Empirical Evidence Against Phenomenal Theses

Classical anti-physicalist reasoning about phenomenal consciousness involves two related theses: (1) phenomenal consciousness exists, and (2) the existence of phenomenal consciousness generates an epistemic gap. From the epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal, the anti-physicalist then concludes that there is a corresponding ontological gap. Defences of the existence of these two phenomenal theses rely heavily on appeals to intuitions. Further, the phenomenal intuitions at issue are typically taken to be widespread in the population, and not only by anti-physicalists but also by a majority of physicalists. I will show, first, that the most common way of defending the phenomenal theses is by appeal to phenomenal intuitions. Second, I will present empirical evidence indicating that these phenomenal intuitions are not in fact widespread. Finally, I argue that the fact that phenomenal intuitions are not widespread undercuts the most common defence of the phenomenal theses offered by anti-physicalists. In total, this dissertation lays out and defends a general argument against the theses that phenomenal consciousness exists and generates an epistemic gap: the main way of defending phenomenal theses fails because the arguments given in favour of each ultimately require phenomenal intuitions to be natural and thus widespread, but the evidence indicates that they are not. This evidence, in turn, has direct implications for a further recent philosophical debate surrounding the supposed meta-problem of consciousness, which is also motivated by the assumption that phenomenal intuitions are widespread or, at least, have a widely shared basis. I conclude by arguing that the evidence concerning phenomenal intuitions suggests that this assumption is false, and that this renders the problem both less interesting and less important than has been assumed. I conclude that even if explaining the phenomenal intuitions of the minority remains a problem, the evidence presented in this dissertation raises a much more significant problem for those who defend qualia realism. The reverse meta-problem raises the question: Why should we believe that phenomenal consciousness exists given the paucity of intuitive support for it?