**Consociationalism, Party Organization and
Adaptation: The Austrian Party System and the
Challenge of Post-Industrialism**

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Abstract

In October 1999, the political situation of the Second Republic of Austria changed with the centre-right *Österreichische Volkspartei* (Austrian Peoples Party, ÖVP) coming in second place in the general elections for the *Nationalrat* (National Assembly) to the far-right, populist *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (Freedom Party of Austria, FPÖ), resulting in an FPÖ-ÖVP coalition government. This outcome was the culmination of a gradual decline in the vote share for the centre-left *Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs* (Social Democratic Party of Austria, SPÖ) and the ÖVP which began with the 1986 general elections. This situation was unprecedented in not only post-war Austria, but also in post-war Europe. Nowhere else had the far-right achieved such impressive electoral successes, let alone been in government. Why was it possible for a new far-right party to be so electorally successful in Austria?

This thesis joins a growing body of literature that looks inside party organisations to understand parties' relative capacities to respond to changes in their environment. It demonstrates that, at least in one case, it is unwise to assume that parties behave like unitary actors that rationally seek electoral goals. This is because institutional rules inside parties privilege some interests in internal power games, shaping whether and how the party responds to changes in the composition of interests in the electorate.

The response of the Austrian party system to the 'post-industrial' transformation of Austrian society provides a good opportunity to observe the impact of organisation on party adaptation to environmental change. The post-war 'consociational' organisation of the ÖVP and the SPÖ entrenched the power of economic interest groups—labour unions, business associations and farmers—within each party organisation and, through them, in policymaking. This so-called *Proporz* system provided a reasonable reflection of the composition of social interests in post-war society. It also responded to the challenges to Austrian democracy in the post-war environment. However, it proved extremely rigid in the face of changing Austrian society.

Institutional rigidity within the post-war Austrian party system proved ill-suited to confront the challenges of post-industrial transformation. Social transformation in Austria was not unlike that which had occurred throughout all advanced industrial democracies. It undermined traditional class-mass constituencies, such as blue collar workers, farmers and small business, while creating a new and largely white collar pool of voters. Orthodox conceptions of party change would assume that parties adapt automatically to such changes in voter concerns. The SPÖ and ÖVP responded to these changes, at best, slow and half-heartedly. This provided an opportunity for the FPÖ to target with little competition. It was the entrenched economic interests within the SPÖ and ÖVP prevented these parties from offering a credible challenge to the FPÖ for these voters.

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Terms and Abbreviations

Important Organisations

Cartellverband (CV):. A nationwide Catholic university society of students in fraternities. Linked to the ÖVP, though Jörg Haider was also a member.

Chambers of Agriculture: Austria-wide elected bodies that represented farmers' interests. Dispensed expert economic and agricultural advice, lobbied government. Dominated by the ÖVP/ ÖBB.

Chambers of Commerce: Austria-wide elected bodies that represented businesspeople. Dispensed expert economic and business advice, lobbied government. Dominated by the ÖVP/ ÖWB.

Chambers of Labour: Austria-wide elected bodies that represented labour. Dispensed expert economic and industrial relations advice, lobbied government. Dominated by the FSG.

Fraktion Christliche (FCG): Catholic *Lager* fraction within the Chambers of Labour and Works Councils

Fraktion Sozialistische (FSG): Socialist *Lager* fraction within the Chambers of Labour and Works Councils

Katholische Jugend (KJ): Catholic Youth. Catholic high school students' organisation.

Katholische Jungscharen: Catholic Youth Squads. Catholic elementary students' organisation.

Kinderfreunde :Childrens Friends. A Socialist elementary student's organisation

Österreichischer Arbeiter- und Angestelltenbund (ÖAAB): Austrian Workers and Employees League. Constituent league of the ÖVP. Was represented as a minority faction within the Chambers of Labour and within the ÖGB.

Österreichischer Bauernbund (ÖBB): Austrian Farmers League. Constituent league of the ÖVP. Dominated the Chambers of Agriculture

Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund (ÖGB): Austrian Federation of Trade Unions. Heavily linked to the SPÖ.

Österreichische Studentenunion (ÖSU): Austrian Students Union. Catholic university students' organisation.

Österreichischer Wirtschaftsbund (ÖWB): Austrian Business League. Constituent league of the ÖVP; dominated the Chambers of Commerce.

Sozialistische Jugend (SJ): Socialist Youth. Socialist high school students' organisation.

Verband Sozialistischer Studenten (VSSt): Society for Socialist Students. Socialist university students' organisation.

Works Councils: Elected bodies within workplaces that represented workers interests to management. Dominated by the FSG.

Parties

Pre-1945

Christiansozial (CS): Christian Social Party. Represented the Catholic *Lager* before 1938.

Großdeutsche Volkspartei (GDVP) Greater German Peoples Party. Represented the German National *Lager* before 1938

Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Österreichs (SDAPÖ): Social Democratic Party of Austria. Represented the Socialist *Lager* before 1938.

Post 1945

Die Grünen-Die Grünen Alternative (Grünen): The Greens- The Green Alternative

Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ): Freedom Party of Austria

Kommunistische Partei Österreichs (KPÖ): Communist Party of Austria

Liberales Forum (LIF): Liberal Forum. Broke away from the FPÖ in 1993.

Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) Austrian Peoples Party

Sozialistische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ): Socialist Party of Austria

Verband der Unabhängigen (VdU) League of Independents. Became the FPÖ in 1955.

Terms

Lager: Political camps. Founded along class lines and interest groups; acted as self-sustaining sub-societies that included media, auxiliary organisations, and occupational organisations (trade unions, employer organisations). In Austria, the Socialist *Lager* traditionally represented blue collar workers while the Catholic *Lager* represented farmers, self-employed/ small businesspeople, and urban Catholics. The existence of a third German National *Lager* was weakened after 1945; arguably was not overly important since then.

Land/ Länder: Provinces of Austria. The latter as plural.

Lagermentalität: *Lager* mentality. A term denoting an introverted *Lager* culture, that reinforced a sense of self-sustainability and exclusivity within those cultures. Defined by opposition to other *Lager*.

Lagerparteien: *Lager* parties. Collective term referring to the parties which represented the *Lager*: the SPÖ and ÖVP.

Umfeld: Term referring to the political domain of the party; represented by ideological auxiliary organisations.

Vorfeld: Term referring to the exclusive ‘domain’ of the *Lager*.

Introduction: Challenges to Institutions in Changing Environments and the Austrian Case Study

“To predict the future does not force it to become reality”
-Franz Blei

In October 1999, the political situation of the Second Republic of Austria changed with the centre-right *Österreichische Volkspartei* (Austrian Peoples Party, ÖVP) coming in second place in the general elections for the *Nationalrat* (National Assembly) to the far-right, populist *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (Freedom Party of Austria, FPÖ). This outcome was the culmination of a gradual decline in the vote share for the centre-left *Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs* (Social Democratic Party of Austria, SPÖ) and the ÖVP which began with the 1986 general elections. During that election and proceeding elections through to 1999, the combined vote share of the SPÖ and ÖVP fell from a post-World War Two average of about 90% to 60.04% in 1999. Although the SPÖ achieved plurality with 33.15%, the ÖVP had fallen to third place with the FPÖ with 26.9% each. Post-Election, the resulting coalition government was composed of the FPÖ as largest party, with an ÖVP chancellor. This situation was unprecedented in not only post-war Austria, but also in post-war Europe. There had never been a far-right party in government, let alone as the largest party, up until that point. Why was it possible for a new far-right party to be so electorally successful in Austria?

The success of the FPÖ in Austria is interesting precisely because it is so unusual. Extreme outcomes, or outliers, provide opportunities to observe particular causal relationships more clearly. Standard explanations for the emergence of far-right parties focus on voter backlash against post-industrial development and globalisation.¹ These

¹ Ronald Inglehart (1997), *Modernization and Postmodernization*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, pp. 1-440.

developments, however, have taken place across advanced democracies without producing far-right electoral successes such as those experienced by the FPÖ. The electoral success of the FPÖ raises questions about its electoral competitors and, in particular, the capacity of the SPÖ and ÖVP to adapt to the challenges of changing social structure. Can the FPÖ's successes be explained, in part, by the (in)capacity of the SPÖ and ÖVP to the changing terms of electoral competition? If so, how do we explain the relative 'adaptive capacities' of different political parties?²

Orthodox explanations of party change fail to take into account variation in the capacity of parties to adapt to environmental circumstances. One can use the work of Bell, Inglehart and Kirchheimer to illustrate how orthodox explanations conceive of a relationship between social change and party adaptation. A post-industrial or post-modern transformation changes the composition of social interests and, therefore, voter behaviour.³ Parties, pursuing votes and offices, adjust automatically to changing electoral behaviour as espoused by Kirchheimer's post-war transformation from class-mass to catch-all parties.⁴ Obviously, from their own perceptions, neither the SPÖ nor ÖVP adjusted automatically or successfully to transformations in Austrian society during the 1980's and 1990's.⁵ Why did this happen?

Herbert Kitschelt with Anthony J McGann (1995) *The Radical Right in Western Europe*, University of Michigan Press, Michigan, pp. 1-90

Hans-Georg Betz (1994) *Radical Right Wing Populism in Western Europe*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, Great Britain, pp. 1-189

Terri Givens, (2005), *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 1-188.

Pippa Norris (2005) *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*, Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 1-366.

² Steven Levitsky (2001) 'Organisation and Labor-Based Party Adaptation: The Transformation of Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective', in *World Politics*, No. 54, pp. 27-56.

³ Daniel Bell (1999), *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*, 3rd Edition, Basic Books, New York, pp. 1-616

Inglehart (1997), *Modernization and Postmodernization*, pp. 1-440

⁴ Otto Kirchheimer (1966) 'The Transformation of Western European Party Systems', in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (ed), *Political Parties and Political Development*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, pp. 177-200

⁵ Kitschelt (1995) *The Radical Right in Western Europe*, pp. 159-201.

This thesis joins a growing body of literature that suggests that forces inside party organisations influence their capacity to adapt to challenges in the external environment.⁶ The leadership and many within the SPÖ and ÖVP realised that something had to change. This thesis bridges important gaps in orthodox thinking by factoring in party organisational structure as an impediment to party adaptation. Indeed, the ÖVP vote declined almost continuously since the 1970 general election; and for the SPÖ since the 1983 general election; while the FPÖ vote, though it appeared that they would lose *Nationalrat* representation in 1986, won 9.7% in 1986 and increased this share almost every general election until 1999. Adaptation was not automatic. Indeed, party leaders found their hands tied when they attempted to meet the challenges posed by the FPÖ. These constraints were found within their own parties.

To explain the adaptive capacities of the SPÖ and ÖVP one must understand the post-war foundations of Austrian consociationalism and the organisational structure of the parties themselves. Arend Lijphart coined the term consociationalism to describe the situation where dominant socio-economic interests, represented politically by respective class-mass parties, coalesce in the face of internal and external threats.⁷ Post-war Austria faced external and internal challenges in the form of Soviet military occupation and Communist subversion; forcing Socialist and Catholic forces into coalition. This temporary social coalition continued long after the Soviet army departed and Communist threat subdued. Consociationalism, however, became a permanent feature of the Second Republic; embedded in the very organisations of the SPÖ and ÖVP. The structures of these parties institutionalised the influence of the dominant socio-economic interests in

⁶ Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda (1994) 'An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change', in *Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 259-288

⁷ Arend Lijphart (1977) *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*, Yale University Press, Binghamton, pp. 1-248.

immediate post-war Austrian society within themselves. The structure of party organisations changed more slowly than the structure of Austrian society. This explains the sluggish responses of the SPÖ and ÖVP to challenges in their environment, particularly the rise of the FPÖ.

The structure of this thesis aims to explain this hypothesis through four chapters. The first chapter will explain how SPÖ and ÖVP, structurally built out of historical and cultural circumstances, were tied to coalition government and supported through vast networks of hierarchical patronage and control; dominating Austrian politics for most of the post-war years. The second chapter will emphasise that the evolution of Austria from an industrial to a post-industrial environment undermined their bases; in common with every post-industrial democracy, but largely different in the way that both support fell dramatically and the continuation of 'industrial' interest power despite the decline in real influence over the population at large. The third chapter will argue that the success of the FPÖ was based on its ability to unite significant segments of industrial voters who had been abandoned by their patron parties the SPÖ and ÖVP, together with white collar voters who were disillusioned with the status quo; creating a voter base around anti-statist populism. The fourth chapter will reveal that SPÖ and ÖVP attempts at policy and organisational reform were undermined by the disproportionate structural strength of their increasingly unrepresentative, industrially-based interest groups. This resulted in rather haphazard and largely moderated changes that failed to reach out to new voters, leaving them open to the appeals of the FPÖ.

Chapter One: What Were the Reasons For SPÖ-ÖVP Dominance of Austrian Politics From 1945?

This chapter examines the impact of consociationalism on the organisations of the SPÖ and ÖVP. Consociationalism has been characterised as a system of ‘pillars and bridges’ but the literature has focused almost exclusively on the bridges while ignoring the equally important structure of the ‘pillars’. This chapter examines the pillars: the internal structure of the political parties in particular

Austria must be understood within the context of its dysfunctional history; namely the pillarisation of Austrian society. Arend Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism does answer this well by espousing that cooperation between the major political and socioeconomic interests in a society can occur after times of disunity and crisis. Austria in 1945 was economically and socially ruined because of the War, but also this state was created for the second time by the Allies.

However, orthodox consociational theory of being a temporary situation does not go far enough to explain the Austrian outcome because grand coalition governance lasted beyond this time of national crisis until 1966 and continued from 1987-1999. Despite times where one party could have formed a single party majority government or small coalition with VdU/ FPÖ, they chose not to until 1966. Lijphart does not address this exception: why did the SPÖ and ÖVP continued this arrangement long after the immediate crisis period after 1945 ended? This unanswered question leads to structural observations about Austrian politics. What structural incentives within the system could have existed that would have convinced the parties that it would be advantageous to continue with consociationalism? Did the parties find incentive in staying in power together? This begs another question about internal power relationships within the

parties. Lijphart talks about an alliance of interests as represented by parties; namely, labour, farmers and business. Did these interests, benefiting from governmental power, use their positions within party organisations to continue consociationalism? And if so, did these interests have a degree of power within their parties that convinced party leadership to continue with this arrangement? Lastly, how did *Lager* elites control their supporters, some of whom would have disagreed with the alliance of two very different parties for such a long period of time? Firstly, why did two broad camps or *Lager*, the ‘Socialists’ and ‘Catholics’ as represented politically through the SPÖ and ÖVP respectively, entered into such an arrangement during most of the Second Republic? Secondly, why did a “*temporary expedient*” become permanent? Thirdly, what were the ‘vertical’ foundations of Austrian consociationalism? Lastly, how did those controls restrain those at the top of the vertical pillars?

Chapter 1.1: Reasons for Socialist and Catholic Lager and Consociational Governance in 1945

In April 1945, with the defeat of Nazi Germany and the occupation of the former Austrian state by Allied forces, a provisional Austrian government was formed by Soviet, American, British and French Allied forces. This government comprised of the three ‘anti-fascist’ currents: the newly formed socialist SPÖ, the newly formed Catholic ÖVP, and the underground communist KPÖ, with cabinet positions divided evenly between the three parties. From 1947, with the exit of a weakened KPÖ until 1966, the government was an SPÖ-ÖVP grand coalition. However, before 1945, Socialist and Catholic *Lager* were bitterly against each other. The First Republic collapsed in part due to bitter rivalry between the two that divided Austria. This subchapter asks, within the context of pre-1945 history, why Socialist and Catholic *Lager* cooperated in a consociational arrangement in 1945.

The broadest answer is because of the need for unity for the sake of the unity of the state, which had never properly existed in Austria before 1945. Lijphart is correct in interpreting that times of crisis and disunity often result in a grand coalition as the main feature of consociational democracy. Lijphart says, simply, that “...*a grand coalition may be installed as a temporary expedient to cope with a grave domestic situation or foreign crisis... Grand Coalitions have achieved unity and stability during critical transition periods by stilling partisan passions and strenghtening consensus*”.¹

Voting qualifications based on property during the late 19th century meant that many supporters of the industrial ‘class-mass’ *Christlich-Soziale Partei* (Christian Social Party, CS) and *Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei Österreichs* (Social Democratic Workers Party of Austria, SDAPÖ) were prevented from voting; entrenching divisions and developing *Lager* as a parallel ‘states within a state’. This included separate party newspapers, trade unions, clubs and associations and even paramilitary wings.² Political tribes acted, according to Pelinka, as “*substitute nations*”.³

This continued into the First Republic of Austria from 1918 onwards because the abruptness of the Allied creation of Austria in the Treaty of St Germain in 1919 left Austrians with *Lager* identity being primary, culminating in disunity during the First Republic and contributing to the eventual downfall of the First Republic in 1938. Despite promising grand coalition governments from 1918-1920 between the three *Lagerparteien*, from 1920 onwards until 1932, the SDAPÖ was excluded from government

¹ Lijphart (1977) *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*, pp. 28-29.

² Steiner (1972) *Politics in Austria*, pp. 136-141.

The German National *Lager* was unable to become a mass lager like the Socialists or Christian Socials, so was less important overall.

³ Anton Pelinka (1988) ‘The Great Austrian Taboo: The Repression of the Civil War’, in *New German Critique*, No. 43, Special Issue on Austria, p. 71.

by coalitions headed by the CS.⁴ Official exclusion of Socialists from political life after the banning of the SDAPÖ, the establishment of the CS-based, Austro-Fascist *Vaterlandfront* government under Engelbert Dolfuß (1933-1934) and Kurt Schuschnigg (1934-1938) confirmed divisions.⁵

By 1945, memories of these divisions made an imperative for both *Lager* for national unity to occur. Like in 1918, the Austrian state was yet again created under the terms and conditions of the Allies due to the loss of war; but also that Austria was in a state of economic ruin and social disunity. What made the two *Lager* accept that cooperation was necessary this time?

The first factor was the moderation and shared experiences of the representative parties. William Blum argues that “...*the men who came forward to create a Second Republic either had always been moderates... or had been converted to moderate democratic politics by the experiences of the concentration camp, war, and life in democratic England*”.⁶ Both parties were moderated due to the decline of more radical factions to be displaced by moderate leaders, and the moderation of many radicals due to experiences from 1938-1945. SDAPÖ radicals were damaged by defeat in the Civil War and subsequent exile. The new SPÖ was led by Karl Renner until 1947 and Adolf Schärf 1945-1957; both distinguished as moderates who remained in Austria during *Anschluss* and were instrumental in contacting former CS leadership in 1944-1945 about future cooperation.⁷ Many exiled radicals such as Bruno Kreisky were moderated by English and Scandinavian models of democracy and welfare.

⁴Kurt L. Shell (1962) *The Transformation of Austrian Socialism*, State University of New York, New York, pp. 14-17.

From 1945 onwards, the term *Lagerparteien* will only refer to the SPÖ and ÖVP as respective representatives of the Socialist and Catholic *Lager*.

⁵ William T. Bluhm (1973) *Building an Austrian Nation: The Political Integration of a Western State*, Yale University Press, London, pp. 35-41.

⁶ Ibid, p. 62.

⁷ Ibid, pp. 60-61.

Moderates were overall less ideological, more pragmatic, pro-liberal democracy, definitely anti-communist, and pro-trade unionism.⁸

Like the SPÖ, the ÖVP was a defiantly moderate party because of roots in leadership from the former CS who were always moderate or moderate by conversion. Initial discussions into the creation of the new party were started by CS trade union leader Lois Weinberger, former Farmers League chief and one time Dachau prisoner Leopold Figl, and former Business and Trade Association chief Julius Raab.⁹ All except Raab were arrested in Gestapo raids in 1944 and sentenced to death until the Soviet occupation of Vienna. During the founding, Figl was appointed chairman, Weinberger and Raab deputy chairmen.

The second factor was the Cold War as a crisis that shepherded the “*temporary expedient*”. For Austria, this was the fear of Soviet influence. Soviet occupation of an eastern part of Austria lasted until 1955, and KPÖ presence, which had Soviet support, was deemed to be a threat to the survival of the Austrian state; especially given Soviet-backed communist takeovers in Eastern Europe at that time. The presence of Soviet forces in Austria was quite unpopular because of immediate moves against Austrian industry and interference in politics. Immediate asset stripping of industry in Soviet occupied zone began from 1945; leading to confrontation between the USA and Soviet authorities in Austria.¹⁰ The KPÖ attempts to infiltrate the ÖGB and an attempted coup during a general strike in October 1950 made the communist threat seem more immediate.¹¹ As opposed to allying with their left counterparts, the SPÖ cooperated with

⁸ Kurt Steiner (1972) *Politics in Austria*, Little, Brown and Company; Boston, pp. 127-128.

⁹ Bluhm (1973) *Building an Austrian Nation*, pp. 55-58.

¹⁰ Günter Bischof (2002) ‘Allied Plans and Policies for the Occupation of Austria, 1938-1955’, in Rolf Steininger, Günter Bischof and Michael Gehler (eds), *Austria in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 175-178.

¹¹ Melanie A. Sully (1981) *Political Parties and Elections in Austria*, C. Hurst & Company, London, pp. 124-126.

the ÖVP against the KPÖ; confirming the moderation within the SPÖ. The threat of Communism from inside and outside Austria was instrumental in cooperation between *Lager*.

The third factor of this relationship that was a reason to unite was protection against both SPÖ and ÖVP wrongdoing associated with *Anschluss* and the Second World War. This was allowable because of the Moscow Declaration. In 1943 the Allied Moscow Declaration had declared that on the one hand that “*Austria, the first free country to fall to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination*” but on the other hand that “*Austria is reminded, however, that she has a responsibility for participation on the side of Hitlerite Germany and that in the final settlement, account will inevitably be taken of her contribution to her liberation*”.¹² There were two main conveniences to be benefited from this. One, the legacy of the First Republic and *Anschluss* needed to be hidden from the public through a national unity myth in order to protect the Socialist and Catholic leadership. Both parties came to understand not to use the legacy of *Anschluss* against each other because no good would come of “*If you ‘de-nazify’ my Nazi, I will ‘de-nazify’ your Nazi*” as it would destroy them both.¹³ Secondly, it helped Austria start anew from separating itself from Germany and into a new Austrian identity that was needed for the sake of unity.

Given these reasons of national unity, both parties sought to moderate themselves in order not to repeat the mistakes of the First Republic and forge a new national political identity by moderating demands and working together for self and mutual interest in building an Austrian national identity. The situation in 1945 was the declaration of “*Jahr Null*” or “Year Zero” for the Republic of Austria.

¹² David Art (2006) *The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria*, Cambridge University Press, New York, p. 105.

¹³ Margarete Lamb-Faffelberger (2003) ‘Beyond “The Sound of Music”: The Quest for Cultural Identity in Modern Austria’, in *The German Quarterly*, Vol. 76, No. 3, p. 290-291.

Chapter 1.2: Interest Entrenchment and the Continuation of Consociational Governance

Lijphart's explanation of why consociationalism can occur applies well to Austria in 1945: that a grand coalition could be explained as a "*temporary expedient*" within the context of civil strife, war, and the Communist threat doesn't properly account for why consociationalism continued. The State Treaty of 1955 not only ended Allied occupation but also neutrality protected Austria against the Soviets; while economic ruin had been eased by reconstruction, spurred on by the Marshall Plan after 1947. This ensured that the Soviets would be no threat to Austria; and this occurred after the immediate economic ruin of Austria after 1945 and the enactment of the Marshall Plan in 1947. The broad answer was that the *Lagerparteien*, built upon structures based upon interest group influence, entrenched themselves in government in order to control their interest and protect their constituencies. Austrian society was 'pillarised' between two *Lager*; whose parties and associated interest groups leadership provided an umbrella to create each two large swathes of society which had different interests.

There were several factors that were strong incentives for both *Lager* to remaining in government. The first factor was that grand coalition government guaranteed protection of ideological interests and domains; whether guaranteeing a say on government policy or protecting their own interests. Despite willingness of moderates from each party to work together, there were still considerable divisions between *Lager*. SPÖ ideology derived from Austro-Marxism, while ÖVP descended from Austro-Fascism. Because the Civil War was only a recent occurrence, there were understandable tensions between *Lager*. A grand coalition would have had to base trust upon power sharing, based on election results dividing the 'spoils of state'. Lijphart says

"...proportionality adds a refinement to the grand coalition concept: not only should all significant

segments be represented in decision-making organs, but they should also be represented proportionally".¹⁴

This stood as a guarantee of representation of the main economic interest groups: trade unions, farmers and businessmen. Thus, the post-war system that distributed government and bureaucratic posts and public resources between the two major parties in proportion to their relative electoral strength, known as *Proporz*, was born.

The first main feature, the distribution of power through the awarding of cabinet positions, gave parties incentive to stay in grand coalition in order to protect their interests over *Lager 'Vorfeld'* or natural domain, also known as segmental autonomy.¹⁵ This coincides with Lijphart's exception to usual 'zero-sum' theory on politics. Lijphart claims that in polarised societies there is a greater common good in coming together to protect one's own interests especially in times of instability; and that compromise and protection of interests all the time is preferable to possible exclusion from government during some of or all of the time.¹⁶

In cabinet, *Proporz* protected party interests by guaranteeing control over interested portfolios and public resources, referred to by Luther as segmental autonomy. Lijphart mentions this as a guarantee of security for all parties in order to remain influential. Until 1966, the ÖVP was guaranteed Finance, Education, Commerce, Agriculture and Defence, while SPÖ was guaranteed Interior, Justice, Social Welfare and Transport.¹⁷ The nationalisation of 71 strategic industries in 1947 gave parties greater opportunities to represent their interests and constituencies. In 1955, the SPÖ was able

¹⁴ Lijphart (1977) *Democracy in Plural Societies*, p. 39.

¹⁵ Kurt Richard Luther (2007) 'A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Political Parties in Consociational Democracy', in Kurt Richard Luther and Kris Deschouwer (eds) *Party Elites In Divided Societies: Political Parties In Consociational Democracies*, Routledge, London, p. 13.

¹⁶ Lijphart (1977) *Democracy in Plural Societies*, pp. 26-30.

¹⁷ Frederick C. Englemann (1966) 'Austria: the Pooling of Opposition', in Robert A. Dahl (ed), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, Yale University Press, New Haven, p. 273.

to establish control over industries that were financially beneficial and were a means to guarantee patronage to their blue collar support base: with steel, coal, transport, oil, and with most heavy industries being placed under the 'Red' Ministry of Transport in 1955, known as 'Waldbrunner's Kingdom' after the Minister Karl Waldbrunner, while the ÖVP controlled two of the three largest banks, under the 'Black' Ministry of Finance.¹⁸ Furthermore, *Proporz* gave a guarantee that ministry staff would be appointed according to election result proportions based on who controlled which ministry so that the party in control could dispense jobs to *Lager* members.¹⁹ It was clear from this that both SPÖ and ÖVP became integrated into the state because they could now protect their interest areas and could control strategic industries for the benefit of their respective *Lager*.

The second feature, mutual veto, ensured compromise on contentious areas of policy. Lijphart notes this important feature as providing a mechanism to prevent the other side from enacting policy that is deemed to be too partisan.²⁰ Compromise was enforced through several important mechanisms. Coalition committees that formed governments after each election, comprising of important party elites and interest group elites, ensured a unanimous vote on policies that were to be implemented as was stated in the coalition programs. From 1945-1966, government legislation received unanimous approval between 87.2% to 97.6% of the time.²¹ Even during single party majority governments, most laws were passed unanimously.²² Another mechanism, as Engelmann makes mention of, was the concept of *Bereichsopposition* or opposition within the government by each partner in order to ensure compromise. The use of counter

¹⁸ Bluhm (1973) *Building an Austrian Nation*, pp. 72-73.

¹⁹ Luther (1992) 'Consociationalism, Parties and the Party System', p. 88.

²⁰ Lijphart (1977) *Democracy in Plural Societies*, pp. 36-38.

²¹ Wolfgang C. Müller (1993) 'Executive-Legislative Relations in Austria: 1945-1992', in *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 4, p. 473.

This included KPÖ and FPÖ unanimity as well as for SPÖ and ÖVP.

²² Ibid, pp. 481-485.

balanced 'Secretaries of State' as junior cabinet members attached to important portfolios which the other party controlled, such as the Chancery and Finance, was used to act as a counterbalance.²³

One famous example of how this compromise worked was broadcasting licensing in 1957. Opposition to SPÖ plans in 1955 to nationalise all broadcasting under a centrally run public corporation resulted in a rather complicated compromise in 1957. This included a 26 member board of directors with balanced political representation.²⁴

The second factor behind the continuance of consociational governance was that disproportionate interest group influence within each party's organisational structure kept parties within *Proporz* because of the benefit to interest groups being influential in government. This is evident in certain Ministries that were dominated by Ministers who were directly linked to interest groups. Both parties were locked into place because the party structures gave disproportionate influence to particular interest groups and vice versa, which dominated powerful and influential Chambers. The economic power of the Chambers, given compulsory membership of concerned professions, was made stronger through the powers granted by government as advisors and within parties as politicians. Although they were elected bodies that were supposed to be independent, in reality they were dominated by party lists from the early years of the Second Republic. This factor must be explained by references to party structures.

²³ Englemann (1966) 'Austria: the Pooling of Opposition', pp. 270-271.

²⁴ Herbert P. Secher (1958), 'Coalition Government: The Case of the Second Austrian Republic', in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 52, No. 3, p. 800.

During the ÖVP single majority government from 1966-1970, the Minister of Social Welfare, Grete Rehor, was an ÖAAB functionary as Deputy Chairwoman of the third largest union in Austria. This shows that consociational and corporatist considerations meant that the ÖGB was 'given a seat at the table'.

SPÖ party structure gave disproportionate power to the trade union body, *Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund* (ÖGB), and to ÖGB leadership. In 1983, about 75% of all SPÖ members were also members of the ÖGB as members of the Socialist Fraction (*Fraktion Sozialistische*, FSG).²⁵ But this was apparent on all levels of organisation because of the ties between SPÖ and ÖGB that made the organisations indistinguishable as part of a greater *Lager*.²⁶

Structural ‘pillarisation’ of SPÖ and ÖGB into a Socialist *Lager* successfully solidified SPÖ penetration by countering the KPÖ and its attempts at dominating trade unionism through infiltration into Work Councils. From 1945, the SPÖ dominated the ÖGB, largely based on dominance of pre-war Socialist trade unions using blue collar numbers, and the monolithic, hierarchical structure of the ÖGB to retain union dominance. The sole right of negotiation of workers wage agreements was given to ÖGB, solidifying it as the main organ of the labour movement. The SPÖ successfully prevented the KPÖ from challenging its dominance of the labour movement. The KPÖ aimed to use grassroots Works Council elections, running left wing ‘unity lists’ in 1947, and won more than 20% in the industrial Styria and Lower Austria.²⁷ During September-October of 1950, the KPÖ attempt to mobilise the Works Councils to take over the labour movement by campaigning against the Fourth Wage/ Price Agreement, but failed largely due to SPÖ-ÖGB mobilisation of rank and file against it. In 1952, to assure

²⁵ Melanie A. Sully (1986) ‘Austrian Social Democracy’ in William E. Paterson and Alistair H. Thomas (ed), *The Future of Social Democracy: Problems and Prospects of Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe*, Oxford University Press, USA, p. 166.

²⁶ The difference with the ÖGB here is that the Chamber of Labour was dominated by the outside through earlier politicisation by party-affiliated lists that ran union members and officials, whereas the ÖGB was dominated in turn due to FSG-SPÖ links.

²⁷ William B. Bader (1966), *Austria Between East and West, 1945-1955*. Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp. 145-149.
Shell (1962) *The Transformation of Austrian Socialism*, pp. 65-71.

Socialist dominance and Communist weakness, the SPÖ formalised the politicisation of the ÖGB and Chambers of Labour by forming the FSG.

There were clear links between ÖGB leadership and officeholders and elected SPÖ officials, indicating that they were a part of a greater *Lager* leadership. From 1945, all Presidents of the sixteen affiliated unions were both FSG and SPÖ members, and from 1945-1986, the same applied to the presidents of the ÖGB, who were simultaneously members of the *Nationalrat*.

Table 1.1 ÖGB Presidents and the *Nationalrat* 1945-1986

<i>President and Nationalrat Member</i>	<i>Posts</i>	<i>ÖGB Presidency</i>
Johann Böhm 1945-1959	Deputy President of the <i>Nationalrat</i> , 1945-1959	1945-1959
Franz Olah 1948-1966	Deputy President of the <i>Nationalrat</i> , 1959-1961; Minister of the Interior 1963-1964	1959-1963
Anton Benya 1956-1986	President of the <i>Nationalrat</i> , 1971-1986	1963-1986
Friedrich Verzetnitsch 1986-2006	Member of the <i>Nationalrat</i> , 1986-2006	1987-2006

Source: Steiner (1972) Politics in Austria, pp. 81-82, 315

This reveals *Lager* ties in which important leadership represented Socialist interests through continuing office-holding while in the *Nationalrat*. In cabinet, the SPÖ-held post of Ministry of Social Welfare had, until 1986, been held by an ÖGB representative. In the *Nationalrat*, many SPÖ members have had past careers in the ÖGB. For example, in 1968, 33 SPÖ members out of 74 were still ÖGB officials.²⁸ ÖGB hierarchy confirms

²⁸ Steiner (1972) *Politics in Austria*, p. 233.

integration into the Socialist *Lager*. The structure of the Executive from 1966 confirms SPÖ connections at the height of the hierarchy.

Table 1.2: ÖGB Executive Composition, 1966.

<i>Party Grouping</i>	<i>Members</i>
FSG	52 (81%)
FCG	7
Communist	4
Non-Partisan	1
<i>Total</i>	<i>64</i>

Source: Steiner (1972) Politics in Austria, p. 301.

The ÖVP had similar issues with dominance through a division of real structural power equally between its three main component organisations: the *Österreichischer Arbeiter-un Angestelltenbund* (ÖAAB, Austrian Workers and Employees League), the *Österreichischer Bauernbund* (ÖBB, Austrian Peasants League), and the *Österreichischer Wirtschaftsbund* (ÖWB Austrian Business League). This issue was far more clear-cut than the SPÖ because of clearer structural ties in a decentralised party organisation. Members of the leagues, though league members first and foremost, were dual members of the ÖVP.

Table 1.3: Party Membership, 1980.²⁹

ÖBB	388,863
ÖWB	152,906
ÖAAB	271,995
Others (Youth, Pensioners, Women)	354,124
Total	1,167,888

Source: Sully (1981) *Political Parties and Elections in Austria*, p. 74.

Unlike the centralised SPÖ and the case of ÖGB domination over a Chamber, the ÖVP was dominated by these leagues, of which the ÖWB and ÖBB dominated the Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture respectively. Elections for these Chambers favoured ÖVP lists because of entrenched *Lagermentalität* that associated farmers, business and employees with the Catholic *Lager*. Though membership figures show numerical influence of ‘other’ groups within the party, the three leagues dominated. As an analogy to *Proporz*, the leagues represented powerful constituencies, were financially self-sufficient, and guaranteed structural representation and the ability to veto decisions detrimental to interests.³⁰ The only real change that has been made is in factional balances of power. For example, Raab succeeded Figl as party chairman and Chancellor of Austria, signalling a shift from the ÖBB to the ÖWB. Ties, nonetheless, have been obvious amongst ÖVP leadership.

²⁹ Family members counted for 49.7% of members.

³⁰ Wolfgang C. Müller and Barbara Steininger (1994), ‘Party Organisation and Party Competitiveness: The Case of the Austrian Peoples Party, 1945-1992’, in *European Journal of Political Research*, No. 26, p. 13.

Table 1.4: ÖVP Leadership-Leagues Connections, 1945-2000.³¹

<i>Name, and Years of Leadership</i>	<i>Affiliation</i>
Leopold Figl 1945-1953	ÖBB President, 1945
Julius Raab 1953-1961	Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce 1946-1953, 1961-1964
Anfons Gorbach 1961-1964	None
Josef Klaus 1964-1970	None
Josef Taus 1975-1979	None ³²
Alois Mock 1979-1989	ÖAAB Chairman, 1971-1978
Erhard Busek 1991-1995	ÖWB Secretary General 1972-1975
Wolfgang Schüssel 1995-2007	ÖWB Secretary General 1975-1991

Sources: Steiner (1972) Politics in Austria, pp. 91-82, Bluhm (1973) Building an Austrian Nation, pp. 55-58, Crepaz (1995) An Institutional Dinosaur: Austrian Corporatism in the Post-Industrial Age, p. 82

Connections between leadership and interest groups are more direct than the SPÖ, which never had an ÖGB President as leader. Although they resigned their posts when they became leaders onwards, leaders were still linked to the interest groups through past affiliations nonetheless; while even future leaders such as Raab, Mock, Busek and Schüssel retained their posts while in the *Nationalrat*.

Like the SPÖ, ÖVP and interest group ties existed on all levels. In cabinet, interest groups similarly dominated particular portfolios. As mentioned above, ÖVP chairmen were usually linked to a prominent interest group through prior or incumbent position-holding. Until 1970, the Minister of Trade and Commerce had an ÖWB background,

³¹ Those left out include shorter term leaders such as Herman Withalm (1970-1971), Karl Schleinzer (1971-1975) and Josef Riegler (1989-1991).

³² Was Chairman of the Board at Austrian Industry Holdings from 1967-1975. This company was a corporation of nationalised industrial interests. Reflects nature of *Proporz* and ÖVP interests.

while the Ministers of Agriculture was from the ÖBB. In the *Nationalrat*, many interest group officials were prominent ÖVP members but more so than in the case of the SPÖ.

Table 1.5: ÖVP *Nationalrat* Dual League Membership, 1968 Session

<i>League</i>	<i>Number Of Officials as Members of Nationalrat</i>
ÖAAB	13
ÖBB	23
ÖWB	14
<i>Total out of 85 ÖVP Members</i>	<i>50</i>

Source: Steiner (1972) *Politics in Austria*, p. 233.

The third factor that provided incentive for the parties to stay in consociational governance, as a combination of the previous two factors, was that the corporatist system of negotiations on policy provided interest groups a strong position of influence over social and economic policy. The negotiating positions which they were granted due to party influence, regardless of which party was in power, gave interest groups massive influence, which could only exist in its strongest through interest groups cooperating in a grand coalition government.

The most prominent and basic of these positions of influence was the inclusion in negotiations through organisational positions to form governments and influence legislation. All grand coalition cabinets from 1945 were negotiated through coalition committees after the elections, which decided the agenda of any government through a guarantee of policies that would be enacted in the coming term; stronger if in grand coalition. ÖVP delegations included the Chairmen of the three leagues, while SPÖ

delegations included ÖGB representatives.³³ These groups had a seat at the table representing their interests and therefore had a stake in the future, even during the Klaus and Kreisky governments of 1966 and 1970 and 1970-1983, major interest groups admitted their preference for a grand coalition government.³⁴ One example of this was the floated possibility of the SPÖ and the FPÖ in coalition against the ÖVP during the Habsburg Crisis in 1961, which was defeated in part by the efforts of trade unionists such as future ÖGB President Benya.³⁵ Even with strong control of legislation from the centre, legislation was heavily influenced in creation in the *Nationalrat* because of the high number of officials as *Nationalrat* members, pressure from *Lager* elites, and intense lobbying.³⁶

This is evident in the feature of inter-group corporatist cooperation. Steiner refers to this as a '*paracoalition*'. This began with five Wage-Price Agreements between SPÖ and ÖVP, the three Chambers, and the ÖGB, as represented by their leadership, from 1947-1951, in order to negotiate wage and price increases.³⁷ This developed into a permanent advisory board, with the establishment of the Joint Commission on Prices and Wages as an interest group advisory body to cabinet on prices and wages. This was negotiated between the respective presidents of the ÖGB, Böhm and Olah, and former Chancellor and Chairman of the federal Chambers of Commerce, Julius Raab, from 1956-1963.

The resulting structure, as well as important politicians such as the Chancellor, ministers of interior, social welfare, consisted of two representative of each of the three

³³ Steiner (1972) *Politics in Austria*, pp. 253-254.

³⁴ Ibid, pp. 305-306.

During the Klaus-ÖVP single majority government from 1966-1970, the Minister of Social Welfare, Grete Rehor, was an ÖAAB functionary and Deputy Chairwoman of the third largest union in Austria. This shows that consociational and corporatist considerations meant that the ÖGB was still given a 'seat at the table'.

³⁵ Ibid, pp. 131-132, 315.

³⁶ Ibid, pp. 307-308.

³⁷ Ibid, pp. 81-82.

chambers and ÖGB.³⁸ The three sub-organs, the Subcommittee on Prices, the Subcommittee on Wages, which heard collective bargaining cases from any of the sixteen unions, and the Subcommittee for Economic and Social Questions, which negotiated on issues of economic and social importance, were similarly structured.³⁹

The influence and gains for interest groups being negotiators, only possible together, were enough incentive to encourage the continuation of this comfortable arrangement.

What can be surmised in this subchapter is that Socialist and Catholic *Lager* continued this consociational arrangement in Austrian politics for most of the post-war years because their interests became entrenched in the state. Their stake in government, combined with specific interests within the party, meant that this mutual arrangement was beneficial insofar as it gave parties and interest groups control over their direct ideological, political and socio-economic interests and ensured safe compromises over other issues. The three leagues and the ÖGB had incentive in staying within government and cooperating with other interest groups because this gave them maximum influence.

Chapter 1.3: Socialist and Catholic Elite Mechanisms of Control Over Lager

The previous subchapter raises a further question about the sustainability of *Lagermentalitat*. Lijphart mentions that segmental autonomy of political camps is a major feature of consociationalism, but does not delve into how *Lager* were controlled. How were Socialist and Catholic *Lager* elites able to continue with this given the possibility of opposition demands within affiliated interest groups and parties for single party rule

³⁸ Ibid, p. 313.

³⁹ Ibid, pp. 316-317.

rather than grand coalition rule? This subchapter will argue that immense politicisation of grassroots organisations and membership within *Lager*, and control by elites over the structure of the *Lager*, placated members and crushed dissent. There were two elements to control: political socialisation of the masses through *Lager* organisations, whether party or occupational groups; and party hierarchy control over dissent. First, though, it must be shown that *Lager* were strong during most of the Second Republic.

Political *Lager* were a notable feature in Austrian society, as opposed to most other Western countries. Political party membership was one example. In the early 1960s, 26.2% of the Austrian electorate were members of political parties.⁴⁰ In 1970, the peak in figures for both parties, there were 719,389 SPÖ members and 819,397 ÖVP members, compared to only 28,000 for the FPÖ and 29,000 for the KPÖ.⁴¹ This mass base for the main parties meant that they could rely on mass mobilisation for a reliable turnout during elections. In 1970, SPÖ members made up 32.4% of its total voters and ÖVP members made up about 30% of its total voters.⁴² This gave the main parties an overwhelming edge over non-*Lager* rivals.

Furthermore, party loyalty was fairly consistent, making *Lager* support fairly unassailable. Taking a survey sample from 1961, 75% of the core voters for SPÖ and 57% of ÖVP core considered themselves ‘declared party supporters’.⁴³ In an Ifes survey of from 1968 that analysed polling data from the 1959, 1962, 1965 (presidential) and

⁴⁰ Peter Mair (1997) *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p.130.

⁴¹ Luther (1992) ‘Consociationalism, Parties and the Party System’, p. 49.

⁴² Ibid, p. 48.

⁴³ Fritz Plasser, Peter A. Ulram, and Alfred Grausgruber (1992), ‘The Decline of ‘*Lager* Mentality’ and the New Model of Electoral Competition in Austria’, in *West European Politics*, Vol. 15, No. 1 p. 21.

1966 elections, 27% of voters identified as ‘consistent’ ÖVP voters, 36% as consistent SPÖ, and 37% as inconsistent for either party.⁴⁴ Class identification was clear as well.

Table 1.6: Party Identification By Relevant Groups, 1954

<i>Demographic Occupational Group (%)</i>	<i>1954</i>
Farmers	81
Self-Employed and Professionals	63
Blue Collar	78
White Collar	69
Average	73

Source: Ifes Fessel and GfK Surveys, 1968, in Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber (1992), The Decline of ‘Lager Mentality’ and the New Model of Electoral Competition in Austria’, p. 26.

Lastly, there was consistency in voting patterns among family and environment. In the same Ifes survey, 67% of respondents voted along the same lines as their fathers did when they were children.⁴⁵ Therefore, it can be understood that *Lager* political support from their natural bases was very consistent from election to election.

This is best summed up by divisive features that determined *Lager*. One was class and occupation. Socialists were blue collar, unionised and urban; Catholics were self-employed businesspeople, farmers and some white collar urban workers. Another social element needed to be mentioned is religion. Socialists tended to be lapsed Catholic or atheist, while Catholics tended to be devoutly religious.⁴⁶ Class-occupational *Lager* bases were strongly traditional, however, why was it that members stayed loyal after 1945 and most of the Second Republic?

⁴⁴ Frederick C. Engelmann and Mildred A. Schwartz (1974), ‘Partisan Stability and the Continuity of a Segmented Society: The Austrian Case’, in *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 79, No. 4, p. 953.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 953.

⁴⁶ According to a series of polls from 1954-1961, ÖVP supporters tended towards strong religious values, with 67% of supporters claiming to attend Church every Sunday, as opposed to 15% for SPÖ supporters.

There are four main explanations for the ability of *Lager* elites to sustain loyalty: auxiliary control over life activities, auxiliary youth indoctrination, loyalty incentive of patronage, and communication indoctrination.

Firstly there was auxiliary control of social environments. Luther labels the three types of auxiliary organisations associated with the parties: employment, voluntary values-based organisations, and voluntary leisure organisations. Employment organisations are those previously referred to: fractions inside the Chambers (FSG and ÖAAB + FCG for Chambers of Labour, ÖWB for Chambers of Commerce, and ÖBB for Chambers of Agriculture) and ÖGB for industrial relations. Luther argues that “*Fraktionen... directly affect the working lives of their members. Each Chamber is dominated by a single Fraktion and thus the working lives of employed persons are significantly influenced by socialist Lager politics, while those of the self-employed and of farmers are similarly organised by the Catholic-conservative Lager politics*”.⁴⁷

Below this level is an example of the representation party-linked groups at the 1963 ÖGB annual conference.

Table 1.7: 1963 ÖGB Conference Delegates

<i>Party Grouping</i>	<i>Delegates</i>
FSG	287 (73%)
FCG	63
Communist	36
Non-Partisan	5
<i>Total</i>	<i>391</i>

Source: Steiner (1972) Politics in Austria, p. 301.

⁴⁷ Luther (1992) ‘Consociationalism, Parties and the Party System’, p.53.

On a grassroots level, as mentioned earlier, the SPÖ politicised networks to ensure a lack of competition and to ensure their own dominance, using FSG to infiltrate and dominate grassroots level control over the Chambers of Labour and the Work Councils.

Table 1.8: 1959 Chambers of Labour Elections (Federal Total)

<i>Party List</i>	<i>Percentage of Vote</i>
FSG	68.4
FCG	18.6
Communist	6.6

Source: Shell (1962) The Transformation of Austrian Socialism, pp. 284-285.

Table 1.9: 1952 Work Council Elections (Federal Total)

<i>Party List</i>	<i>Percentage of Vote</i>
FSG	59
Communist	6
FCG	4
Non-Party/ Independen	30
VdU	1

Source: Shell (1962) The Transformation of Austrian Socialism, p. 286.

Although the ÖAAB (as FCG) was weaker, it still had strong influence within white collar professions and the financial employee sector within the ÖGB and Chambers of Labour. Meanwhile, the leagues of the ÖVP dominated the Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture.

Table 1.10: 1965 Chambers of Commerce Election (Federal Total)

<i>Party List</i>	<i>Total Seats</i>
ÖWB	9,777 (84.7%)
FWB (SPÖ)	1,000 (8.6%)
Independent/ Other	770 (6.7%)

Source: Steiner (1972) Politics in Austria, pp. 292-294

Table 1.11: 1960-1965 Chambers of Agriculture (Federal Total)

<i>Party List</i>	<i>Total Seats</i>
ÖBB	219 (86.2%)
League of Working Families (SPÖ)	21 (8.3%)
FPÖ list	8 (3.1%)

Source: Steiner (1972) Politics in Austria, pp. 292-294.

With Chamber membership compulsory and high levels of unionisation, it is evident that *Lager* organisations were heavily entrenched in the workplace of interested party voting bases; this maximised *Lager* political socialisation. Given party infiltration into the workplace, employment advancement within the organisation or workplace would be more likely for notable members of an affiliated organisation.

Voluntary values-based organisations were linked to the party through obvious leadership and activist links, financial support; ideologically connected the base. These were linked as part of a feeling of natural *Vorfeld*, and *Umfeld* (part of political environment) of the relevant *Lager* party.⁴⁸ Organisations would include Socialist examples such as *Sozialistische Jugend* (Socialist Youth, 42,000 in 1983) and the Working

⁴⁸ Ibid, pp. 53-54.

Group for Sport and Body Culture in Austria (968,000 in 1983) as ideological organisations of special interest. The unusually large membership of these groups, especially in the case of the latter, is an example of affiliated penetration of *Lager* into subsidiary social activities with political-ideological flavour.

Voluntary leisure organisations were rather removed from the party because they revolve around hobby activities. But there certainly were financial links and the main purpose of these is to socialise within *Lager* and operated within and parallel as separate Socialist or Catholic *Lager* organisations; and included a wide variety of hobbies such as the Austrian Club for Automobilists, Motorbikers and Cyclists (ÖVP/ Catholic) and the First Austrian Association of Worker-Stamp Collectors (SPÖ/ Socialist).⁴⁹

This excessive politicisation of social life was successful to say the least. Steiner notes, especially with the more hobby and purpose oriented groups, that the purpose of these was that “... *members of these organisations are exposed to others with like backgrounds or political views.. The members mutually reinforce their identification with their organisation’s views and their hostility to those of differing views... Membership in cumulative organised groups also leads to primarily partisan friendships, which reinforce, on the primary level, the views held in common*”.⁵⁰ These organisations reflect *Lagermentalitat* of both the functionaries but also of the *Lager* masses themselves.

Secondly, auxiliary organisations were built around age structures, meaning that people could be socialised from an early age through the establishment of parallel upbringings, increasing *Lager* control over social life from the beginning

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 54.

⁵⁰ Steiner (1972) *Politics in Austria*, pp. 258-259.

Table 1.12: Youth Organisations and Party Links

<i>Groups</i>	<i>Socialist</i>	<i>Catholic</i>
<i>Elementary</i>	<i>Kinderfreunde</i> (Childrens Friends)	<i>Katholische Jungscharen</i> (Catholic Youth Squads)
<i>High School</i>	<i>Sozialistische Jugend</i> (SJ, Socialist Youth)	<i>Katholische Jugend</i> (KJ, Catholic Youth)
<i>University</i>	<i>Verband Sozialistischer Studenten</i> (VSSSt, Society for Socialist Students)	<i>Österreichische Studentennunion</i> (ÖSU Austrian Students Union), <i>Cartellverbund</i> (CV, Catholic Fraternities)

Source: Steiner (1972) Politics of Austria, pp. 258-259, Luther 1992) Consociationalism, Parties and the Party System, p. 54.

Though this point is brief, it is important to emphasise that *Lager* could raise children from a young age with a distinct world view based on politics and class.

Thirdly, *Lager* elites could sustain support through patronage of resources and protecting supporters' interests. As parallel societal structures, *Lager* elites used preferential allocation of resources through control of ministries relevant to members and control over a district or region, which could provide patronage in exchange for loyalty (party membership, serving the party or organisation).⁵¹ For example, SPÖ used its control of Social Welfare or ÖVP control of Agriculture to deliver to its core constituents, or even jobs in controlled Ministries and nationalised industries.⁵² Serving the party through auxiliary groups or interest groups was the best way to earn promotion through loyalty to the party, while using this to maintain control from the top of the hierarchy.⁵³ Shell notes one prominent example. "*The fact that in 1951 the SPÖ was called upon to fill 17,221 positions - over 1,000 of them full-time political jobs such as mayoralty, membership*

⁵¹ Ibid, pp. 267-268.

⁵² Wolfgang C. Müller (1989) 'Party Patronage in Austria: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Findings', in Anton Pelinka and Fritz Plasser (eds) *The Austrian Party System*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, pp. 332-337.

Excellent coverage of job and resource patronage in Austria.

⁵³ Kurt Richard Luther (2007) 'Must What Goes Up Always Come Down?' in Kurt Richard Luther and Kris Deschouwer (eds) *Party Elites In Divided Societies: Political Parties In Consociational Democracies*, Routledge, London, pp. 56-57.

in central and provincial legislatures and governments - amply supports the conclusion that the level of District chairman and above, Party functions are almost invariably linked to perquisites, political or otherwise, provided by the Party".⁵⁴ He furthermore adds that there were 57,588 mostly unpaid cadre in 1955.⁵⁵ Many of these could have benefited from patronage, which meant services rendered, as well as continued loyalty.

Fourthly, communication indoctrination was important due to the ability to control information inside *Lager* that could increase likelihood of loyalty. This was achieved in several ways: press, education and functionaries. As separate social entities, parties had their own newspapers controlled by the party executives: SPÖ had the party newspaper *Arbeiter Zeitung* and the theoretical organ, *Die Zukunft*, while ÖVP had the semi official, *Land*-based *Volksblatt* and the theoretical monthly *Österreichische Monatshefte*. Party media was fairly well perused. *Fessel and GfK* surveys from the early 1960s exhibit that although the independent media was strong (45%), about 35% of voters on average read party newspapers as their source of political information.⁵⁶ The SPÖ furthered this through 'Socialist Education', using party cadre, numbering 57,588 in 1955, as conduits between the central party and the ordinary members through auxiliary organisations and collecting of party dues.⁵⁷ According to Shell, although they largely failed to be successful, they did provide a conduit of communication from the elites to the masses; which says more about the hierarchical nature of the SPÖ, affiliated organisations. Because of ÖVP decentralisation, efforts were largely organised by *Lander* units and League units as well as central office. Nonetheless, party communication to masses

⁵⁴ Shell (1962) *The Transformation of Austrian Socialism*, p. 82.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 89.

⁵⁶ Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber (1992), 'The Decline of '*Lager* Mentality' and the New Model of Electoral Competition in Austria', p. 23.

⁵⁷ Shell (1962) *The Transformation of Austrian Socialism*, pp. 89-93.

strengthened Lager-based information that shaped a *Lager*-based outlook to ensure loyalty.

The second way that *Lager* leadership used to maintain consistent *Lager* support was using structural dominance to crush opposition to *Proporz*. This has largely been explained already in this chapter by showing real control of organisations being in the hands of *Lager* elites. For interest groups, party infiltration ensured influence, and for the party, interest group infiltration helped with compliant members and leadership.

A reflection of this control was the ability of elites to easily remove or ignore alternative viewpoints within *Lager* on how the parties and interest groups should operate. An example for the Socialist *Lager* was the expulsion of central secretary Erwin Scharf in 1947 for advocating a more united left approach with the KPÖ against ÖVP. Another is the expulsion of former ÖGB President and SPÖ Minister of the Interior, Franz Olah, in 1964. Olah, a pragmatic trade unionist, attempted to use his position to overhaul what he deemed to be Austro-Marist doctrine within the SPÖ using *Länder* party organisations to end grand coalition governance with an SPÖ-FPÖ coalition.⁵⁸ Opposition by key ÖGB figures defeated him by using corruption charges against him based on the donation of ÖGB funds to the FPÖ and was soon expelled from trade union and party offices. Lastly, there was SJ youth leader Josef Cap, who rallied against what he saw as a drift towards complacency of achieving socialist goals. During the 1982 party conference, Cap proceeded to attack party privilege by targeting Governor of Burgenland, Theodor Kery, for connections between his Chairmanship of the

⁵⁸ Bluhm (1973) *Building an Austrian Nation*, pp. 120-121.

Burgenland electricity company and his cheap personal electricity rates.⁵⁹ As a result of the embarrassment endured by the leadership, Cap was voted off the party executive.⁶⁰

The Catholic *Lager* was not so clear cut as expelling disgruntled members, but the issue was more about particular party leaders being unsuccessful at achieving internal party reform. The best example of this was ÖVP leaders Josef Klaus (1964-1970) and Josef Taus (1975-1979). Klaus, as Chancellor and former Governor of Salzburg, was a professional party politician and attempted to reform the arrangement of *Proporz* by governing with a single party majority, which he achieved in the 1966 election. However, he ultimately was unable to reform party policy due to League opposition and lost the election in 1970. Likewise, Josef Taus, as a businessman and industry manager, attempted to reform the party by taking control away league control over membership and centralised party policy decision making.⁶¹ Taus ultimately failed to make meaningful reforms and resigned.

Elite control over *Lager* was possible because of a tight grip over members' social lives through auxiliary organisations that were connected to the party and interest groups. Hierarchical control by elites effectively neutralised potential opposition to the system, which easily crushed through rigid structures and expulsion of dissenters.

⁵⁹ Sully (1986) 'Austrian Social Democracy', pp. 168-169.

⁶⁰ Cap did receive candidacy for the district of Vienna and received enough votes, especially those of disgruntled members by running a left wing campaign, in the 1983 election to be elected to the *Nationalrat*. This itself is a good indication of the possible popularity of internal dissent.

⁶¹ Müller and Steininger (1994), 'Party Organisation and Party Competitiveness: The Case of the Austrian Peoples Party, 1945-1992', pp. 19-20.

Conclusion

The purpose of this first chapter was to show that the Austrian political party organisation behaviour could be explained in the context of pillarisation and division of society between two *Lager*; ultimately controlling through elite compromise and control of spheres of influence. Both *Lager* had arisen out of Austro-Hungarian circumstances: poorer voter disenfranchisement and a lack of national identity as Austrians. The First Republic of 1918-1945 failed because of this division of society into parallel *Lager* and the inability to cooperate; ultimately assisting the eventual downfall of the First Republic in 1938. By 1945, successor *Lager* party leadership comprised of those who had evolved politically due to the consequences of the First Republic and the Second World War. They moderated sufficiently to deal with the important problems: building a nation where there was none, the repercussions of Austrian war involvement, and the threat of communism from the Soviets and KPÖ. This was a government that learned from the past and had to deal with the situation in 1945

This arrangement continued in part due to *Lagermentalitat* of the past, which evolved into a mechanism of self-interest. Features such as mutual veto and segmental autonomy over portfolios guaranteed compromise and control of interest domains, providing interest groups with means to serve their *Lager* as well as control rank and file. The politicisation of interest group elites and party elite into the same *Lager* made each organisation almost indistinguishable. Party and interest groups elites' influence depended on their positions as leaders of their domains but also as negotiators between the two *Lager* and between separate *Lager* interest groups. Parties remained in consociational governance because *Proporz* guaranteed a stake in the state, economy and society, giving segmental autonomy over their *Vorfeld*; which could only be achieved

through interest group corporatism in giving all entrenched economic interest groups maximum power.

Proporz extended to all spheres of society. Each *Lager* was a parallel society, whose elite influence infiltrated every facet of that *Lager* social realm: employment, interests, hobbies, and ages. *Lager* members were dependent on loyalty and party membership for utilities, job promotion, housing and connections. Elites, as representatives, were gatekeepers and could provide resources through their control of relevant Ministries, districts and organisations. Those who questioned the system were unable to change much because of entrenched interests: either being ignored or sacked from relevant positions.

This chapter explains that *Proporz* locked the two parties into place by entrenching *Lager* control over interests, resources and organisations that dominated daily lives; thus acting as gatekeepers for the vast majority of Austrian society. Yet, this must be ended on two points. Firstly, if the Austrian people were somehow less dependent on the system for resources and that *Lager* could no longer act as guaranteed gatekeepers to resources, then *Proporz* could not be as powerful in ensuring mass or individual loyalty. Secondly, although the elites controlled *Proporz* through organisational hierarchy, elites were also beholden to constituent organisations because of the disproportionate power within party organisations. If these constituencies' grassroots bases were reduced in size over time, yet their influence was locked into party structure, how would party policy reflect public concerns? By the late 1970s the system was still very strong, but in 1999 *Nationalrat* elections, the system of *Proporz* had symbolically been defeated by the far right FPÖ. The next three chapters will look at this massive turn of events and developments within the context of the two points.

Chapter Two: How Did the Post-Industrialisation of Austrian Society Affect the Political Landscape and Hurt the Dominance of the SPÖ and ÖVP?

The previous chapter argued that consociational democracy of the Second Republic made Austria a special political case because of the continuation and intensity of inter-*Lager* cooperation and intra-*Lager* control. From 1945 to 1986, SPÖ and ÖVP were the only major political players in Austria, and this system continued to provide social and political stability. However, since 1986, there was a marked decline in SPÖ-ÖVP dominance to the point where their position as absolute dominant players in Austrian politics had been revoked due to changing voting patterns. Though in the 1975 general election the combined SPÖ-ÖVP vote was 85.9%, in 1986, when the newly revitalised and more nationalistic FPÖ achieved 9% of the vote, it fell to 75.0%. The culmination of this decline occurred in the 1999 elections, when the combined two-party vote fell to 60%: 33.15% for the SPÖ and 26.9% for the ÖVP, compared to 26.9% for the FPÖ. The object of this chapter is to discuss how post-industrialisation broke the stranglehold of the *Lagerparteien* over the electorate.

Like other western European states, and indeed, like most other western democracies, Austria evolved from an industrial to a post-industrial society. Unlike most other western states, mainstream, industrial-based parties suffered massively from a decline in their combined share of votes during elections after years of dominance. This chapter focuses on post-industrialisation undermining the *Lagerparteien*. What is notable about the FPÖ and other challenging parties was that their success came from issues associated with modern, rather than industrial concerns. The FPÖ was built around and structured by post-industrialisation. Furthermore, what is notable was that the traditional

constituencies of the two major parties, previously whom *Lagerparteien* relied upon in elections, by 1999 voted disproportionately for the FPÖ. Clearly, certain concerns of post-industrialisation were not targeted by the two major parties, as well as industrial concerns being of lesser importance to the SPÖ and ÖVP. This chapter will require an explanation of the importance of post-industrialisation resulting political consequences. It will go on to discuss the Austrian case and observe declining voter loyalty and the shift of voters so that political changes can be understood within the context of post-industrial society. Only then can the case studies of parties be fully explored in subsequent chapters.

Chapter 2.1: Post-Industrialisation and Societal Changes

This chapter must begin with an explanation of why post-industrialisation is so important to explaining changes in politics from the industrial era. This thesis supports post-industrial and post-modernist theory of societal development. Post-industrialisation is the process that transforms countries from industrial and agricultural to post-industrial service-based societies. The sociologist Daniel Bell, using the American case study in his book 'The Coming of Post Industrial Society', explained that post-industrial societies arose after the Second World War because the growth of industry and the services that grew as a result (marketing, sales), urbanisation, and expanded welfare allowed more opportunities for poorer people in education. In turn this resulted in an increase in white collar jobs through expanded the role of the state through education, healthcare, bureaucratic and private sector employment, and that technological advances rendered many industrial jobs obsolete.¹ White collar employees dominate post-industrial societies due to the gains of social mobility of a welfare state, while traditional classes, including

¹ Bell (1999), *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*, pp. 129-133.

industrial, urban blue collar workers, small business owners, and rural farmers decline as a percentage of the population.²

Major social changes that occur due to post-industrialisation have expanded and changed political spaces insofar as they have introduced new social dynamics to politics. Ronald Inglehart argues this about the rise of the industrial welfare state:

*“... this has produced unprecedentedly high levels of economic security, giving rise to a cultural feedback that is having a major impact on both the economic and political systems of advanced industrial societies. This new trajectory shifts authority away from both religion and the state to the individual, with an increasing focus on individual concerns such as friends and leisure. Post modernisation deemphasises all kinds of authority... allowing much wider range for individual autonomy in the pursuit of individual subjective well-being”.*³

Inglehart explains that ‘quality of life’ issues arise from the advances of the welfare state and education, leading to an increased focus on freedom from authority and more human concerns.⁴ Political movements have been built more around social issues, which was evident during the 1960s in peace movements, feminism, gay liberation and youth movements. This has entailed a much larger focus on social issues as well as economic issues; turning politics from a spectrum towards an economic-social axis. These issues include immigration, environment, law and order, consumer rights, and quality of government services.

As a result, this hurts industrial-based parties, which suffer decline of their natural support bases in terms of size and voter turnout. Traditional base constituencies of industrial ‘class-mass’ parties such as farmers and self-employed businesspeople to the

² Ibid, pp. 133-136.

³ Inglehart (1997), *Modernization and Postmodernization*, pp. 74-75.

⁴ Ibid, pp.39-41.

right, and blue collar workers to the left, have markedly declined because economic development has led to the decline in numbers and influence of the traditional groups; while these parties respond by focusing more on white collar voters over traditional bases.⁵ Mair, Muller and Plasser state that:

*“... the share of white-collar employees... has increased dramatically, and what is most relevant here is that this ‘new middle class’ is considered to lack a prima facie loyalty to any political party... the changing class structure is seen to lead to a growth in the ‘available electorate’. On the other hand, this obviously presents an opportunity for those parties that previously lacked strong support from specific social groups”.*⁶

Mainstream political parties must reach beyond their traditional bases to white collar voters, who are more notably fickle about political loyalties, by appealing strongly to their concerns; namely quality of life issues as important issues as well as a de-emphasis on industrial ideologies. Those who are most responsive to broad voter concerns tend to achieve the best result.

Chapter 2.2: Austria: Socioeconomic Change and The Decline of SPÖ and ÖVP

Socio-economic changes in Austria have had a much more marked impact upon the Austrian political environment because of the factor of *Lager* networks. At the end of the previous chapter, it was noted that the stability of Socialist and Catholic *Lager* hinged on the stability of the numerical strength of political parties. If a larger segment of society grew outside *Lager* societal structures, *Lagerparteien* could be challenged; if a political party was able to successfully target voters on the basis of rejection of the system. This did occur in Austria: the larger segment of the population grew out of post-

⁵ Peter Mair, Wolfgang C. Müller, Fritz Plasser (2004), ‘Introduction: Electoral Challenges and Party Responses’, in Peter Mair, Wolfgang C. Müller and Fritz Plasser, *Political Parties and Electoral Change*, SAGE Publications, London, pp. 2-3.

⁶ Ibid, p. 3.

industrialisation as white collar voters who were outside the sphere of immediate *Lager* employment or auxiliary organisations. There are two major socio-economic patterns with regard to the impact on *Lager* in the post-industrialisation of Austria: occupational change and decline of values networks that have had two main outcomes: the decline of the clout of traditional structures through loss of influence, and a lesser ability to retain old constituencies.

The first pattern was occupational structure change due post-industrialisation process, which impacted upon the ability of *Lagerparteien* to rely on traditional bases that were rapidly in decline. From the immediate post-war period after 1945, it is evident that Austrian society did undergo significant socio-economic change. Notably this was the shift from economic production from agriculture and manufacturing to the service sector.

Table 2.1: Workforce Changes 1951-2004

<i>% of the employed population working in</i>	<i>1951</i>	<i>1961</i>	<i>1971</i>	<i>1981</i>	<i>2004</i>
Agriculture and Forestry	31.6	23.0	15.0	8.5	0.8
Mining, Industry and Trade	37.6	41.4	42.0	41.0	26.9
Services	29.8	35.6	42.8	50.5	68.5

Source: (1951-1981) 'Österreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt' (Census Survey), in Fritz Plasser, Peter A. Uhlam, and Alfred Grausgruber (1992), 'The Decline of 'Lager Mentality' and the New Model of Electoral Competition in Austria', *West European Politics*, Vol. 15, No. 1, p. 20. 2004; (2007) 'Employees By Economic Sectors and Branches, Statistics Austria. Available: http://www.statistik.at/statistische_uebersichten/englisch/pdf/c15a_6.pdf (Accessed: 23 May, 2007).

Numbers of rural farmer votes declined, hurting ÖVP voter bases, while manufacturing and industry also declined, hurting the fortunes of the SPÖ. The service

sector rapidly increased to become the largest potential voter bloc. Further statistics reveal that class and work structure changed to the point where the white collar employees became the largest group.

Table 2.2: Occupational Structure in Austria, 1951-2004.

<i>% of the employed population working as</i>	<i>1951</i>	<i>1961</i>	<i>1971</i>	<i>1981</i>	<i>2004</i>
Self-Employed	35	29	22	14	N/A
Blue Collar	45	44	43	44	39.8
White Collar	20	27	35	42	50.6

Source: (1951-1981) 'Österreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt', in Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber (1992), 'The Decline of 'Lager Mentality' and the New Model of Electoral Competition in Austria', p. 20.

ÖVP-leaning self employed/ businesspeople have declined dramatically as a percentage of the population, and could be observed as a negative for ÖVP. Blue collar workers increased in size but then fell slightly by the 1990s to 2004; similarly negative were SPÖ fortunes. Interestingly, observing the size of the blue collar workforce being larger than the industrial workforce in the previous table, it is clear that many blue collar people became involved in the service industry, most likely in retail and trades jobs. White collar employees, increasing in size, again reveal the potential for new political targeting by specifically focused policies.

The second pattern was the decline in importance of traditional values such as religion which was a major factor in removing voters from *Lager* networks. Religious support was clear cut in Austria, with deeply religious voters voting overwhelmingly for ÖVP, and those with little to no religious activity voting overwhelmingly SPÖ. Though

still more important for many ÖVP voters, the percentage of ÖVP voters who attended church every Sunday declined from 67% in 1955 to 47% in 1990; while SPÖ religious voters remained static from 15% to 12% in the same period.⁷ This would indicate that the religious vote declined and that the ÖVP suffered, but this secular gain evidently did not translate into support for either party.

The first major outcome was that the growth of white collar electorates outside auxiliary *Lager* networks meant that the ability to mobilise voters as a percentage of the population significantly reduced, impacting negatively on the relative control of SPÖ-ÖVP-*Lager*-corporatist networks upon voters. A more educated citizenry, tending towards the private sector, with relatively few ties to *Lager* networks meant that the rise of post-industrial 'issues' parties such as *Grünen* and the FPÖ could be predicated on the ability to appeal on the basis of challenging the system (structures, organisation and parties).⁸ Implicit ties of extra-constitutional instruments of *Proporz*, including the chambers and the Joint Commission on Prices and Wages, weakened as a result, lessening the 'gatekeeper' role of the *Lagerparteien*. On the other hand, the continuation of relative influence of the Chambers, and the rather industrial structures, were unable to represent more modern concerns, such as white collar with blue collar union members, and modern entrepreneurs over traditional small and medium business regulations and concerns as represented by Chambers.⁹

The second major outcome was that post-industrialisation of the Austrian workforce and economy undermined *Proporz* because economic conditions meant that

⁷ (Polling company) Fessel and GfK (1955-1990) 'Political Indicators', in Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber (1992), 'The Decline of '*Lager* Mentality' and the New Model of Electoral Competition in Austria', p. 21.

⁸ Peter Gerlich (1992) 'A Farewell to Corporatism', in *West European Politics*, Vol. 15, No. 1, p. 139.

⁹ Markus M.L Crepaz (1995) 'An Institutional Dinosaur: Austrian Corporatism in the Post-Industrial Age', in *West European Politics*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 77-81.

parties could not rely on these constituencies for voter turnout and support, nor could they continue to provide full socio-economic security through resources and patronage as before. The service sector-based economy saw the rapid decline of *Lager* constituencies as a percentage of the electorate, meaning that their base support had been undermined. Furthermore, whether purposeful or as a part of globalisation, *Lagerparteien* were less able to provide patronage through resources and services to their traditional constituencies. Globalisation, the shift towards neo-liberalism impacted on Austria. Economic reforms began during the grand coalition from 1986-2000 under SPÖ Chancellors Franz Vranitsky and Viktor Klima, enacting measures such as and tax reform, deregulation, dealing with economic crises such as the Oil Shock of the early 1980's, efficiency in payment of state subsidies, nationalised industry management and balanced budgets changed the ideological character of both *Lager*¹⁰. Changes including subsidies ending or being altered to encourage profitability, nationalised industry priority to be more market oriented, income and corporate taxes being lowered, the public sector resulted in fewer reasons to support *Lagerparteien*.¹¹ Reforms also hurt state sector workers. 20% of the workforce in nationalised industry was cut from 1985-1987, many of them blue collar workers.¹² These reforms and the decline of the power of *Proporz* to provide meant that dependents on patronage were no longer guaranteed security and favours; thereby *Lager* roles as 'gatekeeper' lessened.

The overall situation was that white collar voters in the private sector, not directly under *Lagerparteien* patronage or networks, were the future; while traditional *Lager* constituencies were in decline. Post-industrialisation undermined Austrian parties

¹⁰ Wolfgang C. Müller (1988) 'Privatising in a Corporatist Economy: The Politics of Privatisation in Austria', in *West European Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 103-106.

¹¹ Volkmar Lauber (1992) 'Changing Priorities in Austrian Economic Policy, in *West European Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 157-162.

¹² Ibid, p. 161.

significantly more because of the undermining of *Lager* networks that previously guaranteed such strong support.

Chapter 2.3: Changing Voter Patterns in Austria, 1986-1999

The political outcome of post-industrialisation in Austria was a major shift in voting patterns that hurt SPÖ and ÖVP dominance; leaving large spaces for political competition open to other parties. A Fessel and GfK survey reveals declining party identification over time. In 1954, 73% of respondents stated a total identification with a party and 27% with no identification, and in 1990 only 49% had total identification and 51% with none.¹³ A second example is the decline of loyalties of traditional party voters. Self employed and professionals, an ÖVP base, went from 63% identification for a party in 1954 to 42% in 1990; and the blue collar workers from 78% identification in 1954 to 45% in 1990.¹⁴ In summation, traditional electorates declined in support and ability to turn out large numbers of voters that could swing elections significantly, while white collar voters were insufficiently enticed by SPÖ or ÖVP to swing in favour of one or the other party because of a lack of auxiliary influence.

As a result, the new electorate had more open spaces in terms of voters than before, undermining the ability of *Lagerparteien* to guarantee turnout. Using exit poll data from the general elections of 1990, Plasser, Ulram and Grausgruber compiled what they would deem the new voter groups according to their loyalties or lack thereof.

¹³ (Polling company) Fessel and GfK (1954-1990) 'Political Indicators' in Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber (1992), 'The Decline of *Lager* Mentality' and the New Model of Electoral Competition in Austria', p. 25.

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 26.

Table 2.3: New Electoral Loyalty in Terms of Voter Preference, 1990

<i>Cluster</i>	<i>% of Electorate</i>	<i>Type of Competition</i>	<i>Combined Vote of SPÖ ÖVP</i>	<i>Close Party ties</i>	<i>White Collar</i>	<i>Blue Collar</i>
Social Democratic	23.2	No competition	90.2	55.3	25.3	55.4
Bourgeois	6.1					
Rural Catholic	4.3					
Traditional <i>Lager</i> competition	11.4	Traditional two party competition	90.6	51.8	35.9	55.8
Welfare state new middle	28.1	Open, multi- party competition (with SPÖ- ÖVP advantage)	66.6	2.5	80.8	2.0
Market oriented middle	18.0					
Populist blue collar protest	5.8	Open, multi-party competition	47.6	4.7	48.2	37.2
Urban white collar protest	3.1					

Source: (Polling company) Fessel and GfK (1954-1990) 'Political Indicators' in Plasser, Ulram, and Grausgruber (1992), 'The Decline of 'Lager Mentality' and the New Model of Electoral Competition in Austria', p. 38.

Traditional SPÖ-ÖVP voter bases notably declined when compared to the more open segments of the population whom espouse little loyalty to any party. Although both the welfare and market oriented had preference for one of the two parties, 33.15% of those who voted for the opposition and protest voters voted 52.4% for third parties, revealing a large proportion of the population who outside of the auxiliary reach of the SPÖ or ÖVP. *Lager* bases were not nearly as strong as they once were. About half the electorate had no immediate tendency towards *Lager*. The ÖVP and SPÖ could not rely on as larger percentage of the voting population as they did in the past.

Looking closer at this, the younger, larger white collar generations combined with the decline of traditional industrial constituencies meant more open political spaces in post-industrial Austria.

Table 2.4: Voter Demographics and Preferences of Austria, 1999

<i>Social Groups</i>	<i>Voters (As a Percentage of the electorate)</i>	<i>Percentage of the group who changed vote since 1995</i>
<i>Age</i>		
<30	21	20
30-44	32	44
45-59	28	24
60-69	11	8
70	9	4
<i>Total</i>	100	100
<i>Profession</i>		
Self employed, professionals, farmers, businesspeople	11	13
White Collar	31	38
Blue Collar	15	11
Pensioners	20	13
<i>Total</i>	100	100
<i>Education</i>		
Primary	17	10
Secondary	46	40
Tertiary	37	50
<i>Total</i>	100	100

Source: Fritz Plasser, Peter A. Ulram and Franz Sommer (1999) 'Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und Entscheidungsmotive', ZAP: Center for Applied Political Research, Available: www.zap.or.at, Accessed 13th May, 2007, p. 21.¹⁵

Those who changed their vote since 1995 tended to be the younger to middle 30-44 age category (32% of voters and 44% changing votes), white collar (31% and 38%), and secondary (46% and 40%) and tertiary (37% and 50%) educated.¹⁶ This denotes

¹⁵ nb/ These surveys are based on polls and preliminary results.

¹⁶ Secondary educated voters (46% of the electorate, 40% changed vote since 1995) could be explained in several ways. One would be white collar through the service sector (office, retail) or trade-school trade school educated blue collar workers. This would not necessarily indicate white collar employment, but more about removal from *Lagermentalität*.

middle aged and white collar voter open spaces, which may also be associated with some volatility amongst the younger 18-30 and 45-59 brackets. Traditional groups within the electorate were smaller than in the past but also not noticeably volatile. 'Self employed' made up only 11% of the electorate and only 13% changed their vote, while blue collar workers made up 15% and only 11% changed respectively. This can also be correlated with older voters, specifically pensioners (20% and 13%), who could be argued to be more indoctrinated through greater *Lagermentalität* in the past; and primary educated (17% and 10%) in a similar situation.

Comparing election results throughout the defined period of change, 1986-1999, it is evident that there was a significant shift of votes among all occupational groups: those who were previously reliable *Lagerparteien* voters or at least had tended towards the SPÖ and ÖVP, and those white collar voters. These statistics were taken as part of voter exit polls in the election years.¹⁷

¹⁷ Given the sheer significance of FPÖ results, *Grünen* and *Liberale Forum* (LIF) results will not be compared, though may be mentioned when important.

Table 2.5: Occupation and Austrian Voter Patterns, 1986-1999

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>SPÖ 1986</i>	<i>SPÖ 1994</i>	<i>SPÖ 1999</i>	<i>ÖVP 1986</i>	<i>ÖVP 1994</i>	<i>ÖVP 1999</i>	<i>FPÖ 1986</i>	<i>FPÖ 1994</i>	<i>FPÖ 1999</i>
Farmers	1	8	1	93	73	87	5	15	10
Self Employed, Managers	14	10	10	60	40	41	15	30	33
White Collar	57	29	36	36	25	23	13	22	22
Blue Collar	49	47	35	27	15	12	10	29	47
<i>Total</i>	43.1	34.9	33.4	41.3	27.7	26.9	9.7	22.5	27.2

Sources: Fritz Plasser, Peter A. Ulram and Wolfgang C. Müller (1995), Wahlverhalten und Parteienwettbewerb: Analysen zur Nationalratswahl, Signum Verlag, in Givens, (2005), Voting Radical Right in Western Europe, pp. 56, 65; Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) 'Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und Entscheidungsmotive', p. 21.

Both traditional *Lager* voters and white collar voters shifted their votes significantly. Significant numbers of ÖVP-leaning self employed changed their votes in large numbers (60% in 1986 to 40% in 1999) to FPÖ (15% to 33%). White collar voters tended towards the SPÖ in 1986, and although there was a decline, by 1999 it was clear that the SPÖ was more of a white collar, socially liberal party, though not overwhelmingly. ÖVP never recovered white collar votes but interestingly became about even with FPÖ (23% to 22% in 1999 respectively). FPÖ gained white collar votes, probably from both parties. Most of the rest of the white collar vote (15%) went to the *Grünen* and LIF in 1999.¹⁸ More striking is the massive decline of the blue collar vote, seemingly directly from ÖVP at first, then SPÖ to FPÖ; with the FPÖ for the first time gaining plurality amongst blue collar voters, dealing a significant blow to SPÖ. The only exception were farmers, though as a smaller percentage of the population as they once

¹⁸ Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) 'Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und Entscheidungsmotive', p. 21. 10% and 5% of white collar voters voted *Grünen* and LIF respectively.

were, their clout was lessened and so arguably was the traditional ÖVP base.

Occupational figures reveal overall that the FPÖ gained at the expense of both parties.

Though only taking from the 1986-1994 results, the shift in voters dependent on education levels provides a clear trend away from the SPÖ and ÖVP.

Table 2.6: Education Levels and Austrian Voting Patterns, 1986-1999

<i>Education</i>	<i>SPÖ 1986</i>	<i>SPÖ 1994</i>	<i>ÖVP 1986</i>	<i>ÖVP 1994</i>	<i>FPÖ 1986</i>	<i>FPÖ 1994</i>
Primary	47	45	42	28	6	21
Secondary	45	50	38	24	11	26
Tertiary	29	19	46	32	11	19
<i>Total</i>	43.1	34.9	41.3	27.7	9.7	22.5

Sources: Plasser, Ulram and Müller (1995), Wahlverhalten und Parteiennwettbewerb: Analysen zur Nationalratswahl, in Givens (2005), Voting Radical Right in Western Europe, pp. 56, 65.

Voters with a primary education show a correlation of change from ÖVP to FPÖ, including some blue collar workers, some farmers and self employed. Many university-educated voters switched from both the SPÖ and ÖVP to the FPÖ, though many voted for *Grünen* and LIF.¹⁹ Most interesting is that many voters with a secondary education, such as trade schools and retail, changed from the ÖVP; many likely voted FPÖ. Like occupation, voters of all education levels shifted from SPÖ and ÖVP to FPÖ.

Another interesting account to make is age because this is reflective of generational differences between ‘industrial’ and ‘post industrial’ generations.

¹⁹ Ibid, pp. 56, 65
16% of tertiary voters for *Grünen* in 1994.

Table 2.7: Age and Austrian Voters, 1986-1999

<i>Age</i>	<i>SPÖ</i> <i>1986</i>	<i>SPÖ</i> <i>1994</i>	<i>SPÖ</i> <i>1999</i>	<i>ÖVP</i> <i>1986</i>	<i>ÖVP</i> <i>1994</i>	<i>ÖVP</i> <i>1999</i>	<i>FPÖ</i> <i>1986</i>	<i>FPÖ</i> <i>1994</i>	<i>FPÖ</i> <i>1999</i>
18-30*	39	31	25	33	19	17	12	25	35
31-44**	43	31	32	37	26	23	11	22	29
45-59	42	37	35	48	30	32	6	22	21
60+***	45	48	39	44	33	31	8	22	25
Total	43.1	34.9	33.4	41.3	27.7	26.9	9.7	22.5	27.2

Sources: Plasser, Ulram and Müller (1995), Wahlverhalten und Parteienwettbewerb: Analysen zur Nationalratswahl, in Givens (2005), Voting Radical Right in Western Europe, pp. 56, 65; Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) 'Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und Entscheidungsmotive', p. 21.

The voter statistics clearly show that the younger generations, both the 18-30 and 31-44 blocs, voted disproportionately less for the SPÖ and ÖVP. Only with voters aged 49-59 and 60 did SPÖ and ÖVP match or exceed their average vote, perhaps due to more likely *Lagermentalität* of the older generation. However, this is balanced off with an extra age 60-69 statistic from 1999 that has the FPÖ on 21%.²⁰ The FPÖ did disproportionately well amongst younger voters (18-30 35% and 31-44 29% in 1999) and poorer (with previous exception) amongst older voters. Looking at age voting statistics it is clear that the older, 'industrial' generations reveal a disposition for the SPÖ and ÖVP; while younger, post-industrial generations disproportionately voted in lower numbers for the SPÖ and ÖVP, and with FPÖ the main beneficiary of younger votes.

An overall analysis shows that voter volatility increased in Austria from 1986-1999. Firstly, what should be noted is that the combined vote for the SPÖ and ÖVP has fallen from 84.4% in 1986 to 62.6% in 1994 and then to 60.3% in 1999. This reflects more volatility and less *Lager* hold. Secondly, the SPÖ, but especially the ÖVP, lost white collar voters to the *Grünen*, LIF, but especially the FPÖ, supporting that these parties had more opportunities in a post-industrial setting. Thirdly, both SPÖ but especially ÖVP lost

²⁰ Ibid, p. 21.

their traditional industrial base support to the FPÖ. The FPÖ gained significant blue collar firstly from the ÖVP but then from the SPÖ so that by 1999 it overtook the SPÖ in terms of blue collar votes. The shift of ÖVP self-employed base to the FPÖ (though still holding dominance) was also significant. The shift of significant bases away from the parties signified the end of *Lager* monopolies over respective core bases. Fourthly, the SPÖ, although lost a significant amount of its original white collar vote, was able to retain a sizeable plurality; making the SPÖ the largest ‘white collar party’ as its largest occupational base, reflecting its appeal but also that something had undermined its share nonetheless. Fourthly, the ÖVP can be concluded to be the biggest loser, suggesting that the FPÖ outperformed the ÖVP in terms of targeting constituencies, which will be revealed in the next chapter. Fifthly, there was a rise in FPÖ support across the board for age groups but especially the young, but it is more a reflection of generational attitudes to the parties.

Conclusion

The process of post-industrialisation since 1945, resulting in changing socioeconomic structures in society, changing attitudes and a more volatile and changed economic paradigm has challenged political parties to adapt. This chapter explained how socioeconomic changes occurred and broke the hold that *Proporz* and *Lagermentalität* had, which disappeared because of their declining base: a higher percentage of white collar voters outside *Lager* networks, and the abandonment of industrial political meant less likelihood of support from former targeted constituencies. The major parties did not hold the clout that they once did due to the decline of patronage and the reach of auxiliary organisation, so their shares of the vote declined. Notably, the bulk of shifting votes went from SPÖ and ÖVP to FPÖ. Therefore, this chapter explains that, when

faced with changing political environments, the SPÖ and ÖVP failed to adapt to a post-industrial political environment; evident in election results from 1986-1999. From here, it must be asked why both SPÖ and ÖVP took such a massive decline in a period of less than 20 years, and why they did not make necessary changes to policy and organisation in order to successfully target white collar voters. A telling clue here is that FPÖ did so well by appealing to and receiving the votes of those better off and those worse off due to post-industrialisation. Why did they appeal to such a broad spectrum of society? The next chapter will explore the reasons why FPÖ did so well amongst *Lager* party base and those volatile voters.

Chapter Three: How Did the FPÖ benefit From a Collapse in the Combined SPÖ-ÖVP Vote?

The previous chapter looked at the socio-economic situation that fundamentally changed Austria from being an industrial to a post-industrial society, resulting in the decline in voter share for the main parties, the SPÖ and ÖVP. In general elections from 1986 to 1999, SPÖ-ÖVP share of the vote declined rapidly, with the overwhelming bulk of volatile voters changing to the FPÖ, culminating in it receiving 26.9% of the vote in the 1999 elections. This must be seen within the context of a wider post-industrial shift in terms of electorate make up, shifts in public concerns, and the ability of political parties to respond to this.

The previous chapter noted statistical information which showed that the FPÖ united blue collar, white collar, young and middle aged people behind the party. This chapter will explain that the FPÖ, of all third parties, was able to be the main beneficiary of a shift in voting behaviour because of its ability to form a cross-societal coalition that united blue collar, white collar, young and middle aged people specifically. The environmentalist left *Grünen* and the liberal LIF were both unable to match FPÖ successes. Kitschelt pondered possible appeals that the far right could have to a broad cross-section of society, saying:

“... it (the far right) can appeal to a cross-class alliance: it attracts segments of the working class based on racist-xenophobic and authoritarian appeals. It rallies small business on additional pro-market and anti-state slogans, calling for the dismantling of public bureaucracies and the welfare state”.¹ This is an apt statement with regards to Austria because it appears that the biggest vote collapse

¹ Kitschelt (1995) *The Radical Right in Western Europe*, p. 19.

was with the ÖVP, which came third to the FPÖ. This is important to indicate how the FPÖ targeted its appeal, and how that appeal was so well targeted towards such a wide range of voters: both traditional *Lager* constituencies who did poorly out of post-industrialisation, and white collar voters who did well. These could be termed ‘losers’ and ‘winners’ of post-industrialisation respectively.

This chapter will look the changes in politics from an industrial to a post-industrial society and will look at the Austrian case study as an example of open political spaces that were successfully targeted by the FPÖ. Specifically, this chapter will look at how the FPÖ appealed to both the winners and losers of post-industrialisation, and from which party their votes might have come from. Also important is why the LIF and *Grünen* were not able to successfully take advantage of the new political spaces to the extent that the FPÖ was able to. From this, it must be ascertained how the FPÖ appealed broadly to a cross-societal coalition and what it could offer to a broader range of the electorate. As a post-industrial party, what gave it an edge over traditional industrial-based parties?

Chapter 3.1: The Austrian Political Landscape and Post-Industrialisation Competition

To begin this chapter, it must be ascertained how the political landscape changed and how the FPÖ was able to benefit from the new opportunities from the growth of segments of society who were no longer part of the network of the two *Lager*. As a result of Austrian realignment, the FPÖ was able to take advantage of new spaces that became unaligned and segments that were never aligned and had grown in numbers.

Kitschelt argues that the far-right benefited from the introduction of a social dimension to politics that realigned the centre left towards left-libertarianism and the centre right towards right authoritarianism, and the economic shift towards the centre by centre-left and centre-right parties. This is associated with the general shift of the political mainstream from an industrial mainstream to a post-industrial mainstream.

Figure 3.1: The Competitive Space for Political Parties in Europe, 1980's

Source: Adapted from Kitschelt (1995) The Radical Right in Western Europe, p. 15.

The introduction of a social dimension to politics which combined less doctrinaire ideology of post-industrialisation has meant changes for both the mainstream left and right elements. The industrial centre-left (SD) becomes more socially liberal, probably due to social reforms, advocating feminism, gay rights and minority rights, and becomes less economically doctrinaire and more towards a neo-liberal direction, so tries to gain voters from SD1 to SD2. Likewise, the industrial centre-right (CR) attempts to capture socially conservative voters as opposed to social liberals, and enters economic consensus with the centre-left towards a more neo-liberal economic model, meaning a shift towards C1 and C2. Overall, this has three main outcomes for major parties. Firstly, there is realignment from a Keynesian to a neo-liberal economic consensus. This is influenced by international trends from the 1980s onwards. Secondly, the centre-left and centre-right, in shifting emphasis on policy, each experience a shift in their general voter catchments areas, as shown on the axis. Thirdly, the abandonment of industrial catchments in favour of post-industrial white collar catchments leads to a disassociation with the former, therefore leaving them targets for other political parties' focus. In theory, this would help account for the rise of the far-right in many Western post-industrial democracies.

The Austrian case largely reflects this theory, yet, because of the specialty of institutional *Lagermentalitat*, political spaces became far more open for third party competition. Because Austrian analysis must take into account internal party structure, consociationalism, grand coalition government and *Proporz*, the parties must be seen as less politically different than has usually been the case.

Figure 3.2: Competitive Space in the Austrian Political Axis, 1986-1999

Source: Adapted from Kitschelt (1995) *The Radical Right in Western Europe*, p. 184.

The closeness of the SPÖ and the ÖVP means that there are more contestable spaces for other parties to gain from. Kitschelt argues that:

“Among the remaining highly advanced countries, the opportunities for the extreme-rightist mobilisation depend on the convergence between moderate left and moderate right parties. If the distance between these

*parties is relatively small, political entrepreneurs have a chance to create a successful electoral coalition with a right-authoritarian agenda. Where “partocracy” in a country’s political economy prevails, such entrepreneurs should be able to broaden their electorate beyond the right-authoritarian core through populist antistatist messages and actually build a very strong “cross-class” alliance against the established parties”.*²

Even with different interests and ideological orientation, *Proporz* and the re-emergence of grand coalition government in 1986 means that in practice, the parties were close together; especially in terms of economics. This further isolated traditional *Lager* voters in both parties as well as a large number of white collar voters economically to the right of both the ÖVP and LIF and/or voters disenchanted with *Proporz*. Therefore, the FPÖ was able to attract a cross-societal coalition of voters, which were voters previously aligned to *Lagerparteien* and white collar voters. Interestingly, the FPÖ positioned itself to the right of the ÖVP, so was able to squeeze the ÖVP, as well as the new LIF, between the SPÖ and itself. What remains to be seen is how exactly the FPÖ successfully targeted such a wide cross-section of society.

Chapter 3.2: The FPÖ and the Appeal to the ‘Losers’ of Post-Industrialisation

The most interesting part of the voter base of the FPÖ was the disproportionate support of groups who formerly voted SPÖ and ÖVP; namely blue collar workers and self-employed, who made up a combined total of 37% of their base (27% and 10% respectively).³

² Ibid, p. 53.

³ Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) ‘Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und Entscheidungsmotive’, p. 21.

nb/ Given the continual dominance of the ÖVP over farmers’ vote, only self employed and blue collar workers will be considered the ‘losers’ of post-industrialisation in Austria.

The overarching reason for the significant loss must be the abandonment by *Lagerparteien* of traditional base concerns in an attempt to reach out to white collar voters. Betz argues that during post-industrialisation, unskilled and semi-skilled blue collar workers lose previous security of employment and economic opportunities and thus become more insecure about the future.⁴ This is also relevant for the small businesses such as retailers and manufacturers, many of whom could not compete against larger service sector firms that grew out of a post-industrial economic environment.

The key difference with Austria, is that *Lager*, previously being ‘gatekeepers’, could no longer guarantee security and patronage; thus previously secure constituencies were now open political spaces.⁵ In attempting to realign towards white collar concerns, the SPÖ and ÖVP coalition from 1986-2000 liberalised the Austrian economy towards a more neo-liberal market model; somewhat moving away from industrial political spaces. This was most significant in economic reforms enacted by the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition of 1986-1999, such as deregulation, nationalised industry efficiency measures including redundancies, public spending cuts, market deregulation, and the entry into the EU in 1995. Although this was moderate in international terms, *Lagerparteien* made a major shift in Austrian terms. White collar workers, being in jobs with arguably more employment security and less affected by privatisation, better working conditions and opportunities for promotion, were favoured; blue collar workers suffered from less job security and less attention paid to their concerns. As a result, these people were now open to political competition as they were no longer the main focus of their traditional *Lagerparteien*.

⁴ Betz (1994) *Radical Right Wing Populism in Western Europe*, p. 176.

⁵ Luther (2007) ‘Must What Goes Up Always Come Down?’ p. 68.

With economic issues becoming more bi-partisan between the *Lagerparteien*, while being largely unresponsive to economic change, appeals could be made to the ‘losers’ of post-industrialisation through social issues. The FPÖ was able to attract the ‘losers’ through targeted appeals to the instability and insecurities suffered by them in a post-industrial society. Kitschelt puts this simply by saying: “...*the rise of extreme rightist electorates voicing great disaffection with all the democratic parties is fuelled in part, but not exclusively, by the dissatisfaction of less skilled labourers with declining labour market opportunities and high structural unemployment...*”⁶ With economic realignment, social issues became a source of meaning and debate for people.

Firstly, the appeal to both blue collar workers and self-employed and small businesspeople was done by appealing to socially authoritarian spaces that were neglected by the *Lagerparteien*; using job security, immigration and welfare chauvinism. The FPÖ appealed strongly to those blue collar constituencies abandoned by the SPÖ by using immigration as a scapegoat; laying blame for job losses, claiming that welfare and housing for immigrants hurt those Austrians in need, and that immigrants were a source of crime.⁷ Haider goes as far to accuse the SPÖ of attempting to silence critics by accusing opponents of immigration of being “fascists” and attempting to use immigrants as a “*new proletariat*” in class warfare.⁸ At the same time, it appealed to former ÖVP-conservative voters by attacking the SPÖ and “extreme leftists” for encouraging multiculturalism and welfare culture; an appeal to the authoritarian right. Arguably, with the lack of security about jobs and welfare, it is understandable that entitlement to what is now believed to be scarce is up for question. What the FPÖ was able to do was to

⁶ Herbert Kitschelt (2000), ‘Citizens, Politicians, and Party Cartellization: Political Representation and State Failure in Post-Industrial Democracies’, in *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 37, p. 161.

⁷ Jörg Haider (1995) *The Freedom I Mean*, Swan Books, Pine Plains, New York, pp. 34-36.

⁸ Ibid, pp. 32-33.

successfully target insecurities and attribute blame, whether from ‘lazy’ welfare recipients or immigrants.

Secondly, in an attempt to capture a broad range of social authoritarian spaces, the FPÖ focused on tradition and stability in times of insecurity. Piero Ignazi describes this appeal as neo-conservatism: opposition to welfare collectivism and more individual responsibility (for self employed) as well as nostalgia for an imagined, conservative past as opposed to post-materialist liberalism (both).⁹ Ignazi proposes that far-right issues such as traditional values, law and order, or even xenophobia (immigration) are the reaction of the far right to the post-materialist left; almost an answer or response to the challenge of social liberalism for a lack of values.¹⁰ Haider and the FPÖ focused strongly on a nostalgic, neo-conservative view of the past, reflected in this criticism from Haider about work ethics and the breakdown of society:

*“...once puritanical abstinence and the Protestant ethic were effective correctives to excessive consumption. Work had no negative connotations and was seen as the fulfilment of professional duty to make a contribution to the common good. This has given way to a plastic credit card society in which no-one thinks any more about what they could do for others”.*¹¹

A more neo-conservative approach of a nostalgic past with solutions of individual work ethic backed up by traditional structures and values is a viable target for the socially conservative industrial voters whom SPÖ and ÖVP have left without a ‘natural’ party to support.

It can therefore be argued that because the SPÖ and ÖVP abandoned appeals to the old electorate spaces, the ‘losers’ of post-industrialisation were open for FPÖ

⁹ Piero Ignazi (1992) ‘The Silent Counter-Revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe’, in *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 22, pp. 18-19, 23.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 19, 24.

¹¹ Melanie A. Sully (1997) *The Haider Phenomenon*, East European Monographs, New York, p. 57.

appeals. The FPÖ focused on social authoritarian appeals to the bases of the old left and old right through the framing of threats and a neo-conservative appeal to values.

Chapter 3.3: The FPÖ and the Appeal to the ‘Winners’ of Post-Industrialisation

Although the ‘losers’ of post-industrialisation were disproportionately important to the FPÖ, in 1999 white collar voters made up 26% of those who voted FPÖ and overall 21% of white collar voters voted FPÖ.¹² This is a curious contrast to the ‘losers’ of post-industrialisation because the ‘winners’ did well, yet, for different reasons many voted for the FPÖ as many ‘losers’ did. It must be remembered that the white collar voters tended towards the ÖVP through the ÖAAB in the Chambers of Labour, but subsequently were enticed by the SPÖ under Bruno Kreisky, but then appeared from 1986 onwards to be volatile, though eventually still leaning towards the SPÖ. Both parties lost significant amounts of white collar support despite their attempts to target white collar voters. Although the SPÖ still held a large plurality, the ÖVP was worst affected, which is significant insofar as the FPÖ appears to be the direct recipient.

The main reason that the ‘winners’ of post-industrialisation were a politically free space was that they were not within the auxiliary networks of the *Lager*. The younger generations, being those of 18-30 and 31-44, were better educated, in a better employment position, more likely to work in the private sector so outside of public sector patronage and auxiliary networks; they were therefore less targeted as potential voters by the *Lagerparteien*.¹³ These groups being outside *Lager* sub-cultural networks lessened the abilities of *Lagerparteien* to indoctrinate them, with white collar employees

¹² Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) ‘Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und Entscheidungsmotive’, p. 28.

¹³ Gerlich (1992) ‘A Farewell to Corporatism’, pp. 139-140.

participating less in chamber elections, employer organisations or the ÖGB.¹⁴ With less *Lager* penetration into working lives, the FPÖ had an opportunity to target free political spaces.

Firstly, the FPÖ targeted white collar voters through attacking the networks of *Proporz* by highlighting and campaigning on resentment of privilege. Kitschelt claims of the far-right: *'Faced with a patronage-driven, clientalist traditional party establishment, many educated white-collar professionals will also be cynical about the established parties and sense a desire to 'teach them a lesson'.*¹⁵ Because of the decline in the public sector and the rise of the private sector, natural *Lager* white collar bases such as employees in particular ministries controlled by a particular *Lagerpartei* declined. During the period of grand coalition government from 1987-2000, SPÖ and ÖVP appeals to public sector workers were stronger because of the continuance of public sector patronage and *Lager* networks, while appearing to neglect private sector employees.¹⁶ This created an opportunity for the FPÖ to target white collar private sector workers in particular by focusing on possible resentment towards *Proporz*. Haider claimed: *'We want to get rid of the corporate elements in this system and abolish privilege and corruption... We do not want to descend to the level of the old parties which cannot tolerate new ideas... They need the great (grand) coalition, since it is only with public funds that they can fatten up the party machines of their loyal backs'.*¹⁷

During the 1990's, the FPÖ campaigned on the founding of a "Third Republic" based on an end to corporatism and *Proporz*, and enacting populist decision-making

¹⁴ Ibid, pp. 139-142.

¹⁵ Kitschelt (1995) *The Radical Right in Western Europe*, p. 21.

¹⁶ Luther (2007) 'Must What Goes Up Always Come Down?' p. 69.

Civil services and government sector leaned towards the governing parties because of party control over certain ministries: meaning benefits for those *Lager* patrons under those ministries, and patronage appointments.

¹⁷ Haider (1995) *The Freedom I Mean*, p. 60.

measures such as a strong presidency, and a Swiss-based model of ‘plebiscitary democracy’ with important decisions being put to a national vote.¹⁸ The perception created was to create democratic accountability in contrast to *Lagerparteien* and thus target white collar voters disillusioned with the system. This would have worked with a broad range of white collar political spaces.

Private sector employee voting habits in 1999 reveal the success of the FPÖ. Although the SPÖ dominated with 36% of the vote, and the ÖVP still had 19% of the vote, the FPÖ had 31% of the vote.¹⁹ The FPÖ was clearly successful in its attempt to target white collar private sector voters.

Secondly, more specifically, the FPÖ positioned itself to the economic right of the ÖVP, effectively squeezing the ÖVP between the SPÖ and FPÖ by targeting ‘pro-market’ voters. The FPÖ made a strong emphasis on classical liberalism, freedom of the individual and of entrepreneurship, with the state as a moderator that could maintain conditions for individual freedom.²⁰ The ÖVP failed to develop and articulate alternative policies to the reformist market model of Vranitzky and Klima or a more neo-liberal alternative along the lines of most conservative parties in the western world.²¹ The SPÖ-led reforms of Chancellor Franz Vranitzky reflected SPÖ initiative, while the ÖVP was too close to the SPÖ, thus leaving open a space to the economic right of those who wanted more neo-liberal economic reforms.²² The FPÖ advocated pro-market policies such as privatisation of some state companies, tax cuts, cutting bureaucracy, targeting

¹⁸ Sully (1997) *The Haider Phenomenon*, pp. 24-27.

¹⁹ Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) ‘Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und Entscheidungsmotive’, p. 33.

²⁰ Betz (1994) *Radical Right Wing Populism in Western Europe*, pp. 112-114.

²¹ This will be discussed in-depth in Chapter Four.

²² Lauber (1992) ‘Changing Priorities in Austrian Economic Policy’ pp. 156-160.

welfare cheats and rewarding hard work, and cutting ‘excessive’ welfare services.²³

Notable are Haider’s attacks against welfare. *“Hard work must pay off. But the collectivist welfare state rewards all, irrespective of performance, in the same measure. The ‘achievers’ are in effect penalised and the bone idle rewarded... We must have the courage to remunerate those willing to work and contribute. This will make it unattractive for passive fellow travellers to abuse the system”*.²⁴

While SPO white collar support fell from 56% in 1986 to 36% in 1999, this was still a strong plurality; while ÖVP white collar votes fell from 36% to 23%, compared to the FPÖ from 13% to 22%²⁵. While the ‘left’ vote was able to still stay relatively strong but unsplintered with a combined SPÖ-Grünen vote of 40.15% in 1999, the ‘right’ ÖVP-FPÖ vote, combined at 53.82%, was split. This reflects the fight for conservative voters between the ÖVP and FPÖ; with a strong tendency towards a centre-right squeeze.

To sum up, the FPÖ attracted significant numbers of white collar ‘winners’ of post-industrialisation due to appeals directed at populist political reform measures and by positioning itself to the right of the ÖVP. Due to anger at the system for various reason, they could be attracted through messages from the FPÖ that took advantage at anger towards the system and turned it into a protest movement.

²³ Haider (1995) *The Freedom I Mean*, pp. 53-55, 98-100.

²⁴ Sully (1997) *The Haider Phenomenon*, p. 58

²⁵ Plasser, Ulram and. Muller (1995), *Wahlverhalten und Parteienwettbewerb: Analysen zur Nationalratswahl*, Signum Verlag, in Givens (2005), *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe*, pp. 56, 65.

²⁵ Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) ‘Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und Entscheidungsmotive’, p. 21.

Chapter 3.4: Grünen, LIF and the 'Ideological Ghetto'

What about *Grünen* and LIF, who received 7.1% and 3.6% of the vote in 1999 respectively? Why was it that they were not able to gain from discontent with *Lagerparteien*, considering that they were post-industrial political parties that also could have appealed to discontent with major parties? The contention here is that the *Grünen* and LIF represented post-industrial ideological niches rather than being broad based enough to appeal to both the 'winners' and 'losers' of post-industrialisation.

Green parties, tending towards the libertarian left, demand post-materialist reform but apply socially liberal and economically left redistributionist solutions that many white collar voters would not subscribe; thus do not tend to appeal beyond a libertarian left political space. *Grünen* structure and policies would indicate that is a young, white collar, post-industrial party. Surveys from 1999 show that *Grünen*, with 7.1% of the vote, were strongest among white collar (10%), civil servants (12%), women (9%), under 30s (13%), public sector (9%), and students (20%).²⁶ In contrast, they did poorly among traditional industrial class voters, including skilled blue collar (3%), unskilled blue collar (1%), farmers (2%), pensioners (1%), male (5%) and people 45-59, 60-69, and 70 and older (5, 1, and 2% respectively).²⁷ *Grünen* had to compete with the SPÖ for economic left voters but could not appeal to socially conservative blue collar voters. Issues such as the environment and gender equality may not appeal strongly outside white collar, libertarian-left spaces; thus excluding social authoritarian and economic right spaces.

Meanwhile, the LIF could not achieve a cross-society coalition because, again, they appeal to a certain section of white collar workers with socially liberal views, so did not

²⁶ Ibid, p. 21.

²⁷ Ibid, p. 21.

appeal to those to the libertarian left who tended to vote SPÖ and *Grünen*, or more socially authoritarian views like those who voted for the ÖVP or FPÖ. The LIF, which gained 3.4% of the vote in 1999, was strongest among self employed and free professionals (8%), white collar (5%), students (10%), women (4%) and across age groups (4% across 18-59 groups).²⁸ They did poorly with people aged 60-69 and 70+ (2 and 0% respectively), blue collar workers (1%), farmers (0%), male (3%), and pensioners (1%).²⁹ Like the *Grünen*, the LIF did well with younger, well educated, post-industrial workforce, but poorly among older, industrial class voters. Meanwhile, like *Grünen*, LIF had to contend with more pro-market positioned rivals: between the ÖVP on the pragmatic side and the FPÖ on the more pro-market end. LIF share of the vote fell from 6% in 1994 to 3.65% in 1999, signifying that like the ÖVP being squeezed between left and right, LIF was squeezed between pragmatic market and 'pro-market'.

This would suggest that *Grünen* and LIF were positioning themselves on white collar concerns, yet competed on different ends of the post-industrial divide and also compete against larger parties. *Grünen* had to compete with the SPÖ on social issues while LIF had to compete with the FPÖ and ÖVP on economics, suggesting cannibalisation. Both *Grünen* and LIF could not extend beyond their niche, post-industrial appeals, so they could not build the cross-societal alliance that the FPÖ was able to do.

Chapter 3.5: The FPÖ and the Cross-Societal Coalition

This subchapter will focus on the tactical appeals of the FPÖ that explain how it was able to attract this cross-class alliance of voters behind it from the 1980s onwards.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 21.

²⁹ Ibid, p. 21.

Consider this information from 1999 comparing the voter bases of the FPÖ to *Grünen* and LIF.

Table 3.1: Party Voter Support Bases by Occupation and Education (Percentage), 1999

<i>Categories</i>	<i>FPÖ</i>	<i>Grünen</i>	<i>LIF</i>
<i>Occupation</i>			
Self Employed-Free Professionals	10	8	19
Civil Servants	7	16	9
White Collar	26	46	43
Blue Collar	27	5	4
Pensioners	18	3	6
<i>Total</i>	100	100	100
<i>Education</i>			
Primary	16	3	3
Secondary	55	29	24
Tertiary	30	68	73
<i>Total</i>	100	100	100

Source: Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) 'Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und Entscheidungsmotive', p. 28.

Compared to the potential alternatives, it is clear that the FPÖ was able to do what *Grünen* and LIF could not do: build a party with support that spanned both the industrial classes and white collar voters. This reflects the ability to engage in strategy and message that can appeal to more voters than a typically post-industrial party. What united this cross-societal alliance was that the FPÖ appealed to both insecurity of the 'losers' and discontent of the 'winners'. This combination of issues was capitalised by the FPÖ by it appealing to populist, protest instincts in portraying itself as an outsider party.

The appeal of the FPÖ as a protest party for young, disillusioned voters was an appealing tactic in a society where politics were dysfunctional. The right is arguably a powerful vehicle for post-industrial populism, previously more left-wing and class based, because of new definitions of elitism. Taggart defines this ‘new-populism’ as an approach that *“fuses the anti-politics stance of the New Politics with the broad based protest of the populist right”*.³⁰ He defines new-populist parties to combine populism, namely a ‘silent majority’ (us) against an indifferent or threatening ‘them’ (those in government, liberal and cultural elites; indifferent to ‘welfare cheats’ and immigrants). This has been particularly successful from the 1990s onward, associated with centre-right parties such as the Republican Party in the USA under George W. Bush from 2000 onward, and the Law and Justice Party of Poland under the Kaczyński brothers from 2001. It can be successful because the post-industrial environment allows new-populists to redefine the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ beyond class in order to frame in order to suit its own views on issues; namely political culture, welfare, government and immigration; therefore succeeding where post-war, neo-fascist far-right parties failed.³¹

The new-populist appeal of the FPÖ was a major factor in creating that cross-societal alliance. In any case, significant numbers from both occupational groups wanted to, as Kitschelt described, to *“teach them a lesson”*. An exit poll of FPÖ voters in 1999 on reasons for their vote is revealing as an indicator of why people chose to vote for that party.

³⁰ Paul Taggart (1995) ‘New Populist Parties in Western Europe’, in *West European Politics*, Vol. 18, No. 1, p. 35.

³¹ Ibid, pp. 36-40.

Table 3.2: FPÖ Voters and Voting Reasons, 1999

<i>Reasons for Voting FPÖ</i>	<i>FPÖ voters and floating voters</i>	<i>FPÖ core supporters</i>	<i>FPÖ soft supporters (swing voters)</i>
-Because the FPÖ would expose scandals and try them	65	68	65
-Because the FPÖ would bring a fresh wind of change	63	65	62
-Because they would represent my interests and for the sake of tradition	48	55	37
-Because the FPÖ is against foreign migration	47	52	39

Source: Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) 'Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und Entscheidungsmotive', p. 15.

This survey indicates that swing voters largely voted FPÖ as a means of protest and democratic renewal. Both hardcore and swing voters wanted to attack perceived corruption and renew the system. Swing voters were not overly enthusiastic about feeling that the FPÖ represented their interests, or the core FPÖ issue of immigration; this suggesting that immigration appeals, to many, were either more seen as another example of an indifferent government or that the issue was not that important. This suggests the FPÖ positioning itself as a protest party.

Within the new post-industrial political landscape the FPÖ used new-populist appeals to rally against *Lagerparteien* and 'cultural elites' while portraying themselves as the outsiders who aimed to begin anew with the "Third Republic". Haider used broad based, culturally focused attacks on the political elites of Austria, focusing on government elites as being responsible for self interested, self sustaining, corrupt, selfishness that had

caused the breakdown of traditional values such as fairness and hard work; while the FPÖ would end *Proporz* and institute a system based on hard work and fairness.³²

Haider's attack on the 'bankrupt '68 generation', an attack on liberal elites, sent a clear message: *"The revolutionary spirit dried out in the sun-baked vineyards of Tuscany ... they are 'conservative' in so far as they stand for their own naked power claims and the preservation of their own influence. They are no longer bothered about a better world or a just society but only with keeping their jobs and positions"*.³³ The intention of this was to criticise the political elites, more so the SPÖ. Haider's rhetoric more often has singled out 'Socialists' and 'Marxists' and more or less portrayed *Lagerparteien* as one 'left', 'elitist' bloc. By portraying them as wealthy, self interested elites, the FPÖ was able to harness anger against perceived privilege.

Furthermore, the FPÖ attacked what it perceived as the liberal excesses in Austrian society by attacking the 'wrong' kind of culture that attacked Austria. Haider relentlessly targeted playwrights, authors and artists as 'left wing intelligensia' who attacked Austrian participation in World War Two, whose production and works were perceived to be 'sexual perversion', or attacked anything perceived as liberal excess and therefore 'anti-Austrian'.³⁴ 'New left intellectuals', 'feminists' and 'political correctness' were targeted by the FPÖ, which positioned itself as defending a 'silent majority' against the erosion of traditional values.³⁵ Contrasting himself to the elites, the FPÖ under Haider was portrayed as being able to appeal to the 'man on the street'. From this, the FPO campaigned for the votes of these 'decent' people, against the "'68-vintage pseudo-left Viennese intellectuals" who knew nothing of the ordinary people.³⁶

³² Sully (1997) *The Haider Phenomenon*, pp. 21-29, 57-60.

³³ Haider (1995) *The Freedom I Mean*, p. 17.

³⁴ Andre Gingrich (2002) 'A Man For All Seasons: An Anthropological Perspective on Public Representation and Cultural Politics of the Austrian Freedom Party', in Ruth Wodak and Anton Pelinka, *The Haider Phenomenon in Austria*, Transaction Publishers, New Jersey, pp. 82-84.

³⁵ Sully (1997) *The Haider Phenomenon*, pp. 57-59.

³⁶ Ibid, pp. 35-37, 57-60.

Social issues, namely immigration and welfare entitlement is another example of new-populism and have been important to tap discontent as part of a greater theme of anger at the system and therefore garnering protest votes.³⁷ The FPÖ used the frame of ‘us’ and ‘them’ to portray threats to Austrian livelihood and safety; namely immigration and perceived consequences. “...it is not the immigrants who integrate into the society and culture they find themselves in, instead they expect from nations that they should accept their customs. Peaceful integration is not likely”.³⁸ Examples from the 1999 election campaign include the slogan “Stop Foreign Infiltration”, a caricature of African immigrants as wealthy criminals with “designer suits and mobile phones”, and the claim of top list candidate Thomas Prinzhorn of “free hormone treatments from the Social Welfare Office” as a conspiracy to increase their numbers.³⁹ Again, Haider created another ‘them’ who are not ‘us’, namely immigrants, by using a broad stereotype of all immigrants as a threat against ‘us’. The FPÖ combined this threat with government inaction and even claims of support for such ‘others’. “Most of the leftist ideologues seem to have a hatred of their own people. “Austrians stink and steal” was the title of a brochure of the Austrian Socialist Youth, calling for an open immigration policy. They think they have found in foreigners a new “proletariat” to be engaged in a new kind of class warfare. Whoever is against unrestricted immigration...is a ‘racist’, a ‘fascist’, a Nazi or at best ‘xenophobic’ ”.⁴⁰

The combination of framing of perceived threats with government indifference combined fear with anger in order to mobilise protest support behind the FPÖ.

³⁷ Taggart (1995), ‘New Populist Parties in Western Europe’, pp. 40, 47.

³⁸ Sully (1997) *The Haider Phenomenon*, p. 58.

³⁹ Ruth Wodak (2002) ‘Discourse and Politics: The Rhetoric of Exclusion’, in Wodak and Pelinka, *The Haider Phenomenon in Austria*, p. 36.

⁴⁰ Haider (1995) *The Freedom I Mean*, p. 60.

What also must be considered was the affect of right wing new populism upon the ÖVP. It has already been highlighted that the ÖVP was squeezed between the SPÖ and FPÖ due to it being sidelined between 'left' and 'right' poles. Given Haider's attacks focusing on a 'Socialist', 'Marxist' left, the ÖVP was trapped in the middle or saddled with the left. The ÖVP did not fit neatly because it was squeezed economically and socially between the poles of left and right. An example of this was the debate over the Nazi legacy in Austria that took place in the 1980s and 1990s.⁴¹ Though it could be argued that the ÖVP defence against accusations of against Kurt Waldheim's Nazi past were questionable, FPÖ defence of Austrian participation in the *Wehrmacht* and SS, and downplaying war atrocities was more in line with defending the status quo that was agreed upon by the SPÖ and ÖVP after World War Two.⁴² The SPÖ gradually came to represent, at least in part, the contrition side, the FPÖ defending the status quo, and the ÖVP defending but squeezed between the two. This provides another example of the SPÖ and the FPÖ taking either side, while the ÖVP was squeezed.

What can be ascertained in spite of who the target was, whether immigrant, cultural elites, or people on welfare, is that the FPÖ used new-populist appeals to garner protest votes from all sides. The FPÖ created archetypes of an 'un-Austrian', 'elitist' 'them' pitted against the 'honest', 'hard working', 'native' 'us' in order to garner protest votes.⁴³ The governing parties, namely the SPÖ as senior governing partner, was portrayed as uncaring or even encouraging of threats to Austria, while the ÖVP was squeezed by the two other parties due to the FPÖ positioning itself to the authoritarian right of the ÖVP.

⁴¹ David Art (2006) *The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria*, Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 110-111.

⁴² Wodak (2002) 'Discourse and Politics: The Rhetoric of Exclusion', pp. 37-38.

⁴³ Reinhold Gartner (2002) 'The FPO, Foreigners, and Racism in the Haider Era', in Wodak and Pelinka, *The Haider Phenomenon in Austria*, p 23.

Chapter 3.6: Post-Industrial Organisational Advantages of the FPÖ

What must also not be forgotten as a factor in FPÖ success in occupying political spaces was the clear party organisational advantage that it had over both major parties.

The FPÖ had a simple advantage in that it was a post-industrial party that was beholden to no real tradition, no encompassing base in society, no strong ties to strong economic interest groups, and no strong auxiliary networks; therefore allowing for a manoeuvrable organisation. The SPÖ and ÖVP, as class-mass parties with industrial interest-group-based organisational structures, had to rely in auxiliary groups and elites for permission for policy approval; making changes time consuming. This table reveals voter density in parties in Austria during elections (voter density being members as a percentage of voters).

Table 3.3: Voter Density (Membership vs Votes), 1971-1990

Year	<i>SPÖ</i>			<i>ÖVP</i>			<i>FPÖ</i>		
	Members	Voters	Density (%)	Members*	Voters	Density (%) **	Members	Voters	Density (%)
1971	719,389	2,280,168	32.4	805,771	1,964,713	31	-----***	248,473	11.3
1979	721,262	2,413,226	29.9	813,715	1,981,739	30	37,288	286,743	13.0
1986	674,821	2,092,024	32.3	806,331	2,003,663	26	36,583	472,205	7.8
1990	620,141	2,012,787	31.7	813,331	1,460,392	35	40,629	754,379	5.4

Source: Kurt Richard Luther (1992) 'Consociationalism, Parties and the Party System', in *West European Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 4, p. 49.

* ÖVP figures distorted because of members are counted as they belong to for all three leagues separately, as well as family membership.

** Overall estimate for ÖVP

*** Estimate for FPÖ for 1971

Both SPÖ and ÖVP can be said to have relied upon about 30% of their votes from party members. The FPÖ never relied on a strong base, but this did not matter because it could target both the newly released ‘losers’ as well as the free space of ‘winners’. FPÖ organisation was cheaper to run and left more money for advertising, and was more able to change policy and direction than the other parties who had to consult mass membership and affiliated interest groups.⁴⁴ The focus on Haider allowed the party not only to bypass grassroots members to create clearer policies that can be arguably easier to sell, but also focus on the leader is arguably a simpler way to market a party in order to maximise impact on the constituency because the leaders ‘qualities’ become associated with the party.⁴⁵ The FPÖ was freer to decide strategy, in which they could appeal to groups as far apart as voters to the economic right and former SPÖ *Lager* voters.

Modern media techniques also gave an advantage to the FPÖ because it helped focus a finely tuned message to appeal across constituencies. The FPÖ utilised a mix of good communications through PR firm’s creative branding of the FPÖ and Haider, gimmicks such as celebrity candidates, used media formats of debates against the main parties by having Haider as an equal to SPÖ and ÖVP leaders, and most importantly, making Haider the centre of political campaigning.⁴⁶ Given the broad base, Haider could appeal as many things to many people by manipulating the media perceptions of him to create a universal, appealing perception. Haider could appeal to blue collar working class and rural voters through attending folk culture festivals, wearing lederhosen and using a

⁴⁴ Wolfgang C. Müller, Fritz Plasser, Peter A. Ulram (2004) ‘Party Responses to the Erosion of Voter Loyalties in Austria: Weakness as an Advantage and Strength as a Handicap’, in Mair, P, Müller, W.C and Plasser, F (eds), *Political Parties and Electoral Change*, SAGE Publications, London, pp. 154, 157-158.

⁴⁵ Taggart (1995) ‘New Populist Parties in Western Europe’, pp. 40-42.

⁴⁶ Muller, Plasser and Ulram (2004) ‘Party Responses to the Erosion of Voter Loyalties in Austria’, pp. 154, 158, 165-168.

simplified dialect of German, to the white collar young through expensive dress sense to show sophistication on the one hand and casual for press conferences on the other.⁴⁷

All of this shows a deliberate campaign to appeal to all people through use media strategies to target a broad, volatile audience. The FPÖ, through Haider, used anger against the system as an outside third party to promote an image of Haider as a rebel outsider against the excesses of ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘political elitism’ and a defender of traditional Austrian culture. They could be all things to all people.

Conclusion

The FPÖ was successful in appealing to a significant cross-section of the Austrian electorate as a result of populist campaigning that targeted both the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of post-industrialisation. Theoretical shifts towards post-industrialisation applied in Austria, but due to factors of *Proporz* and party organisational structure, *Lagerparteien* were closer together, leaving spaces open for social authoritarian and economic right voters. Because of grand coalition government, *Proporz* and attempts at targeting white collar votes, the SPÖ and ÖVP abandoned their respective appeals to traditional left and right spaces respectively, yet also left spaces open to the FPÖ. The FPÖ appealed to the ‘losers’ of post-industrialisation by framing insecurities like immigration as a threat to previously guaranteed jobs, housing and welfare payments, and representing itself as a neo-conservative party that would return order and tradition in an insecure, modern world. The FPÖ appealed to the ‘winners’ of post-industrialisation by targeting white collar voters by targeting conservative spaces through appealing on the basis of anti-*Proporz* appeals and campaigning to the economic right of the ÖVP. This squeezed the

⁴⁷ Gingrich (2002) ‘A Man for All Seasons’, pp. 73-80.

ÖVP between the SPÖ and FPÖ, leading to FPÖ gains largely at the expense of the ÖVP. The *Grünen* and LIF, being strictly post-industrial parties with ideological concerns, were unable to appeal beyond niche ideological white collar voters.

The FPÖ united both ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ by using a new-populist message that framed a clearly defined ‘us’ against an uncaring, cultural and governmental elitist, and outsider them (immigrants, government). The FPÖ positioned itself as the guardian of ‘us’ against the privileged excesses of ‘them’. Being a post industrial party with organisational flexibilities and no loyalties to the status quo, the FPÖ was able to use media and organisational techniques to skilfully position itself and appeal to wide cross-sections of society by being something different to each group; whether pro-market tax reformers to the right of the ÖVP or as defenders of welfare and education from immigrants to target former SPÖ voters.

In conclusion, FPÖ new-populism successfully targeted open political spaces to establish a cross-societal coalition of voters. However, the successes of the FPÖ would not have been as pronounced without the failures of the *Lagerparteien*. Surely, the SPÖ and ÖVP must have realised what was happening and knew that in order to sustain their votes, they would have needed to change policies, appeals and approaches. Why did they both fail to change? As discussed in the next chapter, the crux of this thesis, party organisational structure matters.

Chapter Four: Why Did the SPÖ and ÖVP Fail to Adapt to Post-Industrial Environmental Challenges?

The previous chapter explained how the FPÖ used cross-societal appeals to empty political spaces to gain at the expense of the major parties. Yet this does not explain why the FPÖ was so successful within the context of the main parties' actions and responses. Surely, SPÖ and ÖVP leadership anticipated the new political environment of the 1980s, which there is ample evidence that they did, and would have concluded that in order to survive, they would have adapt their strategies, tactics and appeal to meet new challenges. ÖVP support had been falling gradually since 1970. The SPÖ began promisingly enough, winning a plurality of votes in every general election from 1970 until 2002. But, its share of the vote began to decline after 1983, rising only in 1995.

Unlike in most western European societies, the SPÖ and ÖVP failed where others have succeeded, evident in their decline from 1986-1999, suggesting that something within these parties was preventing them from changing policies and approaches that were incompatible with a post-industrial environment. Previous chapters highlighted *Lagermentalität* and *Proporz* as an incentive to continue consociational governance. Parties served in defending their ideological interests, embedded interest group interests, and as a dispenser of *Lager* patronage. As suggested, support for *Lagerparteien* was undermined by two factors. Firstly, by the decline of Lager constituencies and their replacement by white collar voters outside of auxiliary networks, and secondly, by the inability to protect traditional industrial bases from post-industrial economic forces sacrificed the role as 'gatekeeper'. These both allowed for the FPÖ to claim votes from across all political spaces, however, this begs the question: why didn't

the *Lagerparteien* fight back? The answer is that internal organisational structures within both parties prevented leadership from making necessary changes to policy and action; severely limiting their abilities to reach out to new voters.

Certain factors must be taken into account when asking why the SPÖ and ÖVP failed to adapt. Firstly, both parties had different experiences with governance, with the SPÖ ruling without the ÖVP from 1970 to 1987, and the ÖVP not having a Chancellor from 1970 until 2000. This provided different incentives and disincentives. Secondly, the relative decline of the parties' traditional *Lager* also varies with regard to whose decline was most dramatic. The rural, self-employed and Catholic ÖVP base declined faster than the SPÖ electorate, while the SPÖ initially gained significant support from the white collar voters during the 1970s. Taking this into account, there are three subchapters. The first subchapter will be a discussion of flaws in orthodox theory that leads to a broad outline of why both parties failed to adapt. The second and third subchapters must investigate reasons unique to each party as to why they failed to adapt.

Chapter 4.1: Orthodox Party Theory, Cartelism and the Failure of Transformation from an Industrial to Post- Industrial Party System in Austria

The failures of both the SPÖ and ÖVP to adapt must be analysed within the context of orthodox theory on party transformation and its flaws in order to argue an alternative theory.

The main structural orthodox theory of party transformation, Otto Kirchheimer's 'catch-all' theory, will be accepted as the framework, but also reveals major flaws in orthodox thinking. Kirchheimer argues that parties will inevitably transform from an

industrial, 'class-mass' party model towards a catch-all party model because it is better suited to deal with post-industrial environments, being reformist, socially mobile, and based more on social issues.¹ Parties should become more centralised and less doctrinaire in order for leaders to make appeals beyond traditional industrial bases to reach out to service sector-based, white collar voters.²

The major critique of orthodox theory on party transformation is the inadequacy in assuming that parties are rational bodies that are capable of responding to changing environments by simply changing tactics and policy. If it were that simple, then leadership, realising the inevitability of decline if there was no change, would change policies in order to broaden appeals. Strom argues against this, claiming that orthodox theory treats parties as singular actors, rather than factoring in the constraints of party organisation from forces and institutions inside and outside the party.³ In other words, parties and their leaders cannot be uniform bodies that aim always to win or for maximum influence, nor are they universally able to change, policy and tactics to suit aims.

The Austrian case study makes a powerful case for the consideration of internal party constraints as opposed to assuming that external factors of changing environments will force parties to act rationally. Party leadership in Austria realised that their parties needed to change and adapt, especially after reversals from 1986 onwards, but were undermined by their organisations. This is evident in the re-establishment of grand coalition government from 1987-1999 despite its increasing unsuitability in post-

¹ Kirchheimer (1966) 'The Transformation of Western European Party Systems', pp. 182-193

² Ibid, pp. 190-191.

³ Kaare Strom (1990) 'A Behavioural Theory of Competitive Political Parties, in *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 569-570.

industrial Austria.⁴ Corporatist groups used their influence within their parties in order to maximise their influence as corporatist negotiators; best in grand coalition government, just as during the 1945-1966 period of coalition government. Katz and Mair are correct in detailing cartel model theory, claiming that mutual survival as a feature exists in order to maintain influence for themselves and as a group.⁵ However, despite their intent, cartelism cannot be a party model. Instead, cartel tactics are used in order to ensure mutual benefit; this is reflected in political outcomes such as government formation and parliamentary votes that excluded other parties and interests.⁶

Therefore, the argument is that orthodox party transformation theory is inadequate because internal constraints imposed by interest group-based structures prevented party leadership from acting rationally, thus preventing *Lagerparteien* from broadening their support.

Chapter 4.2: The SPÖ: Promising Start, Poor Finish

The SPÖ was the one of the two main parties that fared better. Though it won a plurality of the votes and provided a Chancellor from 1970-1999, it was unable to halt an almost constant electoral decline in support since 1983 and fell to a low of 33.15% in 1999. There is ample evidence that forces within internal party organisation, namely the ÖGB, used its position to undermine attempts at adaptation and reaching out to new voters.

⁴ Luther (2007) 'Must What Goes Up Always Come Down?' pp. 64-67.

⁵ Peter Mair and Richard S. Katz (1997) 'Party Organisation, Party Democracy and the Emergence of the Cartel Party', in Peter Mair (ed), *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 109-114.

⁶ Luther (2007) 'A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Political Parties in Consociational Democracy', p. 12.

Interestingly, this tactic has existed in countries which experienced strong anti-statist, populist parties that attacked cartel tactics; including the *List Pim Fortuyn* in the Netherlands, *Lega Nord* in Italy and the FPÖ in Austria.

The SPÖ was in a difficult position because of the decline of the Socialist *Lager* since the beginning of the Second Republic. Firstly, the SPÖ could not continue to rely on a shrinking part of the electorate. By 1999 blue collar workers made up only 15% the electorate and 16% of the SPÖ voters.⁷ Secondly, SPÖ membership fell dramatically in number as a proportion of the electorate from a high of 721,737 (15% of electorate) in 1959 to 522,000 (9%) in 1995, reducing the potential reliable turnout in elections.⁸ Thirdly, the base membership of the party was still largely unrepresentative of the electorate as a whole because it overrepresented blue collar workers. In 1989 the rank and file was 47.3% blue collar compared to 25.6% civil servants and 24.4% white collar.⁹ The SPÖ was in danger of appealing to a shrinking part of an electorate that no longer supported it with such past fervour and could no longer guarantee it significant numbers of votes.

Observing the transition period that began in the 1960s it is evident that SPÖ leadership understood the changing socioeconomic situation and did try to become a catch-all party. The election of Bruno Kreisky to the post of Chairman of the SPÖ in 1967 is a good indicator of the beginnings of attempted transformation; given the loss of the 1966 election which led to a reformist, single-party majority ÖVP government. Defeating establishment candidate Hans Czettel (backed by former leader Bruno Pitterman, former Transport Minister Karl Waldbrunner, and ÖGB President Anton Benya) by appealing to the *Länder* party organisations, Kreisky attempted to transform the SPÖ into a “*liberal People’s Party*” and appealed successfully beyond the blue collar

⁷ Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) ‘Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und Entscheidungsmotive’, pp. 11, 28.

⁸ Kurt Richard Luther (1998) ‘From Accommodation to Competition: The ‘Normalisation’ of the Second Republic’s Party System’ in Kurt Richard Luther and Peter J. G. Pulzer (eds), *Austria 1945-1995: Fifty Years of the Second Republic*, Ashgate, Brookfield, Vermont, p. 127.

⁹ Luther (1992) ‘Consociationalism, Parties and the Party System’, p. 56.

base to the growing numbers of university educated, white collar employees, youth and women.¹⁰ The SPÖ targeted white collar liberal voters; contrasted with the ÖVP, which was under socially reactionary pressure from the Catholic Church on issues such as abortion and gay rights, and therefore appeared less socially liberal.¹¹ Kreisky disassociated the SPÖ from the perceptions of radicalism by emphasising himself as a “*social democrat*” and a “*centrist*”, and enacted a program of Austro-Keynesianism, high employment levels, reducing the period of compulsory military training, expanded educational provision, gender equality, and legal abortion and homosexuality.¹²

Clearly, the SPÖ and its more pragmatic stance intended on softening its image towards more of a catch-all party focus. Kreisky’s SPÖ reversed the ÖVP majority of 1966 by winning the 1970 election, won a majority in 1971, with Kreisky as Chancellor from 1970 to 1983. The successes by 1986, three years after Kreisky stepped down as Chancellor, show that the SPÖ initially retained a monopoly on support of the more post-industrial segments of the electorate.

¹⁰ Oliver Rathkolb (2002) ‘The Kreisky Era, 1970-1983’, in Rolf Steininger, Gunter Bischoff and Michael Gehler, *Austria in the Twentieth Century*, Transaction Publishers, New Jersey, pp. 269-271.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 272.

¹² Ibid, pp. 274-286.

Table 4.1: Austrian Party Voter Bases, 1986 General Election

<i>Voter Segments (%)</i>	<i>SPO 1986</i>	<i>OVP 1986</i>	<i>FPO 1986</i>
<i>Age</i>			
18-30	39	33	12
31-44	43	37	11
<i>Occupation</i>			
White Collar	57	36	13
<i>Gender</i>			
Female	43	43	7
<i>Total</i>	43.1	41.3	9.7

*Source: Fritz Plasser, Peter A. Ulram and. Wolfgang C. Muller (1995), *Wahlverhalten und Parteienwettbewerb: Analysen zur Nationalratswahl*, Signum Verlag, in Terri Givens, (2005), *Voting Radical Right in Western Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 56, 65.*

These election results reveal SPÖ appeal to the core new middle class segments. The SPÖ had a clear lead among younger to middle aged, especially white collar, and a strong base among female voters. Especially telling is the lead with these over the ÖVP. These results would suggest a future with a strong SPÖ and a weaker ÖVP. However, by 1999, though still ahead of the ÖVP on 26.9% and the FPÖ on 27.2%, SPÖ share of the vote fell to 33.4%. Considering the early successes of Kreisky's appeal to the young, female, liberal, middle class, educated voters, the SPÖ knew these groups were the future voter pool. However, attempting to attract these voters clashed the structure of the SPÖ and *Lagermentalität* of interests within that structure, which saw an ideological division between what could be deemed 'post-industrial' and 'moderate' approaches.

The leftist approach, advocated by younger members such Josef Cap and Heinz Fischer, was in favour of more responsive and accountable liberal socialist / libertarian left policies that advocated more redistribution, liberalised work hours, and a more

liberal social policy.¹³ This was more reflective of an understanding of quality of life issues as being important. They were clashed with party interests, evident in the ‘Androsch affair’, where the Minister of Finance Hannes Androsch was attacked by the left as being too linked to business interests; and the willingness of the government to export arms to undemocratic regimes in South America.¹⁴ Cap was placed on the Vienna list in the 1983 general election and with 62,457 votes, and won the largest number of preference votes as a list candidate in Austria, campaigning on a grassroots, leftist, environmental platform that was popular.¹⁵ The leftist approach did have promise and followed a more post-industrial libertarian-left approach.

The pragmatists, led by Kreisky and included conservative forces such as ÖGB, especially under Anton Benya, extolled a softer, more universally encompassing message in order to bridge the gaps between the left and the old party base; especially the industrial workers. The conservative force of the ÖGB and other entrenched interests saw economics as of primary importance against ‘secondary’ social issues because both these projects would bring economic benefits to blue collar workers. It responded harshly to challenges; exemplified by the example from Chapter One of the expulsion of Josef Cap from the party executive for allegations of privilege against Theodor Kery.

Although the pragmatists attempted to bridge the gaps of industrial and post-industrial, it was soon apparent that ÖGB structural power meant that both pragmatists and leftists were unable to properly challenge entrenched interests. Despite attempts at

¹³ Sully (1986) ‘Austrian Social Democracy’ pp. 157, 161-163, 167-169.

¹⁴ Ibid, pp. 162-163, 167-168.

¹⁵ Alfred Stirnemann (1989) ‘Recruitment and Recruitment Strategies’, in Anton Pelinka and Fritz Plasser (eds), *The Austrian Party System*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, pp. 406-407.

n.b/ Austrian *Nationalrat* members are elected on the basis of proportional representation lists within 43 electoral districts in Austria.

Also worth mentioning was that the second ranked candidate in Vienna to Josef Cap was ÖGB President Anton Beyna. This could be deemed significant as symbolic of the generational clash and an indicator of public preferences.

openness and change, Kreisky's SPÖ still engaged in *Proporz* and corporatism. In the *Nationalrat*, despite holding a majority from 1970-1983, during the 1971-1975 and 1979-1983 sessions, 84% and 75% of respective laws were passed with both SPÖ and ÖVP unanimous approval; a reflection that *Nationalrat* legislators were still open to corporatist and *Lager* lobbying.¹⁶ Especially notable was that the President of the *Nationalrat* during these times was Anton Benya. Also, the Joint Commission on Prices and Wages was just as influential under Kreisky as under the previous governments. Party structure and makeup was still restricted because it reflected ÖGB interests. In 1983 ÖGB members made up 75% of the party and 60% of all unionised employees.¹⁷ Until 1994, the head of the ÖGB was on every SPÖ delegation in coalition negotiations. It still had its representatives in post-election coalition committees and party leadership committee structures had not changed over time.¹⁸ Given the ÖGB emphasis on 'industrial thinking', they were not likely to accept left focus on left-libertarian 'quality of life' issues; they were less willing to adapt from 'old left' thinking.

No example could be more significant than the Zwentendorf referendum of 1978. This referendum was called by the SPÖ government in 1978 in order to open the newly constructed first nuclear reactor at Zwentendorf in Lower Austria, which was deadlocked in the *Nationalrat* due to ÖVP political manoeuvring and opposition within local and sectional SPÖ groups, namely the *Sozialistische Jugend* (Socialist Youth, SJ) under Cap, and a cross-section of liberals, greens and conservatives.¹⁹ Despite such opposition within and outside of the party, the corporatist interest groups, especially the ÖGB and

¹⁶ Wolfgang C. Müller (1993) 'Executive-Legislative Relations in Austria, 1945-1992', in *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 481-485.

¹⁷ Sully (1986) 'Austrian Social Democracy', p. 166.

¹⁸ In 1994 and 1999, ÖGB delegations walked out of each SPÖ coalition committee delegation. This was largely symbolic against economic neoliberal policies; but still did not change ÖGB power and influence within the party.

¹⁹ Anton Pelinka (1983) 'The Nuclear Power Referendum in Austria', in *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 254-256.

the ÖIG (Association of Austrian Industrialists, close to the ÖVP), all agreed in favour of nuclear power. Benya, as *Nationalrat* member and President of the *Nationalrat* and the ÖGB at this time, used his influence to favour in Zwentendorf as a corporatist agreement and in favour of job creation.²⁰

Zwentendorf united opposition from youth, green groups, and ultimately many liberal, white collar voters; whom the SPÖ had reached out to in the past and hope to continue with. The victory of the anti-nuclear vote by 50.5% to 49.5% was a defeat for the potential of the SPÖ to reach out to younger, more socially liberal, environmentally conscious ‘post-materialist’ voters. Polls showed that it was the white collar workers (31% to 34%) and professionals (45%-22%) who voted ‘no’; the demographic groups whom the SPÖ hoped to appeal to.²¹ It was from here that the Green movement in Austria began to gain traction, with the *Alternative Liste Österreichs* (ALÖ), the *Vereinigte Grüne Österreichs* (VGÖ) forming each in 1982, were influenced heavily by Zwentendorf and united in 1986 to form *Grünen* and win 4.8% of the vote and representation in the *Nationalrat*.

Though it is doubtful that a green party would not have emerged, they were assisted by the SPÖ in its ÖGB ties, in which they were prevented from rethinking along the lines of a more post-industrial libertarian-left that the left faction supported. The ÖGB was still in a mindset of corporatism and conservative thinking, yet retained a position of disproportionate power within a party that aimed to appeal to white collar voters. Another prominent example was the support by the ÖGB of exporting arms to South American dictatorships during the 1980s, justified by the ÖGB as creating jobs

²⁰ Sully (1986) ‘Austrian Social Democracy’, pp. 158-159

²¹ Pelinka (1983) ‘The Nuclear Referendum in Austria’, pp. 256-258.

Those white collar and professional voters not included were those who claimed to have abstained from voting in the referendum.

and keeping with corporatist agreements, which was opposed by the SJ, and no doubt caused problems with liberal, white collar voters.²² Moves toward the introduction of a 35 hour work week by the ÖGB official and Minister of Social Affairs during the 1980-1983 government, Alfred Dallinger, were viewed with scepticism by the leadership, including Benya, delayed for introduction until the late 1980's, and never enacted; largely because of the ÖVP coalition from 1987.²³ One last example was the well meaning founding of the Ministry of Health and the Environment in 1972, under Minister Kurt Steyrer from 1981-1985, was argued to have been given insufficient power to implement policy that would have more effectively dealt with noise, air and water pollution from industry.²⁴ This was opposed by the ÖGB and would have been precisely the measures to appeal to liberal white collar voters.

After Kreisky, attempts at reform failed because of illegitimacy due to the continuation of Proporz, corporatism and grand coalition government. For a while, economic liberalisation, spearheaded after 1986 by Chancellor Franz Vranitzky, looked promising. Vranitzky, a former director of several large Austrian banks, was seen as a clean, reforming moderniser. The 1990 election campaign in Austria resulted in the SPÖ achieving a large plurality of 42.8% to the ÖVP on 32.1%, largely due to campaigning on Vranitzky's image as a tough reformist outsider and with less emphasis on the SPÖ; similar to the tactics of Jörg Haider.²⁵ However, this did not work because *Proporz* was not reformed; thus Vranitzky's image failed. Müller, Plasser and Ulram emphasise that studies and opinion show that the 1990 victory was more to do with Heinz Fischer's

²² Sully (1986) 'Austrian Social Democracy', pp. 166-167.

²³ Ibid, p. 167.

²⁴ Ibid, p. 168.

²⁵ Wolfgang C. Müller and Fritz Plasser (1992) 'Austria: The 1990 Campaign', in Shaun Bowler and David M. Farrell (eds), *Electoral Strategies and Political Marketing*, St Martins Press, New York, pp. 26-27, 34-35, 40.

“*votes on credit*” and the expectation of reforms of the system and SPÖ itself rather than a preference for the SPÖ.²⁶

Furthermore, the situation of a grand coalition raises the question of how reform could occur while government involved both *Lagerparteien*, including interest group elements intent on continuing corporatism. The leadership of Vranitzky and Klima was unable to reform *Proporz* because it still practiced patronage and corporatism. One famous example was the 1997 sale of remaining government shares in *Creditanstalt* bank, under ÖVP domain, preferably to a private interest. The ÖVP demanded that it be sold to another ÖVP-linked bank, *Raiffeisenbank*, but was instead sold to SPÖ-linked Bank Austria.²⁷ This is an example that shows party leadership, despite voicing reformism, were practicing *Proporz*. Failure of the SPÖ was evident in the 1994 elections. SPÖ voter share fell from 42.8% to 34.9%, despite the main SPÖ selling point again being Vranitzky’s successes such as Austria joining the EU, which passed with significant support in a 1994 referendum.²⁸ The inability of the SPÖ to reach out to voters with a more libertarian left leaning was a missed opportunity because it potentially sacrificed its appeal to white collar liberals that the SPÖ wanted and had the initial support of. By 1999, 18% and 9% of the vote from the liberal *Grünen* and LIF (socially liberal) (7.3% and 3.4% of vote respectively) respectively came from those who had voted SPÖ in 1995; about 2% potentially lost from the SPÖ.²⁹ Many white collar voters wanting real reforms would have also voted FPÖ.

²⁶ Müller, Plasser and Ulram (2004) ‘Party Responses to the Erosion of Voter Loyalties in Austria: Weakness as an Advantage and Strength as a Handicap’, p. 152.

²⁷ Luther (2007) ‘Must What Goes Up Always Come Down?’ p. 70.

²⁸ Melanie A. Sully (1995) ‘The Austrian Election of 1994’, in *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 14, Issue 2, pp. 220-221.

²⁹ Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) ‘Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und Entscheidungsmotive’, p. 12.

At the same time, the SPÖ, in shifting focus away their old blue collar base did not retain enough of it. The SPÖ was unable to retain the support of much of its base because of economic privatisation and deregulation that helped the SPÖ gain white collar votes often isolated traditional supporters. The blue collar vote went from 53% in 1990 to 35% in 1999, while the FPÖ went from 21% to 47% in the same period.³⁰ Though there is precedent for blue collar appeals to be successful for new-populist parties, such as with the Republican Party in the USA, Austria is significant insofar as the FPÖ won a plurality of blue collar votes in 1999; signifying that the SPÖ focused too much away from their old base. Tactical appeals against the former ‘gatekeepers’ allowed the FPÖ to gain from free political spaces. Theoretically, the decline of the blue collar vote should have been balanced by white collar gains. However, white collar gains were unsustainable due to policies, and worsened by the disproportionate loss of blue collar votes.

There were at least some attempts to reform party organisation, though this failed. Besides the change in emphasis by Kreisky towards white collar voters, in the 1980s and 1990s there were attempts to focus more on important, ‘quality of life’ social issues with ‘issue initiatives’ organised as party units open to non-members, a professional media organisation and the open primaries for candidates and list rankings on a *Länder* level.³¹ The central party also attempted to take more control of candidate selection. A major 1968 party reform was that *“Persons whose election is in the interest of the National Council’s work irrespective of their place of residence, are to be nominated to one-fifth of the positions on the list of candidates”*.³² 20% of candidates who could better reflect party

³⁰ Ibid, p. 24.

³¹ Müller, Plasser and Ulram (2004) ‘Party Responses to the Erosion of Voter Loyalties in Austria: Weakness as an Advantage and Strength as a Handicap’, pp. 155-156, 159.

³² Stirnemann (1989) ‘Recruitment and Recruitment Strategies’, p. 408.

strategies such as technocrats, experts, celebrities or even underrepresented groups such as women could have been placed high in rankings through central party intervention.

These reforms proved to be rather lacklustre in terms of ability to change the party. Social issues were not being seen as important by many rank and file members who preferred traditional ideological approaches to problems and were never taken seriously or were at all significant overall.³³ The media campaign relied on too much spin around Klima rather than on targeting core groups. Focusing on Klima, *"They managed to streamline his public statements to the extent that made Klima look like a puppet, repeating the spin doctor's slogans time and time again, even if it was obvious that they did not provide the appropriate answer to questions put to him"*.³⁴ The open primaries depended on a 50% binding turnout, and the end result was apathy and opposition which resulted in the 1994 election primaries applying to two *Länder*, Vorarlberg and Burgenland; but even then few candidates proposed by the central party were rejected; many of whom would have been interest-group and auxiliary linked anyway.³⁵ The only useful quota was the introduction of each gender being guaranteed 40% representation in party bodies.³⁶ Local candidate selection was rather powerless and candidate selection continued largely along the same lines as in the past: party officials, hierarchy in auxiliary organisations, and ÖGB officials. Heinz Fischer argues that ranking and seniority tended to play a major factor in re-election, pointing out that re-election for incumbent *Nationalrat* members from 1966, 1970 and 1971 general elections was about 95% and was likely to continue on seniority principles and was hardly good for renewal of representatives.³⁷

³³ Müller, Plasser and Ulram (2004) 'Party Responses to the Erosion of Voter Loyalties in Austria: Weakness as an Advantage and Strength as a Handicap', p. 155.

³⁴ Ibid, p. 156.

³⁵ Ibid, p. 159.

³⁶ Ibid, p. 156.

³⁷ Stirnemann (1989) 'Recruitment and Recruitment Strategies', pp. 418-419.

The comparison to the FPÖ from the last chapter shows that the slower, less manoeuvrable SPÖ was unable to counter the FPÖ. Despite starting off well in terms of good tactics and appeal under the leadership of Kreisky from 1970-1983, the SPÖ eventually stalled in its effort in evolving from a class-mass party to a catch-all party. Successes under Kreisky were undermined by its organisational structure that made it unable to adapt to modern politics and therefore failed to have the impact they could have had against the FPÖ. ÖGB old left concerns undermined post-industrial environmental, liberal attempts at appeals to white collar voters; while economic attempts to appeal isolated many in the blue collar base.

Chapter 4.3: The ÖVP and the Gradual Decline

Although there should have been potential for the ÖVP to win white collar votes, the ÖVP vote decline massively. In 1999 it received 26.9% of the vote and came third to the SPÖ and FPÖ respectively. Although elites attempted to reform the party and its approach since the 1950s, ÖVP internal power distribution among the three leagues restricted leadership from making necessary changes. Unlike the more straightforward SPÖ case of elite interference, this was more of a case of league deadlock and resistance towards policy changes.

The ÖVP was in a worse position than the SPÖ because it suffered from a bigger decline in its traditional voter bases. Firstly, the strong Catholic voter base that was more important to the ÖVP than other parties declined, with mass attendance on Sundays dropping from 33% in 1969 to 17% in 1990.³⁸ The public became more secular and less religious, which cost the ÖVP a ready audience through traditional ties.

³⁸ Müller and Steininger (1994) 'Party Organisation and Party Competitiveness: The Case of the Austrian Peoples Party, 1945-1992', p. 6.

Secondly, the occupational bases of the self-employed and farmers fell to a combined 11% of the electorate and 20% of ÖVP voters in 1999.³⁹ Thirdly, ÖVP membership fell from a high of about 640,000* (13% of the electorate) in 1970 to about 485,000* (8%) in 1995.⁴⁰ Fourthly, like the SPÖ, the ÖVP over-represented these declining groups in terms of rank and file. In 1990 39.8% of membership were self employed and farmers, 22.3% civil servants, 22.8% blue collar compared to 15.1% white collar.⁴¹

By the 1960s, spurred by the general elections of 1953 and 1959 where the SPÖ won plurality but not more seats, many within the ÖVP felt that the party needed to change and reach out to new voters by disassociating itself from the *Proporz* system. This was pushed within the party by a group of liberal reformers who believed that too many economic concessions had been made to the SPÖ so wanted an end to grand coalitions, and that liberal economics should be a major focus of the party.⁴² This culminated with the rise of Josef Klaus as leader of the party and Chancellor from 1964-1970. Klaus was the former Governor of Salzburg and former Minister of Finance, and was not directly linked to any of the ÖVP organisational leagues. Strongly involved in this group was the ÖAAB, who as an employees league, felt their views and composition better represented the electorate.

This began promisingly, with the 1966 general election leading to a single party majority government. On paper, cabinet was different, with eight ÖAAB ministers and some non-league members dominating cabinet including ÖAAB-linked Josef Taus as

³⁹ Plasser, Ulram and Sommer (1999) 'Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1999: Muster, Trends und Entscheidungsmotive', pp. 11, 28.

⁴⁰ Luther (1998) 'From Accommodation to Competition: The 'Normalisation' of the Second Republic's Party System', p. 127.

Each of these figures is a rough average between the estimated minimum and maximum membership numbers of the ÖVP due to the likely incidence of double counting of organisational membership (1970 720,000 to 561,000; 1995 522,000 to 419,250).

⁴¹ Luther (1992) 'Consociationalism, Parties and the Party System', p. 56.

⁴² Bluhm (1973) *Building an Austrian Nation: The Political Integration of a Western State*, pp. 111-113.

Minister of Nationalised Industries, ÖAAB official Grete Rehor as Minister of Social Affairs, and some provincial politicians such as Franz Heutzenauer from Tyrol as Minister of the Interior.⁴³ Despite the promises of reform, consensual politics continued in Austria during this government's rule. For example, of the 515 new laws introduced from 1966-1970, only 62 were passed with only ÖVP support.⁴⁴ Furthermore, the inclusion of officials in government still allowed for *Proporz* to continue. Rehor, for example, was still within the sphere of corporatism as she was Deputy Chairwoman of the third largest union in Austria within the ÖGB: giving continued corporatist access to government, while the Ministers of Agriculture and Commerce continued to be from the ÖBB and ÖWB respectively. The structures of *Proporz* continued, including the Joint Commission on Prices and Wages. As a result, the ÖVP appeared rather motionless, without strong vision and appeal because of party structure and corporatist arrangements. In the 1970 general elections, the ÖVP lost its majority to the SPÖ.

Opposition should have theoretically provided the ÖVP with an incentive or ability to renew itself, but this was not to be the case. Unlike the SPÖ under Kreisky from 1967-1970, the ÖVP did not make a tactical and policy transformation. Although it was excluded from government at that time, *Proporz* and corporatism gave the ÖVP and its constituent leagues enough power to force compromise that it had no real incentive to make changes to strategy and policy. The vast majority of bills before the *Nationalrat* received support unanimously from both parties. The structures of corporatism were still in place that gave the ÖBB, ÖWB and ÖAAB a place in negotiations, such as the Joint Commission. A change of direction in terms of policy was attempted during the 1970s, but the changes were largely cosmetic. The Salzburg Program of 1972, abandoned after a short time, re-branded the party as representing the 'progressive centre' was strangely

⁴³ Ibid, pp. 105-106.

⁴⁴ Sully (1981) *Political Parties and Elections in Austria*, p. 72.

vague. Economic policies were still Austro-Keynesian and continued to share key positions with the SPÖ such as the maintenance of full employment through state intervention and welfare; instead, the party sold itself as not being the SPÖ.⁴⁵ Despite the ascendancy of some younger politicians in the 1970s such as Josef Taus, as well as more influence of the ÖAAB wing of the party, the other leagues still had massive power. Given ÖVP interest entrenchment, it was unable to articulate an alternative vision to Kreisky's SPÖ.

Only when economic crises in the 1980's began as a result of budget deficits and economic stagnation was the ÖVP given another opportunity to adapt. With post-industrial opportunities approaching on the right due to international trends towards centre-right neo-liberalism, but this proved difficult. A liberal wing, supported by ÖVP Chairman from 1991-1995, Erhard Busek, challenged the status quo on traditional corporatist arrangements in order to allow the ÖVP leadership to make necessary changes. *"By clinging to the utmost principle of consensus, we have not implemented many sensible innovations. Conflicts over subject matters were avoided; sometimes, this costs more than it fetches..."*⁴⁶ The liberal wing wanted to target a neo-liberal, socially moderate Green space in order to attract urban, white collar employees. Busek's successor, Wolfgang Schüssel, was also initially supportive. Indeed, both Busek and Schüssel were former Secretaries-General of the ÖWB; demonstrating that elite leadership, even if rooted in leagues, wanted change. However, unlike the SPÖ, ÖVP internal divisions where interest group elites blocked reforms; preventing the ÖVP from capturing new spaces.

⁴⁵ Wolfgang C. Müller (1988) 'Conservatism and the Transformation of the Austrian Peoples Party', in Brian Girvin (ed), *The Transformation of Contemporary Conservatism*, SAGE Publications, London, pp. 105-107.

⁴⁶ Crepaz (1995) 'An Institutional Dinosaur: Austrian Corporatism in the Post-Industrial Age', p. 82.

Problems with the ÖVP in its inability to change lay with the founding structure. The ÖVP was a microcosm of *Proporz* itself: equally divided power built into a structural pillar, and based policy on interest areas monopolies and compromise. The leagues retained financial autonomy and membership of a league meant automatic membership of the ÖVP, autonomy over *Länder* league membership dues and had a monopoly on policy for respective areas and other decisions by a compromise between the three leagues.⁴⁷ Given that the ÖAAB was in a clear minority position within the Chambers of Labour, it was the ÖBB and the ÖWB who had more power because of the highest number of members and the most funds.⁴⁸ Although leadership wanted change, the division of the party into leagues prevented it from moving; analogous to the immobility of the grand coalition itself. Therefore, the party was paralysed by divisions between white collar employee appeals (liberals, ÖAAB, Busek) and traditional wings (some within both the ÖBB and ÖWB) who wished to retain patronage, protection against reforms, and retain corporatist approaches that appeared to oppose neo-liberalism; effectively immobilising it because of the veto-power that each faction retained.⁴⁹

The opportunities looked promising, but in the end, the ÖVP declined. Though in the 1983 election the ÖVP broke the SPÖ majority in the *Nationalrat*, they were unable to capitalise on these gains in 1986, losing support and joining a grand coalition headed by the SPÖ Chancellor Vranitzky. There were several reasons for the failure to reach out to white collar voters, reflecting the internal division of the party.

⁴⁷ Müller and Steininger (1994) 'Party Organisation and Party Competitiveness: The Case of the Austrian Peoples Party, 1945-1992', pp. 12-13.

⁴⁸ Müller (1988) 'Conservatism and the Transformation of the Austrian Peoples Party', pp. 100-101.

⁴⁹ Fraser Duncan (2006) 'A Decade of Christian Democratic Decline: The Dilemmas of the CDU, ÖVP and CDA in the 1990s', in *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 484-485.

Firstly, although there were those within the party that called for neo-liberal solutions to deficit problems, the prevailing orthodoxy still advocated some Austro-Keynesian measures to deficit such as increased spending measures on family benefits.⁵⁰ There were attempts at tax reforms, deregulation, efficiency and privatisation of some nationalised industries. However, ÖVP-style neo-liberalism was rather mild compared with other centre-right parties around the world. In 1986, it advocated a 50% cut in subsidies and funding of new technologies, which still accepted some fundamentals of Austro-Keynesian ‘intervention’.⁵¹ Essentially, much of the *Proporz* framework was kept in place. The inability of the ÖVP to position itself to the economic right allowed the FPÖ to take advantage by positioning itself as a ‘pro-market’ party; gaining many economically right wing votes. The frustration with internal gridlock was evident in the consideration by the ÖWB to leave the ÖVP and form a separate party.⁵² With far more organisational and policy freedom the FPÖ was able to outmanoeuvre the ÖVP to the economic right.

Secondly, the ÖVP was outmanoeuvred for white collar votes because it did not present a credible alternative as reformers. Although Busek disagreed with proportionality on the basis that it stifled ‘innovation’, league influence was a determining factor to remain in government. In the 1990 campaign, as opposed to the SPÖ’s ‘Vranitsky strategy’, the ÖVP did advocate an ‘eco-social market’ with an emphasis on the ÖVP economic competency as opposed to SPÖ incompetence; it did not focus on leadership and often resolved to just attack SPÖ policy without clear alternatives.⁵³ Considering that the ÖVP was junior partner in government, it was hard

⁵⁰ Lauber (1992) ‘Changing Priorities in Austrian Economic Policy, pp. 156, 168.

⁵¹ Müller (1988) ‘Conservatism and the Transformation of the Austrian Peoples Party’, pp. 111-115.

⁵² Duncan (2006) ‘A Decade of Christian Democratic Decline: The Dilemmas of the CDU, ÖVP and CDA in the 1990s’, p. 484.

⁵³ Müller and Plasser (1992) ‘Austria: The 1990 Campaign’ pp. 36-37.

for many to see how the ÖVP could prove itself capable of delivering reforms. The continuation of league and Chamber influence hurt the ÖVP by association. One way was that leagues continued to dominate certain cabinet posts, with Schüssel, the former ÖWB Secretary-General, serving as Minister of Economic Affairs from 1989-1995. Another was the continuing collaboration of chambers and leagues; with the Chamber of Business and ÖGB cooperating against the liberalisation of shop trading hours.⁵⁴ Rather than having the opportunity to portray themselves as neo-liberal reformers, the ÖVP appeared to be a party of the status quo because internal division prevented reform.

Thirdly, the ÖVP failed to take advantage of the rise of issue-based politics in order to appeal to moderates and white collar voters to the right because it contradicted league interests. A strong undercurrent for green issues in the party was given massive leeway when planning the *Zukunftmanifest* (Future Manifesto). However, the final approved document for the 1986 elections was watered down to a non-committal compromise due to the structural powers of the three leagues.⁵⁵ Zwentendorf provided an opportunity which it took to opposing nuclear power, but this was more nuanced. Opposition was largely political; corporatist groups had already agreed to support nuclear power, including the ÖBB and ÖWB.⁵⁶ Like the SPÖ, industrial economic considerations by internal interest groups prevented it from appealing to issue-based politics. Crepaz uses the example of a waste management bill in the *Nationalrat*, with the ÖVP split between a 'green wing' represented by the party and the business, anti-environment wing of the party represented through the Chamber of Commerce.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Müller, Plasser and Ulram (2004) 'Party Responses to the Erosion of Voter Loyalties in Austria: Weakness as an Advantage and Strength as a Handicap', p. 171.

⁵⁵ Müller (1988) 'Conservatism and the Transformation of the Austrian Peoples Party', pp. 110-112.

⁵⁶ Pelinka (1983) 'The Nuclear Referendum in Austria', pp. 254-256.

⁵⁷ Crepaz (1995) 'An Institutional Dinosaur: Austrian Corporatism in the Post-Industrial Age', p. 71.

What appears to have happened is that the ÖVP was squeezed between the SPÖ and the FPÖ in terms of reaching out to white collar voters. Furthermore, the ÖVP had to compete with *Grünen* and the LIF; which the ÖVP did lose voter bases to these more accountable parties. In 1999, 11% of *Grünen* voters and 16% of LIF voters had voted ÖVP in 1995. Given the environmental current within the *Grünen* and the liberal base of the LIF, the ÖVP clearly lost opportunities to retain votes by not reaching out. The end result was that in the general elections of 1999, the ÖVP came third with 26.9% of the vote; its worst result to date. Müller, Plasser and Ulram contend that by the mid 1990s the ÖVP, by trying to hold the core base while trying to extend beyond that base to the white collar new middle class, could not be reconciled because of *Lager* interest group versus reformist contradiction.⁵⁸

Despite numerous attempts at reform, the ÖVP was still beholden to these corporatist interests. From the late 1960s and especially since the 1970 defeat, the reformers in the party made strong attempts to take away their power by diluting it. Firstly, there was an attempt at broader representation in the late 1960s by mandating that in the larger party bodies be divided by 48% ÖAAB members, 32% ÖBB, and 16% ÖWB in terms of representation; multiple policy committees, and in the 1970's the youth and women's organisations equal formal status as constituent organisations as the three leagues.⁵⁹ Secondly, there were attempts for more central party control by having a certain proportion of candidates nominated by the central party eventually (10% won by Chairman Alois Mock in the 1980's), more control over *Länder* and league membership being brought closer to the central party (1970's and 1980's), and fixed percentages of

⁵⁸ Müller, Plasser and Ulram (2004) 'Party Responses to the Erosion of Voter Loyalties in Austria: Weakness as an Advantage and Strength as a Handicap', pp.163-164.

⁵⁹ Müller and Steininger (1994) 'Party Organisation and Party Competitiveness: The Case of the Austrian Peoples Party, 1945-1992', pp.15-17.

Länder and league donations to the central party as decided by the central executive and collected by the *Land* organisations (1970s and 1980s).⁶⁰

Most of these reforms were ineffective in creating real change, evident in the declining vote, because they were unable to sufficiently challenge the power of the leagues; thus leaving the party still largely unreflective of the electorate. Almost all of these reforms were enacted but did not challenge the fundamental power such as the control of the leagues over party finance and policy; still leaving them powerful. The most relevant proposal, being the one on the domination of the ÖAAB at the expense of the other leagues, may have worked, but was not adopted. The equalisation of women's and youth branches with the leagues ignored the traditional authority and financial clout of the leagues and was unsuccessful.⁶¹ Furthermore, party control was still not centralised enough over the leagues. The agreed level of central control over candidate selection, agreed upon at 10% between Chairman Mock, is arguably not very effective; the only real change, *Land* organisation collection of dues, still ignored the problem of league membership being paramount.⁶² Like with the SPÖ, the tendency towards incumbency, based on seniority, loyalty and interest group ties, still existed.

It appears evident that the ÖVP was unwilling to substantially change its structure and tactics to become a catch-all party because vested corporatist interests, whether public or within parties, had too much to lose. ÖVP leaders did enact reforms but because of the consideration of influence of the autonomous bodies, leaders were unable to act rationally towards true change and therefore reforms were insufficient. Because

⁶⁰ Ibid, pp. 17-23.

⁶¹ Ibid, pp. 17-18.

⁶² Ibid, pp. 18-23.

the ÖVP did not appear to be a credible modernising force the FPÖ being more credible and flexible, was able to take the ÖVP bourgeois, white collar and blue collar base.

Conclusion

The reason why the SPÖ and ÖVP were unable to halt the rise of the FPÖ was because they were incapable of adapting to the post-industrial environment of electorate expectations and needs by branching out to become catch-all parties. The SPÖ could have more successfully become more socially liberal, while the ÖVP, which should have become more economically neo-liberal, was instead outflanked and squeezed between the SPÖ and FPÖ. The leadership was unable to act rationally because of the strength of the traditional structures of corporatist interests and *Proporz*, resulting in the re-emergence of the cartel. The inability to adapt from this culture resulted in the FPÖ being able to attract both white collar and traditional voters for both parties.

The SPÖ began from the mid 1980s with promise because of tactical and policy changes with help from Kreisky and Vranitzky, but was not bold enough to pursue a bold agenda of accountability reform in government because of internal considerations of ÖGB power and appealing to the base. The SPÖ still did retain white collar and blue collar workers but lost support from the former because lack of political accountability and reform, and the latter because of new found insecurity from SPÖ-led economic reforms. The attempt to balance with a catch-all party in a cartel situation led the SPÖ to lose support from all groups. Both the former but especially the latter were potential voters for the FPÖ. The ÖVP fared worse in attempting transition because of the traditional power bases and culture were more powerful in this party. It was unable to be bold or legitimate enough in terms of being a credible, conservative, neo-liberal

alternative to the SPÖ. The FPÖ was bolder than the ÖVP and statistics show that the FPÖ gained the most from the decline of the ÖVP. The SPÖ and ÖVP failed because they were unable to make that transition to catch-all parties without the cartel situation lurking in the shadows; while the FPÖ was able to be all it could be to all segments of the electorate.

Conclusion: Austria Parties, Adaptability, and the Importance of Party Organisation

This thesis argues that, in part, the FPÖ's electoral successes reflected the inability of the SPÖ and ÖVP were unable to transform their policies and reach out to new voters, in response to the challenges of post-industrial politics. It suggests that the organisations of these parties prevented them from doing so. The ability of their leadership to respond and adapt to new challenges was shaped by the structure of power in each organisation. Any entrenched interest, when threatened, will fight back, but, the degree of its success will be influenced by how much power it has within the organisational structure.

In the case of the *Lagerparteien*, leadership attempts to respond to post-industrial political realignment by changing policies and appeals were severely restrained by their internal *Lager* economic interests. SPÖ leadership knew to reach out to socially liberal political spaces of white collar voters on issues such as the environment and work-life balance, but evidence shows ÖGB interference based on 'old-left' understandings stunted these attempts. ÖVP leadership attempts at reorientation towards white collar, economically right spaces by adopting meaningful, neo-liberal positions was hindered by entrenched interests of the ÖBB and ÖWB. Both *Lagerparteien* were limited also by the corporatist entrenchment and domination of each party, resulting in grand coalition government and the continuation of *Proporz*. The challenge of the FPÖ succeeded in part because the *Lagerparteien* could not effectively respond to challenges. The FPÖ took advantage of these inabilities to position itself in order to target, specifically, social authoritarian, blue collar, former SPÖ voters; and economically right wing, white collar spaces that the ÖVP needed.

The Austrian case study of the adaptation of the SPÖ and ÖVP to the challenges of post-industrial politics explains well the pitfalls of self-interested, entrenched groups within party organisations; especially given the challenge from the FPÖ. From 1945 onward, consociational and corporatist governance continued in Austria because of the entrenchment of specific economic interests that cooperated within parties and between each other to ensure their positions in cabinet, the *Nationalrat*, the bureaucracy, and as corporatist negotiators. Consociational governance occurred in 1945 because of the consequences of the Second World War, the threat of Communism, and the need for a national identity through working together. This thesis extended Lijphart's theory of consociationalism through explaining the continuance of consociationalism beyond being a "*temporary expedient*" in national crises becoming an institutionalised solution.

Entrenched interest group power within each party enjoyed newfound positions of influence from being in power and protecting their economic interests, so used their power to retain *Proporz* and, when possible, consociational government. *Proporz* provided entrenched interest group incentive to remain within the status quo; using a cartel of interests and parties to protect their interests. The SPÖ was dominated by the ÖGB and vice versa, the ÖVP by a cartel of the ÖAAB, ÖBB and ÖWB and vice versa; while each interest group held powerful corporatist positions within their own chambers and between each other as negotiators. Industrial roots of the predecessor SDAPÖ and CS lay in sub-cultural, segmental autonomous *Lager*; a combination of occupational and political representation based on specific ideological and economic interests.

The formation of cultural identity around *Lager* combined with the degree of hierarchical and entrenched control made party policies dependent on interest groups and vice versa. It is hardly difficult to determine that powerful interest group officials tended to also serve in powerful positions of their respective parties and vice versa. Cabinet was the best government example; with the ÖGB dominating Social Welfare for the SPÖ; and the ÖAAB dominating Commerce, ÖBB running Agriculture, and the ÖWB in charge of Finance for the ÖVP. Presidents of the ÖGB served in high ranking positions in the SPÖ, while leaders of the ÖVP tended to be former officials in constituent leagues. Each Chamber and organisation was dominated by politically-affiliated lists dominating their interest areas. On a lower level, the workplace, ideological organisations, student groups, even hobbies were dominated by a ‘cradle to the grave’ system of auxiliary organisations. They provided ideological comfort, patronage for those in need of resources through their control of ministries or *land* governments and those who wanted to climb the ranks. Those who disagreed with the general direction were expelled or sidelined.

This system could only work well as long as the bulk of the population were under the direct influence and network of the *Lager*. Post-industrialisation of Austria undermined *Lagerparteien* by undermining their bases. The decline of rural farmers, small businesses and religion undermined the ability of Catholic networks to remain powerful, as did the decline of blue collar industry. The replacement of these groups by white collar employees, who did not fall under *Lager* patronage networks, undermined the almost assured turnout of voters for the *Lagerparteien* and made them weaker. Furthermore, the impact of changes of globalisation and neo-liberal thinking undermined the role of ‘gatekeepers’ that the *Lagerparteien* had. As a result of this, the support of the *Lagerparteien* fell from a combined high of nearly 90% during most of the

post war years until 1986, to 60% in 1999. Not only did they lose the support of white collar workers, but also former *Lager* bases; overwhelmingly to the FPÖ

This thesis investigated the case of the challenge of the FPÖ and its successes in taking advantage of untargeted political spaces. The challenge for the SPÖ and ÖVP was to adapt and shift themselves towards becoming libertarian left and authoritarian right parties respectively, but, given the continuance of consociational governance, *Proporz* and corporatism, these parties' moves were minimal at best and remained close around a status quo at the centre of the axis. The FPÖ took advantage by reorienting itself on two main fronts to take advantage of the open political spaces of the 'losers' (social conservative) and winners (white collar tending towards economic right). Firstly, it focused on the 'losers' of post-industrialisation, ie, the industrial bases of both parties, by using a socially authoritarian appeal of welfare insecurity, targeting immigrants and 'welfare cheats'; while using an overall theme of neo-conservative nostalgia and structure. Secondly, it focused on the 'winners' of post-industrialisation; white collar employees, by appealing to the centre and economic right. The centre was appealed to through attacking the SPÖ and ÖVP over lack of accountability of *Proporz* and corporatism, and promising to reform the system along democratic lines. The economic right was appealed to by espousing economic policies to the right of the ÖVP such as lower taxes, deregulation and privatisation. The targeting of the winners hurt the ÖVP the most.

The result of FPÖ success can be attributed mainly to the ability of the FPÖ to squeeze the ÖVP between the SPÖ on the left and itself. To unify sections of society into a cross-societal alliance was achievable because the FPÖ was easily able to navigate around the perception a 'classless society' by framing a new 'us' versus a new 'them' made up of cultural and political elites, and created 'enemies' of society such as

immigrants and welfare cheats. This was something that the *Grünen* and LIF could not do; as ideological niches of the post-industrial left and right, they could not break out of white collar left and right 'ideological ghettos' respectively. Compared to the large, inefficient party machines of the SPÖ and ÖVP, the FPÖ had virtually no ties to economic interests and a rather simple yet efficient party structure. In 1999, the FPÖ had destroyed the party status quo of *Lagerparteien* dominance.

The response of the *Lagerparteien* was insufficient because of party organisational power distribution. Despite attempts by party leadership, SPÖ and ÖVP attempts to adapt and reposition themselves failed because they were undermined by self-interested interest groups who had the aim of self-preservation and protection of their power and positions as paramount. The continuation of *Proporz* through corporatism, patronage and bipartisan legislation confirmed the underlying power of interest groups. With the SPÖ, Kreisky attempted to reform the party from 1967 onwards towards a liberal, centre-left focus, but was always mindful of the influence of the ÖGB under Anton Benya. Despite the attempts of the leftist approach, the pragmatists and the ÖGB undermined attempts to adapt and reposition the party along libertarian left, issues based politics. Issue after issue, including nuclear power, arms sales to South American dictators, pollution laws and work hour liberalisation, were struck down because ÖGB organisational power within the party gave it power to enforce its rather 'old left' industrial based outlook. Attempts to attract white collar voters under Vranitzky and Klima were not overly successful because they appeared insincere in the face of grand coalition government and the continuation of *Proporz*; while the party isolated much of its blue collar support in its attempts to target white collar voters with some pro-market policies. Any real attempts to change party organisation were defeated by stronger forces or insufficient to guarantee freedom of leadership to adapt.

Similarly, the ÖVP failed to transform into a party of the economically liberal, socially conservative centre-right because of the entrenched interests; the leagues. The domination of the ÖAAB, ÖBB, and ÖWB, each financially and organisationally autonomous and with membership loyalty paramount over party membership, left the ÖVP trapped from making meaningful change. The ÖVP under Josef Klaus from 1964-1970 was the closest to change, yet failed because powerful interests maintained *Proporz* and corporatism rather than going down the path of liberal economics. The ÖVP also failed to adapt to issue based politics such as the environment, to reform organisational power balances, and to take advantages of the failures of the SPÖ. Although economic policies became more pro-market, this was not far enough on the basis of international trends, the retaining of many Austro-Keynesian features, and the continuation of grand coalition governance, corporatism and *Proporz*. Without opposition and a vow to dismantle *Proporz*, the ÖVP could not be credible. Despite reform attempts, real party power lay with the leagues; who did not want their positions inside the party or as corporatist negotiators challenged. As a result, the FPÖ was able to outflank the ÖVP to the right, economically, socially and issues-wise; while the ÖVP ended the 1999 elections in third place.

This thesis would not be complete without a prologue that would reflect the general argument of the importance of party organisation. In 2000, because of the lack of options and perhaps in order to save itself, the ÖVP joined in coalition government with the FPÖ. Led by Wolfgang Schüssel of the ÖVP, the government enacted pro-market measures such as a balanced budget, cuts to social services, privatisation of nationalised industries, and tax cuts. Ironically, this is what the ÖVP should have and the leadership may have wanted to do but were prevented by party organisation. In a snap

election in 2002, the ÖVP succeeded in attracting white collar voters; winning 42.3% of the vote to the SPÖ on 36.51%. Although the FPÖ campaigned against the state, by participating in government meant that, as an anti-statist populist party, it became part of the system it claimed to despise. Due to infighting and without their leader Haider in government, their share of the vote collapsed to 10.01%. After the 2006 general elections, due to a lack of options, the largest party, the SPÖ, entered into a grand coalition government with the ÖVP. One can determine from this that perhaps an electoral earthquake can force a party to change, but, the re-emergence of grand coalition governance may have given *Proportz* another opportunity, or it may just be a temporary situation.

This thesis concludes by stating that party organisation is the key to a political party's ability to adapt to new environments and circumstances. The entrenchment of economic, industrial interest groups within the SPÖ and ÖVP meant that institutions based on industrial understandings that would prove difficult in new environments were entrenched in post-industrial Austria despite their undermined bases. Parties are not rational bodies; they are a sum of parts.

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