The Oscillating Logic of the Economic-Security Nexus in New Zealand’s China Policy Discourse
Scholars usually assume that the interactions between economics and security (the economic-security nexus) either follow a logic of the “virtuous cycle” where there are positive entanglements between economics and security or a logic of the “vicious cycle” where the entanglements are negative. My thesis starts with the observation that New Zealand’s take on the economic-security nexus in the relationship with China oscillated between the two logics under the Clark, Key-English and Ardern governments from 2008 to 2022.
The mainstream international relations (IR) theories do not take seriously the idea that the logic can change over time. Yet, the back-and-forth between the two logics in New Zealand’s China policy discourse shows that the logic does change over time. This thesis accordingly asks two questions: What are New Zealand decision-makers’ logics of the economic-security nexus in the relationship with China from 2008 to 2022? How and why might their logic change from one to another over time? This thesis extends the understanding of two patterns of the economic-security nexus in the context of New Zealand’s relationship with China.
Chapter 2 reviews the analytical conception of the economic-security nexus and decision-makers’ perceptions (the logic) of the nexus. I use decision-makers’ depictions as a proxy for perceptions. Chapter 3 develops an inductive two-level framework to examine possible changes in the logic of the nexus. I argue that integrating external factors (threat perceptions from power competition and alliance commitments) and domestic factors (economic and security preferences and societal interest groups) can better explain the logic and its changes.
Adopting process-tracing and comparison methods, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 examine New Zealand decision-makers’ depictions of the economic-security nexus in New Zealand’s China policy discourse from 2008 to 2022. I identify and analyse 113 official public policy documents and speeches to explain the logic of the nexus. The primary dataset of New Zealand’s meetings with China, the United States of America (US) and Australia, exercises and cooperation programs in economic and security issues, commentaries, media statements, and academic work provide more evidence of decision-makers’ logic. These primary and secondary sources are also employed to investigate the impacts of the interactions between external and domestic factors on decision-makers’ depictions of the logic.
Observing the oscillations in depictions over time, I make three arguments in Chapters 7 and 8. First, I argue that in addition to the virtuous and vicious cycle logics, there are two further logics of the economic-security nexus. Decision-makers adopted a coexisting logic where both the positive and negative impacts of China’s growing economic capabilities on security are recognised. They also used a delinking logic to recognise the positive/negative economic or/and security ties with China but did not indicate the nexus between economics and security. Second, New Zealand decision-makers’ depictions oscillated between the four logics over time. Third, New Zealand decision-makers’ logic is not pre-determined and is not simply driven by external or domestic factors; it results from the interactions between external and domestic factors.
Chapter 8 also concludes with three main findings that provide novel insights into New Zealand’s foreign policy changes. First, at the external level, Australia’s China approach is more important than that of the US to New Zealand’s China policy. Even so, New Zealand’s China policy does not mimic the pattern of Australia-China relations. Second, at the domestic level, the adoption of different logics cannot be attributed to the differences between domestic political parties. Third, domestic factors can play a greater role in shaping how decision-makers depict the logic of the economic-security nexus when the external environment is competitive.