A Case for Optimism around Philosophical Progress

In this thesis, I analyse the meta-philosophical dialectic of philosophical progress: a discourse and debate concerned with whether and how the field of philosophy can be justifiably described as making progress or not. The conclusion I defend is an optimistic one; I argue that we can have a reasonable level of confidence that many philosophical investigations are progressing in a reasonably satisfactory manner. More than defending an optimistic position, I defend an optimism along tradition-preserving lines as well. My assertion is not just that philosophy can be defended as making progress (in general), but also that it can be defended as making progress as a field of investigative inquiry, akin to the sciences (rather than only as a ‘pragmatic’ or ‘view refining’ discipline, for example). Aside from defending my own view, I also map out, analyse, and critique the most prominent arguments for optimism that appear in the contemporary philosophical progress literature, in order to afford the opportunity for future arguments around philosophical progress to take place with more conceptual clarity and precision. Ultimately, I forward an original optimistic argument for progress based on an adapted truthlikeness model, modified to fit the context of philosophy.