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Causal attributions and the trolley problem

journal contribution
posted on 16.09.2022, 18:32 authored by Justin SytsmaJustin Sytsma, J Livengood
In this paper, we consider two competing explanations of the empirical finding that people’s causal attributions are responsive to normative details, such as whether an agent’s action violated an injunctive norm–the counterfactual view and the responsibility view. We then present experimental evidence that uses the trolley dilemma in a new way to investigate causal attribution. In the switch version of the trolley problem, people judge that the agent ought to flip the switch, but they also judge that she is more responsible for the resulting outcome when she does so than when she refrains. As predicted by the responsibility view, but not the counterfactual view, people are more likely to say that the agent caused the outcome when she flips the switch.

History

Preferred citation

Sytsma, J. & Livengood, J. (2021). Causal attributions and the trolley problem. Philosophical Psychology, 34(8), 1167-1191. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2021.1945568

Journal title

Philosophical Psychology

Volume

34

Issue

8

Publication date

01/01/2021

Pagination

1167-1191

Publisher

Informa UK Limited

Publication status

Published

Online publication date

27/06/2021

ISSN

0951-5089

eISSN

1465-394X

Language

en

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