Japan's Public Diplomacy as an Effective Tool in Enhancing its Soft Power in
Vietnam - A Case-study of the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program

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ABSTRACT

Soft power is a term defined by Nye as the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. Public diplomacy is an instrument that government uses to mobilize resources of soft power to attract the public of other countries, rather than merely their governments. Both soft power and public diplomacy have been widely used in both academic works and the media. However, in Northeast Asia, while much has been talked about soft power of a rising China, there is little empirical work on Japan's soft power with a particular case study. Vietnam is a part of Southeast Asia, a strategic location in which Japan has a special interest. The research is an attempt to explore dimensions of Japan's soft power and to examine whether public diplomacy is an efficient tool to enhance Japan's soft power in Vietnam. A case study of the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program will be used to examine if it can help Japan project its soft power in Vietnam. Two separate surveys aiming at the participants of the program and the non-participants are conducted simultaneously. The outcomes of the two surveys will reveal whether the participants have more positive views about Japan than the non-participants. Moreover, these positive views should be correspondent with the foreign policy goals of Japan in its relations with Vietnam. Therefore, the surveys can help conclude whether the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange program contributes to the enhancement of Japan's soft power in Vietnam.

INTRODUCTION

Background Information

In Northeast Asia, currently with much talk about a rising China, the role of Japan is sometimes ignored. After being defeated in World War II, Japan has not focused strictly on military ambitions, instead it prioritized economic growth. Despite enormous difficulties including severe destruction after the historic bombing and the country's lack of natural resources, with appropriate strategies and policies, Japan has constituted impressive economic achievements. The country had once captured significant attention from the outside world in the mid-1980s with a vibrant wave of its foreign direct investment in the East Asian region. Nowadays, Japan is the world third largest economy (after the United States and China) and the second largest developed economy (second to the United States). Apart from economic might, Japan is also well-known for its unique and diverse culture. There is no more vivid illustration for the obvious attraction of Japan by the following facts and figures. According to the Country Brand Index (CBI), a prominent global study of country brands¹, Japan is now ranked the third in the Top 25 Country Brands. Moreover, the BBC Global Poll, which measured perceptions of different countries' influence in the world, has revealed that Japan topped the ranking during the 2011-2012 period².

Vietnam is a part of Southeast Asia in which Japan has a special interest³. The country is considered by some as one of the major powers in Southeast Asia with a huge population of about 90 million and as an emerging economy. Bordering with China, which has a prolonged territorial dispute with Japan, Vietnam lies in a strategic position to Japan's foreign policy. Moreover, Southeast Asia is also a strategic region because Japan is dependent on the region for importing natural resources and exporting its products. The country also definitely needs support from ten ASEAN countries for its quest for a permanent seat in the United Nations

¹ The basic elements of a country brand's strength include Value System (Political system, environmental friendliness, stable and legal environment, tolerance, freedom of speech); Quality of life (education system, healthcare system, standard of living, job opportunity and most like to live in); Good for business (investment climate, advanced technology, regulatory environment, skilled workforce); Heritage and Culture (History, art and culture, authenticity, natural beauty) and Tourism (Value for money, Attractions, resorts and lodging options, food). (see www.futurebrand.com)

² Japan is seen as having the most positive influence in the world among all countries evaluated, and views have improved slightly since 2011. On average, in the 21 tracking countries surveyed, 58 per cent of respondents hold positive views of Japan's influence (up from 56% in 2011), and 21 per cent hold negative views (up 1 point from 2011). (see www.japanprobe.com)

³ Shiraisi, *Japanese Relations with Vietnam: 1951-1987*, p1

Security Council. And it is apparent that if the ASEAN community appreciate Japan's values, the country can gain higher recognition as well as improve its international image. In addition, facing a rising China and its increasing influence in South East Asia, it is a good option for Japan to gain the support of Southeast Asian countries including Vietnam.

The above analyses mean that there is much to talk about Japan's power (both hard and soft power) and about the importance of strengthening its relations with Southeast Asian countries. With regard to soft power, while much has been discussed about that of the United States and China, there is not enough empirical work on Japan's soft power. Moreover, although Japan has lagged behind China in terms of economic strength, it is still a strong economic power and may embrace a great deal of soft power. Therefore, a careful examination of Japan's soft power is essential to accurately measure the country's capabilities. This research will attempt to analyze resources of Japan's soft power in general and public diplomacy in particular and examine whether youth exchange programs as an example of Japan's public diplomacy can help this country project its soft power in Vietnam. In this connection, the following research question will be addressed:

Research questions:

Is public diplomacy an effective tool to enhance Japan's soft power in Vietnam?

In order to support the research question, the dissertation will attempt to address the following sub-question:

Do youth exchange programs as a tool of Japan's public diplomacy help enhance Japan's soft power in Vietnam?

Research Goal

The main goal of this research is to examine whether public diplomacy in general and youth exchange programs has been efficient in enhancing Japan's soft power in Vietnam. If such program helps increase the positive views on Japan by Vietnamese people, Japan should invest more in such activities.

Methodology

Materials used in the dissertation will be used from both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include documents such as speeches of leaders, documents issued by Japanese government and related ministries and authorities; and secondary sources include

books, research works, articles and manuscript from the internet, etc...on the issues related to the dissertation.

In the research, inductive method will be applied. Induction is the method which moves from the particular to the general. It gathers together particular observations in the form of premises, then it reasons from these particular premises to a general conclusion. It is contrary to deductive method which moves from the general to the particular. It takes a general premise and deduces particular conclusions⁴.

In Nye's analysis, "Soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument. In terms of behavior, soft power is attractive power. In terms of resources, soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction. Whether a particular asset is a soft power resource that produces attraction can be measured by asking people through polls or focus groups".

To illustrate the significance of public diplomacy in enhancing Japan's soft power resources, two surveys aiming at non-participants and participants (focus groups) in an exchange program hosted by Japan will be conducted. The survey will be in questionnaire form. One survey will cover Vietnamese participating youths (members) who participated in the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program (SSEAYP) in different years. The other survey will examine Vietnamese people who have never joined any exchange programs hosted by Japan and have no personal linkage with this country. Data collected from these surveys (particular premises) will be analyzed to a general conclusion if youth exchange program is an efficient way for Japan to enhance its soft power.

Theoretical framework

Regarding the measurement of state capabilities, realism, one of the most powerful IR theories sometimes cannot fully explain the nature of power while merely focusing on hard power. To realists, power is based on the material capabilities that a state controls. These capabilities include tangible military assets and socio-economic ingredients that go into building military power (which is called latent power). Latent power is based on a state's wealth and the size of its overall population⁵. At the first glance, this view of power may be appropriate, especially with examples of great powers like the United States or China which have both huge military assets and latent power. However, empirical evidence has shown that power is not that simple. It is not enough to look at a state's military, wealth or population. It

⁴ Harvey Bluedorn, 'Two Methods of Reasoning'

⁵ Mearsheimer, 'Structural Realism', pp78-92

is sometimes how its identities are constructed by its government, people and other countries that matters more. That is constructivism. Constructivists emphasize the role of ideas, of shared knowledge of the social world. To illustrate how constructivism works in IR studies, take Great Britain and North Korea, for example. 10 nuclear weapons of North Korea is much less challenging than 250 nuclear weapons of Great Britain. A realist with strong emphasis on hard power would think that Great Britain is a far greater threat than North Korea in the international system⁶. However, a “shared knowledge” of the social world will reveal the opposite thing. Great Britain is considered to be a friendly power; whereas North Korea is often thought to be extremely aggressive. Therefore, while realism sometimes cannot explain a certain issue in the international relations, especially with regard to state power, constructivism help fulfill the gap. Nye’s conception of soft power was designed to remedy the narrow focus of realist power analysis (‘the ability to change what others do’) by bringing in the power of attraction (‘the ability to shape what others want’). In fact, soft power is not an alternative to hard power; it complements that of realism. As proposed by Nye, soft power derives from three sources: culture, political values and foreign policy. Therefore, constructivism is the right theory to explain soft power in this dissertation.

Gap in Literature review

Concerning the empirical works on soft power and public diplomacy, much has been written about soft power and public diplomacy of great powers, especially the United States and China and even middle powers such as South Korea or Canada. In East Asia, China has recently emerged as a great power in both hard (surpassing Japan as the world’s second largest economy) and soft term (with powerful mechanisms to boost soft power such as the notion of peaceful rise and then peaceful development). As a result, a variety of works have concentrated on discussing and evaluating China’s soft power. Mellisen and Lee noted that “soft power and public diplomacy are now household terms that are frequently used in discussion about international relations”⁷ in this region. However, it seems that Japan has not been sufficiently discussed. Many of works are generally discussed about Japan’s soft power. Particularly, there is little research investigating Japan’s public diplomacy. And there is not much empirical work on Japan’s soft power and public diplomacy with a particular case

⁶ Jackson and Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, p.238

⁷ Lee and Mellisen, *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia*

study. Therefore, this thesis is an attempt to explore dimensions of Japan's soft power and public diplomacy with a case-study of Vietnam and the effect of the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program on enhancing Japan's soft power in Vietnam.

Research Structure

The research is structured as follows:

Chapter 1 introduces an overview of soft power and public diplomacy, the theoretical framework of the research. It analyses derivations of soft power and the relationship between soft power and public diplomacy.

Chapter 2 aims at providing an analysis of Japan's soft power and its public diplomacy. A detailed discussion of public diplomacy in Japan will be initiated to examine whether Japan's public diplomacy is an effective tool to enhance its soft power or not.

Chapter 3 analyses Japan's foreign policy toward Vietnam with a detailed insight in Japan's national interests in Vietnam.

Chapter 4 is used to analyze Japan's public diplomacy in Vietnam and describe two surveys to examine the effectiveness of youth exchange programs (SSEAYP is an example) in enhancing Japan's soft power. Youth exchange programs have been used as a tool of Japan's public diplomacy. A comparison between the results of these two surveys will reveal whether youth exchange programs in general and SSEAYP in particular have contributed to the projection of Japan's soft power in Vietnam.

CHAPTER 1: THE THEORY OF SOFT POWER AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

I. THE CONCEPT OF SOFT POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

1. What is Soft Power

According to different theories, states are considered to be highly important actors in international relations. For example, realists argue that states are the major actors in world affairs; neo-liberal institutionalists believe that international institutions as well as states are key players in world politics. Therefore, political scientists have been studying various aspects of states, and power is one of the principal focuses. Power is defined as how one state uses its material resources to compel another state to do something it does not want to⁸. Especially, power can be considered as the exclusive realm of realism, one of the most powerful political theories. Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and indeed all classical realists believe that the goal of power, the means of power and the uses of power are a central preoccupation of political activity⁹.

In this definition, there are only material forms of power which encompass military and economic capacity. However, there are also other scholars who have developed different views on power. Susan Strange defined that power embraces both structural and relational dimension. Structural power is the capability to create rules, norms, and modes of operation for various dimensions of the international system¹⁰. Relational power is the power of A to get B to do something they would not otherwise do”¹¹. Hannah Arendt maintained that power in social relations result from the human ability to act to persuade or coerce others¹². Lukes in *Power: A Radical View* argued that power is seen as the imposition of internal constraints, and those subject to it acquire beliefs that result in their consent or their adaption to domination by either coercive or non-coercive forms¹³.

⁸ Barnett and Duvall, ‘Power in International Politics’, p.22

⁹ Jackson and Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, p.68

¹⁰ Volgy et al, ‘Structural versus Relational Strength: The Cohesion of the G7 and the Development of the Post-Cold War International System’

¹¹ *ibid*

¹² Hutcheon, ‘Hannah Arendt on the Concept of Power’

¹³ Lozenri, ‘Power: A Radical View by Stephen Lukes’, pp.87-95

http://www.webasa.org/Pubblicazioni/Lorenzi_2006_2.pdf

Joseph S. Nye may well have shared these views when he coined the term “soft power” which defined the non-material and non-coercive form of power. According to Nye, measuring state capabilities does not merely base on such “tangible assets” as size of population or military and economic strength. Instead, it requires a more comprehensive understanding of power, questioning the relevance of “conventional” power. This gives rise to the development of a new concept of power as well as the taxonomy with hard power and soft power. Hard power is mainly composed of military and economic capabilities; and soft power encompasses the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.

To date, there has been no generally accepted definition of soft power; and even Joseph Nye, the ‘father’ of this term, has produced different “versions” of what soft power means. For example, in the very first book about soft power, “Bound to Lead” in 1990, Nye defined soft power as “getting others want the outcomes you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them”. And in his best-selling book *Soft Power - The Means to Success in World Politics* in 2004, Nye developed the concept more fully to “a state’s ability to attract others to a set of “shared values and justness and duty of contributing to those values”¹⁴. And also in this book, he called soft power the second face of power. “Countries can sometimes obtain the outcomes they want without tangible threats or payoffs. This indirect method has sometimes been called “the second face of power” or *soft power*”.¹⁵

Apart from Nye, IR scholars around the world have widely discussed and developed different understandings of soft power. Steven Lukes in “Power and the battle for hearts and minds” suggested that Nye’s conception of soft power “might seem to be a cousin” of what he

¹⁴ Walt, ‘The Downside of Soft Power’

¹⁵ Nye, *Soft Power – The Means to Success in World Politics*

called “power’s third dimension¹⁶: the power to shape, influence or determine others’ beliefs and desires, thereby securing their compliance¹⁷.”

Participants to the Soft power workshop held at the Johns Hopkins University in 2008 created the following perceptions about soft power:

“Non-kinetic power of persuasion, even the power to seduce”

“Non-military means for achieving particular foreign policy objectives”

“Getting others to want the same things you do, and thus making your aims legitimate”

“The ability of international actors to advance their foreign policy interests through the attractiveness of their culture and values rather than through force or economic leverage”

“Modifying behavior or attitudes across wide functional distances”¹⁸

And most recently, Alexei Pilko, a senior research fellow at Moscow Lomonosov State University described “soft power” as the attractiveness of a country’s international image. A country’s image is a set of integral parts, such as their value system, political system, economic order, culture, traditions and customs, historical heritage, ideology, religion, etc¹⁹.

All in all, the concept of soft power has been viewed differently and therefore, there are various definitions of soft power as mentioned above. However, similarities among these definitions can be summarized in the following words: non-material, tangible, indirect, attraction, persuasion, acceptance and influence. The very first and “primitive” definition of soft power (the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments) will be used as a base in this dissertation most because the ability to attract is a very important element of public diplomacy in general and youth exchange programs in particular.

¹⁶ According to Lukes, power is a multi-dimensional social factor. The one-dimensional view of power focuses on *behaviour* in the making of *decisions* on issues over which there is an observable (overt) *conflict* of (subjective) *interests*, seen as expressing policy preferences, revealed by political participation. The two-dimensional view of power focuses on decision-making and control over the political agenda on issues and potential issues over which there is an observable (overt and covert) conflict of subjective interests, seen as preferences or grievances. The three-dimensional view of power proposed by Lukes focuses on decision-making and control over the political agenda (not necessarily through decisions) on issues and potential issues over which there is an observable (overt and covert) and latent conflict of subjective and real interests (see Lozenri, ‘Power: A Radical View by Steven Lukes’)

¹⁷ Lukes, ‘Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds’, p.447

¹⁸ Deane et al, ‘Soft power Workshop’

¹⁹ Pilko, ‘What is soft power and how should Russia use it? ‘

2. What Makes Soft Power?

Nye pointed out three major instruments of soft power for a country: “Culture, values, and foreign policies”²⁰. “Culture is the set of values and practices that create meaning for a country”. There are two categories of culture: high culture and popular culture. Philosopher Roger Scruton defined high culture as the “self-consciousness of a society”²¹ or “a tradition in which objects made for aesthetic contemplation renew through their allusive power the experience of membership”²². High culture comprises the works of art, literature, scholarship and philosophy that are usually for educated people. Popular culture (or pop culture for short) is popular, easy to understand and entertaining to the majority of young people. Examples of pop culture may be pop music, comics, films or reality TV shows. High culture is more so sophisticated than pop culture. While high culture is usually for intellectual experience; pop culture is often for entertainment.

According to Nye, it is more probable for a country to expand its soft power when its culture includes “universal values” and its policies “promote interests that others share”²³. As an illustration, the traditional Chinese cultural values with “harmony between nature and human kind” and “giving priority to human beings” seems more appealing, putting Chinese culture in a more advantageous position²⁴ than that of many others. Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho emphasize that together with the economic miracle, the spreading of Chinese values and culture to the outside world has enabled China to become a potential competitor to the United States in the Asian region. They argue that China’s recognition of soft power and its application to national policies is an important factor in explaining the country’s rapidly improving image and increasing influence in Asia, along with rapid economic growth and military power²⁵.

Furthermore, a country’s foreign policies can be an important instrument of its soft power. For example, “China’s foreign policy has attempted to reassure others of its nonthreatening intent, enhance acceptance by the international community, and proactively

²⁰ Nye, ‘Soft Power – The Means to Success in World Politics’

²¹ Jones, ‘High culture versus pop culture: which is best for engaging students?’

²² Roger Scruton: Can High Culture be a Substitute for Religion?’

²³ Nye, ‘Soft Power – The Means to Success in World Politics’

²⁴ Li, *Soft power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics*

²⁵ Cho and Jeong, ‘China’s soft power: Discussions, Resources and Prospects’, pp. 453-472

realign the international environment to its liking”²⁶. However, domestic or foreign policies which are not supported or bring about negative effects can easily undermine soft power²⁷. The classical example for the failure of the American foreign policy which revealed a steep decline in the US soft power was the war in Iraq in 2003.

A country’s values (for example, democracy or freedom) are also an important source of its soft power. For instance, “American liberal democracy as an ideology is a strong source of US soft power because it is very appealing to many social-political elites throughout the world”²⁸. Another example is the Beijing Consensus, the Chinese model of development. It can be an effective source of China’s soft power as it has been accepted and followed by many third-world countries²⁹. And according to James F. Paradise, “the Chinese government is attempting to project a more favorable image of the country and reassure the world that its intentions are benign. The Confucius Institute project...is part of a broader soft power projection in which China is attempting to win hearts and minds for political purposes”³⁰.

Therefore, by projecting attractive culture, political values and foreign policies, states can maximize their soft power as well as their power in general.

3. Soft Power versus Hard Power

Hard power is closely related to command power. Nye defined command power as “the ability to change what others do” and it “can rest on coercion or inducement”. Hard power strategies include forces, sanctions, payments and bribes. For example, the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 was a perfect example of using hard power. Classical and neo-realists have mainly focused on military and economic might - hard power to measure state capabilities.

Soft power can be referred to co-optive power. It is the ability to shape the preferences of others. Instead of using coercion, soft power embraces attraction and influence instead. Therefore, soft power can be called “attractive power” or the power of attraction. It is an important source of power. On the one hand, soft power is needed to obtain hard power. On the other hand, it is easier to project soft power than hard power.

²⁶ Li, *Soft power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics*

²⁷ Nye, ‘Soft Power – The Means to Success in World Politics’

²⁸ Li, *Soft power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics*

²⁹ Li, *Soft power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics*

³⁰ Paradise, ‘The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing's Soft Power. Asian Survey’, pp. 647-669

All kinds of power are crucially significant when measuring the capabilities of states. Hard power is more “visible” in defining state strength. It is also very significant during war time and in the protection of state sovereignty. However, countries have been so aware of the horrors of war that they tend to avoid being involved. Therefore, nowadays, on the one hand states are seeking to strengthen its hard power to some extent; on the other hand, they are putting more emphasis on projecting soft power because of enormous benefits this power confers.

4. The Benefits of Soft Power

Soft power has many benefits; and the most prominent of which can be summarized in 3Ys: Credibility, Legitimacy and Efficacy

4.1. Soft Power’s Credibility

“Credibility is the crucial resource and an important source of soft power. Reputation becomes even more important than in the past, and political struggles occur over the creation and destruction of credibility”³¹. In the world of technology and information today, people can easily get access to information every time and everywhere. Therefore, the diffusion of culture as well as political values and policies, the fundamental instruments of soft power, has been assisted efficiently. As soft power is the ability to shape the preferences of others, it should establish credibility to attract or to persuade. With the paradox of plenty³², it is hard to define which information is right or wrong. Therefore, credibility becomes the foremost attraction of soft power.

4.2. Soft Power’s Legitimacy

Legitimacy can be defined as a value whereby something or someone is recognized and accepted as right and proper³³. In the case of states, internationally, legitimacy means that state values are accepted and may be followed by others, not because states wield coercive force, but because their values are attractive and persuasive. It can be said that soft power is basically about legitimacy. “Legitimacy is central to soft power. If a people or nation believes American objectives to be legitimate, we are more likely to persuade them to follow our lead

³¹ Nye, ‘The Benefits of Soft Power’

³² *ibid*

³³ O’Neil, *Essentials of Comparative Politics*, p.35

without using threats or bribes”³⁴. Therefore, it is undeniable that, with the ability to attract and persuade, soft power can help increase state legitimacy. For example, as the US policies and values have been widely recognized and accepted, the United States’ soft power is also on a par with its military and economic capabilities. Another example put by Nye was that some radical Muslim fundamentalists may have been willing to support Osama bin Laden not because of payments or threats, but because they believed in the legitimacy of his objectives³⁵.

4.3. Soft Power’s Efficacy

As soft power is described as the ability to shape the preferences of others by attracting or persuading, it does not involve forces or compulsion like military or economic means. Therefore, in comparison to hard power strategies, states can save a huge amount of financial resources with soft power. Moreover, according to Nye “soft power resources are the assets that produce attraction which often leads to acquiescence; seduction is always more effective than coercion”. Armitage and Nye also claimed that with the attribute of legitimacy, soft power can help reduce the cost of using hard power when the situation demands. Moreover, “if you can get others to be attracted, to want what you want, it costs you much less in carrots and sticks”³⁶. As an illustration, with its well-established civilization, no one can deny the profound influence of China in the cultures of its neighboring countries such as Japan, Korea or Vietnam. The process of cultural assimilation could be stimulated naturally due to the attractiveness of various China’s values such as Confucianism or Chinese literature.

5. The Critics of Soft Power

Few could argue about the popularity of the concept of soft power in policy papers, academics works and the media. To illustrate, Google will produce 212 million results for the key words “US soft power” in just 0.27 seconds, about 33 million for “Chinese soft power” and nearly 100 million for “UK soft power” in a similar period of time. However, it does not mean the concept of soft power is accepted everywhere. Some claim that it is a rather ineffective and vague concept. Some argue that it is just a reflection of hard power. Therefore, only states with a powerful military and economic capability can possess a great deal of soft

³⁴ Armitage and Nye, ‘A Smarter, More Secure America’

³⁵ Nye, *Soft Power – The Means to Success in World Politics*

³⁶ Nye, *Soft Power – The Means to Success in World Politics*

power. Others think that it is difficult to measure soft power because it embraces intangible assets like influence, reputation or prestige³⁷. And Nye, the father of the concept also acknowledges several limits of soft power. He noted that soft power depends more on context than hard power. In other words, it relies largely on the existence of willing interpreters and receivers³⁸. More specifically, columnist Etyen Mahcupyan shared a similar view with Nye in maintaining that “the precondition for the effectiveness of soft power with respect to other nations depends on the development of these nations in terms of democracy”³⁹. For example, Hollywood movies are popular around the world; however, they are not accepted by societies which consider violence or sexuality as a taboo⁴⁰. In this case, Hollywood movies serve as a damaging factor in establishing the US soft power in those societies.

Moreover, according to Stephen Walt, soft power seems to be an epiphenomenon because hard power is needed to produce much of the soft variety”⁴¹. However, the close link between hard and soft power is still being questioned. On the one hand, great power does not necessarily mean great soft power and the other way round. For example, neither Canada nor Switzerland is a great power; but both have a huge source of soft power. On the other hand, great powers with strong hard power including the United States, China or Japan often acquire a great deal of soft power. For example, the United States has long been accepted as a superpower, the only predominant actor in the global affairs. It is undeniable that in terms of hard power, the United States is second to none (it has always been by far the world largest military spender; and economically, it accounts for about one quarter of the global output). Furthermore, with regard to soft power, according to Nye, the United States has been attractive to the rest of the world, due to its political values, democratic institutions and popular culture. As a result, Washington is able to achieve some of its foreign policy goals, without necessary resorting to coercion, threats and bribery.

As Hayden put it, soft power’s currency is most readily observable in the spread of public diplomacy and similar policies⁴². Therefore, a close relationship between public

³⁷ Liaropoulos, ‘Being Hard on Soft Power’. Research Institute for American Studies.
<http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/global-issues/transatlantic-studies/1519-being-hard-on-soft-power-.html>

³⁸ Nye, *Soft Power – The Means to Success in World Politics*

³⁹ Mahcupyan, ‘The Limit of Soft Power’

⁴⁰ Li, *Soft power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics*

⁴¹ Walt, ‘Joe Nye was Right’

⁴² Hayden, ‘The Rhetoric of Soft Power’, p.1

diplomacy and soft power is obviously visible; and it is worth examining how public diplomacy works in international relations.

II. THE THEORY OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

1. The Concept of Public Diplomacy

There has been a wide range of definitions for diplomacy. Generically, diplomacy is called an art, a science, a craft, a process, a practice, a function, and an institution⁴³ or simply “the art of conducting relations between civilized nations”⁴⁴. Academically, diplomacy has been defined as “a political process by which political entities conduct official relations with one another in the international environment”⁴⁵. Christopher Hill emphasized on the manner and the purpose of diplomacy in maintaining that diplomacy is the human face of getting your own way in international politics, as well as a crucial instrument for building international stability⁴⁶. Malone pointed out a different purpose of public diplomacy when he defined it as the direct communication with foreign peoples with the aim of affecting their thinking and ultimately that of their governments⁴⁷. With regard to functions, diplomacy “encompasses the making and implementing of foreign policy; the traditional functions of representation, reporting, communicating, negotiating, and maneuvering, as well as caring for the interests of nationals abroad.”⁴⁸ The role of diplomacy in international relations as well as in domestic levels is crucial as it is an important independent variable⁴⁹ of peace and conflict. As G.R. Berridge analyzed, the principal purpose of diplomacy is “to enable states to secure the objectives of their foreign policies without resort to force, propaganda, or law”⁵⁰. Melissen suggested that the main purpose of diplomacy is “resolving international difficulties peacefully”⁵¹. In other words, “diplomacy is an important means by which states pursue their

⁴³ Plischke, ‘Treatment of "Diplomacy" in International Relations Textbooks’, p.328

⁴⁴ Broderick, ‘Diplomacy’

⁴⁵ Broderick, ‘Diplomacy’

⁴⁶ Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*

⁴⁷ Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*

⁴⁸ Plischke, ‘Treatment of "Diplomacy" in International Relations Textbooks’, p.333

⁴⁹ In an experiment, the *independent variable* is the variable that is varied or manipulated by the researcher, and the *dependent variable* is the response that is measured. An *independent variable* is the presumed cause, whereas the *dependent variable* is the presumed effect. (See ‘Independent and Dependent Variables’)

⁵⁰ Berridge, ‘Diplomacy: Theory and Practice’

⁵¹ Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*

foreign policies”⁵². The famous saying by Adolf Hitler that “When diplomacy ends, war begins” highlights the importance of diplomacy in deterring conflicts.

There are many ways to categorize diplomacy which is based on purpose, manner, function, field, etc. Cultural diplomacy, economic diplomacy, shuttle diplomacy, preventive diplomacy, to name a few, are some types of diplomacy. Among these, the rise of public diplomacy has been “an important new dimension of the domestic environment in recent decades”.⁵³

The term ‘public diplomacy’ was coined in 1965 by Edmund Gullion with the following definition “Public diplomacy... deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications”⁵⁴. Since then, scholars and practitioners have developed increasingly sufficient and thorough understandings of public diplomacy. Malone did not point out actors of public diplomacy when he described public diplomacy as “direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and ultimately, that of their governments”⁵⁵. Hans Tuch went a further step with “public diplomacy is a government's process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies.”⁵⁶ Signitzer and Coombs defined public diplomacy as “the way in which both government and private individuals and groups influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes and opinions which bear directly on another government's foreign policy decisions”⁵⁷. And according to Nye, “public diplomacy is an instrument that government uses

⁵² Mellisen, *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*

⁵³ Hill, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*

⁵⁴ Cull, ‘Public Diplomacy before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase’

⁵⁵ Gilboa, ‘Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy’, p.57

⁵⁶ Gilboa, ‘Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy’, p.57

⁵⁷ Gilboa, ‘Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy’, p.57

to mobilize resources of soft power to communicate with and attract the public of other countries, rather than merely their governments”⁵⁸.

Diplomacy of a nation, basing on actors and receivers, can be categorized into different types or branches. State diplomacy, which can be referred to “traditional diplomacy” aims at maintaining and improving relations between a country and others. Party diplomacy refers to the establishment and enhancement of relations between a nation’s party and parties of other countries. Public diplomacy deals with relations among governments, organizations and individuals of different countries to better serve a nation’s policy. Public diplomacy can also be called people’s diplomacy or people-to-people diplomacy in some countries. It is difficult to define which diplomacy (public, state or other kinds of diplomacy) is the most effective. However, it can be said that public diplomacy not only supplements other kinds of diplomacy but also surpasses them in a certain case. To illustrate, during the meeting with leaders of the Vietnam – Cambodia Friendship Association in 2011, Prime Minister of Cambodia Hun Sen noted that people-to-people diplomacy (or public diplomacy) is like a “bamboo bridge”, which is easier to build than a “cement bridge” (which implies state diplomacy). Therefore, there are cases when state diplomacy does not work and public diplomacy has to give a hand⁵⁹. Realizing the important role of public diplomacy, many countries have established special governmental agencies in charge of promoting these relations. For example, there are the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries in China, the All India Peace and Solidarity Organization in India and the Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations in Vietnam.

The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office defined five components of public diplomacy including listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy and international broadcasting⁶⁰. “Listening is an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment by collecting and collating data about publics and their opinions overseas and using that data to redirect its policy or its wider public diplomacy approach accordingly”. Listening, as pointed out by Cull, “precedes all successful public diplomacy⁶¹” Listening in public diplomacy may be included in talks by state leaders with foreign publics during their

⁵⁸ Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, p.95

⁵⁹ Personal discussion with a member of the Vietnam – Cambodia Friendship Association, November 2011

⁶⁰ Cull, ‘Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories’, pp. 31-54

⁶¹ Cull, ‘Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories’, pp. 31-54

official visits. “Advocacy in public diplomacy is an actor's attempt to manage the international environment by undertaking an international communication activity to actively promote a particular policy, idea, or that actor's general interests in the minds of a foreign public”. Embassy press relations can be one form of advocacy diplomacy. “Cultural diplomacy is an actor's attempt to manage the international environment through making its cultural resources and achievements known overseas and/or facilitating cultural transmission abroad”. “Exchange diplomacy is an actor's attempt to manage the international environment by sending its citizens overseas and reciprocally accepting citizens from overseas for a period of study and/or acculturation”. “Efforts like organizing an eleven-nation performance tour entitled “Voyage of Chinese Culture to Africa”⁶² can be categorized as exchange diplomacy. International broadcasting is an actor's attempt to manage the international environment by using the technologies of radio, television and the internet to engage with foreign public⁶³. International broadcasting has long been at the heart of major nations' public diplomacy strategies as one of the most effective ways to reach international publics”.⁶⁴ Examples of international broadcasting are quite many, VOA, CNN or BBC, to mention a few.

Nye identified three dimensions of public diplomacy. The first and most immediate dimension is daily communications, which involves explaining the context of domestic and foreign policy decisions. The second is strategic communication, which develops a set of simple themes much as a political or advertising campaign does. The third is the development of lasting relationships with key individuals over many years through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences, and access to media channels.⁶⁵

Public diplomacy is usually equated or even used interchangeably with several related concepts including (international) public relations and propaganda. For example, “Signitzer and Coombs even argued that public diplomacy and public relations are very similar and called for conceptual convergence of the two. Wang suggested that managing national reputation is a key concept in public diplomacy”⁶⁶.

⁶² Cull, ‘Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories’, pp. 31-54

⁶³ ‘International Broadcasting in the Social Media Era’

⁶⁴ ‘International Broadcasting in the Social Media Era’

⁶⁵ Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, p.101

⁶⁶ Gilboa, ‘Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy’, pp. 55-77

However, in fact, basing on such categories as purpose and manner, a clear-cut separation among these concepts is clearly seen. Public diplomacy tries to draw attention and understanding of foreign publics for its nation's culture, values and policies through broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports, arrange exchanges, and so forth⁶⁷. Public relations is an effort to establish mutually beneficial relations with the public of other nations. And propaganda, according to Welch, is "the deliberate attempt to influence the opinions of an audience through the transmission of ideas and values for the specific purpose, consciously designed to serve the interest of the propagandists and their political masters, either directly or indirectly"⁶⁸. Put it another way, propaganda is merely to inform foreign peoples of a nation's policies. Therefore, while there may be certain convergence among these notions, public diplomacy, public relations and propaganda are totally different in their respective purpose which can be summarized in three following words: understanding, linking and informing. After all, apart from additional contents, public diplomacy includes the functions of both public relations and propaganda. "Conveying information and selling a positive image is part of it, but public diplomacy also involves building long-term relationships that create an enabling environment for government policies"⁶⁹. With its crucial functions as analyzed above, the significance of public diplomacy has been increasingly appreciated. For instance, Jan Mellisen noted that public diplomacy has already become the bread and butter of many diplomats' work. In Europe, public diplomacy has also become a staple commodity in international affairs.⁷⁰ The significance of public diplomacy was also acknowledged by Lee and Mellisen when they maintained that practitioners increasingly categorize public diplomacy as one of the core functions of diplomacy today, and sometimes even the most important⁷¹.

2. Old Public Diplomacy versus New Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy was traditionally considered as "the transparent means by which a sovereign country communicates with publics in other countries aimed at informing and influencing audiences overseas for the purpose of promoting the national interest and

⁶⁷ Nye, 'Public Diplomacy and Soft power', p.95

⁶⁸ Welch, 'Power of Persuasion', pp 24-6

⁶⁹ Welch, 'Power of Persuasion', pp 24-6

⁷⁰ Mellisen, *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*

⁷¹ Lee and Mellissen, *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia*

advancing its foreign policy goals”⁷². By this definition, it is apparent that public diplomacy is not totally separated from state diplomacy with states as principal actors. The concept of new public diplomacy has included additional actors of public diplomacy (both state and non-state actors). Moreover, thanks to technological advancements (especially the internet and mobile phones), the new public diplomacy has benefited greatly from a modern technological environment. As a result, the separation between domestic and international news spheres has disappeared in new public diplomacy. While “old” public diplomacy relied on the concept of advocacy and propaganda, the “new” one aims at branding and network. Furthermore, the new public diplomacy has concentrated on building soft power and nation brand instead of merely prestige and international image⁷³. Gilboa suggested that the term “new public diplomacy” represents an attempt to adjust public diplomacy to the conditions of the information age⁷⁴.

In short, the major difference between “old” diplomacy and new public diplomacy is that old public diplomacy deals with relationships between the representatives of states, or other international actors; whereas new public diplomacy includes both state and non-state actors⁷⁵. The concept of public diplomacy used in this dissertation will be implied as the new public diplomacy.

3. Public Diplomacy and Soft Power

While soft power is often cited as an ambiguous concept, public diplomacy “seems to be a somewhat easier concept to grasp because of its inherently practice, hands-on qualities and the fact that it can be framed in the context of wider diplomatic practice”⁷⁶. The close relationship between public diplomacy and soft power is quite clear. According to Melissen, “public diplomacy means yielding soft power” and “public diplomacy is one of soft power’s key instruments”⁷⁷. Concerning the United States, Peter van Ham suggested that “public diplomacy is an essential tool to win over the hearts and minds of foreign audiences, and to convince them that their values, goals and desires are similar to those of the US. []. In an effort to touch ordinary citizens of Muslim countries, public diplomacy is considered crucial

⁷² ‘What is Public Diplomacy?’

⁷³ Cull, *Public Diplomacy: Lesson from the Past*, p.13

⁷⁴ Gilboa, ‘Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy’, pp. 55-77

⁷⁵ Gilboa, ‘Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy’, pp. 55-77

⁷⁶ Lee and Melissen, *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia*

⁷⁷ Gilboa, ‘Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy’, pp. 55-77

to exercise the US's ample soft power"⁷⁸. Gilboa was more specific in explaining that public diplomacy is presented as an official policy translating soft power resources into action. Put it another way, public diplomacy is a means while soft power is an end. Nicolas Cull examined the relationship between public diplomacy and soft power in a different way. He argued that public diplomacy can be the mechanism to deploy soft power⁷⁹; however, it does not mean that public diplomacy and soft power always go together. Sometimes public diplomacy can be conducted without any soft power; and vice versa, a country may have soft power with little resort to public diplomacy.

Nye pointed out, "public diplomacy tries to attract by drawing attention to these potential resources through broadcasting, subsidizing cultural exports, arranging exchanges, and so forth"⁸⁰. Therefore, it can be understood that public diplomacy in its various tools can help promote a nation's soft power. Bigger powers such as the United States, China and Japan see a greater need to incorporate soft power in their public diplomacy toward the region (East Asia)⁸¹. However, it is a must that the resources used in public diplomacy (which may be culture, values, policies or institutions) should be attractive to foreign publics; otherwise public diplomacy cannot fulfill its task.

4. Exchanges as a Tool of Public Diplomacy

As mentioned earlier, exchange is one of the five components of public diplomacy (the others include listening, advocacy, cultural and international broadcasting). Moreover, according to Nye, "effective public diplomacy is a two-way street that involves listening as well as talking. We need to understand better what is going on in the minds of others and what values we share"⁸². Nye also cited that "the development of lasting relationships with key individuals over many years through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences, and access to media channel"⁸³ is one dimension of public diplomacy. Therefore, it is apparent that exchanges serve as a tool of public diplomacy.

Exchange programs, as mentioned above, are a part of public diplomacy activities. In comparison the other components of public diplomacy, exchange diplomacy seems to target

⁷⁸ Mellisen, *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*

⁷⁹ Cull, *Public Diplomacy: Lesson from the Past*, p.15

⁸⁰ Nye, 'Public Diplomacy and Soft power', p.95

⁸¹ Lee and Melissen, *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia*

⁸² Lee and Melissen, *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia*

⁸³ Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p.109

individuals instead of the mass public⁸⁴. As a result, exchanges will exert more impacts on participants with than the non-participants. With their personal experience developed during and after participating in exchange activities, participants can have either positive or negative views about the host country. The country which holds exchange programs expects that participants will hold a more positive view about its country. These participants, who may become important leaders in the future, will be more inclined to support the host country's policies. In this case, it can be said that exchanges as a part of public diplomacy contribute to the enhancement of its soft power.

⁸⁴ Scott-Smith, *Network of Empire: The US State Department's Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France and Britain 1950-70*, p.25

CHAPTER 2: JAPAN'S SOFT POWER AND ITS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

I. JAPAN'S SOFT POWER

1. Overview of Japan's soft power

According to Yasushi and McConnell, Japan was the first country in East Asia to embrace the concept of soft power as an instrument of its foreign affairs and security policy, particularly because of its constitutional constraints on the use of military hard power⁸⁵. Nye asserted that Japan has more potential soft power resources than any other Asian countries and is the first non-Western countries, which has the same level of income and technology as the Western countries, while keeps its unique culture⁸⁶. These statements can be effectively supported by the following facts and figures. According to annual surveys by the Monocle Magazine, Japan has always been listed in of Top 10 nations with soft power (ranked 7th in 2012⁸⁷) and currently Japan acquires one of the leading positions in terms of nation branding (ranked 3rd in the 2012-2013 Top 25 Country Brands)⁸⁸.

However, Japan still faces a number of obstacles in maintaining and enhancing its soft power. First of all, because of constitutional restriction (as stated in Article 9 in Japan's constitution which prohibits Japan to wage war), Japan has no other option than resorting to the expansion of its soft power. Therefore, as noted by Utpal Vyas, Japan is experienced in using softer forms of power due to externally imposed constitutional restrictions on its use of military force in international affairs⁸⁹. Simply put, while hard power is restricted, soft power plays a crucial role in Japan's national power. However, according to Lam, there are several limits of Japan's soft power including historical constraints, lack of CNN or BBC-like institution or its unpopular language⁹⁰. Historical constraints include historical issues during the previous war (the well-known case is wartime comfort women mainly from the Philippines, Republic of Korea, China and Taiwan) and recent disputes (for example, the visit of Prime Minister Koizumi to Yasukuni Shrine or the history textbook). Another limit of Japan's soft power is that the country is still distrusted by many East Asian states and involved in territorial and resources disputes with China and South Korea over the Senkaku

⁸⁵ Yasushi and McConnell, *Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States*

⁸⁶ Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*

⁸⁷ 'Top Ten Nations with Soft Power'

⁸⁸ 'Country Brand Index 2012-2013', p.4

⁸⁹ Vyas, 'Japan Foundation in China: An Agent of Japan soft power?'

⁹⁰ Lam, 'Japan's Quest for "Soft Power": Attraction and Limitation', p.358.

(Diaoyu in Chinese) and Takeshima (Tok-do in Korean) islands respectively⁹¹. Therefore, while the factors like the establishment of universal institutions or the popularization of Japanese language to the world take time or seem to be difficult, there is an urgent need for Japan to settle historical issues with its neighboring countries; otherwise, Japan cannot exert its soft power efficiently in these countries.

2. What Makes Japan's Soft Power

2.1. Japan's Culture

Japanese culture, including both traditional and popular culture has been increasingly popular around the world. As Lee and Melissen put it, "Japan's cultural attraction, both for the distinctive elements of Japan's ancient culture and modern culture has been the most distinguishing part of its soft power"⁹². Gilbert Rozman suggested that the high degree of Japan's soft power derives from the charm of her affluent and free society, and the appeal of her traditional as well as contemporary culture⁹³. One example of traditional culture which embraces a great attraction not only to Japanese people but also people around the world is Haiku, a short and special form of Japanese poetry. With a history of over 400 years, since the end of the 19th century, Haiku has been introduced to the rest of the world. To date, Haiku has been developed in over 50 countries around the globe with about 2 million people writing Haiku poems in 30 different languages⁹⁴. Great attraction can also be found in Japanese contemporary or pop culture in various forms such as popular films, television program, manga, music or video games. Japanese government also acknowledged that culture is an important field within the diplomacy of Japan, and its role has become more and more important in recent years⁹⁵. Moreover, with the assistance of technological advancements including the internet, international community has been familiar with and become fond of Japan's cultural products such as J-pop, Japan's television dramas, video games, anime and manga. For example, if asked about Japanese cuisine, most will produce the same answer "sushi". A long queue of international students waiting for being served at the sushi kiosk at Victoria University of Wellington reveals the attraction of Japanese cuisine. Apart from

⁹¹ Hook, *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics, and Security*

⁹² Lee and Melissen, *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia*

⁹³ Rozman, *Japanese strategic thought toward Asia*

⁹⁴ Nguyen, 'The Spreading of Haiku Poem to the Western Countries', p.57.

⁹⁵ 'Culture Exchange'

exporting cultural products, Japan has organized various cultural activities to promote its culture and values. For example, with the establishment and development of Japan Foundation all over the world, Japan aims to provide Japanese language training, art performance and Japan study to people around the globe. In addition, various activities and events are held around the world to celebrate and follow Japan pop culture such as cosplay, origami paper crafts, etc... Japan Cool, the concept about the attraction of Japan's pop culture has become the unique "brand name" of Japan culture. Utpal Vyas noted that the Japan Foundation, as a cultural agency of the Japanese government, was expected to enable the process of enabling Japan's ideas and values to be accepted and integrated by foreign publics through a range of cultural activities. If this process is successful, the Foundation can be considered to be an agent of Japan's soft power. Furthermore, in Otmazgin's analysis, Japan's cultural policy and cultural diplomacy has changed dramatically over the past one hundred years, from actively introducing and imposing Japanese culture during its empire-building period, to essentially avoiding the promotion of Japanese culture in Asia for most of the postwar period, and more recently, to supporting and encouraging the export of Japanese contemporary culture and lifestyle in order to obtain "soft power"⁹⁶. Therefore, it is undeniable that culture has served as an important element which helps enhance Japan's soft power as well as its national power.

2.2. Japan's Political Values

"Japan has long been characterized as a largely conservative, group-based society where the individual's freedom of thought and expression is positioned secondary to group obligations"⁹⁷. This culture has exerted a profound impact on Japanese political behavior and values. The concepts of uniformity, homogeneity and hierarchy⁹⁸ are often mentioned in Japanese traditional political values. Moreover, Japan's key political values can be clearly seen its present constitution with the desire and commitment for peace. As stated in the article 9, "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes". And the preamble of the constitution clearly states the importance of Peace, Human Rights and Human Security. Regarding human security, Japan takes into account both the elements of freedom from fear

⁹⁶ Otmazgin, 'Geopolitics and Soft Power: Japan's Cultural Diplomacy in Asia', pp.37-61

⁹⁷ Payne, 'Burying the Past: Nihonjinron and the Representation of Japanese Society in Tamil', pp.13-20

⁹⁸ Payne, 'Burying the Past: Nihonjinron and the Representation of Japanese Society in Tamil', pp.13-20

and freedom from want⁹⁹. Japan is also the founder and the main donor of the UN Trust Fund for Human Security¹⁰⁰. As a matter of fact, Japan does not have any universal political values to export to other countries (like the case of the United States or the United Kingdom with democracy or human rights). Moreover, despite strongly supporting liberal and democratic values, the Japanese government has not effectively utilized political ideology in its international relations¹⁰¹. Therefore, political values are not and cannot be an important instrument of Japan's soft power (the most important one should be its culture, as analyzed above).

2.3. Japan's Foreign Policy

Since the end of World War II, maintaining a close relationship with the United States has been a foundation of Japan's foreign policy. The two countries signed the Security Treaty in 1951. Since then the treaty has experienced several times of revision and renewal; and the Japan – US relations have been increasingly close. Japan has benefited much from this treaty. The most significant one is to focus foreign policy on economic development. Another benefit which is closely related to a source of Japan's soft power is to attract other US allies. Apart from the security treaty with the United States, ODA policy is also of great importance in Japan's foreign policy. Official Development Aid (in the form of grants and loan aid) from Japan prioritizes economic development, economic interdependence and political stability¹⁰². Since the late 1970s Japanese government has provided a great amount of ODA to underdeveloped countries with the aim of expanding its international influence¹⁰³. To date, Japan is among the largest aid donors in the world. Furthermore, Japan has realized the significance of its culture as a source of soft power for Japan. As a result, Japan has strived to strengthen its public diplomacy. For example, Japan's Foreign Ministry appointed the popular cartoon character Doraemon as the nation's first 'anime ambassador' as part of the effort to spread Japanese culture.

⁹⁹ Human security integrates three freedoms: freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom from indignity. Freedom from fear refers to protecting people from threats of conflicts, violence and crime. It is closely related to the aspiration for peace. Freedom from want means the satisfaction of basic needs and other economical, social and environmental aspects of life. This freedom is the desire for development. And freedom from indignity indicates the improvement of the quality of life. This freedom can be referred to human rights. (see 'What is Human Security?').

¹⁰⁰ 'What is Human Security?'

¹⁰¹ Hook, *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics, and Security*, p.183

¹⁰² Hook, *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics, and Security*, p.183

¹⁰³ Lee and Melissen, *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia*.

In sum, despite facing several limitations, with impressive resources, Japan has a great potential to develop its soft power. The Japanese government has realized the significant role of soft power and has conducted various policies to maximize it. It is undoubtedly that the most important pillar of Japan's soft power is culture. Cultural diplomacy as well as public diplomacy has included cultural aspects of Japan in its activities, effectively contributing to the expansion of Japanese culture to the outside world. However, in East Asia while much has been written and talked about Chinese soft power and public diplomacy, it seems that academic discourse has not adequately concentrated on analyzing public diplomacy in Japan. Japan is quite late in realizing the significance of public diplomacy (it was officially adopted by Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2004 with the establishment of the division of Public Diplomacy¹⁰⁴). However, public diplomacy is an important tool to enhance Japanese soft power. Therefore, a brief insight into Japan's public diplomacy is crucial to fully understand how it could contribute to expanding Japan's soft power.

II. JAPAN'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

1. Overview of Japan's Public Diplomacy

As mentioned above, public diplomacy is a relatively new concept in Japan. However, as Mitsuru Kitano analyzed, "the origin of Japan's public diplomacy in the sense of striving to improve Japan's national image abroad dates back to peace treaty negotiations following the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905, when Japan and Russia each made every effort to attract U.S. public support"¹⁰⁵). This means that public diplomacy has recently been officially adopted by Japanese government. However, it was actually used by Japanese leaders centuries ago.

Japan has been devoted more efforts to utilizing public diplomacy. As defined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, public diplomacy aims at fulfilling several important functions. First of all, it should assist the dissemination of international situation and diplomatic policies in Japan. Furthermore, it is expected to inform foreign publics of Japan's domestic situation as well as its diplomatic and foreign policies. The next function concerns the implementation of international agreements to promote cultural exchange. Additionally, public diplomacy should promote cooperation between Japan with international cultural

¹⁰⁴ Mori, 'Japan's Public Diplomacy and Regional Integration in East Asia: Using Japan's Soft Power', p.37

¹⁰⁵ Kitano, 'What is Public Diplomacy?', pp. 14-16

organizations. And, last but not least, public diplomacy helps present Japanese culture abroad and promote cultural exchanges with foreign countries¹⁰⁶.

With these functions, the Japanese government expects that public diplomacy could help exert positive influence on the understanding of foreign people about Japan. Cultural diplomacy can be said to be the first and the most important element of Japan's public diplomacy. Pop-culture, in addition to traditional culture and art serve as primary tools for cultural diplomacy¹⁰⁷. As an illustration, "the International MANGA Award" was created in 2007 upon the initiative of then-Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Taro Aso with the aim of awarding MANGA creators who contribute to the spread of MANGA culture overseas. Apart for cultural exchange, Japanese government has utilized various tools of public diplomacy. According to Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's public diplomacy's activities fall into six categories which include (1) public relations abroad, (2) dispatches from Japan, (3) cultural exchange, (4) people-to-people exchange, (5) cooperation with international cultural organizations and (6) cultural grant assistance¹⁰⁸. Serving as important tools of Japan's public diplomacy, contributing to the enhancement of its soft power, the first four categories which are the important tools of Japan's public diplomacy will be analyzed in the following section.

2. Tools of Japan's Public Diplomacy

2.1. Public Relations Abroad

As a component of public diplomacy in Japan, public relations play an important role in Japan foreign policy. The Diplomatic Bluebook suggested that an understanding and a positive view of Japan and Japan's foreign policy by foreign people are essential elements in Japan's foreign policy¹⁰⁹. Therefore, Government of Japan set up a special division to manage public relations called the Public Relations Office of the Government of Japan. The major function of this office is to introduce the Japan's cutting-edge solutions to various global issues rooted in Japan's traditions and experiences¹¹⁰.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, public relations in Japan involves providing foreign people with information about Japan's foreign policy as well as

¹⁰⁶ 'About the Ministry'

¹⁰⁷ 'About the Ministry'

¹⁰⁸ 'Information and Culture'

¹⁰⁹ 'Japan Diplomatic Bluebook 2012', p.46

¹¹⁰ 'Public relations Office of Government of Japan'

Japan's politics, economy, society, and culture. The main focus of public relations is to shape a positive view of Japan by foreign publics. The dissemination of information about Japan can be done through publications about Japan; speeches delivered by Japanese diplomats; appearances or articles in the local media; press release; organizing events to introduce Japan; invitation of foreign reporters to Japan; dispatch of Japanese delegates to international symposiums and conferences which can influence international public opinion; and supply of printed matter and audiovisual materials in foreign languages. For example, in a period of one month, Japan took a total of about 1,500 actions of international public relations in connection with the March 11 disaster. These included TV appearances, interviews, press releases, and messages from ambassadors¹¹¹. Another example of public relations activities regarding overseas events to introduce Japan was "Japan Night". On January 24, 2013 "Japan Night" was held as a side event at the Davos Conference in Switzerland. The event opened with the broadcast of a video message by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe himself, who addressed the participants in English¹¹². Moreover, Japanese Government has set up a website named Web Japan to provide general information about Japanese politics, economy, culture, etc for domestic and foreign people. Another measure of public relations relates to the conduct of surveys and opinion polls to implement effective overseas public relations. Opinion polls on Japan image in selected countries have been conducted almost every year since 1960¹¹³. Furthermore, as part of the Japanese government's Visit Japan Campaign which is aimed at making Japan a tourism-oriented country, the Foreign Ministry encourages foreign travelers to come to Japan by publicizing the attractions of the country and supporting bids to host international meetings in Japan¹¹⁴.

2.2. Peace-keeping Efforts

Although war has been increasingly rare (the last major war in Asia happened over three decades ago), regional conflicts and internal wars still persist and even are on the increase. Take East Asia as an example. Territorial disputes over the South China Sea as well as over Diaoyu/Senkaku and Takeshima/Dokdo are among various current regional conflicts which should be urgently settled. Conflicts exert negative impact on the development and

¹¹¹ 'Japan Diplomatic Bluebook 2012', p.14.

¹¹² 'Public Relations Office of the Government of Japan'

¹¹³ 'Opinion Poll: 2012 U.S. Image of Japan'

¹¹⁴ 'Public Relations Abroad'

prosperity of not only the concerned parties but also the outside world. Therefore, peacekeeping is an important duty of not only related parties but also others. According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan must play a responsible role in the international community as a "Peace Fostering Nation"¹¹⁵. Japan's peace-building efforts consist of the three major pillars. The first pillar is engagement on the ground. In 1992, Japan ratified the International Peace Cooperation Law with a legal framework for comprehensive cooperation to promote international peace and security with the United Nations playing the central role. Since then Japan Self-Defense Forces and civilian personnel has participated in peacekeeping operations in needed areas such as Cambodia, Mozambique or South Sudan. Apart from peace-keeping, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) also conducted public diplomacy as a part of their operation. For example, the JSDF in Samawa, Iraq "earned the trust of many of the local Iraqi people by showing to them their diligence, discipline, readiness, and high morale as well as their goodwill, humility, and friendliness"¹¹⁶. The second pillar of Japan's peace-keeping efforts is intellectual contributions. The contribution may concern the formulation of strategies in conflict prevention to reconstruction. Human resource development is the third pillar of Japan's peace-keeping efforts. Japan began the Pilot Program for Human Resource Development in Asia for Peace-building in 2007 with the objective of training civilians from Japan and other Asian countries¹¹⁷.

2.3. Cultural Exchange

Culture serves as an important factor in Japan's public diplomacy. Cultural exchange, defined by Kazuo Ogoura as cultural activities undertaken not as a political means to bolster a nation's image (cultural diplomacy) but for the purpose of mutual inspiration through international exchange¹¹⁸. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe described politics and economy as the two "wheels" to speed up bilateral ties, and culture as the bond. Therefore, people should learn about the culture of others¹¹⁹. Like overseas public relations, cultural exchange can be an efficient tool to create an accurate understanding and positive view of

¹¹⁵ 'Dispatches from Japan'

¹¹⁶ Naoyuki, 'Japan Does Soft Power: Strategy and Effectiveness of Its Public Diplomacy in the United States', p.236

¹¹⁷ Naoyuki, 'Japan Does Soft Power: Strategy and Effectiveness of Its Public Diplomacy in the United States', p.236

¹¹⁸ Ogoura, 'Japan's Cultural Diplomacy, Past and Present', p.44

¹¹⁹ 'Wen, Abe Attend Opening Ceremony of Sino-Japan Culture and Sports Exchange Year'

foreign governments and foreign citizens about Japan. A favorable image of Japan perceived by the outside world is certainly much better for the implementation of its diplomatic policies than the unfavorable one. With this awareness in mind, Japanese government has made every effort to introduce the attraction of Japanese culture to the world. The Government has started a wide range of initiatives including cultural exchange and cooperation as well as supporting the international exchange activities of private entities¹²⁰. One prominent initiative in cultural exchange is the "Anime Ambassador" project which concentrates on introducing and attracting the interest of foreign people in Japan through Anime¹²¹. In 2008, Doreamon (the robotic cat) was chosen as the Anime Ambassador of Japan. This initiative can also be categorized as pop-culture diplomacy. Apart from pop-culture diplomacy, Japan's cultural exchange may be in form of Japanese language education. As Lam pointed out, one of the limits of Japan's soft power is the lack of a popular language¹²² like English or French. Therefore, Japanese Government is expecting and trying to "internationalize" its language. Through the Japan Foundation, Japan is dispatching Japanese language education specialists overseas, training within Japan overseas Japanese instructors and students, donating and developing Japanese language education materials and holding Japanese speech contests at overseas diplomatic establishments¹²³. Japanese studies and intellectual exchange are other forms of Japan's cultural exchange. The Japanese Government is supporting research overseas related to the politics, economy, society and culture of Japan. Furthermore, Japan is planning, executing and supporting projects concerning cooperative work or exchange with other countries, for the purpose of promoting the intellectual contribution and communication by Japan towards world development and stability¹²⁴.

2.4. People-to-people Exchange

"People believe their own eyes and ears, and what they have observed will help change stereotyped thinking... People-to-people or non-governmental exchanges are sometimes more effective than publicity programs"¹²⁵. Therefore, people-to-people exchange plays an important role in not only bolstering mutual understanding but also in shaping a more

¹²⁰ 'Cultural Exchange'

¹²¹ 'Cultural Exchange'

¹²² Lam, 'Japan's Quest for "Soft Power": Attraction and Limitation', p.358

¹²³ 'Cultural Exchange'

¹²⁴ 'Cultural Exchange'

¹²⁵ 'People-to-People Exchange Important to Sino-US Ties'

positive view of foreign people towards others. Japanese leaders have also acknowledged the importance of people-to-people exchange in strengthening relations between Japan and other countries. For example, in his speech in Singapore, the final stop of his visits to ASEAN countries in 2002, the then Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi emphasized that “Cooperation is working in common purpose with others in order to accomplish more []This cooperation requires an exchange of ideas, opinions and people”¹²⁶. As a result, Japanese government has promoted people-to-people exchange in various forms encompassing student exchange program, youth exchange and sport exchange¹²⁷.

Regarding student exchange program, as Nye pointed out, universities and other non-state actors can “develop soft power of their own that may reinforce or be at odds with official foreign goals”¹²⁸. Therefore, there is a close connection between student exchange and the reinforcement of soft power. More specifically, as noted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, student exchange helps promote friendship and goodwill with other countries and gain their understanding toward Japan. From that perspective, Japan promotes student exchange programs with various countries, welcoming young people from around the world to study in Japan¹²⁹. For example, there are a considerable number of Japanese students studying in the United States. In 2011-2012, 19,900 Japanese students were enrolled in American colleges and universities¹³⁰. And as of May 1, 2012, there are 137,756 international students in Japan¹³¹. The Government of Japan is promoting the “Plan to accept 300,000 international students”¹³², an initiative aimed at doubling the current number of international students by 2020.

Youth exchange is another form of people-to-people exchange conducted by Japan as a tool of public diplomacy. The youth is usually considered as a country’s future; therefore, they should be paid due attention in any government policy including public diplomacy. The youth participating in exchange programs can become the bridge of friendship between the host country and their home country. Therefore, with the aim of influencing young people in

¹²⁶ ‘Speech by Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi, Japan and ASEAN in East Asia -A Sincere and Open Partnership’

¹²⁷ ‘People-to-People Exchange’

¹²⁸ Nye, *Soft power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p.17

¹²⁹ ‘People-to-People Exchange’

¹³⁰ ‘Students staying in Japan’

¹³¹ ‘International Students in Japan in 2012’

¹³² ‘People-to-People Exchange’

other countries to develop a positive view of Japan, Japan has initiated numerous youth exchange programs. One example of such program is the JET (Japan and Teaching Program). This program is co-organized by Ministries of Japan and local governments. Young people around the world are invited to teach languages, sports, etc in junior-high and high schools in Japan or to work in local governments in order to foster international exchange in local communities¹³³. Another example, which is more specific to mention here is the Global Youth Exchange Program (GYE). The Program was initiated in 1995 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. It targets young people around the world who will exchange views on global issues¹³⁴. The program aims to foster mutual understanding about Japan and the outside world. The JENESYS 2.0 (Japan-East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youths) incorporates both student and youth exchange in one program. It serves as a key platform for youth exchange between ASEAN and Japan. The program was announced by Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe during his visit to Indonesia in January 2013. Approximately 30,000 youths from Asia/Oceania region including 10,000 youths from ASEAN countries, will have an opportunity to visit Japan in 2013¹³⁵. The original program was successfully conducted in 2007 – 2012, bringing more than 13,500 ASEAN youth who were university students to Japan¹³⁶. Another example is the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program (SSEAYP), which will be used later in this dissertation as a case-study. Ever since the first program in 1974, annually, the program annually brings together about 300 youths from ten countries of Southeast Asia and Japan to foster friendship among participants as well as to enhance international understanding about Japan and related countries.

Sports, as a part of culture, can be an important source of soft power. For example, Nye noted that popular sports can play an important role in communicating American values¹³⁷. The European Sports Charter 1992 stated that “sports reinforce the bonds between peoples”¹³⁸. Japan has introduced its traditional sports such as Judo, Kendo and Karate to the outside world. Many of its traditional sports have been used in international and regional sports games. Moreover, Japan also supports activities to host large scale international sport

¹³³ ‘Youth Exchange: JET Program’

¹³⁴ ‘Global Youth Exchange (GYE) Program’

¹³⁵ ‘Commencement of JENESYS 2.0 for ASEAN’

¹³⁶ ‘ASEAN Youth Meet Japan Prime Minister’

¹³⁷ Nye, *Soft power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, p.47

¹³⁸ Manzenreiter, ‘The Soft Power of Sports in Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy’, p.2

games such as the Olympic Games and the Soccer World Cup¹³⁹. The country has also developed sports exchange, especially in football, with regional counterparts in such activities as the ASEAN – Japan Exchange Year 2003, the Japan – Korea Friendship Year 2005¹⁴⁰ or the Asian Cup which is held every four years.

In short, with regard to soft power, Japan benefits from impressive resources, especially its culture. Moreover, as a tool to enhance its soft power, Japan utilized various areas in its public diplomacy. As public diplomacy is closely related to foreign policy, especially a country's national interests in another country, in order to examine Japan's public diplomacy in Vietnam, an analysis of Japan's foreign policy toward this country is definitely necessary.

¹³⁹ 'Sport Exchange'

¹⁴⁰ Manzenreiter, 'The Soft Power of Sports in Japan's Cultural Diplomacy', p.5

CHAPTER 3: JAPAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM

Chapter 1 is devoted to analyze the analytical framework soft power, the non-material form of power, and public diplomacy; in which public diplomacy is considered as one of the tools to enhance a country's soft power. In chapter 2, Japan is used as an empirical work with an analysis of the dimensions of its soft power and public diplomacy strategy.

This chapter reviews Japan – Vietnam relations and analyzes how Japan has adopted its foreign policy in Vietnam to serve its national interests in the country.

I. SOUTHEAST ASIA IN JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY: RESPONDING TO WH-QUESTIONS

1. WHY Southeast Asia?

Southeast Asia is a part of Asia which is at the crossroad of Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean. It comprises of countries which are geographically south of China, east of India and north of Australia. This region is rich in forest and natural resources ranging from oil to a variety of minerals. Southeast Asia has become one of the major centres of the world not only in political and cultural realms but in the economic domain as well. It is also one of the most dynamically developing regions in the world. For example, in 2012, the whole ASEAN region registered economic growth of 5.7%. In 2011, ASEAN's gross domestic product accounted for 3.1% of global GDP, about six times the share in 1990¹⁴¹.

As an important region, Southeast Asia has generated strong motivations for Japan to build up relations both with the region as a whole and with regional countries. First of all, economically, South East Asia is a strategic region because Japan is far too dependent on the region both as providers of natural resources and export markets for its products. Moreover, as a potential market with low labor costs, Southeast Asia is certainly an attractive destination for Japanese investors. Geographically, Southeast Asia holds key positions for traffic linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans, such as the Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea, and is an important region for Japan¹⁴². Moreover, locating at the heart of Asia, the prosperity of ASEAN is of great importance to the stability and development of other regions. Politically, ASEAN is also the place where major powers compete for influence. With the rise of China,

¹⁴¹ 'Speech by H.E. Mr. Fumio Kishida, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, at the 19th International Conference on "The Future of Asia"'

¹⁴² 'Japan Defense White Paper 2012', p.59

Japan has no other option than tightening its relations with this region. Moreover, Japan also definitely needs support from ten ASEAN countries for its quest for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. And last but not least, Japan enjoys favorable conditions to foster relations with Southeast Asian countries. Consequently, Japan has played an active political role in Southeast Asia; and surprisingly, this role is even larger than in the country's Northeast Asia neighborhood. Part of the explanation may be, compared to Northeast Asia, Japan relations with Southeast Asia suffer less historical constraints and no territorial disputes¹⁴³. To be more specific, according to Lam, there are still some unresolved war-related and territorial issues between Japan and its Northeast counterparts including China, South Korea and North Korea. For example, the issue of comfort women¹⁴⁴ still serves as a hindrance in the relations between Japan and these three countries despite Japanese huge efforts to settle. (Japanese government formally apologized in 1993 to these comfort women and in 1995 to nations that suffered from Japanese aggression during the war¹⁴⁵). In South Korea, from 1992 until 2011, there were one thousand weekly protests in front of Japanese Embassy in Seoul by former comfort women and their supporters¹⁴⁶, requesting a proper apology from Japanese government. Moreover, the territorial disputes over Senkaku/Diaoyu and Takeshima/Dokdo between Japan and China and South Korea have constituted serious impediments to relations between these states in political as well as economic domains. On the contrary, because of the much shorter period of Japanese occupation, the war-related issues of Japan in Southeast Asia are minimal compared to those in Northeast Asia. Moreover, there are no territorial disputes between Japan and Southeast Asian states. Another consideration is that in response to a rising China perceived by outsiders, especially regional countries as a threat, Japan happens to be a more reliable partner. As a result, Southeast Asia countries are more open to Japan's diplomatic initiatives, especially if these are also to their advantage¹⁴⁷.

In short, Southeast Asia is an important region in the international arena in terms of economic, political and other realms. The region also plays an important role in Japan's

¹⁴³ Lam, 'Japan's Quest for "Soft Power": Attraction and Limitation'

¹⁴⁴ The term "comfort women" is a euphemism for women who were forced into prostitution to serve Japanese soldiers during WWII. Most of them were from China, South Korea, Japan and the Philippines, but some were also from Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Taiwan (see <http://www.tealeafnation.com>)

¹⁴⁵ Frackler, 'Japan Says It will Abide by Apologies over Actions in World War II'

¹⁴⁶ Nakano, 'Comfort Women Hold 1000th Protest against Japan'

¹⁴⁷ Lam, 'Japan-Southeast Asia Relations: Trading Places? The Leading Goose & Ascending Dragon'

foreign policy as Japan definitely needs it both economically and politically. As a result, depending on each period of historical development, Japan would formulate a proper foreign policy to foster its relations with Southeast Asian countries.

2. WHAT Policy?

The conventional wisdom is that Japanese foreign policy “is generally passive, reactive, and driven primarily by economics” and relations with the United States¹⁴⁸. However, in fact, Japan has been very active in strengthening its diplomatic relations with Southeast Asia. Japan’s Southeast Asia foreign policy was first introduced in the early Meiji period (1868-1912) with its ambition to dominate Asia by its pre-eminent economic and military might¹⁴⁹. During the World War II, the Japan planned to annex territories throughout Southeast Asia was aimed at building a more powerful East Asia. However Japan could not materialize this plan because of its defeat in the war. After the World War II, with the signing of the Japan – US Security Treaty, Japan’s foreign policy in general and Japan’s Southeast Asia foreign policy in particular depended largely on the United States. With the San Francisco Peace Treaty Japan carried out payment of reparations (or economic diplomacy) to countries including those in Southeast Asia that suffered during the war¹⁵⁰. The period of 1976 and 1991 witnessed an impressive development in Japan – Southeast Asia relations, especially with the proclamation of the Fukuda Doctrine in 1977, “the blueprint of Japan’s foreign policy towards Southeast Asia”, “postwar Japan’s first codification of its foreign policy principles towards Southeast Asia¹⁵¹”. The doctrine consisted of three key points: rejection of the role of a military power, promotion of the relationship of mutual confidence and trust (“heart-to-heart” diplomacy), and equal partnership with ASEAN for building peace and prosperity throughout Southeast Asia¹⁵². During the Cold War, although there were some impediments for Japan to fulfill its commitments in the Doctrine, especially the Cambodia issue,¹⁵³ Japan mainly did “translate” the Doctrine into action. With heart-to-heart

¹⁴⁸ Lam, ‘Japan-Southeast Asia Relations: Trading Places? The Leading Goose & Ascending Dragon’

¹⁴⁹ Lam, ‘Japan-Southeast Asia Relations: Trading Places? The Leading Goose & Ascending Dragon’

¹⁵⁰ ‘Historical Issues Q&A’

¹⁵¹ Lam, *Japan’s Relations with Southeast Asia: The Fudaka Doctrine and Beyond*

¹⁵² Chachavalpongpon, ‘A United Community in a Divided Region: Southeast Asia, Japan, China, and East Asian Community’, pp. 97-126

¹⁵³ When Vietnam intervened into Cambodia in 1978, Japan supported other ASEAN states alongside the US and China against Vietnam and its ally, the Soviet Union. (See Lam, *Japan’s Relations with Southeast Asia: The Fudaka Doctrine and Beyond*)

relationship, Japan became the largest donor of ODA to developing ASEAN states. And there was no direct military intervention by Japan into the region. As a direct consequence of the Fukuda Doctrine, Japan's relations with ASEAN improved dramatically, and many of these nations not just received Japan's official development aid but also saw an exponential rise in Japanese private investment, which in turn boosted trade of these nations with Japan and elsewhere¹⁵⁴. In the post-Cold War era, Japan continued to fulfill its commitments in the Fukuda Doctrine by playing an active role in Southeast Asia. Following its resumption of ODA to Vietnam in 1992, Japan's Southeast Asia foreign policy developed to a new height. In 1997, during his ASEAN's trip, the then Prime Minister Hashimoto stressed the importance of widening the relationship of Japan and ASEAN. He maintained that the relationship should not be limited to economic and trade, but should also include other fields such as cultural exchange, etc. He also proposed a more frequent dialogue at the summit level¹⁵⁵. With some new development in Japan's foreign policy towards Southeast Asia, what Hashimoto mentioned above was sometimes referred as "Hashimoto Doctrine". Five years later, in January 2002, in his keynote speech entitled "Japan and ASEAN in East Asia" in the framework of the ASEAN trip, the then Prime Minister Koizumi called for closer economic and security ties between Japan and Southeast Asian countries. He proposed an Initiative for Japan – ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership which would expand ties from traditional areas of trade and investment to areas such as science and technology, human resource development and tourism¹⁵⁶. That was all about the so-called Koizumi Doctrine. Japan's Southeast Asia foreign policy was "upgraded" to another level with the new "Fukuda Doctrine" developed by Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda (son of Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda) in his speech entitled "Toward the Day When the Pacific Ocean Becomes an Inland Sea in 2008. Japan promised to support ASEAN's effort to create a single integrated market by 2015 because the creation of such a market demands the eradication of gaps within the ASEAN region and the development of the Mekong River region¹⁵⁷. And recently, in early 2013, during his visit to Southeast Asia, the newly re-elected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe affirmed that relations with ASEAN form "a supremely vital linchpin" for Japan's diplomatic strategy

¹⁵⁴ Jain, 'Koizumi's ASEAN Doctrine'

¹⁵⁵ 'Press Conference by the Press Secretary 21 January 1997'

¹⁵⁶ Lam, 'Japan – Southeast Asia Relations. Trading Place? The Leading Goose and Ascending Dragon'

¹⁵⁷ 'Mr. Fukuda's Vision's

and spoke about five new principles for Japanese diplomacy which can be referred as Japan's ASEAN diplomacy¹⁵⁸. With these principles, Japan's foreign policy toward Southeast Asia has been developed in various dimensions. Traditionally, Japan's relations with Southeast Asia mainly focused on the triad of trade, investment and aid, which has been so far very successful¹⁵⁹. Now Japan attaches greater importance to other tools such as cultural exchange and people-to-people exchange (with special attention to youth exchange). Among five principles, there are two principles related to fostering people to people exchange between Japan and Southeast Asia. One is about "bringing ever more fruitful intercultural ties among peoples of Japan and this region". And the other is about "promoting exchange among younger generations who will carry our nations into the future"¹⁶⁰. Moreover, Japan Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida further affirmed the significance of people-to-people exchange in Japan's foreign policy toward Southeast Asia when he maintained that "deeper mutual understanding and relationships of trust are fostered by reciprocal visits to each other's countries, tasting local specialties and gaining hands-on experiences of diverse and rich cultures"¹⁶¹.

In brief, there has been significant development in Japan's foreign policy toward Southeast Asia from the "blueprint" Fukuda Doctrine to Hashimoto, Koizumi and Abe. Japan's relations with the region are not limited to economic and political realms. The relations are increasingly expanded to other fields such as security, culture and exchange.

II. VIETNAM IN JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

1. Overview of Vietnam

Shaped like an elongated S, Vietnam stretches the length of the Indochinese Peninsula covering a surface area of 128,000 square miles with China in the north, Laos and Cambodia in the west, and the South China Sea in the east. The total population in Vietnam was last recorded at approximately 90 million according to the General Statistics of Vietnam 2012, which ranked the third in Southeast Asia and the 14th in the list of the most populous nations in the world¹⁶². Since the adoption of Doi Moi (reform) policy in 1986, Vietnam has

¹⁵⁸ 'Shiraishi Takashi Abe's Visit to Southeast Asia and Japan's Five New Diplomatic Principles'

¹⁵⁹ Sudo, 'Japan and Southeast Asia in the Post-Cambodian Conflict Era', pp. 59-69

¹⁶⁰ 'The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japan Diplomacy'

¹⁶¹ 'Speech by H.E. Mr. Fumio Kishida, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, at the 19th International Conference on "The Future of Asia" At the Imperial Hotel, Tokyo'

¹⁶² 'Population 2012 Country Ranks'

experienced rapid and impressive social and economic development. Vietnam has become a low-middle income country with GDP per capita over 1,200 USD in 2011¹⁶³. Vietnam has joined more than 70 regional and international institutions/regimes including the most prominent ones such as United Nations, World Trade Organization, ASEAN, APEC, etc. It has established diplomatic relations with 179 out of 193 United Nations member countries and developed eco-trade ties with 230 out of 255 countries-territories in the world. To date it has upgraded to strategic partnership with 9 countries including Russia, Japan, India, China, South Korea Spain, the UK, Germany and Indonesia.

The role and status of Vietnam in the regional and international arena has been considerably improved, especially in the front of multilateral diplomacy. It fulfilled the role of a non-permanent member and one-month chairman twice of the United Nations Security Council (2008-9). Moreover, it successfully assumed the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2010 under the theme “ASEAN community: from vision to action”. At present, Vietnam is assuming the first ever Vietnamese Secretary General of ASEAN (2013-2017). The country is lobbying for hosting APEC Summit in 2018, UNHRC (2014-2016), UNSC (2020-2021), ECOSOC (2016-2018). It is negotiating to participate in the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) as well as to join Free Trade Agreement with European Union and the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union¹⁶⁴.

Shortly, Vietnam is a country with increasingly economic and political role in the region and the world. As a dynamically emerging economy, Vietnam is certainly attracting the outside world as both a potential import market and an attractive destination for foreign investment. Moreover, an increasingly active and positive participation in the regional and world affairs has consolidated and enhanced the political status of Vietnam, enabling it to be an important partner in the foreign policy of many other countries including Japan.

2. Background of Japan – Vietnam relations

2.1. Early Periods

Early contacts between Vietnam and Japan date back to the Nara era (710-794) when Buttetsu, a Vietnamese Buddhist monk traveled to Japan by sea in 736 to introduce Mahayana Buddhism. During this time, in 753 Nakamaro Abe, a scholar studying in China, was said to

¹⁶³ ‘World Bank Data’

¹⁶⁴ Vu, ‘Vietnam Foreign Policy since 1986’

be the first Japanese to set foot in Vietnam as a governor to mediate between disputing ethnic minorities in the border between Vietnam and China¹⁶⁵. However, not until at least 15th or 16th century when Japanese commercial ships frequented Vietnam's harbors were Japan – Vietnam trade relations established. Over a century ago from 1905 to 1908 the so-called “Exodus to the East” (*“phong trao Dong Du”*) was initiated to send Vietnamese youths to Japan to study the Meiji Restoration¹⁶⁶.

2.2. Before and During Cold War

During World War II, Japan invaded and occupied Vietnam, a nation on the eastern edge of the Indochina Peninsula in Southeast Asia that had been under French administration since the late 19th century¹⁶⁷. Under the struggle of the Vietnamese army, Japan had to withdraw its forces in 1945. During the Vietnam War against the United States, many Japanese, especially left wingers and antiwar activists, protested against Japan's support for the US in the war. After the conclusion of the Paris accords¹⁶⁸ in January 1973, the Japanese started to think about “a huge international project in postwar Indochina”¹⁶⁹. As a result, Japan officially established diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) on September 21, 1973 with the expectation that it will contribute to the peace and stability of Indo-china¹⁷⁰. Two years later, Embassies were set up in the capital of each country. From this action, together with the huge difference in political systems between Japan and Vietnam as well as the complexity of the international situation, it can be viewed that Japan expressed its goodwill to establish and strengthen relations with Vietnam. With regard to the international situation, during the 1960s and 1970s other Southeast Asian countries, especially the founding members of ASEAN viewed Vietnam as a threat of

¹⁶⁵ Chu, (ed.), *Vietnam – Japan: Thirty years of friendship and Cooperation*, p.128

¹⁶⁶ The successful Meiji Restoration turned Japan into Asia's first industrialized nation, while Vietnam was a quasi-feudal, colonial country under the French rule. For many Vietnamese intellectuals then, Japan was a success story and a great example for Vietnam. (see Chu, (ed.), *Vietnam – Japan: Thirty years of friendship and Cooperation*, p.128)

¹⁶⁷ ‘Vietnam War’

¹⁶⁸ Paris Accords (or Paris Peace Accords) is a peace treaty signed by representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG), and the USA. They provided for the withdrawal of US troops and thus an end to direct US military involvement. In return, democratic elections were to be held in South Vietnam. Peace was enforced only in a final offensive of the People's Army, which led to the collapse of Nguyen's regime on 30 April 1975. (See www.oxfordreference.com)

¹⁶⁹ Shiraishi, *Japanese Relations with Vietnam: 1951-1987*

¹⁷⁰ ‘Japan Diplomatic Bluebook 1973’. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1973/1973-3-6.htm>

communist insurgency; and during the American war, most of them supported the United States against Vietnam; whereas Vietnam conceived that the real nature of ASEAN was to defend the interests of US neo-colonialism in Southeast Asia'¹⁷¹. Although Vietnam and the then ASEAN members had hostile perceptions towards each other, Japan decided to shake hands with Vietnam. The bilateral relations accelerated in a further step when in 1974, Japanese and Vietnamese politicians established the League for Japan-Vietnam Friendship to promote mutual understanding and friendship. The fall of Saigon in April 1975 further accelerated Japanese activism in Indochina. Japan attempted to gain influence in Vietnam through spending strategies, particularly through the disbursement of ODA. The two countries signed an agreement on Japan war reparations in the form of non-refundable aid worth 13.5 billion yen (approximately 49 billion US dollars). However, during the period of 1979 and 1990, due to Cambodian issues¹⁷², Japan discontinued its aid to Vietnam.

2.3. Post Cold War

The settlement of the Cambodian conflict was a necessary condition if Tokyo wished to improve relations with Vietnam and conduct active diplomacy in Indochina. The peace process paved the way for Tokyo's resumption of full-scale aid to Vietnam in 1992 for the first time in thirteen years¹⁷³. Since then the relationship between Vietnam and Japan has developed in various fields. A great milestone in the relations between two countries was the official visit by Vietnam Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung to Japan, opening a new phase of co-operation towards "strategic partnership between Vietnam and Japan for peace and prosperity in Asia". In 2007, for the first time in the history of the Japan – Vietnam relations, President of Vietnam visited Japan. In December 2008, the two countries signed Vietnam – Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (VJEPA). This is a comprehensive bilateral agreement that will boost trade liberalization of goods and services, economic cooperation and investment. The Japan – Vietnam Joint Statement announced by Prime Ministers of two countries in October 2011 on the actions under strategic partnership was another milestone

¹⁷¹ 'Vietnam – ASEAN Relations in Doi Moi's Foreign Policy', pp.171-214

¹⁷² When Vietnam came to Cambodia in January 1979, Japanese foreign policy makers hoped that the People's Army of Vietnam would soon withdraw. Moreover, while the Japanese government officially deferred the disbursement of promised FY 1979 aid to Vietnam, Tokyo postponed its decision to continue or to terminate aid until the Cambodian problem was solved. (See at Hirata, 'Cautious Proactivism and Reluctant Reactivism: Analyzing Japan's Foreign Policy toward Indochina')

¹⁷³ Hirata, 'Cautious Proactivism and Reluctant Reactivism: Analyzing Japan's Foreign Policy toward Indochina'

which demonstrated the two sides' further commitment to strengthening comprehensive cooperation, contributing to peace and stability in Asia¹⁷⁴. Recently, the visit by the newly re-elected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's in January 2013 (which was his first overseas trip after his election last year and second visit to Vietnam as the Japanese Prime Minister) marked a further step in Vietnam-Japan strategic partnership in politics, security and national defense. During this visit, the two Prime Ministers announced the opening of the 2013 Vietnam-Japan Friendship Year to celebrate the 40th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic ties¹⁷⁵. Together with the impressive development in political ties, economic cooperation between Vietnam and Japan has also been strengthened substantially. To date, Japan has become one of the major economic partners of Vietnam. Bilateral trade between Japan and Vietnam in 2010 reached 21 billion¹⁷⁶ and is expected to amount to 29 billion USD in 2013¹⁷⁷. Moreover, the country is currently the leading foreign investor in Vietnam with 1,900 projects, value at 31.84 billion US dollars¹⁷⁸. Japan is now the biggest foreign aid provider to Vietnam with an agreed amount of over \$2 billion in Official Development Assistance (ODA) in fiscal year 2012-2014¹⁷⁹.

Briefly, Japan – Vietnam relations have experienced numerous ups and downs ever since their early establishment. It can be said that the current period is the most developed one which witnesses remarkable improvement in various fields. This helps explain why Vietnam holds an important position in Japan's foreign policy, which will be discussed in the following section.

3. Vietnam in Japan's Foreign Policy: Responding to Wh-questions

3.1. WHY Vietnam?

Vietnam is a major power in Southeast Asia; and it is one of Japan's strategic partners for peace and prosperity in Asia¹⁸⁰. During his visit to Vietnam in January 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed that Vietnam was an important partner for Japan with

¹⁷⁴ 'Vietnam – Japan: Continuing to Strengthen Comprehensive Strategic Partnership'

¹⁷⁵ 'Vietnam – Japan Announce Friendship Year 2013'

¹⁷⁶ Kolapinto, 'Vietnam Key to Japan's Southeast Asia Policy'

¹⁷⁷ 'Vietnam – Japan Trade Expected to Reach 29 bn USD in 2013, up 16 percent'

¹⁷⁸ 'Vietnam – Japan Trade Expected to Reach 29 bn USD in 2013, up 16 percent'

¹⁷⁹ 'Japan Committed US\$2 billion ODA to Vietnam'

¹⁸⁰ 'Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Nations - The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)'

shared regional challenges and a mutually complementary economic relationship¹⁸¹. Furthermore, as analyzed earlier, Vietnam has been highly recognized both economically and politically by regional and global nations. With regard to economic perspective, GDP growth has averaged 7.2% in the last 20 years, which is among the highest rates in the whole of the global frontier and emerging Asian space¹⁸². Therefore, Vietnam is an attractive destination for Japanese investors as well as a potential markets for Japanese imports. It also serves as an important provider of resources for Japan. Moreover, Japan also needs Vietnam to serve its political goals in Southeast Asia as well as in Asia Pacific. Undoubtedly, Vietnam attracts enormous attraction from Japanese policy makers.

3.2. WHAT for?

As a matter of fact, the exact goals of Japan's relations with Vietnam as well as its foreign policy toward this country are of two categories: economic and political-security one. In other words, there are both economic and political-security motivations for Japan to foster relations with Vietnam. These two motivations or "goals" supplement each other. Sometimes economic tools serve as a "means" and political outcomes serve as an "end" and vice versa. For example, the provision of ODA to Vietnam (an economic tool) enables Japan to gain more support from Vietnam in the international affairs (a political outcome). And a good relationship between Japan and Vietnam (political tool) can boost trade between two countries (economic outcome).

3.2.1. Economic interests

Regarding economic interests, it can be said that the most significant impact of Japan's foreign policy toward Vietnam can be seen in the economic dimension. Put it another way, the ultimate goal of Japan in its relations with Vietnam is to serve its economic interests. Moreover, economic relations can serve as solid foundations for expanding relations in other fields as well as for increasing Japan's influence in Vietnam and in Southeast Asia region. On the Japan's side, there are a variety of beneficiaries from Japan's relations with Vietnam which range from Japanese businesses to Japanese consumers. However, in the long run it is the Japanese economy that benefits most.

¹⁸¹ 'Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's Visit to Vietnam (Overview)'

¹⁸² 'Vietnam FDI'

First of all, economic relations with Vietnam bring about a considerable source of supply and demand for Japanese economy. Supply here means that Vietnam acts an important provider of products that are in high demand by Japanese people such as leather and footwear products, farm produce, seafood and consumer goods. Moreover, according to Vu Tien Loc, Chair of the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI), a lot of Vietnamese export items to Japan are not the advantageous products of the country, most of which cannot be made in Japan or made at very high production costs¹⁸³. Therefore, Japan benefits greatly from importing Vietnamese products. This helps explain why Vietnamese products account for a considerable proportion of the total imports of Japan. For example, in 2012 Vietnam's garments reached a turnover of US\$1.97 billion, equal to 6.2 percent of the Japanese imports¹⁸⁴. Also in 2012, the total volume of Vietnam's exports reached US\$13billion¹⁸⁵. Figure 1 below reveals that Vietnam is among the four largest exporters from ASEAN to Japan in 2012, accounting for 12 percent of the total number.

Figure 1: Share of exports from ASEAN countries to Japan in 2012

(Source: Japanese Trade and Investment Statistics)

Moreover, due to the falling birth rate and the aging population, the labor force in Japan is expected to shrink in the long run. For example, in 1998, Japan's labor force recorded

¹⁸³ 'Japan's Economic Stimulus Package Brings High Hopes to Vietnamese'

¹⁸⁴ 'Japan's Economic Stimulus Package Brings High Hopes to Vietnamese'

¹⁸⁵ Van Du, 'Hang Viet Nam xuất khẩu sang Nhật sẽ được hưởng lợi' (Vietnam's exports to Japan will benefit)

a historical high of 67.93 million people. However, the number dropped to 62.61 million in 2011¹⁸⁶. Therefore, Japan is in need of a large quantity of foreign workers, especially in the aftermath of the disastrous earthquake and tsunami in March 2011. Against this background, human resources from Vietnam can serve as an important supply of labor to Japan. However, out of about 700,000 foreign workers in Japan¹⁸⁷, Vietnam now has 20,000 workers and apprentices in this country¹⁸⁸, accounting for just about 3 percent of the total. Whereas, the majority of Vietnamese people working abroad are in other markets such as Taiwan, Korea or Malaysia. This means that Vietnam is still a potential supplier of labor for Japan to recruit foreign workers. According to the Japanese International Training Cooperation Organization (JITCO), every year Japan is keen to receive around 10,000 Vietnamese workers working in Japan's agricultural and seafood-processing sectors¹⁸⁹. Moreover, as Japan is the leading foreign direct investor in Vietnam, there is a huge demand for Vietnamese labors working in Japanese companies in the country. For example, there is about 10,000 Vietnamese staff working for Honda Vietnam¹⁹⁰.

With regard to demand (or market for Japan's exports), Vietnam is now ranked the third in Southeast Asia in terms of population with around 90 million people and is considered as one of the most dynamically developing economies in the region. With good quality, Japanese products are specially favored by Vietnamese people. Japan is now the third biggest import market of Vietnam, making up 10.2 percent of the total imports (see Figure 2). There are three categories of commodity with the import volume of over US\$ 1 billion including machinery, computer and steel¹⁹¹. However, currently, Vietnam's imports from Japan accounts for only around 8 percent of the total imports from Japan of ASEAN countries (the figure for 2012 is 11 billion USD and 130 billion USD respectively¹⁹²). This means that there are still opportunities for Japan to penetrate more into Vietnamese market.

¹⁸⁶ 'Statistics Handbook'

¹⁸⁷ 'Country Notes: Recent Changes in Migration Movement and Policies'

¹⁸⁸ 'Japan Wants More Vietnamese Workers'

¹⁸⁹ 'Japan Needs More Vietnamese Workers'

¹⁹⁰ Thu Trang, 'Honda Vietnam: Cam ket phat trien lau dai tai Vietnam' (Honda Vietnam: Commitment to Stay in Vietnam)

¹⁹¹ 'Viet Nam dang nhap khau nhieu nhat tu dau?' (Which are the biggest import markets of Vietnam?)

¹⁹² 'Value of Exports and Imports by Area and Country'

Figure 2: Top 8 largest exporters to Vietnam in 2012

(Source: Vietnam Economic Times)

Apart from a considerable source of supply and demand for Japan's economy, economic relations between Japan and Vietnam also benefit Japanese businesses, especially Japanese investors. For a number of Japanese investors, Vietnam is eyed for its cheap labor, great potentials in the domestic market and a platform for export to third countries. Moreover, according to the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) in Vietnam, after a period of time searching for investment opportunities in China, Japanese investors are heading to Southeast Asia and Vietnam is considered a potential destination¹⁹³. Japan is currently the largest foreign direct investor in Vietnam. The focused sector is manufacturing industry, accounting for over 80 percent¹⁹⁴. In 2012, Japan's newly-registered and additional capital reached US\$5.13 billion, accounting for 40% of total investment commitments to Vietnam. There are about 250 Japanese companies operating in Vietnam, among which large Japanese corporations have been present with reputable, competitive and high technical content products, namely, Sumitomo, Toyota, Honda, Mitsubishi, Hitachi, Toshiba, Toto¹⁹⁵. A recent survey by JETRO on business conditions of Japanese-affiliated firms in Asia and Oceania shows that over 60 percent of businesses in Vietnam reported a profit in 2012, higher than the 57.2 percent recorded in China. Moreover, over one third of Japanese firms in Vietnam

¹⁹³ Quoc Hung, 'Japan Investment to Forecast to Rise Further'

¹⁹⁴ 'Strengthening the Promotion of Japanese Investment in Vietnam'

¹⁹⁵ 'Vietnam Import for Japan in the First 9 Months'

believed that 2012 would be much better for them with a profit increase of 13.8 percent over the previous year¹⁹⁶.

3.2.2. *Security and political interests*

As analyzed above, it can be said that Japan – Vietnam relations confer enormous economic benefits on Japan's economy as well as its investors. However, it does not mean that the relations are “purely” economic. Political and security motivations are not very visible but really matters behind this relationship. By boosting economic ties with Vietnam and supporting economic development of this country, Japan aims to expand its influence in Vietnam and Southeast Asia region in its strategy for coming back to Asia. Moreover, as Vietnam is a part of Southeast Asia, it is necessary to Japan to promote relations with Vietnam in order to maintain peace and stability in Asia. Former Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa had once addressed that, “It is very necessary that Japan should keep a relationship of mutual understanding with all of the countries in Southeast Asia, in order to maintain peace and stability in Asia”¹⁹⁷.

From a security perspective, Southeast Asia in general and Vietnam in particular has become an increasingly important component in Japanese foreign policy, especially amid Japan – China growing tensions over Senkaku/Diaoyu Island¹⁹⁸ and the China's threat. On the economic front, China has surpassed Japan as the world's second largest economy. Moreover, this country is also strengthening its military might with a constant increase in defense budget. For example, in 2012, China spent 103.3 billion US. dollars on national defense, an increase of 11.5 per cent over the previous year. In 2013, it plans to raise its defense budget by 10.7 percent to 114.3 billion US.dollars¹⁹⁹. Therefore, the power gap between Japan and China is narrowing, partly leading to China's growing assertiveness over their territorial dispute. For

¹⁹⁶ ‘60 percent of Japanese Companies are Making Profit in Vietnam’

¹⁹⁷ Shiraishi, *Japanese Relations with Vietnam 1951-1987*

¹⁹⁸ The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands comprise approximately eight small islets, located approximately 170 kilometers from both Taiwan and Japan's Ishigaki Island in the East China Sea. Although administered by Japan, the Senkakus/Diaoyus are at the center of a sovereignty dispute involving Japan, China, and Taiwan, with all three claimants relying on an array of historical and legal arguments to bolster and legitimize their respective positions. In 1895 Japan annexed the islands. Only in the early 1970s, after possible oil reserves were discovered nearby, China started showing interests in the islands. Japan now asserts that its annexation of the islands in 1895 was not opposed by the Chinese government (then controlled by the Qing dynasty), while China argues that Japan's annexation was invalid given that the islands were already Chinese sovereign territory and thus could not be “discovered” or annexed. (See Smith, Paul, ‘The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Controversy’, pp.27-44 and ‘Territorial Disputes Involving Japan’)

¹⁹⁹ ‘China Defense Budget to Grow 10.7% in 2013’

example, following the Japan's detention of a Chinese fishing boat captain near the oil-rich, uninhabited and disputed islands in the East China Sea (known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China) in September 2010, the Chinese government decided to block exports of rare earth minerals to Japan until the captain was released²⁰⁰. Two years later, in September 2012, shortly after the Japanese government signed a contract to purchase three of the five main islands that constitute the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, anti-Japan protests erupted throughout China, causing a major strain in the two countries' relationship²⁰¹. Moreover, in early October 2012 China decided to deploy seven warships through the Miyako Strait without alerting the Japanese government, which was viewed by some in Japan as conveying displeasure over the Senkaku/Diaoyu²⁰². Therefore, with tremendous pressure from China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Japan definitely needs to gain support from outsiders as well as related parties including Vietnam, which also shares the great concern of maritime security. According to General Nguyen Chi Vinh, Vietnam's Vice Minister of Defense, Japan and Vietnam are facing similar maritime security challenges which include defending their own territorial sovereignty in the continental shelf; ensuring the smooth operation of maritime traffic; protecting maritime free trade and engaging in maritime disputes²⁰³. Furthermore, both Japan and Vietnam confirm their stand against China maritime assertiveness and the need for abiding the international law to ensure maritime security; and according to a senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official, Japan sees Vietnam "as a strategic partner that shares common interests"²⁰⁴.

The important role of Vietnam can be clearly seen in the foreign policy of the new government of Japan. The first overseas trip by the newly-elected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in January 2013 was to ASEAN countries in which Vietnam was the first of the three destinations. Defense cooperation between Japan and Vietnam has been accelerated in various fields, especially since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Defense Cooperation in 2011²⁰⁵. Delegation and experience exchanges have been promoted

²⁰⁰ Brasher, 'Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan'

²⁰¹ Smith, Paul, 'The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Controversy', pp.27-44.

²⁰² Smith, Paul, 'The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Controversy', pp.27-44

²⁰³ Hoang, 'Tuong Nguyen Chi Vinh noi ve hop tac quoc phong Viet Nam – Nhat Ban' (General Nguyen Chi Vinh Talks about Vietnam – Japan Defense Cooperation)

²⁰⁴ 'Japan, Vietnam to hold maritime security talks in May'

²⁰⁵ In 2011, Japan and Vietnam signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Defence Cooperation with five major fields of cooperation. Firstly, two countries will promote bilateral defense exchange. The second

strongly with regular exchanges of high-ranking visits. Furthermore, Japan has efficiently assisted Vietnam in training officers for Vietnam People's Army²⁰⁶. For example, from 2012, a number of troops of the Vietnam Marine Police have received scholarships to study at the Japan Coast Guard Academy in Hiroshima City²⁰⁷.

In addition, Japan also needs Vietnam's support for its quest to be in the United Nations Security Council. The United Nations has become the central element in Japan's foreign policy ever since it joined the organization in 1956, especially when it faces numerous difficulties including severe opposition from many UN members as well as its neighboring countries in Northeast Asia. Reinhard Drifte in his book entitled "Japan's Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat: A Matter of Pride or Justice" noted that "Japanese foreign Ministry officials believe that a permanent seat would fit Japan's economic superpower status, gain recognition for Japan's international contributions, and help rehabilitate Japan's from its World War II history"²⁰⁸. Drifte also argued that the greatest external challenge to Japan's bid is to get the support of a two thirds majority of the UN member states²⁰⁹. In this regard, Japan has encountered considerable opposition from numerous nations. Japan's neighboring counterparts in Northeast Asia including North Korea, China, South Korea do not support Japan's bid. Other UN member states may not be supportive just because they do not want to give the United States a second veto²¹⁰. In this context, the support of Vietnam, a country with increasingly important status in international arena, especially when this country successfully accomplished the role as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the 2008-2009 tenure and as the chairman of the ASEAN in 2010 is very important for Japan to acquire support of other countries in Southeast Asia and in the world.

filed of cooperation is education and training. The third (and also a new one) is cooperation in multilateral forums such as ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defense Ministerial Plus Meeting (ADMM+). Furthermore, two countries will cooperate closely in defense industry. The final is cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. (See Hoang, 'Tuong Nguyen Chi Vinh noi ve hop tac quoc phong Viet Nam – Nhat Ban' (General Nguyen Chi Vinh Talks about Vietnam – Japan Defense Cooperation)

²⁰⁶ 'Vietnam, Japan Defense Cooperation Promoted'

²⁰⁷ 'Japanese Patrol Ship Anchors in Da Nang'

²⁰⁸ Kral, 'Japan's Quest for a Permanent UN Security Council Seat'

²⁰⁹ Kral, 'Japan's Quest for a Permanent UN Security Council Seat'

²¹⁰ Kral, 'Japan's Quest for a Permanent UN Security Council Seat'

3.3. HOW?

In implementing its foreign policy toward Vietnam, Japan carries out the “soft” policy to attract Vietnam. Therefore, Japan has utilized a variety of measures in its foreign policy toward Vietnam in all fields ranging from politics, economy, security, defense, etc.

First of all, with regard to political measures, Japan has held increasingly numerous high level meetings and exchanges with Vietnam. Recently, the bilateral relationship has been developed to strategic partnership for peace and prosperity in Asia. Vietnam and Japan made 2013 the Vietnam-Japan Friendship Year to mark the 40th anniversary of their diplomatic ties. Japan has always supported the Doi Moi (renovation) and opening policy of Vietnam. It also positively assisted Vietnam to enter in the region and the world (APEC, WTO, ASEM, ARF, etc). It was the first G7 country to recognize Vietnam's market economy status in 2011. And Japan expects that Vietnam is a good partner in the ASEAN+3 framework and the future East Asia Community.

In addition, economic measures are central in Japan's foreign policy in general and toward Vietnam in particular. According to Maike Okano-Heijmans, Japan has employed economic diplomacy as a central instrument of its foreign policy and quest for national security since the post-war period, and to a greater extent than any other nation²¹¹. Japan regards economics as the central field in which it can expand its cooperation with Vietnam in other fields. The traditional “triad” of trade, investment and ODA continues to be efficient economic tools utilized by Japan in Vietnam. Currently Japan remains Vietnam's leading economic partner. It is the largest foreign direct investor in Vietnam. As an illustration, in 2012, out of the total registered FDI capital of \$16.3 billion, Japan accounted for \$5.59 billion (34.2 percent), which was much greater than the second and the third including Taiwan (\$2.6 billion) and Singapore (\$1.9 billion)²¹². With regard to Official Development Assistance, the country remains the biggest bilateral Official Development Assistance donor to Vietnam. In fiscal year 2012-2013, Japan pledged to grant ODA worth 2.6 billion U.S. dollars to Vietnam²¹³ out of the total amount of \$6.5 billion of commitment ODA from both bilateral and multilateral donors. Figure 3 reveals that Vietnam is by far the largest recipient of ODA from Japan to the Mekong Delta during the 2007-2011 period (see Figure 3). With regard to

²¹¹ Okano-Heijmans, *Economic Diplomacy: Japan and The Balance of National Interests*.

²¹² ‘FDI Figure Revised for 2012’

²¹³ Thanh Binh, ‘6,5 ty USD von ODA cam ket cho nam toi’ (\$6.5 Billion Pledged ODA for Next Year)

trade, Japan has attached great importance to boosting trade with Vietnam. Among a network of 72 overseas offices in 55 countries, there are two Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO)²¹⁴ offices in Vietnam (one is in Hanoi; and one is in Ho Chi Minh City). The Japanese government started negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement ("Economic Partnership Agreement") with Vietnam in January 2007 and the agreement took effect in October 2009. Since then bilateral trade has been on the increase. Japan is now the third largest trading partner of Vietnam. The two countries are striving to double the bilateral trade turnover by 2020, from the US\$21.181 billion in 2011²¹⁵.

(Source: Japan's ODA Data by Country. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan)

Apart from political and economic measures, under the strategic partnership, Japan also promotes cooperation in military and defense with Vietnam. Two countries regularly exchange high level visits of defense officials. In 2011, Vietnamese Defense Minister Phung Quang Thanh visited Japan for the first time in 13 years as a Vietnamese Defense Minister, holding talks with Japan's counterpart. The two ministers signed the memorandum concerning Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation and exchange, and agreed to promote high-level exchanges, regular dialogue at the vice-ministerial level, and cooperation in such areas as humanitarian aid and disaster relief²¹⁶. In November 2012, Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Hironori Kanazawa visited Vietnam where the first Japan-Vietnam vice-defense ministerial level

²¹⁴ The Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) was established in 1958 by the Japanese Government as a governmental-related trade promotion agency. JETRO is assigned to strengthen balanced and harmonious trade and investment relations with other countries in the world through a network of 72 overseas offices in 55 countries and 36 local offices throughout Japan. (see more at 'About JETRO')

²¹⁵ 'Promoting and Deepening the Vietnam – Japan Strategic Partnership'

²¹⁶ 'Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Nations – The Association of Southeast Asian Nations'

consultation was held. During the consultation, opinions were exchanged regarding defense cooperation and exchange between the two countries, which included capacity-building support, and the security of Asia and Pacific regions²¹⁷. Moreover, Japan has cooperated closely with Vietnam at multilateral forums such as the ASEAN Regional Security Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM+).

Furthermore, Japan has also utilized cultural exchange, education and tourism as important tools in its foreign Japan's foreign policy toward Vietnam as well as to promote its influence in this country. Although cultural relations between Japan and Vietnam was established long ago, these relations have not been as developed as economic relations. Japan has recently adopted various measures to strengthen cultural cooperation with Vietnam. Annually, the country grants a considerable amount of non-refundable aid to cultural projects in Vietnam. Japan also promotes exchanges of cultural delegations with Vietnam with such activities as art performance, exhibitions, film festivals, etc. For example, the Japan – Vietnam Friendship Parliamentary Alliance coordinated with the Vietnamese Embassy in Japan to organize the 2008 Vietnam Festival in Japan. In 2008 and 2011 Japanese Embassy in Vietnam and Vietnamese Ministry of Cultural, Sports and Tourism – Vietnam Grand Music Festival co-organized the Japan – Vietnam Grand Music Festival in Vietnam. In the field of education and training, annually Japan assists Vietnam millions of US dollars in building schools, especially in rural and remote areas. Moreover, every year Japanese government grants about 50-60 scholarships to Vietnamese students to study in Japan. The Japan International Cooperation Agency has provided technical and vocational education and training in Japan for many Vietnamese staff. As regards tourism, Japan is also a market for the Vietnamese tourism industry. The two countries signed the Japan – Vietnam Joint Agreement on tourism cooperation in April 2005. Since then, Japan and Vietnam have waived diplomatic and official visa requirements. Japan is always one of the top 5 biggest tourist markets for Vietnam. Japan effectively supports Vietnam to develop tourism human resources training and development, especially Japanese-speaking guides. It has also planned to establish the Office for Japanese Tourism Promotion in Vietnam²¹⁸.

²¹⁷ 'Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with other Nations – The Association of Southeast Asian Nations'

²¹⁸ Quynh Chi, 'Year of Japan – Vietnam Friendship'

With effective measures in various fields ranging from politics, economy, defense to culture, education and tourism, Japan has established a strong presence in Vietnam, gradually enhancing its influence in Vietnam in all areas. Politically, Japan has strengthened diplomatic relations with Vietnam, effectively assisting cooperation in other fields as well as protecting Japan's political interests in Vietnam and in the region. Economically, Japan has established a high level of economic relations with Vietnam which benefits Japanese economy greatly. In other areas, Japan has tightened cultural and friendly ties with Vietnamese people, which in turn helps build up a positive image of Japan's country and people as well as promote cooperation in other fields. In this connection, a further insight of Japan's public diplomacy in Vietnam will be analyzed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4: JAPAN'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN VIETNAM AND THE CASE-STUDY OF THE SHIP FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA YOUTH EXCHANGE PROGRAM

The previous chapter looks at Japan's foreign policy toward Vietnam with a thorough analysis of Japan's interests in Vietnam. This chapter is going to examine how Japan utilizes public diplomacy to achieve its foreign policy goals in Vietnam. Apart from public relations and cultural exchange, people-to-people exchange serves as one of the efficient tools of Japan's public diplomacy in Vietnam. A case-study of the Ship for Southeast Asia Youth Exchange Program will be used as an illustration. In this connection, two separate surveys aiming at the participants to this exchange program and the non-participants are conducted simultaneously. The purpose of these surveys is to define the perceptions about Japan by Vietnamese people (especially the youth) as well as to examine whether the Ship for Southeast Asia Youth Exchange Program helps change the participants' views positively, which in turn serves Japan's foreign policy goals in its relations with Vietnam.

I. Overview of Japan's public diplomacy in Vietnam

Soft power in general and public diplomacy in particular has garnered great attention from Japanese government. Public diplomacy, "as an efficient tool to introduce the good aspects of Japan's image to the outside world, is considered to be a cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy as well as its national security in international relations"²¹⁹. In its foreign policy toward Vietnam, in order to win over the hearts and minds of Vietnamese people, Japan has utilized various tools of public diplomacy. Among the most efficient tools are public relations, cultural exchange, people-to-people exchange.

1. Public Relations

As discussed earlier, public relations in public diplomacy aims at providing foreign publics with information about Japan's foreign policy as well as its economy, society and culture. In Vietnam, Japan has performed this task through various activities. First of all, publications about Japan as well as its relations with Vietnam are issued by Japanese agencies. For example, to mark the 40th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Japan and Vietnam, the Japanese Embassy in Vietnam has published a book entitled "Japan –

²¹⁹ Hoang, 'Vietnam – Japan Cooperation in the Field of Education, Training and Human Resources' pp10-13.

Vietnam Friendship Year 2013: Towards a New Horizon”. This publication is offered free of charge to Vietnamese readers. In addition, the website of the Embassy (www.vn.emb-japan.go.jp) contains a wealth of information about Japan and Japan – Vietnam relations. The website also provides press releases about cooperation activities between Japan and Vietnam. Moreover, realizing the power of social networks, the Embassy has set up a facebook account on Japan – Vietnam Friendship Year to connect with readers and to update information about prominent activities in celebration of the Friendship Year. Moreover, lovers of Japanese culture can access the facebook of Japan Foundation Centre for Cultural Exchange to know about Japanese cultural activities in Vietnam. Apart from publications, Japan in coordination with related Vietnamese authorities has regularly organized various events to introduce Japanese culture to Vietnamese people; to name a few, Japan Day, Sakura Festival or Japan – Vietnam Grand Music Festival. Japan’s public relations in Vietnam also deal with conducting opinion polls on Japan. For example, in 2008, Japan conducted the opinion poll on Japan in six ASEAN countries including in Vietnam. The results revealed that 96 percent of respondents from Vietnam viewed the relationship between Japan and Vietnam as very friendly or somewhat friendly²²⁰.

2. Cultural Exchange

Cultural exchange is an important component of Japan’s public diplomacy everywhere and in Vietnam it is not an exception. With the aim of furthering the understanding and trust of Japan, traditional culture and art as well as pop culture are primary tools used in cultural exchange. Moreover, cultural exchange between Japan and Vietnam also involves Japanese language and Japanese studies. Regarding traditional culture, Japan has effectively supported Vietnam in its preservation of traditional culture and cultural heritage with its Cultural Grant Aid²²¹. For example, Japan sponsored such projects as “Facilities for archive storage of Sino-Nom Institute” or “Development of Music for Vietnam National Academy of Music”²²². Apart from Cultural Grant Aid, Japan has also organized exchanges of cultural and art performance between Japan and Vietnam. In this regard, the role of the Japan Foundation (the

²²⁰ ‘Opinion Poll on Japan in Six ASEAN Countries’

²²¹ Cultural Grant Aid is an aid scheme in Japan’s Official Development Assistance aiming at the promotion of culture and education in developing countries (see ‘Cultural Grant Assistance’)

²²² Ha, ‘Chinh sach ngoai giao van hoa cua Nhat Ban tu sau chien tranh lanh va tac dong cua no voi Viet Nam’ (Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy since the End of Cold War and its Impact on Vietnam), pp.61-69

first organization specializing in international cultural exchange) and the Japanese Embassy in Vietnam cannot be ignored. In 2008 the Japan Foundation set up an office in Vietnam naming “The Japan Foundation Centre of Cultural Exchange in Vietnam” (hereinafter the Centre), which was the fifth overseas office in Southeast Asia. The Centre has carried out various activities to foster cultural exchange between Japan and Vietnam in three categories including Japanese language, cultural and art exchange and Japanese studies and intellectual exchange. With regard to Japanese language, the Centre has promoted Japanese language education in Vietnam by sending Japanese-language specialists to Vietnam, inviting Vietnamese teachers and students to Japan, providing teaching materials, organizing Japanese-language courses, organizing seminars or training courses for Vietnamese teachers, and administering the Japanese-language Proficiency Test in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City and Danang, etc. Furthermore, in coordination with the Ministry of Education and Training of Vietnam, the Centre has been implementing the project on “Introduction of Japanese Language into Secondary and High School Curriculum during 2003-2013”. In the field of art and cultural exchange, Japan has organized art exhibitions, stage performances, music concerts, film festivals, academic lectures, and press on Japanese publications translated into Vietnamese, etc.²²³. For instance, in April 2013 the Japanese consulate in Ho Chi Minh City organized the Oishi Nippon Food Fair to celebrate the 40th anniversary of diplomatic ties of Japan and Vietnam. In June 2013, the Japan Foundation Centre for Cultural Exchange in Vietnam organized a jazz performance with artists from Japan and ASEAN countries including Vietnam²²⁴. Japanese studies and intellectual exchange are also an important element of Japan’s cultural exchange in Vietnam. With the purpose of providing support for Japanese studies in Vietnam as well as learning more about Vietnam, Japan has promoted international exchange activities with Vietnam including support for Vietnamese organizations and scholars of Japanese studies. Specifically, Japan has sponsored conferences or activities of Japanese studies held by Vietnam’s institutes. Moreover, in coordination with Vietnamese counterparts, Japan has organized various seminars or lectures on Japan²²⁵.

It is undeniable that cultural exchange has contributed greatly to bringing Japanese culture closer to Vietnamese people and vice versa. More importantly, an increasing number

²²³ ‘Brief Introduction of The Japan Foundation Centre for Cultural Exchange in Vietnam’

²²⁴ Information from the facebook of the Japan Foundation Centre for Cultural Exchange in Vietnam

²²⁵ ‘Brief Introduction of The Japan Foundation Centre for Cultural Exchange in Vietnam’

of Vietnamese people, especially the youth, have developed strong affection for Japanese culture. There is the so-called “the Club of Lovers of Japanese Culture” which has been set up in many localities around the country such as Hanoi, Thai Nguyen, Danang, etc. This kind of “club” is usually formed by a group of Vietnamese youths who love Japan’s culture and desire to exchange with each other. For example, regarding the facebook of the Club of Vietnamese lovers of Japanese culture (which was set up in August 2012), as of July 2013, there have been over 20,000 likes. Moreover, according to a recent survey conducted by a Vietnam’s well-established website, the majority of respondents (out of 630 persons) chose Japanese mangas, especially Doreamon, Conan or Dragon balls as their favourite comics (see Figure 4)

Figure 4: “Which are your favorite comics during your childhood?”

(Source: Survey on favourite comics during childhood. Webtretho.com)

3. People-to-people exchange:

In an interview, the former Ambassador of Japan to Vietnam Norio Hattori stated that “government to government relations are, in the long run, based on people to people relations. Therefore, through a variety of personal exchanges, two countries (Japan and Vietnam) can

make their bilateral relationship much stronger and deeper²²⁶. This means that Japan has attached great importance to people-to-people exchange in its public diplomacy in Vietnam. As discussed in the previous chapter, people-to-people exchange in Japan's public diplomacy comprises three elements: student exchange, youth exchange and sport exchange.

3.1. Student exchange

With regard to student exchange, Japan expects to receive more Vietnamese students coming to Japan to acquire knowledge, advanced technology, and understand more about the culture and people of Japan. These students when returning to Vietnam can actively contribute to the building of their country and become a bridge to strengthen exchanges between peoples of the two countries²²⁷. Vietnam is now among the five major countries with over 4,000 students studying in Japan²²⁸ (as of May 2012) and with concerted efforts of both Japan and Vietnam; and the number is expected to increase in the coming years. On the Japan side, it has launched a number of initiatives to boost student exchange with Vietnam. Since the beginning of the new millennium, the Japanese government has boosted its support for Vietnam in the field of education and training education. In March 2008, the two countries signed an agreement in which Japan would help to train 1000 PhDs for Vietnam from 2008 to 2020. During the period of 2000 and 2011, Japan has granted 300 scholarships for Vietnamese students to study master programs at famous universities in Japan²²⁹. Each year over 100 scholarships for undergraduate students from Vietnam are granted by the government of Japan. Moreover, hundreds of Vietnamese students have participated in the JENESYS 2.0 (the Japan – East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youths), a key platform for student exchange between Japan and ASEAN. Another example is the exchange between the Vietnam – Japan Student Conference (VJSC) and the Japan – Vietnam Student Conference (JVSC). Established in 2007 under the sponsorship of the Vietnam – Japan Cooperation Centre, the Japan International Cooperation Agency and the Japanese Embassy in Vietnam, VJSC is a club of Vietnamese students of Japanese-language from universities in Hanoi, the capital of Vietnam. JVSC is a club of students from Japan's universities who share their love for Vietnam. Annually, VJCS receives students from JVSC to Vietnam to attend

²²⁶ Chu, (ed.), 'Vietnam – Japan: Thirty years of Friendship and Cooperation', p.18

²²⁷ 'Vietnamese Students in Japan Hold Congress'

²²⁸ 'International Students in Japan'

²²⁹ Hoang, 'Vietnam – Japan Cooperation in the Field of Education, Training and Human Resources', p.52

numerous activities such as thematic seminars, cultural exchanges, home-stays, visiting Japanese companies in Vietnam, etc²³⁰.

3.2. Youth exchange

Apart from student exchange, Japan has also concentrated on organizing youth exchange programs with Vietnam with the aim of strengthening solidarity and promoting exchange and mutual understanding between young people of Vietnam and Japan. An example of bilateral youth exchange programs is the program co-organized in September 2012 by the Sodateru Association, a social education organization of the Japanese Ministry of Education and Science, and the Danang Representative Office in Japan. In this program, 30 learners of Japanese-language from Danang, Vietnam aged from 16 to 22 had the chance to visit Japan for ten days²³¹. During their stay, the visitors joined with Japanese students to visit some places in Japan as well as to participate in cultural exchange activities. Multilateral youth exchange programs held by Japan with the participation of Vietnam's youth are more diverse. The JENESYS 2.0 which was mentioned above is a prominent example. Another example is the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program (SSEAYP). Vietnam officially joined this program in 1996. Since then, annually, 28 Vietnamese young people join with the youths from Japan and other ASEAN countries in a two-month voyage from Japan to five Southeast Asian countries. The program helps promote friendship and mutual understanding among the youths of the ten Southeast Asian countries including Vietnam and Japan.

3.3. Sports exchange

Sports exchange between Japan and Vietnam has also constituted an important part of Japan's people-to-people exchange with Vietnam, especially recently. A number of Japanese martial arts such as judo, karate or aikido have become popular sports in Vietnam. Moreover, Japan has endeavored to introduce its traditional sports to Vietnamese people. One example is the introduction of the oldest extant Japanese martial arts, the non-physical cultural heritage of Japan, to Vietnamese people in the seminar on Tenshin Shoden Katori Shinto-ryu²³². Recently, to mark the 40th anniversary of diplomatic relations between two countries, sports

²³⁰ 'Hoi nghi sinh vien Viet Nam – Nhat Ban' (Vietnam – Japan Student Conference)

²³¹ 'Danang- Japan Youth Exchange Program'

²³² 'Hoi thao kiem thuat Katori Shinto ryu – 40 nam quan he Viet Nhat' (Seminar on Katori Shinto ryu – 40 Years of Diplomatic Relations between Japan and Vietnam)

exchange between Japan and Vietnam has been promoted actively. In June 2013, in Hanoi the Vietnam's national U23 team played a friendly match with Japan's Kashima Antlers. In Ho Chi Minh City, also in June 2013 the Kawasaki Frontale Football Club from Japan played with the Club of Becamex Binh Duong from Vietnam.

All in all, Japan has utilized various dimensions in its public diplomacy in Vietnam. It especially specializes in public relations, cultural exchange and people-to-people exchange. Public relations has done a good job in informing Vietnamese people of Japan and its relations with Vietnam. Moreover, it has also connected “lovers” of Japan and provided them with opportunities to experience Japanese culture in Vietnam. Cultural exchange has helped bring Japanese culture closer to Vietnamese people, especially the youth. People-to-people exchange in its various forms including student, youth and sports exchange has fostered mutual understanding, contributing to the enhancement of friendship and cooperation between Japan and Vietnam. So far, it can be concluded that Japan has devoted a great deal of efforts in its public diplomacy in Vietnam. The outcome of these efforts will be analyzed in the next section with the case-study of the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program.

II. The Case-study of the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program

1. Overview of the Program

1.1. History of Establishment and Development

The Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Program (SSEAYP) is an annual program sponsored by the Government of Japan and coordinated by the all member-countries of ASEAN with the purpose of promoting friendship, solidarity and mutual understanding among the youths from Southeast Asian countries and Japan. Furthermore, the program also helps broaden their perspective on the world as well as strengthen their motivations and abilities of international cooperation²³³.

The SSEAYP started in January 1974 based on the respective Joint Statements issued between Japan and the five ASEAN countries including Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. In 1985, Brunei Darussalam joined the program. Vietnam officially became a member of SSEAYP in 1996. Two years later, in 1998 both Laos and Myanmar joined the program after their admission to ASEAN in 1997. Cambodia was the last country

²³³‘SSEAYP – The Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program’

in ASEAN to participate in SSEAYP in 2000 following its admission this regional arrangement in 1999²³⁴.

Annually the Government of Japan spends from 7 to 10 million US dollars to organize the SSEAYP, which includes the fees for renting the ship²³⁵; accommodation, meals and transportation for all participants in Japan; air tickets for participants from their home countries to the first port of call and from Japan to their home countries. Governments of ASEAN countries bear local the expenses which include organizing welcoming and send-off ceremony, courtesy calls and receptions, home-stays, institutional visits and interactions with local youths, etc²³⁶.

1.2. Participants

There are 11 contingents from Japan and ten Southeast Asian countries. Before 1996, each contingent comprised of 42 participants to the program (including 01 National Leader, 01 Youth Leaders and 40 members). Since 1996, due to the increasing number of countries joining the program, the members of each contingent has reduced to 29 (01 NL, 01 YL, 01AYL and 26 PYs, see Figure 5 below). Therefore, each year there are more than 300 youths from Japan and ASEAN participating in SSEAYP.

²³⁴ ‘SSEAYP – The Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program’

²³⁵ M.S. Nippon Maru had served for the SSEAYP during 1974-2008, which means for more than three decades. It had become a symbol of friendship among participants when they sang the memorable song “Nippon Maru” during the program, especially in the send-off ceremony. After Nippon Maru, the new ship Fuji Maru began to take young voyagers to the SSEAYP ports of call in 2009. (see ‘The Ship’)

²³⁶ ‘Introduction of the Ship for Southeast Asia Youth Exchange Program’

Figure 5: Composition of a SSEAYP Contingent

Participating Youths (Pys) to SSEAYP must be between 18 and 30 years of age. Youth Leader (YL) is selected among participating youths to be their leader. Assistant Youth Leader (AYL) is the assistant of YL and can act on behalf of YL when necessary. National Leader (NL) is the head of each contingent and sits on the Cruise Operating Committee (COC). NL is usually from 30 to 39 years old and comes from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of each country. To participate in the activities both onboard the ship and in the visiting countries, participants have to be fluent in English. Good health is another important requirement for them as they have to experience a long voyage in hard conditions. Furthermore, participants should have an understanding about Japan and participating countries, especially those being port of calls. They have to be able to participate throughout the program. There is no chance for anyone to participate in SSEAYP as an YL, AYL or a PY for a second time, except for being the National Leader²³⁷.

1.3. Activities

Previously (before 2005), the program usually started in Japan. National Leaders of all contingents would gather in Japan onboard the ship Nippon Maru. The Ship then departed for one of ASEAN countries as the first port of call to collect participating youths who had gathered there. The final port of call would be Japan, where all participants would have 10

²³⁷ 'Introduction of the Ship for Southeast Asia Youth Exchange Program'

days of activities before leaving for their home countries. After 2005, all NLs join PYs going to the first port of call.

SSEAYP lasts for fifty-two days during the fourth quarter of the year. During this period, the ship visits Japan and five countries in Southeast Asia. Annually the Organizing Committee will select 5 out of 10 countries in ASEAN as port of calls. Throughout the program the participants engage in activities onboard the ship and activities in the countries to be visited. Onboard activities are monitored by the Cruise Operating Committee which comprises of national leaders of eleven contingents. The Administrator, who is Japanese, is responsible for the overall program. The main activities on the ship include National Presentation, Discussions, Solidarity and Club activities and other activities approved by the COC. Activities in the countries being port of call include welcoming and send-off ceremony, courtesy calls and receptions, home-stay, cultural exchange, institutional visits, open ship, etc.

2. Vietnam's participation into SSEAYP

In 1995, the National Committee for Vietnamese Youths sent a delegation of 8 members to participate into SSEAYP as observers. In 1996, following its admission to ASEAN, Vietnam officially sent 42 members to SSEAYP and organized the ship welcoming ceremony in Saigon port, Ho Chi Minh City. The participants were warmly received by Vietnam's National Leader at the Presidential Palace. In 1997, the Vietnam's contingent in SSEAYP comprised of 33 participants. The SSEAYP ship also docked in Ho Chi Minh City. The program participants were received by Vietnam's State President. 1998 marked the 25th anniversary of the SSEAYP; and Vietnam also sent 33 persons to participate in the program. In 1999 Vietnam contributed 32 delegates to the program. One year later, in 2000, 30 Vietnamese youths attended the SSEAYP. In 2001, Vietnam had 28 participating youths and 01 National Leader joining the program. Since 2002, the number of participants of Vietnam and other contingents has been fixed to 28PYs and 01 NL²³⁸.

Both Nippon Maru and Fuji Maru could not harbour in any ports in the Northern Vietnam, where Hanoi, the capital of Vietnam is located. The ship can only dock in Saigon port in the South or Danang port in the Central Vietnam. Since Vietnam first joined SSEAYP

²³⁸ 'Introduction of the Ship for Southeast Asia Youth Exchange Program'

in 1996, it has welcomed 12 SSEAYP ships. Due to limited budget, only leaders of each contingent can fly to the North to pay courtesy calls on National Leaders of Vietnam²³⁹.

Thus, the overall activity of the Ship for Southeast Asia Youth Exchange Program is oriented to help enhance solidarity and mutual understanding among the youths of Japan and Southeast Asia including Vietnam. Moreover, as participants have the chance to experience life in Japan and with Japanese people, the program is one of the means of Japan's public diplomacy which help spread the values and information about Japan. Furthermore, according to Mrs Lim Hwee Hua, Minister in Prime Minister's Office of Singapore in her speech at the welcoming ceremony of the 36th SSEAYP, the program "signifies the close ties that ASEAN and Japan share"²⁴⁰. Therefore, it is possible to believe that Japan's public diplomacy as well as SSEAYP serves as an efficient tool to enhance Japan's soft power in Southeast Asia generally and in Vietnam particularly. This will be further consolidated by consulting the results of two separate surveys which examines whether the SSEAYP helps enhance Japan's soft power in Vietnam by comparing the perceptions about Japan (which are correspondent with Japan's national interests in Vietnam) between those of the participants and the non-participants.

3. Description of the Surveys

The research is based on first-hand information and was conducted in two months from July to August 2013. The major purpose of these surveys is to explore perceptions about Japan by Vietnamese people in general and by participants of the Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program (SSEAYP) in particular and to examine whether the SSEAYP helps enhance Japan's soft power in Vietnam.

As analyzed previously, the Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program is a tool of Japan's public diplomacy with an aim to foster friendship and mutual understanding among the youths from Japan and ASEAN countries. Moreover, participants of this program also have the chance to visit Japan as well as to live and work with Japanese people; therefore, after the program, they may change their own perceptions about Japan. Therefore, in order to evaluate the impact of the program on the perceptions of participants, two surveys were

²³⁹ 'Introduction of the Ship for Southeast Asia Youth Exchange Program'

²⁴⁰ 'Speech by Mrs Lim Hwee Hua, Minister in Prime Minister's Office, Second Minister for Finance and Transport, at 36th Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Programme (SSEAYP)'

conducted anonymously. The first survey was performed amongst the participants of the Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program (participants). The second survey aimed at those who had never participated into this program (non-participants).

Due to the age limitation of the program (which is from 18 to 30 years old for participating youths and about 40 years old for national leaders), the target group of the first research are adults over 18 years old. These people were members in different batches of the Vietnam contingent in the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program since Vietnam first joined the program in 1996. However, due to the difficulties in contacting the participants, especially those participated in the program long ago, the majority of the interviewees participated into the program just a few years ago (from 2003 to 2012). Therefore, most interviewees of the first survey are in the group age of 18-25 or 26-35. As occupation may well exert an impact on the perception about a country, the survey tried to cover interviewees of a variety of occupation categories. The gender of the respondents was not taken into account because it was not an important element affecting perceptions of people about a country. Whether the participants joined any other program or event hosted by Japan is also an important factor because their perceptions about Japan may have been affected by that program/event, not the SSEAYP.

The second survey targeted those who had never joined the SSEAYP and the majority of this group included young people from 18 to 35 years old. One consideration of this survey was whether the respondents had participated in any program or event hosted by Japan.

The main limitation of the survey is the final number of questionnaires used for analysis. As the main target group was participants of the Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program, this survey was conducted first. Questionnaires were sent to hundreds of interviewees and due to the fact that many participants may have changed their addresses, emails or phone numbers, 50 questionnaires were received. Then, out of these respondents, those who had participated in other program/event hosted by Japan apart from the SSEAYP were disregarded. Moreover, the questionnaires which missed the answers or chose more than one answer instead of one were disqualified. Finally, 46 questionnaires were used for analysis. Among the respondents, the vast majority was in the age group of 26-35 years old (32/46 or 71 per cent), 20 per cent were from 18 to 25 years old and only 9 per cent were over 35. The respondents worked in a wide variety of job categories including finance/banking,

education/training, government/politics, law, medicine, engineering and others. The second survey was aimed to receive 46 questionnaires which were qualified for analysis. The questionnaires were sent to about 70 non-participants of similar age groups and occupation categories with the participants. Around 60 questionnaires were received. Five questionnaires filled by interviewees who had participated in any program or event hosted by Japan were removed. Then 46 questionnaires were selected randomly for analysis.

The questionnaires of two surveys were similar, comprising of 10 questions. A slight difference was in the general question. In the first survey, interviewees (participants) were asked if they had attended any other program or event hosted by Japan. In the second survey, interviewees (non-participants) were questioned whether they had attended any program or event hosted by Japan. The questions were designed to be correspondent with Japan's interests in Vietnam which include economic benefits (export, import and labor market) and political support (for Japan's bid for a permanent UN Security Council seat; for its territorial dispute with China) and general questions.

Question 1 and question 2 were aimed to examine the support of the respondents towards Japan's involvement in Vietnam as well as its contribution to Vietnam's economy. Question 3, question 4 and question 5 were formed to see how the interviewees support Japan politically. Question 6 is used to define the interviewees' attitude and their preference about Japan's attractiveness. The answers to this question can help reveal sources of Japan's soft power in Vietnam. Question 7, 8, 9 and 10 were to identify whether the respondents advocate Japan's economic interests in terms of investment, market and labor supply from Vietnam. The countries were used as options for answers include China, the United States, Russia, South Korea, India and Germany because of a number of reasons. Firstly, Japan and these countries are all major economic partners of Vietnam. Both China and the United States are among Vietnam's largest trading partners (China is the largest import market of Vietnam; and the United States is Vietnam's largest export market excluding the EU). Therefore, it is apparent that both China and the United States have contributed greatly to the development of Vietnam's economy. Moreover, as a big neighbor of Vietnam, China holds an important position in Vietnam's foreign policy. In addition, South Korea is among the largest donor of ODA to Vietnam. It is also a key trade and investment partner of Vietnam. Especially, Korean products especially consumer goods and cultural products have prevailed Vietnam's market.

Vietnamese people are increasingly fond of Made-in-Korea products such as Samsung mobile phones or K-pop and Korean drama. And Russia, given the special relationship between the former USSR and Vietnam in history, is still an important partner of Vietnam in terms of both political and economic domain. Lastly, apart from Japan, India and Germany are among the countries which are bidding for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

There are several limitations of the surveys. Firstly, some respondents, especially the non-participants did not know about the territorial dispute between Japan and China as well as the role of a permanent member in the UN Security Council. Secondly, the images of Japan and the United States in Vietnam were so large that they overshadowed those of the others including Russia and India. Thirdly, there should have been more options in each question to have more precise results. Lastly, a number of questions seemed to favor Japan, especially when the majority of Vietnamese people usually do not want to support China.

4. Analysis of the Results

The general questions helped select the respondents who did not participated in any other program or event organized by Japan apart from the SSEAYP (in the first survey) and who had never participated in any program or event hosted by Japan (in the second survey). Therefore, it can efficiently serve the purpose of examining perceptions about Japan by participants of the SSEAYP in comparison with those of the non-participants.

The understanding and preference about Japan (Question No. 6 “Which aspects of Japan are you most impressed with?”) differs greatly amongst participants and non-participants. As participants had the chance to experience life in Japan and with Japanese people, many of them liked Japanese culture and its people. And those who had never visited Japan or joined any activities organized by Japan tended to be impressed by Japanese economy. This can be concluded the SSEAYP helped bring the Japan’s culture and people closer to the participants; and therefore, these people can have more positive views about the culture and people of Japan than the non-participants.

Figure 6: The results for Question 6: “Which aspects of Japan are you most impressed with?” amongst participants.

(Source: Hereafter the graphs are based on the results of the surveys conducted in Vietnam, July-August 2013)

Nearly half of the respondents were impressed by Japanese people. Many of them liked Japan's culture. 18 percent admired the economy of Japan. And none of them did not choose any aspect.

Figure 7: The result for Question 6: "Which aspects of Japan are you most impressed with?" amongst non-participants.

The answers to Q.6 amongst non-participants differ greatly from the answers among participants. Just nearly a half of the non-participants liked Japanese culture and people (22% and 27% respectively) while the majority of the participants were impressed by these aspects of Japan.

Figure 8: The results for Question 1 “Which country has played the most important role in the development of Vietnam’s economy?” amongst participants.

Figure 9: The result for Question 1 “Which country has played the most important role in the development of Vietnam’s economy?” amongst non- participants.

Non-participants also prioritized Japan; however, only nearly a half of non-participants (44%) chose Japan as opposed to 60% of the participants.

Figure 10. The result for Question 2 “Which country is the most important partner (in both political and economic realm) of Vietnam?” amongst participants.

Figure 11. The result for Question 2 “Which country is the most important partner (in both political and economic realm) of Vietnam?” among non-participants.

Both the respondents of participants and non-participants chose China as the most important partner in terms of economics and politics of Vietnam. This is due to the fact that China shared the similar political system with Vietnam and it was the largest trading partner of this country. However, more respondents of participants supported Japan than the non-participants (30% and 24% respectively).

Figure 12. The results for Question 3: “Which country would you support to be a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council?” amongst participants.

The vast majority of interviewees of the first survey (participants) (85%) supported Japan for its bid for a permanent seat in the United National Security Council due to its higher political role than India in the Asian region and its great contribution to the development of Vietnam, especially in the infrastructure sector.

Figure 13. The results for Question 3: “Which country would you support to be a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council?” amongst non-participants.

Overall, it is clear that the participants of the SSEAYP have shown much greater political support for Japan than the non-participants. However, two thirds of the respondents (67%) of the second survey is an impressive number. It is surprising that Germany, despite its high role in the EU, was not highly appreciated by respondents of both surveys. Only 2% of the interviewees in each survey supported Germany for its bid for a permanent UN Security Council seat.

Figure 14. The results for Question 4: “Which country deserves to be the regional leader in East Asia?” amongst participants.

Figure 15. The results for Question 4: “Which country deserves to be the regional leader in East Asia?” amongst non-participants.

Because of the high level development in both economic and political domains of Japan, a great proportion of interviewees in the two surveys (74% and 65% consequently) supported this country as the leader in East Asia. However, due to the close relationship between Vietnam and Russia in history, Russia is ranked the second in terms of support for its leadership in the region with 17% and 26% respectively.

Figure 16. The results for Question 5: “Which country would you support in the territorial dispute over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands?” amongst participants.

Figure 17. The result for Question 5: “Which country would you support in the territorial dispute over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands?” amongst non-participants.

With regard to the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, the similar percentage of respondents in the two surveys (57% and 46%) supported Japan. None of the interviewees advocated China. The interviewees of the second survey (the non-participants) showed little understanding in the political issue involving Japan; therefore, nearly half of the respondents had no idea about this issue while the figure for the participants was only 22%.

Figure 18. The results for Question 7: “If there are four foreign companies planning to invest in Vietnam on similar conditions, which company should be given preference?” amongst participants.

Figure 19. The results for Question 7: “If there are four foreign companies planning to invest in Vietnam on similar conditions, which company should be given preference?” amongst non-participants.

The answers to Q.7 rise to 50% for Japan amongst the participants of the SSEAYP from the figure of 43% amongst the non-participants. The United States seems to be advocated strongly in terms of its investment in Vietnam with 43% and 46% respectively. Chinese companies were not welcomed by the respondents in both surveys. Overall, Japanese companies have high reputation in Vietnam. It could be a good condition for Japanese enterprises to do business in this country.

Figure 20. The results for Question 8: “Which country of origin do you prefer when purchasing a laptop if the price is the same?” amongst participants.

Figure 21. The results for Question 8: “Which country of origin do you prefer when purchasing a laptop if the price is the same?” amongst non-participants.

Respondents of both surveys showed great interest in Japanese laptop brands with the high support of 67% and 54% respectively. Moreover, the American brands were also favored strongly by the interviewees with 41 percent of the non-participants choosing an American brand.

Figure 22. The results for Question 9: “If you have your own business, which country would you like to export your products to, if the conditions offered are the same?” amongst participants.

Figure 23. The results for Question 9: “If you have your own business, which country would you like to export your products to, if the conditions offered are the same?” amongst non-participants.

Japan continued to be the leading country which gained the highest support of the respondents of both surveys. However, the interviewees who were the participants tended to have more support for Japan as the export market than the non-participants with 43 percent and 39 percent respectively.

Figure 24. The results for Question 10: “If you have to work overseas, which country would you opt for?” amongst participants.

Figure 25. The results for Question 10: “If you have to work overseas, which country would you opt for?” amongst non-participants.

The majority of the respondents of the two surveys (76% and 67%) were eager to choose Japan as the place of work overseas. This may be due to the fact that in comparison with the rest three countries in Asia, Japan was considered to be more developed and attractive. However, partly because of the influence of the mass media, especially through K-Pop and Korean drama, many non-participants seemed to be more excited about South Korea with 26 percent opting for this country. China and Russia continued to be an uninteresting option.

Overall, the tendency of supporting Japan amongst both the participants of the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program and the non-participants was quite strong.

However, the participants tended to be more enthusiastic about Japan with higher support. The answers can be regarded as relatively objective. Due to historical factors and the current situation with the penetration of Chinese harmful products in Vietnam's market as well as the assertiveness of China in the territorial dispute over the South China Sea, China was not an option in most cases. However, many respondents of both surveys had to acknowledge that China was still an important partner of Vietnam and it contributed greatly to the development of the Vietnam's economy. Interestingly, despite the historical issue with the United States, this country was viewed positively by many respondents with higher support than South Korea.

A surprising result is the low level of support for Russia. This is understandable because the Russia's involvement in Vietnam, especially in everyday life is not very "visible" nowadays. Moreover, as the vast majority of the two surveys were young adults, few of them remembered or received the great assistance of the former USSR (Russia today) to Vietnam during the hard old days.

To conclude, the high support for Japan amongst both participants and non-participants demonstrates that the image of Japan is quite good in Vietnam. This result also corresponds with the results of other surveys conducted in Vietnam. For example, the Opinion Poll on Japan in six ASEAN countries conducted in 2008 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan revealed that 96 percent of the interviewees viewed the relationship between Vietnam and Japan friendly; 32% considered Japan to be a potential important partner of Vietnam in the coming years²⁴¹. However, the participants have shown stronger support for Japan than the non-participants. This means that the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program may have influenced the participants' perceptions about Japan. Moreover, as these perceptions are correspondent with Japan's interests in Vietnam including both political and economic benefits, it can be said that the Program has proved a level of effectiveness in enhancing Japan's soft power in this country.

²⁴¹ 'Opinion Poll on Japan in Six ASEAN Countries'

CONCLUSION

Soft power has been considered as an importance source for Japan to project its power for its political and economic interests in another countries including Vietnam. With the duty of improving Japan's national image abroad or enhancing its soft power, public diplomacy has been utilized by Japan in various areas. Among other tools, youth exchange program is an important tool of Japan's public diplomacy.

This research attempts to address the following questions:

Is public diplomacy an effective tool to enhance Japan's soft power in Vietnam?

Are youth exchange programs as a tool of Japan's public diplomacy help enhance Japan's soft power in Vietnam?

To answer these questions, the research will analyze both the analytical and empirical sides of the argument. Chapter 1 discusses the theoretical framework of soft power, the non-material form of power, and public diplomacy; in which public diplomacy is considered as one of the efficient tools to enhance a country's soft power. In chapter 2, Japan is used as an empirical work with an analysis of the dimensions of its soft power and public diplomacy strategy. A detailed discussion of public diplomacy in Japan will be initiated to examine whether Japan's public diplomacy is an effective tool to enhance its soft power or not. Chapter 3 looks at Japan's foreign policy toward Vietnam with a thorough analysis of Japan's economic and political interests in Vietnam. Chapter 4 analyzes Japan's public diplomacy strategies in Vietnam and describes two separate surveys to examine the effectiveness of youth exchange programs in enhancing Japan's soft power in this country.

The theoretical framework of this research is based on Nye's definition and development of soft power and public diplomacy. Nye defined soft power as "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than through coercion"²⁴². In this connection, a country's soft power, according to Nye, is "its ability to influence events through persuasion and attraction rather than military or financial coercion"²⁴³. Soft power can derive from major resources including culture, values and foreign policies. If these resources are attractive, they can incite admiration and respect in other parts of the world. Therefore, soft power can exert

²⁴² Nye, *Bound to Lead*

²⁴³ Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*.

great influence on the perceptions of foreign public about a country. These perceptions are important for a country to achieve its national interests in another country.

“Public diplomacy is an instrument that government uses to mobilize resources of soft power to communicate with and attract the public of other countries, rather than merely their governments”²⁴⁴. The relationship between soft power and public diplomacy is absolutely clear. According to Nye, public diplomacy in various forms has a long history as a means of promoting a country’s soft power²⁴⁵. The effectiveness of a country’s public diplomacy in another country can be reflected in perceptions or views of the local public about that country. These perceptions or views are usually collected through opinion polls or surveys.

Both soft power and public diplomacy seem to be relatively new concepts in Japan. In 2002 the article written by McGray entitled “Japan’s Gross National Cool” garnered great attraction with the argument that “Japan is becoming a superpower again, but it's not becoming a military superpower or an economic superpower. Instead, it's becoming a superpower of mass culture, an arena where the United States has reigned supreme for the past few decades”²⁴⁶. Soon after that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan began to include soft power strategies in its foreign policies with the spreading of Japanese culture to the outside world. Gradually, apart from culture, Japan has utilized different resources and tools including public diplomacy to project its soft power in other countries. With public diplomacy, Japan expects to exert positive influence on the understanding of foreign people about Japan. The analysis of Japan’s public diplomacy in Vietnam in Chapter 4 demonstrated that Japan has devoted great efforts to various tools of public diplomacy in this country and youth exchange program is an example. The Ship for Southeast Asia Youth Exchange Program was analyzed as a case-study and two surveys were conducted to target participants of this program and the non-participants. The structure of the survey questionnaires was designed to define how Japan was viewed by the interviewees and whether these views were correspondent with Japan’s foreign policy goals or national interests in Vietnam. With the purpose of comparing the perceptions of the participants and those of the non-participants about some issues in relation to Japan, the surveys can help evaluate the effectiveness of the

²⁴⁴ Nye, *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, p.95

²⁴⁵ Nye, *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, p.94

²⁴⁶ McGray, ‘Japan's Gross National Cool’, pp. 44-54

program (as a tool of Japan's public diplomacy) in serving Japan's national interests in Vietnam. More specifically, the surveys can help define whether the Ship for Southeast Asia Youth Exchange Program provides Japan with the ability to get what it wants (economic and political-security interests) through attraction (admiration and respect from the participants who would support Japan's foreign policy goals in Vietnam). In other words, the surveys can help identify whether the program contributes to the enhancement of Japan's soft power in Vietnam.

The results revealed that Vietnamese people (both participants of the SSEAYP and the non-participants) have shown great interest in Japan and supported Japan economically and politically. There may be other factors other than public diplomacy which further a good image or soft power of Japan in Vietnam. These factors could include the popular "prejudice" about China among Vietnamese people because of the assertiveness of China in the South China Sea and the massive influx of harmful "made-in-China" products in Vietnam. Moreover, Japan has a higher level of development in comparison with its regional counterparts including China, South Korea or Russia. Another factor is the impact of Japan's ODA in Vietnam. As the largest donor of ODA to Vietnam, Japan can win over the hearts and minds of Vietnamese people. The surveys also showed that the role of the United States and South Korea was been viewed increasingly important by the respondents. Russia should invest more to strengthen its attraction to Vietnamese youths because these people did not view it as an important and attractive nation to Vietnam.

As the survey results showed that the participants of the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program supported Japan stronger than the non-participants, the role of public diplomacy cannot be ignored. It can be said that public diplomacy in general and the youth exchange program in particular contribute to promoting Japan's soft power in Vietnam. In other words, public diplomacy is a useful tool because it helps constitute positive perceptions among Vietnamese people about Japan. Moreover, the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Exchange Program turned out to be efficient in enhancing Japan's soft power in Vietnam as the participants' views were correspondent with Japan's foreign policy goals in their country. However, it is obvious that there should be a wider scope of survey to produce a more precise conclusion. And a further study of public diplomacy of a certain country other than Japan (for example, the United States or South Korea) or a research on another tool of

Japan's public diplomacy apart from youth exchange programs can be conducted. It would be interesting to compare their effectiveness and to define which tool of Japan's public diplomacy is the most efficient in enhancing a country's soft power in Vietnam.

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This questionnaire is part of a research aimed at exploring resources of Japan's soft power and analyzing how public diplomacy as a tool of soft power can help enhance Japan's soft power in Vietnam. The main purpose of this survey is to define whether the Ship for Southeast Asia Youth Exchange Program helps enhance Japan's soft power in Vietnam by comparing the perceptions about Japan between those of the participants and the non-participants. Thank you for your cooperation.

Please cross (X) to choose

A – General questions

Sex: ☐ Male ☐ Female

Age: ☐ 18-25 ☐ 26-35 ☐ 35+

Occupation:

- ☐ Arts/Performance/Music
- ☐ Business/Finance
- ☐ Journalism/Media
- ☐ Community/Social Service
- ☐ Education/Training
- ☐ Entrepreneur
- ☐ Government/Politics
- ☐ Law
- ☐ Medicine
- ☐ Research
- ☐ Technology/Engineer
- ☐ Other

For participants

Have you participated in other programs or events organized by Japan apart from SSEAYP?

☐ Yes

☐ No

If yes, please specify

For non-participants

Have you participated in any programs or events organized by Japan?

☐ Yes

☐ No

If yes, please specify

B – SURVEY QUESTIONS

1. Which country has played the most important role in the development of Vietnam's economy?
 - A. Japan ☐
 - B. China ☐
 - C. The United States ☐
 - D. Russia ☐

2. Which country is the most important partner (in both political and economic realm) of Vietnam?
 - A. Japan ☐
 - B. China ☐
 - C. United States ☐
 - D. Russia ☐

3. Which country would you support to be a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council?
 - A. Japan ☐
 - B. India ☐
 - C. South Korea ☐
 - D. None ☐

4. Which country deserves to be the regional leader in East Asia?
 - A. Japan ☐
 - B. China ☐
 - C. India ☐
 - D. Russia ☐

5. Which country would you support in the territorial dispute over Diaoyu/Senkaku island?
 - A. Japan ☐
 - B. China ☐

- C. None ☐
- D. No idea ☐
6. Which aspect of Japan are you most impressed with?
- A. Culture ☐
- B. People ☐
- C. Economy ☐
- D. None of the above ☐
7. If there are four following foreign companies planning to invest in Vietnam on similar conditions, which company should be given preference?
- A. Japanese ☐
- B. Chinese ☐
- C. American ☐
- D. Russia ☐
8. Which country of origin do you prefer when purchasing a laptop if the price is the same?
- A. Japan ☐
- B. China ☐
- C. The US ☐
- D. South Korea ☐
9. If you have your own business, which country would you like to export your products to, if the conditions offered are the same?
- A. Japan ☐
- B. China ☐
- C. The US ☐
- D. Russia ☐
10. If you have to work overseas, which country would you opt for?
- A. Japan ☐
- B. China ☐
- C. South Korea ☐
- D. Russia ☐

Thank you very much for your cooperation! If you would like to add anything else in relation to this survey, please feel free to write below.