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Bad News for Moral Error Theorists: There Is No Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies

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posted on 2022-08-26, 01:21 authored by Ramon DasRamon Das
A ‘companions in guilt’ (CG) strategy against moral error theory aims to show that the latter proves too much: if sound, it supports an implausible error-theoretic conclusion in other areas such as epistemic or practical reasoning. Christopher Cowie [2016] has recently produced what he claims is a ‘master argument’ against all such strategies. The essence of his argument is that CG arguments cannot work because they are afflicted by internal incoherence or inconsistency. I argue, first, that Cowie's master argument does not succeed. Beyond this, I argue that there is no good reason to think that any such argument—one that purports to identify an internal incoherence in CG arguments—can succeed. Second, I argue that the main substantive area of disagreement between error theorists and CG theorists essentially concerns the conceptual profile of epistemic reasons—specifically, whether they are strongly categorical—not the ontological question of whether such reasons exist (in some form or other). I then develop an argument in favour of the CG theorist's position by considering the moral error theorist's arguments in support of the conceptual claim that moral reasons are strongly categorical. These include, notably, criticisms made by Joyce [2011] and Olson [2014] of Finlay's [2008] ‘end relational’ view of morality, according to which moral reasons are relative to some end or standard, hence not strongly categorical. Examining these criticisms, I argue that, based on what moral error theorists have said regarding the conceptual profile of moral reasons, there is a strong case to be made that moral reasons are strongly categorical (hence, according to the moral error theorist, ontologically problematic) if and only if epistemic reasons are.

History

Preferred citation

Das, R. (2017). Bad News for Moral Error Theorists: There Is No Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95(1), 58-69. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2016.1178313

Journal title

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volume

95

Issue

1

Publication date

2017-01-02

Pagination

58-69

Publisher

Informa UK Limited

Publication status

Published

Contribution type

Article

Online publication date

2016-04-26

ISSN

0004-8402

eISSN

1471-6828

Language

en

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