. Among those present included other British Far East Commanders and service representatives from India, Burma, Australia, New Zealand and a naval officer from the British East Indies Station.¹⁶ As agreed to between the British and American Governments, an American representative, Commander F.P. Thomas, U.S.N., secretly attended the conference as a Special Naval Observer. The Dutch, however, were reluctant, at this stage, to participate in any military discussions with the British and Americans in the Far East.

As laid down by the British Government, the delegates' tasks were to examine the possible form of military co-operation with Dutch and American military forces in preparation for later military staff talks with Dutch and American authorities. In addition, the delegates were also instructed to examine Far East defence problems and requirements with regard to Singapore, Malaya, Burma and India in light of the UKCOS August (1940) Far Eastern Appreciation and the British Far East Commanders' 16 October (1940) Tactical Appreciation of the defence of Singapore and Malaya. Before the Conference could get under way, however, this latter task was widened,

at the insistence of the Australian and New Zealand Delegations, to include an examination of defence problems and requirements within the Australia and New Zealand Areas as well.¹⁷

In anticipation of future Anglo-American Military Staff talks, the delegates drew up a Far Eastern War Plan "for the strategical employment of British, U.S.A. and Dutch forces" in order to guide British and American planners in their discussions. The Far Eastern War Plan reflected British strategical thinking. It was based upon the assumption that the United States would assume major strategic responsibility in the Pacific by dispatching an adequate fleet to the Far East in the event of war with Japan. Characteristically, the Far Eastern War Plan was operationally structured upon two periods, phases I and II: "a period before and after the arrival in the Western Pacific of the U.S.A. fleet (Battle fleet)." The local naval forces which would be available to the British, Dutch and Americans during the phase I period would include: the U.S. Asiatic fleet, the British China fleet, the Australian and New Zealand naval squadron and the Dutch East Indies fleet. Those local naval forces should be principally assigned, the delegates considered, to the defence of strategic bases within the Far East Area during the phase I period. During that period, the British role should be that of securing the defence of Hong Kong, Burma, Malaya and the sea communications through the Malacca Straits and in the Indian Ocean. The Australia and New Zealand Areas, however, would require forces for the protection of focal shipping areas and important bases within those areas. The Dutch role, the delegates contended, should be that of securing the defence of the Netherlands East Indies and, in particular, the sea passage through those Islands in order to hold the gateways to the Indian Ocean. As for the American role during the phase I period, the delegates considered that it should include the following: attacking Japanese communications on the China coast and any expedition against the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya or Hong Kong, defending Guam and the Philippines, and possibly operating a cruiser off the coast of Japan to divert Japanese naval forces. During the phase II period the delegates accepted that the naval offensive against Japan "would be almost entirely a U.S. responsibility" with the intervention of the U.S. battle fleet. British, Dutch and American local naval forces during that period should

then be principally assigned to the defence of sea communications within the Indian and Pacific Oceans and straits of the Netherlands East Indies.¹⁸

With regard to command arrangements, the delegates agreed that a unified strategical naval command should be established in the Pacific under an American Commander-in-Chief. The United States, therefore, was to be invited to assume strategic naval command of the British Far East, Australia and New Zealand Areas. Great Britain the delegates acknowledged would still retain strategic naval command in the Indian Ocean under the C-in-C, East Indies Station (Map II).¹⁹

Two principal questions, however, confronted the delegates in the development of their Far Eastern War Plan. One question concerned the possible sea route the American authorities would choose in sending their battle fleet westward. Would the Americans wish to send the U.S. battle fleet through the north, central or south Pacific? The other related question concerned the advanced main fleet base the American authorities would choose to operate their battle fleet from in the Far East. Would the Americans accept Singapore, Manila, or, even possibly, Guam as their advanced main fleet base in the Far East? Although the UKCOS, the delegates were informed, proposed to suggest to the Americans that Singapore should be the advanced main fleet base for the U.S. battle fleet, they also accepted that Manila would be a "most suitable advanced main fleet base, provided local defences are adequate."²⁰ Despite the uncertainties about American intentions, the British were strongly to urge Australia and New Zealand to base their local defence plans and preparations upon the security of Singapore. Understandably, this British policy was to provoke a measure of general reluctance on the part of the Pacific Dominions. Now deeply concerned with the defence of their own local Areas, they viewed the defence of Singapore as primarily a British strategic responsibility. Moreover, the Pacific Dominions, now orientated increasingly towards reliance on American seapower, tended to view the Singapore naval base as being of questionable value. They now considered its strategic importance dependent upon American Pacific defence requirements. As a result, Australia and New Zealand were to be stimulated

into undertaking an independent ANZAC approach to American authorities in Washington in order to obtain military information regarding American Pacific defence requirements on which more accurately to guide their local defence plans and preparations.

Having prepared the "British position" for the anticipated military staff talks with American authorities, the delegates then turned their attention to an examination of Far Eastern defence problems and requirements. The assumptions on which the delegates now worked were that, on the outbreak of war with Japan, the United States would be neutral, but her intervention remains a possibility to be reckoned with"; that the Dutch might remain neutral, but their intervention was probable; and that Australian and New Zealand naval forces would return to the Dominions and a battle cruiser and aircraft carrier would proceed to the Indian Ocean in accordance with the British Prime Minister's telegram to the Western Pacific Dominions.²¹ The delegates' objective, it was acknowledged, was now to prepare Far Eastern local defences for an extended phase I period by making "the best dispositions possible to secure the most important of our interests without the cover which a capital ship fleet would provide."²²

As instructed by the British Government, the delegates were to take for discussion the UKCOS August (1940) Far Eastern Appreciation²³ and the recent British Far East Commanders' 16 October (1940) Tactical Appreciation on the defence of Singapore and Malaya. In the latter appreciation, the British Far East Commanders had agreed, after studying the former, that air power should be the principal weapon for the defence of Malaya during the phase I period. They also concluded that Japan would surely continue to advance southward into Southern French Indo-China or Thailand, from where Japanese heavy bombers would be within range of Singapore. They also drew attention, however, to the point that, should Japanese land forces be established in Southern Thailand, they would be able to mount an attack upon the northern frontier of Malaya before effective British counteraction was possible. In effect, the British Far East Commanders considered that the UKCOS decision not to make Japanese entry into Thailand a *casus belli* a serious mistake, which put Singapore into serious jeopardy. They therefore further

recommended that local air strength in Malaya be increased to 566 modern first-line aircraft (230 more than the numbers recommended by the UKCOS) and that only when that air strength had been reached could land forces be safely reduced from three divisions to twenty-three battalions (five more than the UKCOS had suggested) for the defence of Malaya. In addition, the British Far East Commanders had also recommended that three battalions be sent to British Borneo, bringing the total to twenty-six battalions required for the defence of both Malaya and British Borneo.²⁴ Since both Appreciations laid emphasis upon Far East defence problems and requirements, the Australian and New Zealand Delegations had continually to press upon the British Delegation a recognition of the defence problems and requirements within their own local Areas.²⁵ The measure of their success was most clearly reflected in the final conference report.

In examining the defence problems within the Far Eastern Area, so as to determine Far Eastern defence requirements, the delegates considered that the courses of action open to Japan during the phase I period included:

- (a) an attempted invasion of Australia or New Zealand which was highly improbable if American intervention was a strong possibility;
- (b) an attempt to seize Pacific islands in order to pave the way for an invasion of Australia or New Zealand and to secure bases for attacks on trade and troop convoys in Australian and New Zealand waters;
- (c) an attack upon Hong Kong, which was highly probable;
- (d) an attack upon Malaya with the object of seizing Singapore, which would be a "vital blow and must be defeated";
- (e) an attempt to seize bases in British Borneo in order to pave the way for the seizure of Singapore;
- (f) an attack upon Burma by land and air forces from French Indo-China and Thailand;
- (g) an attack upon the Netherlands East Indies or Timor (Portuguese and Dutch) in order to secure vital war materials and bases for further operations, which was considered probable;
- (h) an attempt to seize Darwin as a base, which was considered possible but unlikely in view of the difficulties involved in maintaining the lines of communications and supplying a force there, though an attempt to destroy Darwin's port facilities was considered probable;

- (i) an attack upon trade and sea communications in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, which was considered certain; and
- (j) raids upon Australian and New Zealand ports by warships and seaborne aircraft.²⁶

In view of the multiple courses of action open to Japan, the delegates agreed that until sufficient naval forces were available for offensive action against Japan (phase II period) it would be necessary to "remain on the defensive and concentrate on the protection of vital points and vital trade and convoys" during the phase I period. The first and immediate consideration, the delegates acknowledged, must be to ensure the security of Malaya against direct attack.²⁷ The delegates accepted the British Far East Commanders' recommendations on the defence requirements for Malaya.²⁸ But they noted that serious deficiencies existed there, particularly in air and land forces. These deficiencies included 518 modern first-line aircraft and twelve battalions of infantry.²⁹ The delegates agreed that the deficiencies would have to be "remedied immediately" and recommended that the "further co-operation of India, Australia and New Zealand be sought without delay."³⁰ The delegates were compelled to accept, however, that the primary concern of the Australian and New Zealand delegations was for the security of the Australia and New Zealand Areas. The delegates agreed that, although a major expedition against Australia or New Zealand could be ruled out, sufficient army and air forces must be maintained in the Australia and New Zealand Areas to deal with enemy raids, and also such naval and air forces as are necessary to ensure the maintenance of vital trade, protect troop convoys, and carry out necessary local defence duties. Moreover, the delegates acknowledged that the present number of aircraft in Australia was dangerously small and aircraft in New Zealand were of obsolete types. The delegates therefore accepted that it would not be possible to reduce air forces in Australia or obtain aircraft from New Zealand for the defence of Malaya.³¹

Turning to more general Far Eastern defence problems and requirements, the delegates agreed that air power should be the principal weapon of defence during the phase I period. With sufficient air strength, the delegates considered that Japan could be prevented, or at least discouraged, from establishing naval and air bases within

striking distance of vital interests in Burma, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, Australia and New Zealand. The minimum aircraft now needed for effective Far Eastern defence, the delegates estimated, were:

Burma and Malaya	582 ³²
Netherlands East Indies	346
Australia	312
New Zealand	60
New Guinea-Solomons-New Hebrides	
reconnaissance line	8
Fiji-Tonga reconnaissance line	9
Indian Ocean	87

Additional advanced air bases and ground staffs were also now planned for Burma, Malaya, British Borneo and northern Australia (Darwin). The delegates agreed that it was necessary to proceed forthwith with the preparation of such facilities irrespective of the fact that the required aircraft strength could not immediately be provided. Until the aircraft were provided, the delegates considered that a concentration of existing aircraft at theoretical points should be employed to prevent or deter Japan from establishing naval and air bases within striking distance of vital interests in Burma, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, Australia and New Zealand. An elaborate Far Eastern air reconnaissance and reinforcement line, therefore, was now visualized, which would stretch from Burma to the Tonga Islands (Map II).³³

Naval problems and requirements within the Far Eastern Area were also examined by the delegates. They acknowledged that the main defence commitments in the Indian and Pacific Oceans were: the maintenance of troop convoys through the Indian Ocean to the Middle East; maintenance of sea communications through the Indian Ocean to Singapore-Malaya; the maintenance of Australian and New Zealand involvement in the Empire Air Training Scheme; and the maintenance of essential trade within the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The delegates noted that the anticipated scale of attack in the Indian Ocean during the phase I period, as estimated by the UKCOS in their August (1940) Far Eastern Appreciation, was a force of enemy cruisers supported by one or more capital ships. With the forces available (light naval forces), the delegates agreed that troop

convoys to the Middle East would certainly require capital ship escort. Moreover, the delegates also conceded that the maintenance of trade and vital sea communications in the Indian Ocean would have to depend upon "evasive routing". The delegates accepted that the position in the Indian Ocean was entirely dependent upon the arrival of naval reinforcements from other naval stations, particularly since it would be necessary to replace the Australian and New Zealand ships then on that station in accordance with the British Prime Minister's telegram to the Pacific Dominions. The delegates, therefore, were unable to formulate naval dispositions for the defence of the Indian Ocean during the phase I period. With regard to the Pacific Ocean, the delegates noted that the anticipated scale of attack in the Australian and New Zealand Areas during the phase I period, as estimated by the UKCOS in their August (1940) Far Eastern Appreciation, was cruiser raids, possibly combined with a light scale of seaborne air attacks against ports. The delegates agreed that Pacific trade could be largely defended by "evasive routing". Within the Tasman Sea Area, however, the delegates accepted that this would not be sufficient for the protection of trade, and that such protection, therefore, could only be afforded by naval and air forces within the vicinity of the focal shipping areas (Map II). The delegates agreed that, with the exception of capital ships, the "minimum" naval force necessary to safeguard essential commitments within Australia and New Zealand waters could be met by the return of Australian and New Zealand naval forces then serving overseas, provided that adequate air forces could also be maintained in the focal shipping areas. The delegates noted, however, that the air forces available for the defence of focal shipping areas within the Tasman Sea Area were inadequate. On this basis, naval dispositions for the defence of essential commitments in the Australia and New Zealand Area were formulated:

- (a) South-East Australia: 2 8" cruisers, 1 6" cruiser
- (b) South-West Australia: 2 6" cruisers
- (c) New Zealand: 2 6" cruisers

Such naval dispositions, the delegates acknowledged, would leave only 1 6" cruiser and 3 AMC's available from Australian and New Zealand naval forces (Appendix B) for troop convoy and trade

protection further afield. Moreover, no naval forces were to be provided for the defence of Darwin.

The delegates also examined the possible use of naval bases in the Pacific Ocean and Timor Sea by American and British naval forces. After consideration of this possibility, the delegates recommended that the provision of facilities at Suva, Port Moresby and Darwin should be expedited; and also the defences at Thursday Island in order to control the sea passage through the Torres Strait.³⁴

On 31 October, the Singapore Defence Conference adjourned. The American representative, Commander F.P. Thomas, U.S.N., returned to his station at Manila and presented to his superior, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U.S. Asiatic Fleet Commander, a copy of the British Far Eastern War Plan, which was subsequently forwarded to Washington.³⁵ American military authorities, then busily engaged in preparing the "American position" for the anticipated Anglo-American military staff talks, refused to make any comment on the British Far Eastern War Plan. In particular they had nothing to say about the possibility that the United States would undertake an offensive in the Western Pacific in the event of war with Japan.³⁶ Nevertheless, it became immediately apparent to both the Australian and New Zealand Governments that information regarding American military intentions in the Pacific was urgently needed to guide their local defence plans and preparations, particularly with regard to Singapore, which now required greater military preparations for its defence.

iv Australia takes the initiative: an ANZAC mission to Washington

On 1 November Robert Menzies informed Peter Fraser that the Australian Government intended to send Commander H.M. Burrell, R.A.N., Director of Australian Naval Operations, to Washington for an exchange of information and secret conversations with American naval authorities. Richard Casey, the Australian Minister to the United States would secure the necessary approval from the American authorities. Menzies then suggested that Burrell could also represent New Zealand in his discussions with American naval authorities at Washington.³⁷ The New Zealand Government had also recognized before the Australian initiative, the need for information regarding American military intentions in the Pacific. Uncertain of American Pacific defence

requirements and already heavily committed to defence responsibilities in the Middle East and in the New Zealand Area, the New Zealand Government had warned their delegation at the Singapore Defence Conference not to undertake any additional defence responsibilities, particularly with regard to Singapore which the British were then pressing upon the Pacific Dominions.³⁸ The New Zealand Government, therefore, warmly received the Australian initiative. On 4 November, Fraser informed Menzies that W.E. Parry, R.N., New Zealand's Chief of Naval Staff (NZCNS), would furnish the necessary information on the New Zealand Naval Station to Burrell.³⁹

After obtaining the necessary naval information from Parry in New Zealand, Burrell then continued on to Washington, finally arriving there on 17 November.⁴⁰ Once there, Burrell then held five informal military conversations, between 19 to 27 November, with members of the Navy War Plans Division at the Navy Department.⁴¹ During the conversations, Burrell and the American naval planners exchanged information and discussed, among other things, American, Australian and New Zealand naval co-operation in the Southwest Pacific. Although the American naval planners remained tight-lipped about American military intentions in the Pacific, Burrell was able to learn that American naval plans did exist for an American naval offensive in the Western Pacific, in the event of a war with Japan.⁴² Moreover, Burrell was able to learn some of the details of those plans. The American naval planners expressed their overall strategical interest in the Australia and New Zealand Naval Stations, particularly with regard to the defended naval ports within those areas. They were especially interested in the Torres Strait Area and such naval ports as Darwin, Port Moresby and Suva for the passage of American naval forces and supplies to the Far East. Persistent enquiries were made by the Americans as to the existing defences, repair and supply facilities at Darwin, Port Moresby, Suva and other Australian and New Zealand Pacific ports. From those enquiries, Burrell was able to deduce that plans existed for the dispatch of an American battle fleet to the Far East, by way of the South Pacific. The probable route, it appeared to Burrell, was Hawaii-Suva-Port Moresby-Torres Strait-Darwin. Moreover, Burrell was also able to deduce that such plans called for the use of Singapore as the advanced main fleet base for the American battle fleet in the Far East. When the topic of

discussions shifted to base facilities in the Far East, Burrell was asked point blank by the American naval planners for his personal views with regard to what he considered to be the most strategically desirable advanced main fleet base for American naval forces in the Far East. Guided by the British Far Eastern War Plan, Burrell responded by suggesting that "Singapore would provide security but hinted that Manila was in an ideal strategic position to hamper [Japanese] lines of communication and from which to start offensive operations further north." The Americans, however, quickly dismissed Manila, or any other American Far East base, as a possible advanced main fleet base for American naval forces in the Far East. Burrell was informed that Manila, as well as Guam, were both relatively undefended and held little naval resources, and that to develop them adequately would take at least several years. Furthermore, no provision had been made for this in the naval estimates. Instead, the American naval planners expressed major interest in the Singapore naval base but were deeply concerned about its present security. In this respect, the Americans were particularly interested in reinforcing Singapore with American naval aircraft, by way of the South Pacific, in the event of war with Japan. Unable to provide the necessary information on this subject, Burrell suggested to the American naval planners that Air Vice-Marshall S.J. Globe, Australian Liaison Officer to the R.C.A.F., Ottawa, also take part in the discussions at the Navy Department. This suggestion was quickly accepted and Globe was called to Washington from Ottawa. The American naval planners, Burrell learned, contemplated the reinforcement of Singapore with American naval aircraft, largely from American aircraft carriers deployed off the northeast coast of Australia. The American naval plan, it appeared to Burrell, was for two American aircraft carriers to be dispatched from Hawaii, at different intervals, to the northeast coast of Australia. Once there, four squadrons of aircraft would be launched from such aircraft carriers and then proceed to Singapore via Darwin, Australia, and the Netherlands East Indies. Additional aircraft, comprising two squadrons of American flying boats, would also proceed to Singapore, via Canton Island-Noumea-Port Moresby and the Netherlands East Indies. The inadequate state of existing defences at Singapore, it appeared to Burrell, deeply troubled the American naval planners in the development of their plans for an American naval offensive in the Western Pacific.⁴³

This was also the general impression that Burrell received, but more sharply, from American authorities outside the Navy Department in Washington. While in the company of Richard Casey, the Australian Minister to the United States, Burrell was also drawn into informal discussions with such American political figures as Dr Stanley Hornbeck, Head of the Far Eastern Section of the State Department, Col. Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, and Sumner Welles, Under-Secretary of State. From those discussions, Burrell gathered that the Roosevelt Administration considered the British complacent regarding the defences at Singapore. On this issue, Dr Stanley Hornbeck was particularly blunt. Hornbeck considered that the British should do more to show by deeds rather than words the importance of Singapore to their defence. From the discussions with both American naval and governmental authorities, Burrell was therefore able to consider that the

U.S.A. will not see us lose [a Japanese war], but their support is dependent on us employing every ounce of energy we possess.

That they [the United States] are not certain we are putting our best efforts into strengthening the garrisons and air forces at Singapore.⁴⁴

Having completed his mission, Burrell left Washington on 30 November and reported his findings to the New Zealand and Australian Naval Boards, only to return shortly to Washington as Australian Naval attaché to the United States.⁴⁵ The substance of Burrell's findings were also transmitted direct from Washington to Canberra by Casey, and to the Admiralty in London by Captain A.W. Clarke, R.N., British Assistant Naval Attaché to the United States.⁴⁶

Burrell's findings were to have an immediate impact upon Australian and New Zealand local defence attitudes by fostering the belief that the United States would assume major strategic responsibility in the Pacific by dispatching an American battle fleet to Singapore, in the event of war with Japan. Burrell's findings therefore were to stimulate in Australia and New Zealand immediate support for the defence of Singapore and the American naval approach line from Hawaii to Singapore, via the South Pacific.

After final consideration of the Singapore Defence Conference Report, Mr Menzies, advised both the New Zealand and British Governments on 1 December that the Australian Government was "gravely concerned" with "the most serious position revealed in regard to the defence of Malaya and Singapore." Pointing to the serious existing land and air threats to Malaya, arising from Japan's recent southern advance into French Indo-China, Menzies argued that the British Government since 1937 had given assurances to the Pacific Dominions that they would "render Singapore secure from military attack" and that their "whole defence policy in the Far East was directed towards ensuring that Singapore would hold out." Although the Australian Government recognized that the British Empire's principal effort had to be made in the European theatre, "it would appear a *sine quo non* to American co-operation in the Pacific that Singapore should be as secure as we can make it if we are to expect them to base strong naval forces in that region." Menzies therefore urged "immediate action to remedy deficiencies in army and air forces both in numbers and in equipment" for the defence of Malaya, as recommended in the Singapore Defence Conference Report. Although the Australian Government was unable to assist with additional air reinforcements, they were prepared, Menzies informed the New Zealand and British Governments, quickly to dispatch a Brigade Group (three battalions), together with the necessary equipment on a modified scale, to Malaya, as a contribution to the existing land force deficiencies in that area. With regard to the other aspects of the Singapore Defence Conference Report, Menzies expressed his Government's general agreement and further urged that its recommendations be carried out immediately.⁴⁷

The British Government gratefully accepted Australia's offer of assistance in the defence of Malaya. Moreover, it advised both the Australian and New Zealand Governments that it would give further consideration to the recommendations of the Singapore Defence Conference Report in light of the Australian Prime Minister's telegram.⁴⁸

Understandably, the telegram evoked immediate concern in New Zealand for the security of Singapore. The New Zealand War Cabinet immediately instructed the NZCOS to examine further the Singapore Defence Conference Report with particular reference to the telegram.⁴⁹ As instructed, the NZCOS gave deep consideration to possible New

Zealand military assistance in the defence of Malaya. The NZCOS also recognized "the importance of Malaya to the defence of the Dominion"⁵⁰ and that considerable air and land force deficiencies existed in that area. Entirely dependent upon the United Kingdom for modern aircraft, the NZCOS accepted that the Dominion would be unable to provide any air reinforcements for Malaya. Instead, the NZCOS agreed that the Dominion could chiefly assist by dispatching additional land reinforcements to Malaya. Referring to the Singapore Defence Conference Report, the NZCOS noted that twelve battalions of troops were urgently required for the defence of Malay, until the required level of air strength in that area had been obtained. Since the Australian Government was now willing to provide three battalions (a Brigade Group), the NZCOS further noted that an additional nine battalions would have to be found among British, Indian and New Zealand land forces. After consideration of the Dominion's other commitments, the NZCOS, therefore, recommended to their Government that, since "the defence of Malaya is important to the defence of New Zealand", the Dominion dispatch a battalion of troops to Malaya, as a contribution to help remedy the existing land force deficiencies in that area. The New Zealand battalion, the NZCOS considered, could be drawn from New Zealand territorial units already formed, thereby not interfering with the training programme of the 2nd NZEF.⁵¹ Upon receipt of the NZCOS recommendations the New Zealand War Cabinet accepted in principle their military advisers' recommendations.⁵² Mr Fraser then instructed Major-General Sir J.L. Duigan, Chief of General Staff (NZCGS), who was then in Singapore, to confer with Australian military authorities on the matter and to further advise the New Zealand Government on how a New Zealand battalion could be provided for the defence of Malaya.⁵³

Recognizing the need for more concrete information regarding American military intentions in the Pacific, Fraser also instructed Group Captain L.M. Isitt, now New Zealand Liaison Officer to the RCAF, Ottawa, to represent New Zealand on the British Delegation at Washington during the Anglo-American military staff talks,⁵⁴ which were scheduled to begin in late January. Although the New Zealand Representatives, like other American Representatives, would not take part in the actual British-American military conversations, Fraser hoped that Isitt would be able to provide some indication of the

"American position" at Washington in order to guide the Dominion's local defence plans and preparations.

Upon his return to New Zealand from Singapore and Melbourne, General Duigan advised the New Zealand Government that the battalion of troops for Malaya should be formed from men who had an obligation to service in the 2nd NZEF, so as to ensure reinforcements and identical conditions of service for all New Zealand troops overseas. Duigan further advised the Dominion Government that a battalion, consisting of forty officers and 893 other ranks, could be provided from the men then training for the 5th Reinforcements, 2nd NZEF, and that reinforcements could then be drawn from those men awaiting call-up for the 6th Reinforcements.⁵⁵ Before the New Zealand war

Cabinet could give final consideration to the matter, the Dominion received the British Government's views on the recommendations of the Singapore Defence Conference Report.

On 28 January, the British Government informed New Zealand that the UKCOS considered the Singapore Defence Conference Report as "unduly pessimistic". The UKCOS recognized that there existed a weakness of land and air forces in the Far East, but was doing everything possible to remedy the situation, having regard to the demands of theatres which are the scene of war. The UKCOS argued that the larger total estimate of 582 aircraft was an "ideal" number, but considered that 336 aircraft should provide "a very fair degree of security" for Malaya, especially when "taking into account experience in the Middle East (where our air forces had a 3 to 1 inferiority at the start of the present campaign), in Malta and in the air defences of Great Britain." The UKCOS suggested that "the capacity of the Japanese should not be over-estimated." The British Government then assured New Zealand that the UKCOS would be making every effort during 1941 to form five fighter squadrons for Malaya in order to eliminate the air deficiencies in that area. With regard to land force requirements, the UKCOS agreed that their previous estimate of the required level of land force strength in Malaya was too low, and accepted the figure of twenty-six battalions for Malaya, including three for Borneo. This figure would "be reached by June 1941, after the arrival of our division."⁵⁶

Of major concern to the British Government, however, were the recommended naval dispositions, as found in the Singapore Defence Conference Report, for Australian and New Zealand naval forces. The UKCOS were deeply concerned with the specific dispositions of Australian and New Zealand cruisers in the Southwest Pacific, in the event of war with Japan. They considered that "the mainstay of the defence of the whole British Commonwealth in the Far East is the maintenance of the security of Singapore and of sea communications through the Indian Ocean between that base and the United Kingdom." Moreover, the UKCOS considered that the security of the sea communications through the Indian Ocean was also vital to Australia and New Zealand for the maintenance of trade between Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. For these reasons, the UKCOS felt strongly that the adoption of a less "local" allocation

of Australian and New Zealand naval forces in the contingency envisaged would facilitate the protection of vital sea communications within the Indian Ocean. The British Government urged New Zealand to reconsider, "in view of the strong recommendations of the UKCOS", a modification of their naval dispositions, as "a valuable contribution to the common cause."⁵⁷

The New Zealand War Cabinet accordingly instructed the NZCOS to give further consideration to the Singapore Defence Conference Report and the Australian Prime Minister's telegram (1 December 1940) in the light of the British Government's recent comments. After reconsidering the entire matter, the NZCOS now advised that, in view of the British Government's assurance that the required land forces for Malaya would be met by June 1941, the Dominion's "assistance in providing the additional land forces required will probably not now be necessary but the New Zealand Government may still wish to consult the United Kingdom Government regarding assistance in this way." In explanation of the British assurance, the NZCOS advised that it had been fully accepted at the Singapore Defence Conference that New Zealand, unlike Australia and India, would not be in a position to provide additional land forces for Malaya on such short notice.⁵⁸ The NZCOS therefore seem to have accepted the British assurance that Singapore would be made secure, thereby meeting American Pacific defence requirements. The NZCOS, however, were deeply concerned with the British Government's allegations that Australia and New Zealand were adopting a "local" attitude by deploying their naval forces in the Southwest Pacific, rather than in the Indian Ocean, in the event of war with Japan.⁵⁹ On this matter, Captain W.E. Parry, Chief of Naval Staff, advised the New Zealand Government that Churchill's telegram (11 August, 1940) to the Dominion Government had assured the Pacific Dominions that their naval forces, then serving overseas with the British fleet, would return to the Dominions in the event of war with Japan and that the naval dispositions formulated for Australian and New Zealand cruisers at the Singapore Defence Conference had been based upon that assumption.⁶⁰ Parry then stated that in a recent communication received from the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board (ACNB), concerning a possible ANZAC reply to the British Government's recent comments on the Singapore Defence Conference Report, Australian naval authorities

consider that there were two points which British authorities had failed to consider:

- (a) the defence approach line of U.S.A. naval units from Honolulu via north of Australia to Singapore.
- (b) the attack on Australian-New Zealand trade at terminal ports [shipping focal areas], namely in the Tasman area.⁶¹

The Australian naval authorities considered that

- (a) ...great emphasis must be laid on defence of our bases in North East, namely Port Moresby, Rabaul, Solomon Islands, New Hebrides, New Caledonia, Suva line, because if they fall into hands of the Japanese, the passage of U.S.A. naval units will be most hazardous, and unless such units do pass to Singapore area the relief of Singapore is very doubtful.
- (b) ...attack on Australian and New Zealand shipping in Tasman area and off terminal ports [focal shipping areas] is more likely Japanese course of action than attempting to cut off this trade in Indian Ocean and, therefore, the provision of adequate naval forces in Tasman area becomes more important.⁶²

In order to safeguard these vital interests within the Southwest Pacific, the Australian naval authorities consider it essential, Parry stated, that Australian and New Zealand naval forces return to their own waters in the event of war with Japan. Parry then advised that the New Zealand Naval Board (NZNB) was in entire agreement with the views of the ACNB, and reminded the Dominion Government that the return of Australian and New Zealand naval forces to their own waters was also essential for ANZAC military co-operation within the Southwest Pacific, in the event of war with Japan.⁶³

The New Zealand War Cabinet accepted their military adviser's views regarding assistance in the defence of Malaya and Australian and New Zealand naval dispositions, in the event of war with Japan. On 8 February, Mr Fraser informed the British Government that, after deep consideration and discussion with Australian authorities about the recommendations of the Singapore Defence Conference Report and His Majesty's telegram of 28 January, the New Zealand Government

considered that there were two points overlooked by British authorities regarding the deployment of Australian and New Zealand naval forces in the Southwest Pacific, in the event of war with Japan— those already stated to Parry by the ACNB. Fraser then went on to argue that, with regard to the first, the New Zealand Government must "emphasize the necessity for the defence of bases in the Southwest Pacific between Port Moresby and Suva because if they fall into the hands of the Japanese the passage of USA naval units will be most hazardous and unless such units do pass to the Singapore area, the relief of Singapore is very doubtful." As for the second, the New Zealand Government also consider, Fraser continued, "that an attack on Australian and New Zealand shipping in Tasman area and off terminal ports is more likely than an attempt by the Japanese to get all this trade in the Indian Ocean and that therefore the provision of adequate naval forces for the Tasman area becomes more important." In view of these additional considerations, Fraser concluded "that the return of our naval forces from service with the British fleet, as proposed by the Singapore Conference, is essential to safeguard these important Far Eastern interests in the event of war with Japan."⁶⁴

Despite Churchill's August assurance and recommendations by the Singapore Defence Conference, the British Government continued to take strong exception to New Zealand's stand with regard to the deployment of Australian and New Zealand naval forces within the Southwest Pacific, in the event of war with Japan. In reply, the British Government informed New Zealand that it accepted "that the South Western Pacific area should be regarded as a whole irrespective of station limits" but further considered that "all Far Eastern waters including the South Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean must be considered together strategically", and that this area must, again, "be balanced in with the whole Empire's war effort." The British Government stated that attacks by Germany on British shipping in the Atlantic area would certainly not be less and that the German threat to Great Britain's Northwestern shipping approaches was expected to increase in the Spring. Moreover, the British naval effort in the Mediterranean was also likely to increase. In view of these considerations, the naval forces to be stationed in the Far Eastern area, in the event of war with Japan, could not be substantially increased beyond those already there except by the addition of a

British battle cruiser and aircraft carrier and by the return of Australian and New Zealand naval forces now serving overseas. In such circumstances, "it appears", the British Government now argued, "that in viewing the theatre of war [Far Eastern area] as a whole and the total forces available for the defence of the various Imperial interests concerned the dispositions of Dominion forces proposed at the previous [Singapore] Conference might be regarded as slightly out of balance." "We should be glad, therefore," the British Government continued, "if the Commonwealth Government and New Zealand Government would authorize their service advisers to re-examine the naval dispositions (in consultation with the Commanders-in-chief of the China and East Indies Stations) in light of information⁶⁵ which will now be available with a view to producing a plan for the best employment of the combined naval forces in the whole area of the Indian Ocean, Far East and Australian and New Zealand waters." The British Government then went on to say that "even whilst the situation [in the Pacific] would be alleviated by the entry of the United States into the war we cannot allow for this anyhow in our initial dispositions." New Zealand was warned that the British Delegation at Washington was having a difficult time in urging the Americans to assume major strategic responsibility in the Pacific by dispatching an American fleet to Singapore in the event of war with Japan:

Even should the United States come into the war indications are that they will not station any forces in the Pacific west of Hawaii except for a small Asiatic fleet. Their main Pacific fleet will be at Hawaii and a considerable effort will be directed towards stiffening our forces in the Atlantic and so relieve certain [units] of our forces including capital ships for the Far East.⁶⁶

Despite the British Government's warning, New Zealand nevertheless began to prepare and plan her local defences in conjunction with Australia for an American fleet to move to Singapore by laying emphasis upon the defence of the fleet's approach line from Hawaii to Singapore, via the South Pacific. In this way New Zealand sought to secure an American naval shield in the event of war with Japan.

v The Anglo-Dutch-Australian (ADA) Conference, Singapore

While British and American authorities were busily engaged in forging a joint Anglo-American strategy at Washington, British authorities at Singapore continued their efforts to develop a joint British-Dutch Pacific defence plan intended to complement the development of a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan following the conclusion of the Anglo-American military staff talks at Washington. The bases for British-Dutch local military co-operation had been formulated by the British authorities at the October Singapore Defence Conference, and later agreed, in principle, between the British and Dutch at Singapore during an Anglo-Dutch Conference the following November. In a final effort to formalize the basis for British-Dutch local military co-operation, Air Chief Marshall Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, British Commander-in-Chief, Far East, sought, with the approval of the British Government, the convening of a further conference at Singapore.

On 29 January, Brooke-Popham informed the New Zealand Government that a conference would be convened at Singapore on 22 February, in order to develop a detailed plan for military co-operation between Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies and Australia. Brooke-Popham then suggested that New Zealand representation at the conference would not be necessary, since the discussions would not directly affect the Dominion.⁶⁷ Since the Dominion understood that the scope of the conference would be confined solely to the defence of Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies and Australia, the New Zealand Government accepted Brooke-Popham's suggestion.⁶⁸ In reply, the New Zealand Government informed Brooke-Popham that the Dominion agreed that New Zealand representation at the Singapore conference would not be necessary, and that the Australian naval delegation could also represent the defence interests of New Zealand during the discussions.⁶⁹

In final preparation for the forthcoming Singapore conference, Brooke-Popham held informal discussions with Australian political and military authorities in Australia between 8 and 12 February.⁷⁰ During these discussions, Brooke-Popham presented his views, and those of other British Far East Commanders, in a number of papers⁷¹ prepared by the General Headquarters, Far East, for the Singapore

conference. In one paper dealing with the possible scope for the Singapore conference, Brooke-Popham informed the Australian authorities that the object of the Singapore conference was to "draw up a definite combined plan of operations for British forces in the Far East, the Dutch forces in the NEI, and the Australian forces in the defence of the sea, land and air in the area from Burma to Australia inclusive. This will automatically defend New Zealand." The Singapore Conference, Brooke-Popham advised the Australian authorities, must decide upon: all movements of reinforcements under different enemy courses of action; areas of responsibility including air reconnaissance; the defence of naval and air bases; a system of command; and the collection and distribution of intelligence. In addition, the Singapore conference must also determine what should be regarded as an act of war by Japan.⁷² As the basis for the discussions at Singapore, Brooke-Popham also informed the Australian authorities of his views, and those of other British Far East Commanders, concerning the defence of Dutch, British and Australian interests in the Far East Area. In another paper relating to the defence of Dutch, British and Australian interests in the Far East, Brooke-Popham drew attention to the importance of the Netherlands East Indies to the defence of Malaya and Australia. Unless the Netherlands East Indies were successfully defended, Brooke-Popham asserted, Japan would be able to drive a "wedge" between Malaya and Australia by obtaining free exit for her warships to the Indian Ocean through the Dutch Islands and establishing air and naval bases in those islands within range of Malaya and Australia. Nevertheless, the defence of Singapore, Brooke-Popham stressed, was the keystone to the security of the entire Far Eastern area. With adequate forces in Malaya and a secure fleet base at Singapore, Brooke-Popham considered that it would be "impossible for the Japanese to enjoy effective possession of the NEI since the arrival of a fleet would at once threaten their vital sea communications" to those islands. Similarly, so long as Singapore "remains an effective base for a fleet the Japanese could not afford to undertake any major operations against Australia or New Zealand." Brooke-Popham therefore considered that the only sound policy for Japan to adopt would be one aimed at neutralizing Singapore. Notwithstanding the fact that the capture of Singapore would be Japan's ultimate objective, Brooke-Popham did acknowledge to the Australian authorities that Japan could decide

to concentrate its main attack upon either Malaya or British Borneo and the Netherlands East Indies. In view of the existing direction of Japanese activities in French Indo-China and Thailand, however, Brooke-Popham considered that the more probable course of Japanese action would be against Malaya rather than the Netherlands East Indies. Nevertheless, the British Far East Commander-in-Chief accepted that adequate defence must be made for both possible courses of Japanese action. The prime object of the Allies in the more probable course of Japanese action, an attack upon Malaya, should be, Brooke-Popham considered, to support the defence of Malaya to the maximum extent consistent with an adequate degree of security in Java and, particularly, Western Borneo. The release of air squadrons from the Netherlands East Indies and Australia, plus arrangements for the operation of submarines in the South China Sea, would be, Brooke-Popham maintained, the most practicable first step that could be taken for the defence of Malaya. In this regard Brooke-Popham reminded the Australian authorities that the Dutch had already offered the British, at the Anglo-Dutch Conference in November, to give such support for the defence of Malaya in the event of a Japanese attack upon that area. The object of the Allies in the less probable course of Japanese action, an attack upon British Borneo and the Netherlands East Indies, should be, Brooke-Popham considered, to: preserve the territorial integrity of the Netherlands East Indies and British Borneo; prevent the establishment of Japanese air and naval bases in those areas within range of Malaya, Sumatra, Java and Australia; and to prevent the exit of Japanese warships into the Indian Ocean through those areas. In this regard Brooke-Popham further reminded the Australians that the British had already offered the Dutch, at the Anglo-Dutch Conference in November, the assistance of air squadrons from Malaya and Australia for the defence of the Netherlands East Indies, in the event of a Japanese attack upon that area. In order to implement British-Dutch-Australian military co-operation along such lines of mutual reinforcement, Brooke-Popham proposed the establishment of additional air bases from Singapore to New Guinea, along the Far Eastern air defence line. Within that area Brooke-Popham suggested the establishment of two supporting defence lines. A northern defence line, Brooke-Popham considered, should stretch from British Borneo via North Celebes to North New Guinea, which in turn, should be supported by a southern defence

line stretching from Sumatra-Java-Timor to Darwin (Map II). With the establishment of these additional defences for mutual British-Dutch-Australian reinforcement, Brooke-Popham was confident that the Allies would be able successfully to defend their Far East interests in the event of a war with Japan prior to the arrival of a fleet at Singapore.⁷³

In preparation for the forthcoming Singapore conference, the Australian Chiefs of Staff (ACOS) had also formulated their views by drawing up a Far Eastern Appreciation and submitting it to the Australian War Cabinet on 14 February, where it was then discussed by the War Cabinet in the presence of Brooke-Popham.⁷⁴ In their Far Eastern Appreciation, the ACOS were deeply troubled with what appeared to be an overriding concern by British Far East Commanders for the defence of the Far East Area and the Singapore naval base in particular, to the neglect of other vital Far Eastern areas and points. Although the ACOS agreed that Japan's most probable course of action would be a main attack upon Malaya, with the object of capturing the Singapore naval base, they considered that Japan had sufficient forces to attack other vital points in the Australian and New Zealand Areas, particularly in the Southwest Pacific. Likewise, while the ACOS accepted that the Far Eastern area should be viewed as one strategic problem, they considered that the responsibility of each government for the defence of its own and common interests should be clearly arranged and defined, and a practical scheme worked out for the reinforcement of any threatened point with forces drawn from the strategic area (Far Eastern) as a whole. In the Far East area, the ACOS fully accepted that the retention of the Singapore naval base was of vital importance, and that the security of Malaya and Australia was closely bound up with that of the Netherlands East Indies. The ACOS therefore agreed that British-Dutch local defence plans should provide for the common defence of the Netherlands East Indies. The Southwest Pacific area, the ACOS considered, was also of vital importance and very much open to Japanese attack. "The war effort of Australia and New Zealand", the ACOS maintained, "has its principal focus in the area of the Tasman sea and, if command of this area is lost, unquestionably the transport of troops and trade [to the Middle East and United Kingdom] by both Dominions would cease or be reduced to a trickle." With

existing advanced operational bases in the Japanese Mandated Islands, the ACOS considered that Japan would have "little difficulty and every advantage" in maintaining a cruiser force in those islands for attack upon Australia and New Zealand shipping and trade within the Tasman sea area, even though the main Japanese attack would be directed elsewhere. Furthermore, the Southwest Pacific area was, the ACOS maintained, "of great importance in relation to U.S. naval assistance which must move from North Eastern Pacific to Western Pacific to exercise the necessary pressure" upon the Japanese fleet. It was essential, the ACOS maintained, to prevent Japan from gaining a foothold in the area of New Guinea, the New Hebrides, New Caledonia, and Fiji; for if they succeed in doing so, "it would make the passage of American reinforcements [to Singapore] hazardous." The ACOS therefore considered that British-Dutch local defence plans must also provide for the common defence of the Southwest Pacific. In this regard, the ACOS, again, reaffirmed the necessity for the return of Australian and New Zealand naval forces to Dominion waters in the event of war with Japan, and urgently recommended to their government that the British Government be pressed to provide information regarding total British naval forces which would be available for the Far Eastern area, so as to examine the defence of sea communications in both the Pacific and Indian Oceans at the forthcoming Singapore conference.⁷⁵

The Australian War Cabinet accepted their military adviser's recommendations and a summary of the ACOS Far Eastern Appreciation was then transmitted to the General Headquarters, Far East, and to the British and New Zealand Governments the following day. In general terms the ACOS Far Eastern Appreciation represented the ANZAC local defence position and was to form the basis for extended discussions at the Singapore conference.

As scheduled, the Singapore conference convened on 22 February, 1941, under the Chairmanship of Brooke-Popham, and sat until the 25th of that month. Among those present during the conference included other British Far East Commanders, service representatives from the Netherlands East Indies and Australia, and a number of American military "observers".⁷⁶

The Anglo-Dutch-Australian (A.D.A.) Agreement reached by the delegates, which was subject to the ratification by their respective governments and involved no political commitments, provided for mutual assistance in the event of a Japanese attack upon their respective territories and interests. Due to the uncertainty of American Pacific intentions, planning was on the basis of Anglo-Dutch-Australian action without active American co-operation. Nevertheless, the possibility of American intervention into the Western Pacific had to be taken into account. The delegates considered that a Japanese invasion of Australia or New Zealand was unlikely as long as Singapore remained as a base for a "fleet in being" and the Japanese were unable to gain control of bases in the Netherlands East Indies. The most probable course of Japanese action, the delegates considered, would be an attack upon Malaya, via French Indo-China and Thailand, but they accepted that the possibility of an alternative attack upon British Borneo and the Netherlands East Indies would have to be taken also into account. If the Japanese attack was directed against Malaya, the delegates agreed that the most important Allied objective should be the security of Singapore. On the other hand, if the Japanese attack was, instead, directed against British Borneo and the Netherlands East Indies, the delegates agreed that the most important Allied objective should be the defence of the Netherlands East Indies and British Borneo with the purpose of denying to Japan naval and air bases which would threaten Malaya, Sumatra, Java and Australia, and preventing Japanese warships from entering the Indian Ocean. The delegates, however, considered that Japan was incapable of launching two simultaneous major attacks upon both Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. The delegates believed that if Japan did make two simultaneous thrusts upon both Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, one would have to be of a subsidiary and diversionary nature.⁷⁷ Upon this basis, an operational plan for mutual reinforcement, principally with air forces, between Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies and Australia, was formulated for two alternative situations:

- (a) In the event of the main Japanese attack developing against Malaya with the object of capturing Singapore.
- (b) In the event of the main Japanese attack developing on Borneo and the NEI with the object of capturing Java and gaining control of the sea communications between Australia and Malaya.

In the event of situation (a), the Dutch agreed to assist by reinforcing Malaya with air squadrons and operating their submarines in the South China Sea, while Australia was to assist by reinforcing the Dutch islands of Timor and Ambon, to the north of Australia, with land forces and air squadrons from Darwin. In the event of situation (b), the Dutch agreed to reinforce and hold the northern defence line—British Borneo, North Celebes and Ambon—with submarines and air squadrons, while the British were to assist by reinforcing Sumatra and Java in the southern defence line with air squadrons. As in situation (a), Australia agreed to assist by reinforcing Timor and Ambon with land forces and air squadrons from Darwin (Map II).⁷⁸

The delegates also recognized the importance of collective action against Japanese aggression, and the need for a clear understanding of what should constitute a *casus belli* against Japan. The delegates therefore agreed on what Japanese actions should necessitate immediate British-Dutch military counteraction. These were defined as:

(a) A direct act of war by Japan against British, Dutch, Australian or New Zealand territory or Mandated territory;

(b) The movement of Japanese forces into any port of Thailand west of 100 degrees East or to the south of 10 degrees north (Map II). This action, the delegates considered, would clearly indicate that a Japanese invasion of Malaya was in the offing;

(c) The movement of a large number of Japanese warships, or a convoy of merchant ships escorted by Japanese warships, which from their position and course made it evident that they were heading for the East Coast of the Kra Isthmus or East Coast of Malaya, or had crossed the parallel of 6 degrees north between Malaya and the Philippine Islands (Map II). This action, the delegates considered, would point to a direct Japanese move against Malaya or British Borneo;

(d) The movement of Japanese forces into Portuguese Timor. This action, the delegates considered, would seriously threaten the security of the Netherlands East Indies and Australia;

(e) The movement of Japanese forces into French New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands. This action, the delegates considered, would constitute a direct threat to the security of Australia and New Zealand.

(f) A Japanese attack upon the Philippine Islands. This action would seriously weaken the strategic position in the Far East. Moreover, the delegates assumed that a Japanese attack upon the Philippine Islands would bring the United States into war with Japan.⁷⁹

At the insistence of the Australian delegation, attention then turned to the defence of vital sea communications within the Indian and Pacific Oceans.⁸⁰ In examining the possible Japanese threats to Allied sea communications in both oceans, the delegates considered that the threat to sea communications in the Indian Ocean would be very great should Japan establish advanced bases in the Netherlands East Indies. The best possible protection against such a threat to sea communications in the Indian Ocean would be to attack the Japanese in the passages through the northern defence line, British Borneo, North Celebes, North New Guinea, with the support of such forces as could be based on the southern defence line, Java-Timor-Darwin. This contingency, of course, was provided for in the Anglo-Dutch-Australian mutual reinforcement plan. As for Japanese threats to sea communications in the Pacific Ocean, the delegates considered that "the South Pacific trade routes, including the Tasman sea, are so remote from Japan that, unless she first captures the NEI or establishes bases to the North East of Australia, they are unlikely to be subject to more than spasmodic and limited operations by isolated raiders and possibly submarines." The delegates did acknowledge, however, "the possibility of the Japanese being tempted to attack these important Allied trade routes with heavier forces." The delegates also accepted that Japan could easily establish a base, with only a small force, in the area of New Guinea, the New Hebrides, New Caledonia, and the Fiji Islands "which would make the passage of U.S.A. naval reinforcements to the Far East hazardous."⁸¹ Nevertheless, the Conference made no provision for the defence of the Pacific Island area through any scheme of mutual reinforcement. In this regard, the Australian delegation failed to achieve one of their major strategic objectives at the conference.⁸²

The delegates then examined other policies for the defence of sea communications in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the naval forces available and their general areas of deployment. The delegates accepted

that the defence policies previously agreed to, at the October Singapore Defence Conference and the Anglo-Dutch Conference at Singapore in November, were adequate to meet the protection of vital sea communications in both oceans. These included:

- (a) to provide capital ship cover for troop convoys in the Indian Ocean.
- (b) to provide cruiser escort for troop and trade convoys in the Indian Ocean, NEI and Australian and New Zealand waters.
- (c) to employ evasive routing for merchant shipping in the Pacific outside focal [shipping] areas, and in the southern Indian Ocean (Australian-Cape route).
- (d) to employ air reconnaissance and striking forces in focal [shipping] areas as far as air forces available permit.
- (e) to route traffic between NEI, Malaya and the West, through the Molucca Straits rather than through the Sunda Strait.
- (f) to route traffic to and from Australia and New Zealand south and west of Australia rather than north of Australia.⁸³

With regard to available naval forces and areas of general deployment, the British naval forces which would be available for the defence of the Far Eastern area, the delegates learned,⁸⁴ would include: one battle cruiser; two aircraft carriers; one 8" and seven 6" cruisers; five armed merchant cruisers; destroyers and small craft; and possibly, depending upon the raider situation in the South Atlantic, an additional aircraft carrier and three 8" cruisers. These British naval forces, the delegates agreed, should be deployed in the Indian Ocean for the defence of vital sea communications within that area. The Dutch naval forces which would be available for the defence of the Far Eastern area included: three light cruisers; six destroyers; and eleven submarines. These Dutch naval forces, the delegates further agreed, would be deployed in the waters of the Netherlands East Indies, except for two cruisers or perhaps one cruiser and two destroyers, which would be available for trade protection in either the Indian or Pacific Oceans. The Australian and New Zealand naval forces which, when reinforced by the return of Australian and New Zealand ships then serving overseas, would be available for the defence of the Far

Eastern area included: two 8" cruisers; six 6" cruisers and three armed merchant cruisers. These Dominion naval forces, it was accepted, would be maintained in the Southwest Pacific for the defences of vital sea communications within that area.⁸⁵

It was not until New Zealand had received the summary of the ACOS Far Eastern Appreciation from the Australian Government and a telegram from the British Government, on 23 February, 1941, giving some indication of the nature of the discussions at the A.D.A. Conference, that the Dominion Government became aware that the scope of the conference had been enlarged so as to examine the defence problems of the entire Far Eastern area. On 25 February, the day the A.D.A. Conference adjourned, Mr Fraser informed the British Government that Brooke-Popham had advised the Dominion on 29 January that the Singapore Conference would deal only with matters concerning defence co-operation between Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies and Australia, and that New Zealand would not be directly affected. On this advice the New Zealand Government requested that the Australian naval delegation represent New Zealand's defence interests at the conference. Fraser then sharply pointed out to the British Government that "no further information regarding the agenda of the conference" had been received from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom since that time." Had the nature of the agenda been known in time, Fraser advised the British Government, "New Zealand would certainly have arranged for direct representation in discussions so vitally affecting her own defence interests." Fraser then informed the British Government that "under the circumstances New Zealand must reserve their liberty to express their opinion on conclusions reached until after they have studied the report of the conference."⁸⁶ In reply, the British Government explained to Fraser that as a result of Brooke-Popham's visit to Australia it became clear that the scope of the conference should be amplified, and immediate steps were then taken by him accordingly. The British Government then expressed their regrets but considered that time was insufficient to afford the New Zealand Government an opportunity, once the scope of the conference had been widened, to reconsider the question of their representation at the conference. Nevertheless, the British Government assured Mr Fraser that the conclusions reached at the conference "were subject to reference to

Governments concerned" and that the views of the New Zealand Government would be taken into full account.⁸⁷ Having sufficiently impressed upon the British Government the importance that the Dominion attached to the discussions held at Singapore, the New Zealand Government then turned its attention towards an examination of the A.D.A. Report.

On 28 February, the New Zealand War Cabinet gave preliminary consideration to the A.D.A. Report in light of their military adviser's views on the summary of the ACOS Far Eastern Appreciation. The most striking aspect of the A.D.A. Report, the War Cabinet considered, was the lack of concern for the defence problems in the Australia and New Zealand Areas, chiefly in the area of the South-west Pacific. In particular, the War Cabinet was deeply concerned that the A.D.A. Conference had given only perfunctory consideration to the importance of the New Guinea-New Hebrides-New Caledonia-Fiji Island area, and made no provision for its defence. In this regard the War Cabinet noted the recommendation of their military advisers that they confer with the ACOS for the development of a scheme for the mutual reinforcement and defence of that area. The New Zealand War Cabinet accepted their military advisers' recommendations.⁸⁸

On 1 March Mr Fraser informed the British Government that the New Zealand Government had given some consideration to the A.D.A. Report, but pending a report by the NZCOS, whom they proposed to send to confer with the ACOS, they were not in a position to comment on the Report.⁸⁹

On 6 March the Australian Government informed the New Zealand Government that it fully agreed with the proposed visit of the NZCOS for discussions in Melbourne on the recent Singapore conference report.⁹⁰ Between 9 and 13 March, therefore, the NZCOS conferred with their military counterparts in Melbourne on the many aspects of the A.D.A. Report. The outcome of their common efforts was the formulation of a joint Australian and New Zealand Chiefs of Staff report on the A.D.A. conference for consideration and approval by their respective governments.

On 22 March the New Zealand War Cabinet conferred with their military advisers on the subject of their conversations with the ACOS in Melbourne. The NZCOS advised their government that many aspects of the A.D.A. Report had been jointly discussed and agreed

upon in Melbourne. Of particular importance were discussions and agreements relating to the mutual defence of the Southwest Pacific. The NZCOS informed their government that it was fully appreciated in Melbourne that Japan could, with only a small force, establish a base in the New Guinea-New Hebrides-New Caledonia-Fiji Island area and that such action would make the passage of U.S.A. naval reinforcements to the Far East hazardous and seriously threaten sea communication within the Tasman Sea area. In order to prevent Japan from establishing bases in that area, the NZCOS advised their government that an essential part of Australian and New Zealand local defence strategy was to "hold Port Moresby, Rabaul, New Caledonia and the Fiji-Tonga area." The NZCOS then informed their government that it had been agreed in Melbourne that further steps should be taken to speed up the planned defences in Port Moresby, Rabaul, New Caledonia and the Fiji-Tonga Island area. The NZCOS advised their government that, for New Zealand's part, the Dominion had already taken sufficient steps to provide for the defence of Fiji and Tonga (Appendix A), and that the Australian Government was now providing adequate defence for their air bases along the New Guinea-New Hebrides line, and strengthening their defences in New Caledonia. In this regard the NZCOS were apparently referring to the recent defence efforts undertaken by the Australian Government in those areas since February. Those local defence efforts included land reinforcements for Port Moresby and Rabaul and the installation of two additional 6" coastal defence guns at Rabaul and Noumea, New Caledonia.⁹¹ The NZCOS then informed their government that the ACOS had further agreed to investigate the establishment of an air operational base at Vil New Hebrides, in order to facilitate mutual reinforcements of Australian and New Zealand land forces and aircraft to any threatened point along the Far Eastern air defence line from Port Moresby to Tonga. The NZCOS were also able to inform their government that the ACOS were now also considering the institution of an offensive naval strategy for the defence of the Pacific Islands, in the event of war with Japan. It had been fully accepted in Melbourne, the NZCOS advised their government, that "with those bases [island] in our hands and with the assistance of air reconnaissance, we shall be in a position⁹² to take offensive action, should the Japanese attempt to establish themselves in the Southwest Pacific with the object of threatening our sea communications or making the passage of reinforcements from

America hazardous." The NZCOS then presented to their government a draft telegram containing their views on the A.D.A. Report for final reply to the British Government. The New Zealand War Cabinet expressed their agreement with the Australian and New Zealand Chiefs of Staff report on the A.D.A. conference and approved, without modification, the draft telegram for final reply to the British Government.⁹³

On 22 March Mr Fraser informed the British Government that the NZCOS had now, after their recent visit to Australia, been able fully to advise the New Zealand Government on the A.D.A. Report. Among the many aspects of the A.D.A. Report, Fraser expressed his government's concern for the conference's inability to provide for the defence of the New Guinea-New Hebrides-New Caledonia-Fiji Island area. Fraser advised the British Government that the New Zealand Government considered it vital to prevent Japan from establishing bases in the island area, and that "an essential part of our strategy must be to hold Port Moresby, Rabaul, New Caledonia and the Fiji-Tonga area." "With those bases in our hands and with the assistance of air reconnaissance", Fraser advised the British Government, "we shall be in a position to take offensive action, should the Japanese attempt to establish themselves in the Southwest Pacific with the object of threatening our sea communications or making the passage of reinforcements from America hazardous." Fraser then informed the British Government that the New Zealand Government had already taken the necessary steps to provide for the local defence of Fiji and Tonga, and that further steps were being taken by the Australian Government to ensure the defence of those island bases within their area. In addition Fraser further informed the British Government that the Australian Government was now giving active consideration to the establishment of an air operational base at Vila, New Hebrides, for mutual Australian and New Zealand defence of the entire Pacific Island area. As to the other aspects of the A.D.A. Report, Fraser expressed his government's general approval.⁹⁴

By 27 March, the Australian Government informed the British Government of its views concerning the A.D.A. Report. The Australian Acting Prime Minister, Arthur Fadden, also expressed concern in

the conference's inability to provide for the defence of the New Guinea-New Hebrides-New Caledonia-Fiji Island area. Fadden advised the British Government that the Australian Government fully agreed with the New Zealand Government's concern for the prevention of the establishment of bases by Japan in the Pacific Island area. Additional measures for ensuring the defence of the Pacific Island area were fully discussed, Fadden informed the British Government, by the Australian and New Zealand Chiefs of Staff in Melbourne and approved by the Australian Government. As to the other aspects of the A.D.A. Report, Fadden expressed his government's general approval.⁹⁵

In reply, the British Government informed the New Zealand and Australian Governments that the UKCOS agreed with their views concerning the importance of the New Guinea-New Hebrides-New Caledonia-Fiji Island area. Moreover the UKCOS noted with satisfaction that a good deal had been done to provide for the defence of the Pacific Island area, and that the matter was receiving further consideration by the Australian and New Zealand Governments. As to the other aspects of the A.D.A. Report, the British Government also expressed their general approval.⁹⁶

While the Australian and New Zealand Governments were giving active consideration to the defence of the Southwest Pacific, and the Pacific Island area in particular, the Anglo-American military staff conference at Washington was drawing to a close. On 7 April the British Government advised the Australian and New Zealand Governments that a further conference would be convened at Singapore in order to develop a combined British-Dutch-Dominion Pacific defence plan, on the basis of the Anglo-American military staff conference report (A.B.C.-1). The British Government further advised the Pacific Dominions that the ABC-1 Report should reach the Dominion Governments by safe hand in time for study by their military representatives prior to the convening of the conference at Singapore in late April.⁹⁷ On 8 April, however, Australia and New Zealand were informed, telegraphically, by H.M. Burrell, Australian naval attaché to the United States, of the substance of the ABC-1 Report relating to Anglo-American Pacific defence. Burrell's disclosure was to prove most startling to the Dominion

Governments. Burrell advised the Pacific Dominions that the American authorities at Washington had refused to assume major strategic responsibility in the Pacific by dispatching an American fleet to Singapore in the event of war with Japan. The reasons for the American refusal, Burrell advised, were that:

- (a) Such a deployment would be inconsistent with fundamental principle of U.S. policy that Western Hemisphere must remain secure. In the event of British defeat U.S. must have immediately available for use in Atlantic and Pacific Naval forces capable of withstanding attack from overseas.
- (b) Associate [British] Far East bases are incapable of protecting and supporting a battle fleet and in view of need of British Isles it would be impossible to collect enough shipping to maintain a large fleet in that region.
- (c) Associate British naval strength in Atlantic require maximum possible augmentation in order to bring about defeat of Germany.⁹⁸

The American authorities therefore had refused to accept the British Government's conception of grand strategy. Instead the Pacific was to be a joint Anglo-American strategic responsibility involving the co-operation of an American and also a British fleet. On this basis, New Zealand came directly under the American naval shield, whereas Australia came under the somewhat questionable British naval shield. This development was to present the New Zealand Government with a different and most difficult strategic problem to overcome in their continuing efforts to secure an adequate naval shield in the event of war with Japan. In order fully to understand this development, one must also view British and American efforts since late October 1940, at Washington, where the "American position" had been prepared and the Anglo-American military staff conference was conducted in an intense, and at times, heated effort to forge an acceptable joint Anglo-American strategy, on which to later base a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan.

vi The American Refusal to Adopt a Combined Strategy

In anticipation of the Anglo-American military staff conference at Washington, American military planners had since late October,

1940, been preparing the "American position" for their conversations with the British. By mid January, 1941, their prepared position had been accepted as American national policy upon receipt of Presidential approval. That it was the Navy rather than the Army planning staff which took the initiative in this essential task was understandable in view of the traditional closeness between American and British naval planning. Following conversations between Admiral Stark, U.S.C.N.O., and the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, in late October, 1940, the American Chief of Naval Operations, in consultation with Captain Richmond Kelly, head of the Navy War Plans Division, and other naval planners, drew up a detailed study of possible American policy which could provide a new basis for the co-ordination of American-British plans.⁹⁹ In essence, Admiral Stark's study was an effort to answer "America's strategic question", which had puzzled American military planners since the critical summer of 1940: where should the main American military effort now be directed in co-operation with the British: the Pacific or the Atlantic? Known as the "Plan Dog" memorandum because the recommended course of action was contained in paragraph D ("dog" in military parlance), Admiral Stark's study was ultimately to form the basis for the American position at the Anglo-American military staff Conference in Washington, and to contribute to the development of a new joint Army-Navy war plan, similar to RAINBOW 5, following the Washington conference.

The central point of Admiral Stark's analysis was the recognition that American security depended to a very large extent upon the fate of Great Britain: "if Britain wins decisively against Germany we could win everywhere: but that if she loses the problem confronting us would be very great; and while we might not lose everywhere, we might possibly, not win anywhere."¹⁰⁰ The defeat of Great Britain, and the consequential disruption of the British Empire, would seriously weaken, Stark believed, the military position of the United States. With the collapse of the British Empire, it appeared probable to Stark that the victorious Axis Powers would then seek to expand, economically at first and then politically and militarily, into the Western Hemisphere. The military consequences of a British defeat in Europe, therefore, were so serious for the United States, Stark argued, that the United Kingdom, "the Heart of

the Empire", should be assisted in every way possible so as to prevent the disruption of the British Empire. However, even if the British Isles could be held intact, Stark did not believe that Britain could defeat Germany without American military assistance. In this regard, Stark was deeply influenced by British military capabilities and strategy as revealed to American military authorities during the Anglo-American exploratory conversations at London in September, 1940.¹⁰¹ Offensively, the British were, in Stark's opinion, still less capable of carrying out their aim of defeating Germany and would require "Assistance by powerful allies..." Moreover, the strategy favoured by the British, naval blockade and air bombardment, Stark considered would not "assure final victory":

...Victory would probably depend upon her ability ultimately to make a land offensive against the Axis powers. For making a successful land offensive, British man power is insufficient. Offensive troops from other nations will be required. I believe that the United States, in addition to sending naval assistance, would also need to send large air and land forces to Europe or Africa, or both, and to participate strongly in this land offensive. The naval task of transporting an Army abroad would be large.¹⁰²

In order for the United States to provide such military assistance, Stark strongly argued against any major American military commitments in the Western Pacific which would involve the United States in an all-out effort against Japan. Such a course of action would have, Stark considered, the effect of drawing American military resources away from the Atlantic area and cutting down American national assistance to Great Britain, thereby not ensuring the security of the Western Hemisphere and the continued existence of the British Empire. Even a limited war against Japan, Stark contended, would require considerable American military effort. Moreover, it might prove very difficult, Stark warned, to prevent a limited war from becoming an unlimited war, in which case, "our entire strength would then be required in the Far East, and little force would remain for eventualities in the Atlantic and for the support of the British Isles." The United States, Stark advised, should "remain on a strict defensive" in the Pacific.¹⁰³

The major alternative courses of action open to the United States, as Stark viewed them, were four, and he stated them in the

form of questions:

- (a) Shall our principal military effort be directed toward hemisphere defence, and include chiefly those activities within the Western Hemisphere which contribute directly to security against attack in either or both oceans? [Similar to RAINBOWS 1 and 4.]
- (b) Shall we prepare for a full offensive against Japan, premised on assistance from the British and Dutch forces in the Far East, and remain on the strict defensive in the Atlantic? [Similar to RAINBOW 2, or RAINBOW 3 and ORANGE with Allies.]
- (c) Shall we plan for sending the strongest possible military assistance both to the British in Europe, and to the British, Dutch, and Chinese in the Far East? [In effect, this would call for an equal effort on two major fronts while defending the Western Hemisphere.]
- (d) Shall we direct our efforts toward an eventual strong offensive in the Atlantic as an ally of the British, and a defensive in the Pacific? [Similar to RAINBOW 5.]¹⁰⁴

Of these major alternative courses of action, Stark strongly recommended that (d) would best secure American national interests. Under (d) the United States would be able to exert all its efforts in a single direction, make possible the greatest military assistance to Britain, and provide for the strongest defence of the Western Hemisphere. Stark did admit, however, that the one great disadvantage of (d) was that it would leave Japan relatively free to pursue her programme of expansion in the Western Pacific, until the war in Europe was won. For this reason, Stark considered that the United States, while making every effort to avoid war with Japan, should also seek to prevent that nation from occupying British and Dutch territories within that area. Plan (d) therefore, was the course to be followed in the event of an American war with Germany, Italy and Japan. Until such time as the United States was actually engaged in a war, however, Stark recommended that the best course to follow would be that outlined in (a).¹⁰⁵

Should his proposals find favour with the President, Stark also recommended certain measures to put them into effect. The first measure would be to prepare a new joint war plan to guide Army and Navy planning and, at least, the skeletons of alternative plans to fit the other situations which might develop. Such plans, however, would be of little value, Stark pointed out, if there was not a "clear understanding between the nations involved as to the

strength and extent of the participation which may be expected in any particular theater..." For this reason therefore, Stark recommended that secret staff talks should be initiated at once with British military and naval authorities in order "to reach agreements and lay down plans for promoting unity of allied effort should the United States find it necessary to enter the war..."¹⁰⁶

The reaction of General Marshall, U.S. Army COS, and the Army planners to the "Plan Dog" memorandum, which amounted to nothing less than a complete reversal of American naval strategy since 1921, was entirely favourable. The Army had strongly argued along that line of strategy since June 1940, when the prospect of an Axis victory in Europe appeared imminent. General Marshall had then asked his planners: "Are we not forced into a question of reframing our naval policy, that is purely defensive action in the Pacific, with a main effort on the Atlantic side?"¹⁰⁷ Thus, except for minor comments, the Army planners endorsed Stark's proposals, which were then presented to Roosevelt on 13 November, shortly after his successful re-election as President of the United States. Receiving no immediate confirmation, Stark and Marshall then directed the Joint Planning Committee to prepare a statement of national defence policy on the basis of the "Plan Dog" memorandum for formal submission to the President and the Secretaries of War and the Navy.¹⁰⁸

Although Roosevelt did not wish to commit himself, at this stage, to the strategy outlined in Stark's memorandum, he did, however, authorize conversations between representatives of the American and British military staff to lay down plans for Anglo-American military co-operation, as Stark had recommended, and as the British were again urging.¹⁰⁹ Admiral Stark therefore instructed Admiral Ghormley, whose exploratory conversations with the British in London had reached the limit of their usefulness, to arrange with the British Chiefs of Staff the convening of an Anglo-American military staff conference at Washington early the next year. Aware of the Admiralty's views concerning the best form of American naval deployment in the Pacific, Stark further advised Ghormley to inform the Admiralty that anyone they sent to Washington "should have instructions to discuss concepts based on equality of considerations for both the United States and British Commonwealth, and to

explore realistically the various field of war co-operation."¹¹⁰ In reply to the American invitation, Admiral Ghormley informed the American authorities on 2 December of the names of the British staff officers who were to come to Washington for the conversations. They were to come ostensibly, Ghormley advised, as members of the civilian British Purchasing Commission in order to avoid public notice and possible isolationist reaction.¹¹¹

The announcement of the British acceptance of the American invitation to converse in Washington lent urgency to the Joint Planning Committee's efforts to produce a statement of national defence policy based on Admiral Stark's recommendations. Their study, if acceptable, would then serve as the basis for instructions to the American representatives in the forthcoming Anglo-American military staff conference. On 21 December, 1940, the Joint Planning Committee completed their study. In all essential respects, their recommendations followed those of Admiral Stark's. The major objective of American defence policy, they asserted, was the security of the Western Hemisphere, and this was to be secured by full co-operation with the British Empire. Until forced to enter the war, they recommended, as did Stark, that the United States should continue to build up American military power and defences in the Western Hemisphere as rapidly as possible, and stand ready to take action in either or both oceans. If forced into a war with Japan, the United States should limit her operations in the Pacific so as "to permit prompt movement to the Atlantic of forces fully adequate to conduct a major offensive in that ocean." American strategy, therefore, would now be primarily designed to defeat Germany in order to prevent the extension of Axis influence into the Western Hemisphere, while also seeking to keep the Japanese from seizing British and Dutch territory in the Pacific.¹¹²

The Joint Board approved their Planning Committee's study on 21 December, and the Secretaries of War and the Navy¹¹³ gave their approval shortly after. On 16 January, President Roosevelt, in a special conference at the White House with the two Secretaries and Service Chiefs, approved in principle their unanimous recommendations on national defence policy.¹¹⁴ By mid-January, 1941, therefore, the American position for the scheduled Anglo-American military staff

conference at Washington had been fully established: In the event of war with Germany, Italy and Japan, the United States would adopt a defensive policy in the Pacific and direct its main military efforts towards the defeat of Germany and her European allies in the Atlantic and European area. The only question which now concerned American authorities was whether they would be able to maintain their established position at Washington in the face of strong British views on grand strategy.

vi British Grand Strategy and the Anglo-American Staff Conference, Washington

The Anglo-American military staff conference opened in Washington on 29 January and continued until 29 March, 1941, fourteen sessions in all. The meetings came to be known as the ABC meetings (American-British Conversations) and the final report by the short title, ABC-1.¹¹⁵ The British Delegation at the conference was headed by Rear Admiral R.M. Bellairs. Service representatives from the Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand¹¹⁶ were represented in the British delegation as advisers only and did not participate in the actual ABC meetings. The American delegation at the conference was headed by Major General Stanley D. Embick. General Embick was considered by American authorities as an expert on Far Eastern affairs,¹¹⁷ and was most responsible for the development of the American concept of hemispheric defence. The Navy section was headed by Admiral Chormley, Special Naval Observer, London, who had returned to the United States for the conference.¹¹⁸

After General Marshall and Admiral Stark welcomed the British delegation and dwelt on the need for secrecy,¹¹⁹ the Anglo-American military staff conference opened for discussion in a room set aside for the conference at the Main Navy Building, Washington. As a preliminary step to the opening of the formal military conversations, the delegations established the necessary guidelines for the conduct of such conversations. Both delegations agreed that the conversations should be free of outside political interference and that any plans agreed upon would then be subject to the approval of their respective chiefs of staff and governments. As for the agenda, the delegations agreed that the conversations should cover: the consideration of a strategy of joint military and naval action by the United

States and British Commonwealth forces towards the defeat of Germany, Italy and Japan, operations to carry out the proposed strategy, and agreements on the division of strategic responsibility by areas, forces to be committed, skeleton operating plans (military tasks) and command arrangements.¹²⁰

At the opening of the formal military conversations the British delegation gave a clear and complete summary of their views. They began by presenting three propositions of general strategic policy:

The European Theatre is the vital theatre where a decision must first be sought.

The general policy should therefore be to defeat Germany and Italy first, and then deal with Japan.

The security of the Far Eastern position, including Australia and New Zealand, is essential to the cohesion of the British Commonwealth and to the maintenance of its war effort. Singapore is the key to the defence of these interests and its retention must be assured.¹²¹

The first two propositions were in direct accord with the views of the American delegation on general strategic policy; the retention of Singapore was most definitely not. In line with their general strategic policy, the British delegation then proposed that American naval forces should, after making appropriate dispositions in the defence of the Western Hemisphere, be deployed mainly in "the Atlantic and European theatres," while maintaining in the Pacific a fleet of sufficient strength in order to "ensure that Japanese operations in the Far East cannot prejudice the main effort of the United States and the British Commonwealth in the principal theatres of war."¹²² Read in the light of British views on grand strategy, the British declaration amounted to nothing less than a proposal that the United States should assume major strategic responsibility¹²³ in the Pacific by dispatching an American battle fleet to Singapore, in the event of war with Japan.

Although the Americans appreciated the British concern for the security of their Far Eastern Empire, the American delegation considered that an acceptance of the British proposal would be

inconsistent with the fundamental American principle that the Western Hemisphere must remain secure from attack in both the Pacific and Atlantic areas. Such a major commitment in the Western Pacific, the American delegation recognized, would not only seriously jeopardize American security in the Atlantic but also her main military efforts in the European theatre. This was the American delegation's primary reason for objecting to the British proposal. It also, however, strongly doubted the British premise that the retention of Singapore was the key to the defence of the British Far Eastern Empire. In this respect, the Americans considered that Singapore was an inadequate fleet base incapable of protecting and supporting a battle fleet in the Western Pacific. They were concerned that should Japan seize air fields in southern French Indo-China, within bombing range of Singapore, the naval base could not be adequately defended. Moreover, they were also aware that the British had neither the resources nor the facilities to undertake major repairs on capital ships at Singapore.¹²⁴ The American delegation therefore refused to accept a Pacific strategy based upon the defence of Singapore and strongly countered the British proposal by arguing that the United States must

...maintain dispositions which under all eventualities will prevent the extensions in the western hemisphere of European or Asiatic political and military power.

The objective of the war will be most effectively attained by the United States exerting its principal military effort in the Atlantic or navally in the Mediterranean regions.

Should Japan enter the war, United States operations in the mid-Pacific and the Far East would be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate the exertion of its principal military effort in the Atlantic or navally in the Mediterranean.¹²⁵

Nevertheless, despite the American position, the British stubbornly continued their efforts to obtain American acceptance for their proposal, and in so doing, "the conversations almost foundered" on this very issue.¹²⁶

On 11 February the British delegation presented to the Americans a detailed paper, *The Far East: Appreciation by the U.K. Delegation*, which gave the basis for their proposal. At the same time, Lord Halifax, the newly appointed British Ambassador to the

United States, was communicating the substance of the paper to the American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull.¹²⁷ Significantly, the British delegation based their proposal not so much on the strategic value of Singapore to the defence of the British Far Eastern Empire but, rather, upon "political, economic and sentimental considerations which, even if not literally vital on a strictly academic view, are of such fundamental importance to the British Commonwealth that they must always be taken into serious account." The British delegation frankly admitted that it would not be necessary to hold Singapore in order to protect Australia or New Zealand or to prevent the movement of a large Japanese fleet into the Indian Ocean: "An American fleet in the Pacific, actively threatening the Japanese left flank, would be enough to prevent the Japanese from extending their operations so far from home." Even so, the British delegation made it clear that the retention of Singapore was important to the British Government irrespective of its military value. Politically, the loss of Singapore would seriously weaken "the hand of those political leaders in Australia, New Zealand and India-- and also in China, who believe in the value of close association with Great Britain." Economically, the loss of Singapore and the subsequent deterioration of the British position in the Far East, would also result in the loss of important sources of rubber and oil, so essential to the British economy. In addition Singapore was important as a "symbol of British ability and determination to protect the British Dominions and Colonies and the overseas trade with them and with other countries in the Orient."¹²⁸ Singapore was, therefore, so important to the British Government that "if Singapore were in serious danger of capture, and the United States still withheld their aid, we should be prepared to send a fleet to the Far East, even if to do so would compromise or sacrifice our position in the Mediterranean."¹²⁹

On 13 February the American delegation met in private session to discuss the British paper. They reviewed the background of the British proposal,¹³⁰ which had its beginnings, the American delegation noted, when the "President and Secretary of State more or less committed the United States fleet to actions in conjunction with the British forces in the Far East" in the event of a common war against Japan, following Captain Ingersoll's mission to London in January

1938. The American delegation noted that the British were later unable to send a strong naval force to the Far East, but still wanted "the United States to send their whole fleet, together with a large United States Army, to engage against the Japanese."¹³¹ This informal American commitment, however, had been based upon the assumption that Britain and her Allies would be able to contain the Axis Powers in the Atlantic and European area, thereby enabling the United States to undertake an offensive against Japan in the Western Pacific. It was obvious to the American delegation that this assumption was no longer valid. To accept the British proposal now, the American delegation considered, would not only be contrary to their instructions¹³² but would constitute "a strategic error of incalculable magnitude."¹³³ The American delegation therefore agreed not to alter their original stand and began to draw up a reply which was firmly based upon the established American position.

At this time, however, the American-British conversations almost broke down. The American delegation, upon learning of the British Ambassador's discussions with Hull on the controversial Singapore issue, protested vehemently to their British counterparts for what appeared to be an attempt to secure political pressure in order to influence their decision on the British proposal. The American delegation strongly reminded the British delegation that the conversations were to be, as agreed, on a purely military level and free of outside political interference. In reply, the British delegation expressed their regrets and assured the Americans that no further papers would be passed to the American State Department, though they insisted that Halifax had to be kept informed.¹³⁴

Although the American delegation considered that the British were "playing the game fairly", further open conflict over the Singapore issue ceased in the conversations after the American delegation presented their written reply to the British paper, The United States Military Position in the Far East, on 19 February.¹³⁵ Although the American delegation appreciated the political, economic and symbolic importance of Singapore to the British Empire, they made it clear that America's vital concern was to meet and eliminate the German threat to the security of the North Atlantic and the British Isles, and on this basis refused to accept for their part a major

military commitment in the Western Pacific. In explaining more fully the reason for the American refusal, the American delegation declared that

The United States Staff Committee [U.S. delegation] agrees that the retention of Singapore is very desirable. But it also believes that the diversion to the Asiatic theater of sufficient forces to assure the retention of Singapore might jeopardize the success of the major effort of the Associated Powers. From the broad view this diversion would amount to employment of the final reserve of the Associated Powers in a non-decisive theater. A commitment on the part of the United States to assure the retention of Singapore carries with it a further commitment to employ the forces necessary to accomplish that mission. It implies that the United States will undertake the early defeat of Japan and that it accepts responsibility for the safety of a large portion of the British Empire. No one can predict accurately the forces that will be required in such an effort, but it is conceivable that a large part of United States army and naval forces would ultimately be involved.¹³⁶

The American delegation therefore re-affirmed that "the objective of the war will be most effectively attained by the United States exerting its principal military effort in the Atlantic or navally in the Mediterranean regions."¹³⁷ With this firm American refusal, the British delegation was forced to accept that the main American military effort would be in the Atlantic and European area, rather than the Pacific. The Pacific, therefore, would have to be a joint Anglo-American strategic responsibility. On the basis of this general strategic policy, the American and British delegations were able to reach an agreement on an Anglo-American strategy which provided for the defence of British, Dutch and American interests in the Pacific, principally through a joint defence of the Malay Barrier (the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and the islands stretching eastward to northwest Australia).

The delegates agreed that since Germany was the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area was the "decisive theatre", and that "the principal United States military effort will be exerted in that theatre, and operations of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort." The delegates further agreed that should Japan enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, the

military strategy in the Pacific theatre would be "defensive". Since "the United States does not intend to add to its present Military strength in the Far East," it was accepted that the United States would employ the United States Pacific fleet offensively "to support the defence of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaya," and at the same time "augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas" so "that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East."¹³⁸ Having agreed upon a general operational strategy, the delegates then established areas of strategic responsibility and command, and determined the tasks and the appropriate strength of military forces for each area. With regard to the Pacific proper, that area was divided into two main areas of strategic responsibility and command: 1) the Pacific Ocean Area, and 2) the Far East and Australia and New Zealand Area (see Map III).

The Pacific Ocean Area was exclusively an area of American strategic responsibility and command. As Maps III and II indicate, the Pacific Ocean Area included those contiguous continental land areas and Pacific islands in the north, central and south Pacific, and a major portion of the New Zealand Area. The principal tasks assigned to American naval forces within the Pacific Ocean Area were for the United States Pacific Fleet, based at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. They were: a) support the forces of the Associated Powers (British, Dutch and American) in the Far East Area by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of enemy positions in the Marshall and Caroline Islands; b) protect the territory of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Ocean Area, and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that Hemisphere; and c) to protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Ocean Area. The principal tasks assigned to American land and air forces within the Pacific Ocean Area were to defend vital sea and air bases along the American Pacific defence line, the strategic triangle of Alaska, Hawaii and the Panama Canal.¹³⁹

Outside the Pacific Ocean Area, the United States had an additional strategic responsibility. The United States Pacific fleet was assigned the additional task of supporting Dominion naval forces in the area south of the equator, as far west as longitude 155°East.¹⁴⁰ This area later became known as the "Shaded Area". As Maps III and II indicate, the Shaded Area consisted of the Solomon-New Caledonia-New Hebrides-Fiji Island and Tasman Sea areas, including the Dominion of New Zealand. It also comprised the adjacent portions of the Australia and New Zealand Areas, including much of their area of mutual military co-operation within the Southwest Pacific. The American delegation's assumption of strategic responsibility for the defence of the Shaded Area was based upon their desire to obtain Australian and New Zealand support for the defence of the Malay Barrier, by the release of a major portion of their naval forces to the Far East Area.¹⁴¹ In this regard, the Americans had obviously been deeply concerned about the Australian proposal, at Washington, to concentrate their naval forces for the defence of focal shipping areas within the Tasman Sea.¹⁴²

The Far East and Australia and New Zealand Area was, primarily, an area of British strategic responsibility and command. As Map III indicates the Far East and Australia and New Zealand area included: the British territories of Burma, Malaya, Hong Kong and Borneo, the American Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand, and the Pacific islands from New Guinea to the Fiji Islands. Within the Far East and Australia and New Zealand Area, the British Commander-in-Chief, China Station, was assigned strategic command over all naval forces. The only exceptions to this naval command arrangement were those American naval forces, under the American Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, engaged in the defence of the Philippine Islands. The command of local air and land forces within the area, the delegates accepted, would remain with their respective local British, Dutch and American commanders. The principal tasks assigned to British, Dutch and American naval forces within the Far East and Australia and New Zealand Area were to:

- a) support the land and air forces in the defence of the territories of the Associated Powers, and b) to protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, patrolling and by destroying enemy raiding forces within the Area. The only British

and Dominion naval forces which were then available to carry out such tasks were: one 8" cruiser, seven 6" cruisers, three armed merchant cruisers, and five destroyers. Consequently, the British delegation agreed to reinforce the Area with British naval units from other British naval commands (i.e., Home and Mediterranean) and by new naval construction. This British naval task force would form the basis for a British fleet to go to Singapore: five battleships, one battle cruiser, one aircraft carrier, three 8" cruisers, eight 6" cruisers and thirty-two destroyers.¹⁴³ The delegates therefore considered that the U.S. Pacific fleet, acting in conjunction with the British fleet in defence of the Malay Barrier would provide an adequate defence against a Japanese southward advance upon British, Dutch and American interests in the Pacific. In order to give final form to the southern encirclement of Japan, the delegates agreed that British, Dutch and American commanders should convene a further conference in the Far East for the development of a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan on the basis of their recommendations (The ABC-1 Report).¹⁴⁴

The American and British Delegations at Washington also recognized the need for a greater degree of Anglo-American co-operation in other areas, in addition to joint planning. In this regard, the delegates agreed that military missions should be established in their respective countries and liaison officers exchanged between the various British and American military commands, in order to facilitate continued collaboration in the formation and execution of strategical policies and plans.¹⁴⁵ In addition, the delegates agreed that the United States should continue to furnish material aid to the United Kingdom.¹⁴⁶ In order to secure this vital aid, however, the American delegation accepted that the United States should also undertake strategical responsibility for protecting the "Northwestern approaches to the United Kingdom" from North America.¹⁴⁷ This meant that the American Navy would assume prime responsibility for the defence of British trans-Atlantic merchant convoys in the North Atlantic as soon as the newly-established U.S. Atlantic fleet was prepared to do so.¹⁴⁸ In effect, the United States was now to enter the Battle of the Atlantic in order to maintain the security of the United Kingdom.

Immediately following the conclusion of the Anglo-American military staff conference at Washington, the American and British Chiefs of Staff gave their endorsement to the conference's ABC-1 Report, and American and British Governmental approval followed shortly afterwards.¹⁴⁹ Consequently, secret military missions were established in both London and Washington, and increased economic aid and war materials began to pour out to the United Kingdom from America, as a result of the Administration's successful efforts to obtain Congressional approval for its Lend-lease Bill. Moreover, major naval units of the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor were transferred to the Atlantic in order to assist the Royal Navy in its convoy escort duties, and American military planners began to formulate a new war plan, RAINBOW 5, on the basis of the ABC-1 Report. In addition, American, British and Dutch commanders hastily convened a conference at Singapore in order to develop a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan, on the basis of the ABC-1 Report.¹⁵⁰ Despite the accepted primary importance of the Atlantic and European theatre to the American and British Governments, their efforts to complete the southern encirclement of Japan began to assume an almost equal importance with that theatre as Japan moved towards war in the southern region.

Footnotes

- ¹S. Woodburn Kirby, *Singapore: The Chain of Disaster* (London: Cassell and Co. Ltd, 1971), p. 61.
- ²Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, p. 104.
- ³Kirby, *Singapore: The Chain of Disaster*, p. 6.
- ⁴Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, pp. 150-151.
- ⁵Jones, *Japan's New Order in East Asia*, p. 236; Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, p. 60.
- ⁶Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, pp. 151-152.
- ⁷Jones, *Japan's New Order in East Asia*, p. 237.
- ⁸*Ibid.*, p. 268.
- ⁹Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, p. 313; Drummond, *The Passing of American Neutrality, 1937-1941*, p. 196.
- ¹⁰Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, p. 61; Kirby, *Singapore: The Chain of Disaster*, p. 63.
- ¹¹Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, p. 171.
- ¹²Kirby, *Singapore: The Chain of Disaster*, p. 63.
- ¹³Jones, *Japan's New Order in East Asia*, p. 214.
- ¹⁴Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, pp. 189-190.
- ¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 191.
- ¹⁶Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, p. 49.
- ¹⁷SSDA to UKHC, Wellington, 11 October, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1). GOC, Singapore to CGS, NZ, "NZ Delegation to Minister of Defence, NZ," 24 October, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ¹⁸Staff discussions with U.S. delegation, Singapore Defence Conference, 1940, Report, Part III, paragraphs 1-9, 27 October, 1940, NZ 22/4/47.
- ¹⁹*Ibid.*, GOC, Singapore to NZCGS, "NZ delegation to NZ Minister of Defence", 26 October, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1). On 25 October, 1940, the New Zealand Government informed the United Kingdom that it accepted the British Government's proposed command arrangements in the Pacific; the Australian Government did likewise on 5 November, 1940. PMNZ to UKHC, Wellington, 25 October, 1940, PMA to SSDA, PMNZ, 5 November, 1940. PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ²⁰Part III, Singapore Defence Conference, 1940, Report, Paragraph 8, 27 October, 1940, NZ 22/4/47.

- ²¹This was Churchill's 11 August, 1940, telegram to the Pacific Dominions. See *supra*, p. 111.
- ²²Survey of Defence Problems in the Far East based on the Chiefs of Staff Far Eastern Appreciation and the Tactical Appreciation of the Defence of Malaya, Singapore Defence Conference, 1940, Report, Part I, paragraphs 1-2, 28 October, 1940, NA 22/4/47.
- ²³See *supra*, p. 113.
- ²⁴Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, pp. 48-49.
- ²⁵GOC, Singapore to NZCGS, "NZ Delegation to NZ Minister of Defence", 26 October, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ²⁶Part I, Singapore Defence Conference, 1940, Report, paragraph 3, 28 October, 1940, NZ 22/4/47.
- ²⁷*Ibid.*, paragraphs 4, 5.
- ²⁸J.R.M. Butler, *Grand Strategy*, Vol. II: *September 1939—June 1941* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957), p. 491.
- ²⁹Lionel Wigmore, *The Japanese Thrust* (Adelaide: Griffin Press, 1957), p. 44.
- ³⁰Part I, Singapore Defence Conference, 1940, Report, paragraph 5, 28 October, 1940, NZ 22/4/47.
- ³¹*Ibid.*, paragraphs 12, 14.
- ³²This figure 582, was an increase from the 566 aircraft, as recommended in the British Far East Commanders' Tactical Appreciation on the defence of Singapore and Malaya, by the addition of one fighter squadron to be stationed in Burma.
- ³³Part I, Singapore Defence Conference, 1940, Report, paragraphs 6, 7, 11, 28 October, 1940, NA 22/4/47.
- ³⁴*Ibid.*, paragraphs 15-29.
- ³⁵In commenting upon the British Far Eastern War Plan, Admiral Stark, the American Chief of Naval Operations, described it as "usual British wishful thinking." Herzog, *Closing the Open Door*, p. 124.
- ³⁶Summary of Activities in the Sphere of Staff Conversations Which Have So Far Taken Place or Which Are Still Continuing, 12 November, 1940, NA 22/4/47.
- ³⁷PMA to PMNZ, 1 November, 1940, NA 22/4/47.
- ³⁸PMNZ to Defender, Singapore (NZ delegation), 28 October, 1940, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ³⁹PMNZ to PMA, 4 November, 1940, NA 22/4/47.
- ⁴⁰Notes of Commander Burrell, 6 December, 1940, NA 22/4/47.

- ⁴¹Conversations with U.S.A. Naval Administration, Appendix I, Notes of Commander Burrell, 6 December, 1940, NA 22/4/47.
- ⁴²Obviously, these plans were RAINBOWs 2 and 3 which, unlike the Army, were still being considered by the Navy, on the basis of interim planning, in fear that the United States would be drawn into an immediate war with Japan in the Western Pacific, as a result of Roosevelt's policies. As such, those plans did not represent the "American position", which the Navy was also preparing for in anticipation of the Anglo-American military staff talks. Herzog, *Closing the Open Door*, p. 87.
- ⁴³Appendix I, Notes of Commander Burrell, 6 December, 1940, NA 22/4/47.
- ⁴⁴Notes of Commander Burrell, 6 December, 1940, NA 22/4/47.
- ⁴⁵In this capacity Burrell also served, as did his immediate successor, Commander D.H. Harries, R.A.M., to represent New Zealand on important naval matters until July 1941. As arranged by the Australian and New Zealand Governments, important naval information gathered by the Australian naval attaché in Washington was also forwarded to the New Zealand Chief of Naval Staff through the Australian Chief of Naval Staff. PM 62/3/9.
- ⁴⁶NA 22/4/47.
- ⁴⁷PMA to PMNZ, SSDA, 1 December, 1940, NA 22/4/43.
- ⁴⁸SSDA to PMA, Governor-General, NZ, 3 December, 1940, NA 22/4/43.
- ⁴⁹Memo, Singapore Defence Conference, Secretary, ONS, to NZCOS, 4 December, 1940, NA 22/4/43.
- ⁵⁰Minutes of the 37th Meeting of the Chief of Staff Committee, Recommendations of the Singapore Defence Conference, 6 December, 1940, PM 81/4/2 (1).
- ⁵¹Defence of Malaya, COS Paper NO.65, 13 December, 1940, PM 81/4/3 (2).
- ⁵²Memorandum for NZCOS, Secretary, ONS, to NZCOS, 13 December, 1940, PM 81/4/2 (1).
- ⁵³Naval Officer, China Station to NZNB, "Duigan to PMNZ", 20 December, 1940, NA 22/4/43.
- ⁵⁴PMNZ to Group Captain Isitt, Ottawa, 24 December, 1940, Air 123/5/1.
- ⁵⁵Defence of Malaya, Duigan, NZCGS to NZ Minister of Defence, 14 January, 1941, Air 123/4/1.
- ⁵⁶UKHC to PMNZ, 28 January, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁵⁷*Ibid.*
- ⁵⁸Defence of Malaya, COS Paper No. 76, 5 February, 1941, PM 81/4/3 (3).
- ⁵⁹Minutes of the 41st Meeting of the COS Committee, Naval Dispositions in the Event of a War in the East, 5 February, 1941, Air 123/4/1.

- ⁶⁰NZCMS to NZ Minister of Defence, 5 February, 1941, NA 22/4/43.
- ⁶¹*Ibid.*
- ⁶²*Ibid.*
- ⁶³*Ibid.*
- ⁶⁴PMNZ to SSDA, PMA, 8 February, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁶⁵This information, which the Australian Government had been pressing for, consisted of an estimate of the total naval forces (British) available for deployment, in the Far Eastern area during the phase I period. On 24 February the Admiralty provided such information, with qualifications, to the Anglo-Dutch-Australian Conference at Singapore to assist in the best employment of the combined naval forces (dispositions) for the entire Far Eastern area, including both the Southwest Pacific and Indian Ocean. See *infra*, p. 175-177.
- ⁶⁶SSDA to PMNZ, 23 February, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁶⁷Commander-in-Chief, Far East to Defender, Wellington, 29 January, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁶⁸Air 123/4/2, NA 22/4/44.
- ⁶⁹Defender, Wellington to General Headquarters, Far East, 13 February, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁷⁰G. Herman Gill, *Royal Australian Navy, 1939-1942* (Adelaide: Griffin Press, 1957), p. 425.
- ⁷¹The papers (three) prepared by the General Headquarters, Far East, were: Notes for Three Party Staff Meeting, Singapore; Memorandum Relating to the Defence of Dutch, British and Australian Interests in the Far East; and the Potential Strength of Japanese Forces For Attack on Malaya.
- ⁷²Notes for Three Party Staff Meeting, Singapore, paper prepared by the General Headquarters, Far East, Australian Air Board, Melbourne, to NZ Minister of Defence, 10 February, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁷³Memorandum Relating to the Defence of Dutch, British and Australian Interests in the Far East, paper prepared by the General Headquarters, Far East, Australian Air Board, Melbourne to NZ Minister of Defence, 10 February, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁷⁴Gill, *Royal Australian Navy, 1939-1942*, p. 425.
- ⁷⁵Summary of ACOS Far Eastern Appreciation, PMA to PMNZ, SSDA, Commander-in-Chief, Far East, 15 February, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁷⁶Report of the Anglo-Dutch-Australian Conference, Singapore, 22 to 25 February, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁷⁷*Ibid.*, paragraphs 1-2.
- ⁷⁸*Ibid.*, paragraphs 6-9.

- ⁷⁹*Ibid.*, paragraphs 23-27 and Appendix "B".
- ⁸⁰Report by the Australian delegation to the Anglo-Dutch-Australian Conference at Singapore, 22-25 February, 1941, Part III, NA 22/4/44.
- ⁸¹Report of the Anglo-Dutch-Australian Conference, Singapore, 22-25 February, 1941, paragraph 10, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁸²Report by the Australian delegation to the Anglo-Dutch-Australian Conference at Singapore, 22-25 February, 1941, Part III, NA 22/4/44.
- ⁸³Report of the Anglo-Dutch-Australian Conference, Singapore, 22-25 February, 1941, paragraph 11, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁸⁴In a telegram to the conference on 24 February, 1941, the Admiralty informed the delegates that "in the event of war in the Far East in the near future, no major redistribution of naval forces is intended other than move of one battle cruiser, one aircraft carrier and one cruiser from Gibraltar to Indian Ocean and return of those Dominion cruisers now serving with Imperial forces to their Dominions." However, the Admiralty then went on to "forecast", in an effort to "assist in planning", the total British forces which would be available, but added that: "you will appreciate that we are forecasting for hypothetical date and it cannot be guaranteed above named units will actually be available when the time comes." Report by the Australian delegation to the Anglo-Dutch-Australian Conference at Singapore, 22-25 February, 1941, Appendix IV, NA 22/4/44.
- ⁸⁵Report of the Anglo-Dutch-Australian Conference, Singapore, 22-25 February, 1941, paragraph 12, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁸⁶PMNZ to SSDA, 25 February, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁸⁷SSDA to PMNZ, 13 March, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁸⁸W.E. Parry's (NZCNS). Notes on War Cabinet Meeting—February 28, 1941—concerning telegraphic summary of Singapore Conference-A.D.A., NA 22/4/44; Far East Appreciation of Australian COS, COS Paper No. 80, February 27, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁸⁹PMNZ to SSDA, PMA, 1 March, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁹⁰Acting PMA to PMNZ, 6 March, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁹¹Gill, *Royal Australian Navy, 1939-1942*, pp. 426-427.
- ⁹²The possibility that Australian military authorities would accept an offensive naval strategy for the defence of the Pacific Islands, rather than a defensive naval strategy for the defence of the Tasman Sea area, was on the basis of American intervention into the Western Pacific. With the dispatch of an American fleet to Singapore, it was accepted by the Australian military authorities that the scale of attack within the Southwest would be considerably reduced, thereby enabling Australian and New Zealand naval forces to take offensive action against Japanese naval forces of equal or lesser strength in defence of the Pacific Islands. Moreover, the Australian military authorities fully recognized that should the Japanese establish bases in the Pacific Islands, the scale of attack within the Southwest Pacific would be considerably increased.

- ⁹³Minutes of New Zealand War Cabinet, 22 March, 1941, NA 22/4/44. Singapore Defence Conference, February, 1941, COS Paper No. 83, March 20, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁹⁴PMNZ to SSDA, PMA, 22 March, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁹⁵Acting PMA to SSDA, PMNZ, 27 March, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (1).
- ⁹⁶SSDA to PMNZ, PMA, 15 April, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (2).
- ⁹⁷SSDA to PMNZ, PMA, 7 April, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (2).
- ⁹⁸ACNB to NZNB, "Burrell to ACNS", 8 April, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (2).
- ⁹⁹Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, p. 25.
- ¹⁰⁰Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 81; Herzog, *Closing the Open Door*, Appendix A, "Plan Dog", p. 241.
- ¹⁰¹See *supra*, pp. 128-131.
- ¹⁰²Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, p. 26; Herzog, *Closing the Open Door*, Appendix A, "Plan Dog", pp. 243, 250.
- ¹⁰³Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 82; Herzog, *Closing the Open Door*, Appendix A, "Plan Dog", pp. 249-250.
- ¹⁰⁴Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 82; Herzog, *Closing the Open Door*, Appendix A, "Plan Dog", pp. 252-253.
- ¹⁰⁵Morton, *Strategy and Command*, pp. 82-83; Herzog, *Closing the Open Door*, Appendix A, "Plan Dog", pp. 253-254.
- ¹⁰⁶Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 83; Herzog, *Closing the Open Door*, Appendix A, "Plan Dog", pp. 254-255.
- ¹⁰⁷Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, p. 17.
- ¹⁰⁸Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 83.
- ¹⁰⁹Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, p. 28; Watson, *Chief of Staff*, p. 120.
- ¹¹⁰In reply, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord, personally assured Stark that the ideas already expressed by the Admiralty were not to be regarded as "an unalterable basis" for the discussions at Washington. Nevertheless, upon receipt of the "Plan Dog" memorandum from Ghormley, the Admiralty immediately dispatched a British naval representative to Washington in early December in order to explain to Stark the importance of Singapore to the defence of the British Empire as well as to the interests of the United States. Herzog, *Closing the Open Door*, p. 109; Hendrichs, "The Role of the United States Navy", p. 222.

- ¹¹¹Herzog, *Closing the Open Door*, p. 109; Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, p. 28.
- ¹¹²Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 84.
- ¹¹³The Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, announced in early January, 1941, that the United States fleet would be reorganized on 1 February, 1941, into two naval forces: the Pacific Fleet and the Atlantic Fleet. The status of the small U.S. Asiatic Fleet would remain the same. In effect, the Pacific Fleet would now primarily serve as a "strategic reserve" for the Atlantic Fleet and its operation in that ocean against Germany and Italy. Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, p. 287.
- ¹¹⁴Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 85; Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, pp. 28-31.
- ¹¹⁵Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, p. 32.
- ¹¹⁶New Zealand was represented at the conference by Commander H.M. Burrell, R.A.N., Australian Naval Attaché to the United States, on naval matters; and on army and air matters by Group Captain L.M. Isitt, New Zealand Liaison Officer to the R.C.A.F., Ottawa, Air 123/5/1.
- ¹¹⁷Quinlan, "The United States Fleet: Diplomacy, Strategy and the Allocation of Ships (1940-1941)", p. 163.
- ¹¹⁸Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, p. 33.
- ¹¹⁹The Administration's principle fear was not the possible leakage of the plans to enemy spies but to the isolationist oriented American public and Congress, and its subsequent effect upon the passage of the Administration's Lend-Lease Bill through Congress. As Robert E. Sherwood observed at this time:
- "It is an ironic fact that in all probability no great damage would have been done had the details of these plans fallen into the hands of the Germans and the Japanese, whereas, had they fallen into the hands of the Congress and the press, American preparation for war might have been well nigh wrecked and ruined...." Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 274, "citing" *ibid.*
- ¹²⁰Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, pp. 33-34.
- ¹²¹*Ibid.*, p. 34.
- ¹²²*Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.
- ¹²³The British delegation also proposed that, as an example of the principle that the partner having predominant forces in an area should exercise command over the Allied forces in that area, an American Admiral should assume strategic command of all British and Dominion naval forces in the Pacific. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

- ¹²⁴Morison, *The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-1942*, p. 50.
- ¹²⁵Watson, *Chiefs of Staff*, pp. 372-373.
- ¹²⁶Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, p. 288.
- ¹²⁷Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, pp. 35-36, footnotes 16, 18.
- ¹²⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.
- ¹²⁹Herzog, *Closing the Open Door*, p. 116.
- ¹³⁰See *supra*, pp. 88-90.
- ¹³¹Herzog, *Closing the Open Door*, p. 116.
- ¹³²In this regard, the American representatives were instructed prior to the conference to bear in mind that:
- "United States Army and Naval officials are in rather general agreement that Great Britain cannot encompass the defeat of Germany unless the United States provides that nation with direct military assistance, plus a far greater degree of material aid than is being given now; and that, even then, success against the Axis is not assured.
- It is to be expected that proposals of the British representatives will have been drawn up with chief regard for the support of the British Commonwealth. Never absent from British minds are their post-war interests, commercial and military. We should likewise safeguard our own eventual interests..." Watson, *Chiefs of Staff*, p. 371.
- ¹³³Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 88.
- ¹³⁴Herzog, *Closing the Open Door*, p. 117; Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, p. 166, footnote 4.
- ¹³⁵Herzog, *Closing the Open Door*, p. 118.
- ¹³⁶Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, pp. 37-38.
- ¹³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 38.
- ¹³⁸U.S. Congress, *Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 39 Parts (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), (Hereinafter referred to as *Pearl Harbor Attack*), Part 15, Exhibit No. 49 (United States-British Staff Conversations, Report, 27 March, 1941), pp. 1491-1492.
- ¹³⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 1511-1515.
- ¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 1512.
- ¹⁴¹NZCNS to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 2 September, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).

- ¹⁴²Morison, *The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-1942*, p. 50.
- ¹⁴³U.S. Congress, *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part 15, Exhibit No. 49 (United States-British Staff Conversations, Report, 27 March, 1941), pp. 1501-1502, 1515-1518.
- ¹⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 1516, paragraph 30.
- ¹⁴⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 1494-1495.
- ¹⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 1489, paragraph 8.
- ¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 1491, paragraph 13, B.
- ¹⁴⁸Samuel E. Morison, *History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II*, Vol. I: *The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 50.
- ¹⁴⁹Butler, *Grand Strategy*, II, 426.
- ¹⁵⁰Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, pp. 168-170, 197-198.

Chapter VI

The Pacific: A Joint Anglo-American Strategic Responsibility

i Japan Moves Towards War in the Southern Region

While British, Dutch and American authorities sought to complete their southern encirclement of Japan, the Japanese endeavoured to hasten their control over the Southern Region, in accordance with the "General Principles" of their July, 1940, programme for conquest. Further frustration in the Far East and at Washington, together with the rise of a more favourable opportunity for southern expansion, however, were to convince the Japanese Government that their existing programme for conquest no longer fitted the rapidly changing Pacific situation. By July, 1941, therefore, Japan had abandoned her "General Principles" for a new programme of conquest based upon early control over the Southern Region, even at the risk of war with Great Britain and the United States.

In the Far East, the Netherlands East Indies continued to withstand, despite considerable pressure, Japanese efforts to bring her within the orbit of their New Order. On 14 May the Yoshizawa Mission at Batavia presented to the Dutch Government a new series of exaggerated demands for increased supplies of oil, rubber, tin, bauxite and nickel ore. Again, these Japanese demands were based upon the assumption that Japan should hold a preferential economic position in the Netherlands East Indies. This assumption was, again, firmly refuted by the Dutch Government in their reply on 6 June which, while offering some minor concessions, refused all major Japanese demands. Frustrated by their continued failure to gain control over the Netherlands East Indies through piecemeal conquest, the Japanese Government finally broke off negotiations with the Dutch Government and withdrew the Yoshizawa Mission from Batavia on 17 June.¹

At Washington, Japan's efforts to convince the American Government of her right to establish a New Order in the Pacific also met with little success. On 11 May Japan's Ambassador to the United States, Admiral Nomura, presented to Cordell Hull his government's scheme for a general Pacific settlement, which included the following proposals:

Firstly, that the United States Government should request Chiang Kai-Shek to negotiate peace with Japan and, if he refused, should discontinue assistance to the Chinese Government; secondly, that normal trade relations between Japan and the United States should be resumed; thirdly, that the United States should help Japan to acquire facilities for the exploitation of natural resources (including oil, rubber, tin, and nickel) in the south-west Pacific.

The scheme also contained an affirmation of Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact and of her obligation to come to the aid of Germany or Italy should either of them be attacked by a Power, other than the Soviet Union, not at that time engaged in the war in Europe or China, i.e. the United States.² Significantly, those proposals gave absolutely no attention to any of the principles enunciated by Hull, in mid-April, as the basis for the negotiations:

- 1) Respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
- 2) Non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
- 3) Recognition of national equality, including the equality of commercial opportunity, and
- 4) Maintenance of the status quo in the Pacific except where it might be altered by peaceful means.³

Despite the narrow and one-sided character of the Japanese proposals, the American Government accepted them as a starting point in the negotiations, knowing full well they could not be accepted as they stood, but hoping that discussions would bring about modifications which would make them acceptable to the American Government.⁴ Repeated conversations between Nomura and Hull took place therefore in an effort to clarify Japan's proposed scheme for a Pacific settlement. Those conversations, however, only revealed the existence of widely divergent views concerning the bases for a mutually acceptable Pacific settlement. So long as the Japanese persisted in pursuing an aggressive policy in China and in southeast Asia, there was not, Hull believed, "one chance in twenty or one in fifty or even one in one hundred of reaching a peaceful settlement" with Japan.⁵ Subsequently pressed by the Japanese Government for a formal reply to their proposals, the American Government handed to Nomura, through Hull, a redraft of the Japanese proposals in a formal Note on 21 June,

1941. Despite Japanese diplomatic pressure, the American Note revealed no disposition on the part of the American Government to retreat from its position. On the contrary, "it was an uncompromising restatement of the principles of international relations, so frequently enunciated by Secretary Hull, and of the American position regarding the peaceful settlement of the China affair, trade relations and economic activities in the Pacific area, the political stabilization of that area..."⁶ Moreover, the American Note was accompanied by an oral statement read to Ambassador Nomura by Secretary Hull which insisted that any final Pacific settlement must be in accord with the "liberal policies" (i.e. American principles) to which the American Government was committed, and warned that progress in the negotiations was contingent upon "some clearer indication than has yet been given that the Japanese Government as a whole desires to pursue courses of peace such as constitute the objective of the proposed understanding."⁷ The American Note of 21 June, which marked the culmination of several months of negotiations therefore was a source of further frustration to Japan, in her efforts to curtail American opposition to the establishment of a New Order in the Pacific.

On 22 June, 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union. The German invasion of the Soviet Union came as a complete surprise to Japan, and something of a blow to her national pride, as Germany had not given any indication to its Pacific ally of its intentions to invade the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Japanese Government fully appreciated the fact that Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union had removed the restraining influence on their northern flank far more effectively than the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact. Japan now had full freedom to expand into the Southern Region.⁸ The rise of this favourable opportunity, together with the frustration brought about by her failure in the Far East and at Washington, therefore prompted the Japanese Government to re-examine their programme for conquest, which had been established only one year earlier.

After an examination of the current Pacific situation and their existing programme for conquest, the basis for a new programme was agreed upon at a Liaison Conference, on 25 June, 1941, between Japanese political and military authorities. In essence, it was agreed that

Japan, while adhering to the Tripartite Pact, would not join with Germany in an attack upon the Soviet Union, at least for the present time, but would instead, establish early control over the Southern Region, even at the risk of war with Great Britain and the United States. Consequently, on 2 July, at an Imperial Conference consisting of the principal members of the Japanese Cabinet and military services meeting with the Emperor, a new programme for conquest was drawn up and formally adopted. This was to set into motion events which, almost exactly five months later, would result in Japan going to war with Great Britain and the United States.⁹

The programme was set down in a document entitled, An Outline of the Policy of the Imperial Government in View of Present Developments, as a guide for the future conduct of Japanese foreign policy:

1. The Imperial Government is determined to follow a policy which will result in the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere...no matter what international developments take place.
2. The Imperial Government will continue its effort to effect a settlement of the China Incident and seek to establish a solid bases for the security and preservation of the nation. This will involve an advance into the Southern Regions and, depending on future developments, a settlement of the Soviet Question as well.
3. The Imperial Government will carry out the above program no matter what obstacles may be encountered.¹⁰

In order to effect early control over the Southern Region, the Conference recommended that Japan should immediately occupy the whole of French Indo-China, develop plans for a full offensive in the Southern Regions, and undertake general preparations for war with Great Britain and the United States. These policies, the Conference accepted, would be correlated with those of diplomacy. Nevertheless, should diplomacy fail, the Conference affirmed that Japan "would not be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war with England and America."¹¹ Despite the definite bellicose character of the programme, the Japanese Government was not yet fully committed to a war in the Southern Region, for opinion was still divided between those extremists and moderate factions within the government as to the wisdom of undertaking a war with both Great Britain and the United States for control of that region.

Nevertheless, the extremists, being the principal architects of the programme, were to push for its full implementation and, in so doing, lead Japan into war with Great Britain and the United States.

In accordance with her new programme for conquest, Japan sought to gain complete control over French Indo-China in order to enhance her strategic position within the Southern Region. On 14 July, Japan presented to the Vichy Government a series of demands which included: French consent to the dispatch of the necessary number of Japanese troops, fleet units and air units to southern Indo-China; the establishment of air and naval bases in southern Indo-China; and full freedom of movement for Japanese troops throughout Indo-China. Should these demands be refused, the Vichy Government was warned by Japan that "a grave change might occur in the situation of Indo-China." On 21 July, the Vichy Government assented to the Japanese demands, and on 24 July, 40,000 Japanese troops poured into southern French Indo-China.¹² By this further southern advance, Japan now possessed strategically located air and naval bases from which to launch attacks upon Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines.

Japan's advance into southern French Indo-China, however, was also met by swift American, British and Dutch counteraction which not only came as a complete surprise to the Japanese Government, but more importantly, put into jeopardy the successful implementation of the programme for control over the Southern Region. On 26 July the United States, Britain and her Dominions, froze all Japanese assets within their control. In addition, Britain and her Dominions, following America's earlier example, denounced their commercial treaties with Japan. By 28 July the Netherlands East Indies had also taken similar action against Japan.¹³ The American, British and Dutch Governments had therefore virtually imposed an economic blockade on Japan. More importantly, the United States had also responded to Japan's further southern advance by undertaking a major strategical re-adjustment with respect to the defence of the Philippine Islands. It now became accepted American military policy that the Philippine Islands would not only be held, but also serve as bases for offensive air operations against Japan. In effect, the United States was now beginning to re-assert its military posture in the Far East, in conjunction with

the British and Dutch, by reinforcing the Philippine Islands with land and air forces for defence and operations against Japan.¹⁴ Japan therefore was now presented with the options of either concluding a Pacific settlement with the United States and Britain, or going to war with them before their economic embargoes and southern encirclement undermined Japan's ability to gain control over the Southern Region.

Towards the end of July a Liaison Conference was convened in Tokyo to discuss those very options. The conference was marred by a conflict of opinion between extremist and moderate factions within the Japanese Government. During the conference, Prime Minister Konoye sought to persuade the Army and Navy to agree that Japan should avoid war and seek some form of Pacific settlement with the United States and Britain. The Army refused to countenance any agreement which would in any way interfere with Japan's freedom of action immediately to advance southwards or against the Soviet Union, and was thus, in favour of going to war. The Navy,¹⁵ like Konoye and the other civilian members of the Japanese Government, preferred negotiations but was prepared to fight if the negotiations did not bring speedy results. As a result of the conference Konoye decided once again, to open discussions in Washington, and on 6 August, Ambassador Nomura handed a formal Note to Secretary Hull, which purported to be the Japanese Government's long-delayed reply to the American Note of 27 June. The Japanese Government now demanded, as the basis for a Pacific settlement that: the United States remove the restrictions she had imposed upon her trade with Japan; suspend her defensive preparations in the Philippine Islands; discontinue the supply of military equipment to British and Dutch garrisons in the Far East; and suspend all aid to the Chinese Government. The United States was also to recognize Japan's special military position in French Indo-China, and agree to her permanent political and military predominance in that country. In return, the Japanese Government would neither move nor maintain troops in any area of the southwest Pacific. In essence, these Japanese proposals were on the same general lines as those of 11 May; for they offered only one concession—that Japan would not advance further south than French Indo-China—and were in no way responsive to the American Note of 21 June.¹⁶ Understandably, therefore, Nomura was informed by Cordell Hull on 8 August that the Japanese demands

were unacceptable and did not constitute a response to the American Note of 21 June. In a further effort to find a way out of the impasse while diplomatic action was still possible, for the Army and Navy might force the issue at any time, Konoye advised Nomura on the same day to suggest to the United States the convening of a meeting between himself and Roosevelt in order to reach an immediate Pacific settlement. Roosevelt agreed in principle to the meeting with Konoye and suggested on 17 August that it might be held in Juneau, Alaska, on about the 15th of October. On 28 August Roosevelt received another message from Konoye in which the Japanese Prime Minister urged that the meeting be held as quickly as possible since "the present situation was developing swiftly and might produce unforeseen contingencies." Although Roosevelt was optimistic on the possible outcome of the meeting, Hull was very much the reverse. He scented the possibility of a "Far Eastern Munich" and advised the President accordingly. On 3 September therefore, Roosevelt informed Konoye through Nomura, that the meeting should be deferred until the basis for a Pacific settlement had been first agreed upon.¹⁷

Konoye's failure to make any progress in the diplomatic field now brought about a demand by both the Army and Navy for a decision to go to war before Japan's ability to gain control over the Southern Region was seriously undermined. This action led to the convening of another Liaison Conference in early September, and after much debate, a compromise was finally reached: all arrangements for war were to be perfected, and a time limit was to be set for diplomatic discussions.¹⁸ This compromise was formally accepted at an Imperial Conference held on 6 September. There it was agreed that the Army and Navy should complete their preparations for war by the end of October. At the same time, diplomatic discussions would continue, but "if by the early part of October there is no reasonable hope of having our demands agreed to...we will immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against America (and England and Holland)." The Imperial Conference also fixed the minimum demands that Japan would make and the maximum concessions she would grant in any negotiations with the United States and Britain. Those demands and concessions, while generally similar to those of 6 August, were now stiffer in tone and showed definite signs of a hardening of Japanese policy, particularly with regard to China.¹⁹

The Army and Navy meanwhile continued their preparations for war. Troops earmarked for operations in the Southern Region intensified their training and planning was brought to its final stages. Since an agreement on general strategy had already been reached in mid-August, Army and Navy General Staffs directed their attention, following the Imperial Conference, towards developing detailed operational plans for their offensive into the Southern Region. The area marked for conquest within the Southern Region formed a vast triangle whose eastern arm stretched from the Kuril Islands in the north and then south past Wake and the Marshall and Gilbert Islands. The southern base of the triangle then extended from the Gilbert Islands to the western end of the Malay Barrier; from there the western arm of the triangle stretched from Malaya through southern Burma to the French Indo-China—Chinese border (see Map I). Control of that area would give Japan free access to abundant supplies of oil and other raw materials and greatly satisfy her national objectives. If all went well, however, that area of conquest was to be extended, thereby fulfilling Japan's ultimate national objective, control over the entire Southern Region. The general strategy, which the Army and Navy General Staffs were now drawing up, operational plans to implement, had as its prime objective the capture of the British and Dutch territories in the Far East Area, so as to gain control of their rich resources of oil and other minerals. The greatest threat to the attainment of this objective, was the U.S. Pacific Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor. The Japanese therefore hoped to eliminate or neutralize that fleet before launching their major southward thrust into the Far East Area. The Japanese also recognized the need to expel the British and Americans from Singapore and the Philippine Islands. They would also need to cut American sea communications across the Central Pacific by capturing Wake Island and Guam to secure their lines of communications to the South and eliminate bases from which counterattacks could be mounted. Once these threats had been removed and the area of conquest completely secured, Japanese military forces were then to occupy and fortify strategic bases along the perimeter of the entire area of conquest. Those bases, would then form a powerful defensive shield around Japan's newly acquired empire in the south, the Home Islands and her vital sea communications connecting Japan with its new sources of raw materials in the Far East. With acquisition of abundant raw materials in the Far East and the

establishment of a powerful defensive shield, the Japanese considered that they would then be in a position to hold on to the entire area of conquest indefinitely, ultimately compelling the United States and the British Empire to accept a *fait accompli*.²⁰

Having won a temporary reprieve to continue diplomatic discussions, Konoye pressed again for a Pacific settlement. Immediately following the Imperial Conference, Konoye submitted the new proposals to the American Government for consideration. Cordell Hull, however, reacted unfavourably to the Japanese proposals received on 6 September. He considered that Japan was narrowing down the concessions she had originally been prepared to make, particularly with regard to China. The Americans wanted Japan to agree to a troop withdrawal from China as a part of a Sino-Japanese Treaty; whereas the Japanese wanted to include in their peace treaty with China, an article giving Japan the right to retain her troops in Inner Mongolia and parts of Northern China for the professed purpose of co-operating with the Chinese against Communism. As a consequence to this diplomatic impasse, another Liaison Conference was convened in Tokyo on 20 September to consider the matter. The Army was vehemently opposed to any agreement involving the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China.²¹ Moreover, the Army and Navy now demanded that a decision for war or peace should be made "by October 15 at the latest."²² They felt justified in finally forcing the issue between war or peace. Both were convinced that there was no hope of reaching a satisfactory Pacific settlement with the United States and stressed the danger of being caught by what they considered to be American delaying tactics. Not only did the passage of every day see a decline in precious Japanese oil and mineral resources, but it gave the Americans, British and Dutch time to complete their defences in those very areas coveted by Japan. In addition, the military leaders were aware that the weather conditions for their southern offensive and for the delivery of their attack upon the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor were favourable only until the end of December.²³ The Konoye Cabinet was therefore now faced with a 15 October deadline to conclude a Pacific settlement with the United States. On this understanding the conference re-drafted the peace proposals but, in all respects, they followed the pattern laid down at the Imperial Conference on 6 September. On 27 September in a last bid, Konoye submitted the

proposals to Ambassador Nomura for consideration by the American Government. At the same time, the Japanese Foreign Secretary, Soemu Toyoda, again suggested to the American Government that a meeting between Konoye and Roosevelt be held, preferably around 10-15 October, and warned the American Government that, unless this happened, the Konoye Cabinet would fall and with it all possibility of a Pacific settlement between Japan and the United States.²⁴ On 2 October, the United States gave its reply. Cordell Hull informed Ambassador Nomura that the Japanese proposals were a "source of disappointment" to the American Government. As for the possibility of a meeting between Konoye and Roosevelt, the American Government did not shift from its earlier position. Hull stated that it was the "President's earnest hope that discussion of the fundamental questions may be so developed that such a meeting can be held."²⁵ On 10 October Nomura was compelled to inform Foreign Minister Toyoda that, after further discussions with Secretary Hull, there was not "the slightest chance on earth" of a leaders' conference "so long as Japan refused to compromise."²⁶ Unwilling fully to support the extremists' programme for conquest and to accept responsibility for its consequences, Konoye resigned on 16 October, together with a number of other civilian members of the Japanese Cabinet. The new Cabinet, which emerged had General Hideki Tojo, a hard-core extremist, as Prime Minister.²⁷ The extremists therefore had now assumed full control and a decision for war would swiftly follow.

ii. Japan's Decision for War

The Tojo Cabinet and the military services, meeting in an almost continual series of Liaison Conferences, examined every aspect of Japan's programme for conquest. It was obvious to Tojo that the Army and Navy wished Japan to go to war before her ability to gain control of the Southern Region was seriously undermined. Unlike his predecessor, Tojo fully supported Japan's programme for conquest and was fully prepared to accept responsibility for its consequences. It was therefore agreed on 2 November that Japan would make one last attempt to reach a Pacific settlement with the United States and, if that effort should fail, to go to war. This decision was then formally confirmed at an Imperial Conference held on 5 November. There it was agreed that all military preparations for war should be completed by 1 December, and that the final decision for war should be

made on 25 November, if no agreement had been reached with the United States by that date. The Imperial Conference also drew up the final proposals which Japan would submit to the American Government for consideration. These were divided into two parts, Plan A and Plan B. Plan A was nothing more than a minor revision of the previous proposals on the most disputed points. These were: acceptance of economic equality in China and throughout the Pacific, provided it was adopted in all the other parts of the world; the retention of Japanese troops in North China, Mongolia and Hainan for a "necessary period."

The withdrawal of all other Japanese troops in China within two years, after the restoration of peace between China and Japan; and the withdrawal of Japanese forces from French Indo-China when the war in China was settled or when a "just peace" was established in East Asia. A more conciliatory attitude was taken with regard to Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact, but in such vague terms as to be largely without meaning. In return, the United States was to compel Chiang Kai-Shek to make peace with Japan by withdrawing American support should he fail to accept Japan's peace terms. Plan B, which was to be submitted to the American Government in the event of an American refusal to accept Plan A, made no mention of the Tripartite Pact or the removal of Japanese troops from China. It proposed that Japan would withdraw her troops from southern French Indo-China immediately, and from the whole of that country "upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area." In return, the United States was to agree not to interfere in China, and to resume her commercial relations with Japan. Moreover, the United States was also to supply Japan with oil, and co-operate with Japan in obtaining needed supplies of raw materials from the Netherlands East Indies. Like Plan A, Plan B did not meet any of the American suggestions of 21 June or recognize the four fundamental American principles as the basis for a Pacific settlement.²⁸

Immediately following the Imperial Conference, the Japanese Government on 5 November informed Nomura in Washington of the new Japanese proposals, Plans A and B. The Japanese Government also warned Nomura that, "because of various circumstances", it was absolutely necessary that the signing of a Pacific settlement be completed by 25 November. In explanation, Nomura was advised that

this would save Japanese-American relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Nomura was not informed then or later precisely what would happen if no agreement was reached by that date.²⁹

While the Japanese Government awaited an American response to their final proposals, the Army and Navy sought to formalise their preparations for war. On 5 November their General Staffs approved their planning staffs' completed operational plans for war with the United States, the British Empire and the Netherlands East Indies, and on the following day operational orders allotting various military tasks to particular formations and units were issued.³⁰ On 20 November the actual order for attack was issued to the various Japanese commands, but with the proviso that operations would not commence until the results of the diplomatic negotiations in Washington were known.³¹ All that was now needed by the military therefore was the actual date for war.

Meanwhile Nomura's efforts at Washington to obtain an immediate Pacific settlement met with little success. Upon receiving Plan A from the Japanese Ambassador, the American Government, fully aware from decoded Japanese messages that Japan's diplomatic actions were now limited to a date in November, rejected the Plan, and in this the British Government concurred.³² On 15 November, Cordell Hull informed Nomura that the American Government was not prepared to consider any proposals from the new Japanese Government which were couched in the form of an ultimatum. Turning to matters of substance, Hull further informed Nomura that the offer to withdraw troops from China and French Indo-China was indefinite and uncertain and that the United States, while willing to agree to non-discrimination in trade, could not guarantee that other nations would do so. With regard to the Tripartite Pact, Hull informed Nomura that the United States could not accept the Japanese Government's interpretation of her obligations under the Pact. The United States must have the assurance that Japan's Pact with Germany and Italy would become a "dead letter", Hull declared, otherwise neither the American public nor the British and Dutch could be convinced that Japan was ready to embark upon a peaceful course of action in the Pacific.³³ Nomura now recognized that war, with all its probable serious consequences to his country, was inevitable. In a personal effort to stave off a general Pacific

war, he now attempted to obtain an immediate Pacific settlement independently of Tokyo. On 18 November he suggested to both the Japanese and American Governments that an immediate solution to the diplomatic deadlock lay in the acceptance of a stop-gap arrangement whereby Japan would withdraw from southern French Indo-China in exchange for a relaxation of economic embargoes upon Japan, that is, a return to the position prevailing before 26 July, 1941. The American Government informed Nomura that the proposal might be worth discussion. The Japanese Government, however, informed Nomura that they would accept nothing but Plan B *in toto*,³⁴ but agreed to extend the deadline to 29 November, with the added warning that thereafter "things are automatically going to happen."³⁵ Obeying his government's earlier instructions, Nomura presented Plan B to the American Government on 20 November. The American Government was aware that this was Japan's final set of proposals and that their refusal might bring about general Pacific war. The American Government also recognized, however, that although the plan contained a provision by which Japan would immediately move her forces from southern to northern French Indo-China there was no limit to the numbers which might be stationed there, and that a complete withdrawal of Japanese forces from that country would not take place until peace had been restored. In addition, there was nothing in the plan to prevent fresh Japanese aggression from breaking out in any part of the Pacific, nor any pledge by Japan to pursue a peaceful course of action in that area. Finally, the American Government fully recognized that the plan still left Japan a full member of the Tripartite Pact, and thus a potential enemy of the United States, the British Empire and the Netherlands East Indies. After consultation with the British, Dutch and Chinese Governments, the American Government decided to reject Plan B. On 26 November Nomura was informed that Plan B was unacceptable and, at the same time, handed a further American note containing proposals for the possible basis of a Pacific settlement. In as much as the American note was nothing more than a reiteration of the American position calling for, among other things, the withdrawal of all Japanese forces from China and French Indo-China and the neutralization of the Tripartite Pact, it was obvious to the American Government that there was little likelihood that the Japanese would accept these counter-proposals even though their tentative character was stressed.³⁶ The American Government, therefore, had no other

choice but to direct their main efforts towards completing their defences and plans with the British and Dutch for a war in the Pacific.

When the American note reached Tokyo on 27 November, a Liaison Conference between members of the Tojo Cabinet and the Military Services was immediately convened to consider it. All present agreed that the American note was unacceptable and that Japan must now go to war.³⁷ It was decided, however, that the decision for war should be formally confirmed at the Imperial Conference scheduled for 1 December.³⁸ In order to obtain an element of complete surprise for the launching of their southern offensive, the Japanese Government then advised Nomura on 28 November to keep the negotiations open and that a formal reply to the American note would be dispatched shortly.³⁹ On 1 December the Imperial Conference convened, as scheduled. Presiding over the conference, Prime Minister Tojo presented to the Emperor his government's case for war:

In accordance with the decision of the Imperial Conference of 5 November, the Government has taken all possible steps, concentrating all its energies, to adjust the relations with the United States, while the Imperial Army and Navy have made efforts to complete their preparations for operations...It is now clear that Japan's claims to Empire cannot be attained through diplomatic measures. Meanwhile, the United States, Britain, the Netherlands and China have increasingly strengthened their economic and military pressure upon Japan. From the viewpoints of both of Japan's national power and of strategy, it is now utterly impossible for Japan to permit the present situation to continue any longer. In such circumstances, Japan has now no other way than to wage war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands...⁴⁰

The Emperor spoke not a single word.⁴¹ The Army, Navy and Cabinet ministers then formally voted for war. Since "our negotiations with the United States regarding the execution of our national policy, adopted 5 November, have finally failed", the conference decreed, "Japan will open hostilities against the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands." With the formal decision for war now made, Japanese military and naval commanders were then informed, the following day, to commence hostilities on 8 December, 1941 (East longitude time).⁴² At last, Japan was now prepared, both politically and militarily, to undertake with one deep and final southward thrust, her greatest bid for empire.

iii The American-Dutch-British (A.D.B.) Conference, Singapore

While Japan moved towards war in the Southern Region, British, Dutch and American authorities had sought to complete their southern encirclement of Japan. With the bulk of the U.S. Pacific Fleet retained at Pearl Harbor, the British, Dutch and Americans had endeavoured to finalize their Pacific defences and their efforts towards developing a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan before Japan launched her expected southern offensive. The first step in that effort was taken at Singapore in late April, 1941.

In accordance with the recommendations of the ABC-1 Report, a conference was convened at Singapore on 21 April in order to formulate a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan on the basis of that report. The conference, which sat until 27 April, was chaired by the British Commander-in-Chief, Far East, Sir Robert Brooke-Popham. Among those present were other British Far East commanders and service representatives from Australia, New Zealand, India, the Netherlands East Indies, the United States and a British naval officer from the British East Indies Station.⁴³ The conference produced what later became known as the ADB Agreement or Report. The ADB Report reflected, however, a decidedly British point of view, which in many ways, was contrary to the strategical terms and concepts of the ABC-1 Report, and was subsequently to provoke intense American dislike.

At the outset of the conference, the delegates confirmed that their purpose was to reach agreement upon a combined plan for the conduct of military operations against Japan on the basis of the ABC-1 Report. Such an agreement would then be subject to the ratification of the governments concerned and involve no political commitments. The delegates then defined their "most important" strategical interests: "(A) the security of sea communications and (B) the security of Singapore." They recognized, however, that "an important subsidiary interest" was the security of Luzon in the Philippine Islands.⁴⁴ The delegates rated the defensive value of the island of Luzon to the security of Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, Australia and New Zealand: "Until the forces, particularly submarine and air, maintained in the Philippines Luzon, are eliminated, Japan would be taking great risks in launching an attack either west of

them on Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies, or east of them on the Netherlands East Indies or Australia and New Zealand." Luzon had an "even greater value from the offensive point of view" as a base for air operations against Japan. The delegates therefore recommended, despite the advice received from the American delegation,⁴⁵ that the defence at Luzon be strengthened and that every effort should be made to develop a bombing force there for offensive air operations against Japan.⁴⁶

In examining the courses of action open to Japan, the delegates agreed that after securing full control of French Indo-China, Japan's most probable future course of action would be a sudden attack upon the Philippines and Hong Kong, immediately followed by an attack upon Malaya or Borneo (British and Dutch). Until Japan had successfully secured those territories, Japanese attack upon Sumatra, Java, Australia or New Zealand would not be attempted. Nevertheless, a Japanese attack upon sea communications in all areas would certainly form part of any Japanese plan of action.⁴⁷

As at the ADA Conference in February, the delegates recognized the importance of collective action against Japanese aggression, and the need for a clear understanding as to what should constitute a *casus belli*. The delegates agreed upon a number of specific Japanese actions which, if they eventuated, would call for immediate British, Dutch and American military counteraction.⁴⁸ Those Japanese actions followed the earlier recommendations of the ADA Conference in almost every detail.⁴⁹

The delegates then turned their attention to the actual development of a combined defence plan. As a first step the delegates, on the advice of the Admiralty, expanded the area of operations for the development of a combined defence plan. They did this by enlarging the Far East and Australia and New Zealand Area to include the Indian Ocean, i.e., East Indies Station and designating that area the "Eastern theatre".⁵⁰ On this basis, a combined defence plan for the employment and disposition of British Dutch and American military forces within the Pacific Ocean Area and Eastern theatre was then drawn up. Characteristically, the plan was structured upon two periods, phases I and II: the period before and after the arrival of the British Far Eastern Fleet in the "Eastern theatre".

As at the ADA Conference, the delegates agreed that the local air and land forces of the Associated Powers should be principally employed in defending important naval and air bases.⁵¹ The delegates therefore brought the Philippine Islands into the established Far Eastern air reconnaissance and reinforcement scheme by agreeing that: (a) should the main Japanese attack fall upon the Philippine Islands, air squadrons from the Netherlands East Indies would be sent to Luzon, while Malayan air squadrons would replace those formerly in the Netherlands East Indies; (b) should the main Japanese attack fall upon the Netherlands East Indies, Malayan air squadrons would proceed to Borneo; (c) should the main Japanese attack fall upon Malaya, air squadrons from the Netherlands East Indies would proceed to Malaya; and (d) that Australian air squadrons and land forces would reinforce the Dutch Islands of Timor and Ambon from Darwin at the outbreak of war with Japan.⁵² With regard to the naval forces of the Associated Powers, the delegates accepted that, under the present circumstances, the U.S. Pacific Fleet would have to be employed in holding "our position in the Pacific"⁵³ by acting offensively against Japanese naval forces. The remaining local British, Dutch and American naval forces would have to be employed for the defence of bases and sea communications. After the outbreak of war with Japan and until the arrival of the British Far Eastern Fleet in the Eastern theatre (phase I), the U.S. Pacific Fleet, based at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, was assigned to counter the Japanese offensive. Its tasks were to be (a) undertaking offensive operations against Japanese bases and forces in the Japanese-held Marshall and Caroline Islands; and (b) supporting Dominion naval forces south of the equator between 155° East and 180° (the Shaded Area). In order to determine and facilitate the support to be afforded by the U.S. Pacific Fleet in the Shaded Area, the delegates recommended that Australian and New Zealand authorities establish communication and co-operate directly with the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific (CINCPAC).⁵⁴ Since the "remaining naval forces of the Associated Powers in the Eastern theatre are so weak...", the delegates acknowledged, "they will inevitably find themselves very largely occupied with the local defence of bases and the protection of vital sea communications."⁵⁵ On this basis, the delegates then assigned the Dutch naval forces to the defence of the Netherlands East Indies and the narrow passages between those Islands; the U.S. Asiatic Fleet to the defence of the

Philippine Islands for as long as that defence continued, and British naval forces to the defence of their sea communications within the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific. A table of initial naval dispositions along those lines was then drawn up by the conference (See Appendix C).⁵⁶ During phase I, therefore, Dutch naval forces and the U.S. Pacific Fleet were to be solely charged with conducting offensive operations against Japan in support of the Malay Barrier, whereas, British naval forces were to be almost exclusively charged with defending sea communications in the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific, far south of the Malay Barrier. These naval dispositions for phase I were, of course, contrary to the basic strategical concept of the ABC-1 Report by not providing for a joint Anglo-American defence of the Malay Barrier, and was subsequently to be the major American objection to the ADB Report.

With the arrival of the British Far Eastern Fleet in the Eastern theatre (phase II), the delegates considered that the balance of naval strength in that theatre would be considerably altered against Japan. The immediate objective of the British Far Eastern Fleet would then be to operate from Singapore so as to mount offensive operations against Japan in conjunction with the naval forces of the other Associated Powers. But "so many developments must precede the arrival of the British Far Eastern Fleet" that it would not be "profitable" to formulate naval dispositions for phase II.⁵⁷

Having completed the development of a combined British-Dutch-American defence plan, the ADB Conference adjourned on 27 April. Copies of the conference's report were then transmitted to the various governments concerned for immediate ratification. Until such ratification was obtained, the British, Dutch and Americans would be unable to meet through combined action, Japan's expected southern offensive.

iv Australian Intransigence and the Shaded Area

The New Zealand Government was not entirely disappointed by the outcome of the Washington Conference. Despite the general American refusal to accept the British concept of grand strategy, the United States had assumed strategic responsibility for the naval defence of New Zealand and environs within the Shaded Area in the event of war with Japan. On 21 May Walter Nash, the Acting Prime Minister,⁵⁸

informed the British Government of the Dominion Government's acceptance of the ABC-1 and ADB Reports. Nash further informed the British Government that the Dominion Government appreciated "the reasons which necessitated deferring to United States views at Washington regarding the strategical situation in the Far East, and particularly the reinforcement of Singapore by American capital ships." Recognizing that the Pacific was now to be a joint Anglo-American strategic responsibility, Nash then urged the British Government to make every possible effort towards expediting the arrival of a British fleet to Singapore and considered that the Atlantic transfer of a number of major units from the U.S. Pacific Fleet should enable the British Government to do so, thereby, meeting its share of strategic responsibility in the Pacific. Nash then informed the British Government that New Zealand was, for her part, now endeavouring to establish the basis for ANZAC-American naval co-operation in the Shaded Area, as recommended by the ADB Report.⁵⁹

While anxiously awaiting word of American acceptance of the ADB Report, the New Zealand Government sought to establish the basis for ANZAC-American naval co-operation in the Shaded Area, as suggested to the British Government. The New Zealand Government was to encounter, however, an intransigent attitude on the part of the Australian Government in their efforts to establish the basis for ANZAC-American naval co-operation in the Shaded Area. Australian authorities tended to view that aspect of the combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan as a threat to Australian and New Zealand plans for mutual military co-operation in the Southwest Pacific, specifically in the Tasman Sea area. In this regard, Australian authorities looked with disfavour not only upon the American objective of the Shaded Area, which was to obtain Australian and New Zealand naval support for the defence of the Malay Barrier, but upon the boundaries of that area which failed to include Australia's eastern coast and southeastern focal area within the Tasman Sea (see Map II).

As a first step in their efforts to establish the basis for ANZAC-American naval co-operation in the Shaded Area, the New Zealand Government had earlier recognized the need for completing their defence arrangements with Australia in the Southwest Pacific. On 14 May Walter Nash had advised the Australian Government that the

New Zealand Government had approved the proposal, arising out of recent discussions between the Australian and New Zealand Naval Staffs on naval strategy, that a concentration of all available Australian and New Zealand cruisers for offensive operations should be effected immediately information is received "that Japan is attempting to establish an advanced base to the North East of Australia, thereby threatening both Dominions and...attacking in force in the Southwest Pacific." In "these circumstances", Nash advised the Australian Government, unified control would pass to the Central War Room, Melbourne, on the basis already agreed upon for the hunting of German raiders in the Tasman Sea area and that an Australian Flag Officer would assume operational control of the concentrated naval force in the Southwest Pacific.⁶⁰ By 24 May, the New Zealand Government had secured the Australian Government's agreement to their proposed arrangement for ANZAC military co-operation within the Southwest Pacific,⁶¹ and took additional steps to establish the basis for ANZAC-American naval co-operation in the Shaded Area.

On 29 May, in response to New Zealand's efforts to obtain information regarding American naval intentions in the Shaded Area, the British Government informed the New Zealand Government that, from information just received from the British Military Mission (BMM) in Washington, American naval authorities were anxious to make arrangements for American naval support in the Shaded Area, but considered that no arrangements could be made until it was clarified as to whom the CINCPAC should deal with on matters relating to ANZAC-American naval co-operation in that area. The British Government then advised the Dominion Government that the American Chief of Naval Operations had advised the BMM that it would be "most desirable" if arrangements could be made for the CINCPAC to deal with a single British naval authority within the Shaded Area. In view of New Zealand's existing operational arrangements with Australia and her belief that the "extent and efficiency" of American naval support in the Shaded Area "would be materially increased" if operational arrangements with the United States could be simplified,⁶³ the New Zealand Government accepted the American suggestion. On 31 May the New Zealand Government informed the British Government that, since arrangements have already been made between the Australian and New Zealand Governments for their naval forces to come under operational

control of the ACNB in certain circumstances, the Dominion considered it "logical" that CINCPAC should deal direct with the ACNB on operational matters concerning ANZAC-American naval co-operation in the Shaded Area. The New Zealand Government, however, also advised the British Government that it was "essential" that the NZNB be kept fully informed on all naval matters pertaining to ANZAC-American naval co-operation in that area.⁶⁴ This operational arrangement was fully accepted by the Australian Government. On 5 June, the New Zealand Government was advised that the "Commonwealth Government feel that any agreement which would have the effect of increasing the extent and efficiency of U.S. help in the Pacific merits the fullest possible consideration and they are prepared to do what they can to assist in measures to this end."⁶⁵ Due to a delay in obtaining the full report of the ADB Conference,⁶⁶ American naval authorities were still reluctant to discuss with Australian and New Zealand naval authorities their intentions in the Shaded Area, until they had received and studied the recommendations. Nevertheless, by the end of June, New Zealand naval authorities were able to learn, from information gleaned from the reports of the ABC meetings and the Admiralty, that American naval support for the Shaded Area was largely conditional upon Australian and New Zealand naval support for the defence of the Malay Barrier:

Amount of help from Pacific fleet conditioned by fact that U.S. authorities think Dominions have already too many cruisers in this part of the world Tasman Sea ... they were...tacitly supported by the UKCOS on this point at the Washington Conference .

As a result of this view U.S. help will probably be limited to protection of trade generally speaking up to the 180° meridian and the possible provision of a squadron from U.S. Pacific fleet operating in the Tasman or in the islands to the northward in the event of a direct Japanese attack and/or the absence of allied ANZAC vessels elsewhere.⁶⁷

In the wake of this most revealing information, fears were immediately aroused within the New Zealand Government by news of the American rejection of the ADB Report.

On 9 July the New Zealand Government was informed by the New Zealand Chief of Naval Staff, W.E. Parry, that from information just received from Australian naval authorities the USCOS were now in the

process of submitting a report to the UKCOS through their Military Mission in London, indicating the basis for their rejection of the ADB Report.⁶⁸ In view of this startling development, the New Zealand Government now feared her American naval shield in the event of war with Japan might not be provided, for without the American acceptance⁶⁹ of a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan, the Dominion considered that the efficiency and extent of American naval support in the Shaded Area would be open to serious question. This fear was all that more heightened within the New Zealand Government by recent reports from the British Government that Japan was preparing to advance further south into southern French Indo-China and the Dominion's general belief that Anglo-American military co-operation in the event of a general Pacific war would "be inevitable."⁷⁰ The New Zealand Government's primary defence efforts, therefore, was now to be directed towards effecting the development of an acceptable combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan so as to secure the American naval shield in the event of war with Japan. In order to assist in this effort, the New Zealand Government now recognized the immediate need for having direct representation on the BMM in Washington. Up to this time, the NZCOS were represented on the BMM by the Australian naval attaché in Washington, Commander D.H. Harries, RAN. This arrangement had since May been generally recognized as inadequate. A report from the Minister of New Zealand's Supply Mission in Washington,⁷¹ J.G. Coates, to the New Zealand Government on 30 May had strongly recommended that the NZCOS be directly represented on the BMM in Washington, especially by a naval officer, since the BMM was chiefly concerned with naval matters of "great moment to New Zealand."⁷² Lacking a suitable naval officer to fill this position, the New Zealand Government had allowed their arrangement with Australia to continue. The receipt of information regarding the American rejection of the ADB Report, however, convinced the New Zealand Government of the urgency of the need for having direct representation on the BMM in Washington. After securing Admiralty approval, the New Zealand Government, therefore, formally approved on 15 July the appointment of Lieutenant Commander R.J. Bailey, RN, former gunnery officer on the New Zealand cruiser, HMNZS Leander, as the NZCOS representative on the BMM in Washington.⁷³ Inasmuch as the BMM was not functioning openly, Bailey was to be attached to the New Zealand Supply Mission in Washington, as the

Naval Supply Liaison Officer.⁷⁴ Having been earlier prepared for the position by the NZCNS, Bailey was fully conversant with Anglo-American naval planning, and was to play a prominent role at Washington, in New Zealand's efforts to effect the development of an acceptable combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan.

On 18 July the New Zealand War Cabinet was called into session in order to discuss the basis for the American rejection of the ADB Report. The War Cabinet was deeply "perturbed" by the disagreement which had arisen between the British and American military authorities, and the NZCOS were asked to explain the basis for the American rejection of the ADB Report.⁷⁵ The NZCOS explained to the War Cabinet that there were a number of American objections to the ADB Report:

(a) The Report contains "political commitments" on matters which the military officers at Singapore were unauthorized to make. In particular, these included the Report's recommendations concerning the need for collective military action and definitions of acts of war by Japan. Such matters, the USCOS contended, are for discussion and agreement by Associate Governmental departments.

(b) The strategical scope of the Report was "too broad". It was not the intention of the United States, the USCOS contended, that the Singapore Conference should have discussed military matters beyond those Areas—the POA and the Far East and Australia and New Zealand Areas—as agreed to at the Washington Conference. The British East Indies Station, the USCOS specifically pointed out, was clearly outside the scope of the ABC-1 Report. In addition, the USCOS could see no reason for the setting up of a Commander-in-Chief, Eastern fleet, to supersede the Commander-in-Chief, China Station, upon the arrival of an Eastern fleet at Singapore. The American Chief of Naval Operations was therefore not prepared to allow U.S. naval forces (i.e., the U.S. Asiatic Fleet) to be employed outside the Far East area nor be placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, except under some special or exceptional circumstances.

(c) The Report failed to recognize the strategic "importance of holding the line at Malaya, Sumatra, Java and to the Eastward Malay Barrier ." The only naval forces deployed for that purpose would be American, whereas all British naval forces were to be deployed "to protect the sea communications of the British Empire." As such, the

Report contained no "practical" operating plan for Associate naval forces. Unless such a practical operating plan were drawn up, the American Chief of Naval Operations, therefore, considered that "U.S. co-operation will be largely discounted."⁷⁶ With regard to (a), the NZCNS advised the War Cabinet that during the framing of the war plan at Singapore, "certain postulates had to be made". Nevertheless, the NZCNS pointed out to the War Cabinet that a provision was made, within the body of the Report, which clearly absolved all contracting parties of any implied political commitments.⁷⁷ With regard to (b), the NZCOS agreed that American military authorities had a legitimate gripe. The Singapore Conference was never informed by the Admiralty that the USCOS had not accepted the inclusion of the Indian Ocean (i.e., the British East Indies Station) into the area of operations for the development of a war plan. Only papers just received from the BMM in Washington now indicated, that the American Chief of Naval Operations had definitely insisted, prior to the Singapore conference, that the British area to be considered by that conference should be limited to "the Far East and Australia and New Zealand Area, as agreed in the ABC-1 Report." The British, by establishing an "Eastern theatre" under the strategical direction of the Commander-in-Chief, China Station, had therefore enabled that British Commander to move U.S. naval forces (the U.S. Asiatic Fleet) into the Indian Ocean if he so desired. Moreover, the British had now proposed to appoint a Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, who, although not mentioned in either the ABC-1 or ADB Reports, would assume strategic command from the Commander-in-Chief, China Station, upon arrival of an Eastern Fleet at Singapore. Undoubtedly the Americans feared that even after the arrival of the Eastern Fleet, U.S. naval forces could still be moved westward into the Indian Ocean and away from the centre of their strategical interests.⁷⁸ But the NZCOS considered that (c) provided the most serious American objection to the ADB Report, for it withheld American naval support to the Shaded Area as well as the entire Eastern theatre. The NZCNS, W.E. Parry, advised the War Cabinet that, after previous consideration of the matter, he was convinced that "we [New Zealand] do not perhaps take sufficient account of the American point of view," he reported. "There is undoubtedly a feeling in Washington, that our [Australian-New Zealand] forces are being employed too much in a purely defensive role." The NZCNS then informed the War Cabinet that he had just dispatched a naval

appreciation to the ACNS suggesting that Australia and New Zealand revise their present naval strategy for phase I, involving the institution of escort convoys as recommended in the ADB Report, for a more offensive naval strategy, thereby conforming to American ideals. By adopting a more offensive naval strategy "it would show", the NZCNS suggested, "a more offensive spirit and perhaps encourage the U.S. authorities to adopt a more offensive attitude themselves."⁷⁹ The War Cabinet fully supported the suggestion of their NZCNS that Australia and New Zealand should adopt a more offensive naval strategy during phase I. They considered that "every effort should be made to meet the American point of view."⁸⁰ The War Cabinet and the NZCOS therefore agreed that Bailey should be given full authority at Washington to do all he could to meet American objections to the ADB Report.⁸¹ On 19 July Bailey was advised by Parry of the nature of the War Cabinet discussions the previous day, given his instructions, and then dispatched to Washington to take up his position as New Zealand's representative on the BMM. On that same day, in an endeavour to strengthen Bailey's efforts at Washington, Walter Nash informed the ministers at the New Zealand Supply Mission in Washington of the previous day's War Cabinet discussions. Nash advised Coates and Langstone that information just received from Australian naval authorities indicated that difficulty had arisen in obtaining American military concurrence to the ADB Report. The points raised by the Americans had been discussed by the War Cabinet. Bailey had the views of the New Zealand Government and of the NZCOS, and the Ministers were told to assist him in making those views known to the BMM. "It is obviously essential," Nash advised the Ministers, "that we should make every effort to go the American way...we must go the limit in accepting the American viewpoint in defence matters even if it means the sacrifice of some of our own cherished plans and concepts."⁸² The necessity for obtaining an agreed British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan was more forcibly hammered home to the Dominion Government by Japan's further move south four days later.

On 24 July Japanese troops marched into southern French Indo-China in final preparation for their southern offensive. As established policy, British, Dutch and American authorities reacted to this latest Japanese move in concert, by imposing economic embargoes upon Japan so as to deter any further Japanese advance south.⁸³ This latest Japanese move, however, also evoked an additional American response

which had significant implications for the development of a viable British-Dutch-American defence in the Far East. In this regard, the United States had responded to Japan's latest move by undertaking a major strategical re-adjustment with respect to the defences of the Philippine Islands. It now became accepted American military policy that the Philippine Islands would not only be held, but also serve as bases for offensive air operations against Japan. On 26 July General Douglas MacArthur was appointed Commander-in-Chief U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, and B-17 bombers began to cross the Central Pacific to the Philippines in ever increasing numbers, via Hawaii, Australia and the Netherlands East Indies (see Map II).⁸⁴ In effect, the United States was now beginning to re-assert its military position in the Far East, in conjunction with the British and Dutch, by reinforcing the Philippine Islands with land and air forces for defence and offensive air operations against Japan, as recommended in the ADB Report.

By 9 August Bailey had achieved notable success at Washington in impressing upon the BMM the views of the New Zealand Government concerning the ADB Report, particularly with regard to British naval strategy during phase I. Bailey informed Parry that the BMM had, upon his urgings, drawn up a number of recommendations which advocated a more offensive naval strategy for British naval forces during phase I, which was then forwarded to the UKCOS in London for consideration as a possible basis for closer agreement with the USCOS on the ADB Report. The recommendations envisaged an offensive naval strategy involving a more determined defence of the Malay Barrier, with Australian and New Zealand naval forces operating from Darwin, and possibly Noumea, New Caledonia. The recommendations were as follows:

- (1) Criticism of ADB naval dispositions justified in that nearly all United Kingdom, Australian and New Zealand naval forces are employed in the Indian Ocean, Australian and New Zealand trade routes in phase I;
- (2) On purely strategical grounds maximum available naval forces should be concentrated to carry out harrassing operations in phase I against Japanese naval forces and sea communications. These operations would be calculated to assist retention of Singapore as initial base for offensive operations in phase II, to in the meantime secure NEI and to indirectly protect sea communications by

pinning Japanese forces in the China Sea for protection of their own communications;

(3) United Kingdom and such U.S. forces as were allocated might operate from Singapore and Australian forces from Darwin if Singapore considered too remote from Australia. Available New Zealand ships would reinforce British forces of Australian concentrations;

(4) During phase I, restrictions of trade might have to be accepted as diversion of forces to escort duties must be kept to a minimum;

(5) Australia and New Zealand forces that could not be spared further North and West might be useful to operate from Noumea if Port Moresby-New Caledonia reconnaissance line is efficient. Attack on this chain consequently unlikely if U.S. Pacific Fleet moves south-west.⁸⁵

Bailey advised Parry that he considered these recommendations quite satisfactory "as it sets the ball rolling in the direction of a more offensive strategy".⁸⁶ Moreover, Bailey suggested to Parry that the support generated by the BMM for the recommendations should "strengthen your hand in dealing with Australia" for a revision of ANZAC war plans.⁸⁷ Armed with support from the New Zealand Government and the BMM, the NZCNS now sought to further inform the Australian naval authorities of the need to revise ANZAC naval strategy in order to conform to the American point of view. On 10 August Parry informed the ACNB of his intentions to call upon the ACNS, Admiral Sir Guy Royle, RN, to further discuss ANZAC war plans for phase I.⁸⁸ Having arrived in Melbourne on 15 August, Parry was "horrified to find out" that the Australian naval authorities had, upon hearing of the BMM recommendations, already replied with a "blank refusal" to alter their naval strategy.⁸⁹ Parry was also disturbed by the fact that Royle had literally torn up his recent naval appreciation which had also recommended a revision of ANZAC naval strategy for a more offensive role in order to meet the American point of view. As a further source of disappointment and embarrassment, Parry was also upset by Royle's efforts to avoid any prolonged discussion on the matter. After only a half hour discussion with Parry at the Navy Department, Royle "went sick" and left the Navy Department. As a result, Parry was forced to continue his discussions with the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, Captain F.E. Getting, RAN. Parry found Getting's views on the matter "very parochial" and the Deputy Chief generally ignorant of the seriousness of the disagreement with the Americans. Nevertheless, Getting agreed to assist Parry in making his views known.

to Royle. Together Getting and Parry paid a call upon Royle at his private residence in an attempt to discuss the matter further. This time, Parry found Royle more understanding but still unwilling to alter his basic position on ANZAC naval strategy for phase I. Although Royle recognized the importance to New Zealand of meeting the American point of view, he considered that he could not possibly advise the Australian War Cabinet to alter their naval strategy for phase I as recommended in the ADB Report. His estimation of the scale of attack within the Southwest Pacific and the Tasman Sea area in particular, accounted for his intransigent attitude. Royle considered that the scale of attack during phase I would include Japanese naval forces far heavier than armed merchant cruisers and, therefore, Australian and New Zealand naval forces should assume escort convoy duties immediately upon the outbreak of war with Japan, as agreed at Singapore. Parry voiced his disagreement with the Australian position and endeavoured to alter it. The NZCNS suggested that the scale of attack within the Southwest Pacific would not include heavier Japanese naval forces than armed merchant cruisers, as they would not be sent so far afield owing to major operations elsewhere. This opinion, Parry argued, was in accordance with the ADB Report which visualized the main Japanese attack falling upon Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies. Parry therefore suggested that it was ridiculous immediately to institute an escort convoy scheme on the outbreak of war with Japan until it was clearly necessary to do so. Instead, Australia and New Zealand should rely more upon the Australia-New Zealand air reconnaissance line and evasive routing for the protection of their shipping, at least until shipping losses did occur. Royle did not accept Parry's argument. Royle considered that, despite the opinion advanced at the Singapore conference, Japan could very easily spare a cruiser force to attack shipping in the Southwest Pacific, particularly in the Tasman Sea area, and at the same time carry out her major operations in the Far East. Moreover, Royle considered that a strategy of trade protection based upon the Australia-New Zealand air reconnaissance line and evasive routing would be ineffectual, owing largely to the lack of a sufficient number of suitable aircraft. The Australian Government, Royle argued, just would not accept the risks to their shipping by releasing part of their naval forces for operations in defence of the Malay Barrier. As it was, Royle argued, it was doubtful whether

Australia and New Zealand had sufficient naval forces to provide strong enough convoys. Royle, therefore, insisted that Australia and New Zealand naval forces assume escort convoy duties within the Southwest Pacific immediately upon the outbreak of war with Japan. Royle did accept, however, that the situation would be quite different if either of two conditions did arise: (1) if the operations of the U.S. Pacific fleet, by attacking the Marshall and Caroline Islands, did reduce the scale of attack within the Southwest Pacific, as recognized as a possibility in the ADB Report; or (2) if U.S. ships would replace British (Australian and New Zealand) ships as convoy escorts for the protection of shipping within New Zealand's focal shipping areas. If either of these conditions pertained, Royle assured Parry he would then recommend to the Australian Government that an Australian naval force be deployed, possibly at Darwin, "for the defence of the Malay Barrier", as the Americans were urging. Feeling that he had done all that could be done "to meet the American point of view", Parry did not press the matter further with Royle but, instead took the opportunity to continue his discussions on other matters with the Australian Navy Department while in Melbourne.⁹⁰ Upon his arrival back in Wellington, Parry received a report from Bailey in Washington which, undoubtedly, gave the NZCNS some hope that the Americans might now accept the ADB Report. On 23 August Bailey informed Parry that, as a result of a recent Anglo-American conference, "it is understood that ADB differences have been largely settled." Bailey then advised Parry that he expected to be in a position to confirm and amplify on this matter in the very near future.⁹¹

The Anglo-American Conference which had interrupted for a time the flow of American criticisms of the ADB Report was the Atlantic Conference held, from 9th to 12th August, on board the USS Augusta and HMS Prince of Wales in Argentia harbour, Newfoundland.⁹² Although the conference was convened in order to deal principally with political matters between Churchill and Roosevelt, military discussions were also held between their respective military advisers. During those military discussions the UKCOS attempted to bring the ADB Report into line with the ABC-1 Report, which the USCOS regarded as their "bible". "With the exception of initial dispositions of British Naval forces", the main points on which the USCOS had earlier expressed their disapproval with the ADB Report were cleared up.⁹³ On that basis, the UKCOS immediately following the Atlantic Conference

drew up a revision of the ADB Report, entitled ADB-2, in London. On 29 August the UKCOS advised the BMM at Washington that, as a result of recent discussions between the UKCOS and the USCOS, a re-draft of the ADB Report had been made for approval by the USCOS. The UKCOS then informed the BMM of the major changes made to the ADB Report.⁹⁴ This information was then passed on to New Zealand by the Dominion's representative on the BMM at Washington.

On 3 September Bailey informed Parry that in reference to his earlier telegram, the ADB Report had been redrafted and would be sent to concerned defence authorities in due time for early approval. Bailey then advised the NZCNS of the major changes made to the ADB Report, namely:

(1) With regard to the USCOS's objection to political matters within the Report, "all political matters have been extracted and placed in an Appendix as recommendations by military authorities for submission to and discussion by the respective governments."

(2) With regard to the USCOS's objection to the strategical scope of the Report, "it has been made clear that there is no intention of employing U.S. ships [U.S. Asiatic fleet] beyond the southern or western limit" of the Far East Area "except in exceptional military circumstances."

(3) Regarding objections to British naval dispositions, the importance of providing as much naval strength in the Far East Area "as can be spared from trade protection" was emphasized in the revised Report. Moreover, the revised Report "confirms" that British naval reinforcements for the Far East and Australia and New Zealand Areas will be made, as agreed in the ABC-1 Report.⁹⁵

Added to this already encouraging information, Bailey also informed Parry that the Americans were now offering Australian authorities the necessary equipment and material for the establishment of a defended naval base at Rabaul in order to insure the execution of the U.S. Pacific Fleet's task in the Shaded Area during the initial stages of war with Japan. In the later stages of such a war, Rabaul would also serve as a base for a considerable American naval force operating against the Caroline Islands.⁹⁶ This information, which passed through governmental channels, undoubtedly raised hopes within the Dominion that the ADB-2 Report would be accepted by American military authorities. If such was the case, it was quickly dispelled by Prime Minister Peter Fraser, upon his return to New Zealand.

Arriving in New Zealand on 13 September from a global tour which included the United States,⁹⁷ Fraser informed his government and military advisers that "he had heard much criticism", while in Washington, of British naval dispositions for their lack of support in defence of the Malay Barrier.⁹⁸ In addition, the written information brought by Fraser from Washington, which consisted of recent BMM papers, clearly indicated that the ADB-2 Report did not entail any re-adjustment of British naval dispositions for phase I.⁹⁹ It was now obvious to the New Zealand Government that the principal American objection to the ADB Report—British naval dispositions—had not been revised to meet the American point of view. This belief was substantiated by a report received by Bailey in Washington on 20 September, which indicated that "ADB-2 seems to be hanging fire", and advised the NZCNS that he was attempting to settle the differences between American and Australian military authorities over that Report on the basis of the ACNS's two possible conditions¹⁰⁰ for ANZAC naval support in defence of the Malay Barrier.¹⁰¹ On 2 October the War Cabinet was called into session in order to review the matter. Fraser expressed his full agreement with the War Cabinet's earlier efforts, during his overseas absence, in "trying to meet the Americans in every possible way" with regard to the ADB Report. In particular, Fraser endorsed the War Cabinet's earlier efforts to arrange for a combined Australian and New Zealand naval force to operate in defence of the Malay Barrier, even if it entailed a risk to shipping in the Southwest Pacific.¹⁰² With regard to the present situation, all present feared that the Americans would reject the ACNS's two possible conditions, and, ultimately, the ABC-2 Report. In order to forestall this possible development, the War Cabinet examined the possibility of providing a suitable basis for ANZAC-American agreement on naval dispositions for phase I. Should the Americans reject the ACNS's two possible conditions, Parry suggested to the War Cabinet a compromise proposal, as earlier proposed to Parry by Bailey in Washington should "Australian doggedness" persist.¹⁰³ New Zealand should then unilaterally offer to deploy one or both of her two cruisers in a more offensive position for the defence of the Malay Barrier if Australia and/or the United States would undertake trade protection in the vicinity of New Zealand's focal shipping areas to any degree agreed as necessary. The War Cabinet approved this compromise proposal. As suggested by Bailey, the proposal would be a last-ditch effort to

meet the American point of view with regard to the ADB-2 Report should the Americans reject the ACNS's two possible conditions for ANZAC naval support in defence of the Malay Barrier. Even then the War Cabinet, undoubtedly, must have had doubts concerning its approval. Australian authorities would hardly accept any less defence measure than escort protection for their shipping in New Zealand's focal shipping areas, nor would the Americans be willing to accept any such commitment for trade protection in that area until it was proven to be absolutely necessary. On 3 October Parry advised Bailey that the War Cabinet had approved his compromise proposal, should the military discussions in Washington warrant it.¹⁰⁴ Having done its utmost to meet the American point of view, the Dominion anxiously awaited word from Washington on further American reactions to the ADB-2 Report.

After an exchange of letters and conversations between the USCOS and the BMM in the early weeks of October, the USCOS finally rejected the ADB-2 Report. The principal reason was the unwillingness of the British and Australian authorities to modify their naval dispositions for a more offensive role in the defence of the Malay Barrier. On 12 October New Zealand received word of the American rejection of the ADB-2 Report. Bailey informed the NZCNS that "the United States propose to take no further action on ADB-2." "Chief criticisms of the report", Bailey advised Parry, "are thinness of naval forces allocated to the defence of the Malay barrier and the fact that the Commander-in-Chief, China, although nominally the controlling strategical authority of the Eastern Theatre is, in fact, nothing of the sort", as exemplified by the "ACNB refusal" to release any of their naval forces to the Commander-in-Chief, China. With regard to ANZAC-American military discussions, the Americans had refused to undertake a definite commitment for trade protection (i.e., escort duties) even if Australia and/or New Zealand moved their cruisers to the Malay Barrier. The USCOS considered, Bailey informed the NZCNS, that the U.S. Pacific Fleet, which would take immediate action against the Marshall and Caroline Islands, would certainly reduce the scale of attack within Australia and New Zealand focal shipping areas. The BMM was now advising London, Bailey assured Parry, on the proper line to be taken now with regard to the development of an acceptable combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence

plan.¹⁰⁵ Despite this most disappointing information, the New Zealand Government did not give up hope that an acceptable combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan would emerge. Awaiting a "solution" to the problem from London, New Zealand turned its attention towards further strengthening the basis for a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence.

On 24 October, New Zealand was informed by the American Government, through its Consul-General in Wellington, that the U.S. War Department had now reached the conclusion that it was "imperative" that there be immediately established an air reinforcement route between Hawaii and the Philippine Islands, via the South Pacific. The New Zealand Government was further informed that the air reinforcement scheme contemplated by the U.S. War Department involved the construction of air bases for heavy bombers (B-17) along the southern route: Palmyra-Canton-Tutuila-Fiji-New Hebrides-New Caledonia-Rockhampton-Darwin-Celebes or Ambon-Ceram-Davao-Manila. Such a southern route, it was understood by all concerned, would provide for greater security to American air reinforcements to the Philippine Islands than the existing American Central Pacific air reinforcement route which passed between the Japanese-held Marshall and Caroline Islands (see Map II). Assistance by New Zealand was then requested by the American Government in the fulfilment of the project.¹⁰⁶ The New Zealand Government was anxious to assist in any project which brought American power directly into her immediate area and, at the same time, contributed to a general strengthening of a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence. The New Zealand Government, therefore, immediately informed the American Government that they would "be most happy to do anything within their power to further the project."¹⁰⁷ After further consultation with American authorities, the New Zealand Government undertook immediately to improve and establish additional air bases in the Fiji Islands, thereby providing for what was considered as "possibly the most vital link" in the American Southern Reinforcement Route.¹⁰⁸ Meanwhile in London, British authorities had decided upon a possible solution to the problem of a combined British-Dutch-American defence plan: a British fleet for Singapore.

iv Fresh Efforts to Achieve a Combined Pacific Defence Plan

In response to the American rejection of the ADB-2 Report, the BMM in Washington had advised London on 11 October immediately to reinforce the Far East and Australia and New Zealand Area with British naval forces in accordance with the programme set down in the ABC-1 Report.¹⁰⁹ This recommendation was the BMM solution to the problem of a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan. Additional British naval forces for the area, the BMM recognized, would allow for a British defence of the Malay Barrier as well as a British defence of vital sea communications within the Far Eastern theatre. In addition, the forming of a British fleet in the area would virtually cancel the phase I period in British-Dutch-American planning and thereby necessitate the development of new war plans in order to meet phase II conditions—offensive action by a British fleet. The BMM recommendation, however, was contrary to existing Admiralty plans. The question of British naval reinforcements for the area had been raised before by the British Prime Minister immediately following the Atlantic Conference. In a memorandum to the First Sea Lord on 25 August, Churchill had suggested to Admiral Sir Dudley Pound that one of the new King George the Fifth class battleships should be promptly dispatched to Singapore as the vanguard of a small but powerful fleet to be formed there by the end of October, 1941.¹¹⁰ This policy greatly appealed to Churchill not only for its assumed deterrent effect upon possible Japanese actions but also as a concrete demonstration to the United States of Britain's intentions to meet her strategic responsibility in the Pacific. The Admiralty, however, was thoroughly opposed to the proposal. In reply to the British Prime Minister's memorandum, the First Sea Lord had informed Churchill that the Admiralty's plans were to form a much larger fleet at Trincomalee, not Singapore, by April, 1942. The Admiralty's plans were greatly influenced by their views concerning the probable scale of Japanese attack within the Far East Area and the vulnerability of the Singapore naval base to that attack.¹¹¹ "Until we can form a fleet in the Far East which is capable of meeting a Japanese force of the strength they are likely to send south", Admiral Pound advised Churchill, "it is necessary to deter Japanese action in the Indian Ocean." Any lesser British naval force formed at Singapore, the First Sea Lord stated, "would have to retire to Trincomalee" if war did eventuate with Japan.¹¹²

Due to strong Admiralty opposition, therefore, the matter was put aside by Churchill. However, the BMM recommendation, together with a recommendation from the Foreign Office on 16 October that British capital ships be sent to the Far East as a deterrent to possible Japanese action resulting from the fall of the Konoye Government,¹¹³ strengthened Churchill's position and gave urgency to the need for a decision on the matter. At a meeting of the Defence Committee on 17 October, Churchill repeated his previous suggestion made to the First Sea Lord on 25 August. Churchill then reminded the Defence Committee that the battleship Repulse was already in the Indian Ocean and suggested that "no time should be lost in sending the Prince of Wales a King George the Fifth class battleship to join up with her at Singapore." The Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, supported Churchill's proposal, and further suggested that "if the Prince of Wales were to call at Capetown on her way to the Far East, news of her movements would quickly reach Japan and the deterrent effect would begin." Churchill then invited the First Lord of the Admiralty, Albert V. Alexander, to consider the proposal. "In view of the strong feeling in the committee in favour of the proposal", Churchill hoped "the Admiralty would not oppose the suggestion." Alexander agreed to discuss the matter with the First Sea Lord, Admiral Pound, and to make recommendations in a few days' time.¹¹⁴ The Admiralty, however, was still reluctant to revise their plans but were gradually forced to do so by continued pressure from the British Prime Minister and Foreign Office. Discussion on the matter was resumed at a Defence Committee meeting on 20 October, with Admiral Pound in attendance. Swayed by pressure from Churchill and Eden, Admiral Pound agreed that the report of the arrival of the Prince of Wales at Capetown would have a great deterrent value. Admiral Pound yielded so far as to suggest that she should sail forthwith for that port, and that a final decision on the matter could then be taken when she arrived there. This suggestion was adopted by the Defence Committee. On the following day the Admiralty informed all British Naval Commands that the Prince of Wales would leave shortly for Singapore, and on 24 October Admiral Sir Tom Phillips was appointed Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet. The next day he left for Singapore, via Capetown, aboard his flagship, the Prince of Wales.¹¹⁵ Pressed as to future Admiralty plans, Admiral Pound informed Churchill, on 1 November that he intended "to review the situation generally just before the Prince of Wales reaches Capetown." However, on 11 November, just before the Prince of

Wales reached Capetown, the Admiralty ordered the Prince of Wales and Repulse to meet in Ceylon and then proceed in company to Singapore.¹¹⁶ The Admiralty had therefore completely yielded to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Office by that time.¹¹⁷ As Churchill later wrote of the British decision:

It was decided...to let the two fast capital ships go forward, in the hope of steadying the Japanese political situation, and also to be in relation to the United States Pacific Fleet. Our general naval policy was to build up under the remote cover of the main American fleet in the Pacific a British Eastern Fleet based on Singapore, which by the spring of 1942 would comprise seven capital ships of varying quality, one first-class aircraft-carrier, ten cruisers, and twenty-four destroyers.¹¹⁸

The British decision to establish a fleet at Singapore before the outbreak of war with Japan had therefore been prompted by both a British belief in the deterrent effect upon Japan and the hope of securing an early agreement with the United States on a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan. In this latter regard, the British decision was correct for it demonstrated to the United States that Britain intended to meet her strategic responsibility in the Pacific, in accordance with the Washington Agreement. In order to do so, however, the British Government clearly recognized the vital need for obtaining Australian and New Zealand co-operation in development of a new war plan on the basis of the ABC-1 Report. On 7 November the Australian and New Zealand Governments were informed of the British decision to form an Eastern Fleet in the hope of finally reaching an accord with the United States on a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan. The Revenge, Repulse, Prince of Wales, Royal Sovereign, Ramillies and Resolution, the Dominions were informed, would be sent to the Far East by December, 1941, to form the capital ship force of the projected Eastern Fleet. Admiral Sir Tom Phillips had been selected as Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, and had already sailed for Singapore. Upon her arrival at Singapore, a conference would be convened by British naval authorities so as to decide what British naval forces would be made available to the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, in his future planning with American authorities. It was hoped that a new conference would be held with the Americans in order to draw up a new combined British-

Dutch-American Pacific defence plan, as American agreement to neither ADB-1 nor ADB-2 had been obtained and it was necessary to make a fresh start. A preliminary British conference at Singapore was therefore suggested in order to determine what British naval forces (United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand) would be made available for the defence of the Malay Barrier, before meeting the Americans in a new conference. Deeply desirous of Dominion naval co-operation in this regard, the British Government expressed the hope that "we may count on the full co-operation" of the Australian and New Zealand Governments "in facilitation of the new Commander-in-Chief's tasks."¹¹⁹ On 11 November the Australian Government cabled to the British Government its "assurances of full co-operation with Admiral Phillips in his responsible task."¹²⁰ Likewise, the New Zealand Government on 13 November, informed the British Government that they welcomed the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, and wished to assure him of their full co-operation.¹²¹ Recognizing the vital importance of co-operation with the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, in his future planning with American authorities, the New Zealand War Cabinet had, on the same day, instructed W.E. Parry, NZCNS, to attend the preliminary Singapore conference.¹²² In addition, the War Cabinet had also empowered Parry to offer Admiral Phillips both of New Zealand's cruisers, if need be, in order to meet the American point of view in the development of a new combined Pacific defence plan.¹²³

Meanwhile, the Admiralty had successfully obtained American agreement to the convening of a further Far East conference for the drafting of a new combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan. On 5 November the First Sea Lord, Admiral Pound, informed Admiral Stark, USCNO, that the naval situation in the Far East had been under recent review by the Admiralty and they agreed that they were able to start forming the nucleus of an Eastern Fleet, a British capital ship force, in the Far East before the outbreak of war with Japan and "thus reduce the difference between phase 1 and phase 2 in ADB-1." The Repulse and Revenge were already in the Indian Ocean, Pound informed Stark, and the Prince of Wales with Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, was on passage out. In addition, the Royal Sovereign and the Ramillies would leave in November and the Resolution in December, 1941. Pound then

expressed hope that American naval authorities would provide additional destroyers for the Eastern Fleet and consider basing the British capital ship force at Manila, instead of Singapore, for security reasons. With regard to a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan, Pound advised Stark that he did not "consider that either ADB-1 or ADB-2 meet the new conditions", and suggested that the need for a further conference to draw up a new combined Pacific defence plan based "afresh on ABC-1" had now become urgent. Pound then proposed that the conference be held in the Far East, possibly Singapore. "If you agree in principle to the abandonment of further discussions on ADB-1 and ADB-2 and to the holding of a fresh conference on the bases of ABC-1," Pound concluded, "we can then proceed to discuss agenda."¹²⁴ It now appeared to American military authorities that Britain intended to meet her strategic responsibilities in the Pacific, as agreed in the ABC-1 Report, and for that reason Pound received the favourable response the British Government had obviously hoped to obtain. On 7 November Stark informed Pound that he considered the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, "has been a most effective step" and deemed "it desirable that all British naval forces United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand in the Eastern theatre should be made integral parts" of the Eastern Fleet. The "Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, would then be responsible", Stark advised Pound, "for the distribution of forces between subordinate United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand commanders after the needs of the Far East area had been satisfied." Stark then informed Pound that the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, would be willing to contribute two divisions of destroyers to the Eastern Fleet, and that Manila would not be a proper place to base the British capital ship force since it was suitable for use by light naval forces only. With regard to a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan, Stark fully agreed with Pound "that ADB should not be revived" and that ABC-1 was an adequate directive "which should be implemented by a strategic operating plan." Stark also considered that the principle of mutual co-operation between British and American forces should apply, rather than unity of command. The plan should be developed in the Far East between Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet.¹²⁵

These preliminary exchanges between Admirals Pound and Stark were then followed by further exchanges between the USCOS and UKCOS which thrashed out in greater detail the basis and procedure for producing a new combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan. On 13 November the USCOS, acknowledging Admiral Pound's communication of 5 November to the USCNO, "cordially" concurred in the British decision to dispatch a British capital ship force to the Far East and trusted that those important naval reinforcements would be augmented by a British aircraft-carrier and cruisers (British and Dominion) and placed under the strategic control of the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet. The USCOS agreed that "ADB-1 and ADB-2 do not meet the new conditions about to be established in the Far East," and suggested that the ABC-1 Report, with minor revisions,¹²⁶ was an appropriate major directive upon which a new combined Pacific defence plan should be based. The USCOS also confirmed that the plan should be based upon mutual co-operation rather than unity of command, and that no detailed agenda be established for the conference in order that the "responsible officers on the spot military commanders may feel free to solve their own problems, subject to the minimum interference from above." The USCOS then proposed a possible procedure for developing a new combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan: (a) that Admiral Phillips, Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, and Admiral Hart, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, meet in conference at Manila in order to agree upon the broad outlines of a joint Anglo-American naval operational plan, after appropriate preliminary conferences with other military commanders of their own nationalities at Singapore and Manila; and (b) that a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan then be prepared at a later conference at Manila, Singapore or Batavia.¹²⁷ On 26 November the UKCOS informed the USCOS that they accepted their proposals for developing a new combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan and that the Pacific Dominions would be informed accordingly.¹²⁸ Time, however, was now one of the most important elements for the successful development of such a war plan. American and British authorities, well aware that Japanese military preparations for a southern offensive were working towards a pre-determined date, clearly understood that this was, indeed, their period of eleventh hour planning.

v The Eleventh Hour

The Prince of Wales and Repulse, with their four-destroyer escort, reached Singapore on 2 December. Admiral Phillips, on Admiralty instructions, had flown from Colombo to Singapore in advance of the naval force on 29 November, and after briefly conferring with Admiral Layton, Commander-in-Chief, China Station,¹²⁹ flew on to Manila, where he arrived on 5 December for his conference with Admiral Hart, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet.¹³⁰ After a full day of discussions, the two came to an agreement on 6 December on the broad outlines of a joint Anglo-American naval operational plan. (Appendix D), as the basis for a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan. Both Phillips and Hart agreed on the "great importance to prevent any Japanese movement through the Malay Barrier." The naval dispositions agreed upon for the vital purpose were:

(a) British battle fleet to be based upon Singapore and operate as required from there as a striking force in connection with any Japanese movement in the China seas, Netherlands East Indies and through the Malay Barrier.

(b) A cruiser striking force to be based on East Borneo-Surabaya-Darwin area in order to act as a striking force in connection with air reconnaissance. This force could also provide cover and when necessary, escort for convoys within the Netherlands East Indies and Philippine area or for an occasional important convoy from Australia to Singapore.

(c) "Minimum cruiser force" should be maintained in the Australia-New Zealand area to deal with a moderate scale of raider attack or escort important convoys.

(d) "Minimum cruiser force" to be maintained in the Indian Ocean to escort important trade.

The actual dispositions of British, Dutch and American naval forces to give effect to the agreed defence policy—defence of the Malay Barrier—was then drawn up by Phillips and Hart. They were:

Singapore

Battleships: Prince of Wales, Repulse, Revenge, Royal Sovereign (UK).

Cruisers: Mauritius (UK), Achilles (NZ), Tromp (Dutch), de Ruyter (Dutch), and possibly Australia and Hobart (Australia).

Destroyers: ten British, six Dutch, four American.

East Borneo-Surabaya-Darwin Area

Cruisers: Houston (US), Marblehead (US), Cornwall (Dutch), Java (Dutch).

Destroyers: four American.

Australasia (Australia-New Zealand area)

Cruisers: Australia or Canberra (Australia), Perth (Australia), Leander (NZ), and three armed merchant cruisers.

Indian Ocean

Cruisers: Exeter (UK), Glasgow (UK), nine of the older "C", "D" and "E" class cruisers and five armed merchant cruisers.

Having laid down British-Dutch-American naval dispositions for the defence of the Malay Barrier in the Far East Area,¹³¹ Phillips and Hart considered that action in that area should be co-ordinated as closely as possible with the movements of the U.S. Pacific fleet. Both Far East commanders therefore agreed that the timetable, as visualized in the American RAINBOW 5 plan, for the U.S. Pacific Fleet's westward advance through the Marshall and Caroline Islands, should be made known for more detailed planning. Hart and Phillips further considered that it was impracticable at the time to establish a joint Anglo-American Headquarters in the Pacific, and that strategic control should remain "with the respective British-American Commanders in Chief", who would work together "under the principle of mutual co-operation." Hart and Phillips then concluded their agreement by expressing the hope that if the agreed naval plan was accepted "in principle by Dutch, Australian and New Zealand authorities in consultation with British Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, next week, then all that remains to do in the way of conference is the perfection of details by our respective staffs."¹³²

Having completed his discussions with Hart, Admiral Phillips left Manila for Singapore, arriving there on 7 December. In an effort to hasten the development of a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan, Phillips then held discussions with the ACNS, Admiral Royle, and the NZCNS, Commodore W.E. Parry, in order to obtain their support in the formation of an Eastern Fleet for the defence of the Malay Barrier, as recommended in the Hart-Phillips Agreement. The NZCNS informed Phillips that the New Zealand

War Cabinet had already agreed to assist the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, in his discussions with the Americans, by releasing to him if need be, both of the Dominion's cruisers. Parry then advised Phillips that, in view of his instructions from the War Cabinet, he was confident that they would release the Achilles to the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet as recommended in the Hart-Phillips Agreement. A telegram was then dispatched to the New Zealand Government by Parry which requested authorization to release Achilles to the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, and on that same day, Parry received the necessary authorization from the New Zealand Government. Admiral Phillips was greatly encouraged by the New Zealand Government's co-operation and advised Parry to express his "very warmest appreciation" to the Dominion Government for their prompt reply. The ACNS then advised Phillips of the Australian point of view with regard to assisting in the formation of an Eastern Fleet for the defence of the Malay Barrier, as recommended in the Hart-Phillips Agreement. Royle informed Phillips that despite the British decision to base a British battle fleet at Singapore, the Australian Government considered that all their naval units would be needed to meet Australian commitments in the Southwest Pacific, and therefore was "disinclined to spare any of their cruisers to co-operate with the Eastern Fleet." Admiral Phillips fully appreciated the Australian point of view and agreed that existing Australian naval forces were certainly not "an over-insurance" for Australian commitments. However, the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, pointed out that the British Empire was faced with a situation in which it had inadequate naval forces all over the world, and that the Empire had to do its best to deploy them for the most essential operations. A compromise was finally reached between Phillips and Royle whereby the latter agreed to ask the Australian Government whether a single cruiser, HMAS Hobart, could be released to the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, for operations in defence of the Malay Barrier, in conjunction with a cruiser striking force, from Port Darwin.¹³³ A telegram was then dispatched to the Australian Government by Royle on the following day, 8 December, 1941.¹³⁴

However, before a reply was received from the Australian Government and further action could be taken on the matter, Japan had launched her southern offensive. The event which had been anticipated during those fourteen months of joint Anglo-American

planning had finally happened, and despite this, British and American authorities were still without a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan. The general Pacific war, however, would quickly bring out of dire necessity a solution to the many problems which had previously confronted British and American planners in their efforts to effect the development of a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence.

Footnotes

- ¹Jones, *Japan's New Order in East Asia*, p. 246; Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, p. 207.
- ²Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, p. 64.
- ³*Ibid.*, p. 65.
- ⁴Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, Vol. II, (London: Hadden and Straughton, 1948), p. 1009.
- ⁵Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 92.
- ⁶Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, p. 632.
- ⁷*Ibid.*
- ⁸Kirby, *Singapore: The Chain of Disaster*, p. 79.
- ⁹Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, pp. 211-215; Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 93.
- ¹⁰Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, pp. 215-216.
- ¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 216.
- ¹²Jones, *Japan's New Order in East Asia*, pp. 261-262.
- ¹³*Ibid.*, pp. 264-265; Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, p. 651.
- ¹⁴Watson, *Chiefs of Staff*, pp. 434-441.
- ¹⁵This was the first time that the Japanese Navy had weakened in their opposition to a war which might involve the United States, and, as such, reflected the Navy's gradual re-alignment of support from the moderate to the extremist position within the Japanese Government.
- ¹⁶Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, pp. 71-72.
- ¹⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 73-74; Jones, *Japan's New Order in East Asia*, pp. 283-284.
- ¹⁸Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, p. 74.
- ¹⁹Jones, *Japan's New Order in East Asia*, pp. 286-287.
- ²⁰Morton, *Strategy and Command*, pp. 105-108; Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, pp. 89-93.
- ²¹Jones, *Japan's New Order in East Asia*, pp. 287-288.
- ²²Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 114.
- ²³Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, p. 74.
- ²⁴Jones, *Japan's New Order in East Asia*, p. 289.

- ²⁵Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, Vol. II, p. 1033.
- ²⁶Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 114.
- ²⁷Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of the War*, pp. 296-300.
- ²⁸Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, pp. 291-295, 309; Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, pp. 83-84.
- ²⁹Jones, *Japan's New Order in East Asia*, p. 300.
- ³⁰Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, p. 93.
- ³¹Morton, *Strategy and Command*, pp. 116-117.
- ³²Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, pp. 86-87.
- ³³Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, pp. 865-866.
- ³⁴Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, p. 87.
- ³⁵Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, p. 884.
- ³⁶Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, pp. 87-88; Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, pp. 884-901.
- ³⁷Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, p. 906; Jones, *Japan's New Order in East Asia*, p. 317.
- ³⁸Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of the War*, p. 344.
- ³⁹Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, p. 908.
- ⁴⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 909-910.
- ⁴¹Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, p. 330.
- ⁴²Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 122.
- ⁴³American-Dutch-British Conversations, Singapore, April, 1941, Report, PM 81/10/13 (2).
- ⁴⁴*Ibid.*, paragraphs 1, 4.
- ⁴⁵During the course of the conference, the American delegation consistently endeavoured to discourage British expectations that: (1) American forces in the Philippine Islands would be strengthened; (2) there would be any determined American defence of the Philippine Islands beyond the Manila area, and (3) that Luzon would serve as a base for offensive air operations against Japan by American forces. Watson, *Chiefs of Staff*, p. 395.
- ⁴⁶American-Dutch-British Conversations, Singapore, April, 1941, Report, paragraphs 21, 29, PM 81/10/13 (2).
- ⁴⁷*Ibid.*, paragraphs 11-25.
- ⁴⁸*Ibid.*, paragraph 26.

- ⁴⁹*Supra*, pp. 174-175.
- ⁵⁰American-Dutch-British Conversations, Singapore, April, 1941, Report, paragraphs 3A, 34.
- ⁵¹*Ibid.*, paragraph 69.
- ⁵²*Ibid.*, Appendix II (System of Air Reinforcement).
- ⁵³*Ibid.*, paragraph 41.
- ⁵⁴*Ibid.*, paragraph 42.
- ⁵⁵*Ibid.*, paragraph 41.
- ⁵⁶*Ibid.*, paragraphs 43-49, Appendix I (List of Initial Dispositions and Functions of Naval Forces).
- ⁵⁷*Ibid.*, paragraphs 61, 62, 64.
- ⁵⁸Prime Minister Peter Fraser had left New Zealand in early May, 1941, for a tour of Australia, the Middle East, the United Kingdom and the United States. He returned to New Zealand in mid-September, 1941.
- ⁵⁹Acting PM NZ to SSDA, PMA, 21 May, 1941, PM 86/1/9. The Australian Government, likewise, accepted the ABC-1 and ADB Reports. Acting PMA to PMNZ, SSDA, 23 May, 1941, PM 86/1/9.
- ⁶⁰Acting PMNZ to Acting PMA, 14 May, 1941, Air 130/3/2.
- ⁶¹Acting PMA to Acting PMNZ, 24 May, 1941, Air 130/3/2.
- ⁶²SSDA to UKHC, Wellington, 29 May, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (1).
- ⁶³Robert Firth, Washington to PMNZ, 29 May, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (1).
- ⁶⁴UKHC, Wellington, to SSDA, 31 May, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (1).
- ⁶⁵PMA to SSDA, PMNZ, 5 June, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (2). Like the British and New Zealand Governments, the Australian Government also confirmed that CINCPAC would have to deal with the British Commander-in-Chief, China Station, on general strategical matters relating to the Shaded Area, in view of the position of the British Commander-in-Chief, China Station, as principal strategic authority within the Eastern theatre.
- ⁶⁶The delay was due to a failure in the transmission of the Report from Manila to Washington. Instead of being dispatched by air all the way to Washington as planned, the Report was intercepted at San Francisco and retransmitted by a "slow boat" to Washington until intercepted and retransmitted by air from the Panama Canal to Washington. American authorities, therefore, had to rely upon a summary of the ADB Report, provided by the BMM in Washington until receipt of the full Report on 9 June, 1941. Watson, *Chiefs of Staff*, pp. 395-396.
- ⁶⁷R.J. Bailey, Australian-New Zealand Pacific Fleet Co-operation, 28 June 1941, NA 030/68/4 (1).

- ⁶⁸Topic 34, Memo for PM Department from NZCNS, 9 July, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (1).
- ⁶⁹On 15 June, 1941, the Admiralty had already informed New Zealand that the UKCOS were in general agreement with the ADB Report and that ratification by the British Government would follow receipt of the full report. The UKCOS, however, added some "amendments" to the Report which were transmitted to the various governments concerned. The most significant of those amendments dealt with command arrangements within the Eastern theatre: upon the arrival of an "Eastern Fleet" to Singapore, strategical command of the Eastern theatre would then pass from the British Commander-in-Chief, China Station, to the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet. Admiralty to NZNB, ACNB, 15 June, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (1).
- ⁷⁰New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs, *Documents*, III, pp. 35-38, 47.
- ⁷¹In May, 1941, a New Zealand Supply Mission had been established in Washington in order to handle New Zealand's procurements under the Lend-Lease Act and formed part of the British Supply Mission. PM 62/3/7.
- ⁷²British Ambassador, Washington to PMNZ, "from J.G. Coates", 30 May, 1941, PM 62/3/9.
- ⁷³Acting PMNZ to PMNZ (London), 15 July, 1941, AD 290/1/1.
- ⁷⁴NZCNS to Bailey, 16 July, 1941, PM 62/3/9.
- ⁷⁵Memo for Lt Commander R.J. Bailey from W.E. Parry, NZCNS, 19 July, 1941, PM 86/1/9.
- ⁷⁶Topic 34, Memo for PM Department from NZCNS, 9 July, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (1).
- ⁷⁷Notes by NZCNS on Topic 34 in preparation for War Cabinet meeting, 18 July, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (1).
- ⁷⁸Memo for Lt Commander R.J. Bailey from W.E. Parry, NZCNS, 19 July, 1941, PM 86/1/9.
- ⁷⁹Notes by NZCNS on Topic 34 in preparation for War Cabinet meeting, 18 July, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (1).
- ⁸⁰Memo for Lt Commander R.J. Bailey from W.E. Parry, NZCNS, 19 July, 1941, PM 86/1/9.
- ⁸¹NZCNS, W.E. Parry to Commander E.K.H. St Aubyn, Commander-in-Chief, China Office, 21 July, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (1).
- ⁸²Acting PMNZ to Rangi, Washington (NZ Supply Mission), "Notes to Coates and Langstone", 19 July, 1941, PM 86/1/9.
- ⁸³Jones, *Japan's New Order in East Asia*, p. 262.
- ⁸⁴Watson, *Chiefs of Staff*, pp. 434-441; W.F. Craven and J.L. Cate, *Army Air Forces in World War II*, Vol. I: *Plans and Early Operations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 177-179.

- ⁸⁵Rangi, Washington (NZ Supply Mission) to Acting PMNZ, "Bailey to NZCNS", 9 August, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (1).
- ⁸⁶*Ibid.*
- ⁸⁷Memorandum for Chief of Naval Staff, Bailey to Parry, NZCNS, 9 August, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (1).
- ⁸⁸NZNB to ACNB, 10 August, NA 030/68/4 (1).
- ⁸⁹Notes by NZCNS on his visit to Australia, 15-22 August, 1941, N.D., NA 030/68/4 (2); NZCNS to Bailey, NZ Supply Mission, Washington, 29 August, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).
- ⁹⁰*Ibid.* The ACNS's two possible conditions for ANZAC naval support in defence of the Malay Barrier were, subsequently proposed to CINCPAC via his British Liaison Officer, C.R.L. Parry, R.N. C.R.L. Parry to CINCPAC, Hawaii, 2 September, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).
- ⁹¹Rangi, Washington (NZ Supply Mission) to Acting PMNZ, "Bailey to NZCNS", 23 August, 1941, 81/10/13 (2).
- ⁹²Watson, *Chiefs of Staff*, pp. 400-401; Conn and Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defence*, p. 133.
- ⁹³Summary of British-American COS Discussions at recent Conference at Sea, Admiralty to B.A.D., Washington, "UKCOS to BMM", 23 August, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).
- ⁹⁴Admiralty to B.A.D., Washington, "UKCOS to BMM", 29 August, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).
- ⁹⁵Rangi, Washington (NZ Supply Mission) to Acting PMNZ, "Bailey to NZCNS", 3 September, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).
- ⁹⁶Rangi, Washington (NZ Supply Mission) to Acting PMNZ, "Bailey to NZCNS", 3 September, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).
- ⁹⁷New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs, *Documents*, III, p. 34.
- ⁹⁸W.E. Parry, NZCNS to Commander E.K.H. St Aubyn, Commander-in-Chief, China Office, 3 October, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).
- ⁹⁹ADB Report, Memorandum for PM Department from NZCNS, 3 October, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).
- ¹⁰⁰*Supra*, p. 235.
- ¹⁰¹Rangi, Washington (NZ Supply Mission) to PMNZ, "Bailey to NZCNS", 20 September, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).
- ¹⁰²NZCNS, W.E. Parry to Vice-Admiral Sir Guy Royle, Department of the Navy, Melbourne, 3 October, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).
- ¹⁰³Rangi, Washington (NZ Supply Mission) to PMNZ, "Bailey to NZCNS", 26 September, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).
- ¹⁰⁴PMNZ to Rangi, Washington (NZ Supply Mission), "NZCNS to Bailey", 3 October, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).

- ¹⁰⁵British Ambassador, Washington to PMNZ, "Bailey to NZCNS", 12 October, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).
- ¹⁰⁶American Consul-General, Wellington, to PMNZ, 24 October, 1941, PM 86/1/11.
- ¹⁰⁷PMNZ to American Consul-General, Wellington, 24 October, 1941, PM 86/1/11.
- ¹⁰⁸Development of Southern Reinforcement Route for American Aircraft, Memo for Prime Minister from NZ Chief of Air Staff, 16 November, 1941; PMNZ to Minister of Defence, Fiji, 17 November, 1941, PM 86/15/15.
- ¹⁰⁹B.A.D., Washington to Admiralty, 11 October, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).
- ¹¹⁰Churchill, *The Second World War*, III, pp. 768-769.
- ¹¹¹The ADB Conference had accepted that: 'In the unlikely event of it proving impossible for the British Fleet to operate from Singapore, it will operate from bases in the Indian Ocean with the object of securing our vital sea communications in the Indian Ocean and Australian and New Zealand areas, disputing any further advance by the enemy to the southward or westward, and if possible, relieving pressure on Malaya by operations in the Malacca Straits and against any enemy activities on the west coast of Malaya". American-Dutch-British Conversations, Singapore, April, 1941, Report, paragraph 63, PM 81/10/13 (2).
- ¹¹²Churchill, *The Second World War*, III, pp. 769-773.
- ¹¹³Roger Parkinson, *Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat*, (London: Hart-Davis Max Gibbon, 1973), p. 305.
- ¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 306; S.W. Roskill, *The War at Sea, 1939-1945*, Vol. I: *The Defensive*, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954), (Hereinafter referred to as *The Defensive*) , p. 556.
- ¹¹⁵Roskill, *The Defensive*, p. 557; Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, p. 85.
- ¹¹⁶Roskill, *The Defensive*, p. 558.
- ¹¹⁷By that time the Admiralty had secured American approval for the initiation of fresh efforts towards the development of a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan. *Infra*, p. 243.
- ¹¹⁸Churchill, *The Second World War*, III, p. 524.
- ¹¹⁹SSDA to PMNZ, PMA, 7 November, 1941; Admiralty to ACNB, NZNB, 7 November, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).
- ¹²⁰Gill, *Royal Australian Navy, 1939-1942*, p. 460.
- ¹²¹PMNZ to SSDA, 13 November, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).
- ¹²²W.E. Parry, NZCNS, to Royle, ACNS, Navy Office, Melbourne, 13 November, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).

- ¹²³NZCNS, W.E. Parry to Bailey, NZ Supply Mission, Washington, 27 November, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).
- ¹²⁴Admiralty to B.A.D., Washington, "First Sea Lord to USCNO", 5 November, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).
- ¹²⁵Summary of letter received from Admiral Ghormley dated 7 November, 1941, Admiralty to S.O. force "G" (Admiral Phillips), 9 November, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).
- ¹²⁶These minor revisions largely concerned military tasks within the Far East area. As such they took into account the major strategical readjustment of American military policy since July, 1941, with regard to the Philippine Islands. That strategical readjustment, the Americans had clearly recognized, went outside the previous American policy of hemisphere defence as visualized in the ABC-1 Report.
- ¹²⁷B.A.D., Washington to Admiralty, 13 November, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).
- ¹²⁸Admiralty to B.A.D., Washington, 26 November, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).
- ¹²⁹Since the ACNS, Admiral Royle, had not arrived at Singapore by then, Admiral Phillips decided to confer with both the ACNS and NZCNS on 7 December (East longitude time), after his conference with Admiral Hart in Manila. Notes on visit of CNS, NZ, to Singapore, 4 December-17 December, 1941, NA 22/4/46.
- ¹³⁰Gill, *Royal Australian Navy, 1939-1942*, p. 462.
- ¹³¹These naval dispositions are at variance with those found in S.W. Roskill's, *The War at Sea, 1939-1941*, Vol. I, p. 562. The two sets of naval dispositions vary with regard to Australian naval dispositions. As brought out in this dissertation, the ACNS did not confer with Admiral Phillips before the Manila conference and, therefore, had not agreed to support the defence of the Malay Barrier as indicated in Roskill's treatment of the matter. In his study, Roskill also fails to follow up the Manila conference by examining Admiral Phillips' subsequent discussions with the ACNS and NZCNS at Singapore, and particularly the ACNS's lack of support for the Hart-Phillips Agreement.
- ¹³²Hart-Phillips Agreement, 6 December, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2). Attached to the formal agreement was an additional agreement in which Hart and Phillips both agreed that Singapore was unsuitable as the main base for offensive operations, that Manila was the only possible alternative, and that measures should be put in hand to enable the British battle fleet to operate from there by 1 April, 1942. See Appendix D.
- ¹³³Notes on visit of CNS, NZ, to Singapore, 4 December-17 December, 1941, NA 22/4/46.
- ¹³⁴1st Naval Member (Royle) to ACNB, 8 December, 1941, NA 030/68/4 (2).

Chapter VII

Meeting the Japanese Thrust: The ABDA and ANZAC Pacific Command Areas

i Japan Goes to War in the Southern Region

When Japan launched her offensive into the Southern Region, she struck with such dramatic suddenness, at so many points, and with such effectiveness that British, Dutch and American military authorities were unable to take immediate and effective counter-action. On the very first day of the offensive, Japan launched six separate and widely scattered operations, all timed to obtain the maximum advantage of surprise throughout the entire Pacific theatre (Map IV). On that day Japan sought to: destroy or neutralize the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor; cut the line of American sea communications to the Far East by occupying Guam, Wake and the Gilbert Islands; destroy American air power in the Philippine Islands to remove the threat to her eastern flank and as a prelude to the invasion of the islands; occupy Thailand to secure a base for operations against Burma and Malaya; land in northern Malaya and the Isthmus of Kra to begin an advance down the Malay Peninsula towards the Singapore naval base; and seize the British outpost at Hong Kong.¹

On 7 December (West longitude time), 1941, a Japanese naval-air striking force, consisting of six carriers supported by a squadron of two battleships, two cruisers, nine destroyers, three submarines and a train of tankers and supply ships, successfully reached its predetermined launching position, about 275 miles north of Oahu, Hawaii, without being detected. From the carrier decks of the naval force, Japanese torpedo-bombers, dive-bombers, fighters and high-level bombers then began their flight towards the American naval base at Pearl Harbour. The first attack started at 7.55 a.m. and lasted half an hour. During that time, the Japanese torpedo and dive-bombers attacked the American battleships along "Battleship Row" and made strafing runs on naval and army installations. Then there was a lull in the attack for about fifteen minutes. Next came another attack from Japanese high-level bombers and dive-bombers. At 9.45 a.m. the planes withdrew and the attack was over. Within two

hours Japan had crippled the U.S. Pacific Fleet. She had either sunk or put out of action eight battleships, three light cruisers, three destroyers, and a number of auxiliary vessels. The American casualties for that day were 2,403 men killed and 1,178 wounded, most of them naval personnel.²

While the Japanese naval-air striking force was immobilizing the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, other Japanese forces were moving to cut the American line of sea communications to the Far East by seizing a number of Central Pacific islands. Japanese aircraft from Saipan began their bombardment of Guam shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack and, about the same time, another force of Japanese aircraft from Kwajalein began their bombardment of Wake Island. After two days of steady air bombardment, Guam was captured by a small Japanese naval landing force on 10 December. That same day, the Japanese also seized Makin and Tarawa in the British-held Gilbert Islands from their bases in the Marshall Islands, without encountering resistance. At Wake Island, where the defenders were more numerous and better prepared, the Japanese met some resistance. On 10 December a Japanese naval landing force was repulsed by American Marines and the Japanese force, minus two destroyers sunk by Marine aircraft, was forced to withdraw to Kwajalein to await reinforcements. On 22 December the Japanese attempted another landing and before the day was over, the American Marine garrison, after bitter resistance, was forced to surrender. With the capture of Wake Island the Japanese had gained control of the American line of sea communications across the Central Pacific to the Far East.³

In the Far East area, where Japan launched her main southward thrust, the Japanese set into motion four operations on the very first day of their offensive. Of those four, two were relatively minor operations directed towards the capture of the British outpost at Hong Kong and the invasion of Thailand in preparation for the Burma campaign. On 8 December (East longitude time), Japanese aircraft from Canton bombed the Kowloon airfield on the Chinese mainland just across the strait from Hong Kong. About the same time, a Japanese land force, also based at Canton, stormed British defences on the Chinese mainland and by 14 December had reached the southern end of the Kowloon Peninsula. On 18 December the Japanese land

force crossed the strait and by the next day was firmly lodged on the island of Hong Kong. Despite stiff resistance by the British and Canadian forces, the Hong Kong garrison was forced to surrender on 25 December.⁴ On the same day that Japan launched her attack against Hong Kong, the Japanese also moved to bring Thailand under complete control. Japanese forces moved across from southern French Indo-China into Central Thailand while other forces landed at points along the narrow Kra Isthmus. The Thai Government offered no resistance and, after consolidating their position, the Japanese began to assemble their forces in Thailand for the invasion of Burma. The major operations within the Far East area, as expected by the British, Dutch and American military authorities, were directed against Malaya and the Philippine Islands, in preparation for a later thrust into the Netherlands East Indies. The Japanese campaign for Malaya, opening on the first day of the war, began with landings at Singora and Pattani in southern Thailand, and at Kota Bharu in northern Malaya from Hainan Island. Two days later, the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, which had ventured forth from Singapore to repel the landings, were sunk by Japanese land-based aircraft, with the tragic loss of Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, and many of his men. The loss of these two British battleships had now gained for Japan undisputed naval command of the Western Pacific. With the occupation of Singora, Pattani and Kota Bharu, the Japanese were soon able to make use of the air bases there, gain control of the air over Malaya, and give close support to their land forces. Once deployed in parallel columns along the east and west coasts of the Malay Peninsula, Japanese land forces began their drive south towards their ultimate objective—the Singapore naval base. In order to safeguard their line of communications to Malaya, a Japanese land force from southern French Indo-China invaded British Borneo on 13 December and occupied Miri, pushing on towards Kuching on 24 December. By that time the Japanese advance down the Malay Peninsula had achieved remarkable success. In their southerly drive, the Japanese Army continually drove back the British, Indian and Australian troops. By 25 December, the Japanese were only 150 miles away from their objective.⁵ Seizure of the Singapore naval base, it was understood by all, would herald the end of British sea power in the Pacific. Across the South China Sea, the Japanese had likewise achieved remarkable success in the Philippine Islands. The

Japanese campaign for the Philippines, opening on the first day of the war, began with an air offensive in an effort to gain complete control of the air over the Philippine Islands, before an invasion of the islands in full force. As at Pearl Harbor, the element of surprise was the keystone to the Japanese plan. From air bases in Formosa and the Palau Islands, Japanese air forces arrived unheralded over Clark Field, a major American air base near Manila, and caught the Americans completely off guard. Finding all the American air squadrons on the ground, the Japanese wrought havoc among the closely packed aircraft. By the close of the day half of the heavy bombers and one-third of the fighters of the American Far Eastern Air Force had been destroyed, and many others heavily damaged.⁶ The Japanese Air Force attacked other American air bases and within the first few days of the war had virtually eliminated the American Far Eastern Air Force.⁷ With her first objective achieved, Japan then began her invasion of the Philippine Islands. On 10 December Japan made landings in northern Luzon and, on 12 December more Japanese came ashore at the southern end of Luzon. These landings, however, were only subsidiary operations and the main landing, which had as its objective the capture of Manila, had not yet come. Meanwhile, the Japanese made additional landings in the southern Philippines in order completely to isolate the islands and acquire bases for the later invasion of the Netherlands East Indies. Two landings were made from the Palau Islands: one at Davao in Mindanao on 20 December; and another on Jolo Island in the Sulu Archipelago four days later. By that time the main Japanese attack had fallen upon the Philippine Islands. On 22 December a large Japanese force from Formosa made successful landings at Lingayen Bay, 120 miles north of Manila, and later at Lamon Bay to the southeast. In neither case were the American and Filipino troops able to offer much resistance. and by 25 December the Japanese were poised to drive on towards Manila from both the north and south.⁸ This grave situation now forced General MacArthur to declare Manila an open city, transfer his headquarters to Corregidor and withdraw his troops to the Bataan peninsula for a last defence of the Philippine Islands.⁹

Japan's successful offensive in the opening weeks of the war far exceeded the expectations of even the most optimistic of Japanese leaders. By 25 December the Japanese had achieved all of the

objectives outlined in their plans for the first phase of the war and were well on their way towards completing the second phase, which included the invasion of Burma and the Netherlands East Indies, the final conquest of Malaya and capture of the Singapore naval base, and the occupation of the Bismarck Archipelago (Map IV).¹⁰

The amazing success of the Japanese offensive can be attributed to the lack of a common Pacific defence plan between the British, Dutch and Americans as much as to the suddenness of the Japanese attack and numerical superiority of Japanese forces and equipment. Without a common Pacific defence plan, the British, Dutch and Americans, instead of meeting the Japanese thrust by combined action, were forced to take independent and unco-ordinated defensive action. The British and Dutch, who responded to the Japanese thrust in accordance with the joint British-Dutch war plan "Plenaps",¹¹ directed their efforts towards the defence of Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies, the Pacific Islands and sea communications within the Eastern theatre. As soon as it was evident that the main Japanese attack was west of Borneo, the Dutch reinforced Malaya with aircraft, submarines and other naval forces.¹² Australia and New Zealand, likewise, took action, in accordance with the plan to meet the Japanese thrust. Immediately upon the outbreak of the war, Australia and New Zealand activated their air reconnaissance scheme and their naval forces assumed escort convoy duties for the protection of shipping within the Southwest Pacific.¹³ At the same time Australia, in accordance with the plan, reinforced Koepang and Ambon with land forces from Darwin, while New Zealand took additional steps to strengthen her defences in the Fiji Islands.¹⁴ In a further effort to meet the Japanese thrust, the British Government hastily diverted one army division and four fighter squadrons, then en route to the Middle East, to India and another army division in India, destined for Iraq, to Burma and Malaya. In addition, the British Government took steps to form the Eastern Fleet in the Indian Ocean in order to protect sea communications within that area and to relieve Singapore or repel any grave threat to Australia and New Zealand.¹⁵ The Americans, on the other hand, responded to the Japanese threat in accordance with a "modified" RAINBOW 5 war plan. Reeling back from the blows suffered at Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Pacific Fleet was reassigned to the purely defensive role of defending territory and sea communications east of the International Date Line (180°). In

addition, the American Government took steps to strengthen the weakened U.S. Pacific Fleet by reinforcing it with naval units from the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and quickly dispatching additional troops, aircraft and equipment to the Far East for the defence of the Philippine Islands.¹⁶ Despite these largely independent and unco-ordinated British, Dutch and American efforts to meet the Japanese thrust, efforts were once again being made by the British and American Governments to construct a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence against Japan. It was now accepted, however, that such a combined Pacific defence could not be quickly achieved without political direction. In addition, it was also accepted that to obtain immediate military co-operation from so many military commands for the implementation of a single war plan would be virtually impossible. A solution to the problems of a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence was, therefore, found in the convening of a high-level Anglo-American conference at Washington and the establishment of two unified Pacific command areas, on the basis of the ABC-1 Report.

ii New Zealand Secures Her American Naval Shield

On 9 December the British Prime Minister, after obtaining permission from both the Cabinet and the King to leave the United Kingdom, suggested to Roosevelt that it would be wise to convene a high-level Anglo-American Conference, possibly in the United States. "We could review the whole war plan ABC-1 in light of reality and new facts", Churchill suggested, "as well as the problems of production and distribution of military equipment. I feel that all these matters, some of which are causing me concern, can best be settled on the highest executive level."¹⁷ In reply, Roosevelt suggested that the conference could be held the following month, but Churchill, who had every reason to fear what decisions might be taken in Washington under the impact of the Pacific crisis, was insistent that the conference be held as soon as possible.¹⁸ Churchill warned the American President that there was "great danger in our not having a full discussion on the highest level about the extreme gravity of the naval position, as well as upon all the production and allocation issues involved...I feel it would be disastrous to wait for another month before we settled common action in face of new adverse situation, particularly in Pacific."¹⁹

Roosevelt accepted Churchill's argument and on 11 December informed the British Prime Minister of his agreement to the convening of an immediate high-level Anglo-American conference, to be held at Washington.²⁰ It was then agreed between Churchill and Roosevelt that the conference should begin on or about 20 December.²¹

On 14 December, Churchill and his party, which included the UKCOS, embarked for America aboard HMS Duke of York from England. During their eight-day outward voyage across the Atlantic, Churchill and his military advisers took the opportunity to re-assess the Pacific situation in preparation for the Washington conference. After an exchange of papers and strategic discussions between Churchill and the UKCOS, it was agreed that, inasmuch as Germany was still the prime enemy, Great Britain and the United States should maintain only such positions in the Eastern theatre as would safeguard vital interests there, while concentrating upon the defeat of Germany. These vital interests were defined as: the security of Australia, New Zealand and India; the maintenance of Chinese resistance; and the holding of "points of vantage" from which an offensive against Japan could later be taken. Churchill and the UKCOS therefore agreed that the immediate objective of Great Britain and the United States should be to hold: (a) Hawaii and Dutch Harbour, Alaska; (b) Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippine Islands; and (c) Rangoon and the route to China.²²

Meanwhile, American authorities had also been re-assessing the Pacific situation in preparation for the Washington conference. On 14 December General Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staf, instructed General Dwight D. Eisenhower, of the Army War Plans Division, to review American Pacific strategy in light of the altered Pacific situation. Reporting his initial findings, Eisenhower informed Marshall that the "United States must keep open the Pacific line of communications to Australia and go ahead as fast as possible to establish a military base there." Marshall agreed. On 17 December he approved Eisenhower's recommendations for establishing a military base at Darwin.²³ It was first of all to be an air and supply base, and as recommended, a new command, United States Army Forces in Australia, was to be established there with the primary mission of facilitating the defence of the Philippine Islands. The Pensacola

convoy of American troops, equipment and aircraft, due in Brisbane on 22 December, was to form the nucleus of the new American Command.²⁴ On 21 December, the eve of the Washington conference, President Roosevelt and his military advisers met and confirmed the recommendation for "the establishment of an American base in Australia and the necessity for securing communication with it across the Pacific."²⁵ The American decision to establish a military base in Australia was based not entirely upon a desperate effort to prolong the defence of the Philippines but also upon an American determination to continue the fight in the Southwest Pacific with its allies, whatever might happen in the Philippine Islands. As Henry Stimson, the American Secretary of War, explained to his associates concerning the American decision:

...the issue which was now pending before us, namely as to whether we should make every effort possible in the Far East or whether...we should treat that as doomed and let it go. We all agreed that the first course was the one to follow; that we have a very good chance of making a successful defence, taking the southwestern Pacific as a whole. If we are driven out of the Philippines and Singapore, we can still fall back on the Netherlands East Indies and Australia; and with the cooperation of China—if we can keep that going—we can strike good counterblows at Japan...It has been accepted by the President, and the Army is taking the steps to make a solid base at Port Darwin in Australia.²⁶

In that report, the American decision represented the final break with the American policy of hemisphere defence, which had since July, 1941, gradually given way to an active American defence in the Western Pacific. It took the Pearl Harbor disaster, therefore, fully to convince the American Government that hemisphere defence was no longer a viable policy on which to maintain the nation's Pacific security.

The Anglo-American conference at Washington, known by the code name ARCADIA, began on 22 December and continued through to a final White House conference on 14 January, 1942.²⁷ During that period, Churchill, Roosevelt and their military advisers finally agreed on the necessary measures to bring about a combined British, Dutch and American Pacific defence against the mounting Japanese offensive. A solution to the problem was found in the establishment of two unified Pacific command areas, on the basis of the ABC-1

Report (Maps IV and V). In the opening meetings of the conference, it was made clear that the fundamental basis of grand strategy, as previously agreed in the ABC-1 Report, was still acceptable, despite the present Pacific crisis. The American and British delegations expressed the belief that, although much had happened since the American-British conversations in February 1941 (above all, the entry of Japan into the war), "our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated, the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow." They therefore agreed that, as "a cardinal principle" of grand strategy, "only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany."²⁸ As to what those "vital interests" might now be in the Eastern theatre, the American official history puts the British view slightly differently from the way it is presented in the British official history:

The security of Australia, New Zealand, and India must be maintained, and the Chinese war effort supported. Secondly, points of vantage from which an offensive against Japan can eventually be developed must be secured.²⁹

Viewing the Eastern theatre and Pacific Ocean area as a whole, the British delegation therefore considered that "our immediate object" was as stated above.³⁰ After one minor revision,³¹ the American delegation accepted the British delegation's general views on Allied objectives, and the American and British Chiefs of Staff then instructed their planners to undertake a study on the appropriate strategic tasks for meeting the Japanese thrust in the Far East,³² the principal area of the Japanese offensive (Map IV). While the British and American planners were working together on the study, the conference turned its attention towards the subject of strategic command within the area. With the failure of the principle of "mutual co-operation" still fresh in their minds, the principle of unified command came under discussion by the conference. Introducing this principle to the conference on 25 December, General Marshall argued that "its adoption would solve nine-tenths of the problems of British-American military collaboration."³³ "A man with good judgement and unity of command," Marshall argued, "has a distinct

advantage over a man with brilliant judgement who must rely on cooperation." The immediate reaction of the conference to Marshall's proposal was not favourable and it was dismissed after polite comment.³⁴ Nevertheless, Marshall successfully fought to keep his proposal alive and for the next two days the conference debated the issue. During that time Marshall elaborated on his proposal for establishing a unified command in the Far East and gradually won the necessary support for its adoption. Without minimizing the difficulties in establishing such a command over the forces of four different powers in the Far East, American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA), Marshall forcefully argued that it could be done. The whole area from northwest Australia to Burma, Marshall declared, constituted a "single natural theater" for direction under a single commander. The principal aim of such a command arrangement, Marshall explained, was to place on a single officer responsibility for initiating military action to be decided in Washington and London with reference to strategic deployment to and within the area. Marshall suggested that General Sir Archibald Wavell was the "logical man" since he knew India, was "used to moving troops", and had "been engaged in active operations which included both a successful operation and a setback."³⁵ Doubts and misgivings, however, still greeted Marshall's proposal. Regarding Marshall's declaration that the area from northwest Australia to Burma constituted a single natural theatre for direction under a single commander, Churchill had his doubts. The British Prime Minister considered that the area was too vast for a single commander effectively to control all the scattered land, sea and air operations. Moreover, like his military advisers, Churchill was reluctant to assume command of an area almost certain to be the scene of Japanese victories, even though it remained an area of British strategic responsibility. However, after gradually winning support from Roosevelt, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins and Lord Beaverbrook, Marshall was soon able to gain Churchill's assent,³⁶ though for different reasons. Unwilling to hand over strategic responsibility for Singapore to the Americans or to give the Australian Government any reason to believe that Great Britain would not provide for its defence, Churchill informed the conference on 28 December of his agreement with Marshall's proposal to establish an ABDA unified command area in the Far East with General Wavell as its Supreme Commander.³⁷ This command arrangement was then endorsed

by the conference. The United States Navy, the conference agreed, would "remain responsible for the whole Pacific Ocean east of Philippine Islands and Australasia, including United States approaches to Australasia Pacific Ocean Area."³⁸ On the following day Churchill informed the Australian and New Zealand Governments of the conference's decision to establish an ABDA unified command area in the Far East under General Wavell.³⁹ By that time British and American planners had completed their study on appropriate strategic tasks for meeting the Japanese thrust within the Far East and it was approved by the British and American Chiefs of Staff on 31 December. This primary strategic task within the Far East was "to hold the Malay Barrier...as the basic defensive position", and "to operate sea, land and air forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance." Other strategic tasks agreed upon were to: hold Burma and Australia "as essential supporting positions" for the area, and Burma as essential to the support of China and to the defence of India; re-establish communications through the Netherlands East Indies with Luzon and to support the Philippine garrisons there; and to maintain essential communications within the area.⁴⁰ Having agreed upon appropriate strategic tasks, the American and British Chiefs of Staff, with the aid of their planners, then determined the precise boundaries (Map V) and command arrangements for the ABDA unified command area, which were then fashioned into an appropriate directive (Appendix E) for the Supreme Commander, General Wavell, and approved by Churchill and Roosevelt on 1 January.⁴¹ On 4 January the British Government informed the Australian and New Zealand Governments of the directive sent to General Wavell⁴² and, on 10 January, Wavell arrived at Batavia to take up his appointment as Supreme Commander, ABDA Area.⁴³

Having found only a partial solution at Washington to the problem of a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence, a gap now existed in those defences between the ABDA and Pacific Ocean areas. This, it was becoming increasingly apparent, Japan would soon fill if the Allies themselves did not take additional steps to secure it. As Maps III and V indicate, this area included the eastern New Guinea-New Hebrides-New Caledonia-Fiji Island area, eastern Australia, the Tasman Sea and New Zealand and the Chatham Islands. Prompted by the New Zealand and Australian Governments,

therefore, another measure would quickly be agreed upon by Churchill and Roosevelt at Washington to meet the Japanese thrust in that vital area of the Pacific.

The defence arrangements reached at Washington did little to relieve New Zealand of her fears for her own security against the mounting Japanese thrust. Deeply puzzled by New Zealand's apparent exclusion from the American naval zone in the Pacific, the New Zealand Government sought greater clarification from Churchill on this matter. On 30 December Prime Minister Fraser, noting the terms of the recent Washington agreement that naval command in the area east of the Philippine Islands and Australasia was to be an American strategic responsibility, questioned Churchill as to whether that "ambiguous term 'Australasia' is intended to include New Zealand, and that the line of demarcation is intended to follow the line of the ABC-1 Report 180° ." If that was so, Fraser anxiously pointed out, then "it appears that New Zealand must be dependent upon the joint resources of the Royal Australian Navy and the Royal New Zealand Navy for naval defence within this area Australia and New Zealand Areas ." Fraser then, in his effort to get Churchill to spell out precisely the understandings reached on this vital matter, emphasized his government's deep concern for adequate naval defence of not only New Zealand but also of the Dominion's forward defence line, New Hebrides-Fiji-Tonga, which was "at present apparently protected only by an inadequate air patrol operating from Fiji and such small naval forces as can be made available from Australia and New Zealand."⁴⁴ The New Zealand Government had good reason to fear for her security. Added to Dominion's anxiety over her apparent exclusion from the American naval zone in the Pacific, the Dominion also received reports from R.J. Bailey, New Zealand's Naval Liaison Officer at Washington, that, in the unofficial opinion of the British and American Chiefs of Staff, it was probable that Japan would mount an attack upon the Fiji Islands any time after 10 January.⁴⁵ Receiving no immediate reply from Churchill, Fraser expressed to the British Government on 6 January the Dominion's "considerable anxiety" over New Zealand's "apparent isolation" from the Allied Pacific command areas.⁴⁶ Finally on 8 January, Churchill informed Fraser that he was:

...trying hard to get the Americans to assume naval responsibility for the area [the Shaded Area] south of the Equator and west of 180 degrees up to the east coast of Australia, and I think they will probably agree. The Australian and New Zealand naval forces in the area would, of course, come under American operational command.⁴⁷

Despite Churchill's efforts to allay the New Zealand Government's fears for New Zealand's security, Prime Minister Fraser, nevertheless, expressed his dissatisfaction with the current higher direction of the war against Japan and informed Churchill that the Dominion Government was urgently preparing New Zealand and the Fiji Islands for a possible attack by Japan on a substantial scale.⁴⁸

The Australian Government, likewise, considered the defence arrangements reached at Washington as inadequate in providing for Australia's security against the mounting Japanese thrust. Deeply concerned about Japanese air attacks upon Rabaul in the Bismarck Archipelago (Map IV) and the threat to Australia's communications in the Tasman Sea by the possible Japanese occupation of New Caledonia, Prime Minister Curtin protested more strongly to the British Government over the lack of adequate naval protection in that area. Feeling that the area should have been brought into the American naval zone, more so now that Australia was functioning as an American Pacific base, Curtin strongly urged the British Government to consider that:

Without adequate naval protection line of communication to Australia for American supply ships cannot be maintained. As already pointed out Japanese have only to walk into New Caledonia where they would be astride this line and in position to launch air attacks on the most northern ports Australia used by Americans for unloading aircraft and other supplies for transit to Darwin and the Netherlands East Indies. Quite frankly we feel strategic approach is not well conceived...⁴⁹

Meanwhile, in Washington, Churchill had consistently pressed upon American authorities the Pacific Dominions' objections to the existing Pacific defence arrangements. The gap in British-Dutch-American Pacific defence had been foreseen by the American authorities when the A.B.D.A. Area was first created but the American Navy, still reeling from the blows suffered at Pearl Harbour, had refused

to accept the additional burden of providing for that area's defence, despite the ABC-1 Agreement for American naval support to Australia and New Zealand naval forces in the Shaded Area (150°East-180°).⁵⁰ The previous difficulties encountered by American naval authorities in establishing a suitable basis for ANZAC-American naval co-operation in the Shaded Area may have also been a contributing factor in the American refusal. Nevertheless, Admiral King, recognizing the vital importance of maintaining the lines of communications between Australia and the United States, directed his planners on 1 January to study the problem. As a result, King recommended to the Washington Conference the establishment of an additional unified Pacific command area, the ANZAC Area.⁵¹ The conference then drew up a series of proposals, defining the boundaries, command arrangements, initial forces and tasks of the ANZAC Area for submission to the Australian and New Zealand Governments, which were approved by Admiral King, Roosevelt and Churchill. On 14 January Churchill informed the New Zealand Government of the proposals, which he also advised would be communicated to the Australian Government, for the establishment of a new naval area to be known as the ANZAC Area. The area's boundaries, Churchill stated, would be as follows:

(a) From longitude 141 degrees east eastward along the Equator to the longitude of 170 degrees east; thence south-eastward to latitude 020 degrees south, longitude 175 degrees west, thence south along meridian 175 degrees west.

(b) From a point on the Equator southwards along meridian 141 degrees east to the south coast of New Guinea, thence east along the southern New Guinea coast to the meridian 143 degrees east, thence in sea areas south along this meridian to the Pole.⁵²

As Map V indicates, this area filled the gap in British-Dutch-American Pacific defences between the ABDA and Pacific Ocean areas and embraced the eastern New Guinea-New Hebrides-New Caledonia-Fiji-Tonga Island area, eastern Australia, the Tasman Sea and New Zealand and the Chatham Islands. As Maps III and V indicate, the Shaded Area had, in effect, been extended on the east⁵³ and, particularly, on the west to include Australia's eastern coast and southeastern focal shipping area. It therefore met what Australian leaders had long regarded as a most important requirement if Australian strategical interests in the Tasman Sea area were to be secured.

The ANZAC Area, Churchill advised Fraser, is to be designated as "an adjunct of the Pacific Ocean area"; and naval forces operating therein would be considered to be an adjunct of the United States Pacific Fleet and would be under the strategical direction of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. This direction would be exercised through an American Flag Officer. The initial Allied naval forces assigned to the ANZAC Area, Churchill continued, were to include: from the British, one aircraft carrier; from the United States, one heavy or light cruiser; from New Zealand, two light cruisers and one armed merchant cruiser; and from Australia, two heavy cruisers, one old light cruiser, three armed merchant cruisers, three destroyers, three sloops and two anti-submarine patrol vessels. The remainder of Royal Australian Navy vessels other than local defence forces were to be assigned to the A.B.D.A. Area. This included, among other vessels, the two Australian light cruisers, Hobart and Perth.⁵⁴ The strategic tasks assigned to the Allied naval forces within the ANZAC Area, Churchill continued, were to:

- (1) Cover the eastern and north-eastern approaches to Australia and New Zealand;
- (2) Safeguard by all practicable [author's emphasis] escorting and covering operations convoys in the adjunct ANZAC area;
- (3) Support the defence of islands in the adjunct ANZAC area, with particular emphasis on its key points; to attack adjacent enemy key points;
- (4) Correlate operations with the forces in the ABDA area and with the United States Pacific force.⁵⁵

Should the circumstances arise, Churchill advised Fraser, the naval forces assigned to the ANZAC and adjacent areas "are authorised to extend their operations into other areas as may be required." Churchill then concluded by expressing to Fraser his hope that the proposals for establishing the ANZAC area were a valuable step forward in meeting the New Zealand Government's views regarding Allied Pacific defence arrangements.⁵⁶

Although Mr Fraser had some concern for the "technical disadvantages" of operating the ANZAC naval force, which was predominantly British, solely under the command of an American Flag Officer, the New Zealand Government fully accepted the proposals because of the

close American naval co-operation which they now ensured.⁵⁷ Anxious quickly to secure an American naval shield against the mounting Japanese thrust, the New Zealand Government urged the Australian Government to accept the proposals for the establishment of the ANZAC Area. In a cable to the Australian Prime Minister on 16 January, Fraser advised Curtin that the New Zealand Government fully accepted the proposals for the establishment of the ANZAC Area. The proposals, Fraser pointed out to Curtin, had the following advantage:

(a) they indicate the importance attached by the British and the United States Governments to the problems of the area in question.

(b) they make some provision for necessary co-operation with the adjacent areas.

(c) they make some provision for reinforcements which are urgently required.

(d) they provide some measure of direct American naval assistance.⁵⁸

From these points of view, Fraser stated, the proposals "are a distinct advance on any which have yet been put forward" for the area.⁵⁹ Having urged the Australian Government to accept the proposals, Fraser then informed Churchill on 22 January of his government's acceptance of the proposals for the establishment of the ANZAC area:

My colleagues and I have studied the proposals put forward in your telegram...of 14 January, which we welcome from the point of view of the close association with the United States forces which they will necessarily involve. We accept the proposals in their entirety.⁶⁰

The Australian Government, however, was not so quick to accept the proposals for the establishment of the ANZAC area. The Australian authorities were concerned with those proposals relating to command arrangements, strategic tasks and naval forces assigned to the ANZAC area. They considered that: a British Flag Officer, preferably Australian, should deal with the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and assume operational command of the ANZAC naval force, instead of an American Flag Officer; American naval authorities might neglect the defence of shipping within the ANZAC area in

order to carry out other strategic tasks; and Australian naval forces should be deployed entirely in the ANZAC area, preferably the focal shipping areas.

After a study of the proposals, the ACOS advised their government that, with regard to command arrangements, they accepted that the ANZAC area should be under the strategic command of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, but that a British Flag Officer, instead of an American, "would be preferable" for operational command of the ANZAC naval force due "to predominant British interests in the area, commitments, facilities, and composition of naval forces." The ACOS also advised their government that they accepted the proposed strategic tasks but were deeply concerned for the protection of shipping within the ANZAC area which they felt might be neglected by American naval authorities. The ACOS, therefore, advised their government that the ACNB should have some calls upon the naval forces within the ANZAC area in order to exercise control over the protection of coastal and overseas shipping within the area, as the ACNB was in the best position for exercising such control. With regard to the initial assignment of naval forces to the ANZAC area, the ACOS were also deeply concerned with what they considered to be inadequate American naval support in the area (one heavy or light cruiser), particularly since Australia was to contribute naval forces to the ABDA area. The ACOS therefore advised their government that they should obtain a clearer indication of the degree of American naval assistance which could be expected for the ANZAC area.⁶¹ After consideration by the Australian War Cabinet, Curtin then informed Churchill on 22 January of his government's views concerning the proposals for the establishment of the ANZAC area. The Australian Government agreed, Curtin stated, with the appointment of a United States Flag Officer for operational command of the naval forces within the ANZAC area "in view of fact that strategic control of whole of the Pacific area is vested in Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, who is not only responsible for security of air ferry route and convoys and supplies between the United States and Australia but whose forces can alone provide potential reinforcements for the area." Nevertheless, the Australian Government assumed "that United States Government will have no objection to retention afloat of a British Flag Officer [Rear-Admiral J.G. Crace]⁶²

who will work under and in the closest co-operation with the United States Flag Officer in command and be charged with administration of British units and advising on British commitments and base facilities, thus following principles now established for naval control in ABDA area." Curtin then expressed his government's agreement with the strategic tasks assigned to the Allied naval forces within the ANZAC area, but stressed that the protection of Australian vital overseas and coastal shipping within the area would become the responsibility of the United States Flag Officer and the occasion might arise when these "vital interests" might necessitate Australia making some special call upon him for provision of protection from the forces assigned to the ANZAC area. The Australian Government therefore assumed, Curtin continued, that the United States Flag Officer "will be directed to co-operate closely with Australian Commonwealth Naval Board in matters affecting local naval defence of Australia and protection of convoys and shipping to and from Australia." Deeply concerned by the "situation developing at Rabaul at the present moment" and its growing threat to Australian sea communications, Curtin emphasized "the importance of Australia as a base for American operations", as indicated by the Washington conference and American plans conveyed to the Australian Government by General Brett⁶³ and his staff. The Australian Government therefore hoped that the "Americans have a full realization of the fact that their capacity to launch an attack [offensive] at an early date with land and air forces may be frustrated by inadequate naval strength in this region."⁶⁴

In an effort to obtain immediate agreement for the establishment of the ANZAC area, the newly formed Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington re-examined and revised the proposals in order to meet the Australian point of view. On 25 January the British Admiralty delegation (B.A.D.) informed the Australian Government, through the ACNB, of the revisions made to the proposals for the establishment of the ANZAC area. With regard to command arrangements, the B.A.D. advised the Australian authorities that the ANZAC naval force was now to be under the strategical direction of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (Admiral King), as exercised through one or more United States Flag Officers and "assisted by one or more Flag Officers named by Australia and/or New Zealand." As for strategic

tasks, Australian authorities were advised by the B.A.D. that the second task assigned to the ANZAC naval force had been reworded to stress the importance of trade protection within the ANZAC area: "second, protect shipping and safeguarding convoys in the ANZAC area by escorting, patrolling and/or covering operations." With regard to Allied naval forces assigned to the ANZAC area, the B.A.D. also informed the Australian authorities that the United States had agreed to assign two additional destroyers to the ANZAC area from the U.S. Pacific Fleet.⁶⁵

The Australian Government, however, was still not entirely satisfied. Australian authorities were still concerned for the protection of their shipping, particularly their coastal shipping, since this was not specifically mentioned in the rewording of the second strategic task for naval forces in the ANZAC area. Moreover, Australian authorities were reluctant, in view of the present military situation at Rabaul, to release immediately the Australian cruiser Perth to the A.B.D.A. area until the Australian cruiser Canberra, which was assigned to the ANZAC area, was fully fit for active service. To these concerns, the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Washington assured the Australian authorities that the American Admiral in operational command of the ANZAC naval force would be responsible for the protection of coastal shipping within the ANZAC area, which he would deal with through an appropriate subordinate, preferably Australian. Moreover, the American admiral would also co-operate fully with the ACNB and NZNB in controlling shipping within the area. In a still further effort to assure the Australian authorities, the Combined Chiefs of Staff informed them that the second strategic task assigned to Allied naval forces within the ANZAC area would, again, be reworded to read: "second, protect shipping, including coastwise shipping [author's emphasis], and safeguarding convoys in ANZAC area by escort, patrol and/or covering operations..." The Combined Chiefs of Staff then warned the Australian authorities that:

Any delay in availability of vessels allocated ABDA area will have an unfavourable effect on protection of northwestern Australia. Consequently, it is the considered opinion of C in C, United States Fleet that Perth would be of greater value to common cause in ABDA area rather than the ANZAC area. The Combined Chiefs of Staff concur in this opinion and

consider that Perth should not—repeat— not be retained in ANZAC area until Canberra can be repaired.⁶⁶

The existing military situation in the ANZAC area, the Combined Chiefs of Staff warned the Australian authorities, necessitated immediate agreement for the establishment of the ANZAC area in order that the proposals be implemented at once. Accepting the Combined Chiefs of Staff's assurances and warnings, the Australian Government on 29 January accepted the revised proposals (Appendix F) for the establishment of the ANZAC area,⁶⁷ and on 7 February, Vice-Admiral H.F. Leary, U.S.N., arrived in Wellington to take up his appointment as "Commander ANZAC Force".⁶⁸

After more than twenty-one months of anxiety arising from inadequate naval defence, causing New Zealand to look to America rather than Britain for naval support, New Zealand had finally secured the American naval shield. This dependent relationship with America was to form the new basis for New Zealand's Pacific security, not only during the remaining years of the Pacific war but in the post-war period, as exemplified by New Zealand's present-day adherence to the ANZUS Treaty of 1951.

Footnotes

- ¹Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 131.
- ²A. Russell Buchanan, *The United States and World War II* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 71-74.
- ³Morton, *Strategy and Command*, pp. 133-134.
- ⁴*Ibid.*, p. 137.
- ⁵*Ibid.*, p. 138.
- ⁶Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, pp. 100-101.
- ⁷Buchanan, *The United States and World War II*, p. 92.
- ⁸Morton, *Strategy and Command*, pp. 136-137.
- ⁹Buchanan, *The United States and World War II*, p. 94.
- ¹⁰Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 139; Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, p. 93.
- ¹¹"Plenaps" was a joint British-Dutch war plan based upon the ADA Agreement of February, 1941, and the ADB-2 Agreement. Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, p. 86.
- ¹²Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, p. 192.
- ¹³Outbreak of Hostilities with Japan— Immediate Action Required, COS paper, No. 108, 8 December, 1941, PM 81/4/3 (3).
- ¹⁴*Ibid.*, Gill, *Royal Australian Navy, 1939-1942*, pp. 495-496.
- ¹⁵SSDA to PMNZ, 23 December, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (2).
- ¹⁶Morton, *Strategy and Command*, pp. 143, 149.
- New Zealand Secures Her American Naval Shield
- ¹⁷Churchill, *The Second World War*, III, 541.
- ¹⁸J.M.A. Gwyer, *Ground Strategy*, Vol. III: *June 1941-August 1942*, Part I (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964), p. 315.
- ¹⁹Churchill, *The Second World War*, III, 542.
- ²⁰*Ibid.*
- ²¹Gwyer, *Ground Strategy*, III, Pt I, 315.
- ²²*Ibid.*, pp. 346-348.
- ²³Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, p. 87.

- ²⁴Morton, *Strategy and Command*, pp. 151-152.
- ²⁵Conn and Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defence*, p. 169.
- ²⁶Henry Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 396.
- ²⁷Conn and Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defence*, p. 169.
- ²⁸J.R.M. Butler, *Grand Strategy*, Vol. III: June 1941-August 1942, Pt II (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964), p. 670.
- ²⁹Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, p.120. Cf. p. 12 *supra* and n. 22.
- ³⁰*Supra*, p. 12. See also *ibid.*, p. 121.
- ³¹The American Delegation added "the Maritime Provinces of Russia" to the list of Allied objectives. The ARCADIA Conference, however, did little to examine the future role of the Soviet Union in the Pacific against Japan. This was largely due to an understanding between the British and American Governments that the Soviet Government intended to avoid hostilities with Japan and that it was logical for the Soviet Union not to enter into any arrangements with the United Kingdom and the United States which might hasten her involvement in the war against Japan. The American Delegation, therefore, was merely attempting to lay the basis for "possible" Russian participation in the war against Japan. *Ibid.*, p. 121.
- ³²Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 159.
- ³³Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, pp. 123-124.
- ³⁴Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 160.
- ³⁵Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, p. 124.
- ³⁶*Ibid.*
- ³⁷Gwyer, *Grand Strategy*, III, Pt I, 370; Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 160.
- ³⁸Churchill, *The Second World War*, III, 599.
- ³⁹SSDA to PMNZ, "PM to PM", 29 December, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (2).
- ⁴⁰Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, p. 122.
- ⁴¹Gwyer, *Grand Strategy*, III, Pt I, 373.
- ⁴²SSDA to PMNZ, 4 January, 1942, PM 81/10/13 (2).
- ⁴³Matloff and Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942*, p. 126.

- ⁴⁴PMNZ to SSDA, "PM to PM", 30 December, 1941, PM 81/10/13 (2).
- ⁴⁵Bailey, New Zealand Naval Liaison Officer, Washington to NZNB, 1 January, 1942, PM 86/1/7 (1).
- ⁴⁶PMNZ to SSDA, 6 January, 1942, PM 81/10/11.
- ⁴⁷SSDA to PMNZ, "PM to PM", 8 January, 1942, PM 81/10/11.
- ⁴⁸PMNZ to SSDA, "PM to PM", 12 January, 1942, PM 81/10/11.
- ⁴⁹PMA to SSDA, PMNZ, 8 January, 1942, PM 81/10/13 (3).
- ⁵⁰Morton, *Strategy and Command*, p. 201.
- ⁵¹*Ibid.*
- ⁵²PMUK to PMNZ, 14 January, 1942, PM 81/10/11.
- ⁵³As Maps III and V indicate, the Shaded Area had been extended on the east to include the Tonga Islands, apparently, to put the Australia-New Zealand air reconnaissance line under a single command area.
- ⁵⁴Gill, *Royal Australian Navy, 1939-1942*, pp. 519-520.
- ⁵⁵PMUK to PMNZ, 14 January, 1942, PM 81/10/11.
- ⁵⁶*Ibid.*
- ⁵⁷PMNZ to PMA, 16 January, 1942, PM 81/10/11.
- ⁵⁸*Ibid.*
- ⁵⁹*Ibid.*
- ⁶⁰PMNZ to PMUK, 22 January, 1942, PM 81/10/11.
- ⁶¹ACNS to NZCNS, 18 January, 1942, PM 81/10/11.
- ⁶²At the suggestion of the Australian Government, New Zealand accepted Rear-Admiral J.G. Grace, Rear-Admiral Commanding Australian Squadron, as the candidate for the position. Grace was, subsequently, appointed as Commander ANZAC Squadron "afloat". PM 81/10/11.
- ⁶³Lt General George H. Brett, Commander U.S. Army forces in Australia.
- ⁶⁴PMA to PMNZ, 22 January, 1942, PM 81/10/11.
- ⁶⁵BAD, Washington to ACNB, NZNB, Admiralty, 25 January, 1942, PM 81/10/11.
- ⁶⁶Combined Chiefs of Staff, Washington to ACNB, NZNB, Admiralty, 27 January, 1942, PM 81/10/11.
- ⁶⁷ACNB to Combined Chiefs of Staff, Washington, Admiralty, NZNB, 29 January, 1942, PM 81/10/11.
- ⁶⁸NZNB to Bailey, Washington, 7 February, 1942, PM 81/10/11.

PART III

CONCLUSION

Chapter VIII

Towards New Zealand Dependence on the U.S.A.: the Basis, 1919-1939

The basis for New Zealand's abrupt reorientation in 1940 from Britain to the United States in quest of naval support stemmed from Britain's early failure in 1919 to challenge Japan's naval supremacy in the Western Pacific by establishing a Far Eastern Fleet in that area. Immediately following the First World War, the United Kingdom was faced with a potential threat to her Far Eastern Empire. The elimination of German sea-power and the rapid growth of both the American and Japanese Navies during the war had resulted in those states becoming, after the British Empire, the second and third strongest naval powers. Moreover, both powers were engaged in a heated post-war naval arms race for naval supremacy and an early conflict in the Pacific appeared possible. Ironically enough, the potential threat to Britain's Far Eastern Empire, as viewed by British authorities, was not America but Japan, despite the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This largely developed as a result of Japan's skilful and successful efforts to use the First World War and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to further her territorial ambitions in the Central Pacific and China. It therefore became apparent to British authorities in London that measures would have to be taken in order to ensure the security of the Far Eastern Empire.

One of the most controversial figures to emerge during that time of post-war debate on Imperial defence was Lord Jellicoe, Admiral of the Fleet and former First Sea Lord. Lord Jellicoe represented those elements within the Royal Navy which sought to establish British sea-power in the Western Pacific on a scale which had never before existed. In essence, Jellicoe wanted successfully to challenge Japan for naval supremacy of the Western Pacific. At the recommendation of the 1918 Imperial War Conference, Jellicoe had toured India, Australia, New Zealand and Canada from 1919-1920, advising them on their post-war naval defence. In New Zealand, Jellicoe's views attracted much attention and were strongly supported by the Dominion Government. Arriving in New Zealand in August, 1919, Jellicoe warned the Dominion Government of the almost inevitable

future conflict between the British Empire and Japan in the Pacific. In order to meet this Pacific threat, Jellicoe had recommended to the Dominion Government the establishment of a Far Eastern Fleet. Jellicoe clearly saw that the establishment of a Far Eastern Fleet in the Pacific was most essential for the future security of the Far Eastern Empire since the Home and Far Eastern waters were so far apart, and insisted that modern British naval strategy demanded adequate fleet strength in both oceans. Jellicoe also recognized the necessity for establishing a first-class naval base in the Pacific capable of servicing the Royal Navy's more modern post-Jutland capital ships with submarine bulges; for no such base then existed east of Malta. Jellicoe had therefore also recommended to the Dominion Government that Singapore be the site for the establishment of a fortified first-class naval base and headquarters for the Far Eastern Fleet. In accordance with this general naval scheme, Jellicoe had recommended to the Dominion Government that New Zealand contribute to the establishment of the Far Eastern Fleet by developing her own local navy. Lord Jellicoe's apprehensions concerning the emerging Pacific threat and the inadequacies of British sea-power in the Pacific had merely reinforced New Zealand's long-held anxieties concerning her Pacific security. Britain's reliance upon the Anglo-Japanese Alliance for the defence of the Far Eastern Empire since 1905, so that the Royal Navy could meet the German threat in home waters represented a fundamental departure from the traditional British naval policy of maritime supremacy. Prior to that time, Imperial naval defence had been based entirely upon a British policy of maritime supremacy, whereby Britain endeavoured to maintain the maritime defence of the British Empire "alone" and against any possible hostile combination. New Zealand had never fully accepted that fundamental departure from traditional British naval policy since 1905. Due to the Dominion's developing suspicions of Japan, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was viewed by New Zealand as a most unreliable and unnatural device for the defence of the Pacific Dominion. Clearly desired by New Zealand was her traditional naval shield—the Royal Navy. This had led to the Dominion's continual protestations to the British Government, both before and after the First World War, over the absence of British sea-power in the Pacific. New Zealand had therefore endorsed Lord Jellicoe's naval scheme for the establishment of a Far Eastern Fleet to be stationed at Singapore and, guided by his recommendations, had

established the basis for a local navy in March 1921 to later form part of the Far Eastern Fleet.

In London, however, Lord Jellicoe's post-war naval scheme was strongly repudiated by British authorities, for the British Government had been moving in the opposite direction, towards naval disarmament. In August 1919 the British Government had decided to accept, in the face of the naval competition, the one-power naval standard-parity with the next strongest navy, the United States, as the future basis for the maritime defence of the British Empire. In essence, the British Government had decided formally to renounce the traditional naval policy of maritime supremacy and share with the United States global command of the world seas. This momentous decision was prompted by the British Government's desire, largely for reasons of economy, to end the Pacific naval arms race through disarmament on the assumption that the British Empire would not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years. Thus, the British Government considered it neither economic nor necessary to maintain adequate fleet strength in both home and Far Eastern waters. The security of the Far Eastern Empire, therefore, would rest upon the existing main British fleet. Upon this basis, the British Government approved in principle the C.I.D. proposal of a Far Eastern or Singapore strategy which was structured upon the establishment of a fortified first-class naval base at Singapore and the existing main British fleet. This strategy called for the dispatch of the main British fleet from European waters to Singapore on the outbreak of war with Japan. Fundamental to the strategy was the assumption of only a single threat to the British Empire, Japan. Due to the final disappearance of Germany as a naval power, the possibility of a dual threat to the British Empire arising from any European power or powers was strongly discounted. This was the inherent flaw within the strategy which was later to surface with the rise of Germany and Italy as naval powers in the mid-thirties. In order further to prepare their post-war Imperial defence policy, the British Government had also given major consideration to the future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. British authorities clearly recognized that the existing Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a source of major friction between the British and American Governments, for the Americans viewed the alliance as an effective political shield for

Japanese imperialism. Renewal, therefore, would severely strain Anglo-American relations at a time when good relations were of vital importance to the British Government. Not only would renewal of the alliance jeopardize the possibility of reaching a naval accord with the United States, but also the prospect of future American military assistance in the Pacific against Japan. Nevertheless, British authorities were also aware that a British decision to denounce the alliance, while Japan favoured renewal, would be imprudent. Britain would not only lose what little influence she held over Japan's territorial ambitions, but might even force that state into hostile alignment with Germany or Russia, or both, against the British Empire. Moreover, it could also precipitate a serious rupture in Anglo-Japanese relations which might seriously threaten the security of the Far Eastern Empire, for until the Singapore naval base was completed, British possessions in the Pacific would be vulnerable to Japanese sea-power. The British Government finally decided to seek the convening of a Pacific conference for the discussion of Far East and Pacific problems in the hope of reaching some understanding with the United States and Japan over the alliance.

At the 1921 Imperial Conference in London, post-war Imperial defence, among other matters, was discussed. There the British Government informed India and the Dominions of its decision to accept a one-power naval standard and to seek naval disarmament. The security of the Far Eastern Empire would be guaranteed by the establishment of a fortified first-class naval base at Singapore in order to enable the main British fleet fully to operate in that area. Aware of the vital importance of British sea-power to her Pacific security, New Zealand was deeply disappointed with the British Government's decision to accept a one-power naval standard and to seek naval disarmament, rather than to establish a Far Eastern Fleet in the Pacific. The Dominion considered that the British Government was not fully meeting its naval obligations in the Pacific and expressed its dissatisfaction with the Singapore strategy and grave apprehension over the British decision. With regard to that other related question, the future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the conference was deeply split by a conflict of opinion between the Dominions. Canada and South Africa, stressing the importance of Anglo-American relations, argued that the alliance

should not be renewed; whereas, New Zealand and Australia, for reasons of security, urged renewal. Well aware of the increased naval strength of Japan and the present vulnerability of British sea-power in the Pacific arising from the lack of a modern fleet base in that area, New Zealand, like Australia, was concerned that non-renewal would transform Japan from a suspicious ally into a formidable foe. Although New Zealand acknowledged that the United States was a preferable and natural ally, due to identity of interests and race, the Dominion also recognized the United States as a questionable ally due to her isolationist policies prior to her entry into the First World War. In essence, New Zealand strongly doubted that the United States would enter into any formal commitment with the British Empire which would guarantee her Pacific security. New Zealand was willing to modify her views on the future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and to join in any well-thought-out alliance with the United States, but frankly, believed that the preferable Anglo-American Alliance was not possible to obtain. Although the conference remained split over the issue, Britain was able to get the Dominions' agreement to the calling of a Pacific conference in order to find a suitable substitute for the alliance.

The British Government then approached the American Government, while the Imperial Conference was still in session, with the proposal for convening a Pacific conference to settle outstanding issues in the Far East and Pacific. The American Government fully accepted the British proposal. Moreover, responding to Great Britain's earlier informal overtures for naval disarmament, the American Government advised the British Government of its intentions to convene a conference at Washington for the limitation of armaments. Retreating into a posture of isolationism, the United States, like Great Britain, was unwilling to challenge Japan for naval supremacy of the Western Pacific. Against the advice of the military advisers to undertake additional battleship construction and establish a fortified first-class naval base at Guam, in order to meet the growing Japanese threat to American territory in the Western Pacific, the American Government, like Great Britain, also considered naval disarmament a solution to the Pacific tensions. The British Government accepted the American proposal, and interrupted the proceedings of the Imperial Conference with the announcement of

a conference to be convened at Washington for the limitation of armaments and settlement of Far East and Pacific problems. The nature of post-war Imperial and American defence was therefore ultimately framed in Washington.

At the Washington Conference of 1921, Britain and the United States ceded to Japan naval hegemony in the Western Pacific in return for Japanese pledges of non-aggression. Under the terms of the Four Power Treaty, which replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Britain, the United States, France and Japan promised to respect each others' Pacific possessions; and in the Nine Power Treaty, those four nations joined five others in pledging to respect the sovereignty, rights and interests of China. It was through the concessions obtained from Britain and the United States in the framing of the additional Five Power Treaty that Japan made her naval gains in the Pacific. Under that treaty, Britain, the United States and Japan agreed to restrict the tonnage of their capital ships to a ratio of 5:3:3, respectively. Although Britain and the United States retained a superiority over Japan in capital ship tonnage, the ratio of five to three was out of all proportion to their larger naval responsibilities, particularly those of Britain, in other oceans. In addition, Japan's strategic position in the Western Pacific was further enhanced by Article XIX of the treaty which dealt with the establishment of additional fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific. Under the terms of that article, Britain and the United States had agreed not to establish any additional fortifications or naval bases in closer proximity than the British zone of Singapore-Australasia and the American of Alaska-Hawaii-Panama, respectively. By relinquishing her right to fortify and develop major naval bases at Guam, the Philippines or the Aleutians, the United States had further denied herself the ability to conduct a successful offensive against Japan in the Western Pacific. By not challenging Japan for naval supremacy of the Western Pacific and ceding to Japan naval hegemony of that area at Washington, Britain and the United States had therefore ushered in a new order of sea-power in the Pacific.

The Washington treaties left New Zealand exposed as never before. Britain had acknowledged Japan as the supreme naval power in the Western Pacific. In addition, Great Britain had failed in

her efforts at Washington to draw the United States into some form of Pacific alliance, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been subsequently replaced by the Four Power Treaty, which lacked guarantees of mutual military support in the Pacific. New Zealand was therefore confronted by a new order of sea-power in the Pacific which greatly threatened her Pacific security. In the years following the Washington Conference, New Zealand's Pacific security became increasingly threatened. Japan, under the growing influence of her militarists, re-embarked upon a programme of expansion in Manchuria in 1931 and, later, in Central China in 1937. With isolationist America militarily retreating from the Western Pacific into a policy of hemisphere defence, New Zealand had no real alternative but to look to Britain for her Pacific security. New Zealand therefore directed her post-Washington efforts towards further assisting and encouraging Britain in the defence of her Far Eastern Empire by supporting the Singapore rationale. This was demonstrated by New Zealand's overwhelming support for the Singapore naval base project and the assumption of greater local Imperial defence responsibilities in order to counter the inherent flaw within the Singapore strategy. The New Zealand Government acutely recognized, following the Washington Conference, that without an established modern naval base in the Pacific, the Singapore strategy could not be implemented for "technical" reasons. With the scrapping of the majority of pre-Jutland British capital ships at Washington, the composition of the British fleet was significantly altered to consist largely of the more modern post-Jutland capital ships, with submarine bulges, which could not be serviced, due to their design, by any existing British naval base in the Pacific. New Zealand therefore undertook in 1923 both to assist and encourage Britain in the speedy completion of the Singapore naval base project. This took the form of financial contributions to the Singapore naval base project and the consistent "spur" New Zealand provided to successive British Governments, particularly Labour Governments, to complete the naval base project between 1923 and 1935. By 1935 New Zealand was generally confident that the Singapore naval base project would be completed. Ironically, just as the Singapore naval base approached completion, doubts concerning the successful implementation of the Singapore strategy intensified within the New Zealand Government between 1936 and 1939. These doubts stemmed from the inherent flaw within the strategy which became increasingly visible to the security-conscious Dominion.

With the rise of Germany and Italy as hostile maritime powers, the likelihood of the British fleet leaving European waters unprotected to meet the outbreak of hostilities with Japan in the Pacific became progressively more remote. This stimulated the Dominion into questioning Britain about the basis for Imperial defence and examining in greater detail the threats to her Pacific security posed by a possible war with Japan in light of the questionable Singapore strategy. In an effort to quell the Dominion's fears for her Pacific security, the British Government continually reassured New Zealand that the basis for Imperial defence rested upon the security of Britain and the Singapore naval base, and that she would, if necessary, abandon her "Mediterranean position" in order to send a fleet of sufficient strength to Singapore in the event of war with Germany, Italy and Japan. Although New Zealand accepted the British assurance, the Dominion Government recognized that there might still be a considerable period of time between the outbreak of war with Japan and the arrival of a British fleet at Singapore (phase I period), during which time Japan would have command of the Pacific. This prompted New Zealand to call for a thorough examination of local defence problems and requirements in the Pacific during the phase I period in order to counter this inherent flaw within the Singapore strategy. At the Pacific Defence Conference at Wellington in 1939, Britain, Australia and New Zealand focussed their attention on this very topic, and local areas of strategic responsibility were determined. While Britain accepted responsibility for the local defence of Singapore, Australia and New Zealand placed their emphasis upon the defence of territory and sea communications within the Southwest Pacific.

Unknown to New Zealand, the British Government had undertaken additional measures to remedy the basic weakness of the Singapore strategy caused by the rise of Germany and Italy as possibly hostile maritime powers. Despite the assurances made to the New Zealand Government, the British found themselves unwilling seriously to contemplate the abandonment of their Mediterranean position in order to send a British fleet to Singapore in the event of war with Germany, Italy and Japan. Thus, the possibility that the United States might assume the defence of Britain's Far Eastern Empire in the Pacific began to play a prominent part in British strategical

thinking and planning for a war with Germany, Italy and Japan. British naval assistance likewise began to play a prominent part in American strategical thinking and planning in the American Government's desire to conduct an offensive against Japan in the Western Pacific, in the event of war with Germany, Italy and Japan. In this regard, the prime concern to American military authorities was British naval assistance in the Atlantic and the use of the Singapore naval base. The rise of Germany and Italy as hostile maritime powers therefore gave impetus to Anglo-American naval co-operation and the gradual development of a crypto Anglo-American Alliance. In a series of informal and non-binding secret conversations between British and American naval authorities in London and Washington between 1937 and 1939, it eventually became informally understood that the United States would assume major strategic responsibility in the Pacific while Britain and her allies would do so in European and Atlantic areas, in the event of war with Germany, Italy and Japan. This informal understanding between British and American military authorities, together with the later critical weakening of the British position in the Mediterranean, provided the necessary conditions for New Zealand's abrupt reorientation from Britain to the United States for her Pacific security in 1940. Had Britain in 1919 accepted the challenge from Japan for naval supremacy in the Western Pacific by establishing a Far Eastern Fleet, as recommended by Lord Jellicoe, she would not have been forced to make that inevitably painful decision over strategic priorities which led New Zealand to look to America for her Pacific security in 1940.

The Reorientation, 1940-1942

With the outbreak of war between Germany and the British Empire in September 1939, New Zealand, accepting British assurances for her Pacific security, undertook to train and dispatch a major land force to the Middle East, thereby contributing to Empire defence. In return, New Zealand continued to look towards Britain for her Pacific security which the mother country appeared able to provide, for Italy had not entered the war and Britain was in a position to dispatch a fleet of sufficient strength to Singapore in the event of war with Japan. By April 1940, however, the war in Europe was suddenly and dramatically transformed by a German offensive which completely destroyed Allied defences in continental Western Europe.

The German victories in Europe, culminating in the fall of France, shook the Singapore strategy into an almost virtual collapse, as the result of the sudden alteration in the balance of naval powers within European waters. With Italy's entry into the war on the side of Germany and the impending fall of France in early June 1940, the British Government was confronted with a serious weakening in the British position in the Mediterranean region and a painful choice with regard to future strategic priorities. Without French naval support, the Royal Navy would have the task not only of ensuring the defence of the United Kingdom but that of also neutralizing the Italian Navy in Mediterranean waters. With this additional naval responsibility, Britain would be unable to dispatch a British fleet of sufficient strength to Singapore in the event of war with Japan. Britain therefore was faced with a most painful choice with regard to future strategic priorities: should the British Mediterranean position be abandoned in order to ensure the defence of the Far Eastern Empire in the event of war with Japan? Despite the previous pronouncements of Imperial defence policy and the assurances made to the New Zealand and Australian Governments, the British Government would not accept the abandonment of British Mediterranean positions in order to ensure the defence of the Far Eastern Empire in the Pacific against Japan. Encouraged by their "informal" understanding with the American Government, the British Government endeavoured to retain the Mediterranean positions while secretly urging the United States formally to assume the defence of the British Far Eastern Empire against Japan. This policy formed an essential feature of British grand strategy from June 1940 to March 1941. In accordance with this policy, the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, informed the New Zealand Government in mid-June 1940, that without French naval assistance, it would be unlikely that Britain would be able to send a fleet to Singapore in the event of war with Japan. In those circumstances, Churchill informed the Dominion that the defence of Imperial interests in the Pacific would have to rest with the United States of America. New Zealand's immediate reaction to this disclosure of British grand strategy was a sudden reorientation from Britain to the United States for her Pacific security. Recognizing that this was now to rest upon American sea-power, New Zealand immediately sought the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States. Having done that,

the Dominion then turned its efforts towards securing the American naval shield within the developing Anglo-American Alliance. This was to form New Zealand's basic defence policy for the next twenty-one months. Although New Zealand accepted the British Government's conception of grand strategy, the Dominion's fears for her security heightened with the formation of a militarist-oriented government in Japan which sought to create a "New Order" in the "Southern Region" of the Western Pacific. In an effort to relieve the Dominion of these fears and to put British grand strategy on a more solid footing, Churchill assured the New Zealand Government in August that, should Japan enter the war and set about invading Australia or New Zealand on a large scale, the British Government would abandon the Mediterranean theatre and come to the immediate aid of the Pacific Dominions. In addition, Churchill informed the Dominion Government of a recent UKCOS Far Eastern Appreciation which called for Dutch participation in British Pacific defences and greater local defence preparations for the Singapore naval base. The New Zealand Government accepted Churchill's assurance and the UKCOS Far Eastern Appreciation. Anxiously awaiting the first indication of American military co-operation in the Pacific against Japan, New Zealand then sought greater local military co-operation with Australia in the Southwest Pacific, as recommended by the Pacific Defence Conference in 1939. This resulted in a series of military conversations between the Australian and New Zealand Chiefs of Staff in September, which focussed on the problems of local defence for the protection of trade and territory within the Port Moresby-Vila-Fiji-Tonga Island and Tasman Sea area. As a result of those discussions, an ANZAC local defence scheme for the protection of trade and territory within the Tasman Sea area, on the basis of war with Germany and Italy, was agreed upon, with Australia as the controlling partner of ANZAC military forces. Despite this positive result, the discussions revealed a fundamental difference of view with regard to local naval strategy which inhibited fuller ANZAC military co-operation within the larger area, the Port Moresby-Vila-Fiji-Tonga Island and Tasman Sea Area, in the event of war with Japan. The difference of view with regard to local naval strategy stemmed from a difference of opinion between the Pacific Dominions over the possible scale of attack and strategic priorities within the area. Australia, deeply concerned for the protection of trade within the

Tasman Sea area, desired the introduction of a defensive naval strategy, such as escort convoy duties for ANZAC naval forces, in the event of war with Japan, whereas, New Zealand, more concerned with the defence of the islands to her north, desired an offensive naval strategy, such as a concentration of ANZAC naval forces in defence of the Pacific islands, in the event of war with Japan. It was accepted, however, that with the settlement of the issue of local naval strategy the local defence scheme would be put into effect for the much larger area and on the basis of war with Germany, Italy and Japan. Despite the different strategical views between the Pacific Dominions, both Australia and New Zealand had recognized the vital need to co-ordinate their future efforts and limited military resources in the event of war with Japan. In essence, both Dominions began to look upon themselves as one strategical whole, with their primary defence interests within the Southwest Pacific.

While New Zealand had sought greater local military co-operation with Australia, the British had successfully obtained active American military co-operation in the Pacific against Japan. Unknown to the British Government, however, the German victories in Europe had completely upset American planning for an offensive against Japan in the Western Pacific and confronted American military authorities with a major strategical question. It appeared to American military authorities that Britain might be defeated, let alone unable to contain the Axis Powers in the European and Atlantic area. Recognizing that American security and future planning depended upon a detailed assessment of Britain's chances for survival and ability to contain the Axis Powers in the European and Atlantic area, President Roosevelt agreed to the holding of informal Anglo-American military conversations in London, as proposed by the British Government. During those August discussions in London, the British fully disclosed their conception of grand strategy and impressed upon the Americans the vital importance which they attached to American military support in the Pacific against Japan. The Americans, however, were uncertain as to where the main American military effort should be directed, the Pacific or Atlantic, in co-operation with Britain. Although the discussions in London did not result in any immediate active American military co-operation with Britain against Japan, the discussions did convince the Americans that Britain would not be defeated and

provided them with an opportunity to assess Britain's capacity to contain the Axis Powers in the European and Atlantic area in order to reassess their views on grand strategy. With Japan's initial southern advance into northern French Indo-China and her conclusion of a Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in late September, the United States then recognized the need for active military co-operation with Britain in the development of a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence against further Japanese southward expansion. This recognition led to an American proposal to the British Government in October, for the holding of formal Anglo-American military staff talks for the development of a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan. Encouraged by this first indication of active American military support against Japan, the British Government eagerly accepted the American proposal. In an effort to guard against American isolationist reaction which could seriously upset Roosevelt's chances of re-election as President, the British and American Governments agreed that the Anglo-American military staff talks would be held at Washington after the American Presidential election in November, 1940. In the meantime it was agreed that British, Dutch and American military authorities would exchange information on Pacific defence. By October 1940, therefore, the United States and Britain were involved in a joint effort to halt further Japanese southern expansion through the development of a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence or southern encirclement of Japan.

The movement towards a general Pacific war which had begun in June with the formation of the militarist-oriented Konoye Government in Japan, continued unabated from late October to mid-April, 1941. During that time, Japan unremittingly endeavoured to construct a New Order in the Southern Region by attempting, in accordance with her July programme of conquest, to: secure a greater share of vital raw materials from the Netherlands East Indies to fuel her growing military machine; gain complete control over French Indo-China and Thailand; curtail American interference in the pursuit of her New Order through diplomatic action at Washington; and to reach an accord with the Soviet Union in order to secure her northern flank for expansion into the Southern Region. During that same time, British and American authorities sought to forge the

framework for the southern encirclement of Japan, a joint Anglo-American strategy, upon which later to base a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan. The first step in that effort was taken at Singapore in late October, where a defence conference was convened by British military authorities in order to prepare the British position for the Anglo-American military staff talks in Washington, and to reach agreement on immediate Far Eastern defence requirements. Having done that, another defence conference was convened by British and Dutch military authorities in late February at Singapore for the purpose of producing a joint British-Dutch Pacific defence plan, which was intended to complement the development of a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan following the conclusion of the Anglo-American military staff conference at Washington. During that period of intense planning at Singapore, British grand strategy and the active military co-operation of the United States in the development of a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence had a profound influence upon Australia and New Zealand defence policies. Together the ANZAC partners endeavoured to shape British Far Eastern defence plans and preparations to meet ANZAC-American defence requirements, on the assumption that American authorities at Washington would accept Britain's conception of grand strategy. This was clearly demonstrated by their joint efforts to ensure the defence of the Singapore naval base and the American naval approach line from Hawaii to Singapore, via the Southwest Pacific. In that way, Australia and New Zealand sought to secure an American naval shield in the event of war with Japan by preparing for an American fleet to be based on Singapore. At the Anglo-American military staff conference in Washington, however, the British encountered strong American opposition in their proposal that the United States should assume major strategic responsibility in the Pacific by dispatching an adequate fleet to Singapore in the event of war with Germany, Italy and Japan. This was due to a reassessment and revision of the American position on grand strategy by American military authorities just prior to the Washington conference. The London Anglo-American military conversations in August had convinced American military authorities that Britain would be unable unilaterally to contain the Axis Powers in the European and Atlantic area in order for the United States to conduct a successful offensive against Japan in the Western Pacific. The American military authorities therefore

had agreed, prior to the Washington conference, that the United States should maintain a strict defensive in the Pacific against Japan and undertake an offensive in the Atlantic and European area against Germany and Italy in co-operation with Britain. With the firm American rejection of British grand strategy at Washington, it was eventually agreed between the British and American military authorities that Britain and the United States would assume joint strategic responsibility in the Pacific, in the event of war with Germany, Italy and Japan.

Upon that basis, British and American military authorities were able to devise a joint Anglo-American strategy which, with its main emphasis upon the Atlantic and European area, provided for the defence of British, Dutch and American interests in the Pacific, principally through a joint defence of the Malay Barrier. The joint Anglo-American strategy involved the United States advancing the U.S. Pacific Fleet offensively across the Central Pacific in support of the Malay Barrier by diverting enemy strength away from that area through the denial and capture of enemy positions in the Marshall and Caroline Islands; and at the same time, augmenting American naval forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean waters so that Britain would be able to dispatch a British fleet to Singapore. In order to implement this joint Anglo-American strategy, British and American military authorities clearly defined respective British and American areas of strategic responsibility and command, and determined the tasks and the appropriate strength of military forces for each area. The Pacific proper was divided into two main areas of strategic responsibility and command, the Pacific Ocean Area and the Far East and Australia and New Zealand Area. The Pacific Ocean Area was exclusively an area of American strategic responsibility and command. The Area included those contiguous continental land areas and islands within the North, Central and South Pacific. The principal American naval tasks within the area were for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, based at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, to: (a) support the forces of the Associated Powers (British, Dutch and American) in the Far East Area by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of enemy positions in the Marshall and Caroline Islands; and (b) to protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Ocean Area. Outside the

Pacific Ocean Area, the United States had the additional strategic responsibility of supporting Australian and New Zealand naval forces in the area south of the Equator from 155° East to 180°. This area became known as the Shaded Area and consisted of the Solomon-New Caledonia-New Hebrides-Fiji Island and Tasman Sea Area, including New Zealand. The Area also comprised the adjacent portions of the Australian and New Zealand Areas, including much of the area of mutual military co-operation within the Southwest Pacific. The American military authorities' assumption of strategic responsibility for the defence of the Shaded Area was based upon their desire to release a major portion of Australian and New Zealand naval forces for operations in defence of the Malay Barrier. The Far East and Australia and New Zealand Area was, primarily, an area of British strategic responsibility and command. The area included: the British colonies of Burma, Malaya, Hong Kong and Borneo, the American Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand, and the Pacific islands from New Guinea to the Fiji Islands. The principal naval tasks assigned to British, Dutch and American naval forces within the Area were to: (a) support land and air forces in the defence of the territories of the Associated Powers; and (b) to protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the Area. In order to carry out those vital tasks, the British military authorities had agreed to reinforce the Area with a British fleet consisting of British naval units from other British naval commands, i.e., Home and Mediterranean, and by new naval construction. The British and American military authorities at Washington therefore considered that the U.S. Pacific Fleet, acting in conjunction with the British fleet in defence of the Malay Barrier, would provide an adequate defence against a Japanese southward advance upon British, Dutch and American interests in the Pacific.

New Zealand was not entirely disappointed by the outcome of the Washington Conference for, despite the general American refusal to accept Britain's concept of grand strategy, the United States had assumed strategic responsibility for the naval defence of New Zealand and environs within the Shaded Area in the event of war with Japan.

From late April to early December, 1941, events moved with an increasing tempo towards the outbreak of general Pacific war.

Frustrated by her failure to obtain significant progress in the establishment of a New Order in the Southern Region, Japan abandoned her July 1940 programme of conquest for one based upon early control over the Southern Region, even at the risk of war with both Britain and the United States. Japan therefore began to develop operational plans for an offensive into the Southern Region of the Western Pacific and undertook general preparations for war with both Britain and the United States. The question of when to go to war, however, was one which continually divided the Konoye Government in Japan. The military, deeply concerned that British, Dutch and American trade embargoes and the build-up of defences would soon seriously jeopardize their ability to gain control over the Southern Region, demanded a decision for war; whereas, the civilian members of the government generally hoped that Japan's objectives could be achieved through diplomacy. With the continued failure of the Konoye Government to obtain Japan's objectives in the Southern Region through diplomacy, the military eventually forced the issue and assumed full control of the Japanese Government in mid-October. With the extremists in control of the Japanese Government, a decision for war with Britain, the Netherlands East Indies and the United States quickly followed. Against this background, British, Dutch and American authorities feverishly endeavoured to complete their southern encirclement of Japan by establishing their Pacific defences and concerting their plans before Japan launched her expected southern thrust. A further defence conference was therefore convened by British, Dutch and American military authorities in late April at Singapore in order to develop a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan on the basis of the Anglo-American military staff conference agreement (ABC-1) concluded at Washington the previous month. The subsequent plan, referred to as the ADB Agreement or Report, was unacceptable, however, to the American Chiefs of Staff. The principal point of American disagreement concerned British naval dispositions during the phase I period, the period from the outbreak of war with Japan to the arrival of a British "Eastern fleet" at Singapore. As agreed at the Washington Conference, the Pacific was to be an Anglo-American strategic responsibility, through a joint defence of the Malay Barrier. Without the prospect of dispatching a British fleet to Singapore in the immediate future, British military authorities at the Singapore Conference had placed their emphasis instead upon the naval defence of their sea communications

in the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific during the phase I period. This left the U.S. Pacific Fleet with major responsibility in undertaking offensive action in defence of the Malay Barrier during the phase I period. Understandably, the American Chiefs of Staff repeatedly rejected the plan and were therefore reluctant to commit the U.S. Pacific Fleet to offensive operations in conjunction with slender British naval forces within the Far East and Australia and New Zealand Areas. Only New Zealand, exclusively under the American naval shield of the U.S. Pacific Fleet within the Shaded Area, attempted to meet the American point of view regarding the phase I period. The New Zealand Government clearly understood that unless an acceptable combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan was developed, the efficiency and extent of American naval support within the Shaded Area would be seriously jeopardized. In a further effort to secure the American naval shield in the event of war with Japan, New Zealand, therefore, had endeavoured to contribute to the development of an acceptable combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan by urging her ANZAC partner, Australia, to adopt an offensive naval strategy in defence of the Malay Barrier during the phase I period. In her repeated attempts, New Zealand encountered a most intransigent Australian attitude towards the phase I period, which inhibited ANZAC-American naval co-operation in the Shaded Area and the development of an acceptable combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan. This was due to Australia's overriding concern for the defence of her sea communications within the Southwest Pacific, particularly in the Tasman Sea area. The Australian Government and military authorities therefore looked with disinterest upon the prospect of American naval support in the Shaded Area since it was largely conditional upon Australian and New Zealand naval support in defence of the Malay Barrier. Australia tended to view that aspect of the combined British-Dutch-American defence plan as a threat to Australian and New Zealand plans for military co-operation in the Southwest Pacific, particularly in the Tasman Sea area. In that latter regard, Australia and New Zealand had finally come to an agreement on local naval strategy which called for the assumption of escort convoy duties by Australian and New Zealand naval forces immediately upon the outbreak of war with Japan, as recommended by the ADB Agreement. The boundaries of the Shaded Area, which failed to include Australia's eastern coast and

southeastern focal shipping area, and the lack of a definite American commitment for American naval support in the defence of sea communications, particularly through escort convoy duties, in the Shaded Area account for Australia's intransigent attitude. With the British Government's decision in mid-October to reinforce the Far East and Australia and New Zealand Area with a British capital ship force and form an Eastern Fleet at Singapore, before the outbreak of war with Japan, the possibility of obtaining American agreement on a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan vastly improved. At the insistence of the British Prime Minister, the Admiralty was forced to cancel plans for determined defence of sea communications in the Indian Ocean and develop new plans for the establishment of a Eastern Fleet at Singapore which would co-operate with the U.S. Pacific Fleet in a joint defence of the Malay Barrier. The British Government had clearly understood that a decision to establish a British fleet at Singapore, before the outbreak of war with Japan, would demonstrate to the United States that Britain intended to meet its strategic responsibilities in the Pacific and give impetus towards the development of a new war plan, since the ADB agreement had been based entirely upon the phase I period. As anticipated by the British Government, the American Chiefs of Staff agreed to the convening of a further Far East Conference for the development of a new combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan. The British decision therefore initiated a British and American rush to Manila in early December for eleventh-hour planning. As agreed between the British and American Chiefs of Staff, the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, met at Manila in order to agree upon a joint Anglo-American naval plan which would serve as the basis for a new combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan. A joint Anglo-American naval plan was subsequently agreed upon which provided for a joint defence of the Malay Barrier, through the co-operation of the Eastern and U.S. Pacific fleets. In further efforts to hasten the development of a combined Pacific defence plan, the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, then held a further conference at Singapore with the Australian and New Zealand Naval Chiefs of Staff in order to obtain their support for the formation of an Eastern Fleet for the defence of the Malay Barrier. As instructed by his government, the New Zealand Naval Chief of Staff fully

co-operated with the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, in his efforts to meet the American point of view with regard to a combined Pacific defence plan. The Australian Naval Chief of Staff, however, advised the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, of his government's refusal to release any naval forces for the defence of the Malay Barrier. Before the matter could be fully explored, Japan launched her offensive into the Southern Region on 7 December, 1941 (West longitude time). The event which had been expected during those fourteen months of joint Anglo-American planning had finally occurred. But British and American authorities had still not reached an agreement on a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence plan. The general Pacific war, however, out of dire necessity quickly brought solutions to the many problems which had previously obstructed such an agreement. But this is not to say that the solutions were all satisfactory. The road ahead was still bestrewn with rocks.

When Japan launched her offensive, British, Dutch and American authorities, lacking a combined Pacific defence plan, were forced to meet the thrust largely by independent and unco-ordinated action. This situation only accelerated the disintegration of their northern defences against Japan. The vital need for a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence against Japan was once again recognized by the British and American Governments. It was then accepted, however, that the development of a combined Pacific defence could not be quickly achieved without political direction. Moreover, it was also apparent that to obtain immediate military co-operation from so many military commands for the implementation of a single war plan was virtually next to impossible. A solution to the problem of a combined British-Dutch-American Pacific defence was therefore found in the convening of a high-level Anglo-American conference at Washington and the establishment of two unified Pacific command areas, on the basis of the ABC-1 agreement. On 14 December, the British Prime Minister and his military advisers rushed to Washington for discussions with President Roosevelt and the American Chiefs of Staff in what became known as the Arcadia conference. In the opening sessions, the delegates agreed that the most "immediate object" was to hold: (a) Hawaii and Dutch Harbor, Alaska; (b) Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies; and (c) Rangoon and the route to China. In an effort to meet the Japanese thrust in the Far East, the principal area, the conference

recommended the establishment of the ABDA (American-British-Dutch-Australian) Area, placed under the unified command of a British Commander-in-Chief. The boundaries of the ABDA Area followed the limits of the British Far East Area to the northern shores of Australia. The primary strategic task of Allied military forces within the area was to hold the Malay Barrier as the basic "defensive position" within the area, and to operate in as great depth as possible forward of the Malay Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance. The United States would retain command of the Pacific Ocean area.

Understandably, Australia and New Zealand were not pleased by these arrangements; for a serious gap existed in British-Dutch-American Pacific defence between the ABDA and Pacific Ocean Areas. This area comprised the eastern New Guinea-New Hebrides-New Caledonia-Fiji Island Area, eastern Australia, the Tasman Sea and New Zealand. The New Zealand Government was deeply puzzled by their country's apparent exclusion from the American naval zone in the Pacific. The Pacific defence arrangements appeared contrary to the terms of the ABC-1 agreement, whereby the United States had assumed strategic responsibility for the naval defence of New Zealand and environs within the Shaded Area. The New Zealand Government therefore sought greater clarification on the matter from Mr Churchill. The Australian Government, deeply concerned about the increased threat to their sea communications in the Tasman Sea arising from the possible occupation of Rabaul by Japan, protested vigorously to Churchill on the exclusion of Australian eastern waters from the American naval zone. In an effort to placate these Dominions, Churchill endeavoured at Washington to obtain an American commitment for the naval defence of the Shaded Area, as agreed to in the ABC-1 Report. The gap in British-Dutch-American Pacific defences had been foreseen by the American delegation when the ABDA Area was first created but the American Navy, still reeling from the blows suffered at Pearl Harbor, had refused to accept the additional burden of providing for that area's defence, despite the ABC-1 Agreement. The previous difficulties encountered by American naval authorities in establishing a suitable basis for ANZAC-American naval co-operation in the Shaded Area may also have been a contributing factor in the American refusal to assume strategic responsibility in that area.

Nevertheless, the American delegation had also recognized the vital importance of maintaining the lines of sea communications between Australia and the United States. In this regard, American military authorities, fully disillusioned with the American concept of Hemisphere defence, had, since the outbreak of the Pacific war, earmarked Australia as their forward Pacific base for operations against Japan. The American delegation therefore recommended to the conference the establishment of an additional unified Pacific Command Area, the ANZAC Area, which was accepted by the British delegation. This area was placed under the unified command of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet. The area's boundaries completely filled the gap between the ABDA and Pacific Ocean Areas, for the Shaded Area had been enlarged in order to meet the strategical interests of Australia and New Zealand. In that regard, the ANZAC Area included Australia's eastern coast and southeastern focal shipping area, a most important criterion for meeting Australia's strategical interests. The primary strategic task of the Allied naval forces within the ANZAC Area was to cover the eastern and northeastern sea approaches to Australia and New Zealand from America. American naval support in the ANZAC Area, however, was conditional upon a measure of Australian naval support in the ABDA Area, in defence of the Malay Barrier. Urged on by New Zealand, the Australian Government eventually accepted the American proposals for the establishment of the ANZAC Area, but only after the United States had assured Australia that it would meet, among other things, her conditions for the defence of sea communications with the Area. By early February, 1942, therefore, the ANZAC Area had been fully established. After more than twenty-one months, since her reorientation away from Britain in June 1940, New Zealand had finally secured an American naval shield. How effective it would be in guarding New Zealand and her vital interests against possible Japanese attack only time would tell. But it was at least a source of great reassurance to the New Zealand authorities concerned in the long-drawn-out negotiations which achieved it.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Selected Bibliography

I. Primary Sources

A. Official

(i) Unprinted

(a) Held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wellington

Prime Minister's Department

PM 62/3/1, New Zealand Representation Overseas, United States of America, Establishment of Legation in United States of America.

PM 62/3/7, New Zealand Representation Overseas, United States of America, New Zealand Supply Mission in Washington.

PM 62/3/8, New Zealand Representation Overseas, United States of America, Service Personnel in Washington.

PM 62/3/9, New Zealand Representation Overseas, United States of America, New Zealand Liaison Officer.

PM 81/4/2, (1), Constitution and Administration, War, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes of Meetings.

PM 81/4/3, (2-3), Constitution and Administration, War, Chiefs of Staff, Chiefs of Staff Papers.

PM 81/10/11, Constitution and Administration, Command, ANZAC Area and South Pacific.

PM 81/10/13, (1-3), Constitution and Administration, Command, Far East and Pacific.

PM 81/12/2, (1), Constitution and Administration, War, Council of Defence, Notice of Meetings and Agenda.

PM 86/1/1, Defence of the Pacific, General.

PM 86/1/7, (1), Defence of the Pacific, Appreciations and Requests for Equipment for the Pacific Area.

PM 86/1/9, Defence of the Pacific, American-Dutch-British Naval Liaison in the Pacific.

PM 86/1/11, Defence of the Pacific, Aerodrome Construction in the Pacific.

PM 86/15/15, Defence of the Pacific, Fiji, Aerodrome Construction.

PM 86/27/10, (1), Defence Conference, 1939, Verbatim Report of Proceedings.

PM 87/2/1, New Zealand Forces, Navy, General.

PM 455/7/1, (1-3), Singapore, Defence, General.

(b) Held at National Archives, Wellington

Air Department

Air 130/3/2, Plans: Theatres of Responsibility, Co-ordination of Australian and New Zealand Forces in the Tasman Sea.

Air 123/4/1, Conference, Singapore, October, 1940.

Air 123/4/2, Conference, Singapore, Anglo-Dutch-Australian (ADA), February, 1941.

Air 123/5/1, British Military Mission, Washington, 1941.

Army Department

AD 11 7/20, Defence: Co-operation between Australia and New Zealand.

AD 11 12/22; New Zealand, Defence Conference, 1939, Report.

AD 11 17/2, Report by Viscount Jellicoe: Naval Mission to New Zealand, August-October, 1919, Vols I-III.

AD 290/1/1, New Zealand Joint Staff Mission, Washington, United States of America.

External Affairs Department

EA 11/53, Meetings of British Commonwealth Prime Ministers, 1935, Proceedings and Memoranda.

Governor-General

G 40-2, Imperial Meetings, 1921,

- (i) Minutes of Meetings of Principal Delegates,
- (ii) Summary of Proceedings and Documents.

G 40-4, Imperial Conference, 1923, Stenographic Notes of Meetings.

G 40-8, Imperial Conference, 1937,

- (i) Minutes of Meetings of Principal Delegates,
- (ii) Memoranda (E Series).

Navy Department

NA 22/4/7, Conferences, Commander Burrell's "Washington Conversations".

NA 22/4/13, (2), Conferences, Imperial.

NA 22/4/43, Singapore Defence Conference, October, 1940.

NA 22/4/44, Singapore Defence Conference, February, 1941.

NA 22/4/46, Singapore Defence Conference, December 1941.

NA 030/68/4, (1-2), War, 1939-1941, Plans, Appreciation of New Zealand's Defence Requirements in the Event of War With Japan.

(ii) Printed

(a) New Zealand

New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs. *Documents Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War, 1939-1945*. Vols I-III. Wellington: War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1949-1963.

New Zealand Department of Statistics. *New Zealand Official Yearbook*. Wellington: Government Printer, 1972.

New Zealand. Parliament. *Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, Report of the Hon. Sir John Salmond, Delegate for the Dominion of New Zealand*. Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives of New Zealand, Vol. I, A-5, 1922.

New Zealand. Parliament. *New Zealand Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 200, (June 14-July 18, 1923).

(b) United Kingdom

United Kingdom. Parliament. *Parliamentary Debates* (House of Commons), Vol. LIX (March 2-March 20, 1914).

(c) United States of America

U.S. Congress. Senate. *Conference on the Limitation of Armament*. Senate Document No. 125, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, 1922.

U.S. Congress. *Pearl Harbor: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*. 39 Parts. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946.

U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. *Summary Report (Pacific War)*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1, 1946.

B. Unofficial

Printed

Churchill, Winston S. *The Second World War*. Vol. II: *Their Finest Hour*. London: Cassell and Co. Ltd, 1949.

Churchill, Winston S. *The Second World War*. Vol. III: *The Grand Alliance*. London: Cassell and Co. Ltd, 1950.

Hull, Cordell. *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*. Vols I-II. London: Hodden and Stroughton, 1948.

Stimson, Henry and Bundy, McGeorge. *On Active Service in Peace and War*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948.

II. Secondary Sources

A. Official

(i) Unprinted

Henderson, J.T. *The Evolution of New Zealand Defence Policy, 1840-1939*. Wellington: Ministry of Defence, 1971.

(ii) Printed

Butler, J.R.M. *Grand Strategy*. Vol. II: *September 1939-June 1941*. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957.

Butler, J.R.M. *Grand Strategy*. Vol. III: *June 1941-August 1942*. Pt I. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964.

Cline, Roy S. *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, The War Department, U.S. Army in World War II*. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1951.

Conn, Stetson and Fairchild, Byron. *The Framework of Hemisphere Defence, The Western Hemisphere, U.S. Army in World War II*. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1960.

Craven, W.E. and Cate, J.L. *Army Air Forces in World War II*, Vol. I: *Plans and Early Operations*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948.

Gill, G. Herman. *Royal Australian Navy, 1939-1942*. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957.

Gwyer, J.M.A. *Grand Strategy*. Vol. III: *June 1941-August 1942*. Pt I. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964.

Kirby, S. Woodburn. *The War Against Japan*. Vol. I: *The Loss of Singapore*. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957.

Lissington, M.P. *New Zealand and Japan, 1900-1941*. Wellington: Government Printer, 1972.

Lissington, M.P. *New Zealand and the United States, 1840-1944*. Wellington: Government Printer, 1972.

Matloff, Maurice and Snell, Edwin. *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, The War Department, U.S. Army in World War II*. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953.

Morison, Samuel E. *History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II*. Vol. I: *The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943*. London: Oxford University Press, 1948.

Morison, Samuel E. *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*. Vol. III: *The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942*. London: Oxford University Press, 1948.

Morton, Louis. *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, The War in the Pacific, U.S. Army in World War II*. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1962.

Roskill, S.W. *The War At Sea, 1939-1945*. Vol. I: *The Defensive*. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954.

Watson, Mark. *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, The War Department, U.S. Army in World War II*. Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1950.

Wigmore, Lionel. *The Japanese Thrust*. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957.

Wood, F.L. *The New Zealand People at War: Political and External Affairs*. Wellington: War History Branch, New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs, 1958.

Woodward, Llewellyn. *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*. Vols I-III. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970-1971.

B. Unofficial

(i) Unprinted

Cumming, R.C. "The Genesis of the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy, 1880-1921". M.A. Thesis, University of Auckland, New Zealand, 1964.

Harland, W.B. "New Zealand's Security Problem in the Pacific, 1939-1951". M.A. Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, 1954.

Henderson, J.T. "The Defence of New Zealand". M.A. Thesis, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, 1971.

MacGibbon, Ian C. "The Blue-Water Rationale: New Zealand's Naval Security Problem, 1919-1939". M.A. Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, 1971.

Ross, I.M. "New Zealand and Imperial Defence, 1919-1926: Problems and Policies". M.A. Thesis, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, 1965.

Wasserman, L. "The United States and New Zealand: Political and Commercial Relations". Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1948.

Wilson, J.M. "New Zealand and the United States, 1897-1908". M.A. Thesis, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, 1965.

(ii) Printed

(a) Books

Adler, Selig. *The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction*. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1957.

Beasley, W.G. *The Modern History of Japan*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963.

Bisson, T.A. *American Policy in the Far East, 1931-1940*. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942.

Braisted, William R. *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922*. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1971.

Brown, Delmer M. *Nationalism in Japan*. New York: Russell and Russell, 1971.

Buchanan, A. Russell. *The United States and World War II*. Vol. 1. New York: Harper and Row, 1964.

Buell, Raymond *Isolated America*. New York: Knopf, 1940.

Butow, Robert. *Tojo and the Coming of the War*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961.

Bywater, Hector C. *Sea Power in the Pacific: A Study of the American-Japanese Naval Problem*. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1921.

Clyde, Paul H. *The Far East*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1971.

Craig, Albert, Fairbank, John, and Reischauer, Edwin. *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation*. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973.

Crawley, James B. *Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Cunninghame, R.R. "The Development of New Zealand's Foreign Policy and Political Alignment". *New Zealand's External Relations*. Edited by T.C. Larkin. London: Oxford University Press, 1962.

Dauids, Jules. *America and the World of Our Time*. New York: Random House, 1960.

De Conde, Alexander. "On Twentieth-Century Isolationism". *Isolation and Security*. Edited by Alexander De Conde. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1957.

- Divine, Robert A. *The Reluctant Belligerent: American Entry in World War II*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965.
- Drummond, Donald. *The Passing of American Neutrality, 1937-1941*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1955.
- Feis, Herbert. *The Road to Pearl Harbor, The Coming of the War Between the United States and Japan*. New York: Atheneum, 1963.
- Ferrell, Robert. "The Peace Movement". *Isolation and Security*. Edited by Alexander De Conde. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1957.
- Gordon, Bernard K. *New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960.
- Griswold, A.W. *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1930.
- Heindrichs, Waldo, Jr. "The Role of the United States Navy". *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941*. Edited by Dorothy Bory and Shumpei Okumoto. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973.
- Herzog, James H. *Closing the Open Door: American-Japanese Diplomatic Negotiations, 1936-1941*. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1973.
- Jonas, Manfred. *Isolationism in America, 1936-1941*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1966.
- Jones, F.C. *Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937-1945*. London: Oxford University Press, 1954.
- Kirby, S. Woodburn. *Singapore: The Chain of Disaster*. London: Cassell and Co. Ltd, 1971.
- Knaplund, Paul. *The British Empire, 1815-1939*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941.
- Knox, Dudley W. *The Eclipse of American Sea Power*. New York: American Army and Navy Journal, Inc., 1922.
- Langer, William L. and Gleason, S. Everett. *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953.
- Latourette, Kenneth S. *A Short History of the Far East*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957.
- Latourette, Kenneth S. *The History of Japan*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957.
- Louis, William R. *British Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939*. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1971.

- Maki, John M. *Japanese Militarism*. New York: Knopf, 1945.
- Medlicott, W.M. *British Foreign Policy Since Versailles, 1919-1963*. London, Methuen, 1968.
- Miller, J.D.B. *Britain and the Old Dominions*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1966.
- Morton, Louis. "Germany First: The Basic Concept of Allied Strategy in World War II". *Command Decisions*. Edited by K.R. Greenfield. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1959.
- Nish, Ian. *The Story of Japan*. London: Faber and Faber, 1968.
- Osgood, Robert. *Ideals and Self-Interest in American Foreign Relations*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.
- Parkinson, C. Northcote. *Britain in the Far East, the Singapore Naval Base*. Singapore: Donald Moore, 1955.
- Parkinson, Rober. *Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat*. London: Hart-Davis MacGibbon, 1973.
- Pelz, Stephan E. *Race to Pearl Harbor, The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974.
- Quinlan, Robert J. "The United States Fleet: Diplomacy, Strategy and the Allocation of Ships (1940-1941)". *American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies*. Edited by Harold Stein. Birmingham, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1963.
- Roskill, Stephan. *Naval Policy Between the Wars*. Vol. I: *The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929*. London: Collins, 1968.
- Schwarz, Urs. *American Strategy: A New Perspective*. New York: Doubleday and Co., 1966.
- Sherwood, Robert E. *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948.
- Sprout, Harold and Sprout, Margaret. *Towards a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1946.
- Tate, Merze. *The United States and Armaments*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948.
- Vinson, J. Chalmers. "Military Force and American Policy, 1919-1939". *Isolation and Security*. Edited by Alexander De Conde. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1957.
- Watt, Alan. *The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938-1965*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1967.

Wheeler, Gerald E. *Prelude to Pearl Harbor, The United States Navy and the Far East, 1921-1931*. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1964.

Yanaga, Chitoshi. *Japan Since Perry*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949.

(b) Articles

Callahan, Raymond. "The Illusion of Security: Singapore 1919-1942". *Journal of Contemporary History*, IX, No. 2 (April, 1974), 69-92.

McIntyre, W.D. "The Strategic Significance of Singapore, 1917-1942: The Naval Base and the Commonwealth". *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, X, No. 1 (March, 1969), 69-94.

McIntyre, W.D. "New Zealand and the Singapore Base Between the Wars". *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, II, No. 1 (March, 1971), 2-21.

Morton, Louis. "Preparations for the Defence of the Philippines During the War Scare of 1907". *Military Affairs*, XIII (Summer, 1949), 95-104.

Morton, Louis. "American and Allied Strategy in the Far East". *Military Review*, XXIX, No. 9 (December, 1949), 22-39.

Morton, Louis. "War Plan ORANGE, Evolution of a Strategy". *World Politics*, XI (January, 1959), 221-250.

Pratt, Lawrence. "The Anglo-American Naval Conversations on the Far East of January 1938". *International Affairs*, XLVII, No. 4 (October, 1971), 745-763.

Ross, Angus. "Reluctant Dominion or Dutiful Daughter? New Zealand and the Commonwealth in the Inter-War Years". *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, X, No. 1 (March, 1972), 28-43.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

New Zealand Local Defence*— South Pacific Islands 1939-1941

(a) Defence forces-Land

<u>Locality</u>	<u>Total Requirements</u>	<u>Existing Strength (Oct 1941)</u>
Fiji (Suva)	Three 6" guns Two 4.7" guns HQ Indep. Bde Gp One fd bty (six guns) One fd coy Three inf bns Two inf coys	Two 6" guns Two 4.7" guns HQ Indep. Bde Gp (NZ) One fd bty (six guns) One fd coy (NZ) One inf bn (NZ) One inf bn (Fiji) First Reinforcements (NZ) Two inf coys (Fiji)
Fiji (Momi)	Two 6" guns One inf bn MG coy Two inf coys One sec fd coy	Two 6" guns One inf bn (NZ) One inf bn less two coys (Fiji) One sec fd coy (NZ)
Tongatobu	Two 4" guns One bn (four rifle coys)	Three rifle coys
Fanning Island	Two 6" guns One inf coy	One 6" gun One 3.7" how. One inf coy (NZ)
Ocean Island	One inf pl	Two 18-pdr guns Native Constabulary and Volunteer Reserve
Western Samoa	One inf coy	One coy local force
Makatea	Two 6" guns Two inf pls	One inf pl (French)

* New Zealand local defence preparations were based upon the "most probable" scale of attack: sporadic raiding activities by enemy land, air and naval forces.

Source: Appendix VI in *Appreciation of the Defence Requirements of New Zealand in the Event of War with Japan*, prepared by General Sir Guy Williams, Military Adviser to the New Zealand Government, 1 October, 1941, AD 11 12/22.

(b) Reconnaissance

1. Coastwatching and Wireless Stations

Gilbert Islands

Ocean Island (P)
Little Makin
Makin
Apaiang
Maiana
Tarawa
Kuria
Abemama
Nonouti
Beru (P)
Tamana

Phoenix Islands

Canton (P)
Hull
Gardner

Union Group

Atafu
Nukunano
Fakaofu

West Samoa

Apia (P)
Upolu
Savaii

Tongan Islands

Niutobatabu
Niuafo
Neiafu
Vavau Group
Haapai Group
Nomuka
Tongatabu
Nukualofa (P)
Eua

New Zealand and Outlying Islands

Kermadecs
Chathams
Auckland Island
Campbell Island
Wellington (P)

Ellice Islands

Nanumea
Niutao
Nui
Vaitupu
Nukufetau
Funafuti (P)
Niulakita

Fiji Islands

Suva (P)
Kandavu
Lakemba
Wailangslala
Vanua Levu
Taveuni
Lakevil
Rotuma
Viti Levu

Line Islands

Washington
Fanning (P)
Christmas

Cook Islands

Penrhyn
Rakahanga
Manihiki
Pukapuka
Nassau (P)
Suvarrow
Palmerston
Niue
Aitutaki
Manuae
Mitiaro
Atiu
Mauke
Rarotonga (P)
Mangaia

All (P) Parent Island group stations were to maintain constant wireless communication with Area Operational Headquarters, Suva, Fiji, from where information would then be transmitted by wireless or cable to Central War Room, Wellington, New Zealand.

2. Land Air Bases and Seaplane Alighting Areas

<u>Locality</u>	<u>Land Air Bases</u>	<u>Seaplane Alighting Areas</u>
Fiji Islands	Suva (Nausori) Nandi	Suva Lauthala Lautoka
Tongan Islands	Nukualofa	Nukualofa
West Samoa		Satapuala (Upolu)

Appendix B

Australia and New Zealand Cruiser Strength, 1940

	<u>8" Cruisers</u>	<u>6" Cruisers</u>	<u>Armed Merchant Cruisers (AMC)</u>
Australia	2	Australia Canberra	2
		Adelaide Hobart Perth Sydney	Manoura Westralia
New Zealand	_____	2	1
		Achilles Leander	Monowai
TOTAL	2	6	3

Source: *Singapore Defence Conference Report, 1940, Part I, NA 22/4/47.*

Appendix C

List of Initial Dispositions and Functions of Naval Forces--

A.D.B. Report

<u>Ship</u>	<u>Base</u>	<u>Function</u>
(a) British Commonwealth Forces-East Indies Station		
Glasgow Ranchi Carthage Kanimbla	Durban	Cover to shipping from Cape Area through Mozambique Channel.
Shropshire Enterprise Hermes (or Eagle) 4 Hunter (if available)	Seychelles Mombasa	Cover to shipping from North and Mozambique Channel towards Maldives area. Reconnaissance over Saya de Malba area. Escort of troop and supply convoys as required.
1 cruiser 2 A/S sloops	Maldives	Cover to shipping to westward of Maldives to Ceylon. Escort of troop and supply convoys in this area as necessary.
Emerald Colombo Eagle (if available) 2 A/S sloops	Colombo	Cover to shipping in Ceylon area and to eastward. Escort of troop and supply convoys to and from Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea as requisite.
Ceres Capetown	Trincomalee Madras Calcutta	Cover of shipping in Bay of Bengal. Escort of troop and supply convoys from Indian ports as requisite in conjunction with China cruisers operating from Penang area.
Caledon Hector Antenor	Bombay	Cover of shipping in Arabian Sea. Escort of troop and supply convoys Bombay-Arden, Bombay-Colombo as requisite.
Renown Ark Royal 5 Destroyers (Force "H")	Trincomalee	General cover to route Seychelles to Aden. Escort of troop convoys Fremantle-Colombo and onward as necessary. Escort or cover of troop convoys in Bay of Bengal as requisite. Destroyers A/S protection of Force H in terminal areas.
Seabelle Falmouth 3 R.I.N. sloops	Bahrein Basra Khor Kuwai	Protection of shipping in Persian Gulf. Patrol of Straits of Ormuz.

<u>Ship</u>	<u>Base</u>	<u>Function</u>
3 sloops	Aden Suez	Protection of shipping in Red Sea. Patrol and convoy cover in Perim Strait.

(b) British Commonwealth Forces-China Station

Dauntless Durban Danae	Singapore and Penang	Protection of shipping in Malacca Straits and to westward.
------------------------------	-------------------------	--

(c) British Commonwealth Forces-Australian Station

Australia Canberra	Operating in and from S.W. Pacific.	Act as hunting force in Indian Ocean or S.W. Pacific. Escort of troop convoys to Middle East as far as Fremantle. Escort of supplies Fremantle to Malaya.
2 6-inch cruisers	Operating in S.W. Pacific	Act as hunting force in S.W. Pacific. Escort trans-Tasman convoys. Escort troop convoys to Tulagi and Vila. Provide cover for supplies to islands in S.W. Pacific.
1 6-inch cruiser	Operate in N. Australian waters	Escort troop convoys to Ambon and Koepong. Escort reinforcements to Singapore. (Then to be at disposi- tion of Commander-in-Chief, China).

(Note: Cruisers in the Tasman Sea will provide a degree of cover for the east coast trade.)

Adelaide Manoora Westralia	Melbourne	Escort westbound shipping from Melbourne and Adelaide to Fremantle and/or point of dispersal for inde- pendent routing.
----------------------------------	-----------	--

(d) British Commonwealth Forces-New Zealand Station

Achilles Leander Morav	Auckland	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Escort of troop convoy. 2. Protection of eastbound shipping (NZ-Panama) within focal area. 3. Protection of NZ-Fiji-Vancouver convoys, in focal area. 4. Troop movements in Pacific Islands. 5. General defence of territory and shipping on New Zealand Station.
------------------------------	----------	--

<u>Ship</u>	<u>Base</u>	<u>Function</u>
(e) Dutch Naval Forces in Netherlands East Indies		
Java 2 destroyers	Sourabaya	Under order of Commander-in-Chief, China. Escort of important convoys.
De Ruyter Tramp 4 destroyers 6 submarines	Sourabaya	Defence of straits and passages in N.E.I., and general action against enemy forces in N.E.I. waters.
3 submarines	Sourabaya	Local defence of Sourabaya
2 submarines	As requisite	Available for offensive action in S. China Sea south of line Cape Padaron-Kudat under Commander-in-Chief, China.

(f) United States Asiatic Fleet

Houston Marblehead 13 destroyers (1200 ton class)	Singapore	Under order of Commander-in-Chief, China 1. to attack enemy naval forces and sea communications 2. to escort important convoys
17 submarines	Manila	Under order of Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet 1. Defence of Philippines 2. Attack on enemy naval forces and sea communications

Source: Appendix I (List of Initial Dispositions and Functions of Naval Forces), American-Dutch-British Conversations, A.D.B. Report, April 1941, PM 81/10/13 (2).

Appendix D

[Hart-Phillips Agreement]

Manila,
Philippine Islands

December 6, 1941

1. We have met and discussed the problems with which we are faced in the Far Eastern area.
2. In the early stages of a war with Japan occurring at the present time, the initiative must inevitably rest with the Japanese
3. It is consequently not possible for us to draw up definite plans to be carried out by all our forces at the outbreak of war, and the most we can do is to decide upon the initial dispositions that appear to us best suited to meet the probable Japanese action. Plans for submarines and naval aircraft are definite and ready.
4. We are agreed that it is of great importance to prevent any Japanese movement through the Malay Barrier.
5. We are agreed on the following initial dispositions:
 - (a) British battle fleet to be based upon Singapore and operate as required from there as a striking force in connection with any Japanese movement in the China seas, Dutch East Indies and through the Malay Barrier.
 - (b) A cruiser striking force to be based on East Borneo—"Surabaya-Darwin" to act as a striking force in connection with air reconnaissance. This force can provide cover, and when necessary, escort, for convoys within the Dutch East Indies and Philippine area or for an occasional important convoy from Australia to Singapore.
 - (c) The minimum cruiser force should be maintained in the Australia-New Zealand area to deal with a moderate scale of raider attack or escort important convoys.
 - (d) The minimum cruiser force to be maintained in the Indian Ocean to escort important trade.
6. The actual dispositions of forces to give effect to "5" are contained in Appendix I.
7. We consider it very important to action in the Far East area should be coordinated with the movements of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and we hope we may be informed of the time-table visualized for the movement of this fleet to Truk in accordance with Plan "Rainbow V". The release of cruisers from Australia and New Zealand is intimately connected with the movements of this fleet.

8. All operations of U.S. Army aircraft which touch the operations of any naval forces to be coordinated through Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet.
9. The setting up and use of a Joint Headquarters is found impracticable at this time.
10. Strategic control. Strategic control as between H.M. and U.S. forces for the present to remain under respective commanders in chief and then operations to be coordinated under the principle of mutual cooperation.
11. Tactical command. The policy in force/North Atlantic will be followed.
12. We consider that liaison officers should now be exchanged between the United States Asiatic and British Eastern Fleets, and are taking the necessary action.
13. We consider that if the above is agreed to in principle by Dutch, Australian and New Zealand authorities in consultation with British Commander in Chief, Eastern Fleet, next week, then all that remains to do in the way of conference is the perfection of details by our respective staffs.

(Signed) Thos. C. Hart

(Signed) Tom S.V. Phillips

[Hart-Phillips Agreement]

Manila,
Philippine Islands

December 6, 1941

In addition to the items reported in our _____,
we are also agreed as follows:

1. As our forces in the Far East area grow, it will be important to be in a position to undertake more offensive operations. Such operations are not practicable from Singapore and we consider that it is necessary to have, in due course, a base further north from which to operate.
2. The only suitable base available is Manila, and we consequently consider that the necessary measures should be put in hand to enable Manila to be used by the British battle fleet. The question of just what action is necessary for this purpose will be discussed by our staffs.
3. We consider that we should aim at having Manila available as a base by the first of April, 1942, if this can be done.

(Signed) Thos. C. Hart

(Signed) Tom S.V. Phillips

[Hart-Phillips Agreement]

Manila,
Philippine Islands

December 6, 1941

Appendix I

Singapore

Battleships

Prince of Wales
Repulse
Revenge
Royal Sovereign

Cruisers

Mauritius
Achilles
Tramp
De Ruyter
(Australia? and later Hobart?)

Destroyers

10 British
6 Dutch
4 U.S.

Sourabaya-Darwin-East Borneo

Houston
Marblehead
Cornwall
Java
4 Destroyers (U.S.)

Australasia

Australia or Canberra
Perth
Leander
3 AMC's

Indian Ocean

Exeter
Glasgow
2 "E" Class
3 "D" Class
4 "C" Class
5 AMC

(Note: Hart's understanding is that he builds up destroyer force to operate with British battleships as they increase in number. At present the two Destroyer Divisions are deployed with his cruisers, one Division being in full readiness at Balikpapan to proceed to Singapore upon declaration of war.

Source: NA 030/68/4 (2).

Appendix E

Directive to the Supreme Commander,
ABDA Area 3 January, 1942

By agreement among the Governments of Australia, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, hereinafter referred to as the ABDA Governments.

1. Area: A strategic area has been constituted, to comprise initially all land and sea areas including the general regions of Burma-Malaya-Netherlands East Indies and the Philippine Islands: more precisely defined in Annex 1. This area will be known as the ABDA area.
2. Forces: You have been designated as Supreme Commander of the ABDA area and of all armed forces, afloat, ashore and in the air, of the ABDA Governments, which are or will be:
 - (a) stationed in the area;
 - (b) located in Australian territory when such forces have been allotted by the respective Governments for service in or in support of the ABDA area.

You are not authorised to transfer from the territories of any ABDA Government land forces of that Government without the consent of the Local Commander or his Government.

3. The Deputy Supreme Commander, and if required a Commander of the combined naval forces and Commander of the combined air forces, will be jointly designated by the ABDA Governments.
4. No Government will materially reduce its armed forces assigned to your area [group mutilated-nor] any commitment made by it for reinforcing its forces in your area except after giving to other Governments and to you timely information pertaining thereto.
5. Strategic Concept and Policy: The basic strategic concept of the ABDA Governments for the conduct of the war in your area is not only in the immediate future to maintain as many key positions as possible, but to take the offensive at the earliest opportunity and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. The first essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest moment through the employment of concentrated air power. The piecemeal employment of air forces should be minimised. Your operations should be so conducted as to further preparations for the offensive.

6. General Strategic Policy will be therefore:
 - (a) To hold the Malay Barrier defined as a line of the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, North Australia, as the basic defensive position of the ABDA area, and to operate sea, land and air forces in as great a depth as possible forward of the barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.
 - (b) To hold Burma and Australia as essential support positions for the area, and Burma as essential to the support of China and to the defence of India.
 - (c) To re-establish communications through the Dutch East Indies with Luzon, and to support the Philippine Islands garrison.
 - (d) To maintain essential communications within the area.
7. Duties, Responsibilities and Authorities of Supreme Commander:

You will co-ordinate in the ABDA area the strategic operations of all armed forces of the ABDA Governments; where desirable, to arrange the formation of task forces, whether national or international, for executing specific operations; and appointing any officers, irrespective of seniority or nationality, to command such task forces.
8. While [group mutilated-you] have no responsibilities [group mutilated-in respect of the internal] administration of the respective forces under your command, you are authorised to direct and co-ordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials.
9. You will dispose of reinforcements which from time to time may be despatched to the area by the ABDA Governments.
10. You are authorised to require from the Commanders of the armed forces under your command such reports as you deem necessary in discharging your responsibilities as Supreme Commander.
11. You are authorised to control the issue of all communiqués concerning the forces under your command.
12. Through the channels specified in paragraph 18, you may submit recommendations to the ABDA Governments on any matters pertaining to the furthering of your mission.
13. Limitations: Your authority [group mutilated-and control] with respect to the various positions of the ABDA area and to the forces assigned thereto will normally be exercised through the Commanders duly appointed by their respective Governments. Interference

is to be avoided in the administrative processes of the armed forces of any of the ABDA Governments, including free communication between them and their respective Governments. No alteration or revision is to be made in the basic tactical organisations of such forces, and each national component of a task force will normally operate under its own commander and will not be subdivided into small units for [group mutilated-attachment to] other national components of task forces, except in cases of urgent necessity. In general, your instructions and orders will be limited to those necessary for the effective co-ordination of forces in the execution of your mission.

14. Relations with ABDA Governments: The ABDA Governments will jointly and severally support you in the execution of duties and responsibilities as herein defined, and in the exercising of authority herein delegated and limited. The Commanders of all sea, land and air forces within your area will be immediately informed by their respective Governments that, from a date to be notified, all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provisions of this directive will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective Governments.
15. In the unlikely event that any of your immediate subordinates, after making due representation to you, still considers that obedience to your orders would jeopardise the national interests of his country to an extent unjustified by the general situation in the ABDA area, he has the right, subject to your being immediately notified of such intention, to appeal direct to his own Government before carrying out the orders. Such appeals will be made by the most expeditious methods, and copies of the appeals will be communicated simultaneously to you.
16. Staff and Assumption of Command: Your staff will include officers of each of the ABDA Powers. You are empowered to communicate immediately with national commanders in the area with a view to obtaining staff officers essential to your earliest possible assumption of command. Your additional staff requirements will be communicated as soon as possible to the ABDA Governments through the channels of communication described in paragraph 18.
17. You will report when you are in a position effectively to carry

out the essential functions of the Supreme Command, so that your assumption of command may be promulgated to all concerned.

18. Superior Authority: As Supreme Commander of the ABDA area you will be directly responsible to the ABDA Governments through the agency defined in Annex 2.

Annex 1. Boundaries of the ABDA Area

The ABDA area is bounded as follows:

On the north: by the boundary between India and Burma, thence eastward along the Chinese frontier and coastline to latitude 030 degrees north, thence along the parallel 030 degrees north to meridian 140 degrees east. (Note: Indo-china and Thailand are not included in this area.) On the east: by meridian 140 degrees east from 030 degrees, to the Equator, thence east to longitude 141 degrees east, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence east along the southern New Guinea coast to meridian 143 degrees east, then south down this meridian to the coast of Australia. On the south: by the northern coast of Australia from meridian 143 degrees east, westward to meridian 114 degrees east, thence north-westward to latitude 015 degrees south, longitude 092 degrees south, longitude 092 degrees east. On the west: by meridian 092 degrees east.

Forces assigned to ABDA and adjacent areas are authorised to extend their operations into other areas as may be required.

Annex 2

1. On all important military matters not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander of the ABDA area, the United States Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will constitute the agency for [group mutilated-developing] and submitting the recommendations for decisions by the President of the United States and by the British Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Amongst the chief matters on which decisions will be required are:
 - (a) Provision of reinforcements.
 - (b) Major changes in policy.
 - (c) Departures from the Supreme Commander's directive.

2. This agency will function as follows:
 - (a) Any proposals coming either from the Supreme Commander or from any of the ABDA Governments will be transmitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee both in Washington and in London.
 - (b) The Chiefs of Staff Committee in London will immediately telegraph to their representatives in Washington to say whether or not they will be telegraphing any opinion.
 - (c) On the receipt of these opinions, the United States Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will develop and submit their recommendations to the President and by telegraphing to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. The Prime Minister will then inform the President whether he is in agreement with these recommendations.
3. Since London has the machinery for consulting Dominion Governments, and since the Dutch Government is in London, the British Government will be responsible for obtaining their views and agreement and for including these in the final telegrams to Washington.
4. Agreement having been reached between the President and the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, the orders to the Supreme Commander will be despatched from Washington in the name of both of them.

Source: SSDA to PMNZ, 4 January, 1942, PM 81/10/13 (2). Mutilations in text of this telegram as received in New Zealand have been corrected from the version published in the British official history, *The War Against Japan*, Vol. I, Appendix 20.

Appendix F

The Full and Final Text of the ANZAC Area Agreement,
10 February 1942

The following arrangements for the establishment of ANZAC Area have been agreed to by the Chiefs of Staff:

1. Boundaries. Beginning at longitude 141 degrees east at Equator, eastwards along the Equator to longitude 170 degrees east, thence south-easterly to a point in latitude 20 degrees south, longitude 175 degrees west, thence due south from a point of beginning, south along meridian 141 degrees east to south coast of New Guinea, thence eastward along said coast to meridian 143 degrees east, thence due south in sea area only.
2. ANZAC force is to be under strategic direction of the United States, exercised by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, through one or more U.S. Flag Officers, assisted by one or more Flag Officers named by Australia and/or New Zealand.
3. All practicable use will be made of naval supply, communications, and repair facilities in Australia and New Zealand.
4. Initial assignments of ships to ANZAC force: British, one carrier; United States, one heavy or one new light cruiser and two destroyers; New Zealand, two light cruisers and one auxiliary cruiser; Australia, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, three auxiliary cruisers, two destroyers, two anti-submarine patrol vessels, and six 600 ton anti-submarine vessels. Remainder of Australian seagoing forces, namely two light cruisers, two destroyers, three sloops, will be assigned to ABDA area command. All other Australian and New Zealand naval units to remain at the disposal of their respective Governments for local defence. The disposal of additions to Dominion naval forces will be decided by agreement at the appropriate time.
5. Tasks to be assigned the ANZAC force, in co-operation with air forces available in the area, are, first, cover eastern and north-eastern approaches to Australia and New Zealand by destroying enemy forces; second, protect shipping, including coastwise shipping, and safeguarding convoys in ANZAC area, with emphasis on key points, and attack adjacent enemy island key points;

fourth, correlate operations with forces in the ABDA area and with the U.S. Pacific Fleet, as well as with local defence forces of Australia and New Zealand.

6. Naval forces assigned to ANZAC and adjacent areas are authorized to extend operations into other areas as circumstances may require.
7. Effective date of the foregoing organization, allocations and approximate control of operations will be communicated shortly (February 7).