Yes to moral fictionalism; no to religious fictionalism

Abstract A version of moral fictionalism is presented and defended, modeled on Coleridge’s “suspension of disbelief” and Mill’s solution to the paradox of happiness. The key observation is that sometimes, in order to achieve our goals, we must come at them obliquely—practicing “self-distraction.” This, it is argued, is the case with our Humean values: “in order to get them, one must forget them” (as Sidgwick put it). More specifically, in order to satisfy these non-moral goals we must dress them in a Kantian moral veneer, which renders our judgments false but also more practically efficacious. After this version of moral fictionalism is defended, the question is posed whether similar arguments might support religious fictionalism. Kant’s “moral hazard argument” for religious fictionalism is discussed. Ultimately, it is argued that ambitious religious fictionalism faces challenges that don’t arise for a comparably ambitious moral fictionalism.