**The Condition of Security of Gated Communities under Private
Governance: findings from residents' experiences and opinions**

By

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Abstract

The number of gated communities is rapidly increasing worldwide. Although security has always been one of the most appealing features of gated communities, studies show that there is no significant difference in crime rates between gated communities and surrounding non-gated neighbourhoods. How safe are gated communities? How effective are the enhanced security measures of gated communities in preventing crime? Are residents responsible for the condition of security in gated communities? All these questions need to be addressed to improve the safety and security of residents of gated communities.

The study aims to examine the condition of security of gated communities by drawing on the experiences and opinions of residents. It used a quantitative approach, with a descriptive methodology. Surveys were distributed to residents of seven sample gated communities in Auckland. Survey results were analysed by descriptive statistics and cross-tabulations.

In conclusion, the study found that the condition of security of Auckland gated communities is generally good as experienced and perceived by surveyed residents. 'Security' was regarded as one of the most significant factors for moving into a gated community. The majority of residents felt safe and secure both inside the property and within the community, and believed that their community was experiencing less crime than

surrounding neighbourhoods. The study also found that the building manager, rather than the Owners' Committee or the Body Corporate secretary, was identified as the most significant agent in the management of security related issues. The building manager was heavily relied by both residents and members of the Owners' Committee. The study has presented basic findings about gated communities in the light of security and private governance. However, more research is needed to obtain sufficient data to discover the elements of successful crime prevention for gated communities.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH

Introduction

A gated community is residential development in which houses, streets, footpaths, communal space and other communal amenities are physically enclosed by barriers. Each gated community has an underlying system of private governance administered by a private governance body comprised of property owners. The governance body, often referred as the 'Owners' Committee',¹ acts as a quasi-government responsible for the operation and management of important community affairs and issues.

In recent decades, crime and anti-social behaviour have been perceived as a growing neighbourhood problem (Shearing & Stenning, 1983; Low, 2004; Blandy, 2007). Together with declining economy and increasing geographical and social mobility, they are identified as insecurities and risks in the so-called 'risk society' (Beck, 1992). With the rise of neoliberal policies that support consumerism and the commodification of state provided services, individuals have been encouraged to take responsibility for their own well-being, including security. The state's perceived inability to provide adequate security has led some to purchase additional protection, often in the form of contracting private security (Beck, 1992; Berg, 2007). For others, and another consequence of the process of responsibilisation

¹ The governance body is also referred as the 'homeowners' association' or 'residents' association' in different countries.

has been the development of high standard security in the form of gated communities that offer the possibility to deter crime and maintain control over private territory by exercising physical means of access control (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). However, it is also the case that these gated communities offer individuals a refuge to escape their insecurities and risks at the same time as making them more aware of apparent threats and risks (Beck, 1992; Bellet, 2007). By raising individual's awareness of threats and risks, it is also argued that some security measures employed in gated communities may in fact increase their anxiety of crime rather than reducing it (Zedner, 2006).

In the United States, it was recently estimated that around 5.9% of households live in gated communities (Low, 2004). In the United Kingdom, a recent study suggests that there are more than 1000 gated communities in England alone (Atkinson et al., 2004). The number of gated communities has increased significantly in Europe, South Africa, south-east Asia, the Middle East, and Australia (Low, 2004; Atkinson et al, 2005; Raposo, 2006). Although not on the same scale, New Zealand too has experienced a growth in gated communities (Dixon & Dupuis, 2003).

Although one of the primary appeals of gated communities is the promise of high standard security, their actual crime prevention effect in crime prevention is contested. Most available studies report only a marginal difference in crime rates between gated communities and nearby non-gated neighbourhoods (Atlas, 1999; Drew & McGuigan, 2006). Moreover, in the United States, there is substantial evidence that there are still high

rates of burglary and vandalism occurring in many of the gated communities (Calvert & Schroder, 2003). As such, it is often suggested that gated communities provide more of a perception of security rather than real security (Lee, 2007). Additionally, while providing high standard security within their own boundaries, it is argued that gated communities are doing so at the expense of decreased security in the streets outside the fences/walls, and that they also promote a sense of unease in the wider neighbourhood by encouraging the idea that the neighbourhood is unsafe and one therefore needs to be 'walled off' from it (Goix, 2005). As much as they have already been criticised for their negative impacts on the wider society, their ability to provide a safer residential environment is now also under question.

The obvious question here is why is it that gated communities cannot successfully prevent crime in, and maintain control over, their territory? Available studies suggest various possibilities including: residents' false sense of security, quality of private security services, and the lack of informal or casual surveillance from passers by that is a common feature on the streets of non-gated neighbourhoods (Jacobs, 1972; Blakely & Snyder, 1999). Other studies point out that the design of gated communities in fact works against the concept of what is called 'Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED)' (Blakely & Snyder, 1999; Bislev, 2004). Blakely and Snyder (1999), for example, argue that gates, fences/walls, and other enhanced security measures may have actually prevented residents from actively participating in 'defending' the community and from

seeking out the best security solutions for their own community, as these tasks have been outsourced to various private service providers. They also argue that enclosure does not automatically unite and strengthen the relationship of residents, which is essential for the effective operation of private governance systems. These arguments question the assumed connection between security and private governance systems. As stated by Blakely and Snyder, “exclusion is not the same as protection, and fenced borders do not automatically create a community that will defend them” (1999, p. 163). To study why a gated community cannot successfully prevent crime and/or maintain control, one must first examine whether its private governance system is running effectively. Moreover, since private governance systems depend upon the collective action of all residents, it is therefore necessary to examine residents’ views on both the aspects of security and private governance in order to further assess the condition of security in a gated community. This study will focus on residents’ experiences and opinions on security and private governance in a sample of gated communities in New Zealand.

1.1 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to examine the condition of security of gated communities under private governance. The study will not examine or compare the crime prevention outcomes achieved by either gated communities or the nearby non-gated neighbourhoods,

as the crime statistics required for such an assessment are simply not available and it is beyond the capacity of a single researcher to collect the necessary raw data. Nor will it assess the effect of different types of security measures in access control and crime prevention for the same reasons. As such, the main focus of this study is to examine the condition of security from the residents' point of view drawing upon residents' experiences and opinions on security and private governance. The study has employed a quantitative research methodology and data and information been collected in selected gated communities by means of surveys.

Research area

According to official documents (Dixon & Dupuis, 2003; Cullen, 2005), Auckland contains not only the largest number of intensive residential developments but has also experienced the fastest growth of such developments compared to other major New Zealand cities. The Auckland Regional Growth Strategy (Auckland Regional Council, 1999) has promoted development of intensified and medium-density housing, specific built forms such as apartments, terrace houses and town houses, and mixed use developments at growth nodes in suburban and inner city locations. As a result, gated residential developments are expected to grow at a constant rate and in the near future could possibly reach a similar level of prevalence of some overseas countries. In consideration of its past

experience, that it currently has the largest number of gated communities in New Zealand and given its likely future growth trends, the greater Auckland region was selected by this study as the area from which a sample of gated communities would be drawn.

Research objectives

By drawing on the experience and opinions of their residents, this study aims to examine the condition of security of gated communities under private governance. The study aims to explore how security was regarded before the decision to move into a gated community was made, how security was perceived after moving into a gated community, and how security related issues were or are dealt with in private governance systems. The research was conducted in a selected number of gated communities in Auckland primarily by means of a series of surveys. The main research objectives are:

1. To discover the significance of 'security' as a reason for moving into a gated community.
2. To examine residents' perception of safety and security both within and beyond the 'gated community'.
3. To examine the manner in which security is managed or governed under private governance.

Importance of the research

While the growth of gated communities world-wide has also sparked an equal growth in the literature discussing them, the focus to date has been largely on the negative impacts and cost for society, such as diminished sense of community, spatial segregation, and social exclusion (Goix, 2005; Low, 2004; Atkinson et al., 2005). Much less attention has been given to the nature of security in and the private governance of gated communities, both of which are fundamental features (Lemanski, 2005). In the case of New Zealand, because the phenomenon of ‘gating’ has yet to be recognised in the policy making process, currently there are no restrictions on the development of gated communities, no official definition of the term ‘gated community’, and insufficient studies focusing on gated communities specifically (Dixon & Dupuis, 2003; Walker, 2005). While the number of gated communities here may not yet be significant compared to many overseas countries, the growing proportion of multi-unit residential developments in major cities that exhibit features of ‘gatedness’ have already generated several problems particularly in relation to private governance arrangements, community sustainability, and local planning policy (Walker, 2005; Lysnar et al., 2007). In recognition of the dearth of research, researchers have pointed to the urgent need for more studies on the phenomenon of ‘gatedness’ and related fields in the New Zealand context (Dixon & Dupuis, 2003). It is anticipated that this research and the quantitative data acquired through it could provide a starting point for

future more comprehensive research.

1.2 Thesis Outline

This thesis has five main chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the background, purpose, objectives, and importance of the study. Chapter 2 then reviews the literature on the concept, origins, development, and the main issues associated with gated communities, particularly those related to security and private governance. Both the international and New Zealand literature will be reviewed to give an insight into the extent to which New Zealand either differs or resembles those overseas countries that have experienced a high growth of gated communities. Chapter 3 explains the research design and methodology. It will describe how the research was carried out, how and why the research sites and samples were selected, what problems arose during that process, and explain the analysis and presentation of the data. Chapter 4 presents the findings of the research. In line with the research objectives, the findings will be presented in three main sections: the significance of security as a motivation for moving into a gated community, residents' perception of security both within and beyond the community territory, and the manners in which security is managed or governed in the private governance system. Where appropriate, the findings will also be presented in table form. Chapter 5 will summarise the findings, identify possible practical implications of the results to gated communities in

New Zealand in terms of security and private governance systems, discuss the contribution of the study to the field of gated communities in New Zealand, list the limitations of the current study, make recommendations for future studies worthy of investigation and bring the research study to a final conclusion.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to examine the condition of security of gated communities in Auckland under private governance. This chapter will review the literature on the concept, origins, development of, and the main issues associated with gated communities. It begins by describing the context within which the number of gated communities has been rapidly increasing in recent decades. Drawing on the relevant literature and research, this chapter then discusses two of the most significant features of gated communities, which are also the key factors that constitute the foundation of this study: security and private governance. It will examine the notions, applications, and effects of both security and private governance. The situation of gated communities in the New Zealand context will be discussed at the end of each section. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a better understanding of the background literature of gated communities and which forms the basis of further discussion in Chapter 5.

2.1 Understanding Gated Communities

Origins and development

Gating is not a new phenomenon. In England, the earliest gated fortresses were built around 300 B.C by the ruling Romans to guard against rebellion among the local villagers (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). Around the same time many other fortresses were also built for the same purpose by Roman soldiers across Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East (Owens, 1991). In medieval Europe, gated and walled towns were built for both the need of protection from attack and the desire for enhanced social control of movement and trade (Mumford, 1961). Similar forms of gated residential developments can be traced across different parts of the world throughout the later stages of human civilisation (Leisch, 2002; Grant, 2007).

In the United States, the first gated residential developments appeared in the late 1800s when upper-income citizens tried to wall themselves off from the troublesome aspects of rapidly industrialising cities (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). In later decades, more gated compounds were built by these wealthy citizens for privacy, protection, and prestige. However, they remained rarities until the master-planned retirement villages began to develop in the 1960s (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). Characteristic gates and fences soon spread to resorts and country club developments, and then to middle-class suburban areas.

In the 1980s, a series of contemporary gated communities with high standard security began to proliferate throughout the country and soon spread to other parts of the American continent and the rest of the world (Blakely & Snyder, 1999; Coy, 2006).

The development and prevalence of gated communities in the United States since the 1980s is largely associated with a growing fear of crime and disorder. An American census in mid 1990s reported that almost 90% of Americans thought that crime was getting worse; 55% worried about becoming a victim of crime; and the same percentage felt inadequately protected by the police (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). By enabling the residents to hide away from negative social change in a controlled and secure space, gated communities appeared as a residential typology in response to this fear of crime and disorder.

While many factors, such as exclusivity, prestige, lifestyle, aesthetic designs, privacy, and even investment value, are all attractive features, security tends to stand out from the rest as the most attractive feature for many residents choosing to live in a gated community. A survey conducted by Blakely and Snyder in 1995 targeting gated community residents in the United States found that nearly 70% indicated that security was a very important issue in their decision to live in their gated communities while only 1% replied that security was not an important motivation (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). In a regional survey of gated communities in Phoenix, America, conducted by Frantz in 2000 - 2001, residents reported that they moved to feel safer and because of their fear of crime (Frantz,

cited in Low, 2007).

The development and prevalence of gated communities in other countries has also been shown to be related to the fear of crime and need of security. A report of five combined studies into gated communities in England cited security, safety, and fear of crime as common motivations for moving into a gated community (Blandy et al., 2003). A Portuguese survey found that 49% of residents mentioned security as one of their motivations for moving into their gated community (Raposo, 2006). It is important to note that more recently, researchers have found that the growth of gated communities often reflects the historical and other contexts in each country and thus the American experience may not entirely apply to every country (Blandy, 2006). As the above UK and Portuguese studies indicate, however, little empirical evidence exists suggesting that security does not appear to be the most significant factor behind the growth of gated communities in many countries.

Some researchers also argue that rise of gated communities are an inevitable result of the neoliberal movement of recent decades (Dixon & Lysnar, 2004; Bellet, 2007; Rosen & Razin, 2009). The underlying belief of neo-liberal theories is that the market can resolve matters in the most efficient way possible through privatisation and self-governance. Neo-liberalists believe that people, as consumers of police services for example, should be empowered through more effective methods of accountability, to be achieved primarily through the expansion of market forces (Peck & Tickel, 2002; Bevir & Krupicka, 2006).

As such, freedom from fear of crime can only be sought through private security services and technologies that act as supplementary security forces to what is already provided by the state.

Furthermore, in line with its campaigning of individual liberty, free markets and minimal state interference, neo-liberalism advocates governmental reform and specifically the transformation from government to governance (Garland, 2002; Shearing & Wood, 2007). That is, the role of formal hierarchical administrative-territorial structures decreases whereas the emphasis on horizontal networks of governance increases (Rosen & Razin, 2009). In this sense, gated communities that are able to provide their own services and amenities and that are privately managed present the best possible solution for a neo-liberal residential project (Bislev, 2004). The private governance body of gated communities is an especially important institution reflecting the ideological shift toward privatism that is characteristic of neo-liberalism (McKenzie, 2005). Many governments have been active in encouraging strategies that are broadly based on neo-liberal beliefs even if neo-conservative governments might have been more unrelenting in this pursuit (Blandy, 2007; Lee, 2007). With consumer demand now being stated by the private sector, the weak balance of governing fear of crime becomes increasingly more fragile. Neo-liberal rationalities and leaner governments have created the space for private sector involvement in the market of security, which has, in turn, opened up 'crime fear' to the market economy (Lee, 2007), and thus increased the demand for gated communities.

Types of gated communities

The size of gated communities can range from a single apartment building with only a few units to a town like master-planned development with thousands of units that even has its own schools, shopping malls, and other common facilities. Gated communities, according to their characteristics, can be classified into three main categories: lifestyle communities, prestige communities, and security communities (or security zones) (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). Lifestyle communities often provide security and separation for the leisure activities and amenities within. Subtypes within this category include retirement villages, country clubs, resort developments, and new towns. In lifestyle communities, the common bond among residents is usually the appreciation of the activities and amenities provided. Prestige communities, on the other hand, often symbolise social distinction, and attempt to create and protect a secured place on the social ladder. The common bond among residents of prestige communities is, therefore, usually based on income and socio-economic status. Subtypes include enclaves for the rich and famous, developments for senior executives and managers, and successful professionals. Both security and privacy are highly regarded in prestige communities.

Security communities, on the other hand, often differ from the previous two types of gated communities at three points. First, the gates and fences of these communities are often not in their original street design but are installed afterward due to increasing

concerns about crime. In some cases, it is simply residents of a few streets blocking the entrance of each street that passes through or around the area in which they live in. As such, they are also called security zones (Newman, 1995). Second, these communities are often located in lower and middle-class neighbourhoods and sometimes even within public housing complexes. Third, these communities often do not have other security measures besides gates and fences and organise voluntary neighbourhood watch programmes instead of hiring private security personnel.

Negative impacts of gated communities

In most countries, gated communities are often prominent as symbolic developments in their local area. As such, they can provide powerful signals about the residential desirability and sustainability of local areas, especially in suburban and rural towns (Atkinson et al., 2005). For neighbouring house owners, such developments are sometimes welcomed as demonstrating the rising status of the wider neighbourhood, increasing house prices, and encouraging a sense of pride in the locality. Nevertheless, other researchers perceive the direct effects of gated communities as detrimental to their surrounding neighbourhoods. They mainly focus on, but are not limited, to issues relating to spatial segregation, social exclusion, and local planning policy (Goix, 2005).

Spatial segregation

A number of leading researchers have highlighted the potential contribution of gated communities to spatial fragmentation in urban as well as rural areas (Landman & Schonteich, 2002; Goix, 2005; Low, 2004). They argue that gated communities are exacerbating urban sprawl and segregation by creating physical boundaries and barriers all over the city. In some areas where there is a high density of gated communities, this has seriously changed the nature of existing public space. In some extreme cases, when residents of gated communities spend more time within their own communities and much less in public spaces, these spaces can be abandoned to the poor, the homeless, and street children who are, in turn, left vulnerable to violence and abuse by criminals (Landman & Schonteich, 2002). As a consequence, some have further argued that such spatial segregation has led to a relocation of crime outside the gates and within surrounding non-gated communities (Goix, 2005). Diverting or displacing crime to other neighbourhoods, they argue, has negative repercussions for residents who are not as well protected as those within gated communities (Goix, 2005). However, such assertions are not clearly supported by empirical data, as currently available data typically shows that there is no substantial difference in crime rates between gated and non-gated neighbourhoods (Blakely & Snyder, 1998; Wilson-Doenges, 2000; Bowers & Manzi, 2006).

In some areas, gated communities may also lead to the privatisation of public space

or the reservation of certain spaces for exclusive use by certain homogeneous social groups (Landman & Schonteich, 2002). In the United States, for example, developers of master-planned communities often donate open space and park land to the local government in exchange for building higher-density housing than that normally allowed by local zoning policy (Low, 2004). Such land is designated as public space, but is available only to the residents who live inside the community. The right of the local residents who live outside the gated community or development to use public spaces is therefore seriously affected.

Social exclusion

By contributing to spatial segregation, gated communities can also result in social segregation. Gated communities exclude other residents from surrounding neighbourhoods and casual passers-by. This could lead to social exclusion, creating a barrier to interaction among people of different races, cultures, and classes, thereby inhibiting the construction of social networks that form the basis of social activities (Landman & Schonteich, 2002).

Social exclusion can be further expanded to include unequal access to a range of public services, such as education, health, transport, and security (or policing). After privatisation, security has become a commodity purchasable by anyone who can afford it. The reality, however, is that not everyone can afford private security services. In the United States, for example, private security in gated communities can become extremely

expensive. “At \$10 an hour, a low figure, the annual cost for 24 hour security covering one gate and one guard is \$87,000” (Dillon, 1994, p. 8). If this figure is multiplied by many guards, more gates, patrols, surveillance cameras, and so on, the cost will be dramatically higher. In this situation, wealthy people can purchase more protection from private security companies whereas poor people have no choice but to stick with the police.

Shearing (1995) argues that when some people have a better capacity to consume and others do not have the same capacity; it creates a reign of unequal access to services. Unequal access means that those who are already disproportionately victimised by crime, the poor, will become increasingly vulnerable and victimised. The movements towards private security (or private policing), and in particular private security in gated communities, may in fact reduce the quality of the service provided by the police. Already police departments in some countries (e.g. the United States) have been shifting their resources away from crimes which have a low probability of detection and low financial value (e.g. property crime) (Low, 2004). On the one hand, increased security resources are a good thing for those exclusive communities who have purchased them. On the other hand, some argue that those who do not have private security patrols may experience more crime problems due to the possible displacement effects produced by their better patrolled neighbours (McManus, 1995). The displacement or deflection effect is not an insignificant one, especially in poor communities. A common representation of gating in Los Angeles, as described by Davis (1990), is that “we live in ‘fortress cities’ brutally divided between

‘fortified cells’ of affluent society and ‘places of terror’ where the police battle the criminalised poor” (p. 224). Although it is not yet clear how differential levels of and access to security resources have affected poor communities, there is no doubt that gated communities have contributed to social exclusion by removing the top tier of society from participation in public life and public services (Minton, 2002).

Problems with local planning policy

The developments of gated communities have created problems for town planners and local governments. Gated communities, especially master-planned communities, require a large amount of land for golf courses, country clubs, and many other communal facilities. The land is usually only available on the fringes of cities, which tend to have concentrations of poorer classes and new immigrants from poorer countries, therefore creating a contrast between prestige gated communities and the surrounding deprived neighbourhoods (Goix, 2005; Dixon & Lysnar, 2004). Moreover, residents of gated communities are sometimes reluctant to pay for some parts of the local taxes, arguing that they already pay the private contractors to provide the infrastructure and services they need (Blakely & Snyder, 1999).

Gated communities in New Zealand

The earliest example of gated developments in New Zealand would probably be ‘fortified pa’ – fortified villages built by the Maori people around five hundreds years ago (Walker, 2005). ‘Fortified pa’ had ditches, banks, and palisades for protection, and cooking and storing areas for the purpose of communal life. They were not occupied all year around but were used more like a temporary retreat during times of inter-tribal wars as well as during the later wars against the British settlers.

The modern phenomenon of gating appeared in the late 90s as a consequence of the urban intensification policy in major cities, particularly in the greater Auckland region (Dixon & Dupuis, 2003). The urban intensification policy in Auckland is a strategy adopted by the Auckland Regional Growth Forum to solve urban problems through consolidating the metropolitan areas (Dixon & Dupuis, 2003).² The policy’s major objective is to develop medium density housing with mixed land uses; thereby making resources such as public transport more viable (Cullen, 2005). Some argue that this transformation from low density suburbanisation into intensive urbanisation is in alignment with New Zealand’s engagement with neo-liberal ideals (Murphy, 2008). That is, the liberation of market forces, in conjunction with new urban governance structures, created the conditions for the development of medium density housing.

² The problems result from geography, past housing and transport policies, population growth, overseas migration, urban sprawl, traffic congestion, and expensive real estate market.

Medium (and high) density housing, typically defined as terraced housing and apartment blocks, often possesses a feature of 'gatedness' achieved through a variety of architectural and environmental designs. This feature of 'gatedness', however, may be different from what is commonly defined as gated communities for it often provides a symbolic enclosure achieved through a variety of architectural and environmental designs rather than a physical enclosure by gates and fences/walls. According to Dixon and Lysnar (2004), 'gatedness' is often manifested in seven ways: physical barriers, technological barriers, video surveillance, signs, design features, natural surveillance, and implicit signals. For example, a typical gated development in Auckland may use a partly obscured entrance, a bump in the driveway, or a 'private road' sign to give an impression of 'resident-only' access instead of restricting access by solid gates and fences/walls. As such, they argue that it may be more appropriate to refer to many of the medium and high density housing developments in New Zealand as 'gated developments' not 'gated communities'. That is, their level of 'gatedness' is not sufficient to render themselves as distinct communities and hence exclusive from the surrounding neighbourhood. In recent years, the incidence of 'gatedness' has been observed to be rising in Auckland and other New Zealand cities (Dixon & Dupuis, 2003). However, it is unknown how many of these developments are commonly defined gated communities and how many of them merely possess some features of 'gatedness'.

Although it seems likely that neo-liberal ideals, embedded in the roots of the latest

housing policy, have pushed the growth of 'gatedness' in New Zealand, it is not yet clear whether, or the extent to which, this reflects growth in crime fear discourse. The New Zealand Crime and Safety Survey 2006 (Mayhew & Reilly, 2006) found that most people did not think there was a crime problem in their neighbourhood and that there was no real change in the proportion of respondents who felt that there was a crime problem in their neighbourhood between the survey in 2006 and the two previous surveys in 2001 and 1996. The vast majority of respondents who walked alone at night, for example, reported feeling very or fairly safe (Mayhew & Reilly, 2006).

Dixon et al. (2006) interviewed 17 residents from 10 different gated developments in Auckland and found that 'gatedness' had no bearing on why the majority had chosen to move into a gated development.³ They found that location (including proximity to amenities, transportations or family members), design and low maintenance were the most important factors for those residents when deciding whether or not to move into their current residence. While it was also discovered that the ability to easily lock up and leave their property unattended was mentioned by the residents, this factor was not as important and did not overrate the importance of the factors previously mentioned. Moreover, four of the interviewees did not even realise that gates would be erected when buying their

³ These interviews were conducted by Dixon et al. with 17 residents individually from 10 different gated developments in Auckland in 2006. The main interview questions included: 1) why the resident chose to live in a gated development; 2) whether they had any previous experiences living in such a development before; 3) their expectations prior to moving in and whether these expectations had been met; 4) what, if any, issues had emerged that were specific to the resident's experience of gated development and how might these be dealt with; 5) how residents in the development worked together and made decisions about issues that affect all residents; 6) relationships with neighbours who live outside the development/community; and 7) the possibility of living in a gated development again.

property off the plans. The results of the research did not seem to indicate that those residents were driven to live in a gated development due to their fear of crime or search for security. Given that there has been no other large scale research, Dixon et al.'s study is the only one available that supplies an indication of why people choose to live in a gated development in New Zealand. At this stage, it is therefore reasonable to assume that the growth of 'gatedness' in New Zealand does not reflect attitudes to security as much as in other countries.

Discussion and debate on the negative impacts of gated communities is not yet common in New Zealand. Two reasons may explain this situation: 1) the number of gated communities (or gated developments) is not yet high enough to have had any readily discernable impacts on society; and 2) many of the gated communities in New Zealand are considered more of a 'development' rather than a 'community' and thus may not have created as much segregation or exclusion as their counterparts may have in many other countries. The most commonly discussed impact of gated communities in New Zealand revolves around issues to do with local planning policy,⁴ and particularly around the issue of resource consent. These will arise most often in situations where city plan rules relate to buildings setback from legal roads, given that the internal roads of gated communities are not likely to have the status of legal road (Calvert & Schroder, 2003). Other planning issues include the location of rubbish collection and the granting of emergency access to

⁴ The core legislation of local planning policy is the Resource Management Act 1991. The purpose of the Act is to promote the sustainable management of natural and physical resources in a way which enables people and communities to provide for their own social, economic, cultural, and physiological wellbeing.

local authorities. However, local authorities in New Zealand have not yet explicitly recognised or included gated communities in their various planning policies. As a result, it has become difficult to regulate the developers and inconsistencies between the design of gated communities and the local planning policy have been uncovered (Dixon & Dupuis, 2003).

2.2 Security in Gated Communities

A common perception is that gated communities are a response to the fear of crime and the need for more effective and efficient security. The high standard of security in gated communities is achieved by a combination of security measures. These may include devices, actions, or procedures whose function is to protect residential areas (U.S. Department of Justice, 1974). Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) with its focus on reducing criminal risk and the opportunities for the perpetration of crime is largely used in the design of gated communities (Blakely & Snyder, 1999; Minnaar, 2005). It aims to reduce residents' fear of crime by designing safer buildings and residential areas.

This section will discuss the strategies of CPTED and various other security features that are typically deployed in gated communities. The question of whether gated communities provide a safer option than non-gated communities will then be considered. A

discussion of the condition of, and resident attitude toward, security in New Zealand's gated developments will complete the section.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)

Crime prevention can be defined as trying to address crime problems at their source in an attempt to prevent crime and anti-social behaviour before it occurs (Pfeffer, 2006). The use of enhanced security measures aims not only to reduce crime but also to make people feel safer by their presence. CPTED origins are traced back to Jacobs and Newman (Spinks, 2001). Whilst Jacobs (1972) suggested an 'inclusive' approach by encouraging natural surveillance via street usage and layout, Newman (1995) advocated an 'exclusive' residential design using territorial ownership to identify and physically exclude potentially dangerous outsiders. The core idea behind CPTED is to create a 'defensible space' that rests on three propositions: territoriality, image, and natural surveillance (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). In relation to gated communities, the concepts of territoriality and image are particularly relevant and applicable (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). Territoriality is created by using designs that incorporate easily claimed spaces – areas that are meant for small groups rather than large public expanses. Image is created using tactics that signal that a place is cared for and that it belongs to someone. Defensible space approaches to security typically involve the deployment of 'target hardening' strategies. These rely on physical barriers,

technical devices, and sometimes private law enforcement services to make it much more difficult for potential criminals to access the community and for criminal behaviours in the community to be more effectively prevented and more easily detected.

Physical barriers – gates and fences/walls

The most basic crime prevention objective within gated communities is to prevent potential criminals from accessing and entering the community and is achieved by the erection of physical barriers: gates and fences/walls. Gates range from elaborate two-story guardhouses guarded 24 hours a day to roll-back wrought iron gates to simple electronically controlled barrier arms. In master-planned communities⁵, there is often a guardhouse (or an operation centre depending on the scale of the community) situated immediately behind the main gate(s). Guardhouses are usually operated by private security guards whose main job is to detect and refuse unauthorised access. Unguarded gates often have intercom systems for visitors seeking entrance (Blakely & Snyder, 1998). Residents may open the gates through the use of an electronic key pad, a set of passwords or codes, or a remote control (Blakely & Snyder, 1998). Fences/walls are typically solid, continuous, of sufficient height, and able to conceal the whole community (Gigliotti & Jason, 2004).

⁵ Master-planned communities typically have elements that define them: landscaping, environmental graphics or signage, wall treatment, lighting and architecture. They generally offer a way of life, with amenity packages from walking trails, open space to parks and recreation centers. Some contain public facilities – schools, libraries, performing arts centers, fire and police stations and even medical clinics and hospitals, along with retail and other commercial enterprises (Banning, 2007).

Electrified fences are sometimes employed as a means to increase the level of security. Gates and fences/walls together establish the frontier barrier of access control and harden the 'target', making the potential target much more difficult to access (Crowe, 1991).

Technical devices – Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)

Different security measures in gated communities are centrally co-ordinated with video surveillance systems, namely, Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras. The main objective of the system is first to prevent crime and second to resolve those crimes that could not be prevented (Kruegle, 2004; Minnaar, 2005). For example, in monitoring the community surveillance systems remove the 'privacy' a burglar requires to operate successfully while the recorded CCTV footage can be used in the investigation of those criminal incidents that did occur. For communities without on-site security guards, the CCTV is usually remotely monitored by the security company that supplied the CCTV system (Kruegle, 2004). For communities with on-site security officers, the CCTV is usually monitored by security guards in the operation centre (Kruegle, 2004). It has been further suggested that, for best results, the CCTV systems should be tied to specific alarms that can occur in the facility and display images of those areas where an alarm has been triggered (Patterson, 2004). Pre-alarm and post-alarm recording assists in assessing triggered alarms by allowing the operators to view images recorded prior to and after the

alarm. This technique has proved much more valuable than expecting an operator to monitor screens continuously and to take action based on what he/she sees happening (Patterson, 2004).

Private law enforcement service - security guards

Many gated communities hire private security guards as a means of improving the level of security (Blakely & Snyder, 1998; Bislev, 2004; Chen & Webster, 2005). They may range from a simple mobile security patrol routinely checking the community to an on-site security team providing security guarding and regular patrols along and within the perimeter of the community at all times. Through their visible presence on-site security guards are deployed to deter potential criminals from attempting any criminal behaviours in the community. The various tasks and responsibilities of on-site security guards' may include guarding the gates, monitoring the CCTV, patrolling along and within the perimeter of the community, responding to emergencies and crimes in progress, and escorting (or arresting if necessary) unauthorised visitors out of the community (Blakely & Snyder, 1998; Bislev, 2004; Chen & Webster, 2005).

Gates and fences/walls, the CCTV system, and private security guards form a substantial part of access control and aim to deter crime and prevent it from occurring in the first place. Each community, however, has their own security regulations, strategies,

and plans as to where and how to deploy these security measures. For example, one of the largest gated communities in California emphasises consistent access control on both visitors and residents and imposes fines on residents who hurry through the gate without stopping for the security check; some communities have highly intensive patrols despatched every hour whereas some only send out patrols upon residents' calls; some communities install CCTV cameras in every corner of the community whereas some only install them around the gates (Pilot, 2003). As a result, the effectiveness of each security measure may vary in different communities. The next section will discuss the crime prevention effect of security measures in gated communities.

Are gated communities safer?

Changes in crime rates

Whether gated communities are as safe and secure as they proclaim has been the subject of much debate and the crime prevention effect of gated communities has not yet been fully studied and thus still remains in doubt (Blakely & Snyder, 1998; Atkinson et al., 2004; Blandy, 2007). A survey conducted by Blakely and Snyder (1999) found that over two-thirds of residents believed that their community experienced less crime than the surrounding neighbourhoods. In reality, and in contrast to the expectations of the residents,

the condition of security in gated communities may not, in fact, be much better than their surrounding neighbourhoods.

The majority of empirical studies that have compared crime rates in gated and non-gated communities report only marginal differences (Bowers & Manzi, 2006; Blandy, 2007). Fowler and Mangoine (1986) found that there is no relationship between actual crime rates and gates and barricades. It has also found that crime rates may vary by area but not between gated and non-gated communities in the same area (Low, 2004). A police report in Florida found no significant differences in rates of violent or property crime in a security zone community before and after the enclosure (Atlas, 1999). Car theft, burglary, and some other crimes dropped considerably right after enclosure, but none were sustained for more than a short time (Atlas, 1999). It is argued that the temporary drop of certain crime rates may have occurred because criminals do not want to go into an area that they are not yet familiar with and where it might be hard for them to make an escape (Drew & McGuigan, 2006).

Evidence of crime prevention is ambiguous, even in security zone style gated communities, where data on crime rates are available for both before and after gating (Blakely & Snyder, 1998). The biggest difference between gated and non-gated communities is perhaps in perception: those behind the gates feel much safer on their streets compared to those outside the gates (Bowers & Manzi, 2006). Such ambiguous 'success' in crime prevention has certainly raised questions as to why and how the

enhanced security measures cannot effectively enforce access control and keep criminals from operating within the community.

Shortcomings of security measures

The apparent lack of a crime prevention effect has revealed some truth about the enhanced security measures in gated communities. That is, they are not perfect and their functions and performance may be compromised under certain circumstances. Gates and fences/walls, for example, are said to have actually hampered the police's efforts in crime prevention (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). It is argued that gates will slow response time as the police often do not have the passwords, codes or remote controls that are issued to residents to open gates if they are unguarded and therefore need to wait for someone inside to open them (Atkinson et al., 2004). As a consequence, the police cannot attend the crime scene immediately and will lose the opportunity to apprehend or pursue suspected offenders at the scene. In order to solve this problem, many local police authorities have begun to request emergency entrance codes from gated communities in their districts. It is further argued that physical barriers also prevent routine police patrols from accessing the community. Consequently, gated communities may not receive sufficient police attention and are thereby, and somewhat ironically, forced to rely on their own security resources.

The CCTV systems also have their own shortcomings in that they cannot cover every

aspect of the community and that there are always some gaps in surveillance (Kruegle, 2004; Button, 2007). The existence of physical barriers has further worsened the situation as they block any natural or 'casual' surveillance that could come from passers-by. In the event of such CCTV 'dead spots', surveillance is instead dependent on residents and, if employed, security guards. As Jacobs noted, "a well-used city street is apt to be a safe street but a deserted street is apt to be unsafe" (Jacobs, 1972, p. 44). CCTV systems, in other words, cannot entirely replicate or replace the function of natural surveillance (Blakely & Snyder, 1999; Walker, 2005).

The performance of private security guards can also be compromised subject to their quality. Researchers have been critical of the minimal training that most private security guards are exposed to pre-deployment and the poorer educational qualifications they have compared to the average police officer (Wakefield, 2003; Drew & McGuigan, 2006). Moreover, the high turnover rate of private security officers suggests that they may not take as much pride in or responsibility for their duties compared to the public police (Wakefield, 2003; Bradley & Sedgwick, 2009). Given the typically low pay rates of private security officers, questions have been raised regarding the extent to which they will properly enforce access control and other security regulations in the community and more generally put themselves in harms way (Bradley, 2009). The service is therefore only as good as the people who provide it.

The core objective of CPTED is to reduce crime risk and increase residents' feeling of safety and security by creating a defensible space. Having said that, it has been pointed out that gated communities cannot provide what is needed to constitute a defensible space. As Blakely and Snyder state, "exclusion is not the same as protection, and fenced borders do not automatically create a community that will defend them" (1999, p. 163). They argue that there is often a lack of mutuality of community in developer-built gated communities.⁶ In many cases, residents do not find much sense of community and sometimes report feeling isolated (Blakely & Snyder, 1999; Low, Donovan & Gieseeking, 2007). This in turn has decreased their willingness to participate in community activities and share responsibilities for the security of the community. Socially-oriented defensible space approaches (i.e. neighbourhood watch programmes) are replaced by enhanced security measures; and mutual responsibility for the security of the community is replaced by security guards, club organisers, and external agents.

It is also argued that the lack of mutuality and the over reliance on private service providers and enhanced security measures may have even discouraged individual resident's responsibility for security of the community (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). This is often indicated by their reckless behaviours. For example, residents sometimes give out codes to

⁶ Blakely and Snyder (1999) found that there is sometimes more connectedness between residents in security-zone gated communities than in developer-built gated communities. However, the point has not been further discussed in the book.

unguarded gates to their friends or even pizza delivery people for reasons of convenience. In master-planned communities, it has been reported that some residents leave the garage door open for fresh air or the door unlocked because they think the gate is safely guarded. Such reckless behaviours undermine the effects of security measures to varying degrees. What these residents need to keep in mind is that security measures can only act as a temporary deterrent and cannot and do not automatically generate a crime free environment.

Residents' perception of safety and security behind gates and fences/walls

Enhanced security measures in gated communities are one of the situational crime prevention strategies that aim to prevent crime before it occurs by reducing opportunities (Walters & Bradley, 2005). However, the reality shows that these measures do have shortcomings and their performances do vary under different circumstances. Moreover, residents' sense of security and responsibility for the security of the community can also be compromised. What this suggests is that enhanced security measures in gated communities may point to a new direction in residential security but not necessarily more effective security. Additionally, it has been suggested that the presence of such security measures may actually increase people's anxiety about crime by raising their awareness of risk (Zedner, 2006). Nevertheless, residents do tend to think their community is safer than the

surrounding neighbourhoods.

Newman (1996) found that people perceived higher security in a gated and fenced/walled territory. However, there have been studies that do not entirely agree with such correlation between the perception of safety and security and the existence of gates and fences/walls. Wilson-Doenges (2000), for instance, found no significant difference in residents' perception of safety and security between gated and non-gated communities in the same area. On the other hand, Rogers (2005) found in his study on a security zone gated community (which was formerly a non-gated neighbourhood but had chosen to join an alley gating scheme) that residents were satisfied with the erection of gates and fences because they had largely reduced the occurrences of anti-social behaviours such as vandalism. Although problems of burglary and drug abuse still existed, those residents appreciated gates and fences for preventing 'low-level' crime and anti-social behaviours that had previously affected their 'quality of life'. As the signs of danger do not need to be crime itself or the threat of it, but more subtle perceptions of criminogenic risk and certain 'signal' incidents (Goffman, 1971; Innes, 2004), the prevention of 'low-level' crime and anti-social behaviours is also seen as the prevention of the likelihood of future serious crime. Currently, there is no empirical study that concludes either that gated communities are definitely safer than non-gated communities or that residents in gated communities feel absolutely safer and more secure than residents in non-gated communities.

Security in gated communities in New Zealand

As previously suggested, the majority of gated developments in New Zealand are different from the more common or typical forms found elsewhere. That is, they are often not fully enclosed by physical barriers but instead create a sense of security and enclosure by various technical tools and architectural designs such as surveillance cameras or narrowed entrances. As such, it is likely that the types of security measures employed and the more general condition of security in New Zealand style gated communities are also somewhat different. However, there is a dearth of empirical New Zealand based research on gated developments from the aspect of security. Therefore, reliable information on what security measures are being used or the level of criminal activities in comparison with non-gated neighbourhoods is not available. The results from the interviews conducted by Dixon et al. (2006) with a small group of gated development residents, does however provide some insights into resident attitudes towards, and the condition of security in those developments.

First of all, the majority of residents saw gates as only a deterrent to burglars and recognised that “where there was a will there was a way” (Dixon et al., 2006, p. 13). However, they also did think that a burglar was more likely to choose a non-gated development than a gated one. Dixon et al. regarded gates as creating a layer of security and other security measures (i.e. surveillance cameras) as additional layers of security. Second, while several residents felt that society was becoming more violent and the need

for security had therefore increased, two expressed the view that they and their family and friends felt more comfortable with that fact that they (the couple) were living in a gated development. Third, Dixon et al. stated that gates do not create a sense of community within gated developments straight away but may have indirect effect on the residents. Interviewees discussed how they had formed a strong sense of community in different instances such as making joint decisions for community maintenance, joining group parties, or attending Body Corporate meetings. One resident reported that the neighbourhood-watch group in their previous non-gated neighbourhood was a good way to increase a sense of community but the watch group was not needed in their current situation. Some residents felt that sometimes renters and/or new immigrant residents were less willing to participate in community activities and it could result in a reduced sense of community. However, it was not regarded as a major issue.

2.3 Private Governance in Gated Communities

One of the more important features of gated communities beside their security aspects is the underlying governance system it requires (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). Gated communities are run by self-governing homeowner associations (HOAs).⁷ HOAs provide a wide range of services to their residents through contracts with private firms including:

⁷ Homeowner association is one of the most commonly used names for such residential institutions. Residential association or Body Corporate is also being commonly used. The structure, obligation, and power of such residential institution may vary under different jurisdictions or due to building types.

security services, landscaping, garbage pick-up, street maintenance, sports and leisure activities. The HOA is operated by a committee of residents and is constantly monitored and evaluated by residents in terms of how well it is performing or the extent which the HOA reflects the values and preferences of residents (Low, 2004). While HOAs are seen as capable of tackling the problems of public goods and externalities, they have also raised several concerns in the course of governing. These concerns often rise from the conflicts between HOAs and residents or the wider neighbourhood, and sometimes from the inadequate content of legislation that deals with private governance (Kennedy, 1995; Chen & Webster, 2005; Blandy, Dixon & Dupuis, 2006). This section will discuss the impact of private governance systems on community life, their impact on the wider neighbourhood, and the problems associated with current private governance systems in New Zealand.

Impact of private governance systems on community life

The rules and regulations

Living in a gated community contributes to residents' sense of well-being and security but comes at the price of maintaining private facilities and services as well as conforming to extensive HOA covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs). Research by Blakely and Snyder (1999) has found that these CC&Rs impose rules and regulations on an astonishing

array of things both inside and outside of each property in the community. Rules and regulations on exterior maintenance and design are standard, requiring that landscaping conform to a common plan and that houses or even front doors be painted a limited number of colours. Pets above certain weight limits are sometimes prohibited. There may be height limits for trees, approved flower and lawn types, prescribed designs for fences and decks. Residents may also be asked to comply with various security rules and regulations (i.e. not giving out entrance codes of the gates) or to install only approved types of security alarms at approved locations around their properties. Rules and regulations may sometimes be trivial, such as forbidding hanging laundry outside, leaving garage doors open, installing window air conditioners, or building swing sets in your own backyards. In some instances, private security guards issue ‘tickets’ for parking or speeding violations within the community as well as imposing sanctions for failing to stop the car at security check points (Pilot, 2003). In more intrusive HOAs, there are rules governing home furnishing that can be seen from the windows and the hours after which residents may not socialise outside the buildings (Blakely & Snyder, 1999).

The conflicts

HOAs govern gated communities by legal contract. Residents (both owners and tenants) agree to comply with the CC&Rs upon signing the purchase deed or tenancy contract.

However, residents may not be aware of all the rules and regulations in the CC&Rs before moving in, or may not understand or accept them, resulting in conflicts with the HOA. HOAs can be very arbitrary when residents have violated or refused to comply with the rules and regulations. In Florida, one resident was sued by their HOA because their dog weighed more than 30 pounds, which was the weight limit set for pet dogs in the CC&Rs (McCabe, 2005). In Houston, an HOA threatened a couple with foreclosure on their house and additional legal costs if they did not pay for a fine imposed as a punishment for the late payment of association fees. As they did not pay for the fine, the amount of legal costs to be paid had reached \$28,000 by the time the case was brought to court (Marshall, 2002).

These may appear as extreme examples but conflicts between residents and the HOA are not only common-place but are becoming a major issue in the private governance system. Scholars have begun to ask whether residents should be protected by law from oppressive CC&Rs and their enforcement. A common conclusion is that contract law could be extended to protect residents as consumers because the law is traditionally based on freedom of contract and equal bargaining power (McKenzie, 1998; Atkinson et al., 2005).⁸ In the United States, there have been a number of legislative measures designed to protect residents' procedural rights, limiting the enforcement powers of HOAs, and requiring disclosure of the CC&Rs by the HOA to potential buyers.

⁸ In these cases, the HOA is treated as a private entity and thus private laws such as contract law should apply. However, there are also studies arguing that HOAs should be treated as state actors for their similar functions and powers and that the conflicts between the HOA and any other entity (residents or non-residents) should be subject to public law (Atkinson et al., 2005). This will be more thoroughly discussed in the next subsection.

The participation of residents in HOAs

In theory, HOAs would be an excellent vehicle for strong communities. They have an institutional structure that serves as a pseudo-government and a mechanism for participation and communication (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). In this sense, HOAs are a form of direct democracy, a means of local control and self-determination that can bring neighbours together in common interest. In reality, however, this ideal is seldom realised.

Studies of private governance systems have found little evidence that they produce higher levels of participation and self-governance (Barton & Silverman, 1987; Dilger, 1992). A survey of Californian residents' associations by Barton and Silverman (1987), for example, indicated that 23% of the associations studied had difficulty filling seats on the board. In 19% of associations, one board member did all the work; less than 1% of residents had ever served on the board; and only 11% of members had contributed to the association in a voluntary capacity. Residents' lack of participation is often explained in three different ways. First, it is attributed to flaws in the structure of HOAs and to the free-rider problem (Dilger, 1992). Because participation is voluntary, a few residents do most of the work, and as long as there are no glaring problems, the majority feels safe leaving those few to bear the burden of running the association. Second, it is argued that there is a degree of dissonance between private property rights and public roles (Barton & Silverman, 1987). Because HOAs represent and reflect the individual goals of residents, and are rooted in

private property rights and ownership, residents do not regard any extension of HOA obligations to the public, shared community as relatively important. Rather, residents view HOAs as a means of protecting their private property and guarding against intrusions into the private enjoyment of the home and community facilities. Third, the lack of participation is viewed as a collective action problem (Olsen, 1965; Stevens, 1993; Chen & Webster, 2005). For example, the unwillingness to form or join the HOA board occurs when the expected gain to any one resident is insufficient to trigger joint action, even though there are overall net gains to acting jointly. Once the board is established, residents must be given incentives to participate in on-going governance, or otherwise the motivation to participate will be again reduced.

When both residents and their representatives on the board are reluctant to participate in the governance of the community, the job will be handed over to professionals. The Community Association Institute in the United States initiated an investigation of 150,000 HOAs in 1992 (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). The report showed that about 52% were managed by professional management companies; 29% are self-managed by volunteers (of the HOA), and 19% had on-site managers employed directly by the HOA. In the previous section, it was mentioned that the overreliance on private service providers and enhanced security measures may have discouraged individual resident's responsibilities for the security of the community (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). Residents' lack of or diminished responsibilities for the security of the community may become a

serious problem in the process of creating a defensible space and eventually undermine the effects and performances of enhance security measures. Given such examples, it is fair to assume that the overreliance on management companies may create a similar atmosphere among members of private governance bodies and may discourage individual member's responsibilities for the operation of the community including those related to security. However, it is not clear as to whether such an assumption is valid or whether it would, too, undermine the effects and performances of enhanced security measures in any way.

Impact of private governance system on local communities

Avoidance of local taxes

HOAs replicate and supplement the functions that used to be performed by local government. They tax residents through regular and special assessments to pay for amenities and services. Residents of gated communities are willing to pay because many believe that HOAs can deliver certain services more efficiently and effectively than the local government (Fleming, 2006). On the other hand, some scholars regard gated communities as a potential threat to local fiscal autonomy (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). That is, because HOAs pay for some local services, some have attempted to opt out of or reduce some payment of local taxes. They argue that these new pseudo-governments are an

attempt to re-localise governance and to avoid public access to local resources that are paid by the HOAs (Blakely & Snyder, 1999; Atkinson et al., 2005).

The attempt at re-localisation of governance is especially obvious in master-planned communities in the United States where HOAs can constitute a powerful force and generally resist local taxation (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). Some states already allow for adjustment in local taxes to reflect the self-provided services of HOAs (Dilger, 1992). In those states with permissive governance formation laws, developers of gated communities are working with residents to create cities that are not only physically separate from local communities but also separate from the existing jurisdiction – the local city or county (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). By becoming an independent jurisdiction, they can direct publicly collected taxes to locally specific goals rather than allowing them to be used over a larger area. With the existence of HOAs, residents of gated communities can set their own taxes in the form of assessments, use them for services they choose, and restrict those benefits to themselves and their immediate neighbours (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). From there, it is a small step to seceding from a local government in order to avoid paying for those who do not live in one's HOA.

Discriminatory security mandate

Access into gated communities is restricted to residents and approved visitors. In

communities where gates are operated by private security guards, the degree to which the security guards enforce access control is dependent on the authority granted to them by the HOA. Some require residents to inform security guards of incoming visitors in advance, some require visitors to be accompanied by residents both on the way in and out, and some exercise consistent access control on both visitors and residents and require all inbound vehicles to stop for security check (The Bow Quarter, n.d.; Beijing Riveria, n.d.; Pilot, 2003). Strict access control may not be a problem when most visitors are related to residents one way or another. However, problems may arise in master-planned communities where many random visitors arrive with the intention of utilising formally public areas such as beaches, bush forests, or small parks that are now located within gates and fences/walls.

Some of the privatised former public space within master-planned communities is open to the public on the requests of other local residents that do not live in the gated community. In such cases, the issue of accessibility is further complicated by the presence of private security guards manning the gate (Kennedy, 1995). Where admission is made on a case-by-case basis, security guards must make their own decisions as to who are desirable and who are not. The result, as one observer in Los Angeles bluntly put it, is that “a black person who shows up in one of these places is likely to get busted” (Kennedy, 1995, p. 781). Some gated communities impose an entry fee, which excludes the very poor. Such partial exclusion by race and class is argued to be worse in many ways than the total

exclusion of non-residents (Kennedy, 1995). While the latter affects more people, the former more explicitly reveals the social prejudices that lie behind the motivation to exclude.

Security guards in gated communities refuse access to certain groups of people based on instructions from the HOA. Kennedy (1995) argues that HOAs should be considered 'state actors' and their actions be regulated by public law, because the services they perform and the authority they wield within their communities are similar to those of the state. As such, if a discriminatory behaviour is displayed by security guards acting under the instructions from the HOA, the behaviour would be viewed as unconstitutional and the HOA should be punished accordingly. Yet, the fact remains that HOAs have rarely been regarded as state actors in American courts (Briffault, 1999). However, the courts are prepared to assess the reasonableness of the HOA's action in light of various public policy considerations (Atkinson et al., 2005).

Private governance in gated developments in New Zealand

The Unit Titles Act 1972 is the statute that regulates all multi-unit developments in New Zealand.⁹ The Act sets out rules for the use and management of the units and common property. Under the provisions of the Act, a Body Corporate must be established when the

⁹ The Unit Titles Act 1972 was still in force during the period of time the research of this thesis was taking place. The new Unit Titles Act 2010 has been passed but not yet come into force by the time the thesis was completed.

developer deposits a unit plan for the development. At the same time the Body Corporate is established, Body Corporate rules will be set out and a Body Corporate secretary (usually from a property management firm) will be appointed to administer the Body Corporate. These Body Corporate rules are the equivalent of the CC&Rs that protect property values and life-style preferences of the development. Initially, the developer will be the sole owner of all units. As the development begins to sell, the owner of each unit will automatically become a member of the Body Corporate and be required to comply with the Body Corporate rules upon the completion of the purchase.¹⁰ The Body Corporate is the private governance system in gated developments in New Zealand. All owners have to pay for Body Corporate levies as well as rates and taxes to local authorities. An annual general meeting (AGM) is required to be held at least once a year for owners to discuss important issues, set budgets for the coming year, and evaluate the performance of any service contractors.

The Act requires a committee to be elected if there are more than three owners in a multi-unit development.¹¹ The Owners' Committee is the administrative body of the governance system. The role of the Owners' Committee depends on the Body Corporate and the contracts it has with the Body Corporate secretary and the building manager, if there is one. Ideally, the Owners' Committee will manage the development themselves,

¹⁰ In many cases, the developer will retain the ownership of a sufficient number of units to ensure their majority vote in the Body Corporate meetings with other individual owners.

¹¹ At least three owners must be members of the committee. A quorum with a minimum number of members is necessary for the committee to make decisions. The quorum is at least two if there are no more than six committee members and three if there are more than six committee members.

such as maintaining common areas, managing contracts for private services, monitoring compliance with the rules and regulations, arranging social activities, and dealing with various issues. However, in reality, most of the Owners' Committee rely heavily on the advice and input of the Body Corporate secretary and/or the building manager employed by the Body Corporate (Auckland Regional Council, 2003).

The major issue with current systems of private governance in New Zealand seems to be the power imbalance between developer, management agent, and owners due to the inadequacy of the Act (Dixon & Dupuis, 2003). The common problems identified include: the need for a review of the initial Body Corporate rules and contractual arrangements set up by the developer before the ownership of the units changes; the inflexible process of changing existing Body Corporate rules; the need to clarify the roles of Body Corporate management agents and owners and Owners' Committees; the need for a sinking fund and asset management plan; the setting of levies at a realistic level to cover the true costs of maintenance; and the problems and difficulties with changing unit entitlements once they are set in place (Blandy, Dixon & Dupuis, 2006). In particular, owners and members of the Owners' Committee have on many occasions made it clear that they felt underpowered in relation to the developer and the Body Corporate secretary assigned to the development, when attempting to make changes to the Body Corporate rules (Dixon & Dupuis, 2003). These findings reinforced the views of various researchers who suggested that the Act was outdated and lacking in both the sophistication and flexibility necessary for current multi-

unit housing developments. As a result, it satisfied neither the needs of developers nor potential owners (Alston et al., 2000; Dixon & Dupuis, 2003). A review of the Act was then undertaken to address the problems identified above. On 1 April 2010, the new Unit Titles Act 2010 passed its third reading in the Parliament and will come into force when the regulations are fully developed. The 2010 Act will make a number of changes to the 1972 Act including (Department of Building and Housing, 2010):¹²

- Clarifying the definition of a principal unit.
- Streamlining the process under which a development is built in stages.
- Creating a fair system for calculating how much a unit owner should contribute to Body Corporate funds.
- Stating that the Body Corporate owns the common property.
- Clarifying the rights and responsibilities of unit owners and bodies corporate.
- Creating fair and transparent governance and management structures.
- Lowering the voting threshold for Body Corporate decisions from a unanimous resolution to a 75% agreement.
- Provide a comprehensive disclosure regime for buyers and sellers, developers, and bodies corporate.

¹² These proposed changes were updated on 1 April 2010. Any further adjustments made to these changes beyond this date will not be discussed in this thesis.

- Provide a fully integrated and cost effective dispute resolution service through the Tenancy Tribunal.

Problems regarding the impact of private governance systems in New Zealand appear to be related more to the conflicts between the Body Corporate (including both owners and the Owners' Committee) and the developer/Body Corporate management agent rather than to the conflicts between the Body Corporate and individual owners or local residents. Although similar issues between developer, management agents, and owners have also been noted in the literature on HOAs, these were not regarded as equally problematic as those other issues discussed in the previous subsection (McKenzie, 1994; Blakely & Snyder, 1999; Blany, Dixon & Dupuis, 2006). With the passing of the Unit Titles Act 2010, it is hoped that Body Corporates will be more active on behalf of and beneficial to the owners in terms of managing multi-unit developments (as well as gated developments). Consequently, it is also reasonable to assume that, once more active and powerful, the Body Corporate may begin to experience similar issues commonly noted in the literature on HOAs in relation to individual residents of the development and other local residents.

2.4 Research Outline

The above sections have provided a general discussion of gated communities particularly

in the aspects of development, security and private governance. Such detailed discussion does not only provide familiarity with the key elements of and thus a foundation for the research but also why those research elements should be involved and from what theories they have been developed.

This study aims to examine the condition of security of gated communities under private governance in New Zealand. However, as there is a dearth of research in New Zealand regarding this specific field (in terms of both academic research and official crime statistics in specific neighbourhoods), the research first needed to collect general information rather than proceeding directly to discover the causal relationships between security and private governance. As such, the research aims to examine the condition of security of gated communities under private governance in the light of the residents' experiences and opinions. Consequently, only a few basic elements from each section above will be included for research. The proposed objectives are: 1) to discover the significance of security as a reason for moving into a gated community; 2) to examine residents' perception of safety and security both within and beyond the gated community; and 3) to examine the manner in which security is managed or governed under private governance.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGIES

3.1 Research Design

This study aimed to examine the condition of security of gated communities under private governance based upon residents' experiences of and opinions towards security and private governance. An exploratory-descriptive method of research was utilised as this method is regarded as the most appropriate to gather information about the present existing condition (Creswell, 2003). The research design is quantitative. To enhance the quantitative aspect, surveys of residents were conducted. Two sets of surveys were distributed: one among residents (Survey A) and one among members of Owners' Committees (Survey B). The surveys were placed in the mailboxes of subject communities together with an information sheet and a postage-included return envelope. Each household was expected to complete only one of the two types of surveys according to the resident's position in the community (i.e. resident or Owners' Committee member).¹³ This research was strictly anonymous and the researcher did not know the identity of residents but was able, through survey coding, to identify the community in which the residents lived.

Field investigation and a pilot study (see 'Pilot Study' for more details) were carried out before distribution of the finalised surveys. The data collected via the surveys

¹³A few Owners' Committee members had answered and returned both types of surveys. The ones (Survey A) answered as residents were not used for the research as their positions in the Owners' Committee may influence their opinions towards their own Committee on several questions in Survey A.

were statistically analysed to discover: 1) the significance of 'security' as a reason for moving into a gated community; 2) residents' perception of safety and security both within and beyond the 'gated community'; and 3) the manner in which private systems of governance manage or govern security. A wide range of statistical tools were employed in the analysis of the data including basic frequency analysis, percentages, and cross tabulation that uses Pearson Correlation tests to analyse the relationship of two different variables. Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used as the main computer program for statistical analysis.

3.2 Selecting the Subject Communities

A range of criteria, including the level of access control, the size and age of the community, and the residential type of the community, were used to select a sample of subject communities. First of all, only those communities that had access controlled entrances (i.e. password or key pad controlled gates) and were fully enclosed were eligible as research subjects. Typical New Zealand style gated residential developments were not considered as they are not fully enclosed. Rather, their gates, fences/walls, and/or other architectural designs are designed to give only a perception of 'gatedness' instead of being physically capable of access control. Second, only communities with more than 30 units were considered because communities with too few residents typically do not create an

organisational setting that generates sufficient governance issues for observation. Third, only communities that were five years or older were considered to ensure that the Owners' Committee had had sufficient experiences of dealing with the residents and community affairs. Finally, the subject communities had to be purely residential, not tourist-oriented (i.e. serviced apartments) or student-oriented or retirement villages or those having business units within the community. This was to ensure that the focus of governance and the opinions and experiences of the residents did not present significant differences to the general or typical gated community population.

3.3 Field Investigation

The purpose of the field investigation conducted prior to the distribution of the principal research instruments was to identify and visit a range of gated residential developments that met the criteria of subject communities. Because of the lack of information and official data regarding the location and distribution of gated residential developments in New Zealand, this became a major difficulty encountered during the research process. In order to overcome this obstacle, two further measures were adopted: a comprehensive internet search and a series of observational 'tours' throughout the greater Auckland region.

The internet proved to be a very useful and convenient tool during the research process. Different combinations of key words, such as 'gated communities' and 'security',

‘gated and secured’ and ‘privacy’, and ‘building manager’ and ‘Body Corporate’, were used to identify and retrieve as many gated residential developments as possible. Sometimes, the search found active websites of residential developments that provided contact details, exact address, building specifications, and other useful information. Most of the time, however, it was merely names of developments and their approximate locations that were available.

After identifying a list of potential gated communities, each location was visited to verify whether they met qualifying criteria. Other field investigation tours throughout the greater Auckland region were also undertaken with the aim of discovering as many qualified communities as possible. Once new subject communities were discovered, an internet search was again conducted to discover contact details of the building manager, the Body Corporate agent, or the Owners’ Committee in order to obtain permission for the distribution of surveys at a later stage. The same routine was repeated during a period of four months from December 2008 to April 2009. However, limited research capacity meant that such trips were conducted more often in North Shore City, Auckland City, Manukau City,¹⁴ and less in the rest of the greater Auckland region. Ultimately, 55 communities were found to qualify the criteria of subject communities, and 28 of which had contact details available. Seven agreed to participate in the research.

¹⁴ It is because these three districts have more concentrated housing developments than the rest of the greater Auckland region.

3.4 Research Instruments for Surveys

General guidelines

As mentioned, there were two types of surveys: one for the residents and one for the members of the Owners' Committee. The design and format of both surveys were based on the elements indicated in Dillman's Total Design Method (1978). The Dillman Total Design Method consists of a series of precisely laid-out steps that help researchers obtain a high return rate from mail/telephone surveys. The typical steps include explaining research purposes and objectives, providing clear instructions, presenting questions in an easy-to-follow format, ensuring the anonymity of residents, and conducting follow-up surveys according to a set pattern. In order to for this research to achieve a higher return rate, the following steps were taken: 1) personal questions were placed at the end of the survey; 2) questions were presented in vertical order and in different sections according to their content; 3) the purpose of the research, its significance, and the process and procedure to be followed, along with the researcher's contact details, were clearly stated in the information sheet which was printed on official Victoria University of Wellington letterhead; and 4) each information sheet was signed individually by hand by the researcher and a postage included return envelope was included. However, due to the strictly anonymous nature of the research, a follow-up letter to remind non-respondents

was not possible and which precluded the opportunity of encouraging further responses.

A package containing an information sheet, a copy of Survey A, a copy of Survey B, and a postage included return envelope was distributed to each randomly selected household in the 7 subject communities. It was hoped that primary research like this could achieve a sample size of 100 responses from the subject population. Because previous research indicated an average response rate for mail out surveys to be between 16 – 20% (Wilson-Doenges, 2000; Chao & Heath, 2003; Kim, 2006), 500 packages were prepared in order to achieve the desired 100 responses.

Survey content

Open-ended questions and Likert-scaled questions were used in both surveys. Open-ended questions provide an opportunity for respondents to supply richer and more detailed information, such as feelings, attitudes, and understanding of the subject matter, in their responses (Wilson-Doenges, 2000; Brunson, Kuo & Sullivan, 2001). This allows researchers more comprehensive insights into the respondents' thoughts and attitudes on an issue. 'Other' followed by a blank space was included as one of the choices for several questions in order to encourage respondents to give additional information that went beyond the provided choices. Five-point Likert-scale questions were used to determine the proximity of ordinal data to consensus (agreement) or dissention toward a given statement

(1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neutral, 4=disagree, and 5=strongly disagree) (Tastle & Wierman, 2006).

For Survey A, questions were divided into two different sections: security and private governance. Questions in the security section were mainly designed to obtain information regarding the residents' perception of security, attitudes towards gated communities and their experiences of and opinions towards enhanced security measures and access control. Questions in the private governance section were designed to obtain information regarding the residents' interaction with and expectation of the private governance body particularly in relation to security related issues. Personal questions such as age or sex were placed at the end of the survey.

For Survey B, questions were mainly designed to obtain information regarding the private governance arrangements and the private governance body's experiences of and attitudes towards security related issues in general. Personal questions were not included as only a small population in each community was expected to be eligible as respondents to Survey B and thus there was no intention to use personal characteristics of the respondents as variables in terms of statistical analysis. The research procedure and the content of the surveys were approved by the Human Ethics Committee of Victoria University of Wellington on 22 April, 2009.

Data analysis

Descriptive statistics, including frequency, percentage, mean, and standard deviation, were applied to the responses to each question to obtain the general characteristics of those responses. Selected independent variables, including gender, age, ethnicity, and residential status were examined to see whether, or to what extent, responses to the same question would differ according to these variables. Furthermore, cross tabulated analysis was applied for selected questions to see how respondents' responses to one question could be related to their responses to another question.

Pilot study

A pilot study is designed to test logistics and gather information prior to a larger study in order to improve the latter's quality and efficiency (Zeisel, 1984). A pilot study can also reveal deficiencies in the design of a proposed study and more importantly, examine whether the content of the survey is understandable before time and resources are expended on the larger scaled study. Due to these reasons, a small scale pilot study was also carried out for this research.

30 packages (each containing an information sheet, a copy of Survey A, a copy of Survey B, and a postage-included return envelope) were randomly distributed to one

qualified subject community that declined to participate in the research (mainly because they were unwilling to take the risk of having the identity of the community revealed once the research was made to the public) but that did agree to participate in the pilot study (since the results of this pilot study would not be available to the public). The total return rate was 23.3% (7 out of 30). The individual return rate was 20% (6 out of 30) for Survey A and 3.3% for Survey B (1 out of 30).

Post pilot data Collection

Once the pilot study had been completed, 500 packages (each containing an information sheet, a copy of Survey A, a copy of Survey B, and a postage-included return envelope) were distributed to 7 subject communities respectively over the period from the 30th of April to the 5th of June, 2009. In the process of distributing the surveys, observation was made in the course of distribution to gather general information on each subject community such as security measures employed and the styles and positions of the gates. Completed surveys began returning one week after the first round of distribution and the final response was received on the 30th of June. The total return rate was 20.6% (103 out of 500). The individual return rate was 16.6% (83 out of 500) for Survey A and 4% (20 out of 500) for Survey B. The return rate for Survey A had reached the desired number. While it may appear that the return rate for Survey B was far below the desired 16 – 20%, when

taking into consideration the fact there are typically only 5 to 7 members in each of the Owners' Committees, the return rate for Survey B was actually not as far below the desired percentage figure. However, the actual number of the Committee members in each gated community was unable to be identified due to privacy concerns. Thus, the actual return rate for Survey B could not be calculated based on the total number of the Committee members from all sites but on the total number of copies of Survey B that had been distributed.

3.5 Sampling

Community and security characteristics of the sample

Among the 83 respondents to Survey A, 32.5% were living in the Central Business District while 67.5% were living in the suburban areas. While 67.5% respondents were living in a 'vertical' style community comprised of a single apartment building or several linked apartment buildings, the rest (32.5%) were living in a 'horizontal' style community comprised of two or more of the following types of buildings: single-detached houses, town houses, terraced houses, and apartment buildings. 79.5% respondents were living in a community that had a fenced/walled outdoor communal space while the rest 20.5% were living in a community with no fenced/walled outdoor communal space. While 60.2% respondents were living in a community that had installed CCTV cameras, the remainder

(39.8%) were living in a community without them. 33.7% respondents were living in a community that had contracted mobile security services to run regular patrols during a specific period of time, or that despatched patrols on call. 66.3% were living in a community that did not contract any kind of mobile security services. Finally, 86.7% were living in a community that employed either an on-site or an off-site building manager who can be contacted 24 hours a day and seven days a week, and 13.3% were living in a community that did not have a specific building manager position.

When presenting these characteristics based on communities rather than respondents, the results were as follows: 1) three communities were located in the Central Business District while four were in other urban suburbs; 2) five communities were ‘vertical’ style gated communities while two were ‘horizontal’ style gated communities; 3) five communities had fenced/walled outdoor communal space while two communities did not; 4) three communities did not install any security cameras (CCTV) while the remaining four had; 5) three communities had contracted mobile security services to run regular patrols during a specific period of time or to despatch patrols on call while four did not have any contracted mobile security services; and 6) six communities had employed either an on-site or an off-site building manager who can be contacted 24 hours a day and seven days a week while only one community did not have a specific building manager position.

Demographic characteristics

Among the 83 respondents, 51.8% were females and 48.2% were males. The age of the respondents were categorised into four groups: 28.9% were between 18 and 30 years old, 37.3% were between 31 and 50 years old, 24.1% were between 51 and 64 years old, and 9.6% were over 65 years old. Respondents were asked to self-identify their ethnicity from the following options: New Zealand Pakeha, Maori, European, Asian, any combinations therefore and other. More than half (54.2%) of the respondents identified themselves as New Zealand Pakeha, 16.9% identified as Asian, 12.0% European, and 6% other. In addition, 4.8% identified their ethnicity as a combination of New Zealand Pakeha and Asian, 3.6% a combination of New Zealand Pakeha, Maori, and other, and 2.4% a combination of New Zealand Pakeha and Maori. Finally, 13.3% of the respondents reported they had at least one child in the household aged under 14 years while 86.7% reported they had no children under the age of 14.

Residential characteristics

In terms of residential status, 53.0% replied that either they or their partner was the owner of the property while 47.0% reported to be tenants. In terms of the length of residence, 21.7% had been living in the community for less than one year, 22.9% longer than one year

but less than two years, 18.1% longer than two years but less than three years, 10.8% longer than three years but less than four years, 10.8% longer than four years but less than five years, 4.8% longer than five years but less than six years, and 10.8% longer than six years. Finally, 32.5% reported that they had lived in a gated community before, 65.1% reported no experience of living in a gated community, and 2.4% were not sure whether or not they had lived in a gated community before.

CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS

Introduction

This chapter reports on the findings that emerge from this research. In order to examine the condition of security of Auckland gated communities under private governance, three main topics were explicated:

1. The significance of security as a reason for moving into a gated community.
2. Residents' perception of safety and security both within and beyond the gated community.
3. The manner in which security is managed or governed under private governance.

These are important themes that allow residents to convey their experiences and opinions regarding gated community life in terms of security and private governance. 103 residents, 20 of whom were both residents and members of the Owners' Committee from seven different gated communities in Auckland participated in this research. Their responses to the surveys were statistically analysed with the aid of SPSS software. The research findings are presented in the order of these three main themes listed above.

4.1 Significance of Security as a Reason for Moving into a Gated Community

Given that enhanced security is a main feature of and a common selling point for gated communities, an important objective of this study was to explore the reasons why residents had chosen to rent or buy property in such a community. In the light of the fact that in New Zealand the subject of gated communities has not achieved the prominence that it has internationally, it was first necessary to ask whether the residents were aware they were living in a gated community. Although the vast majority of the residents (95.2%) were aware that they were living in a gated community, it is interesting to note that almost 5% were not (see Appendix 5: Table i). A slightly smaller number (80.7%) were aware of this fact before they moved in, despite many of them (65.1%) having never lived in such a community in the past (see Appendix 5: Table ii & iii). What this finding suggests is that the knowledge about gated communities amongst New Zealanders could be much higher than expected in spite of the lack of attention given to this topic and that there are a much smaller prevalence of such communities in New Zealand than that found in overseas countries.

In order to discover the significance of ‘security’ among all other reasons for moving into a gated community, the residents were asked to choose up to three reasons and prioritise them. Rather surprisingly, ‘security’ scored behind proximity to workplace/school

as a reason for moving into a gated community with 36.1% choosing the latter and 24.1% the former as their primary reason. Affordability (affordable house price/rent) came third (14.5%) behind proximity and 'security' in this category. However, 'security' returned to top place overall when 21.7% and 14.6% chose it as the second and third reason respectively for moving into a gated community. Affordability (18.1%) and facilities (12%) scored behind 'security' as the second reason, and affordability (13.4%) and convenience of transportation (13.4%) in the third reason category. To facilitate an understanding of the level of significance of each reason, a table was made to show the accumulated points scored by each reason (refer to Table 1 at next page).¹⁵ While the residents scored 'security' highly overall, it was not the most significant reason for moving into a gated community. With proximity claiming the first place and affordability third, it is not difficult to see that the residents were driven by practical life needs as well as need for a sense of security. Moreover, when one combines proximity with 'convenience of transportation' and 'convenience of shopping', it is somewhat clear that other considerations, particularly convenience, might at times be held at higher regard than 'security' alone.

¹⁵ In the primary reason category, each reason was given three points when chosen by the respondents. The number of respondents choosing an individual reason timed three would become the points scored by that reason in the primary category. Two points were given to each reason in the second category and one in the third category. Same process applied. The final points of each reason were the sum of points scored in all three categories.

Table 1

Points Scored by Individual Reasons Overall	
Workplace/school is nearby (proximity)	112
Security	108
Affordable house price/rent (affordability)	77
Other	35
Privacy	29
Facilities	29
Architectural design	28
Convenience of transportation	25
Convenience of shopping	23
Less through traffic	14
No response	12
Possibility of having 'my kind' neighbour	5

4.2 Residents' Perceptions of Safety and Security Within and Beyond the Community

Despite of losing top place in the primary reason category, security was nonetheless highly regarded by the residents and came as the second most significant reason for moving into a gated community in the overall score of points. After investigating the significance of security as a reason for moving into the community, the next step was to examine residents' perceptions of safety and security within and beyond the community before exploring their assessment of the conditions of security after moving in.

Residents' security concerns

In order to discover whether the residents would still worry about becoming a victim of

crime while living in a highly secure environment, they were asked to select their biggest security concern(s) for the community from a list of conventional crimes.¹⁶ With 53% residents having selected it, ‘burglary’ was the most commonly cited security concern. ‘Sexual assault’ (25.3%) came behind ‘burglary’ as the second most common concern. What is interesting about this finding is that all resident reporting ‘sexual assault’ as one of their biggest security concerns were living in vertical gated communities (apartment style). One might wonder whether this could have something to do with some features of apartment buildings (such as long and complicated hallways or security camera dead spots), but since no residents had provided written comments that elaborated on their selections their reasons remain unknown.

Both ‘murder’ and ‘violent assault’ scored 22.9% and came as the third most commonly selected among residents. In relation to concerns about ‘murder’, many residents provided written comments and explained that because this was the worst possible consequence of all types of crime, regardless of its relatively rare chance of happening. ‘Theft’, ‘any act of vandalism’, and ‘manslaughter’ scored 19.2%, 12%, and 4.8% respectively while only 4.8% reported that they had no security concerns at all (see Appendix 5: Table iv). With almost every resident reporting to have one or more security concerns, one might reasonably assume that they had probably experienced some criminal incidents after moving in. In fact, more than half (68.7%) had themselves never

¹⁶ The question was meant for the respondent to select only one type of crime, but all but a few made multiple selections. Therefore, the analysis had changed from the ‘biggest security concern’ to ‘biggest security concerns’, and all selections were counted. Consequently, the numbers do not add up to 100%.

experienced themselves any crime in their current community (see Appendix 5: Table v for a list of criminal incidents experienced by residents). Moreover, as many as 38.6% had never even witnessed or heard about any criminal incidents occurring to any other residents in the same community (see Appendix 5: Table vi for a list of criminal incidents witnessed/heard by residents). As can be seen from the above findings, no evidence was found to indicate any serious crime problems within the sample of gated communities. Nevertheless, the residents did note various security concerns including types of criminal activities that had yet to occur to either themselves or their neighbours in the same community.

Residents' perceptions of safety and security

A set of questions asked the residents whether they feel safe and secure within the community, how they perceive the crime problem beyond the community, and whether they perceive a difference in terms of crime rates between their own community and the greater Auckland urban areas. The vast majority (86.8%) of residents felt rather safe and secure inside their property (see Appendix 5: Table vii). They also felt safe and secure within the community. 92.8% reported that they were not afraid to go anywhere in the community during daytime while a further 78.7% reported having no fear to go anywhere in the community during night time (see Appendix 5: Table viii & ix). While a clear

majority perceived crime as a serious problem in Auckland urban areas (73.5%), they believed that their community is experiencing relatively less (33.5%) or much less (26.5%) crime than its surrounding neighbourhoods (see Appendix 5: Table x & xi).

The research further found that those who felt safe and secure inside their property also have a tendency to believe that their community is experiencing less crime than its surrounding neighbourhoods. A positive correlation was found between the responses to these two questions ($p < .05$) (refer to Table 2). This appeared to be quite logical since one can only feel truly safe and secure in one's home when one believes that the home environment is also relatively safe and secure when compared with areas beyond the community. The strength of the correlation, however, is not high ($r = .283$) (refer to Table 2). Furthermore, perceiving crime as a serious problem in Auckland urban areas was also positively correlated to believing that their particular community is experiencing less crime compared to the surrounding neighbourhoods ($p < .05$) (refer to Table 2 at next page). This suggested that the residents were quite confident in their communities, and that even though they perceived crime as serious problems in the wider community (Auckland urban areas), they still believed that the situation is not as bad in their own community. The strength of the correlation here is not high, either ($r = .320$) (refer to Table 2 at next page). One might begin to wonder, however, how the residents could possibly feel safe and secure at the same time as having so many security concerns (see the findings in the previous subsection). This issue will be further discussed in the next chapter (Chapter 5).

Table 2

Pearson Correlation Table			
		Do you feel safe and secured inside your property?	Do you perceive crime as a serious problem in Auckland urban areas?
Do you believe that your community is experiencing less crime than its surrounding neighbourhood?	Pearson Correlation	.283	.320
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.009	.003
	N	83	83

Perceptions regarding the adequacy of the existing security measures

The reason that gated communities are able to offer a higher standard of security than non-gated communities and thus make their residents feel safer and more secure is mainly due to the security gates and fences/walls as well as other security measures. Therefore, in order to fully understand the residents' perceptions of safety and security, it was also necessary to explore the perceptions of the security measures themselves.

Residents' awareness of other existing security measures in the community

The residents were asked to select the types of security measures¹⁷ currently deployed in

¹⁷ The list of security measures included: on-site security guards, routine/nightly patrols, CCTV/surveillance cameras, electrified wire fences, 24 hour security hotline, security alarms, and others.

the community besides secured gates and fences/walls.¹⁸ The majority (84.3%) were confident they could accurately identify the range of security measures employed within the community while the remainder (15.7%) were not sure what other measures were in place apart from security gates and fences/walls. The list of security measures provided on the survey was later sent to the building manager (or one of the Committee members) of each community in order to acquire an accurate list of security measures deployed in each community. Surprisingly, of those who were confident that they knew of all the security measures in the community, only seven residents had actually made correct selections while the rest (n=76) had selected more or less types than actually existed.¹⁹ The most frequently mis-selected type of security measure was CCTV, which was often omitted by the residents. Another surprising finding that came from the analysis of the residents' written comments for this question was that they sometimes mistakenly identified their building managers as on-site security guards. Again, this issue will be discussed in more depth in the next chapter (Chapter 5). Overall, the findings from this question seems to reveal the residents' lack of awareness of other security measures besides gates and fences/walls, and that they would not necessarily seek to confirm the existing security measures immediately after moving in.

¹⁸ The Committee members were not asked this question, however, in another question, the vast majority claimed that they were either familiar (30%) or very familiar (60%) with the use and functions of all security measures in the community.

¹⁹ Security (night) lightings were installed in some researched sites but were not included along with other types of security measures. Residents from those communities were not treated as giving wrong answers whether they had or had not pointed out the existence of security lightings in the community. Same rule applied to security alarms for it was not specified whether it was installed on single property or in public space.

Regardless of knowing exactly what security measures were deployed, many (65.1%) residents were satisfied with the existing types of security measures in their community and felt safe with their existence (see Appendix 5: Table xii). However, this does not mean that they were not interested in increasing the level of security of their community. When asked whether they would like to see additional security measures being deployed,²⁰ 27.7% chose to have on-site security guards. Routine/nightly patrols (25.3%) and a 24 hour security hotline (25.3%) were equally popular with the residents.²¹ Security alarms (24.1%) scored slightly less and were followed by CCTV (19.3%) (see Appendix 5: Table xiii for a list of additional security measures). Only 16.9% of the residents insisted that they would not need any additional security measures at all. When looking at these findings in the context of previous findings regarding security concerns, it usefully illustrates the situation Zedner (2003) describes as ‘too much security’. That is to say, the more security features one has access to can paradoxically increase one’s worries and anxieties leading to even more demands for greater security. Subsequently, this also makes one wonder whether it might further lead to what described by Blakely and Snyder (1999, p. 100) as “whether crime is rampant or infrequent, the threat actual or perceived, the fear of crime itself is very real’. A more detailed discussion regarding the connections between these findings will be presented in the next chapter (Chapter 5).

²⁰ The list of security measures included: on-site security guards, routine/nightly patrols, CCTV/surveillance cameras, 24 hour security hotline, security alarms, and others. These scores do not add up to 100% because residents were allowed to make multiple selections.

²¹ Some of the researched communities had more types of security measures than the others, and hence might have affected the scores of each type of security measures. For example, if a community had CCTV, then the residents usually would not choose CCTV again. In contrast, if a community did not have CCTV, then its residents would likely choose CCTV as one of their preferred type of security measures.

Access control is the most important security feature of gated communities, in that if it is effective, no criminals would be able to enter the community in the first place. If access control is ineffective, security cannot be ensured inside the community regardless how many other security measures are deployed to deter crime in general. Access control is mainly achieved by the erection of gates and fences/walls, and the residents were therefore asked for their thoughts and opinions on whether the gates and fences/walls are effective in terms of access control. All residents agreed that gates and fences/walls had been effective with 45.8% agreeing to a large extent, 36.1% to a moderate extent, 15.7% to a very large extent, and 2.4% to a small extent. In the later part of the survey, those residents who believed their community was experiencing less crime than its surrounding neighbourhoods were asked again whether they thought this was due to the gates and fences/walls. Not surprisingly, all residents again agreed that it was due to the existence of gates and fences/walls with 42% agreeing to a large extent, 36% to a very large extent, 18% to a moderate extent, and 2% to a small extent.²² These two findings illustrate the importance of gates and fences/walls in terms of access control in the minds of the residents.

The residents were also asked to give reasons as to why gates and fences/walls may

²² N=50 (the number of respondents believing their community was experiencing less crime than its surrounding neighbourhoods).

sometimes be ineffective. The most popular reasons were: 1) residents tended to open the gate for whoever was waiting outside on their way in/out (35.4%); 2) some residents gave password/code/copies of keys or swipe-cards of the gate to outsiders (23.4%) and; 3) residents sometimes left the gates open behind them (15.6%) (see Appendix 5: Table xiv). So far, one would think most residents would have avoided committing the above indiscretions since they were well aware how they could undermine the effectiveness of access control and thus the security of the community. The following findings, however, seem to suggest otherwise.

When asked if they have ever let people in without asking what unit they live in or would like to visit, almost half (45.1%) of the residents reported to have done so at least once. Moreover, more than half (54.9%) had never refused to give access to people after being told of their purposes of visiting while only as few as 6.1% had always refused to give access regardless of circumstances. The 'attitude of the person' (30.3%) was identified as one major indicator that was likely to influence the residents' decision of whether or not to allow strangers inside (refer to Table 3 at next page). Nevertheless, most residents (79.3%) reported that they would be more confident telling people that they are unable to give them access if the community set out a specific rule telling the residents not to let strangers in.

Table 3

Factors Influencing Residents' Decision of Whether or Not Letting People In	
	Percentage
Attitude of the person	30.3
Time of the day	19.7
Appearance of the person	18.9
Purpose of visiting	18.9
Possible awkwardness upon refusing	6.6
None	3.3
No reply	2.5

It was also found that the residents (74.7%) liked to give out password/code/spare keys to non-residents for reason of convenience. Fortunately, they usually just gave them to their relatives (61.4%) and/or friends (31.3%) rather than mere service or delivery personnel (15.7% including deliverer, gardener/plumber or service technician).²³ As to the third most commonly cited reason, no specific questions were asked about leaving the gates open as it was assumed that this would be an unlikely scenario. As such, whether residents themselves left the gates open as often as they had reported seeing or hearing other residents doing so is unknown. These findings clearly suggest that knowing what is inappropriate to do is one thing, but keeping oneself from doing it is another.

²³ These scores do not add up to 100% because residents were allowed to make multiple selections.

4.3 Security under Private Governance

High standard security of a gated community is managed or governed by its private governance body just as the security of a state is by its government and government agencies. In New Zealand, the Owners' Committee is the private governance body of gated communities. This section presents findings that examined the manner in which security is managed or governed by the Owners' Committee. The main focus will be on the following three aspects: the residents' awareness of the Owners' Committee, the interaction between the residents and the Owners' Committee in the discussion of security issues, and the Owners' Committee's ways of managing security issues.

Residents' awareness of the Owners' Committee

Before asking in-depth questions regarding the private governance of security, it was first necessary to know whether the residents were at least aware of the existence of the private governance body – the Owners' Committee. The results showed that the vast majority (100% of owners and 82.1% of tenants)²⁴ were aware that there is an Owners' Committee in their community.²⁵ Furthermore, the majority of the owner residents knew how to contact the Owners' Committee with 47.7% reporting that they knew how to contact some

²⁴ 53% of the respondents were owners while 47% were tenants.

²⁵ The survey, however, did not ask whether the residents were aware of the nature, function, and responsibilities of the Owners' Committee.

of the Committee members and 45.5% all of them. In contrast, the tenant residents did not appear to know the Committee members nearly as well as the owner residents. As many as 51.3% of tenant residents did not know how to contact any of the Committee members. Pearson correlation tests were performed and it appeared that residential status was positively correlated with both awareness of the existence of the Committee and awareness of the contact details of its members (both $p < .05$) (refer to Table 4). In other words, the owner residents tended to be more familiar with both the existence of the Owners' Committee and the methods of contacting its members. However, the strength of both correlations is not high ($r = .322/.575$) (refer to Table 4).

Table 4

Pearson Correlation Table			
		Are you aware that there is an Owners' Committee in this community?	Do you know how to contact the members of Owners' Committee?
Residential status (owner/tenant)	Pearson Correlation	.322	.575
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.003	.000
	N	83	83

Interaction in the discussion of security issues

The most direct way to discover the level of interaction between the residents and the

Owners' Committee in terms of raising and discussing security issues is to simply ask the former to whom they would most likely approach when an issue arose. One might have assumed that the Owners' Committee would be the most commonly identified option since it is the 'governance body' of the community. Rather surprisingly, the responses from two different questions revealed otherwise. Because previous questions revealed a positive correlation between owner residents and tenant residents in both the awareness of the existence of the Owners' Committee and the awareness of the contact details of its members, the results for the following questions will be presented with the figures from owner residents and tenant residents respectively rather than the total figure of the residents as a whole. This will facilitate easy identification of whether or not there are any differences in these responses.

Firstly, the residents were asked to identify with whom they would most prefer to discuss a security concern. The vast majority of the owner residents preferred to discuss it with their 'building manager' (75%), who was also favoured by the tenant residents (74.4%)²⁶. Secondly, the residents were asked to whom they would most likely report an actual criminal incident. The residents were asked to select up to three persons and also prioritise them²⁷. Both the owner (52.3%) and tenant (53.8%) residents mostly preferred to report it to the 'building manager'. The 'building manager' (30.8%) was also most commonly selected in terms of the tenant residents' second most likely person to whom a

²⁶ The list of available persons included: neighbour, building manager, Body Corporate secretary, the Owners' Committee, the police, family member, nobody, and other.

²⁷ Ibid.

criminal incident would be reported while members of the Owners' Committee (27.3%) was the owner residents' most favoured person. As for the third most likely person, 20.5% of the owner residents would talk to their 'neighbour' (20.5%) while 43.6% of the tenant residents would choose to tell nobody about it. Building managers, rather than the Committee members, are thus more favoured by the residents in terms of raising and discussing security related issues. This is more obvious with the tenant residents as many of them simply did not know how to contact any of the Committee members and hence the building manager appeared to be more approachable to them. Table 5 and 6 (at next page) show the points scored by each option.²⁸

Table 5

The Owner Residents' Ranking List for Security Discussion	
	Points
Building manager	91
Police	68
Owners' Committee member	40
Body Corporate secretary	22
Neighbour	19
Nobody	15
Family member	7
Other	2

²⁸ In the most likely person category, each option was given three points when chosen by the respondents. The number of respondents choosing an individual option timed three would become the points scored by that option in the most likely person category. Two points were given to each option in the second category and one in the third category. Same process applied. The final points of each option were the sum of points scored in all three categories.

Table 6

The Tenant Residents' Ranking List for Security Discussion	
	Points
Building manager	87
Police	74
Nobody	35
Body Corporate secretary	12
Family member	12
Owners' Committee member	7
Neighbour	4
Other	3

From the ranking lists above, it is noticeable that the police were still perceived by the residents to be quite reliable and approachable in event of a criminal incident. Further, the tenant residents seemed to be more reluctant than the owner residents in terms of reporting a crime as telling nobody ranked third on the ranking list of the tenant's side. One thing to note is that 11 residents were living in one community that did not have a building manager. If they had security concerns, they were equally likely to contact the Body Corporate secretary (27.3%) as much as the Owners' Committee members (27.3%). If they encountered a criminal incident, they would most likely to contact the police (81.8%) first, and then the Body Corporate secretary (27.3%). These variables, however, did not seem to have lowered the overall points scored by the building manager. Now, one might be confused as to the Owners' Committee's low preference among the residents when they

needed to discuss a security issue or report a criminal incident. But looking back at Chapter 2 it was noted how gated communities in New Zealand are often directly managed by Body Corporate secretaries and their assigned staff instead of the Owners' Committee. That is to say, residents may be more familiar with Body Corporate secretaries and their staff (i.e. building managers) and have more opportunities to talk to them about all sorts of issues. In such circumstances, it would not be too difficult to anticipate the Owners' Committee' low preference in terms of discussing or reporting a security related issue. More detailed discussions in relation to this issue and also the overwhelmed popularity of the building manager will be seen in the next chapter (Chapter 5).

When examining the results of the residents' preferences, it would be inaccurate to describe the interaction with the Owners' Committee in security issues as active. In fact, the survey asked the residents if they were satisfied with how their security concerns were dealt with by the Owners' Committee, and the vast majority (73.5%) of residents reported that they had never actually discussed any security concern with the Committee (see Appendix 5: Table xv). If this result is combined with the results from the preference questions, it reinforces the impression that there is little active interaction between the residents and the Owners' Committee on security related issues. However, as it is unknown whether the residents had discussed their security concerns with anyone else (that was in the preference list), it could simply be that the residents had not discussed them at all.

The survey then explored how such interaction is perceived by the Owners'

Committee member. First of all, the Committee members were asked how often they would hear about the residents' security concerns in an average year. The vast majority (70%) reported they had been contacted regarding residents' security concerns less than once a month while 15% reported to have never heard about any. Secondly, those who had been contacted regarding residents' security concerns were further asked in what ways the concerns were brought to their attention. The results were as follows: 27.8% were brought to their attention by the building manager, 24.1% by the fellow Committee members, and 16.7% the Body Corporate staff or the residents themselves. Once again, the building manager has appeared at the top of the ranking. Thirdly, 45% of those Committee members that responded recalled that there were security issues raised by residents (or their proxies) in the last community meeting. Lastly, the Committee members were asked whether they are satisfied with the level of interaction currently existing between them and the residents in terms of security issues. 40% felt satisfied and another 40% felt very satisfied while only 5% were unsatisfied. Overall, the fact that building managers were the primary source of communicating residents' security concerns, as experienced by the Committee members', corresponds with the findings from the residents' and demonstrate the importance of building managers in the course of interaction between the residents and the Committee (See Chapter 5 for more discussions).

The management of security issues

The management of security issues by the Owners' Committee

Following the investigation of how the residents and the Owners' Committee interact in the discussion of security issues, the survey then explored how those issues are actually managed by the Committee. First, the majority (75%) of Committee members believed that they had sufficient administrative powers to deal with security issues (75%). When asked what they often do after they are made aware of a security concern,²⁹ the results showed that for 65% would deal with it together with either the building manager or their fellow members, and for 16.3% reported that they would discuss it with the resident right away (refer to Table 7 at next page).

²⁹ These scores do not add up to 100% because Committee members were allowed to make multiple selections for this question.

Table 7

Approaches Adopted by the Building Manager to Deal with Residents' Security Concern	
	Percentage
Deal with it together with the building manager	65
Deal with it together with other members of the Owners' Committee	65
Discuss it with the resident right away	40
Deal with it together with the Body Corporate secretary	20
Leave it to the building manager to deal with it	20
Leave it to the Body Corporate secretary to deal with it	15
Wait for the next coming community meeting	10
Try to come up with a solution by yourself	10

The Committee members were also asked who would normally get involved in the process of dealing with a security service provider³⁰. The results show that the Committee members would definitely be involved (100%). 85.7% of Committee member respondents reported that the building manager would get involved, and 71.4% reported that the Body Corporate secretary would get involved. The importance of the building manager has shown up here again scoring a top ranking position in the last two questions.

Two further questions were asked about the dissemination of security related

³⁰ The list of persons included: the Owners' Committee members, the Body Corporate secretary, other Body Corporate staff, and the building manager. These scores do not add up to 100% because Committee members were allowed to make multiple selections.

information. Most (85%) of the Committee members thought that it would be a good idea to give the residents information about security measures in the community, but half (50%) of them would not be willing to provide information on local crime statistics as it would be too much trouble. Despite this difference in the views of providing security information to the residents, the vast majority (40% agreed and 30% strongly agreed) agreed that security is an important issue and should be included in the discussion for the community meeting.

The Owners' Committee's responsibilities in security

The survey also asked the residents what they thought the Owners' Committee should be doing for the community in order to know their views on the Committee's responsibilities on security. 47% of the residents thought the Committee should be 'taking more responsibilities in the maintenance of community safety and security', while 'making more effort to help create a sense of community for all residents' and 'general maintenance of community buildings and grounds' also gained more than 40% of residents' votes (refer to Table 8 at next page).³¹

³¹ These percentages do not add up to 100% because Committee members were allowed to make multiple selections for this question.

Table 8

List of Tasks Residents Thought The Committee Should Do	
	Percentage
Taking on more responsibilities in the maintenance of community safety and security	47
Making more effort to help create a sense of community for all residents	42.2
General maintenance of community buildings and grounds	41
General maintenance of community facilities	39.8
General maintenance of community finances	28.9
Organising more meetings (apart from the AGM) for residents to discuss important issues	28.9
General administration of community affairs	20.5
Other	4.8

Among those who thought the Committee should take more responsibilities for community security, 64.1% explained that it was because the Committee members ‘were also property owners so would care/know more about community security than Body Corporate management agents’, and 56.4% thought ‘it would be easier and more convenient to discuss security concerns with the Committee rather than with outsiders (Body Corporate management agents).³² In addition, when asked what the Committee

³²These percentages do not add up to 100% because Committee members were allowed to make multiple selections for this question.

should do in terms of taking more responsibilities on community security, many of them would like to see the Committee 'search for security problems in the community regularly and improve them' (41%), to 'be well connected with the local community constable and get updated information about crime in the area' (38.5%), or to 'provide information about the use and functions of all security measures in the community' (30.8%).

On the other hand, when the Committee members were asked whether they would be willing to contribute more time and take on more responsibilities if the Owners' Committee was to become solely charged of all community affairs, 45% replied 'maybe', 25% 'not really', while the remainder replied 'absolutely' (10%), 'not sure' (10%), and 'absolutely not' (10%) respectively. Among those who were not sure or unwilling, half of them (55.6%) were still unlikely to change their mind even if they could get financial support for the job. In addition, half (55%) of the Committee members disagreed that residents' interests would be better served if they were to directly run the community instead of the Body Corporate secretary, while 20% agreed and 25% held a neutral position.

4.4 Summary of Research Findings

In relation to the first objective, proximity to the workplace and/or school was found to be the most frequently cited reason for the residents to move into their current gated

community.³³ Proximity was closely followed by security. In relation to the second objective, the research found that most of the residents felt safe and secure inside their property, believed their immediate community was experiencing less crime than the surrounding neighbourhoods, and that the existing system of access control is effective. Beyond the immediate community, residents perceived crime as a serious problem across Auckland urban areas. Many residents reported having various security related concerns even though none had experienced any crime in the community. Many residents could point out why access control was not as effective as it should be, but continued to undermine its effectiveness despite this awareness. Most residents were satisfied with the full range of security measures deployed in their community and felt confident they could identify existing security measures. In relation to the third objective, most residents were well aware of the existence of the Owners' Committee although half of the tenant residents did not know how to contact any members of the Committee. The building manager surpassed both the Owners' Committee and the police as the person the residents were most likely to approach about a security concern or in the event of a criminal incident. From the Owners' Committee point of view, the building manager was also helpful in terms of the supply of information about/or dealing with the security concerns of the residents. Although the Committee members agreed that security is an important issue, they held different views in terms of providing security services to the residents. The research further found that nearly half of the residents thought the Committee should take

³³ 'Respondent' in this paragraph refers to only the residents.

more responsibilities on community security due to various reasons and that they held different views about what the Committee should do in order to fulfill such responsibilities. In addition to these results, other important findings discovered in the process of carrying out the research will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to look back at what has been accomplished in the research and interpret the findings in the light of the discussion presented in chapter 2. This chapter begins by identifying potential and practical implications of the findings for gated communities in New Zealand. It will identify and discuss the limitations of the current study, and make recommendations for future research before presenting a final conclusion.

5.1 Implications of the Findings on Gated Communities in New Zealand

Significance of security as a reason for moving into a gated community

Security is often considered as one of the most influential reasons for people to move into a gated community (Blakely & Snyder, 1999; Raposo, 2006; Low, 2007). In the New Zealand context, the research found that security was the second most frequently cited reason for residents to move into a gated community, scoring just a few points below proximity in the overall scores. A possible explanation for why proximity was the most frequently cited factor for moving into the current property may be that it reflects a more

general housing trend in Auckland urban areas (see discussion in Chapter 2).

As the city council has given a clear direction that much more planning is required, including a focus on higher-density (multi-unit) developments and urban villages in order to accommodate the rapidly increasing urban population in Auckland, more gated residential complexes are appearing as a result. People moving into a gated community are often driven by the proximity factor since many such residential developments areas are located on either the fringe of the city centre and/or the CBD and are close to all major business or institutions, or are completely new suburban areas with plenty of new business opportunities and new schools. Instead of saying that people move into a gated community because of the high standard security it provides, it may be more appropriate to say that they move into such a development simply because many available properties in those areas are from the recently built multi-unit (gated) developments. High standard security and other facilities may be seen as additional benefits that come along with this new style of residential development. For those residents that participated in the research, moving into a gated community was more or less a coincidence of the availability of properties, and the desire of the participants to seek properties in those areas.

The international literature suggests that the growth of gated communities reflects not only attitudes to security but also changes to the cultural, historical and social-economic contexts in each country (Blandy, 2006; Lee, 2007). This research clearly suggests that a similar situation may also apply in New Zealand. Nevertheless, given the high popularity

of security among the residents participating in this research, in the future security may overtake proximity as more people become more familiar (65.1% of the residents had never lived in a gated community before) with this new style of community life and come to see security as a necessary feature when considering moving home or buying a new property.

Residents' perceptions of safety and security within and beyond the gated community

Do residents feel safe and secure behind gates and fences/walls?

A review of the international studies reveals divergent views regarding residents' perception of safety and security behind gates and fences/walls. Some support the idea that gates and fences/walls encourage a perception of greater security among residents (Newman, 1996; Rogers, 2005), while others claim there is no significant relationship between residents' perception of safety and security and the existence of gates and fences/walls (Wilson-Doenges, 2000). Informed by such literature, and to understand whether gates and fences/walls have any influence upon residents' perception of safety and security in gated communities in New Zealand, this research asked residents a series of questions regarding their security concerns, their perception of crime problems in the area, and their perceptions regarding safety and security within their community.

When residents were asked to identify what security concerns they had, burglary was the most frequent response (53%). It is interesting, and somewhat surprising, to note that this is higher than the figure reported by the latest New Zealand Crime and Safety Survey 2006 (Mayhew & Reilly, 2006) where 23% of New Zealanders perceived burglary as a neighbourhood crime problem.³⁴ This figure is also higher than the one reported for England and Wales in 2008/09 where 16% felt fairly or very worried about being a victim of burglary (Walker et al., 2009). What this finding suggests is that security gates and fences/walls may have not necessarily reduced residents' fear of being burgled despite believing in their capability to reduce the overall crime rate within the gated community. Although more than half of the residents had never experienced crime in the community (68.7%), almost all of them worried about becoming a possible victim of one or more types of crime. Only 2.9% reported that they had no security concerns at all. This finding closely corresponds to Blakely and Snyder's (1997, p. 100) observation that "whether crime is rampant or infrequent, the threat actual or perceived, the fear itself is very real".

The vast majority of survey residents (73.5%) perceived crime as a serious problem in Auckland urban areas. This figure is also considerably higher than the findings of the 2006 national New Zealand Crime and Safety Survey where just over one-third (36%) of New Zealanders thought crime was a problem in their area (Mayhew & Reilly, 2006). This finding may be explained in two ways. First, surveyed residents were all from

³⁴ Burglary was also the biggest crime concern in the 2006 survey. However, when respondents in that survey were further asked about their personal worries of victimisation, 59% felt fairly or very worried about having their house burgled. The findings from 2009 survey have not yet been published by the time the thesis was completed.

Auckland urban areas. According to the 2009 Crime Statistics (Police National Headquarters, 2010), Auckland has experienced the highest volume of recorded crime across New Zealand.³⁵ Assuming that residents of Auckland urban areas face higher than average risk, this finding also highlights the limited applicability of nationally based crime survey findings to local and specific communities. Second, in consideration of the fact that security was the second most popular reason for moving into a gated community, many of the surveyed residents are perhaps more security conscious and thus more likely to be aware of crime problems in their area.

In terms of feelings of safety and security, the vast majority of survey residents (86.8%) did report feeling rather safe and secure inside their property and also within their community (that they would not be afraid to go anywhere in the community during either day time (92.8%) or night time (78.7%)). In contrast, the 2006 New Zealand Crime and Safety Survey found that just 68% of New Zealanders felt (or would feel) fairly or very safe walking alone in their neighbourhood after dark (Mayhew & Reilly, 2006). This may suggest that more residents of Auckland gated communities do feel safer, at least within their community territory (in other words, inside the gates and fences/walls), when compared to the average New Zealanders in the average New Zealand neighbourhood. Although security gates and fences/walls may have not significantly reduced residents' fear of crime, they do appear, at least to some extent, to have increased their overall feelings of

³⁵ National recorded crime per 10,000 population in Auckland for 2009 was 1333.1. The national average was 1045.9.

safety and security within their own community environment.

Do residents use secured gates and other security measures correctly?

Having shown that the generally high perception of safety and security among residents within gated communities is related to the existence of gates and fences/walls, it would be interesting to know how much residents know about gates, fences/walls and other enhanced security measures, and perhaps more importantly, whether or not they know how to use them correctly. Studies have offered many suggestions as to why gated communities have not significantly reduced crime rates (or maintained effective access control) with the aid of enhanced security measures. One such suggestion is that the lack of mutuality of community, along with the overreliance on private service providers and enhanced security measures, may have discouraged individual residents from taking responsibilities for the security of the community (Blakely & Snyder, 1999). Consequently, residents may have developed and displayed certain behaviours that could undermine the effectiveness of enhanced security measures. This research did not aim to discover the reasons behind ineffective security measures or ask specific questions regarding residents' opinions on the mutuality of community.³⁶ However, residents' responses to several other questions related to security measures have shown that the problem of residents' reckless behaviours in

³⁶ The only two questions related to mutuality of community were: 1) Do you feel a sense of community here? and 2) Do you consider yourself as active in community affairs and activities? For question one, the majority of residents felt 'not very strongly' (38.6%) or 'fairly strongly' (36.1%). For question two, more than half residents (60.2%) did not think they were active in community affairs and activities in any ways.

relation to the use of enhanced security measures is not only a feature of gated communities in New Zealand but that it is also a serious problem that creates significant but unnecessary risk..

The first thing to consider is the behaviour of residents' vis-à-vis the secured gates. As the results show, although opening the gate to whomever is waiting outside (35.4%) and giving out password/code/copies of keys to non-residents (23.4%) were identified as the two most common explanations for ineffective access control, over half (54.9%) of all residents had never refused to give access to strangers and had given out password/code/copies of keys to non-residents, although mostly their relatives (61.4%) or friends (31.3%). Clearly, knowing what not to do in order to maintain effective access control does not necessarily keep the residents from doing it. The majority of residents agreed that having a specific rule about granting access to non-residents would help improve this situation. However, even when specific rules governing access exists, as in two of the sample communities, the results showed their existence made little difference in terms of residents' behaviour regarding controlling access to non-residents. These 'reckless' behaviours can clearly undermine the very goal of access control and hence inadvertently created various security related concerns.

Apart from the reckless behaviours vis-à-vis access control, residents' lack of knowledge (or unawareness) of other types of security measures was also identified as an issue, specifically that such knowledge deficits may lead to more potential recklessness. It

was found that the majority of residents failed to correctly identify what other security measures were deployed in their community besides security gates and fences/walls.³⁷ Further, when asked whether they were aware of other security measures employed in their community, about one tenth of the residents noted 'building manager' as an example of 'other' or as an example of 'on-site security guards'. Enquiries were subsequently made in those communities where it was explained that building managers either undertook casual patrols within the community at night time or spent a considerable amount of time everyday in the reception office by the main entrance. Perhaps this explained residents' confusion over the security role of their building manager. As one resident commented, "Our building manger acts as a security guard and takes patrols in the hall way." These responses might also explain why a further one tenth of the residents selected 'on-site security guard' (with no mention of building manager) when no such guards were employed in or by their community. Another resident made the comment, "We have a part-time security officer staying in the office during the weekend, I think." The inaccurate knowledge of security measures employed in the community could also contribute, in small part, to the reasons why gated communities have not been able to reduce the crime rates to the extent initially expected. Under such circumstances, it is quite difficult to expect residents to monitor and assess the effects and performance of security measures and maintain an effective level of access control, if they are not even sure what it is they

³⁷ According to data, there were only seven respondents (out of 83) who were both confident to identify the types of security measures employed in their community and able to identify the measures correctly.

are monitoring and assessing. After all, a belief in the effectiveness of enhanced security measures may result in a higher perception of general safety and security in the gated community. However, to improve the crime prevention effect, and the effectiveness and performances of those measures in access control, requires accurate knowledge and their correct usage.

The manner in which security is managed or governed in the gated community

Enhanced security measures are the basis of crime prevention strategies within gated communities. Nevertheless, how security related issues are managed or governed by those who live in and/or administrate the community is also very important in the course of maintaining a high level of security. The research discovered several important features in relation to the management of security in gated communities in New Zealand.

Tenant residents' unfamiliarity with the Owners' Committee

First of all, tenant residents' poorer knowledge about the Owners' Committee compared with owner residents has been identified as a problematic issue. Over half (51.3%) of the former did not know how to contact any of the Committee members. Nevertheless, this was not found to have had much influence on their decision on who to approach when

needing to discuss a security concern or report a criminal incident (as discussed previously), or indeed on any other aspects of community life. This may be explained by the fact that the responsibility for dealing with most community infractions is contracted out to private service providers anyway. Moreover, because most gated communities (or multi-unit residential developments) are operated directly by the building manager and the Body Corporate agents rather than the Owners' Committee itself, it is not clear whether tenants' poor knowledge about the Committee could have actually undermined the operation of the private governance system in any way. That said, given that nearly half (47%) of the residents participating in this research were tenants, and that this would probably be the situation in many Auckland (or even New Zealand) gated communities, it could certainly become a problem not only in terms of community security but also in relation to the system of governance generally. In fact, a number of residents had expressed similar concerns regarding this issue when asked what they think the Owners' Committee ought to be doing. As one commented, "I think they should really work on the relationship between tenants and the Owners' Committee."

The bridging role played by the building manager between the residents and the Owners' Committee

Second, it revealed the importance of the building manager and the extent to which

residents and the Owners' Committee were dependent on him/her. In place of the Owners' Committee, the building manager was the most likely person the residents (75% of owner residents and 74.4% of tenant residents) would contact to discuss a security concern or to report a criminal incident. This might not be so surprising if we look back to chapter 2 which pointed to the dependence of the Owners' Committee on private service providers, including building managers and security officers, to handle security breaches and other resident concerns. In this case, as the building manager was the most visible and readily available person to respond to and manage community related business, it is perhaps no surprise to find that he/she should appear to the residents as the most approachable person when any issue arises. It was also found that both owner and tenant residents chose to first approach the building manager, in spite of the former's higher degree of familiarity with the Owners' Committee. Residents' dependence on the building manager (in regard to security) was further indicated in that residents reported being more likely to contact their building manager rather than the police even if or when an actual criminal incident took place.³⁸

The dependence of the Owners' Committee on the building manager was illustrated by two of the main findings. First, building managers (27.8%) were the most common source of information for the Owners' Committee on residents' security concerns. Second, the Owners' Committee members would liaise with the building manager (65%) as much

³⁸ The building manager scored 91 points (from owner residents) and 87 points (from tenant residents) in the overall ranking, while the police scored 68 points (from owner residents) and 74 points (from tenant residents). Please look back to chapter 4.3 for more details).

as they would with their fellow members (65%) after hearing of a resident's security concern. These findings show that the Committee has, to a very large extent, been relying on the building manager both in terms of getting to know and then dealing with security issues. The dependence on building managers by both residents and the Owners' Committee also highlights the bridging role played by the building manager connecting both the private governance body and those being governed, at least in relation to security.

Currently, the Unit Titles Act 2010 does not specify the role of the building manager in the context of gated communities and/or private governance systems. However, as this research has shown, if future reviews of the Act took into account and formalised the role of the building manager, focused in particular on private systems of governance, it could increase the overall efficiency of private governance in terms of both security and general community life and facilitate a much more effective and comprehensive communication between the Owners' Committee and the residents. Such a formalisation of the building manager's role would not necessarily require new or extra content to the job description but more simply build on and improve a system that already exists in practice if not as policy. This formalisation should be particularly beneficial to tenant residents as they are not familiar with the Owners' Committee (as discussed previously) and are unable to attend the Annual General Meeting (owners only), and hence, the building manager may appear to be the only person with whom tenant residents can discuss security related issues and obtain security related information regarding the community. The formalisation of the role

of the building manager would future encourage tenant residents to identify the building manager as the person to approach and discuss all manner of community related issues including security.

Different expectations of the residents and the Owners' Committee regarding security

Finally, the differing expectations of the residents and the Owners' Committee regarding security related issues might also be a problem in the course of moving toward a more effective system of private governance. The results of the research show that nearly half (47%) of all residents would like to see the Committee take on more responsibility for the maintenance of security and community safety (along with many other tasks). Because they are also property owners, the assumption is that they would both care more and know more about community security and safety than the Body Corporate secretary (64.1% of the residents agreed with this statement).

From the Committee members' point of view, however, half of them were either unsure (10%) or unwilling (35%) to take more responsibilities if the Committee was to become solely responsible for all community affairs. Furthermore, they were unlikely to change their mind (55.6%) on this issue even if financial support for the extra responsibilities was to be forthcoming. Half of the Committee members disagreed (55%) that residents' interests would be better served if they were to directly run the community

instead of the Body Corporate secretary. The number of residents wanting the Owners' Committee to get more involved in, for example, managing security, does not yet appear high enough to force changes to the current mode of governance in gated communities. Nonetheless, the number of the Committee members reluctant to change the status quo also appears insufficient to rule out future change. Therefore, at this stage it is too early to say whether such differences in opinion would in the future pose a problem for the security or governance of gated communities in Auckland. Along with the building manager, the findings of this research also highlight, though to a lesser extent, the reliance of residents of Auckland gated communities on the Body Corporate secretary regarding the administration of the community.

5.2 Limitations of the Study

Several limitations have become evident during this research. The first limitation is related to the generalisation of the research findings. Two reasons have contributed to this limitation. The first reason is that the selection of subject gated communities was limited to the greater Auckland region (especially to Auckland City, North shore City and Manukau City) rather than from all around New Zealand. The second reason is that the survey return rate was 16.6% for Survey A (for the residents) and 4% for Survey B (for the members of Owners' Committees), and thus, non-response errors could occur. Therefore, generalisation

of the research findings should be carefully considered when referring to the general population of gated communities in New Zealand.

The second limitation concerns the nature of the data collected. Most data related to criminal incidents that occurred in the gated community came from surveyed residents. No official data was included in order to verify the actual crime rates (or level of security) in each specific gated community. Official crime statistics of individual gated communities (if they become available) should be included to provide more empirical evidence to help assess the relative incidence of crime in gated and non-gated communities.

The third limitation is related to the length of Survey A (for the residents), which was considered by some residents to be too long. This could have reduced the residents' willingness to complete the survey and may well have resulted in a lower return rate. Survey A was 10 pages in length including one page that asked general information about the resident. Some residents suggested that perhaps a total of seven to eight pages might be more reasonable.

The fourth limitation refers to the nature of this research. Being a largely quantitative, exploratory and descriptive piece of research, it does have limited applicability. However, descriptive research is typically adopted when there is little previous research conducted in the relevant field, which is the case in relation to gated communities in New Zealand. This research does, however, provide a valuable base, a platform from which to understand the condition of security in gated communities in New

Zealand under private governance. Other future research can now build on the findings and insights provided by this study.

5.3 Suggestions for Future Research

First, future researchers who intend to collect data through the survey method or any type of direct observation that requires access to the gated community should expect to be confronted with frequent objections and rejections by the Owners' Committee, the Body Corporate secretary, or the building manager, particularly on the grounds of privacy. This research had several requests to distribute surveys refused on those very grounds. Privacy is a major issue in the gated community, and thus any potential breach of the residents' privacy or possible revelation of the community's identity is a major concern of the Owners' Committee or any personnel who acts on their behalf. In non-gated communities, where there does not exist a specific governance body or system, surveys can be freely distributed to the mailbox of each household and house visits can be made simply by knocking on the front door. In gated communities, once permission to access is refused by the Owners' Committee or its agents, no further research can be carried out within its territory or among its residents. This can result in a loss of hundreds of potential research participants. As such, careful and effective negotiation skills are greatly recommended to future researchers before going out to seek permission to access the gated community and

its residents.

Second, as mentioned previously, the research was confined to the greater Auckland region and from which the sample of gated communities were selected. Future research should expand the collection of data to a wider ample of geographical areas in order to produce more generalisable findings. It would be also interesting to compare data across different areas to assess any difference among residents of gated communities from different areas.

Third, future researchers should avoid conducting similar descriptive research and instead develop hypotheses that require more specific testing. Building on the findings of this research, future researchers should be able to discover correlations between factors or discover new factors that influence the condition of security. For example, as this research has shown, knowing that residents of gated communities in New Zealand display reckless behaviours such as allowing easy access to strangers, researchers can simply assume that such reckless behaviour will undermine access control and potentially contribute to an increase in crime within the community. They may instead observe residents' behaviour regarding access control in different gated communities in the same neighbourhood over time and assess whether, or to what extent, a higher incidence of such resident behaviour produces an increase in crime and victimisation.

Finally, future researchers should try to collect crime data on a smaller local level (i.e. a gated community and its adjacent streets). Researchers should collect data from a

gated community and its surrounding streets respectively in order to make a comparison. They should conduct this for several pairs of gated community and its surrounding streets in different areas in order to obtain a more generalisable data. Currently, police crime statistics and Community Safety Survey in New Zealand do not present data on a sufficiently small or local level. However, crime data on a smaller local level is necessary to assess whether gated communities do experience less crime than surrounding non-gated communities.

5.4 Conclusion

This study set out to examine the condition of security of gated communities in New Zealand under private governance. It approached the topic by analysing the residents' experiences and opinions on security and the private governance system. It focused on the examination of three main objectives: 1) the significance of 'security' as a reason for moving into a gated community; 2) residents' perception of safety and security both within and beyond the 'gated community'; and 3) the manner in which private systems of governance manage or govern security.

First, the research found that security is the second most significant reason for residents to move in a gated community. Its score is slightly behind proximity (workplace/school is nearby). The possible explanation for proximity to over score security

is that many of the new residential developments are located in areas that are highly desirable by the residents and just happen to be gated communities, which is in turn a reflection of the medium-density housing strategies proposed by the Auckland City Council (this is also the trend of housing strategies in other major cities in New Zealand). Rather than choosing a gated community primarily on the basis of its enhanced security, residents simply choose to move into one mostly because of availability, its proximity to workplace/school, and for related reasons of convenience. However, the fact that security was the second most significant reason for moving into a gated community shows that the demand for security remains high. This is a feature of New Zealand gated communities that is shared with gated communities in many other countries such as the United States.

Second, the research discovered that the perception of safety and security is generally high among residents of gated communities in New Zealand during both daytime and nighttime. Most of them also had never experienced any criminal incident after moving into the gated community. Although many residents still have various security concerns such as burglary, they believe their community is safer and more secure than its surrounding neighbourhoods due to the existence of gates and fences/walls. Despite the residents' beliefs in gates and fences/walls and other enhanced security measures, their lack of knowledge about the types of security measures and certain reckless behaviours regarding access control have become serious issues.

Third, the building manager was identified as the most significant agent in the

management of security related issues in gated communities. The building manager is heavily relied by both the residents and the Owners' Committee members. The residents (regardless of their residential status) see the building manager as the most approachable person either when there is a need to discuss security concerns or in the event of a criminal incident. The Owners' Committee members also hold the building manager in high regard as they hear most of the residents' security concerns from him/her and usually deal with the residents' security concerns together. In terms of the Owners' Committee's responsibilities, many residents think that the Committee should take more responsibility for the maintenance of community safety and security. On the other hand, however, many members of the Owners' Committee are not willing to spend more time on the job and take more responsibilities for community affairs: an unwillingness that is unlikely to change even financial support was to be forthcoming.

The research demonstrated that the condition of security of gated community in New Zealand is generally good, at least as perceived by and experienced by residents. The experiences and opinions of both the residents and the Owners' Committee members regarding security and private governance display similarities to a number of examples highlighted and discussed in the literature review. Nevertheless, the discovery of the central role performed by the building manager in the management of security related issues present one significant difference. When talking about security under private governance in gated communities in New Zealand, it is neither the private governance

body (the Owners' Committee) nor the private service provider involved in community administration (the Body Corporate secretary) but the building manager who appears foremost in the mind of the residents.

Given the dearth of research on gated communities in New Zealand, much more is clearly required to examine all of their various features and focus on both those that are similar in form and function to other countries and those that are not. The needs of the residents of gated communities in regard to security and private governance should also be the focus of further research as these no doubt differ significantly from those of residents of non-gated communities. Finally, whether, and the most effective and efficient ways in which, private governance systems can produce and maintain effective access control and in turn significantly reduce crime also needs to be the subject of further and more specific research.

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Appendix 1

MEMORANDUM

Phone 04-463 6134

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TO	Francis Ju-Ting Liu
COPY TO	Associate Professor Mike Rowe
FROM	Dr Rhonda Shaw, Convener, Human Ethics Committee
DATE	22 April 2009
PAGES	1
SUBJECT	Ethics Approval: No 16383 Title: Security in Private Hands: Gated communities in New Zealand

Thank you for your application for ethical approval, which has now been considered by the Social and Cultural Studies Human Ethics Sub-Committee.

Your application has been approved and this approval continues until the end of October 2009. If your data collection is not completed by this date you should apply to the Human Ethics Committee for an extension to this approval.

Best wishes with the research.

Dr Rhonda Shaw

Appendix 2

Survey Information Sheet for a Study of Security and Private Governance of Gated Communities in Auckland

Researcher: Francis J Liu: School of Social and Cultural Studies, Victoria University of Wellington

I am a Master's student in Criminology at Victoria University of Wellington. As part of this degree I am undertaking a research project leading to a thesis. The project I am undertaking is examining the state of security of gated communities under private governance. The University required that ethics approval be obtained for research involving human participants.

I am inviting all residents living in this gated community, either renting or owning the property, to participate in this survey. Each unit will find two surveys and a postage included envelope attached with this information sheet. Please complete it (fill up Survey A if you are just a resident or Survey B if you are currently a member of the Owners' Committee, aka Body Corporate Committee) and return it to me by using the postage included envelope provided as soon as you can. It will only take a small portion of your time filling out the survey and dropping it into a post box.

Your feedback will form a significant part of my research project and will be put into a written report on an anonymous basis. It will not be possible for you or your community to be identified. Although the name of your community will be written on the return envelope, it is only for the purpose of categorisation and will not be revealed in the report. All surveys collected will be kept confidential. No other person besides me and my supervisor, Dr Michael Rowe, will see the surveys. The thesis will be submitted for marking to the Institute of Criminology, School of Social and Cultural Studies and deposited in the University Library. It is also intended that the thesis will be submitted for publication in scholarly journals or disseminated at academic conferences. Surveys will be destroyed immediately after the end of the project. Copies of research findings can be provided to you by request after October.

If you have any questions or would like to discuss further with me about the project, please contact me at 021-1121516 or by email: liujuti@myvuw.ac.nz , or my supervisor, Dr Michael Rowe, at the School of Social and Cultural Studies at Victoria University, P O BOX 600, Wellington, phone: 04-4639452.

Francis J Liu
23 April 2009

Signed:

Note: You do not need to fill the survey if you think it may, in any way, invade your rights and privacy.

Appendix 3

SURVEY A – FOR RESIDENTS

PART 1: SECURITY

This part of survey asks you about your opinion on security and security measures in your community.

Interpretations:

Security – refers to freedom from criminal victimisation.

Security measures – refers to any kind of security devices and services such as password-controlled gates, security alarms, surveillance cameras, security patrol, etc.

Gated community – refers to a fenced/walled residential development (terraced houses, detached houses, high-rise apartments), to which access by non-residents is restricted or controlled by security hardware (intercoms, CCTV) and/or private security personnel.

Questions:

1. What were your reason(s) to choose this property? (Please choose up to 3 reasons and rate them from 1 – most important to 3 – least important)

Privacy __

Security __

Less through traffic __

Proximity (Workplace/school is nearby) __

Affordable house price/rent __

Convenience of shopping __

Convenience of transportation __

Architectural design __

Facilities (sauna, gym, tennis court, etc) __

Possibility of having ‘my kind’ neighbour __

Other__ [_____]

2. Are you now aware that this property is part of a gated community?

Yes __

No __

3. Before you moved in, were you aware that this property is part of a gated community?

Yes ___

No ___

4. To what extent do you agree that secured gates (and fences, if existed) have been effective in terms of access control (keeping outsiders from entering this community)?

Very large extent ___

Large extent ___

Moderate extent ___

Small extent ___

Not at all ___

5. What do you think would be the main reasons that access control is not always effective?
(Please choose up to 3 reasons)

Residents sometimes leave the gate open behind them ___

Some residents give out password/code/copies of keys or swipe-cards of the gate to outsiders ___

Residents tend to open the gate for whoever waiting outside on their way in/out ___

Gates don't get fixed immediately when they break down___

Gates and/or fences are too short in height ___

The existence of passenger through gates (unlocked) has compromised the function of gates and fences ___

Other ___ [_____]

6. Have you ever let people (who were waiting outside of the gate) in without asking what unit they live in/are visiting?

Never ___

Once ___

A few times ___

Many times ___

Always ___

7. Have you ever refused to give access to people after being told of their purposes of visiting?

Never ___

Once ___

A few times ___

Many times ___

Always ___

8. Which of the following factors is most likely to influence your decision of whether or not letting people in?

Time of the day (daytime/night time) ___

Appearance of the person ___

Attitude of the person ___

Purpose of visiting ___

Possible awkwardness upon refusing to give access ___

9. If the community set out a specific rule telling the residents not to let strangers in, do you think you would be more confident when telling people that you are unable to give them access?

Yes ___

No ___

Don't know ___

10. Have you ever given out password/code/spare keys of the secured gate to any of the following people for reason of convenience? (Please tick as many as applicable)

Deliverer ___

Plumber/Gardener ___

Any service technician ___

Friend ___

Family/Relative ___

11. Apart from gates and fences, what other security measures do you know that are employed in this community?

On-site security guards ____

Routine/nightly security patrols ____

CCTV/surveillance cameras ____

Electrified wire fences ____

24 hour security/emergency hotline ____

Security alarms ____

Other ____ [_____]

We don't have other security measures apart from gates and fences __
I'm not sure what else we have apart from gates and fences __ (Go to Q.14)

12. Are you satisfied with the security measures currently employed in your community?

Yes, they make me feel safe inside the community ____

No, I think we need additional security measures ____

13. If you were to select additional security measures for the community, what would be your top selections? (Please choose up to 3 measures)

On-site security guards ____

Routine/nightly security patrols ____

CCTV/surveillance cameras ____

Electrified wire fences ____

24 hour security hotline ____

Security alarms ____

Other ____ [_____]

No need of additional security measures ____

14. Since you moved in, has any of the following occurred or been attempted in/on your property? (Please tick as many as applicable and also write down the number of occurrences)

Burglary (without loss of personal property) ____ times

Burglary (with loss of personal property) ____ times

Any act of vandalism to your property ____ times

Theft ____ times

Other ____ [] ____ times

None of the above ____

15. Since you moved in, have you ever witnessed or been told about any of the following occurring or being attempted in/on other residents' properties in the community?

Burglary (without loss of personal property) ___ ___ times
Burglary (with loss of personal property) ___ ___ times
Any act of vandalism to the property ___ ___ times
Theft ___ ___ times
Other ___ [] ___ times
None of the above ___

16. How often do you discuss your security concerns (regarding the community) with other residents?

Very often ___
Often ___
Sometimes ___
Seldom ___
Never ___

17. What would your biggest security concern for the community? (even if it has not occurred)?

Burglary ___
Any act of vandalism ___
Theft ___
Murder ___
Manslaughter ___
Violent assault ___
Sexual assault ___
Other ___ []
Why? []

18. Do you feel safe and secured inside your property?

Very safe and secured ___
Safe and secured ___
Neutral ___
Not so safe and secured ___
Not safe and secured at all ___

19. In the day time, are there any places in the community that you avoid going due to fear of being the victim of crime? (Please tick as many as applicable)

Laundry room ___
Entrance/reception lobby ___
Emergency exit/stairway ___
Garage/car park/visitor car park ___
Rubbish collection area ___
Garden/ground ___
Swimming pool/sauna room ___
Gym/indoor sport facilities ___
Outdoor sport facilities ___
Other ___ [_____]
None of the above ___

20. In the night time, are there any places in the community that you avoid going due to fear of being the victim of crime? (Please tick as many as applicable)

Laundry room ___
Entrance/reception lobby ___
Emergency exit/stairway ___
Garage/car park/visitor car park ___
Rubbish collection area ___
Garden/ground ___
Swimming pool/sauna room ___
Gym/indoor sport facilities ___
Outdoor sport facilities ___
Other ___ [_____]
None of the above ___

21. Do you perceive crime as a serious problem in Auckland urban areas?

Very serious ___
Serious ___
Not very serious ___
Not serious at all ___
Don't know ___

22. Do you believe that your community is experiencing less crime than its surrounding neighbourhood?

Much less ____

Relatively less ____

About the same ____

Even worse ____

Not sure ____

23. If your answer to question 22 is 'much less' or 'relatively less', to what extent do you believe that it is the result of gates and fences?

Very large extent ____

Large extent ____

Moderate extent ____

Small extent ____

Not at all ____

PART 2: PRIVATE GOVERNANCE

This part of survey asks you about your opinion on the Owners' Committee, in particular on their ways of dealing with security related issues.

Interpretation:

Owners' Committee – refers to representatives of property owners, also known as Body Corporate Committee.

Questions:

1. Are you aware that there is an Owners' Committee in this community?

Yes ____

No ____

2. Do you know how to contact the members of Owners' Committee?

Yes, I know how to contact all of them ____

Yes, I know how to contact some of them ____

No, I don't know how to contact any of them ____

3. If you have a security concern (regarding to the community), who would you approach to discuss it? (Please choose to up 3 persons and rate them from 1 – most likely to 3 – least likely)

Neighbour ____

On-site building manager ____

Body corporate secretary ____

Members of the Owners' Committee ____

Police ____

Nobody ____

Family member ____

Other ____ [_____]

4. If you have discussed your security concerns with the Owners' Committee before, think of the latest event, were you satisfied with the way they treated your concern at that time?

Very satisfied ____

Satisfied ____

Neutral ____

Unsatisfied ____

Very unsatisfied ____

I never discuss my security concerns with the Owners' Committee ____

5. Think of the latest criminal incident you have encountered in the community, who did you report it to? (Please tick as many as applicable)

Neighbour ____

On-site building manager ____

Body Corporate secretary ____

Members of the Owners' Committee ____

Police ____

Family member ____

Nobody ____

Other ____ [_____]

6. If you have discussed your latest criminal incident with the Owners' Committee, were you satisfied with the way they responded to your report?

Very satisfied ____

Satisfied ____

Neutral ____

Unsatisfied ____

Very unsatisfied ____

I never discuss criminal incidents with the Owners' Committee ____

7. If you encounter a criminal incident of any kind, who would you likely to report it to?
(Please choose up to 3 persons and rate them from 1 – most likely to 3 – least likely)

Neighbour ____

On-site building manager ____

Body Corporate secretary ____

Members of the Owners' Committee ____

Police ____

Family member ____

Nobody ____

Other ____ [_____]

8. Do you feel a sense of community here?

Very strongly ____

Strongly ____

Fairly strongly ____

Not very strongly ____

Not at all strongly ____

9. Do you consider yourself as active in participating in community affairs and activities?

No ____

Yes, in the following ways: (Please tick as many as applicable)

Attend the Annual General Meeting (AGM) ____

Attend the special meeting if there is any ____

Volunteer help in community projects ____

Discuss with the Owners' Committee about various issues in the community ____

Discuss with the neighbours about various issues in the community ____

Other ____ [_____]

10. "Information of community affairs/activities/projects are conveyed to us on the notice board or in letters in the name of the Body Corporate secretary or the building manager rather than the Owners' Committee." Do you agree with this statement?

Strongly agree ____

Agree ____

Neutral ____

Disagree ____

Strongly disagree ____

10a. Do you often feel that Body Corporate secretary is more influential than the Owners' Committee on community affairs?

Very often ____

Often ____

Sometimes ____

Occasionally ____

Never ____

11. What do you think the Owners' Committee should be doing for the community? (Not what they actually do, but what they should do)

General maintenance of community facilities ____

General maintenance of community buildings and grounds ____

General management of community finances ____

General administration of community affairs/activities/projects ____

Taking on more responsibilities in the maintenance of community safety and security ____

Organising more meetings (apart from the AGM) for residents to discuss important issues ____

Making more effort to help create a sense of community for all residents ____

Other ____ [_____]

12. If 'taking on more responsibilities in the maintenance of community safety and security' is one of your options for Q.11, why do you think that they should? (Please tick as many as applicable)

They are resident representatives and that should be part of their jobs ___

They are also property owners so would care and know more about community security and safety than the secretary ___

It would be easier and more convenient to discuss security concerns with the Owners' Committee ___

Other ___

13. If 'taking on more responsibilities in the maintenance of community safety and security' is one of your options in for Q. 11, which of the following should the Owners' Committee do first in order to accomplish this new task?

Search for security problems in the community regularly and improve them ___

Be more attentive to the residents especially when they come to discuss their security concerns ___

Be well connected with the local community constable and get updated information about crime in the area ___

Provide neighbourhood crime statistics to the residents on a regular basis ___

Provide information about the use and functions of all security measures in the community ___

Be cautious with the quality of security services providers ___

Other ___ []

14. Are you satisfied with the general performance of your current Owners' Committee?

Very satisfied ___

Satisfied ___

Neutral ___

Unsatisfied ___

Very unsatisfied ___

15. Are you satisfied with the general performance of your current Body Corporate secretary?

Very satisfied ____

Satisfied ____

Neutral ____

Unsatisfied ____

Very unsatisfied ____

GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT YOU, YOUR FAMILY/FLATMATES, AND YOUR PROPERTY

1. You are Female ____ Male ____

2. Age: 18-30 ____ 31-50 ____ 51-64 ____ 65+ ____

3. Ethnic origin: NZ Pakeha ____ Maori ____ European ____ Asian ____
Other ____ (Please tick as many as applicable)

4. Number of under 14 children in your household: ____

5. Do you own or rent this property? Own ____ Rent ____

6. How long have you been living here? ____ Years and ____ Months

7. Before you moved into current property, have you ever lived in a gated community?

Yes ____

No ____

Not sure if it was a gated community or not ____

Appendix 4

SURVEY B – FOR MEMBERS OF THE OWNERS’ COMMITTEE

The purpose of this survey is to obtain information about your experiences and opinions in dealing with security related issues as a member of the Owners’ Committee (also known as Body Corporate Committee)

Interpretations:

Security – refers to freedom from criminal victimisation.

Security measures – refers to any kind of security devices and systems such as password-controlled gates, security alarms, surveillance cameras, security patrol, etc.

Questions:

1. How many community meetings are usually held in your community every year?

Annual General Meeting only ____

AGM plus ____ other meetings

2. Think of the last meeting, were there any security related issues included in the discussion topics prepared before the meeting?

Yes ____

No ____

Don’t remember ____

I was not present ____

3. Think of the last meeting, were there any residents (or their proxies) raising security related issues during the meeting?

Yes ____

No ____

Don’t remember ____

I was not present ____

4. Do you think that security is an important issue that always needs to be included as one of the discussion topics?

Strongly agree ____

Agree ____

Neutral ____

Disagree ____

Strongly disagree ____

4a. Do you think it would be a good idea for the committee to give the residents information about security measures in the community?

Yes ____

No, it would be too much trouble ____

Not sure ____

4b. Do you think it would be a good idea for the committee to provide the residents information about neighbourhood crime statistics on a regular basis?

Yes ____

No, it would be too much trouble ____

Not sure ____

5. Are you familiar with the use and functions of all security measures in your community?

Very familiar ____

Familiar ____

Neutral ____

Unfamiliar ____

Very unfamiliar ____

6. Do you think that if the number of meetings increased, the opportunity of discussing security related issues would also increase?

Strong agree ____

Agree ____

Neutral ____

Disagree ____

Strongly disagree ____

7. How many times in a month, on average, would security concerns of the residents be brought to your attention?

Less than 1 time ____

1 ~ 3 times ____

4 ~ 6 times ____

7 ~ 10 times ____

More than 10 times ____

None ____

7a. The majority of those concerns often come from

A single resident ____

A small group of residents ____

Random resident ____

Not sure ____

7b. The majority of those concerns often include

Only one (the same) subject ____

Two to three different subjects ____

A variety of different subjects ____

Not sure ____

8. Those security concerns of the residents are often brought to your attention

(Please rate from 1 – most often to 3 – least often)

By the residents directly (phone, email, correspondence, personal meeting) ____

Through the building manager ____

Through the Body Corporate secretary ____

Through any staff from the Body Corporate management company ____

Through other members of the Owners' Committee ____

9. After knowing those security concerns of the residents, you often
(Please choose up to 3)

- Try to come up with a solution by yourself ____
- Deal with it together with other members of the Owners' Committee ____
- Deal with it together with the building manager ____
- Deal with it together with the Body Corporate secretary ____
- Leave it to the building manager to deal with it ____
- Leave it to the Body Corporate secretary to deal with it ____
- Wait for the next coming community meeting (including AGM) and discuss it ____
- Discuss it with the resident right away ____

10. Are you satisfied with the current level of interaction on security related issues with the residents?

- Very satisfied ____
- Satisfied ____
- Neutral ____
- Unsatisfied ____
- Very unsatisfied ____

11. Are you satisfied with the rate of residents' attendance at the last community meeting?

- Very satisfied ____
- Satisfied ____
- Neutral ____
- Unsatisfied ____
- Very unsatisfied ____

11a. Do you think that if the attendance rate increased, the opportunity of discussing security related issues would also increase?

- Strongly agree ____
- Agree ____
- Neutral ____
- Disagree ____
- Strongly disagree ____

12. Do members of the Owners' Committee often gather together to discuss community affairs besides scheduled community meetings?

Never ___

About ___ time(s) a year

13. Who are usually directly involved in the process of contracting new security service providers and/or negotiating with existing security service providers? (Please tick as many as applicable)

Members of the Owners' Committee ___

Body Corporate Secretary ___

Body Corporate staff ___

Building manager ___

14. Are you familiar with the Unit Titles Act 1972?

I understand it perfectly ___

I know some sections very well ___

I know it all right ___

I only know a bit about it ___

I have heard of it but don't really know it ___

I have no idea what it is ___

15. Do you think that the powers of Body Corporate (Committee) outlined in the Act are appropriate?

Yes ___

No, Body Corporate should be given greater powers ___

Not sure ___

15a. Do you believe that the powers of your Committee are sufficient to deal with security related issues?

Yes ___

No ___

Not sure ___

16. Were you expecting to be directly involved in the decision making process before you got elected as a member of the Committee?

Yes ___

No ___

17. Have you ever felt that Body Corporate secretary has more control than the owners' committee when it comes to decision making?

Always ___

Often ___

Sometimes ___

Occasionally ___

Never ___

18. Do you often feel that Body Corporate Secretary might not be acting for the best interests of the residents?

Very often ___

Often ___

Sometimes ___

Occasionally ___

Never ___

19. Are you satisfied with the performance of your current Body Corporate Secretary in general?

Very satisfied ___

Satisfied ___

Neutral ___

Unsatisfied ___

Very unsatisfied ___

20. Do you think that the interests of residents would be better attended if it was the Owners' Committee instead of the Body Corporate secretary directly running the community?

Strongly agree ___

Agree ___

Neutral ___

Disagree ___

Strongly disagree ___

21. Would you be willing to contribute more time and take on more responsibilities if the Owners' Committee was to become the sole charger of all community affairs?

Absolutely ___

Maybe ___

Not sure ___ (Go to Q.21a)

Not really ___ (Go to Q.21a)

Absolutely not ___ (Go to Q.21a)

21a. Would you change your mind if you got paid or receive some financial support for the job?

Very likely ___

Likely ___

Don't know ___

Unlikely ___

Very unlikely ___

Appendix 5

Tables in Appendix 5 are intended to present complete numerical data for selected descriptive findings that do not have all individual responses listed in the main text.

Table i

Are you aware that this property is part of a gated community?	
	Percentage
Yes	95.2
No	4.8

Table ii

Before you moved in, were you aware that this property is part of a gated community?	
	Percentage
Yes	80.7
No	19.3

Table iii

Have you ever lived in a gated community before moving into current property?	
	Percentage
Yes	32.5
No	65.1
Not sure	2.4

Table iv

What would be your biggest security concern(s) for the community?	
	Percentage
Burglary	53.0
Sexual assault	25.3
Murder	22.9
Violent assault	22.9
Theft	19.3
Any act of vandalism	12.0
Manslaughter	4.8
None	4.8
Other	2.4
No reply	1.2

Table v

Since you moved in, have you experienced any of the following?	
	Percentage
Burglary (without loss of personal property)	8.4
Burglary (with loss of personal property)	13.3
Any act of vandalism	6.0
Theft	7.2
Other	6.0
None of the above	68.7

Table vi

Since you moved in, have you witnessed/heard any of the following?	
	Percentage
Burglary (without loss of personal property)	13.3
Burglary (with loss of personal property)	42.2
Any act of vandalism	12.0
Theft	18.1
Other	7.2
None of the above	38.6

Table vii

Do you feel safe and secure inside your property?	
	Percentage
Very safe and secure	39.8
Safe and secure	47.0
Neutral	9.6
Not so safe and secure	3.6

Table viii

In the day time, are there any places in the community that you avoid going due to fear of being the victim of crime?	
	Percentage
Laundry room	0
Entrance/reception lobby	0
Emergency exit/stairway	2.4
Garage/car park/visitor car park	2.4
Rubbish collection area	1.2
Garden/ground	0
Swimming pool/sauna room	0
Gym/indoor sport facilities	0
Outdoor sport facilities	0
Other	1.2
None of the above	92.8

Table ix

In the night time, are there any places in the community that you avoid going due to fear of being the victim of crime?	
	Percentage
Laundry room	0
Entrance/reception lobby	0
Emergency exit/stairway	3.4
Garage/car park/visitor car park	6.7
Rubbish collection area	3.4
Garden/ground	2.2
Swimming pool/sauna room	1.1
Gym/indoor sport facilities	1.1
Outdoor sport facilities	0
Other	3.4
None of the above	78.7

Table x

Do you perceive crime as a serious problem in Auckland urban areas?	
	Percentage
Very serious	20.5
Serious	53.0
Not very serious	18.1
Not serious at all	2.4
Don't know	6.0

Table xi

Do you believe that your community is experiencing less crime than its surrounding neighbourhood?	
	Percentage
Much less	26.5
Relatively less	33.7
About the same	21.7
Even worse	2.4
Not sure	15.7

Table xii

Are you satisfied with the security measures currently employed in your community?	
	Percentage
Yes, they make me feel safe inside the community	65.1
No, I think we need additional security measures	16.9
No reply	18.1

Table xiii

If you were to select additional security measures for the community, what would be your top selections?	
	Percentage
On-site security guards	27.7
Routine/nightly security patrols	25.3
CCTV/surveillance cameras	19.3
Electrified wire fences	2.4
24 hour security hotline	25.3
Security alarms	24.1
Other	2.4
No need of additional security measures	16.9

Table xiv

What do you think would be the main reasons that access control is not always effective?	
	percentage
Residents sometimes leave the gate open behind them	15.6
Some residents give out password/code/copies of keys or swipe-cards of the gate to outsiders	23.4
Residents tend to open the gate for whoever waiting outside on their way in/out	35.4
Gates don't get fixed immediately when they break down	7.8
Gates and/or fences are too short in height	3.6
The existence of passenger through gates (unlocked) has compromised the function of gates and fences	3.6
Other	9.9

Table xv

Were you satisfied with how their security concerns were dealt with by the Owners' Committee?	
	Percentage
Very satisfied	6.0
Satisfied	12.0
Neutral	3.6
Unsatisfied	2.4
Very unsatisfied	1.2
Never discuss security concerns with the Owners' Committee	73.5
No reply	1.2