Is a Cheesecake a Cake? And Other Unanswerable Questions: How the Right Theory of Vagueness Solves Long-Standing Philosophical Puzzles

In this dissertation, I lay out a novel theory of vagueness dubbed ‘partial-determinism,’ according to which vague terms are (who would’ve guessed it) partially determined. This means that the existence of borderline cases and the lack of distinct boundaries that vague terms possess are due to an indeterminacy in the extension of these terms. We don’t bother nailing down precise reference conditions for all our terms because, in general, this would be a complete waste of time. As such, there are cases where there is no fact of the matter as to whether some vague term applies. Given this, if we find ourselves needing to talk about areas that pertain to the indeterminate portions of partially determined terms, we must make sure to sufficiently determine them for whatever our purposes. In other words, we have to make a decision: is this a case where the vague term applies, or is it not? This neatly explains and resolves the sorites paradox as well as the tendency for vague borderline statements to resist truth valuation. Partial-determinism also has wider-reaching consequences beyond just the vagueness literature. Just as there is no fact of the matter as to whether or not statements that involve the indeterminate aspects of vague terms hold, there is also no fact of the matter as to how to answer questions that pertain to the indeterminate aspects of vague terms. This means that when we try to find the complete ‘necessary and sufficient conditions’ for vague but philosophically interesting concepts, we will inevitably end up empty-handed, and not for epistemic reasons, but rather because there was never anything to find. We can, of course, make a decision and precisify the relevant vague terms such that they are sufficiently determined. However, once we do, these questions cease to be very interesting as we will have answered them in the process of making such a decision. I will argue that central discussions within epistemology and metaphysics (among other areas) are vulnerable to dissolution under partial-determinism.